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Moldova's Split Society

Blog Article by

Magda Stumvoll

www.pontothinktank.org

office@pontothinktank.org

@pontothinktank


The parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova on 24 February 2019

were essential for the future of the country, which is challenged by the fight

against corruption and the oligarchic system. Its political parties – as well as

its society – are split between the pro-Russian and the pro-European way.

Moldova’s backsliding in the past few years

Moldova claims to be the most European country in the European

neighborhood, which is mainly due to the high number of Moldovan citizens

who simultaneously have Romanian, and thus EU, citizenship. According to

unofficial figures more than 500,000 Moldovans 1 have dual citizenship,

which is linked to the common history of these two neighboring countries. 2

Thanks to its ambitious reforms, the Republic of Moldova was considered –

together with Georgia and Ukraine – as one of the frontrunners of the

European Union’s (EU) Eastern Partnership (EaP). The EaP is an initiative

launched in 2009 as part of the European Neighborhood Policy, which

covers six countries in Eastern Europe and on the Southern Caucasus:

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

However, the situation changed incrementally over the past few years: The

EU froze its financial aid for the first time in July 2015, when a huge banking

scandal was discovered – approximately 1 billion dollars, roughly one eighth

of the Moldova’s GDP, was stolen from three Moldovan banks, revealing that

corruption was still one of the major challenges for the country. 3 When

Moldova’s Supreme Court invalidated the election of the democratically

elected, pro-Western mayor of Chisinau in summer 2018, the European

Parliament decided again to suspend the macro-financial assistance of

about $100 Mio. 4 Prior to the elections in February 2019, the leading parties

(PDM and PSRM, see below) changed the voting system, which is why in

February 2019, 51 of the 101 MPs were elected in uninominal constituencies.

The remaining 50 MPs were elected based on the previously-used party list

system. The Venice Commission and the EU strongly advised against and

highly criticized this change which they saw as major drawback for the

electoral system. The strongest criticism was directed at the high exposure

of the local candidates to influence from oligarchs and the favoring of the

larger established parties through the “winner-takes-it-all-principle” in the

constituencies. 5 On these and other issues, the EU grew increasingly critical

about Moldova: In December 2018, EU Foreign Ministers wanted to adopt a

critical text in the Foreign Affairs Council to express their concerns about the

recent incidents and remind Moldova to follow democratic principles and

the rule of law. However, the text was blocked by the Romanian Foreign

Minister. 6

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@pontothinktank


The political landscape in Moldova

To better understand the current situation in Moldova, one has to take a

closer look at the political landscape. Since December 2016, the country has

had a pro-Russian president, Igor Dodon. Before running for the presidency,

Dodon served as the leader of the Party of the Socialists of the Republic of

Moldova (PSRM). Shortly after President Dodon’s election, Moldova became

an observing member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union.

Prior to the elections in February 2019 a minority coalition between two

parties has led the country, the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) – to

which the still incumbent Prime Minister Pavel Filip belongs – and the

Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM). Although these parties

officially position themselves as “pro-EU” parties, one can claim that,

especially the PDM, has no real interest in modernizing the country,

following reforms towards good governance or fighting corruption, which

the EU is asking for. The PDM rather incorporates the safeguarding of

oligarchic interests which are linked to another Moldovan political actor,

who is in fact one of the most important figures in Moldovan politics: the

oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. He is chairman of the Democratic Party, the formal

coordinator of the governing coalition and the owner of four of the five

nationwide television stations. Critics call him “neither a democrat nor a

reformer […] who, under the cover of false pro-European rhetoric, is

petrifying the weakness of the state”. 7

With Dodon and Filip on the top of the country’s official leadership, two

persons with opposing interests – pro-Russian vs. pro-European, at least on

the surface – and Plahotniuc as an oligarchic unofficial leader, the political

situation of the country before the elections seemed quite challenging.

Besides these two big parties, the third important actor in the February

elections was the electoral bloc ACUM, meaning “now”, which has a real pro-

European agenda and wants to fight corruption and the oligarchic system

in Moldova. The electoral bloc was formed by two opposition parties (the

Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) and the Dignity and Truth Platform

Party (DA)) that are critical of both the government – for its oligarchic and

corruptive system – and the president – for his pro-Russian stance. 8

Parliamentary Elections 2019, where is Moldova heading?

The outcome of the elections of February 2019 was considered to be an

important milestone to set the geopolitical orientation of the country, either

towards Russia or the EU, but did not result in a clear winner: the PSRM won

31,2%, the electoral bloc ACUM achieved 26,6% and the PDM was third with

23,8% of the votes. 9 Due to the mixed voting system, ACUM won fewer seats

in the parliament than the PDM. As none of the parties has a clear majority

and there is generally mistrust among them, it will probably be difficult to

build a coalition.

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office@pontothinktank.org

@pontothinktank


Even before the elections, the ACUM group pledged to not enter a coalition

with neither the Democrats nor the Socialists. 10 As ACUM seems to take its

promise very seriously, some supporters criticize the bloc for “prematurely”

taking its status of parliamentary opposition and not seizing the possibility

to change anything. 11 Voices from outside Moldova see ACUM’s outcome to

enter the parliament, for the first time, with already 26 of 101 seats, as a very

positive one, despite the many obstacles the electoral bloc was confronted

with (like other parties buying votes from the Transnistrian population,

exclusion from voting of part of the diaspora, media coverage mostly in favor

of big parties, changing of the voting system in favor of established parties

etc., see below). 12 The refusal of ACUM to build any coalition leads – despite

the (geo-)political differences between the Socialists and the Democrats – to

open exploratory talks between the two big parties who both want to

govern the country. Another possibility would be snap elections in the

coming months. However, experts claim that political players do not have

guarantees that they will get better results by rerunning the elections and

therefore, they may support the formation of a new government. 13

All in all, the OSCE election observation mission evaluated that the elections

were competitive and the fundamental rights were generally respected.

However, the OSCE reported that pressure was put on public employees,

state resources were misused and found strong indications of vote buying,

which affected mostly inhabitants of Transnistria 14 who were brought to

polling stations in territories under control of the Moldovan government

with special buses and were allegedly paid $20 to cast their ballot.

Additionally, certain media outlets were blamed for the limited range of

viewpoints presented to voters. It was seen critically, that just a few weeks

prior to the elections, it was decided that Moldovans abroad were not

allowed to vote with a (valid) ID or an expired passport, which was accepted

during previous elections. 15 Part of the diaspora who tends to vote for pro-

European forces, e.g. ACUM, was therefore excluded from voting.

The outcome of the elections does not deliver a clear result in which

direction Moldova is heading in the future but it shows that the Moldovan

population is strongly divided. Although Dodon himself underlined the high

probability of snap elections 16 , rerunning elections would be expensive and

it is not thought that they would bring a different outcome, despite the

alleged “inconsistencies” at the last elections. And as the ACUM group does

not seem to be open for any coalition talks, the most likely scenario for

Moldova at the moment will probably be a coalition between the Democrats

and the Socialists, even if they do not have the same viewpoints on many

topics. However, Socialists and Democrats both want to be part of the

government, which may lead them to overcome their differences and find

compromises. The next days and weeks will show in which way Moldova is

heading. It is sure that the outcome will have strong impacts on the

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@pontothinktank


country’s future and its relations with the EU and Russia. From a European

Union’s point of view, it would be unfortunate if Moldova abandoned its

European path now as collaboration with the neighbors in the East is

advancing. From a democratic perspective, moreover, it would be urgent

that Moldova intensifies the fight against corruption and the oligarchic

system and strengthens its institutions.

Author

Magda Stumvoll is project coordinator and research fellow at

the Austro-French Centre for Rapprochement in Europe. She

graduated with a Master's degree in European studies from

University of Regensburg and University of Auvergne. She has

been a Ponto member since autumn 2018 and has been

actively participating in its Eastern Europe Program.

1

Michael Emerson, Denis Cenusa, Deepening EU-Moldovan Relations. What, why and how?,

(London, 2 nd edition, 2018), pp.30-31.

2

The often occurrence of dual citizenship in Moldova is based on its close historic and cultural ties

with Romania, which is especially visible through their common language. Based on a Romanian

citizenship law from 1991, former citizens of Romania and their descendent can easily get Romanian

citizenship. This became especially appealing for Moldovans in 2001 when Romanians were granted

visa-free travel in the Schengen area and after Romania’s accession to the EU in 2007. Although

Romanian authorities do not provide official statistics on re-naturalizations of Moldovans, in 2014 it

was estimated that more than 300,000 Moldovan citizens have reclaimed Romanian citizenship.

However, unofficial figures indicate a higher number of about more than 500,000 Moldovans – of its

3,5 million inhabitants – having official Romanian documents.

3

Kinga Jaromin, EU freezes funding for Moldova. In: Euractiv, 10.07.2015. Available at

https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/eu-freezes-funding-for-moldova/ (25.02.2019);

Delegation of EU to Moldova, Press Release: EU Budget Support for the Republic of Moldova

pending the fulfilment of several conditions, 08.07.2015. Available at

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/moldova/documents/press_corner/press_release_eu_bud

get_support_2015_07_08_en.pdf (25.02.2019).

4

Emerson, Cenusa, Deepening EU-Moldovan Relations, p.19.; Alexander Tanas, EU freezes aid to

Moldova as row over mayoral election festers. In: Reuters, 04.07.2018. Available at

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moldova-protests-eu/eu-freezes-aid-to-moldova-as-row-overmayoral-election-festers-idUSKBN1JU2G7

(25.07.2019).

5

Emerson, Cenusa, Deepening EU-Moldovan Relations, p. 30.

6

Rikard Jozwiak, Romania Blocks Critical EU Text about Moldova. In: Radio Free Europe, 06.12.2018.

Available at https://www.rferl.org/a/romania-blocks-critical-eu-text-about-moldova/29641255.html

(26.02.2019).

7

Kamil Całus, Wojciech Konończuk, Moldova, which used to be perceived as one of the most

democratic post-Soviet countries, has come to be dominated by one politician. In: Carnegie Europe,

04.05.2017. Available at https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/69856 (26.02.2019).

8

William H. Hill, Moldova’s Upcoming Election: What’s at stake? In: Wilson Center, 14.02.2019.

Available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/moldovas-upcoming-election-whats-stake

(26.02.2019).

www.pontothinktank.org

office@pontothinktank.org

@pontothinktank


9

Moldova: Pro-Russian party leads without majority. In: Deutsche Welle/Reuters, 25.02.2019.

Available at https://www.dw.com/en/moldova-pro-russian-party-leads-without-majority/a-47669559

(26.02.2019).

10

Moldova is still caught between Russia and the EU. In: The Economist, 25.02.2019. Available at

https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/02/25/moldova-is-still-caught-between-russia-and-the-eu

(26.02.2019).

11

Denis Cenusa, The place of the opposition in the post-electoral balance of power in Moldova. In:

IPN, 04.03.2019. Available at http://ipn.md/en/special/96854 (05.03.2019).

12

Vladimir Socor, Moldova’s Parliamentary Elections: One Silver Lining Amid Multiple Negative

Trends (Part One), In: The Jamestown Foundation, 11.03.2019. Available at

https://jamestown.org/program/moldovas-parliamentary-elections-one-silver-lining-amid-multiplenegative-trends-part-one/

(12.03.2019).

13

Fewer alliance scenarios remained after ACUM’s statements about non-cooperation with PDM and

PSRM, opinions, in: IPN, 1.3.2019. Available at http://www.ipn.md/en/alegeri-2019/96814 (12.03.2018).

14

Transnistria is a self-proclaimed state on the internationally recognized territory of Moldova.

15

OSCE International Election Observation Mission: Republic of Moldova – Parliamentary Elections,

24 February 2019. Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. Available at

https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/412346?download=true (27.02.2019), pp.1-6.

16

Pro-Russian Party Wins Moldova Parliamentary Vote. In: Warsaw Institute, 26.03.2019. Available at

https://warsawinstitute.org/pro-russian-party-wins-moldova-parliamentary-vote/ (10.03.2019).

www.pontothinktank.org

office@pontothinktank.org

@pontothinktank

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