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<strong>Moldova</strong>'s Split Society<br />
<strong>Blog</strong> <strong>Article</strong> by<br />
Magda Stumvoll<br />
www.pontothinktank.org<br />
office@pontothinktank.org<br />
@pontothinktank
The parliamentary elections in the Republic of <strong>Moldova</strong> on 24 February 2019<br />
were essential for the future of the country, which is challenged by the fight<br />
against corruption and the oligarchic system. Its political parties – as well as<br />
its society – are split between the pro-Russian and the pro-European way.<br />
<strong>Moldova</strong>’s backsliding in the past few years<br />
<strong>Moldova</strong> claims to be the most European country in the European<br />
neighborhood, which is mainly due to the high number of <strong>Moldova</strong>n citizens<br />
who simultaneously have Romanian, and thus EU, citizenship. According to<br />
unofficial figures more than 500,000 <strong>Moldova</strong>ns 1 have dual citizenship,<br />
which is linked to the common history of these two neighboring countries. 2<br />
Thanks to its ambitious reforms, the Republic of <strong>Moldova</strong> was considered –<br />
together with Georgia and Ukraine – as one of the frontrunners of the<br />
European Union’s (EU) Eastern Partnership (EaP). The EaP is an initiative<br />
launched in 2009 as part of the European Neighborhood Policy, which<br />
covers six countries in Eastern Europe and on the Southern Caucasus:<br />
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, <strong>Moldova</strong> and Ukraine.<br />
However, the situation changed incrementally over the past few years: The<br />
EU froze its financial aid for the first time in July 2015, when a huge banking<br />
scandal was discovered – approximately 1 billion dollars, roughly one eighth<br />
of the <strong>Moldova</strong>’s GDP, was stolen from three <strong>Moldova</strong>n banks, revealing that<br />
corruption was still one of the major challenges for the country. 3 When<br />
<strong>Moldova</strong>’s Supreme Court invalidated the election of the democratically<br />
elected, pro-Western mayor of Chisinau in summer 2018, the European<br />
Parliament decided again to suspend the macro-financial assistance of<br />
about $100 Mio. 4 Prior to the elections in February 2019, the leading parties<br />
(PDM and PSRM, see below) changed the voting system, which is why in<br />
February 2019, 51 of the 101 MPs were elected in uninominal constituencies.<br />
The remaining 50 MPs were elected based on the previously-used party list<br />
system. The Venice Commission and the EU strongly advised against and<br />
highly criticized this change which they saw as major drawback for the<br />
electoral system. The strongest criticism was directed at the high exposure<br />
of the local candidates to influence from oligarchs and the favoring of the<br />
larger established parties through the “winner-takes-it-all-principle” in the<br />
constituencies. 5 On these and other issues, the EU grew increasingly critical<br />
about <strong>Moldova</strong>: In December 2018, EU Foreign Ministers wanted to adopt a<br />
critical text in the Foreign Affairs Council to express their concerns about the<br />
recent incidents and remind <strong>Moldova</strong> to follow democratic principles and<br />
the rule of law. However, the text was blocked by the Romanian Foreign<br />
Minister. 6<br />
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The political landscape in <strong>Moldova</strong><br />
To better understand the current situation in <strong>Moldova</strong>, one has to take a<br />
closer look at the political landscape. Since December 2016, the country has<br />
had a pro-Russian president, Igor Dodon. Before running for the presidency,<br />
Dodon served as the leader of the Party of the Socialists of the Republic of<br />
<strong>Moldova</strong> (PSRM). Shortly after President Dodon’s election, <strong>Moldova</strong> became<br />
an observing member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union.<br />
Prior to the elections in February 2019 a minority coalition between two<br />
parties has led the country, the Democratic Party of <strong>Moldova</strong> (PDM) – to<br />
which the still incumbent Prime Minister Pavel Filip belongs – and the<br />
Liberal Democratic Party of <strong>Moldova</strong> (PLDM). Although these parties<br />
officially position themselves as “pro-EU” parties, one can claim that,<br />
especially the PDM, has no real interest in modernizing the country,<br />
following reforms towards good governance or fighting corruption, which<br />
the EU is asking for. The PDM rather incorporates the safeguarding of<br />
oligarchic interests which are linked to another <strong>Moldova</strong>n political actor,<br />
who is in fact one of the most important figures in <strong>Moldova</strong>n politics: the<br />
oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. He is chairman of the Democratic Party, the formal<br />
coordinator of the governing coalition and the owner of four of the five<br />
nationwide television stations. Critics call him “neither a democrat nor a<br />
reformer […] who, under the cover of false pro-European rhetoric, is<br />
petrifying the weakness of the state”. 7<br />
With Dodon and Filip on the top of the country’s official leadership, two<br />
persons with opposing interests – pro-Russian vs. pro-European, at least on<br />
the surface – and Plahotniuc as an oligarchic unofficial leader, the political<br />
situation of the country before the elections seemed quite challenging.<br />
Besides these two big parties, the third important actor in the February<br />
elections was the electoral bloc ACUM, meaning “now”, which has a real pro-<br />
European agenda and wants to fight corruption and the oligarchic system<br />
in <strong>Moldova</strong>. The electoral bloc was formed by two opposition parties (the<br />
Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) and the Dignity and Truth Platform<br />
Party (DA)) that are critical of both the government – for its oligarchic and<br />
corruptive system – and the president – for his pro-Russian stance. 8<br />
Parliamentary Elections 2019, where is <strong>Moldova</strong> heading?<br />
The outcome of the elections of February 2019 was considered to be an<br />
important milestone to set the geopolitical orientation of the country, either<br />
towards Russia or the EU, but did not result in a clear winner: the PSRM won<br />
31,2%, the electoral bloc ACUM achieved 26,6% and the PDM was third with<br />
23,8% of the votes. 9 Due to the mixed voting system, ACUM won fewer seats<br />
in the parliament than the PDM. As none of the parties has a clear majority<br />
and there is generally mistrust among them, it will probably be difficult to<br />
build a coalition.<br />
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Even before the elections, the ACUM group pledged to not enter a coalition<br />
with neither the Democrats nor the Socialists. 10 As ACUM seems to take its<br />
promise very seriously, some supporters criticize the bloc for “prematurely”<br />
taking its status of parliamentary opposition and not seizing the possibility<br />
to change anything. 11 Voices from outside <strong>Moldova</strong> see ACUM’s outcome to<br />
enter the parliament, for the first time, with already 26 of 101 seats, as a very<br />
positive one, despite the many obstacles the electoral bloc was confronted<br />
with (like other parties buying votes from the Transnistrian population,<br />
exclusion from voting of part of the diaspora, media coverage mostly in favor<br />
of big parties, changing of the voting system in favor of established parties<br />
etc., see below). 12 The refusal of ACUM to build any coalition leads – despite<br />
the (geo-)political differences between the Socialists and the Democrats – to<br />
open exploratory talks between the two big parties who both want to<br />
govern the country. Another possibility would be snap elections in the<br />
coming months. However, experts claim that political players do not have<br />
guarantees that they will get better results by rerunning the elections and<br />
therefore, they may support the formation of a new government. 13<br />
All in all, the OSCE election observation mission evaluated that the elections<br />
were competitive and the fundamental rights were generally respected.<br />
However, the OSCE reported that pressure was put on public employees,<br />
state resources were misused and found strong indications of vote buying,<br />
which affected mostly inhabitants of Transnistria 14 who were brought to<br />
polling stations in territories under control of the <strong>Moldova</strong>n government<br />
with special buses and were allegedly paid $20 to cast their ballot.<br />
Additionally, certain media outlets were blamed for the limited range of<br />
viewpoints presented to voters. It was seen critically, that just a few weeks<br />
prior to the elections, it was decided that <strong>Moldova</strong>ns abroad were not<br />
allowed to vote with a (valid) ID or an expired passport, which was accepted<br />
during previous elections. 15 Part of the diaspora who tends to vote for pro-<br />
European forces, e.g. ACUM, was therefore excluded from voting.<br />
The outcome of the elections does not deliver a clear result in which<br />
direction <strong>Moldova</strong> is heading in the future but it shows that the <strong>Moldova</strong>n<br />
population is strongly divided. Although Dodon himself underlined the high<br />
probability of snap elections 16 , rerunning elections would be expensive and<br />
it is not thought that they would bring a different outcome, despite the<br />
alleged “inconsistencies” at the last elections. And as the ACUM group does<br />
not seem to be open for any coalition talks, the most likely scenario for<br />
<strong>Moldova</strong> at the moment will probably be a coalition between the Democrats<br />
and the Socialists, even if they do not have the same viewpoints on many<br />
topics. However, Socialists and Democrats both want to be part of the<br />
government, which may lead them to overcome their differences and find<br />
compromises. The next days and weeks will show in which way <strong>Moldova</strong> is<br />
heading. It is sure that the outcome will have strong impacts on the<br />
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country’s future and its relations with the EU and Russia. From a European<br />
Union’s point of view, it would be unfortunate if <strong>Moldova</strong> abandoned its<br />
European path now as collaboration with the neighbors in the East is<br />
advancing. From a democratic perspective, moreover, it would be urgent<br />
that <strong>Moldova</strong> intensifies the fight against corruption and the oligarchic<br />
system and strengthens its institutions.<br />
Author<br />
Magda Stumvoll is project coordinator and research fellow at<br />
the Austro-French Centre for Rapprochement in Europe. She<br />
graduated with a Master's degree in European studies from<br />
University of Regensburg and University of Auvergne. She has<br />
been a Ponto member since autumn 2018 and has been<br />
actively participating in its Eastern Europe Program.<br />
1<br />
Michael Emerson, Denis Cenusa, Deepening EU-<strong>Moldova</strong>n Relations. What, why and how?,<br />
(London, 2 nd edition, 2018), pp.30-31.<br />
2<br />
The often occurrence of dual citizenship in <strong>Moldova</strong> is based on its close historic and cultural ties<br />
with Romania, which is especially visible through their common language. Based on a Romanian<br />
citizenship law from 1991, former citizens of Romania and their descendent can easily get Romanian<br />
citizenship. This became especially appealing for <strong>Moldova</strong>ns in 2001 when Romanians were granted<br />
visa-free travel in the Schengen area and after Romania’s accession to the EU in 2007. Although<br />
Romanian authorities do not provide official statistics on re-naturalizations of <strong>Moldova</strong>ns, in 2014 it<br />
was estimated that more than 300,000 <strong>Moldova</strong>n citizens have reclaimed Romanian citizenship.<br />
However, unofficial figures indicate a higher number of about more than 500,000 <strong>Moldova</strong>ns – of its<br />
3,5 million inhabitants – having official Romanian documents.<br />
3<br />
Kinga Jaromin, EU freezes funding for <strong>Moldova</strong>. In: Euractiv, 10.07.2015. Available at<br />
https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/eu-freezes-funding-for-moldova/ (25.02.2019);<br />
Delegation of EU to <strong>Moldova</strong>, Press Release: EU Budget Support for the Republic of <strong>Moldova</strong> –<br />
pending the fulfilment of several conditions, 08.07.2015. Available at<br />
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/moldova/documents/press_corner/press_release_eu_bud<br />
get_support_2015_07_08_en.pdf (25.02.2019).<br />
4<br />
Emerson, Cenusa, Deepening EU-<strong>Moldova</strong>n Relations, p.19.; Alexander Tanas, EU freezes aid to<br />
<strong>Moldova</strong> as row over mayoral election festers. In: Reuters, 04.07.2018. Available at<br />
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moldova-protests-eu/eu-freezes-aid-to-moldova-as-row-overmayoral-election-festers-idUSKBN1JU2G7<br />
(25.07.2019).<br />
5<br />
Emerson, Cenusa, Deepening EU-<strong>Moldova</strong>n Relations, p. 30.<br />
6<br />
Rikard Jozwiak, Romania Blocks Critical EU Text about <strong>Moldova</strong>. In: Radio Free Europe, 06.12.2018.<br />
Available at https://www.rferl.org/a/romania-blocks-critical-eu-text-about-moldova/29641255.html<br />
(26.02.2019).<br />
7<br />
Kamil Całus, Wojciech Konończuk, <strong>Moldova</strong>, which used to be perceived as one of the most<br />
democratic post-Soviet countries, has come to be dominated by one politician. In: Carnegie Europe,<br />
04.05.2017. Available at https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/69856 (26.02.2019).<br />
8<br />
William H. Hill, <strong>Moldova</strong>’s Upcoming Election: What’s at stake? In: Wilson Center, 14.02.2019.<br />
Available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/moldovas-upcoming-election-whats-stake<br />
(26.02.2019).<br />
www.pontothinktank.org<br />
office@pontothinktank.org<br />
@pontothinktank
9<br />
<strong>Moldova</strong>: Pro-Russian party leads without majority. In: Deutsche Welle/Reuters, 25.02.2019.<br />
Available at https://www.dw.com/en/moldova-pro-russian-party-leads-without-majority/a-47669559<br />
(26.02.2019).<br />
10<br />
<strong>Moldova</strong> is still caught between Russia and the EU. In: The Economist, 25.02.2019. Available at<br />
https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/02/25/moldova-is-still-caught-between-russia-and-the-eu<br />
(26.02.2019).<br />
11<br />
Denis Cenusa, The place of the opposition in the post-electoral balance of power in <strong>Moldova</strong>. In:<br />
IPN, 04.03.2019. Available at http://ipn.md/en/special/96854 (05.03.2019).<br />
12<br />
Vladimir Socor, <strong>Moldova</strong>’s Parliamentary Elections: One Silver Lining Amid Multiple Negative<br />
Trends (Part One), In: The Jamestown Foundation, 11.03.2019. Available at<br />
https://jamestown.org/program/moldovas-parliamentary-elections-one-silver-lining-amid-multiplenegative-trends-part-one/<br />
(12.03.2019).<br />
13<br />
Fewer alliance scenarios remained after ACUM’s statements about non-cooperation with PDM and<br />
PSRM, opinions, in: IPN, 1.3.2019. Available at http://www.ipn.md/en/alegeri-2019/96814 (12.03.2018).<br />
14<br />
Transnistria is a self-proclaimed state on the internationally recognized territory of <strong>Moldova</strong>.<br />
15<br />
OSCE International Election Observation Mission: Republic of <strong>Moldova</strong> – Parliamentary Elections,<br />
24 February 2019. Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. Available at<br />
https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/412346?download=true (27.02.2019), pp.1-6.<br />
16<br />
Pro-Russian Party Wins <strong>Moldova</strong> Parliamentary Vote. In: Warsaw Institute, 26.03.2019. Available at<br />
https://warsawinstitute.org/pro-russian-party-wins-moldova-parliamentary-vote/ (10.03.2019).<br />
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