Moldova-Blog-Article

Moldova's Split Society
Blog Article by
Magda Stumvoll
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The parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova on 24 February 2019
were essential for the future of the country, which is challenged by the fight
against corruption and the oligarchic system. Its political parties – as well as
its society – are split between the pro-Russian and the pro-European way.
Moldova’s backsliding in the past few years
Moldova claims to be the most European country in the European
neighborhood, which is mainly due to the high number of Moldovan citizens
who simultaneously have Romanian, and thus EU, citizenship. According to
unofficial figures more than 500,000 Moldovans 1 have dual citizenship,
which is linked to the common history of these two neighboring countries. 2
Thanks to its ambitious reforms, the Republic of Moldova was considered –
together with Georgia and Ukraine – as one of the frontrunners of the
European Union’s (EU) Eastern Partnership (EaP). The EaP is an initiative
launched in 2009 as part of the European Neighborhood Policy, which
covers six countries in Eastern Europe and on the Southern Caucasus:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
However, the situation changed incrementally over the past few years: The
EU froze its financial aid for the first time in July 2015, when a huge banking
scandal was discovered – approximately 1 billion dollars, roughly one eighth
of the Moldova’s GDP, was stolen from three Moldovan banks, revealing that
corruption was still one of the major challenges for the country. 3 When
Moldova’s Supreme Court invalidated the election of the democratically
elected, pro-Western mayor of Chisinau in summer 2018, the European
Parliament decided again to suspend the macro-financial assistance of
about $100 Mio. 4 Prior to the elections in February 2019, the leading parties
(PDM and PSRM, see below) changed the voting system, which is why in
February 2019, 51 of the 101 MPs were elected in uninominal constituencies.
The remaining 50 MPs were elected based on the previously-used party list
system. The Venice Commission and the EU strongly advised against and
highly criticized this change which they saw as major drawback for the
electoral system. The strongest criticism was directed at the high exposure
of the local candidates to influence from oligarchs and the favoring of the
larger established parties through the “winner-takes-it-all-principle” in the
constituencies. 5 On these and other issues, the EU grew increasingly critical
about Moldova: In December 2018, EU Foreign Ministers wanted to adopt a
critical text in the Foreign Affairs Council to express their concerns about the
recent incidents and remind Moldova to follow democratic principles and
the rule of law. However, the text was blocked by the Romanian Foreign
Minister. 6
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The political landscape in Moldova
To better understand the current situation in Moldova, one has to take a
closer look at the political landscape. Since December 2016, the country has
had a pro-Russian president, Igor Dodon. Before running for the presidency,
Dodon served as the leader of the Party of the Socialists of the Republic of
Moldova (PSRM). Shortly after President Dodon’s election, Moldova became
an observing member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union.
Prior to the elections in February 2019 a minority coalition between two
parties has led the country, the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) – to
which the still incumbent Prime Minister Pavel Filip belongs – and the
Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM). Although these parties
officially position themselves as “pro-EU” parties, one can claim that,
especially the PDM, has no real interest in modernizing the country,
following reforms towards good governance or fighting corruption, which
the EU is asking for. The PDM rather incorporates the safeguarding of
oligarchic interests which are linked to another Moldovan political actor,
who is in fact one of the most important figures in Moldovan politics: the
oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. He is chairman of the Democratic Party, the formal
coordinator of the governing coalition and the owner of four of the five
nationwide television stations. Critics call him “neither a democrat nor a
reformer […] who, under the cover of false pro-European rhetoric, is
petrifying the weakness of the state”. 7
With Dodon and Filip on the top of the country’s official leadership, two
persons with opposing interests – pro-Russian vs. pro-European, at least on
the surface – and Plahotniuc as an oligarchic unofficial leader, the political
situation of the country before the elections seemed quite challenging.
Besides these two big parties, the third important actor in the February
elections was the electoral bloc ACUM, meaning “now”, which has a real pro-
European agenda and wants to fight corruption and the oligarchic system
in Moldova. The electoral bloc was formed by two opposition parties (the
Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) and the Dignity and Truth Platform
Party (DA)) that are critical of both the government – for its oligarchic and
corruptive system – and the president – for his pro-Russian stance. 8
Parliamentary Elections 2019, where is Moldova heading?
The outcome of the elections of February 2019 was considered to be an
important milestone to set the geopolitical orientation of the country, either
towards Russia or the EU, but did not result in a clear winner: the PSRM won
31,2%, the electoral bloc ACUM achieved 26,6% and the PDM was third with
23,8% of the votes. 9 Due to the mixed voting system, ACUM won fewer seats
in the parliament than the PDM. As none of the parties has a clear majority
and there is generally mistrust among them, it will probably be difficult to
build a coalition.
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Even before the elections, the ACUM group pledged to not enter a coalition
with neither the Democrats nor the Socialists. 10 As ACUM seems to take its
promise very seriously, some supporters criticize the bloc for “prematurely”
taking its status of parliamentary opposition and not seizing the possibility
to change anything. 11 Voices from outside Moldova see ACUM’s outcome to
enter the parliament, for the first time, with already 26 of 101 seats, as a very
positive one, despite the many obstacles the electoral bloc was confronted
with (like other parties buying votes from the Transnistrian population,
exclusion from voting of part of the diaspora, media coverage mostly in favor
of big parties, changing of the voting system in favor of established parties
etc., see below). 12 The refusal of ACUM to build any coalition leads – despite
the (geo-)political differences between the Socialists and the Democrats – to
open exploratory talks between the two big parties who both want to
govern the country. Another possibility would be snap elections in the
coming months. However, experts claim that political players do not have
guarantees that they will get better results by rerunning the elections and
therefore, they may support the formation of a new government. 13
All in all, the OSCE election observation mission evaluated that the elections
were competitive and the fundamental rights were generally respected.
However, the OSCE reported that pressure was put on public employees,
state resources were misused and found strong indications of vote buying,
which affected mostly inhabitants of Transnistria 14 who were brought to
polling stations in territories under control of the Moldovan government
with special buses and were allegedly paid $20 to cast their ballot.
Additionally, certain media outlets were blamed for the limited range of
viewpoints presented to voters. It was seen critically, that just a few weeks
prior to the elections, it was decided that Moldovans abroad were not
allowed to vote with a (valid) ID or an expired passport, which was accepted
during previous elections. 15 Part of the diaspora who tends to vote for pro-
European forces, e.g. ACUM, was therefore excluded from voting.
The outcome of the elections does not deliver a clear result in which
direction Moldova is heading in the future but it shows that the Moldovan
population is strongly divided. Although Dodon himself underlined the high
probability of snap elections 16 , rerunning elections would be expensive and
it is not thought that they would bring a different outcome, despite the
alleged “inconsistencies” at the last elections. And as the ACUM group does
not seem to be open for any coalition talks, the most likely scenario for
Moldova at the moment will probably be a coalition between the Democrats
and the Socialists, even if they do not have the same viewpoints on many
topics. However, Socialists and Democrats both want to be part of the
government, which may lead them to overcome their differences and find
compromises. The next days and weeks will show in which way Moldova is
heading. It is sure that the outcome will have strong impacts on the
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country’s future and its relations with the EU and Russia. From a European
Union’s point of view, it would be unfortunate if Moldova abandoned its
European path now as collaboration with the neighbors in the East is
advancing. From a democratic perspective, moreover, it would be urgent
that Moldova intensifies the fight against corruption and the oligarchic
system and strengthens its institutions.
Author
Magda Stumvoll is project coordinator and research fellow at
the Austro-French Centre for Rapprochement in Europe. She
graduated with a Master's degree in European studies from
University of Regensburg and University of Auvergne. She has
been a Ponto member since autumn 2018 and has been
actively participating in its Eastern Europe Program.
1
Michael Emerson, Denis Cenusa, Deepening EU-Moldovan Relations. What, why and how?,
(London, 2 nd edition, 2018), pp.30-31.
2
The often occurrence of dual citizenship in Moldova is based on its close historic and cultural ties
with Romania, which is especially visible through their common language. Based on a Romanian
citizenship law from 1991, former citizens of Romania and their descendent can easily get Romanian
citizenship. This became especially appealing for Moldovans in 2001 when Romanians were granted
visa-free travel in the Schengen area and after Romania’s accession to the EU in 2007. Although
Romanian authorities do not provide official statistics on re-naturalizations of Moldovans, in 2014 it
was estimated that more than 300,000 Moldovan citizens have reclaimed Romanian citizenship.
However, unofficial figures indicate a higher number of about more than 500,000 Moldovans – of its
3,5 million inhabitants – having official Romanian documents.
3
Kinga Jaromin, EU freezes funding for Moldova. In: Euractiv, 10.07.2015. Available at
https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/eu-freezes-funding-for-moldova/ (25.02.2019);
Delegation of EU to Moldova, Press Release: EU Budget Support for the Republic of Moldova –
pending the fulfilment of several conditions, 08.07.2015. Available at
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/moldova/documents/press_corner/press_release_eu_bud
get_support_2015_07_08_en.pdf (25.02.2019).
4
Emerson, Cenusa, Deepening EU-Moldovan Relations, p.19.; Alexander Tanas, EU freezes aid to
Moldova as row over mayoral election festers. In: Reuters, 04.07.2018. Available at
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moldova-protests-eu/eu-freezes-aid-to-moldova-as-row-overmayoral-election-festers-idUSKBN1JU2G7
(25.07.2019).
5
Emerson, Cenusa, Deepening EU-Moldovan Relations, p. 30.
6
Rikard Jozwiak, Romania Blocks Critical EU Text about Moldova. In: Radio Free Europe, 06.12.2018.
Available at https://www.rferl.org/a/romania-blocks-critical-eu-text-about-moldova/29641255.html
(26.02.2019).
7
Kamil Całus, Wojciech Konończuk, Moldova, which used to be perceived as one of the most
democratic post-Soviet countries, has come to be dominated by one politician. In: Carnegie Europe,
04.05.2017. Available at https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/69856 (26.02.2019).
8
William H. Hill, Moldova’s Upcoming Election: What’s at stake? In: Wilson Center, 14.02.2019.
Available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/moldovas-upcoming-election-whats-stake
(26.02.2019).
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9
Moldova: Pro-Russian party leads without majority. In: Deutsche Welle/Reuters, 25.02.2019.
Available at https://www.dw.com/en/moldova-pro-russian-party-leads-without-majority/a-47669559
(26.02.2019).
10
Moldova is still caught between Russia and the EU. In: The Economist, 25.02.2019. Available at
https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/02/25/moldova-is-still-caught-between-russia-and-the-eu
(26.02.2019).
11
Denis Cenusa, The place of the opposition in the post-electoral balance of power in Moldova. In:
IPN, 04.03.2019. Available at http://ipn.md/en/special/96854 (05.03.2019).
12
Vladimir Socor, Moldova’s Parliamentary Elections: One Silver Lining Amid Multiple Negative
Trends (Part One), In: The Jamestown Foundation, 11.03.2019. Available at
https://jamestown.org/program/moldovas-parliamentary-elections-one-silver-lining-amid-multiplenegative-trends-part-one/
(12.03.2019).
13
Fewer alliance scenarios remained after ACUM’s statements about non-cooperation with PDM and
PSRM, opinions, in: IPN, 1.3.2019. Available at http://www.ipn.md/en/alegeri-2019/96814 (12.03.2018).
14
Transnistria is a self-proclaimed state on the internationally recognized territory of Moldova.
15
OSCE International Election Observation Mission: Republic of Moldova – Parliamentary Elections,
24 February 2019. Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. Available at
https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/412346?download=true (27.02.2019), pp.1-6.
16
Pro-Russian Party Wins Moldova Parliamentary Vote. In: Warsaw Institute, 26.03.2019. Available at
https://warsawinstitute.org/pro-russian-party-wins-moldova-parliamentary-vote/ (10.03.2019).
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