A Well-Articulated Primatology - Bruno Latour

166 Chapter Seventeen
state of affairs
r€sulting statement
biases and theories
Fig. 2. In the dualist model, a statement is the resultant beth'een tno opposite forces, what
the rvorld is like and what we are equippetl to \aV about it.
about them, on the other. with nothing in between. The dynamic of the
meeting, however, slowlv eroded this original intention, and began to
nudge us toward a completelv different set of metaphors. In order to be
able to do the reflexive n'ork required of us, \ /e moved from an optical
metaphor to a new one that I n-ill call "proposition."
To be sure, the original irltention relied on a perfectly sturdy and venerable
intellectual resource. t ikc in the "parallelogram of forces" we all
learned at school, an\' statenrent about a state of affairs can be considered
as the "resultant" of tn'o forces: what the world is like, and what n'e are
equipped to sav about it. lf our biases are stronger, the resultant shifts
toward one axis, n'hile, if the world is somehow strong enough, the staternent
about it moves toward the opposite direction. With this classical
rr.rodel, we inragine our statements to be twice constrained, not ottly by the
world Duf also by our mental and cultural equipment. It thus makes a lot
of sense to try to weigh the different components and to measure, for
each historical period, which one is stronger and which is weaker.
This model is obviously better than the naïve idea of science as an
exact replica of the world, and it makes, I must confess, perfect commolt
sense. Yet, it is utterly rlirolrg, since common sense is rarely a trustworthy
guide in scientif,c matters. A simple thought experiment demonstrates
tl-ris point easily. What would happen if there were no counterforce coming
from the axis that I have called "biases and theories"? According to
the model, it means that the resultant would be entirely determined by
the state of affairs at hand. Thus, if we had no theory, no preconception,
no bias, and no standpoint whatsoever, we would benefit from an indisputable,
unmediated, pristine access to things in themselves. No laborator!'
scientist would believe that for a minute. The same can be said of a
natural historian-they know all too well the work needed To make a feature
of the outside world lisiDle. During the conference, Steve Glickman
prcsented us with a simple and startling example. Hyena ethologists had