Commando Magazine edition 3 2020

exchange between the main assault force and the QRF.
SGT A and his chook, who made up the Australian SOLE
team would have to wait till they were on target to meet
the JTF2 Squadron Commander (Sqn Comd) as he was
chatting to the aviation Commander. The seven vehicle
Commando Platoon QRF of four Special Reconnaissance
Vehicles (SRVs) and three armoured Bushmasters (BMs)
from DCC, 4 RAR Cdo, moved to move to their
prepositioned location approx. 2km South West from the
Target Compound near the village of Dehjawz-e –
Hasenzay in the Chora Valley 5 .
Insertion
The two CH-47s lifted
off from FOB Davis at
0055hrs 10 July 4 , en route
the pilots noticed flashing
lights to their 7o’clock as
they flew North from TK.
The flashing lights were not
un common as they were
normally part of the Taliban
early warning system. Once
the Spectre Gunship was in
position the CH-47s made
their run in on target from
the Insertion Point (IP),
‘Spectre’ provided ob jec -
tive sparkle (an IR Flood
Light known as the ‘Hand of
God’) to help guide the
Chinooks onto their HLZs
Overview of the area of
operations for
OP Nile 09/10 July 2006
which were immediately adjacent to the Target Com -
pound. The Dutch Apaches declared the HLZs clear for
landing, however, ‘Spectre’ high above cut in on the radio
chatter all excited “negative the HLZs are hot, you have
guys all over the place” 4 . ‘Spectre’ specifically identified
6-12 individuals at each landing site, despite the Hot HLZ
the assault force was going in. At 0100hrs with miniguns
blazing, the CH-47s flared to land on the HLZs, one of the
CH-47s observed two Fighting Age Males (FAMs) run
from just outside of the objective and into the target
compound. They were not observed to have weapons
and were most likely ‘spotters’ providing compound
security 4 . The rotor wash of the Chinooks created so
much dust which prevented the aircrew’s observation
(also known as a ‘brownout’) they could not see any
Taliban activity as they touched down on target. The
Dutch Apaches provided overhead security but did not
engage any Taliban due to their poor visibility.
The Battle
At 0101hrs 4 , 10 July 2006, the two Australian CH-47
Chinooks touched down on their respective HLZs on both
sides of the target compound. Two factors provided the
assault force a fighting chance as they ran off the back of
the Chinooks. One, they landed right next to the target
compound, which minimised the amount of time they
were in the open and the second was the ‘Brownout’ the
Chinooks created was actually fortuitous as the Taliban
were not able to zero in on the Assault Force in the first
few minutes of the insertion. A JTF2 Sniper recalled “the
dust cloud was so bad guys were hanging onto the guy
in front of them just so they wouldn’t get lost.” 4 The
Chinooks lifted off without being fired upon and headed
South back to FOB Davis to refuel and wait for the
‘extraction’ call.
Despite being close to the Target, the JTF2 & ANSF
operators had to fight their way to the Target Building.
The JTF2 linguist said “as soon as you got out of the
chopper, you could hear the splatters, the rounds hitting
the ground all around you”. The Ground Commander
recalled “Bullets were popping by as soon as I got off the
helicopter and walked over and introduced myself to the
QRF liaison team members” 4 . JTF2 declared Troops in
Contact (TIC) immediately, they were now under fire from
insurgents from the wood line and compounds from the
North & Northeast as well as those from the South and
Southwest, to the West the Taliban engaged the ANSF as
they approached the mosque.
What JTF2 & the Commandos from DCC didn’t know
was there was a Shura 6 being held by 4-6 Taliban leaders
which included their Personal Security Detachment (PSD)
teams (up to 20 pers per team) 500m away to the South
East of the Target Building with approx. 200 Taliban
bedded down for the night 4 . The QRF was situated
approx. 15mins away to the South West. A scenario such
as this had been identified as the Most Dangerous
Course of Action during planning. So, while accounted
for to some degree, there was still an element of surprise
in the speed and size of the Taliban response. The
‘Spectre’ Gunship advised that there was 50 enemy
approaching from the North, 50 approaching from the
South and ‘too many to count’ approaching from the
East. They began pounding the Taliban where ever they
seemed amassing, which seemed to be everywhere. They
were completely surrounded.
The ANSF moved to a block position to the East of
the Compound at the end of an alley, when they were
engaged by 10 to 15 Taliban firing from behind a low
orchard wall. As the ANSF continued along the alley
between compounds an insurgent fired a full burst from
his AK-47, emptying his entire magazine of 7.62mm short
rounds and killing one ANSF soldier and wounding three
others including an American Mentor. The wounded and
KIA were moved to the target compound quickly whilst
the ANSF maintained their blocks at both ends of the
alley. One of the JTF2 teams breached the compound
wall on the South West portion of the compound and
another team found a natural entry on the Eastern sector
of the compound. Before the dust cleared from the
explosive breach the resounding blast some how
4
‘No Ordinary Men’ – Special Operation Forces Missions in Afghanistan
by Colonel Bernd Horn.
5
‘No Front Lines’ – Australia’s Special Forces At War In Afghanistan, by
Chris Masters.
6
Shura (Arabic: shūrā) is an Arabic word for "consultation". The Quran
and the Prophet Muhammad encourage Muslims to decide their affairs
in consultation with those who will be affected by that decision.
36 COMMANDO ~ The Magazine of the Australian Commando Association ~ Edition 3 I 2020