Commando Magazine edition 3 2020

ADDITIONAL COMMANDO NEWS
BOOK REVIEW
As soon as I heard that this book was
on the streets, I was eager to read it.
I found the title to be fascinating,
having attained the rank of Major in my first
career! Moreover, I am a guerrilla warfare
exponent and I had meet many of the Opera -
tion Semut Operatives and some of their
indigenous guerrillas who feature in the book.
Twenty-five years ago, I had retraced their
bloody and muddy footsteps for three months
in the jungles and along the rivers of Borneo,
and I had studied Major Tom Harrisson, (8 Men
Dropped From The Sky Articles) the chief pro -
tagonist of Semut I, in great depth. I am pleased to say
that even with my extensive background and knowledge,
I learnt many new things, especially with the author’s focus
on post-Armistice battle actions and his objective
assessments of the egocentric Major Tom Harrisson. While
it is now 75 years since Special Operations Australia (SOA)
conducted its most successful operation throughout the
course of the Second World War, the author has provided
a refreshing review of events, and he has re-ignited much
debate over the legacy of Operation Semut!
The first half of the book is in the vein of a boy’s own
adventure, and as if Tom Harrisson was in charge of
almost everything, with his dispersed Western Operatives
and indigenous guerrillas running amok behind the
Japanese lines in support of the 7 th Division’s and the 9 th
Division’s amphibious landings! I had studied all of these
brave, arduous and head-hunting stories before, but for
those readers who have not, they will find it enthralling
reading.
Interestingly the book also provides a lot of new focus
on Major Tom Harrisson’s actions post Armistice, where he
rightfully rose to the occasion, although by then his vexed
reputation had already been framed. I had long forgotten
that Harrisson wanted to stay on after the war to rebuild
Borneo, and this fact explains at lot about his post
Armistice battle actions against the marauding Japanese
troops who did not surrender for some two months.
I was intrigued about Harrisson’s stated claim that
Operation Semut provided 80% of the intelligence for the
9 th Division. I had not heard of this assertion before and
this serious claim needs authentication. While the author
makes some tactical intelligence assessment, I am yet to
see any detailed assessment of the intelligence provided
by Semut to support the 7 th Division and the 9 th Division
prior to their coastal landings, and if it made any
difference, strategically or operationally before, during or
after.
‘KILL THE MAJOR’
The True Story of the Most Successful Allied Guerrilla War in Borneo.
By Paul Malone, first published by Strategic Information & Research Development Centre,
Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia - March 2020
Reviewed by MAJ Jim Truscott – ACA VIC
It would be interesting to read the initial
orders that the Headquarters of the Services
Reconnaissance Department gave to all of the
Semut party leaders, to see what they said
about intelligence gathering, but these most
secret records, many of them shredded just
after the war, probably no longer exist. There
are far too many accounts about Operation
Semut with a focus on the Japanese body
count as opposed to what Harrisson says
himself about their primary intelligence
mission.
Many of the Semut Operatives and their
indigenous guerrillas with blowpipes and parangs clearly
had as much, if not more body count impact on the
Japanese than the entire 9 th Division, much to the chagrin
of the AIF. However far too many past accounts link
Operation Semut to guerrilla warfare offensive operations
than they should. The linkage should be to intelligence
gathering in denied and flank areas, success or otherwise.
The operational summaries that still exist today quite
clearly state that Semut’s objective, as approved by
General Headquarters, was to collect intelligence ahead
of the coastal landings, but conclude that its greatest
impact was in the re-establishment of political control by
the British.
The author makes some assessment of Harrisson’s
many eccentricities, but it omits any discussion of his
tactical employment, knowledge and skill. This ability is
the crux in war fighting, and it needs to be assessed. In
retrospect some military historians would say that he was
just a grand reconnaissance cum fighting patrol master in
tactical terms. Some researchers of anthropology would
remark on his ability to establish an underground
resistance organization in stone age circumstances. Some
academics in geo-political affairs may laud his rogue and
tactical decision to also operate in Dutch territory, with far
reaching post-war strategic impacts for Holland,
Indonesia, Australia and Britain.
This book re-emphasizes to me that Major Tom
Harrisson was a problematic field commander with very
limited military experience compared with most of the
men under his command. It was incredible that the
Headquarters of the Service Reconnaissance Department
left such an eccentric anthropological boffin in charge of
the Operation Semut I grouping. Surely, they must have
known something about his lack of practical field
leadership? Maybe it was a pompous British obsession,
and I regret not having asked one of the key Group
Commanders in the Headquarters of the Services
COMMANDO ~ The Magazine of the Australian Commando Association ~ Edition 3 I 2020 67