[Studies in Strategic Peacebuilding] Daniel Philpott, Gerard Powers - Strategies of Peace (2010, Oxford University Press) - libgen.lc (1)

AN OVERVIEW 37
Strategic peacebuilders therefore are intentional in thinking carefully about
a range of resources and relationships that go beyond their natural niche,
their most immediate circle of influence, access, and exchange. This does not
mean that any specific activity, research, or approach is not important on its
own; it simply means that “strategic peacebuilding” must build toward a common,
coordinated set of goals. These common goals are configured within the
specific connotations of “strategic.”
To put it negatively, under what conditions would the word strategic not
apply? First, thinking and acting is not strategic when the time horizon is too
narrow or constricted. Let us imagine the plight of a U.S. artillery colonel in
Baghdad tasked with discerning a path to “reconciliation” (as called for in the
Iraq Study Group Report of November 2006). Were he to approach the situation
solely by considering the immediate goals to be accomplished for U.S.
forces to withdraw from Iraq—such as ensuring security for the Iraqi people,
training the Iraqi police force, stabilizing key neighborhoods, and so on—the
colonel’s recommendations might have been considered prudent or even “tactical”
in service of short-term political purposes. But by failing to comprehend
the bigger picture, especially what would serve the long-term interests of stability,
security, and peace in the region, such calculations would fall dreadfully
short of the standards of strategic peacebuilding. 21
Second, research or practice that focuses narrowly on one aspect of change
within the larger historic cycles of violence or structural injustice is hardly
strategic. In the service of postviolence reconciliation, for example, offers of
amnesty or forgiveness made in the effort to prevent the recurrence of violence
can be considered strategic only if they are coordinated or integrated with a
commitment to retributive and restorative measures designed to uphold and
strengthen the rule of law. 22
To illustrate this point, we return to our opening example regarding
the Catholic Church in Colombia. Although the Church may fulfill a shortterm
role by monitoring the process of demobilization of paramilitaries, that
role defined in the narrow sense does not constitute strategic peacebuilding.
Given the Church’s accompaniment of local displaced communities,
access to government officials, and direct relationships with armed groups,
the key to acting strategically is found in how processes and roles are integrated
toward a wider transformation of the historic patterns of conflict and
violence. Strategic action requires considering how the process of demobilization
sparks and sustains acknowledgment of past harms and processes of
increased transparency and appropriate forms of reparation for those most
harmed. These requirements imply that government programs move beyond
rote application of narrowly defined negotiations toward initiatives that bring
forward into the public arena processes that embrace the challenge of looking
truthfully at human rights abuses and responsibilities. Such processes
are engaged with local communities affected by the waves of violence and
seeking reparation. In other words, the narrow role of monitoring cannot be
isolated from the wider potential of transformation that involves and links
national government, local communities, and the transition of militias away