The Commissioners of LLRC

Critical analysis of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission 

THE WAIT FOR 

JUSTICE 

Center for Human Rights 

CHR-Sri Lanka 

THE WAIT FOR JUSTICE 1

The Center for Human Rights- Sri 

Lanka was established in 2010 in a 

bid to address the growing human 

rights concerns in the country and 

to educate the people about issues 

which have been neglected by the 

main stream media or civil society 

groups for various reasons. 

In the past two years we have studied, 

spoken about and published 

greatly on Freedom of Information, 

Academic Freedom of Universities 

and the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation 

Commission. 

We were the only independent civil 

society who observed the LLRC’s 

outstation sessions consistently 

and its reports on these sessions 

have been widely quoted by both 

local and foreign media. From the 

beginning the LLRC has responded 

positively to CHR’s reports and recommendations 

and we have been 

instrumental in introducing several 

mechanisms ensuring the safety of 

those coming to give evidence and 

assuring transparency. 

2 THE WAIT FOR JUSTICE 

All rights reserved. 

This publication is 

copyright, but may be 

reproduced for purposes 

of advocacy with prior 

permission from the 

publisher. 

Inquiries, please contact 

rajith_tennakoon@yahoo.com 

Images © CHR Sri Lanka 

chrsrilanka.com 

Written by 

Vositha Wijenayake 

Rathindra Kuruwita 

Edited by 

Rajith Keerthi Tennakoon 

Surangi Ariyawansha 

Published in November, 2011 


100/19A 

Welikadawatta Road 

Rajagiriya, Sri Lanka 

0114-341514 

fax:0112866224 

© CHR- Sri Lanka 2011

Executive Summary 

The end of 30 years of war provides a unique 

opportunity to the Sri Lankan Civil society to 

look back and ascertain the past mistakes. 

However the Sri Lankan civil society has little 

space to generate alternative policies against 

the existing ones of the state. It has been 

further aggravated following the war due to 

the triumphant mentality of the majority and 

the victorious mindset of the rulers. This is 

not a new feature and it is commonly existent 

in many a post war situation. Nevertheless, 

Center for Human Rights believes that 

it is our bounden duty as a civil society 

organization to avert reoccurrence of conflict 

and address the causes that lead to ethnopolitical 

violence. 

Therefore, through the existing LLRC process 

it is the duty of civil society organizations, 

to explore and lobby to reframe the path of 

reconciliation efforts by the government along 

the lines of true political, psycho-social and 

victim perpetrator reconciliation. 

We believe the current process is not 

sufficient to understand the depths of the 

ethno-political conflict of Sri Lanka and 

its past, or the current post war–conflict 

situation. In addition the LLRC process and 

its objectives cannot be deemed as sufficient 

to understand the true reconciliation means: 

political, psycho-social and victim-perpetrator 

aspects of reconciliation. 

Therefore, there is the need to generate a 

new action program and a strategy to make 

reconciliation, in order to reach a viable 

alternative future in Sri Lanka. 

Moreover any alternative efforts that are 

aimed at the creation and sustenance of 

reconciliation and polices need to enhance 

the mandate of the receiving testimonies. 

There exists also the need for the LLRC 

commissioners to whom the submissions 

are made to be of impartiality, non-conflict of 

interest, and also be representatives of ethnic 

harmony and be politically balance. 

Thus it is indispensable that he process 

is equipped with experts who have multidisciplinary 

knowledge, skills and correct 

attitudes to resolve data gaps between 

conflicting perceptions and resolving 

perceptions. The strategy we propose is to 

use the existing LLRC process to resolve this 

existing data gap. 

In the conversion of testimonies into lessons 

learnt, the adoption of modern narrative 

techniques combined with expert knowledge 

guided by correct terms of references form 

an asset. In this sense what is needed is a 

correct working definition for reconciliation 

that is deem worthy as suitable for the 

conditions pertaining in Sri Lanka. 

Furthermore, the lessons learnt need be 

evolved into policies without perpetual 

stagnation as results that emanated from 

former commissions of inquiry. 

On an additional observation of the process it 

is visible that there is a lack of participation or 

involvement of masses in the process. There 

has also existed a persistent lacuna of media 

activism for the implementation of a process 

that is communicated to the grassroot level of 

Sri Lankan society. 

CHR, Sri Lanka through this report and its 

active observation of the LLRC process 

strives to rectify the problems that be noted 

since the inception of the LLRC. Thus the 

report is a reflection of those observations 

and thoughts for improvement in a process 

that needs to be experiences leading to 

lessons learnt, which in turn will lead to 

implementation of practical and productive 

policies for reaching reconciliation in the Sri 

Lankan society. 


Women holding photos of their missing family members in Jaffna 

The Need for Intervention 

Centre for Human Rights (CHR) believes that 

civil society participation is crucial in converting 

testimonies into lessons learnt, and to push 

the government into adopting modern narrative 

techniques combined with expert knowledge 

guided by correct terms of references to 

achieve this. 

We believe that what is needed is a correct 

working definition for reconciliation suitable for 

Sri Lanka conditions. Further, there is a need 

to convert lessons learnt into policies without 

sending those reports into back burner, like 

what has happened in the past. There is no 

assurance that the LLRC report will not follow 

this path, unless we build a consensus among 

the general public that the recommendations of 

the LLRC should be carried out. 

Moreover, there is a need for a true 

reconciliation process which is a change 

management process in the terms of modern 

organizational science, to involve the society in 

deliberating facts and circumstances parallel to 

official reconciliation deliberations. 

During the initial phase of the LLRC 

proceedings we observed that there is no 

involvement of masses in this process and no 


proper media involvement for required social 

engineering. It needs be noted that there 

was virtually no coverage for LLRC outstation 

sessions by mainstream English and Sinhala 

papers. Therefore CHR has stepped up to the 

task by observing the LLRC sessions, both in 

Colombo and outstation, and raising awareness 

among the public as a mechanism for bridging 

this gap. 

We have been campaigning to introduce a 

comprehensive reconciliation building process 

which incorporates people’s experiences, 

conversion of these experiences to lessons 

guided by a proper Terms of Reference, 

development of proper policy regime and 

action plan based on true lessons learnt and 

finally generate wide discourse among the 

masses for a change that will bring stability 

and legitimacy. 

CHR, Sri Lanka has in its own way been been 

able to rectify certain aspects of the LLRC 

process since the beginning of LLRC. This 

final report is based on our experiences of that 

interaction, interventions and our final bid to 

have an affect on the LLRC’s final report which is 

planned to be out on the 15th of November 2011.

Introduction to Lessons Learnt 

and Reconciliation Commission 

LLRC can be deemed as the response 

of the Sri Lankan government to the call of 

the international community to establish an 

investigation for the alleged human rights 

violations during the 30 years civil war of Sri 

Lanka. 

In 2009 , following the visit to the North of Sri 

Lanka immediately after the end of the civil 

war, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon 

and Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa 

issued a joint communiqué on 23 May 2009 

in which the Secretary-General “underlined 

the importance of an accountability process 

for addressing violations of international 

humanitarian and human rights law,”. President 

Rajapaksa promised that the Sri Lankan 

government would “take measures to address 

those grievances.” He reiterated Sri Lanka’s 

“strongest commitment to the promotion and 

protection of human rights, in keeping with 

international human rights standards and Sri 

Lanka’s international obligations.” (1) 

In order to maintain the commitment he 

advocated towards the process of the search 

for truth, the UN secretary General named a 

panel of international experts to advise him 

on accountability issues in Sri Lanka. The 

members of the panel were Marzuki Darusman 

(Indonesia), Chair; Steven Ratner (United 

States); and Yasmin Sooka (South Africa). This 

Panel submitted their report on the subject 

matter to Ban Ki-moon on 12 April 2011 and it 

mentioned of having “found credible allegations, 

which if proven, indicate that a wide range of 

serious violations of international humanitarian 

law and international human rights law was 

committed both by the Government of Sri Lanka 

and the LTTE, some of which would amount to 

war crimes and crimes against humanity.” (2) 

In addition to the above the report further 

recommended that the Secretary-General 

“immediately proceed to establish an 

independent international mechanism” to: 

(i) Monitor and assess the extent to which the 

Government of Sri Lanka is carrying 

out an effective domestic accountability 

process, including genuine investigations of 

the alleged violations, and periodically advise 

the Secretary-General on its findings; 

(ii) Conduct investigations independently into 

the alleged violations, having regard 

to genuine and effective domestic 

investigations; and 

(iii) Collect and safeguard for appropriate future 

use information provided to it, 

which is relevant to accountability for the final 

stages of the war, including the 

information gathered by the Panel and other 

bodies in the United Nations system. (3) 

The report was released on the 25 April 2011 

but Ban Ki-moon asserted that he lacked 

the authority to establish an independent 

international accountability mechanism. In lieu 

of what he claimed he was unable to provide a 

solution that was viable, it was informed that 

he awaited authorization from another UN body, 

such as the Security Council or the Human 

Rights Council. Finally in September 2011 the 

report was referred to the President of the HRC 

and the High Commissioner for Human Rights 

by the Secretary General of the United Nations. 

The Panel’s report was rejected by the Sri 

Lankan External Affairs Ministry which issued its 

rejection despite acknowledging that it had not 

yet reviewed the report in depth. (4) 

The local impetus for the alleged violations 

came in the form of the LLRC which was 

appointed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa. 

According to the introduction provided through 

the President’s Media Unit on the establishing 

of such commission, it was highlighted that 

it was for the purposes of reporting “on the 

lessons to be learnt from the events in the 

period, Feb 2002 to May 2009, their attendant 

concerns and to recommend measures to 

ensure that there will be no recurrence of such 

a situation”. The Commission has been further 


charged with “ reporting whether any person, 

group or institution directly or indirectly bears 

responsibility in this regard.” (5) 

On May 15, President Rajapaksa appointed 

the eight member ‘Lessons Learnt and 

Reconciliation’ Commission to report on lessons 

to be learnt from the events in the period, 

February 2002 to May 2009, their attendant 

concerns and to recommend measures to 

ensure that there will be no recurrence of such 

a situation, under a six months mandate ending 

on November 15. (6) 

The memorandum by the President which 

was given cabinet approval for the mandating 

of the Commission provides that “ it has 

been apparent for quite some time to the 

Government, that the conflict situation due 

to the very brutality and long duration of the 

violence perpetrated against Sri Lanka, would 

have caused great hurt and anguish in the 

minds of the people, that requires endeavours 

for rehabilitation and the restoration of 

democratic governance complimented by 

measures for reconciliation.” 

LLRC is deemed to be perceived as “the 

Government’s commitment to the promotion 

and protection of human rights, as consistently 

articulated and affirmed by Sri Lanka at 

Sessions of the Human Rights Council. The 

President informed the cabinet that in order to 

accomplish this task it has become necessary 

to set in motion a mechanism which will provide 

a historic bridge between the past of a society 

characterized by inflicted strife and a future 


society founded on the continued recognition 

of democracy and peaceful co-existence and 

the affording of equal opportunities for all Sri 

Lankans as guaranteed by the Constitution.” (7) 

It has been further noted that the Commission 

has been set in place based on the truth and 

reconciliation commission of South Africa 

which sort to address the grievances of the 

apartheid of that Nation, through the relating 

of the “stories” of those suffered and those who 

committed acts of violence against others. In 

addition to this the commission is also stated to 

be influenced by the Iraq Inquiry of the UK. 

The six month mandated which was granted on 

the 15th of May 2010 extended by another six 

months by the Sri Lankan President Mahinda 

Rajapaksa in order to facilitate the Commission 

to record more evidence. 

The Commission was set up under provisions 

of Section 2 of the Commissions of Inquiry 

Act (Chapter 393). Former Attorney General 

and LLRC Chairman, Presidents Counsel C. 

R. de Silva, stated upon the extension” the 

Commission wish to avail an opportunity for 

more members of general public to testify 

before it.” (8) He further added that “The 

independence and impartiality of the Lessons 

Learnt and Reconciliation Commission in all 

fairness must be judged by the performance of 

the commission and not on the basis of preconceived 

notions,” (9) 

“Despite your ill-founded misgivings about 

the outcome of the commission’s work, 

the commission will strongly safeguard its 

independence and will continue to work towards 

fulfilling its mandate,” (10)

The LLRC Commissioners 

The Composition of the 

Commission 

The Eight member ‘Lessons Learnt and 

Reconciliation’ Commission was appointed by 

the Presindent Mahinda Rajapaksa on the 15th 

of May 2010 to report on lessons to be learnt 

from the events during the period from February 

2002 to May 2009, their attendant concerns and 

to recommend measures to ensure that there 

will be no recurrence of such a situation. 

As illustrated in the introduction the mandate 

provides the commissioners with the task 

of reporting whether any person, group 

or institution directly or indirectly bears 

responsibility to the events occurred during 

the time duration provided, and on measures 

to be taken to prevent the recurrence of 

such events in the future whilst promoting 

national unity and reconciliation among all 

communities. 

On the initial mandated, the commissioners 

were directed to report back to the 

President within six months from the date of 

appointment - 15th May, 2010. Nevertheless 

on the completion of the first term, the 

President chose to extend the mandate for 

the duration of another 6 months. The LLRC’s 

mandate will be terminated on the 15th of 

November 2011. 

Background to the 

Commissioners of the LLRC 

Mr. C. R. de Silva PC, Chairman, is a former 

Attorney General and Solicitor General of Sri 

Lanka. He was a Member of the Council of 

Legal Education, and of the Law Commission 

of Sri Lanka. He was called to the Bar in 1974, 

worked in the chambers of several prominent 

lawyers of the private Bar before joining the 

Attorney Genera’s Department in 1975. He took 

“silk” as a President’s Counsel in 1997. 

He has been a member of the Sri Lanka 

delegation to many international bodies 

including the Afro-Asian Legal Consultative 

Committee, UN Human Rights Council, UN 

Human Rights Committee, UN Convention 

against Torture Committee and the UN 

Committee for the Convention on the 

Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 

Dr. Rohan Perera PC, was Legal Advisor of 

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was elected 

as the Sri Lanka candidate to the International 

Law Commission, by the UN General Assembly 

in New York securing one of the seven seats 

allocated to the Asian region. 


The International Law Commission was 

established in 1949 by the General Assembly 

and entrusted with codification and progressive 

development of international law. 

Dr. Perera has served for over thirty years in the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initially as assistant 

Legal Advisor and thereafter, as a legal 

advisor and is also was chairman of the UN 

ad-hoc Committee on Measures to Eliminate 

International Terrorism which concluded the 

International Convention on the Suppression of 

Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. This Committee has 

been negotiating a comprehensive Convention 

on Terrorism. 

He also served as a member of the group 

of legal advisors and constitutional experts 

appointed by the President to advice the 

All Party Representatives Committee on a 

constitutional reform to resolve the issues 

relating to ensuring ethnic unity in Sri Lanka. 

Prof. Karunaratne Hangawatte, currently 

professor of criminal justice in the State of 

Nevada’s premier university in Las Vegas, 

has undertaken extensive research on global 

terrorism that has qualified him to teach a 

course on terrorism in the criminal justice 

department. 

Dr. Karu Hangawatte received his LL.B. from 

the University of Ceylon, Colombo, in 1970 and 

his Ph.D. (with distinction) in criminal justice in 

1984 from the State University of New York at 

Albany. He is an attorney-at-law of the Supreme 

Court of Sri Lanka. His areas of interest include 

law and society, criminal law and procedure, 

constitutional law, legal method and process, 

terrorism and political violence, and the 

administration of criminal justice. He has been 

an assistant secretary of justice in Sri Lanka. 

He was one of the experts who worked on 

the United Nations declaration on the victims 

of crime and abuse of power and violation 

of human rights, which covered the cold 

war era. The UN adopted this declaration in 

1985.During the time he was in Sri Lanka 

Hangawatte occupied a position in the legal 

research section in the Ministry of Justice 

and later as assistant secretary of the same 

ministry. He has also received several teaching 

awards at UNLV. 


The Commissioners of LLRC 

The Commissioners appointed 

under provisions of Section 2 of the 

Commissions of Inquiry Act (Chapter 393) 

are, 

1. Chitta Ranjan de Silva Esq, PC - 

Chairman 

2. Dr. Amrith Rohan Perera Esq, PC 

3. Prof. Mohamed Thahir Mohamed Jiffry 

Esq (was replaced by MTM Bafiq Esq) 

4. Prof. Karunaratna Hangawatta ESq 

5. Chandirapal Chanmugam Esq 

6. Hewa Mathara Gamage Siripala 

Palihakkara Esq 

7. Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan 

8. Maxwell Parakrama Paranagama Esq 

Mr. HMGS Palihakkara, was former Permanent 

Representative of Sri Lanka to the United 

Nations. He has served on the Secretary- 

General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament 

Matters. He retired as the Foreign Secretary of 

Sri Lanka in December 2006 after 38 years of 

civil and diplomatic service. 

Since the 1990s, he has served on a number 

of assignments to the United Nations in 

Geneva and New York, covering work related 

to the General Assembly’s First Committee 

(Disarmament and International Security), and 

later the Conference on Disarmament, as well 

as on human rights, humanitarian and economic 

and social affairs. He either led or participated 

as a member of Sri Lanka’s delegation in 

several peace and security/disarmamentrelated 

conferences and meetings, including the 

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the 

Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 

Nuclear Weapons. 

He served as Sri Lanka’s Permanent 

Representative to the United Nations and head 

of delegation to the Conference on Disarmament 

from 1997 to 2000. After his work in Geneva, 

he was appointed Ambassador to Thailand, 

Cambodia, Lao Peoples Democratic Republic 

and Viet Nam, and from 2000 to 2004 served 

as his country’s Permanent Representative 

to the United Nations Economic and Social

Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). 

Mr. Palihakkara served as Acting Director- 

General and Deputy Director-General of Sri 

Lanka’s Peace Secretariat (SCOPP), which 

serviced the Norwegian-facilitated peace talks 

(2002) and subsequent ceasefire (2003). 

Among other positions, during the mid-1990s, 

he was Director-General of Multilateral Affairs 

at Sri Lanka’s Foreign Ministry, covering work 

related to preventive diplomacy, peace-building, 

arms control and non-proliferation. 

Holding a Bachelor of Education degree from 

the University of Ceylon, Peradeniya, Sri 

Lanka, Mr. Palihakkara entered his country’s 

foreign service in 1979. His foreign affairs 

training took place in Australia in 1980, and 

he followed up his studies in international 

human rights and humanitarian law at the 

Raul Wallenberg Institute, University of Lund, 

Sweden. 

Professor M T M Jiffry, is Vice Chairman of 

the University Grants Commission, Senior 

Professor of Physiology -University of Sri 

Jayewardenepura, an Examiner of the Post 

Graduate Institute of Medicine, and former 

President, Health Informatics Society of Sri 

Lanka. 

He has been active in the building of interethnic 

understanding and has been engaged 

in the advance of education in Sri Lanka to 

serve the needs of all communities. 

(Professor Jiffry passed away in September 

2010 at a private nursing home. He was replaced 

by MTM Bafiq, Senior Attorney at law. ) 

MTM Bafiq, is a senior attorney at law, and 

was the Commissioner of the Human Rights 

Commission of Sri Lanka between 2006-09 

Mr. C. Chanmugam is former Secretary to the 

Treasury and former member of the Monetary 

Board of Sri Lanka. He was also Chairman 

of the Board of Directors of Fitch Ratings Sri 

Lanka. An Associate of the Royal Institute of 

Chemistry, Mr. Chanmugam has held many 

positions of distinction in Sri Lanka and 

abroad. 

He was the Executive Director of the Institute 

of Policy Studies, Sri Lanka. A former Advisor 

to the Ministry of Finance and Planning, was 

also e Secretary to the Ministry of Finance 

and Planning; the Alternate Governor to the 

Asian Development Bank and the World 

Bank (1987-88). In Sri Lanka, he was also 

Chairman, Foreign Investment and Advisory 

Committee and the Controller of Tea, Rubber 

and Coconut industries. 

Mrs. Mano Ramanathan, had a long and 

distinguished career in the legal profession 

where she rose to be the Deputy Legal 

Draughtsman. She has been active in the 

reform of law to strengthen the rights of women 

and children, as has been associated with work 

involving women’s empowerment. She is the 

wife of the late Justice P. Ramanathan. 

Mr. Maxwell Paranagama, a former High Court 

Judge had a distinguished career in the legal 

profession before elevation to the bench of the 

High Court. 


The Mandate of the LLRC 

Following is the text of the Warrant issued by 

President Mahinda Rajapaksa: 

WHEREAS I am of the opinion that an opportune 

moment has arrived to reflect on the conflict phase 

and the sufferings the country has gone through 

as a whole and having regard to the common 

aspirations of all we have collectively resolved that 

our people are assured an era of peace, harmony 

and prosperity; 

WHEREAS It has become necessary that while 

we as an independent and proud nation of multiethnic 

polity undertake a journey of common 

goals in a spirit of co-operation, partnership and 

friendship we also learn from this recent history 

lessons that would ensure that there will be no 

recurrence of any internecine conflict in the future; 

WHEREAS I am of the opinion that it is in the 

interest of public welfare, to appoint a Commission 

of Inquiry for the purposes hereinafter mentioned; 

NOW THEREFORE I, Mahinda Rajapaksa, 

President, reposing great trust and confidence in 

your prudence, ability, independence and fidelity, 

do, in pursuance of the provisions of Section 2 of 

the Commission of Inquiry Act (Chapter 393), by 

these presents, appoint you, the said; 

1. Chitta Ranjan de Silva Esq, PC 

2. Dr. Amrith Rohan Perera Esq, PC 

3. Prof. Mohamed Thahir Mohamed Jiffry Esq 

4. Prof. Karunaratna Hangawatta ESq 

5. Chandirapal Chanmugam Esq 

6. Hewa Mathara Gamage Siripala Palihakkara 

Esq 

7. Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan 

8. Maxwell Parakrama Paranagama Esq 

To be my Commissioners, to inquire and report on 

the following matters that may have taken place 

during the period between 21st February 2002 and 

19th May 2009, namely; 

i. the facts and circumstances which led 

to the failure of the ceasefire agreement 

operationalized on 21st February 2002 and the 

sequence of events that followed thereafter up to 

the 19th of May 2009; 


ii. whether any person, group, or institution directly 

or indirectly bear responsibility in this regard; 

iii. the lessons we would learn from those events 

and their attendant concerns, in order to ensure 

that there will be no recurrence; 

iv. the methodology whereby restitution to 

any person affected by those events or their 

dependents or to heirs, can be effected; 

v. the institutional administrative and legislative 

measures which need to be taken in order to 

prevent any recurrence of such concerns in 

the future, and to promote further national unity 

and reconciliation among all communities, and 

to make any such other recommendations with 

reference to any of the matters that have been 

inquired into under the terms of this Warrant 

AND I do hereby appoint you the said Chittaranjan 

de Silva Esq, President’s Counsel and retired 

Attorney General to be the Chairman of the said 

Commission; 

AND I do hereby authorize and empower you the 

said Commissioners, to hold all such inquiries and 

to make all such investigations into the aforesaid 

matters as may appear to you to be necessary, 

and require you to transmit to me within six months 

of the date hereof, a report thereon under your 

hand, setting of the finding of requires and your 

recommendations relating thereto; 

And I do hereby direct that such part of any inquiry 

relating to the aforesaid matters as you may in 

your discretion determine, shall not be held in 

public, 

And I do hereby require and direct all Public 

Officers and other persons to whom you may 

apply for such assistance or information for the 

purpose of your inquiries or investigations, to 

render all such assistance and furnish all such 

information as may be properly rendered and 

furnished in that behalf; 

And I do hereby declare that the provisions 

of Section 14 of the Commissions Inquiry Act 

(Chapter 393) shall apply to the Commission; 

GIVEN at Colombo, under the seal of the ten.

LLRC: The Mandate and 

Its Interpretation 

The mandate of the LLRC does not allow explicitly 

the investigation of violations of human rights and 

humanitarian law, nor does it has as its aim the 

bring to justice of those who have committed acts 

of human rights violations. . 

President Rajapaksa charged the LLRC with 

seeking “methodology whereby restitution to any 

person affected by those events [between the 

February 2002 ceasefire and the end of armed 

conflict on 19 May 2009] or their dependents or 

their heirs, can be affected”. Unfortunately the 

definition of what constitutes restitution has been 

left unelaborated. 

Thus the lack of a definition as to what constitutes 

restitution in the terms of LLRC has left the 

commission one with an undefined objective 

which has been handed to the Commissioners to 

be moulded for the better or the worse. Thus one 

can see the flexibility of the Commission as one 

which could be a negative feature which could 

be blocking the deliverance of a substantial result 

or on a positive note as leaving it open for the 

Commission to use in a flexible manner to befit 

the situations or the circumstances that need be 

addressed. 

An analysis of the LLRC’s proceedings renders it 

clear as to what the Commissioners deemed be 

the interpretation of the mandate. It is illustrated 

through the conduct of the Commission that they 

did not interpret the mandate to mean that they 

were to “seek justice for violations of international 


human rights and international humanitarian law. 

The Commissioners instead undertook a survey 

of public and official perceptions about the root 

causes of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka; the reasons 

for the breakdown of the 2002 ceasefire and 

persons responsible for that breakdown” (11) 

The Chairman of the LLRC in his inaugural 

session in Colombo states “..His Excellency the 

President has appointed a Commission entrusted 

with the task of primarily identifying the root 

causes that led to the failure of the Ceasefire 

Agreement entered into in 2002 and also identify 

the person or persons or groups esponsible for its 

breakdown. Secondly, to identify lessons learnt 

from our past experiences to ensure that such 

incidents will not occur again. Thirdly, and most 

importantly, to formulate proposals which would 

ensure national unity and reconciliation amongst 

all communities in Sri Lanka in order to usher 

in an era of peace and prosperity. . the people 

are the primary concern of our deliberations and 

inquiries. With that in view we have invited the 

public to make representations to the Commission 

regarding matters which are relevant to the 

Mandate granted to us in the Warrant. In addition 

the Commission has decided to hold sittings in 

areas that were affected by the war. This has 

been done with a view of providing access to the 

people in these areas to air their grievances and 

identify the problems that they encountered in the 

past and also that they encounter at present after 

the ending of the war. ” (12) 

Pricilla B. Hayner in her “International 

Guidelines for the Creation and Operation of 

Truth Commissions: A Preliminary Proposal” 

highlights the advantages of a “flexible but strong 

mandate for investigation”. She states that “Each 

commission’s mandate should be appropriate 

to the situation or conflict at hand, and flexible 


enough to allow interpretation by the members 

of the commission. It is far preferred that a 

commission’s mandate does not list specific 

events to be investigated, instead using more 

general language to allow the commission to 

shape its investigations and report around the 

facts and patterns revealed. Language calling for 

investigation into “serious acts of violence which 

have impacted on society” or “gross violations of 

human rights, including violations which were part 

of a systematic pattern of abuse,” have given past 

commissions the leeway to judge which crimes, 

or which patterns of abuse, demand investigation 

and public explanation.” 

Taking the above quote into consideration it could 

also be deemed that, despite criticism by certain 

entities as to the flexibility of the mandate it can 

be seen that the flexibility and the space left for 

interpretation does not necessarily amount to a 

draw back. Such characteristic of the mandate 

can be also seen as an added advantage which 

provides it with an adaptive quality to suit the 

circumstances that require to be addressed. 

The point relating to human rights violations was 

addressed by the Commissioners of the LLRC 

when former Defence Secretary Austin Fernando 

stated that sufficient priority has not been given 

to by the Human Rights by the LLRC Mandate. 

In addition Minister of External Affairs GL Peiris, 

in a statement added that the mandate of the 

LLRC encompasses issues of Human Rights 

issues as well. He said, “Human rights issues,…, 

falls with the mandate of Lessons Learnt and 

Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) and within Sri 

Lanka’s judiciary. (13) He further added that “The 

Sri Lankan legal system is capable of resolving 

issues that has evidence which would stand up to 

scrutiny at the court of law” (14)

Truth Commissions 

“Truth commissions — official, temporary bodies 

established to investigate a pattern of violations 

over a period of time that conclude with a final 

report and recommendations for reforms — have 

been created in more than thirty countries in the 

past twenty-five to thirty years”(15). They can be 

described as being created on an ad basis, and 

usually amidst a political transition “as a means 

to respond to the legacy of a horrific past. (16)” 

Such commissions are by intention destined to 

be short-lived, and does not reflect the function 

of a “courts nor a human rights ombudsman in 

their function and aims. By their very nature, truth 

commissions are quite pliable, and can be created 

in almost any shape or size, and to fit any number 

of agendas, depending on the circumstances and 

who holds the most influence over their design 

and operation.” (17) 

The establishing on the South African truth 

commission in 1995, the idea of a non- judicial 

inquiry to address the past widespread abuses 

has become popular among many governments. 

These truth commissions “ are set up for a short 

period of time — one to three years on average 

— and may employ hundreds of staff to collect 

individual statements, organize public hearings 

and undertake case investigations and thematic 

research. Some have been given subpoena 

powers or the right to gain access to official 

offices and official documents without warning. 

Others have had rely on the voluntary cooperation 

— not only of high-level officials but also of direct 

perpetrators, sometimes in return for promises of 

confidentiality. Truth commissions virtually always 

receive extensive, detailed information from 

victims, survivors and other witnesses, usually 

gathering many thousands of detailed statements. 

Some of these may also be presented in public 

hearings, thus allowing the public to engage in 

the process long before the final report is release” 

(18) 

It needs be noted that these commissions are 

deprived of the power to prosecute, but many 

have recommended that prosecutions take place. 


In truth commissions where they are proposed or 

created where an “international or hybrid tribunal 

is underway” there have been questions raised 

as to their functioning. Examples of such can 

be seen in Sierra Leone, where the public was 

initially at a loss to grasp the “distinction between 

(and independence of) the Sierra Leone Truth 

and Reconciliation Commission and the Special 

Court”. Similar problems were seen in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina, where “an early proposal for a 

truth commission was at first strongly resisted by 

the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 

Yugoslavia (ICTY), which feared that such a 

commission would complicate its work.” (19) 

Despite its popularity, as Priscilla B. Heyer points 

out, “the South African amnesty-for-truth model 

is very unusual and indeed inappropriate and 

unworkable in most contexts.” (20) As she points 

out “the offer of amnesty in exchange for full and 

public truth-telling is not likely to be taken up 

unless there is a serious threat of prosecution for 

those crimes.” 

What needs to be highlighted is the necessity 

for each new commission to be “rooted in 

the realities and possibilities of its particular 

environment. While the international community 

can play a major role in assisting these processes, 

any successful truth commission process must 

be a reflection of national will and a national 

commitment to fully understand and learn from the 

country’s difficult, sometimes very controversial 

and often quite painful history. A commission must 

aim to understand the origins of past conflict and 

the factors that allowed abuses to take place, 

and to do so in a manner that is both supportive 

of victims and inclusive of a wide range of 

perspectives.” 

Truth Commissions of the World 

From 1974 to 2007, at least 32 truth commissions 

were established in 28 countries. More than half of 

these commissions have been established in the 

past ten years. Other truth commissions are also 

being considered. 

• Argentina (National Commission on the 

Disappearance of Persons, 1983) 

• Bolivia (National Commission of Inquiry into 

Disappearances, 1982) 

• Chad (Commission of Inquiry on the Crimes 


and Misappropriations Committed by the 

ex-President Habré, his Accomplices and/or 

Accessories, 1991) 

• Chile (National Commission for Truth and 

Reconciliation, 1990; National Commission on 

Political Imprisonment and Torture, 2003), 

• Democratic Republic of Congo (Truth and 

Reconciliation Commission, 2003) 

• Ecuador (Truth and Justice Commission, 1996; 

Truth Commission, 2007) 

• El Salvador (Commission of Truth, 1992) 

• Germany (Commission of Inquiry for the 

Assessment of History and Consequences of 

the SED Dictatorship in Germany, 1992) 

• Ghana (National Reconciliation Commission, 

2002) 

• Grenada (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 

2001) 

• Guatemala (Commission for the Historical 

Clarification of Human Rights Violations and 

Acts of Violence which Caused Suffering to the 

Guatemalan People, 1997) 

• Haiti (National Commission for Truth and 

Justice, 1995) 

• Indonesia (Truth and Reconciliation 

Commission, 2004) 

• Liberia (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 

2005) 

• Morocco (Equity and Reconciliation 


• Nepal (Commission of Inquiry to Locate the 

Persons Disappeared during the Panchayat 

Period, 1990) 

• Nigeria (Human Rights Violations Investigation 


• Panama (Truth Commission, 2001) 

• Paraguay (Truth and Justice Commission, 2003) 

• Peru (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 

2000) 

• Sierra Leone (Truth and Reconciliation 


• South Africa (Truth and Reconciliation 


• South Korea (Presidential Truth Commission on 

Suspicious Deaths, 2000) 

• Sri Lanka (Presidential Commission of Inquiry 

into Involuntary Removal and Disappearances 

of Persons in Western, Southern and 

Sabaragamuwa Provinces, Presidential 

Commission of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal 

and Disappearances of Persons in the Central, 

North Western, North Central and Uva Provinces 

and Presidential Commission of Inquiry into

Involuntary Removal and Disappearances of 

Persons in the Northern & Eastern Provinces, 

1994) 

• Timor-Leste (Commission for Reception, Truth 

and Reconciliation, 2002) 

• Uganda (Commission of Inquiry into the 

Disappearance of people in Uganda, 1974 and 

Commission of inquiry into Violations of Human 

Rights, 1986) 

• Uruguay (Investigative Commission on the 

Situation of Disappeared People and its Causes, 

1985 and Peace Commission, 2000) 

• Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of (Truth and 

Reconciliation Commission, 2001) 

A point many critics of the LLRC note is the 

failure of many commissions of inquiries of 

the recent past in Sri Lanka. Despite the high 

number, it has been repeatedly being highlighted 

that they have not yielded the expected results. 

In addition to the critics of the LLRC the panel 

of Experts appointed by the UNSC also have 

indicated that the results of the LLRC would be 

guided in the same direction of its predecessors. 

The general perception of the Commission being 

doubted as to its success, given the track record 

of the former of its kind not addressing the issues 

as expected. 

“Indeed, there is a troublingly consistent 

experience with previous commissions of inquiry 

created in response to calls for accountability 

for serious and systematic abuses of human 

rights. Spanning three decades and beginning 

with the 1977 Sansoni Commission, these 

commissions have almost invariably been beset 

by a combination of flaws that have profoundly 

hampered their work. Despite severe limitations, 

however, certain commissions have produced 

a measure of fact-finding and made important 

recommendations for accountability. On the 

information before the Panel, in no instance 

over the full span of 33 years since the initial 

mechanism in 1977 has the follow-up from a 

commission’s findings and recommendations 

resulted in more than marginal accountability, at 

either individual or systemic levels. The striking 

lesson that can be derived from these previous 

processes is the lack of political will displayed by 

successive Governments to address the issue 

of accountability in a manner consistent with 

international standards. This past experience is 

relevant for assessing the extent to which the 

LLRC can potentially contribute to genuine (21) 

accountability.” 


The Process 

The LLRC which began its hearings in Colombo 

in August 2010 was initially granted a mandate of 

six months which was later extended. Colombo 

sessions featured government officials, military 

officers, politicians, clergy and other prominent 

citizens. These submission makers were 

requested to provide information on what went 

wrong with the 2002 ceasefire and how best to 

proceed with reconciliation. 

The overall number of submission makers 

in Colombo amounts to 140 people made 

representations to the commission in 

Colombo. (22) Many or most were known 

supporters of the current government and 

its policies; a handful could be considered 

critics. The vast majority of people testifying 

in Colombo were from the Sinhalese majority 

community; about 30 were Tamil and only 

five were Muslim. The LLRC also conducted 

hearings in the north and the east of Sri 

Lanka where thousands of individuals who 

were directly affected by the conflict testified. 

Apart from this the LLRC also visited 

Vavuniya, Kilnochchi, Mulativu, Batticaloa, 

Jaffna, Trincomalee, Puttalam, Mannar, 


Weli Oya, Galle, Matara, Boossa, Kandy, 

Monaragala, Anuradhapura and Ampara. 

While many came before the commission 

voluntarily to make their statements, when 

required the Commission requested some 

individuals to appeared before it, such as the 

Vanni doctors who made their submissions in 

the Colombo hearings. In addition to this several 

Human Rights Groups such as International 

Crisis Group, Amnesty International and Human 

Rights Watch turned down invitations by the 

LLRC. The LLRC’s timeframe has been extended 

twice. In mid-May 2011, when the commission 

was due to submit its final report to the President, 

Sri Lankan media reports indicated that the 

LLRC would seek a six month extension and that 

President Rajapaksa was prepared to 

grant it. The Commissioners are now scheduled 

to deliver a final report to the President by 

November 2011, buying Sri Lanka more time to 

negotiate away calls for an international 

investigation into alleged war crimes committed by 

both sides during the last phase of Sri 

Lanka’s armed conflict in 2009. (23)


LLRC and Public Opinion 

Access 

The access to the LLRC sessions was open to 

the general public who were allowed to come 

and attend the sessions unless they were closed 

session or were decided to be done on camera 

at the request of the submission maker or the 

Commission. The submission makers were 

requested to make the submissions by the 

Commission or they had made their interest to 

make submission at the Commission known for 

the session to be held in Colombo. 

However, with regards to the sessions that were 

outstation sessions, the LLRC Commissioners 

worked closely with District Secretaries who 

employed the Grama Niladaris to disseminate 

the information to the residents of the areas as 

to when and where the LLRC sessions would be 

held. This information also included the type of 

submissions that were accepted by the LLRC. The 

process could be described as having functioned 

without any hindrance except in those areas where 

the be the presence of the paramilitary groups. 

An illustration of such a situation where the 

presence of the paramilitary groups had an impact 

on the access to the LLRC sessions cab ne seen 

during the sessions in Keytes Island, Jaffna, 

where many who testified at St Mary’s church 

stated that they came to know of the through 

media and that their respective Grama Niladaris 


had not informed them of the holding of sessions 

of the LLRC. They further alleged that the EPDP 

was involved in an effort to change the mindset of 

the people into not attending the Commission. As 

a result of these events the Grama Niladaris were 

instructed not to inform the dates and the venues 

of the LLRC sessions during the days leading to 

the sessions on 14th of November. 

The intimidation of those who were interested 

in being part of the Commission sessions was 

not restricted to merely outside the Commission 

hearings. Even during the sessions, the presence 

of the members of the EPDP were felt as they 

were taking photos of those who came forward to 

give evidence. A situation was created, when a 

photojournalist of the Yaal Thinakura took a photo 

of those individuals who were intimidating the 

public, a man who appeared to be the leader of the 

intimidators threatened the journalist with death. 

The situation was solved only on the intervention 

of journalists from Colombo, representatives of the 

several embassies and the LLRC commissioners 

which lead the Police to take action regarding the 

incident. However the person who was thus taken 

into custody was immediately released upon being 

warned by the police. 

During the sessions in Mankumban Pillayar 

Kovil, Velani, Kaytes about 20 newly appointed 

Grama Sewa Niladaris, who many residents 

claimed were members of the EPDP, were 

The police question the individual (highlighted in red) who threatened a Yaal Thinakural journalist during the LLRC session in 

Keytes. Highlighted in yellow is a high ranking LLRC official who facilitated the Police intervention.

present at the session. Their presence functioned 

as a deterrence for those who were making 

submissions as they were intimidated by their 

presence to make statements which would 

threaten their safety. However this situation could 

have been resolved had the Commissioners 

had taken action to hold the sessions as closed 

sessions, where the testimonies were facilitated to 

be on camera. This incident damaged the LLRC’s 

credibility in the eyes of the public. 

When CHR and its sister organization Campaign 

for Free and Fair Elections (CaFFE) issued a 

press statement regarding the incident requesting 

the LLRC to assure the safety of those who arrive 

to give evidence, LLRC Secretary SB Atugoda 

denied the incident. However by that time CHR 

had circulated images of the incident leading the 

LLRC to change its stance and to introduse incamera 

sessions. 

Nevertheless it should be noted that the 

LLRC commissioners have been receptive to 

constructive criticism regarding the practical 

implementation and increased security in the 

proceeding sessions in areas where paramilitary 

groups are active. Their actions have facilitated 

many, despite the intimidation present, and the 

threat to attend the sessions and make their 

statements be heard. The public has equally 

been availed the possibility to get informed on the 

happenings of the LLRC through the attendance 

at sessions as they were open to the public. Thus 

while the open sessions facilitated those who want 

to create intimidation to be present at the sessions, 

it also rendered those who were interested in 

gaining information on the development of the 

LLRC to be granted their right to information and 

access. 

Media 

Media plays a key role in the forming of public 

opinion though effective conveying of information 

on the difficulties faced by those who were 

affected by the conflict, their immediate needs 

and what they perceive as reconciliation. This 

contributes further in a crucial manner to the 

reconciliation process of the post war era. Media 

coverage of the LLRC varied. While Colombo 

sessions where political, religious and military 

leaders, made their statements, the coverage was 

done by almost all main stream media institutions. 

They were also covered by several NGOs and 

representatives of foreign missions. However 

the attention that was allocated to the outstation 

sessions can be deemed as being minimum. The 

presence of mainstream media was minimum. 

And even the press was represented through at 

most times only by Weerakesari and Thinakural., 

Lakbima and LAKBIMAnEWS. There were no 

journalists from any other Sinhala or English 

newspapers. However even the above mentioned 

newspapers were not represented at the sessions 

that were held in Ampara and Siyambalanduwa. 

Overall the coverage given by Sinhala papers 

were minimum which was unfortunate since 

prominent coverage and commentary would 

have helped the Sinhala reader of the South to 

better understand the Tamil speakers of the North 

which would have entailed them to grasp the 

life of the Northerners highlighting of their many 

similarities. CHR believes that the mainstream 

media institutions did not give LLRC outstation 

sessions the coverage it deserved and even 

among Tamil newspapers that the presence of 

analytical articles was scarce. Some international 

Human Righst organizations analyzed the LLRC 

with official transcripts of the commission. These 

analysis based on mere words cut off from context 

has presented the LLRC in black and white without 

seeing the grey. 

Furthermore, the media coverage of the LRRC 

can be considered as having been selective, 

limited and at times politically biased, as 

mentioned above, apart from CHR no other civil 

society organization covered all the outstation 

sessions. Therefore we believe that it is not 

practical, fair or realistic to write or analyze the 

LLRC process/proceedings based on the limited 

media reports. However the little reporting and 

analysis we have seen from civil society groups 

show that their analysis was based on such media 

reports and without being firsthand witnesses to 

the ground realties of the outstation submissions 

and the subtle nuances that could only be 

observed through first hand observation. 

The conduct of the media institutions can be 

deemed as an illustration where they failed the 

country with their lack of contribution to inform the 

public of the LLRC sessions which would have 

been a great factor in shaping the mind set of 

people and leading to reconciliation among the 

peoples. 


20 THE WAIT FOR JUSTICE

LLRC and Grievances 

During the LLRC sessions the commissioners 

encountered thousands of people who were 

affected by the war and who continue to suffer 

post war. Through the submissions made by 

such people during the out station hearings 

of the LLRC and other input made by those 

who presented in Colombo, the Commission 

has produced in late 2010 an interim report 

where the Commission recommends solutions 

to detention, law and order, land issues, socio 

economic/livelihood Issues. 

In addition an Inter-Agency Advisory Committee 

was appointed by the president to implement the 

recommendations of the interim Lessons Learnt 

and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) report 

in October 2010. The aim of this Committee 

was to ensure that the confidence on the 

LLRC was maintained and to fast track the 

recommendations being made. The committee 

comprises of the Attorney General, Chairman, 

Secretary of Defence, Secretary of Public 

Administration and Home Affairs, Secretary to 

Ministry of Justice, Secretary to the Ministry of 

Economic Affairs, Secretary to the Presidential 

Task Force for Resettlement, Development and 

Security in the Northern Province, Secretary for 

Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms and Secretary 

for External Affairs CHR in its identification of 

the grievances has made the categorization 

of these as below. (this pertains principally to 

the grievances addressed during the outstation 

sessions of the LLRC) 

1 Detention 

2 Disappearances 

3 Land Issues 

4 Financial assistance 

5 Resettlement 

Detention 

From the first outstation session it was apparent 

that detention was the primary concern of people 

from affected areas. Thousands of parents, 

simblings, wives appeared before the LLRC 

and implored the commissioners to look 

into the matter concerning detention of their 

loved ones. They claimed that they have been 

travelling from one centre to another in search 

of those who were in detention, or presumed 

to be in detention centers in order to determine 

whether their loved ones were dead or whether 

they were still alive. 

Commissioners have always stated that they 

believe that a list of detainees should be made 

public and recommended the government to do 

so in their interim report last year. 

“There are persistent complaints pertaining to 

persons being held in detention for long periods 

without charges. In this regard the Commission 

recommends that – 

a) A special mechanism be created to examine 

such cases on a case by case basis and 

recommend a course of action in regard to 

disposal of each case, as appropriate. Further, 

to support this process the establishment of a 

focal point in the Attorney Generals Department 

is also recommended. 

b) A major concern raised before the 

Commission was the fact that many people did 

not know the whereabouts of family members 

in detention as they were constantly being 

shifted from camp to camp. 

Accordingly, the Commission recommends an 

independent unit being established e.g. in the 

Ministry of Justice, to address the following 

issues — 

1. Publishing a list of names of those in 

detention. 

2. When a person is discharged a certificate be 

issued so that the same person is not taken 

into custody again, unless new evidence is 

discovered against him for being linked with the 

LTTE. 

3. To look into the general issue of laws 

delays (to expedite prosecution or discharge 

detainees)” –LLRC Interim Report 

However the comprehensive list that has been 

recommended through the interim report still 

remains lacking and not released by the Ministry 

of Defence. 

In addition IAAC in their (24) “Progress 

report on the implementation of the interim 

recommendations of LLRC” states that regarding 

matters pertaining to detention “a four-member 

special committee, chaired by a Deputy Solicitor- 


General was appointed from the Attorney 

General’s Department of study the cases 

of LTTE suspects in detention and expedite 

legal action where necessary. The objective 

of the Committee is to expedite releases for 

rehabilitation, or expedite investigations where 

adequate evidence of hardcore involvement in 

the LTTE is available.” 

In addition Prof Rajiva Wijesinha, MP Advisor on 

Reconciliation to His Excellency the President 

making a presentation at the Association Of 

Sri Lankan Lawyers in The UK, at “Discussion 

on Challenges to reconciliation, the Sri Lankan 

experience”, on October 11th 2011 states 

that a large number of those detained due 

to involvement in LTTE activities have been 

released. “11,000 youngsters who confessed 

to involvement with the LTTE were recent 

conscripts, not the battle hardened monsters 

now in rehabilitation programmes in other 

theatres of war. About 9,000 have now been 

released, with those left being under court 

orders, though in many cases this was only for 

six months or a year of rehabilitation, which 

means they too will be at home by the end of the 

year. Again, contrary to early expectations that 

about 1,000 might be charged, it now seems 

that far fewer are under suspicion of grave acts 

of terrorism.” (25) Detention was also a main 

issue discussed during the governments talks 

with the Tamil National Alliance and in early 2011 

the government promised to prepare a list of 

detainees and display it at the office for Terrorist 

Investigation Division (TID) in Vavuniya. But this 

promise made by the government has not been 

kept as illustrated to the media by the MP of 

TNA, Suresh Premachandran. 

“The two teams met for discussions in January 

and we discussed resettlement, High Security 

Zones and the plight of the detainees. We urged 

the government to release a list of names of 

the detainees in the camps. At that time, nearly 

11000 people were in camps, and even now over 

6000 are still in camps.” 

Responding to the TNA’s request the 

government delegation told the TNA during 

their meeting in February that the Terrorist 

Investigation Department (TID) has compiled a 

list of names of the detainees. This was claimed 

to be capable of being used by the relatives 


and family members of those who have been 

detained to search the data available on those 

detained. It was added that this facility would 

be available at the TID office in Vavuniya. 

“We asked them whether we could inform our 

constituencies and they said we could. We 

then did so, through the media and through our 

grassroots activists. However, when people went 

to the TID office in Vavuniya they were told that 

there was no such list” 

Premachandran added that they wrote back to 

the government seeking a clarification about the 

issue but so far no response has been received 

from the government. He added that this maybe 

one of the reasons why the government might 

have postponed the scheduled meeting on 

March 1.” (26) 

Disappearances 

These include the disappearances which 

took place during and after the war. In some 

occasions these incidents have taken place in 

the mid 1980s, the government authorities have 

not yet provided death certificates for these 

individuals. Meanwhile there have been many 

allegations that armed paramilitary groups, such 

as Karuna Group and EPDP, have been carrying 

out extortion of money from the relatives of the 

disappeared promising information about them. 

(27) 

During the outstation sessions many widows of 

several LTTE leaders, like Bilan and Yogi, stated 

that their husbands surrendered to the army 

alive. (28) 

Witness 06: I have six siblings.The elder sister is 

married with 05 children.On the 2nd June 1991 

Brother-in-law (sister’s husband) was abducted 

by unidentified people, from his residence in 

Palaivitu. 

Chairman: 

Q. When he was abducted who were there? 

A. Myself, my sister and all their children were 

there. 

Q. By whom he was abducted? 

A. We don’t know. They were in sarongs and 

shirts. They took him in a vehicle. 

Q. Whom are you suspecting?

A. It was dark in the night. We couldn’t identify. 

My second brother was arrested on suspicion 

of involvement with LTTE. He was kept in 

custody for 08 months and released. Since 

he couldn’t live in Sri Lanka, he left for India, 

where he lived for some time and died. 3rd 

brother was arrested by the Sri Lankan Army 

and detained in Boossa Camp from 1986 to 

1988. He used to be tortured by the Army and 

as a result he was developed by an illness 

and later he couldn’t bear up the illness and 

he committed suicide. Then myself. The next 

is my younger brother. He was a Singer, who 

appeared on the TV. He was a performing a 

music group. He is married with 02 children. He 

didn’t take arms and fight in the LTTE. He didn’t 

hurt a person by even a word. He was also a 

Singer. 

Q. Where is he? 

A. He went abroad and came for a 01 month 

holiday. In Karuna’s office, there was one 

Nathan, who was in-charge of the office. 

My brother went to meet him on the friendship 

they had. They had connection for 10 years. 

Everybody knows one Ragu, who contested for 

elections. 

Q. Where is your brother? A. He was 

abducted. He contested for the election, as 

an independent candidate through them. Q. 

Through whom? 

A. Pillayan faction contested the election. He was 

made as an independent candidate to contest 

the election. He used to get anonymous and 

warning calls. On 06th May 2008, I received 

a call at night, saying “tell your brother to stop 

visiting Karuna’s office. Otherwise you and your 

brother will be shot dead in front of your house. 

Q. What is your brother’s name? 

A. X1 Chairman: 

Q. Whom you suspect? 

A. I don’t know, it was for the land phone. It was 

strange voice. 

Q. A person representing what fraction did you 

suspect? 

A. I don’t know. I cannot say that. 

Mrs. Ramanathan: Q. Who arrested your 

brother? 

A. Sri Lanka Navy. On the 18th of May 2008, 

while we were returning from the temple, some 

people came in a Tata cab and a discovery 

motor bike. There were 08 people in the cab 

and 02 in motor bike. The person called Sinna 

search for my brother in our house. My brother 

had gone to the shop at that time. They made 

my husband and sister’s son and brother to 

stand, showing the gun. They forced me to 

bring my brother from inside house. I gave a 

telephone call to my brother at that time ‘they 

have come in search of you, don’t come to the 

house’. The reply given by him was that “I 

have not done any offence and I must come 

and ask why”. After that my brother came, 

he brought some packets of short-eats for 

children. Then they gave the telephone and 

inquired for the names of another 2 people. 

But when my brother spoke to those people 

they understood it and they did not come. 

My brother who was there identified those 2 

people as ‘Sinna’ and ‘Kumara’ and they are 

from the Navy Investigation Unit. 

Q. What brother – who is no more? 

A. Yes. He is no more. When I asked him 

‘why they are going to take him’ - they told ‘no 

problem, nothing of that nature, we are just 

taking him and we will bring him back and not 

to go and inform anybody, we will bring him 

back to the house’. 

Q. Chairman: Your brother was against the LTTE, 

as he was supporting Karuna? 

A. Not that he was a supporter. But actually 

he went to meet his friend there. When he 

went to meet his friend, they told him they 

have just putting him do some assignments in 

the election polling booth. But he was put as a 

candidate. 

Q. So he contested? 

A. Yes he contested. 

Q. He was supporting Karuna and Karuna was 

against LTTE? 

A. Yes. They have taken my brother by Tata cab, 

but my brother said I will be back. don’t go in 

search of me. 

Q. Since he was contested from Karuna faction, 

everybody knew that he had no connection 

with LTTE? 

A. Yes. So, I immediately telephoned Karuna’s 


office. 

Q. There was no reason for anybody to abduct a 

person who is not supporting the LTTE? 

A. When I went to meet Ragu at Karuna’s office, 

and spoke to him he said that they have no 

confidence with anybody and he said that they 

already knew that the Navy was going to take 

him, they will definitely inquire him. Navy will 

inquire from anybody, whom they suspect to 

have supported LTTE earlier. 

Q. By that time, he was an anti-LTTE, when he 

was contested as an Independent, on Karuna’s 

group? 

A. He was not willingly taken - without his 

willingness, permission or approval; he was put 

as a candidate. He did not know about it. Only 

after when they want to provide security for 

him, he came know that this is being done. 

Q. But he is nominated as a candidate. Did he 

campaign for himself? 

A. He did not go out; We did not allow him to go 

to the field. 

Q. How many votes he gets? 

A. I don’t know – no body voted him, if there are 

any votes, it may be only his vote, we did not 

allow him to go to the field. We kept him inside. 

We don’t want LTTE or Karuna. 

Q. What is the Navy camp close to his house? 

A. At that time no Navy camp there, and the 

Navy was at the Dockyard. Only after 15th May 

2008, the Navy camp was established. 

Q. Can you identify the people – if you see them 

again - who came and abducted the brother? 

A. Yes I can. All members of my family can 

identify the people. You can give protection 

and rehabilitation to the LTTEiers. There 

are so many check points near the Navy and 

you have to go through all the check points. 

At that time LTTE people were threatening us. 

We have to give one member of each family. If 

we are not participate at the Pongu Thamil, we 

were punished and we were penalized. That 

kind of scenario we have to experienced. 

At that time, there were so many check points 

you have to pass, but my brother was taken. 


Chairman: Ask her give the particulars, 

including the names of 02 people supposed to 

have abducted her brother. 

It needs be highlighted that the absence of a 

death certificate causes a lot of complications 

to those who are related to the one who 

has disappeared. This is due to the fact that 

without a death certificates the dependants are 

unable to obtain the aid/pensions given by the 

government, neither can the husband or wife 

marry another individual until seven years of the 

disappearances. 

LLRC Interim Report recommends the 

government regarding the disappearances as 

below. 

“3. Law and Order It was brought to the 

attention of the commission that despite the 

end of the conflict significant issues of law and 

order still remain. There is apprehension in the 

minds of the people due to continuing acts of 

extortion, abduction and other criminal acts by 

armed groups. The commission recommends 

that specific measures be introduced to ensure 

the maintenance of law and order in these areas, 

particularly the disarming of armed groups. The 

commission regards this as a matter of highest 

priority.” Meanwhile reporting on the progress 

made on the report IAAC states that most of 

those who have been reported as disappeared 

had last been seen with the LTTE forces and can 

be assumed that most of them would have been 

killed in battle. 

“With regard to the evidence gathered by the 

LLRC on missing persons, it was revealed that 

many of the people alleged to be missing were 

last seen with the LTTE forces. Hence, it can 

be assumed that such people may have been 

killed in the battle, either as a consequence of 

their acting as LTTE combatants, or due their 

being fired upon by the LTTE when endeavoring 

to seek refuge with the Security Forces. The 

Government is also conducting investigation 

and in cases here the dossier of investigation 

discloses a prime facie case of culpability, 

institution of proceedings will follow in ordinary 

course.” However “the Sri Lanka Institute of

Information Technology (SLIIT) is managing 

a data base of the Rehabilitation of Persons, 

Properties and industries Authority (REPPIA) and 

this information will be transferred to the National 

Human Rights Commission” 

In addition the IAAC states that the government 

has taken immediate steps to disarm the armed 

groups operating in the East. “(iv) Law 

and order issues With regard to disarming of 

persons carrying illegal arms, the GoSL has 

taken immediate steps by giving a deadline for 

the surrendering of illegal weapons, as was 

successfully done in the Eastern Province, 

following the clearing of the LTTE from that 

area. The GoSL observes that with the return 

to normalcy following a long-drawn conflict, 

criminal activities such as robberies, killings 

and extortions are likely to recur. These would 

be dealt with by utilizing the criminal law and 

process of the country. Police have been given 

strict instructions in this regard.” 

Although the IAAC states that the surrendering 

of illegal weapons in the Eastern Province 

has been successfully done media reports 

illustrate that the process has been a complete 

failure. Reporting on the latest effort to disarm 

the Eastern armed groups LAKBIMAnEWS 

reported that (29) “the army’s efforts to disarm 

armed groups in the East has come a total 

cropper, claim army sources. So far, the army 

has collected only three weapons which had 

belonged to certain groups in the East. 

The eastern commander promised to disarm 

armed groups in the east after the robbery 

that took place at the Batticaloa branch of the 

Peoples’ Bank. However almost three weeks 

later, only three weapons have been found,” our 

source claimed. 

Meanwhile, speaking to LAKBIMAnEWS, the 

commander of the Sri Lanka Army Eastern 

Command Major General Boniface Perera said 

that the disarmament drive has been a ‘success’ 

although he could not give specific details of 

the number of weapons that were recovered. “It 

has been a great success. We have uncovered 

several weapons and arrested key members of 

certain armed groups,” he said.” 

In addition several journalists, student leaders 

and opposition political party supporters have 

been assaulted by ‘unidentified’ groups since 

the LLRC interim report urged the government 

to establish law and order in the area. On July, 

29, 2011 the News Editor of Jaffna daily Uthayan 

was assaulted less than 50 metros away from an 

army sentry point. (30) TNA’s opening election 

rally for the July, 23, 2011 local government 

election was attacked by a large group which the 

TNA allege as army personnel. (31) 


Land issues 

A large number of people in the East, and to a 

lesser degree in the North, claim to have lost 

their property rights during the war. During the 

session in Trincomalee, this issue has been 

highlighted more due to the loss of land of 

thousands for Sampur HSZ and reservation of 

many coastal property for tourism projects. (32) 

During the session in Mutur a large number of 

people, including the convener of the Peoples 

Forum, Mutur, December, 04, 2011, 

A. Thoufeek complained that people are 

prevented from going back to their lands by 

government authorities who have reserved large 

areas of lands for religious premises and hotel 

projects. 

Representation of witness 19 

Interpreter 

The Commission is requesting that you give it in 

writing in the form of a memorandum. 

Okay. One more matter. The 64th mile post 

has been declared – that is called 3rd mile post 

(malai is a rock area) – that has been declared 

as a sacred area. A particular land area in that 

3rd mile post, what you call the 64th mile post, 

has been declared as a sacred area and the 

declared area has been fenced. 

Interpreter 

He said it has been declared as a sacred area. 

(correction made: It has been declared as an 

archeological site). 

Maybe correct. What I want to tell you here is 

in future it is going to seriously affect the normal 

life of the civilian people in the north area. 

(Removing of granite stones (quarry) is taken 

from that particular hill. They take the granite 

stones from that rock for construction purposes). 

And this is going to affect the future (house) 

settlement – settling people in those areas. 

And there are thousands of families who are 

dependent on that granite industry there. 

And this is going to seriously affect the ordinary 

people. There is another area called Uppural 

Thottam. That area is called Thottam. (When 


you say Thottam a block of land for farming is 

also Thottam. So I asked him to clarify that. He 

said Thottam is the name of the particular area). 

That area is going to be declared for future 

tourist development and that is going to affect 

the normal settlement of the people. We are 

not objecting to development. What I am going 

to tell you is we are the most affected people, 

we are affected. We are ordinary people and 

we are the most affected. So please don’t 

subject us to further sufferings. We are always 

supportive of development. 

The submission maker declared that the 

government is allocating land for tourism 

projects, without any regard for the sentiments 

and livelihood of the local residents. He added 

that this is a clear indication that people of the 

area are not so keen to embrace the vision of 

development advocated by the government. (33) 

The state of emergency has been lifted from 

the end of August, 2011 which in theory should 

mean that there should be no HSZs. Although 

the Army has stated that it will move out of the 

HSZ in the North, it has not made any mention 

of the Sampur HSZ. LLRC in its interim report 

recommended the government to give an 

assurance that private land would not be taken 

for ‘settlements’ by any government agency. 

Recently the government has further decided to 

introduce a program titled Bim Saviya to register 

land in the North and East. However Tamil 

National Alliance has objected to this stating that 

this is an attempt to rob the Tamils living outside 

the country and in displacement. 

Speaking at Parliament on September, 

23, 2011 TNA MP A Vinayagamoorhi said 

that “The Secretary, Ministry of Lands and 

Land Development has made announcement 

requesting people in the Northern Province to 

apply for a new Deed. According to the News 

Item appearing in the “Island” newspaper of 

09th September, 2011, Ministry of Lands and 

Land Development will verify the authentication 

of each application and that the respective land 

will be surveyed before a new Deed is issued 

to the rightful owner. The Law applicable to 

registration of ownership in Sri Lanka is the 

Registration of Documents Ordinance except in 

areas in which Registration of Title Act has been 

brought into operation. The Grama Sevakas in 

the Nallur area have started distributing forms

and collecting information. The indication at the 

bottom of the form is that authentication of Title 

will be ultimately decided on observation and 

certification from the Grama Niladharis which 

arrangement is unsatisfactory. 

He requested the Parliament to direct the 

Secretary, Ministry of Lands and Land 

Development to cancel the announced system of 

registering lands as there are thousands without 

deeds. In addition some owners of the property in 

Jaffna live outside Jaffna and in foreign countries. 

“What is the arrangement that the Secretary to 

the Ministry of Lands and Land Development has 

made for these types of persons to apply and get 

a new deed? This can be made applicable only 

to those people who are living and having deeds 

in the Northern Province. There is another type of 

people in Jaffna who own lands but they do not 

have deeds. When a person dies intestate, his 

properties devolve around his children. They need 

not have deeds unless, of course, they make a 

deed of declaration.” (34) 

In their Interim Report the LLRC stated that “In 

order to address certain apprehensions among the 

people in the affected districts on land issues, the 

commission recommends that a clear statement 

of policy be issued by the government that private 

lands would not be utilized for settlements by any 

government agency.” 

Commenting on the progress made the IAAC 

states that the solutions to some of these issues 

cannot be addressed by existing legal remedies 

as most of the documents have been destroyed by 

the war. However it states that the government is 

pondering whether to implement a land kachcheri 

system to address the land issues. 

The final decision on the matter, however, will be 

taken after the LLRC’s final report which means 

that if the process will be implemented, it will be 

towards the middle of 2012. 

“As highlighted in the LLRC process, the 

Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) recognizes 

the complexity of land related grievances and 

its impact on the lives of civilians as arising from 

the protracted conflict. Some of these issues 

need solution which cannot be offered through 

existing legal remedies due to the devastation of 

administrative infrastructure and private and public 

documentation as a result of 3 decades of conflict. 

In view of the hardship and pain of mind caused 

to civilians from land related issues. GoSL will 

expedite necessary administrative measures. A 

land Kachcheri system is being considered by the 

GoSL, while awaiting the final recommendation 

of the LLC on this complex issue. Demining has 

been accelerated so that more land can be made 

available for resettlement. Complex issues arise 

in regard to lands that were expropriated by the 

LTTE for allocation thereafter outside the law of the 

land. Steps are afoot to allot lands to the original 

owners, who have thus had to face expropriation. 

Land Kachcheris-a mechanism of state land 

allocation where the Government Agent of the 

District after due and fair inquiry plays a central 

role in assigning ownership and tenurial rights, 

will soon be held with ever greater regularity. It is 

a constitutionally recognized fundamental right of 

every citizen to choose his residence anywhere 

within Sri Lanka and the GoSL categorically states 

that there is no policy of forced settlement by the 

GoSL. Furthermore, it is categorically stated that 

any citizen of Sri Lanka is free to purchase land or 

own land anywhere in the country. “ 

On the other hand with the repealing of the 

Emergency Regulations by the government from 

August 30 the security forces claimed that they 

will withdraw from some locations. However 

with government planning to implement a new 

set of regulations based on the US’s Homeland 

Security Act it is not very clear what the future 

holds for those whose lands have been taken 

over by the security forces. (35) 

However the IAAC reiterates the government’s 

official line in their progress report. “There is 

no policy of expansion of High Security Zones 

(HSZ), as alleged by some. On the contrary, the 

policy is to shrink such Zones, as rapidly and as 

significantly as possible. The GoSL expects that 

with the implementation of the two projects in 

the North to develop 100,000 housing units, the 

housing issue could be greatly eased. The GoSL 

will encourage the process where, except when 

essential for security reasons. High Security 

Zone (HSZ) lands are being progressively 

released. This has already commenced in 

the areas surrounding the Palaly HSZ. The 

GoSL notes the progress already underway as 

initiated by the Special Committee under the 

Chairmanship of the High Court Judge Jaffna. 


Action has been taken to return 256 houses 

in the Palay area to the civilians. A further 

2392 houses have been identified for civilians 

occupation in more than 2500 hectares of land 

that were set aside for HSZs. Demining being 

accelerated for this purpose.” 

Financial Assistance 

During the outstation sessions it was revealed 

that the overwhelming majority of these affected 

by the war live in abject poverty and that 

they have not benefited from government’s 

development drives including Uthuru 

Wasanthaya or Negenahira Navodaya. (36) 

Chairman: 

Some Projects Director on behalf of the GA 

Trincomalee has written to your predecessor 

saying that a payment of Rs.60,000/- that has 

been recommended and also there has been 

some monies allocated to compensate people 

who are in the Mutur area who have suffered 

damage. And he is calling for a report in respect 

of these 02 people 

DS: We have already forwarded the report and 

the applications also sir. Recently the Minister of 

Rehabilitation he came to this office. 

Chairman. No, this is in 2006. They have 

been allocated Rs.60,000/- , but no payment has 

been made. 

DS That is not only for these people. There 

are a lot of applications. 

DS Sorry Sir, I was not here in 2007. 

Chairman. I know, we are not blaming you. 

But this is the ... 

DS We have already informed the Minister 

also Sir. Minister and Secretary they came here. 

We informed them that we need a lot of money. 

There are a lot of applications and we already sent 

them. So once the allocation received, we will pay 

sir. 

Chairman 

Explained in Sinhala re: money from India. 

Sir, till the money is received from India if they 


can give me this Rs.60,000 I can engage in some 

business. 

Chairman. * He seems to be poor. No because 

you see there has not been a ... Really he is 

complaining, Trincomalee GA is complaining that 

you all have not responded to his letter. Can you 

just look into this matter? 

The majority of the submissions to the LLRC, 

around 90%, were made by women. Most of 

them told the LLRC that they have lost the 

bread winners of their families and that they are 

going through extreme economic hardships. For 

CHR economic rights are important civil and 

political rights therefore we have requested the 

commission to look into their livelihood issues 

and include suitable recommendations in their 

final report which is to be presented to President 

Rajapaksa by Mid November, 2011. LLRC 

recommended that “5. Socio economic/livelihood 

Issues a) Encourage free movement along the A9 

o ensure greater participation on the economic, 

social and cultural activity b) Greater coordination 

and communication should be maintained 

between the GAs and security authorities in 

normalizing civilian administration” 

The IAAC states that the infrastructure in the 

affected areas has greatly been increased with the 

opening of the A9 road and that many restrictions 

imposed on livelihoods, mainly fishing has been 

lifted following the LLRC recommendations. 

However the A9 road was open to public transport 

almost one year before the LLRC interim report 

and security had been greatly reduced by the time 

the interim report was released. (37) 

“The principal achievement in regard to 

infrastructure is the opening of the A9 road which 

has greatly improved and increased the freedom 

of movement to the North. The resettlement of the 

IDP’s along with the building of the Sangupiddy 

Bridge and the removal of restrictions on fishing 

has transformed the lives of people with activities, 

such as fisheries and agriculture, having resumed 

in full earnest.” 

In addition it states that “Normalization of civilian 

administration has been achieved in the East to 

such an extent that elections to local government 

and provincial councils were conducted. In the 

North, both the Presidential and Parliamentary

elections were held in 2010 in a free and fair 

manner, without after several decades, the 

menace of terrorism. 

The island wide local government elections 

scheduled to be held in March will see the 

participation of people in the North and the East 

exercising their franchise without let or hindrance.” 

However the 2008 Eastern Provincial council 

election was violent and was universally criticized 

by independent observers. The recently held 

Northern Local Government Elections on July 

23rd, 2011 was marred by intimidation, violence 

and misuse of state property. 

“Private sector participation and 

entrepreneurial activities in the North are on 

the increase and with well known industrialists 

establishing their business and investments, 

livelihood and employment opportunities 

have been afforded to the people. Efforts 

have been made to encourage economic 

activity and foreign investment and necessary 

infrastructure is being put in place to that 

end. Mention must be made in this regard to 

the Jaffna International Trade Fair conducted 

in January 2011 under the aegis of the 

Federation of Chambers of Commerce and 

Industry and the Chambers of Commerce 

and Industry of Yarlpanam, along with India 

as a ‘partner country’. Wide consultations 

have been held with those members of the 

Tamil diaspora who have evinced interest 

in participating in the development of the 

North and the East. In May 2010 there was 

a substantial scaling down of Emergency 

Regulations and the IAAC is looking at the 

possibility of a further repeal of the Emergency 

Regulations, leading to an eventual phasing 

out.” 

Resettlement 

Resettlement has been a sensitive issue in 

the North after the end of the war. In May 

2009 over 300 000 residents of the North 

lived in IDP camps and although a large 

number have been resettled by late 2010 

many complained that they have been 

resettled in alien lands and have no access to 

any essential service. 

Government news portal News.lk reported 

that the government has taken action to 

release lands in the High Security Zones 

(HSZs) in the country in keeping with the 

recommendations of the Lessons Learnt 

Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) being 

implemented by the Inter Agency Committee 

(IAC). (38) 

“256 houses surrounding the Palaly HSZ have 

already been returned to civilians and another 

2392 houses have been identified for civilian 

occupation in more than 2500 hectares of the 

land that was set apart for HSZs. These lands 

will be returned to their original owners. 

The government is of the firm policy that 

any citizen of Sri Lanka is equally free to 

purchase land or own land anywhere in the 

country. There is no policy of expansion of 

High Security Zones (HSZs), as alleged by 

some. On the contrary, the policy is to shrink 

such Zones, as rapidly and as significantly as 

possible.” In its report IAAC states that the 

government is considering a Land Kachcheri 

system to resolve land issues, and it is 

awaiting the final recommendations of the 

LLRC. 

“It is an established mechanism of state land 

allocation where the Government Agent of the 

District after due and fair inquiry plays a central 

role in assigning ownership and tenurial rights. 

The State wherever it occupies lands of those 

who have been identified as owners, pays 

rents for occupation of such lands. The IAC 

chaired by the Attorney General has taken the 

initiative to implement practical measures to 

strengthen the reconciliation process. The LLRC 

had made recommendations with regard to the 

detention of suspects, land issues, law and order, 

administrative and language issues, and the socioeconomic 

and livelihood issues pursuant to its 

Warrant dated May 15, 2010.” 

Professor Rajiva Wijesinha, MP Advisor on 

Reconciliation to the President making a 

presentation at the Association Of Sri Lankan 

Lawyers In The UK, Discussion on Challenges 

to reconciliation, the Sri Lankan experience, on 

October 11th 2011 stated that the government 

has resettled close to 290 000 individuals who 

were displaced by the war. 


Passive litsning by LLRC Commissioner 

Failures of the Commission 

The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation has been 

pointed out as a possible failure due to several 

reasons. This chapter seeks to observe what be 

these points of failure and to evaluate whether 

despite such weaknesses whether the LLRC could 

be still be deemed of credit worthiness. 

Conflict of Interest of the 

Commissioners 

It is “of fundamental importance that justice 

should not only be done, but should manifestly 

and undoubtedly be seen to be done” was the 


statement made by Lord Hutton in the case of Re 

Pinochet, quoting the statement of Lord Hewart 

C.J. in Rex v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy 

[1924] 1 K.B. 256, 259. 

If we were to apply the above mentioned principle 

of law to the composition of the LLRC an apparent 

conflict of interest becomes visible given the fact 

that it consists of former government officials 

who have publicly defended the Sri Lankan 

government against allegations of war crimes. 

While the commission partially constitutes of such 

commissioners the rest have worked for the Sri 

Lankan government. Thus it could be stated that

there is high criticism on this group of individuals 

who have been mandated to fulfil the objectives 

of the truth commission. With all due respect to 

the commissioners one may state that while their 

qualifications and experience do make them 

credible candidates for the task that they have 

been allocated with, the question that remains 

pertinent is their affiliations to the government prior 

to their role as commissioner which create doubts 

in the eyes of others of the possible bias that 

could occur in addressing submissions that would 

be anti governmental and consisting allegations 

towards the government. there is little chance that 

they will go any farther. 

The Amnesty International reports that the “The 

LLRC’s Chair, C R de Silva, has faced allegations 

of bias and obstructionism in regard to the 

investigation and prosecution of important human 

rights cases, including the “Trinco Five” case 

noted above and the massacre of 17 aid workers 

(the “ACF [Action Contre la Faim] case”) in Muttur 

in August 2006. Both were investigated by a 

Presidential commission of inquiry established in 

2006 to examine 16 cases of serious human rights 

violations, but the report was never made public 

and no prosecutions have resulted. (39) 

The members of that commission of inquiry 

accused de Silva of serious conflicts of interest 

and of actively inhibiting their ability to 

operate independently and effectively.” 

If we were to be more precise the conflict of 

interest can be seen more precisely through 

the presence of these individuals : C R de Silva 

PC, Chairman, a former Attorney General and 

Solicitor General of Sri Lanka; Dr Rohan Perera 

PC, served as Legal Advisor of the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs; Prof Karunaratne Hangawatte, 

a former Assistant Secretary to the Ministry of 

Justice; HMGS Palihakkara, former Permanent 

Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations. 

Maxwell Paranagama, was a High Court Judge. 

Thus it could be stated that there is with certainty 

a manifested conflict of interest among the 

Commissioners who have been selected to 

perform the task of distributing justice to the 

grievances of those affected during the prescribed 

time of the LLRC mandate. 

Principle 7 (a) of the Updated Set of Principles 

states “[Commissions of Inquiry] shall be 

constituted in accordance with criteria making 

clear to the public the competence and 

impartiality of their members, including expertise 

within their membership in the field of human rights 

and, if relevant, of humanitarian law.” (40) 

it has been noted that many of the comments of 

the Commissioners’ have created doubts as to 

their neutrality. The public has been able to remark 

that there was a certain amount of inclination 

on the part of the Commissioners to be on the 

defence with regards to the state actions. And 

also the courtesy accorder to the government 

representatives on their presence at the 

Commission’s submissions could not be stated as 

being allocated to others who were from different 

groups of political ideology. At times the partial 

and overtly respectful behaviour of the Chairman 

can be deemed as a shrouding on the credibility 

of the commission as a whole, creating doubt on 

the performance of the whole unit with the view 

created on the public that the LLRC was a body 

that has not been created to the elucidation of the 

“truth” but for the promotion of the governmental 

version of the “truth” as it be needed to be told. 

(41) 

in addition the UN Secretary General’s Panel of 

Experts voiced concerns regarding de Silva’s role 

in the LLRC and concluded: 

“International law requires a body investigating 

alleged violations of humanitarian and human 

rights law to be independent, impartial and 

competent. Independence comprises both actual 

independence and the public perception thereof. 

In the case of the LLRC, at least three of its 

members have serious conflicts of interest that 

both directly compromise their ability to function 

with independence and impartiality, and undermine 

public perception of them as independent. [In 

addition to de Silva], … [a] second member was 

Sri Lanka’s Permanent 

Representative to the United Nations during the 

final stages of the armed conflict, representing 

and defending the Government’ s views on the 

evolving military and humanitarian situation. A third 

member was first the legal advisor of the Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs and then advisor on international 

legal affairs to the Ministry, during 

the period under examination by the Commission.” 


Whatever their other qualifications may be, 

individuals subject to such conflicts of 

interest are entirely inappropriate as members 

of a body expected to investigate impartially 

and contribute to accountability for alleged 

violations of international humanitarian and 

human rights law during a period in which they 

served as highlevel officials of the Government. 

From any perspective, it would be virtually 

impossible to expect them to be capable of 

independently assessing the performance of 

the Government, in which they held pivotal 

positions, or of the President, who personally 

appointed them. Concerns in this respect are 

reinforced by public statements by at least one 

Commission member, made outside the LLRC, 

but during its term of operations. (42) 

Thus to conclude on the point of conflict of interest 

it could be stated that despite the respect one 

has for the qualified commissioners and the 

appreciative role that they have proven to have 

performed in their former work and their presence 

in the Commission, the impression of bias that 

their role within the LLRC implicates can be seen 

as diminishing the credibility of the LLRC as a 

whole. Had this point be taken into consideration 

when the selection of the commissioners was 

made, the LLRC would have been capable of 

refuting the allegations of bias that have been 

charged against it. 

Lack of Representation of Minority 

Groups 

Within the composition of the commissioners 

Principle 7 of the Updated Set of Principles states 

that: “In determining membership, 

concerted efforts should be made to ensure 

adequate representation of women as well as of 

other appropriate groups whose members have 

been especially vulnerable to human rights 

violations.” 

If one were to look into the composition of the 

LLRC it could be noted that the gender based 

division is immensely facilitative towards to male 

group as there is only one female commissioner. 

In addition, the majority of the commissioners are 

from the Sinhala community. 

An argument that can be put forth on this matter 

is that, the lack of representation of the ethnic 


minorities, is a draw back as the rights of the 

minorities are being put forward and more 

representation of the groups claimed to have 

been marginalised during the time prescribed 

in the mandate would have felt that they were 

being allocated more attention through the LLRC 

process. 

However in trying to reach reconciliation one 

needs to focus on not only the minorities but 

also the majority group. It is possible to assume 

that an LLRC which would be of a composition 

which was with an ethnic majority of Tamils and 

Muslims might not be well received by the majority 

Sinhalese population. This could have been cause 

for strife and in maintaining the composition as 

it is, the government could be assumed to have 

taken precaution in not paving way to post war 

mentality among the majority public, which would 

cause threat to the reconciliation process. 

In looking at the situation from this angle one 

could imagine it was a strategic approach, 

however one wonders why there could have not 

been more female representation. Is it based 

on the fact that there were not many female 

qualified candidates who could be nominated as 

a Commissioner (which is very doubtful) or is it 

due to any other unexplainable fact that needs be 

elaborated to those who are left wondering of the 

gender discrimination of the Commission in its 

representation. 

Lack of Accountability 

The critics of the LLRC claim that the “failure of the 

LLRC as an accountability mechanism stems from 

the whole conceptualization of the LLRC, which 

as put forth by the Sri Lankan government to the 

UN Secretary General’s Panel of Experts “requires 

that what happened in the past must be relegated 

to history.” 

The Sri Lankan government reportedly told 

the Panel that “the LLRC, which is central 

to its approach, is not focused on individual 

accountability, but on a wider notion of political 

responsibility, by which the state has responsibility 

to protect its citizens.” (43) 

Principle 2 of the General Principles state that 

“Every people has the inalienable right to know 

the truth about past events concerning the

perpetration of heinous crimes and about the 

circumstances and reasons that led, through 

massive or systematic violations, to the 

perpetration of those crimes. Full and effective 

exercise of the right to the truth provides a vital 

safeguard against the recurrence of violations” 

Also Principle 3 on the duty to preserve memory 

states that “A people’s knowledge of the history 

of its oppression is part of its heritage and, as 

such, must be ensured by appropriate measures 

in fulfilment of the State’s duty to preserve 

archives and other evidence concerning violations 

of human rights and humanitarian law and to 

facilitate knowledge of those violations. Such 

measures shall be aimed at preserving the 

collective memory from extinction and, in 

particular, at guarding against the development 

of revisionist and negationist arguments” 

Principle 4 and 5 as demonstrated below goes 

further with the requisites of addressing these 

impunities and requires that the States address 

the rights of those affected and their right to be 

informed the causes and the facts in relevance 

to the situations they have faced. 

“Principle 4 : The victim’s right to know 

Irrespective of any legal proceedings, victims 

and their families have the imprescriptible right 

to know the truth about the circumstances in 

which violations took place and, in the event of 

death or disappearance, the victims’ fate. 

Principle 5. Guarantees to give effect to the 

right to know States must take appropriate 

action, including measures necessary to ensure 

the independent and effective operation of the 

judiciary, to give effect to the right to know. 

Appropriate measures to ensure this right may 

include non-judicial processes that complement 

the role of the judiciary. 

Societies that have experienced heinous crimes 

perpetrated on a massive or systematic basis 

may benefit in particular from the creation of 

a truth commission or other commission of 

inquiry to establish the facts surrounding those 

violations so that the truth may be ascertained 

and to prevent the disappearance of evidence. 

Regardless of whether a State establishes such 

a body, it must ensure the preservation of, and 

access to, archives concerning violations of 

human rights and humanitarian law.” 

These principles highlight the need to be 

accountable to those who have been affected, 

to address to their grievances and to provide 

them with information as to the situations that 

were pertaining during the civil war, which 

violated their rights and created impunities in 

the country. 

The Amnesty International report on the 

LLRC claims that “even when witnesses have 

information that could identify perpetrators of 

violations, the authorities have attempted to deny 

it.” (44) 

On 22 February 2011 Sri Lanka’s Attorney 

General told the UN Panel of Experts that if the 

LLRC should identify a “particular culpability” 

that should be further investigated it would be 

referred to the Attorney General’s office, but 

that “to date none of the representations made 

to the LLRC had identified individuals or groups 

to whom [responsibility for violations] could be 

attributed.” (45) 

There has been a reluctance on the part of the 

Commission to take action against those who 

have been accused of committing the acts of 

violence against those who came forth to make 

submissions. The question that remains posed 

is whether this approach of the Commission 

is grounded on the fact that the punishing of 

the accused would further delay the healing 

of wounds as it would create and approach of 

vengeance rather than of forgiveness. 

Nevertheless whatever be the cause of such 

approach, it remains one that needs be 

analysed and addressed with care. The need is 

heightened by the fact that a body entitled to 

the task of distribution of justice been criticised 

of its lack of accountability does not contribute 

to the building of its qualities of reliability and 

credibility. 

The Amnesty International report on the 

LLRC states, “The LLRC received numerous 

complaints from people searching for missing 

family members, including some that appeared 

to be victims of enforced disappearances. The 

witnesses’ testimony potentially implicated the Sri 

Lankan military and security forces (in particular 


the Army and the STF – an elite police commando 

unit); paramilitary forces now allied with the Sri 

Lankan government, such as the Karuna Group, 

the EPDP; and the LTTE. 

But in the cases publicly available the 

Commissioners demonstrated a lack of 

interest in pursuing the details of these 

allegations. In particular, the Commissioners 

repeatedly failed to ask for information 

that could be used to identify individual 

perpetrators, or initiate an investigation that 

would lead to locating the missing person. 

Enforced disappearances are a gross 

violation of human rights and a particularly 

persistent form of abuse in Sri Lanka – 

where tens of thousands from earlier periods 

of conflict still remain unresolved and 

unpunished – but enforced disappearance 

is not specified as a crime under Sri 

Lankan law (instead authorities apply laws 

governing abductions and related offenses), 

and the LLRC made little effort to address 

accountability for such cases. 

The Commissioners simply failed to provide 

any specific questions or follow up on the 

necessarily vague responses to seek justice 

or compensation for any of the victims. Later, 

in the context of a discussion about land 

issues, a Commissioner notes that witnesses 

who testified in Batticaloa were afraid of 

Chandrakanthan, but does not pursue the 

issue in any depth” (46) 

Pro Governmental Approach 

and the Unfriendly Approach 

Towards Those Who 

Challenged or Pointed Fingers 

at the Government Parties as 

Perpetrators 

Remarks have been made against the LLRC 

for its bias towards the government and its 

hostile approach towards parties who have 

made allegations against government parties 

as the perpetrators of violence. It has also 

been illustrated that the Commissioners have 

at times guided testimony or defended the Sri 

Lankan government against criticism. (47) 


The UN Panel report described 

Commissioners’ treatment of victims as “curt 

and dismissive,” their questioning of people 

reporting violations as either “desultory,” or 

“in other 

instances, when allegations are made 

against the conduct of security forces, 

Commissioners 

at pains to refute any possibility that 

the allegations may be true, pointing to 

inconsistencies in the victim’s account in 

order to discredit it.” (48) 

The report provides as per example the 

dialogue between Commissioners and a 

witness who testified in Mullaitivu on 20 

September 2010. The witness alleged that 

the Navy had fired on a boatload of civilians, 

killing eight people. (49) 

Possibility That 

Recommendations Were 

Decided Upon Prior to the LLRC 

Submissions Were Made 

A follower of the LLRC sessions in Colombo 

was able to witness a pattern in the questions 

that were posed to the submission makers. 

The manner in which these submission 

makers were lead was another constant 

observation where the Chairman was 

decided upon gaining assurance on his 

opinions of English teaching in schools and 

how the interactive teaching of language, 

the provision of teachers to schools to 

teach English would result in eliminating the 

type of problems that was faced by the Sri 

Lankan society over the years. One could 

not but help wondering if the commissioners 

had projected their recommendations to be 

made and whether the whole LLRC hearings 

were a process whereby they were in a 

search for the supporting data to enforce the 

recommendations at which they had arrived. 

However what remains humorous is that 

questions that were on language were 

addressed to those who were of no expertise 

to answer such questions, which completely 

undermined the intellectual capacity of the

LLRC. One would understand questions 

on teaching English being addressed to 

academics and those of who are part of the 

Educational background. But one wonders what 

expert opinion military personnel could provide on 

the teaching of English to the Commissioners and 

their future recommendations. 

Failure to Address the Grievances 

With Sympathy 

On hearing that LLRC hearings would be held 

thousands of civilians Thousands of civilians came 

forward in the former conflict areas. However it 

was noted that those who came forward despite 

many a difficulty and had arrived at the LLRC 

sessions having undergone much travel, were at 

times not provided with an opportunity to make 

an oral submission and were told to submit their 

complains in writing due to lack of time. 

It is observed that many of those who were 

seeking to make submissions were Tamil women 

seeking news of family and relatives who had 

gone missing or were in the custody of the security 

forces. 

. 

The Centre for Human Rights, noted the manner 

the sessions of the LLRC was held on the 8 of 

January 2011 in which preferential treatment was 

LLRC Chairman CR de Silva in repose 

given to high profile witnesses at the expense of 

ordinary civilians. 

“The session which was scheduled to begin at 

9.30 am on January, 8 commenced 

only at 10.30 am. CHR representatives noted that 

there weren’t [sic] adequate seating available and 

most of the people have been exhausted after 

travelling a long distance and were sitting on the 

ground. 4.30 submissions were presented in the 

session at Mannar DS. Bishop of Mannar, Rt. 

Rev Rayappu Joseph and many other religious 

and community leaders gave evidence before the 

LLRC. Both local and foreign media were eager 

to cover the session and gave prominence to 

these dignitaries’ submissions. As the prominent 

figures made extensive presentations, the ordinary 

citizens who were directly affected by the war 

and were desperate to talk to the Commissioners 

were forfeited their allocated time, as CHR has 

pointed out earlier. Chairman of the LLRC spoke 

about there [sic] interim report in which they had 

recommended certain methods to address the 

issues of the people. 

Although, this notification made in English would 

have been of extreme importance to the people, 

his speech, was not translated into Tamil. Further, 

it is to be noted that the overwhelming majority of 

those present do not understand English.” (50) 

These difficulties of opportunity could have 

been addressed had the time schedules been 

better planned and had there been more 

sessions available to the public at their own 

area of residence. The disappointment of having 

travelled for hours and been unable to make 

their submissions be heard would not have been 

existent within this group of community had there 

been more hours allocated to them, or had there 

been more sessions held in the rural areas of the 

North where civil war pertained. 

The problem of the LLRC which can be noted 

here is the non existence of adequate scope and 

resources to allow individuals to receive a fair 

hearing. And the attitude of the Commissioners 

would also have been more compassionate 

towards these individuals had there been more 

time allocated for the hearings and had they 

not been constrained by time. The curtness of 

the commissioners in addressing the witnesses 

could have possibly been evaded if there had 


een better time management and allocation of 

resources as it be needed. 

Lack of Attention to the Human 

Rights Violations That Occurred 

During the War Era 

During the LLRC first field session in Vavuniya, 

the request of the Chairman to the public and 

the witnesses was to “forget the past”. What was 

requested of them was to “ tell the LLRC about 

the problems regarding their children’s education, 

unmet medical needs and accommodations.” (51) 

The statement could be interpreted in light of the 

backdrop to the LLRC and the immediate needs 

of the people which the government was needed 

to address. However it also marks in the eyes of 

the observes that there was no mention of human 

rights violations among the possible “grievances,” 

“difficulties” and ” he encouraged witnesses to 

voice (although many did so), nor did he pledge to 

seek accountability. (52) 

The question which emanates from this statement 

of the Chairman is thus whether the ignoring of 

the human rights violations and the instructions 

given or the request made to the witnesses to 

focus on their practical needs which be pertinent 

in their daily lives as an effort to make their living 

conditions better, or whether it was a conscious 

effort to avoid the possible human rights violations 

which the witnesses would wish to address. 

The Bishop of Mannar, Rayappu Joseph, in his 

presentation provided he LLRC with 

lists of hundreds of enforced disappearances, 

detentions and extrajudicial killings, and called 

for public acknowledgement of these specific 

abuses and more generally acknowledgement of 

“the objective and total truth of what happened 

throughout the conflict and war, particularly in the 

closing stages of the war.” 

However the response of the Chairman was the 

discussing the LLRC’s interim 

recommendations related to detention, land issues 

and language. Amnesty International criticises 

his behaviour and points that “the Commission 

failed to acknowledge the Bishop’s more 

serious allegations of human rights violations by 

government forces” 


Other statements of the Chairman such as the one 

made Mannar in January “Your speech 

does not help us. We only want to know what the 

grievances are and how to rectify them.” (53) is 

indicative of the objectives of the Commission. 

While one is able to understand that practical 

issues of the public that has suffered the war for 

over 30 years need to be addressed, it needs 

to be kept in mind that the LLRC was also the 

mechanism which was put in place to address 

the grievances of those who suffered violence 

and human rights violations during the time of the 

war. Hence the statements of violations of human 

rights been discouraged and them being deemed 

as not of use to the Commission highlights to the 

listener a certain amount of non availability to the 

protection of their rights. And as individuals who 

have lost their families and have no news of their 

loved ones who have disappeared or have been 

arrested or gone missing, their interest would be 

focussed in finding what happened to those who 

they loved but are not with them anymore. 

Thus the LLRC would have been more 

successful in the eyes of those who were putting 

their grievances forward of matters that they 

hold dear to their hearts if the Commissioners 

were conscience in their presentation of their 

objectives, of the plight of the public they were 

addressing and their psychological state/. A more 

sympathetic approach towards the interested 

of the people and a more active role in seeking 

information on the rights of those present would 

have created a better image of productivity and 

credibility for the LLRC. 

Lack of Witness Protection from 

Outside Threats 

Principle 10 of the Updated Set of Principles states 

“Effective measures shall be taken to ensure the 

security, physical and psychological well-being, 

and, where requested, the privacy of victims 

and witnesses who provide information to the 

commission.” 

However despite such requisite the LLRC has 

no procedure implemented for the protection 

of the witnesses. In addition to a specific 

mechanism regarding the matter within the 

process of the LLRC. It needs be highlighted 

that there exists no adequate witness

protection scheme in the country’s judiciary, the 

Sri Lankan Parliament having never passed 

draft legislation first introduced in 2007 and reintroduced 

in 2008. Despite the bill having been 

presented to Parliament and debated over for a 

day. However the bill did not reach the voting 

stage and was postponed. This can be taken 

as an indication of the lack of interest taken by 

the government in the protection of witnesses. 

Given the circumstances to be such, the question 

that remains is how the LLRC process is capable 

of providing the witnesses adequate protection for 

them to come forth with their submissions and to 

make their statements to the Commission without 

fear. 

On an observation of the interim recommendations 

of the LLRC which have been sent to the 

President in September, it can be noted that 

despite the call for protection of witnesses by 

several people, and many having been threatened 

due to their submissions, the Commission has 

failed in their recommendations to address this 

issue. 

The Centre for Human Rights was present at the 

sessions at the Periyapanrivirichchan AGA’s Office 

in Madhu where army personnel photographed 

LLRC witnesses: 

“The session was scheduled to start at 9 am but 

it began only at 10.45. Around 10.15 am a group 

of army officers arrived at the DS Office and 

recorded the names of the LLRC staff and others 

from outside the area. Another officer took photos 

of the LLRC Commissioners and those who had 

come to give evidence.” (54) 

Once again this eludes a comprehension of the 

mentality of the witnesses and their life’s plight. If 

the LLRC is meant to be a search for the truth the 

Commission needs to make the witnesses feel 

comfortable with the assurance that their lives are 

protected. Furthermore the photos being taken 

by army personnel of those making submissions 

would only lead to intimidation which result in 

the truth not being told. Thus the result being the 

A person in military uniform photographing the LLRC commissioners and those who gave evidence in Mannar 


The Answer : Local Mechanism? 

International Investigation? 

Many critics of the LLRC have propounded the 

view that there needs be a UN investigation that 

is carried on Sri Lanka and the mechanism of 

distributing justice needs to be stemming from an 

international body as opposed to the justice that 

be promised by the Sri Lankan government. While 

admitting that there needs be a transparent and 

accountable mechanism in place which respects 

the upholding the rights of individuals and aims at 

addressing the violations of human rights which 

allegedly took place during the time period of the 

civil war in the North and East, CHR stresses the 

need for this to be a local mechanism and not an 

international body which will be intervening with 

the sovereignty of the state. 

Principle 20 of the Updated Set of Principle 

highlights the jurisdiction of international and 

internationalized criminal tribunals. It states 

“It remains the rule that States have primary 

responsibility to exercise jurisdiction over 

serious crimes under international law. In 

accordance with the terms of their statutes, 

international and internationalized criminal 

tribunals may exercise concurrent jurisdiction 

when national courts cannot offer satisfactory 

guarantees of independence and impartiality 

or are materially unable or unwilling to conduct 

effective investigations or prosecutions. States 

must ensure that they fully satisfy their legal 

obligations in respect of international and 

internationalized criminal tribunals, including 

where necessary through the enactment of 

domestic legislation that enables States to fulfil 

obligations that arise through their adherence to 

the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 

Court or under other binding instruments, and 

through implementation of applicable obligations 

to apprehend and surrender suspects and to 

cooperate in respect of evidence.” 

The key terms of the principle here can be noted 

as being that “States have primary responsibility 

to exercise jurisdiction” which is a two way 

providing the States the responsibility to act 


within their sovereignty against the violations that 

have taken place and also the obligation to act 

on such matter. In addition to this it can be also 

read that the primary authority over the acts of 

violations of human rights needs be allocated 

to the country and outsider interventions on 

such matters would be deemed as violations of 

the sovereignty principle of the state. Thus the 

principle encompasses the theories of both state 

responsibility as well as the sovereignty of state. 

The criticism addressed as to the credibility of 

the commission is due to many a failure that has 

been the result of previous commissions that have 

been established by the Sri Lankan government. 

Amnesty International in its publication titled 

“Twenty Years of Make –Believe Sri Lanka’s 

Commissions of Inquiry” point out that the mode 

of addressing of impunity by the State of Sri Lanka 

has been deeply flawed and flout with many 

discrepancies. 

It states “Commissions of Inquiry have not 

worked as mechanisms of justice in Sri Lanka. 

Presidential Commissions have proved to be little 

more than tools to launch partisan attacks against 

opponents or to deflect criticism when the state 

has been faced with overwhelming evidence of its 

complicity in human rights violations. The best that 

can be expected of these Commissions of Inquiry, 

given their non-judicial nature, is that they will be a 

truth-telling exercise.” (55) 

However the facts remain that the sovereignty 

of a state plays a key role in the process of 

a jurisdiction that be applied to it. And the 

empowerment of local mechanisms in order to 

address the local issues will be in the long term 

a more productive effort as opposed to one that 

be imposed from outside and is alienated within 

the local justice system. If the answer that is to be 

applied is to be short term and to address a mere 

pressure that is to be raised by the international 

community then the situation rather than moving 

towards any form of improvement will only reach

a certain exacerbation which will not be of any 

productivity in the long term goal of protection of 

human rights on the Sri Lankans. 

Priscilla B. Hayner also points out that “Clear 

backing from the government is essential for 

such a commission to work with full authority. 

Explicit official support for its work can provide 

increased security, a higher public profile, 

and facilitate access to restricted or classified 

government documents. The government, 

and armed opposition, where relevant, 

should be expected to provide records to the 

commission pertinent to its investigations, 

including restricted documents. Officials or 

former officials with knowledge of the acts and 

events under investigation should be expected 

to provide information to the commission, 

either in public hearings or in private meetings. 

Such support for a commission’s work should 

coincide with clear operational independence, 

necessary for the commission to undertake 

investigation into often politically sensitive 

topics. Once established, the commission 

should operate free of direct influence or control 

by the government, including in the interpreting 

of its written mandate (within any constraints 

that are indicated),in developing its operating 

methodology for research and public outreach, 

and in shaping its report and recommendations” 

(56) This points out the advantage of a local 

based, government supported mechanism as 

opposed to an international investigation for 

which the State’s support may not be granted. 

In addition “each new truth commission must 

be rooted in the realities and possibilities of its 

particular environment. While the international 

community can play a major role in assisting 

these processes, any successful truth 

commission 

process must be a reflection of national will and 

a national commitment to fully understand and 

learn from the country’s difficult, sometimes 

very controversial and often quite painful 

history. A commission must aim to understand 

the origins 

of past conflict and the factors that allowed 

abuses to take place, and to do so in a 

manner that is both supportive of victims and 

inclusive of a wide range of perspectives.” (57) 

Furthermore the imposition of an international 

inquiry would elevate the sentiments of 

nationalism which is already in the process 

of been rejuvenated and which if provided 

opportunity would not step down from going 

into the levels that be of danger to the further 

reconciliation of the country. 

Thus CHR as the solution for the issues in 

contention with regards to the LLRC and its 

performance recommends that the solution lies 

in the addressing of the issues raised throughout 

the report such as the lack of accountability, a 

mode of addressing grievances of the individuals 

and the empowerment of the local mechanisms 

to address the woes of the people and the human 

rights violations while focusing on 

1. Implementing concrete and specific 

recommendations addressing the immediate 

issues of the people including detention, 

disappearances, resettlement, financial aid. 

This is due to the fact that the interim report 

had vague and broad suggestions which 

were not implemented, the broadness of the 

recommendations rendering the non application of 

significant measures. 

2. Serious efforts to understand the causes which 

lead to the conflict and the rights which were 

violated during the war. 

3. Genuine attempts to address the occurrences 

during the last few days of the Ealam war 

IV without which we do not believe that true 

reconciliation could take place. 

4. Recommending that the school curriculum 

includes comparative studies in order to facilitate 

the understanding of students of other ethnicities, 

cultures and religions. 

5. Establishing an independent domestic 

mechanism to investigate the last phase of war 

and to detail a clear mandate which needs be 

followed. 

CHR believes that the reconciliation process can 

only be achieved through addressing the wider 

issues mentioned above, and through empowered 

local mechanisms that uphold democratic, 

impartial and just values which would help 

integrate values of harmony into the Sri Lankan 

social structure. 


References 

1 Joint Statement by UN Secretary-General, Government of Sri Lanka, SG/2151, 26 May 2009 

https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sg2151.doc.htm 

2 Report of the Secretary- General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, Executive Summary 

Page ii, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf 

3 ibid, Page vii 

4 Amnesty 

5 http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20100517_07 

6 http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2010/11/07/sri-lanka%E2%80%99s-lessons-learnt-and-reconciliation-commission-llrc- 

tenure-extended 

7 ibid 

8 http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2010/11/07/sri-lanka%E2%80%99s-lessons-learnt-and-reconciliation-commission-llrc- 


9 http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2010/11/07/sri-lanka%E2%80%99s-lessons-learnt-and-reconciliation-commission- llrc- 


10 http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2010/11/07/sri-lanka%E2%80%99s-lessons-learnt-and-reconciliation-commission- llrc- 


11 http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA37/008/2011/en/76ea6500-a9f5-4946-bf2b-7fc08bc5e37a/asa370082011en. 

pdf 

12 “Chairman’s opening statement; Proceedings of public sittings of the Commission of Inquiry on 

Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation appointed by His Excellency the President in terms of Section 2 of 

the Commissions of Inquiry Act.” Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute of International Relations and Strategic 

Studies, No 24, Horton Place, Colombo 07, 11 August 2010 (LLRC/PS/11-08-10/01), Page 1 

13 http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2011/05/110517_glindia.shtml 

14 ibid 

15 http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_862_hayner.pdf 

16 https://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp/downloads/lcp59dfall1996p173.pdf 

17 https://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp/downloads/lcp59dfall1996p173.pdf 




21 http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf 

22 http://www.llrc.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35&Itemid=57 

23 Ibid 

24 http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:K3BlcI5oD8EJ:www.srilanka-botschaft.de/Images_and_Basics/pdfs/Circu 

lar_49.pdf+LLRC+interim+report+IAAC&hl=en&gl=lk&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESg-4GEANLU7CXunh5vLGzP- 

MAmGLHIxgeP 

1ctieSJzkQaXtsil3KkA5DiPy1fMWJIQMxvmVpDhRf8ZZtWMC6m0NZbc8tFwYdNGWPU866hPAAU_YMFdEoT89BeImNfn 

SlHlGUZsQ&sig=AHIEtbTWBYP4jK0-jXW3yvtP-R2RHhYWFA 

25 http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/press-releases-details/press-releases-details/2879 

26 http://www.lakbimanews.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=756%3Agovt-tna-discussions-a-s 

ham&Itemid=56 


27 Trinco DS http://www.llrc.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=26&Itemid=56 

28 http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2011/04/15/more-than-20-people-last-seen-in-army-custody-remain-missing/ 

29 http://www.lakbimanews.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2278%3Adisarming-easternparmilitariesbecomes-a-joke-army-sources&Itemid=56 

30 http://groundviews.org/2011/08/19/“i-want-to-continue-to-highlight-the-activities-against-the-humanity”-gnanasundaramku 

ganathan/ 

31 http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=28405 

32 http://chrsrilanka.com/LLRC_session_in_Kuchchaweli__146_Complaints__Land_ownership_issue__Critical__-5-37.html) 

33 http://chrsrilanka.com/LLRC_session_in_Kuchchaweli__146_Complaints__Land_ownership_issue__Critical__-5-37.html 

34 http://www.parliament.lk/news/ViewPublication.do?published=Y&documentID=PUB3509 

35 http://lakbimanews.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2956%3Ahomeland-act-to-replace-pta&Itemid=56 

36 Representation by witness number 15 of Mutur DS, LLRC outstation sessions 

37 IAAC Report 

38 http://www.lankapuvath.lk/index.php/latest-news/general/12717-lands-in-the-hsz-soon-to-civilians 

39 When will they get justice? Failures of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission. http://www.amnesty. 

org/en/library/asset/ASA37/008/2011/en/76ea6500-a9f5-4946-bf2b-7fc08bc5e37a/asa370082011en.pdf 

40 Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity, United 

Nations, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/109/00/PDF/ 

G0510900. pdf?OpenElement 

41 See for example (and below), the Commission’s handling of testimony by Dr. Varatharajah, http://www.llrc.lk/images/sto 

ries/LLRC_30.11_-_Dr._T.Vartharajah.pdf 

42 “See, for example, the Prof J E Jayasuriya Memorial Lecture ‘Post-Conflict Foreign Policy Challenges 

for Sri Lanka’. Speaking as a ‘practitioner’, LLRC commissioner Mr Palihakkara asserted that 

‘precautionary humanitarian measures [were] taken by the security forces and [there was] exercise of 

maximum restraint to minimize civilian casualties and other collateral damage.’ Noting that ‘our soldiers 

and the political leadership provided by our President enabled the country to free itself from the manifest 

threat to its sovereignty and integrity.’ He referred to sovereignty ‘rescued by our soldiers’ and ‘so 

valiantly re-established by our soldiers.’ He further hailed ‘successful preventive diplomacy at the United 

Nations Security Council without alienating any country to deter intervention in Sri Lanka during the antiLTTE operation in 

2009.’” Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri 

Lanka, Page 85 

43 Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, Paras 279–80, Page 78 

44 Testimony of Witness 6, proceedings of public sittings of the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt 

and Reconciliation appointed by His Excellency the President in terms of Section 2 of the Commissions 

of Inquiry Act, Divisional Secretariat, Eravur Pattu, Chenkalady, 10 October, 2010 



of Inquiry Act, Batticaloa District Secretariat, 9 October 2010 

46 When will they get Justice? Failures of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission. http://www.amnesty. 

org/en/library/asset/ASA37/008/2011/en/76ea6500-a9f5-4946-bf2b-7fc08bc5e37a/asa370082011en.pdf 7 

47 Field visits were conducted from 14 August 2010 – 19 February 2011: Vavuniya: 14 August 2010 

Public Sittings – DS Vavuniya , DS Cheddikulam , IDPP Centre, Manik Farm; 15 August 2010 Public 

Sittings - DS Nedunkerni. Kilinochchi & Mullaitivu: 18 September 2010 Public Sittings – DS 

Kilinochchi and DS Pachchillaipillai; 19 September 2010 Public Sittings – DS Poonagary; 20 

September 2010 Public Sittings – DS Mullaitivu; 20 September 2010 Mullaitivu Security Forces 

Headquarters. Batticaloa: 09 October 2010 Public Sittings – DS Batticaloa; 09 October 2010 Public 

Sittings – DS Oddamavaddy; 11 October 2010 Public Sittings – DS Eravurpattu. Jaffna: 11 November 

2010 Public Sittings – Ariyalai; 12 November 2010 Public Sittings – Gurunagar Cultural Hall; 12 

November 2010 Public Sittings – Vadukkodai East, Sittankerney; 12 November 2010 Public Sittings – 

District Secretariat, Jaffna; 14 November 2010 Public Sittings - St. Anthony’s Church, Kayts. 

Trincomalee: 03 December 2010 - District Secretariat, Trincomalee; 04 December 2010 - District 

Secretariat, Mutur. Puttalam & Mannar: 07.01.2011 - District Secretariat, Puttalam; 08.01.2011 - 

District Secretariat, Mannar; 09 January 2011 - District Secretariat, Madhu. Galle & Matara: 18 


February 2011 - District Secretariat, Matara; 19 February 2011 - Hall de Galle, Galle 

48 Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, Page 91 

49 Ibid. 

50 See also, Testimony of Witness 1, proceedings of public sittings of the Commission of Inquiry on 

Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation appointed by His Excellency the President in terms of Section 2 of 

the Commissions of Inquiry Act, District Secretariat, Muillativu, 20 September 2010, LLRC/PS/20-09-10/01 

51 Rajit Keethi Tennakoon, “LLRC Mannar Sessions: Oscillation between Hope and Hopelessness,” 

http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2011/01/llrc-mannar-sessions-oscillation.html 

52 When Will They Get Justice? Failures of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission http://www.amnesty. 

org/en/library/asset/ASA37/008/2011/en/76ea6500-a9f5-4946-bf2b-7fc08bc5e37a/asa370082011en.pdf 

Proceedings of public hearings of the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation 

appointed by His Excellency the President in terms of Section 2 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 

District Secretary’s Office, Vavuniya, 14 August, 2010 

http://www.llrc.lk/images/stories/docs/August2010/District_Secys_Office-Vavuniya-14.08.2010.pdf 



of Inquiry Act, Mannar District Secretariat, Mannar, 8 January 2011, Page 19 

54 Rajit Keethi Tennakoon, “LLRC Mannar Sessions: Oscillation between Hope and Hopelessness,” 

http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2011/01/llrc-mannar-sessions-oscillation.html 

55 Twenty Years of Make believe: Sri Lanka’s Commissions of Inquiry, page 3 http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_75/ 

documentos/srilanka.pdf 

56 Pricilla B. Hayner : Guidelines https://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp/downloads/lcp59dfall1996p173.pdf# 

http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_862_hayner.pdf 


ANNEXES 

Interim Recommendations of the 

LLRC 

1. Detention 

There are persistent complains pertaining to 

persons held in detention for long periods 

without charges 

In this regard the Commission recommends 

that: 

a) A special mechanism be created to 

examine such cases on a case by case 

basis and recommend a course of action 

in regard to disposal of each case, as 

appropriate. Further, to support this process 

the establishment of a focal point in the 

Attorney General’s Department is also 

recommended. 

b) A major concern raised before the 

Commission was the fact that many people 

did not know the whereabouts of the 

family members in detention as they were 

constantly shifted from camp to camp. 

Accordingly the Commission recommends 

an independent unit being established. Eg 

in the Ministry of Justice, to address the 

following issues:- 

1. Publishing a list of names of those in 

detention 

2. When a person is discharged a certificate be 

issued so that the same person shall not be 

taken into custody again, unless new evidence 

is discovered against him for being linked with 

the LLTE. 

3. To look into the issues of laws delays (to 

expedite prosecution or discharge detainees) 

2. Land issues 

In order to address certain apprehensions 

among people in the affected districts on land 

issues, the Commission recommends that 

a clear statement of policy be issued by the 

government that private lands not be utilized 

for settlements by any Government agencies. 

3.Law and order 

It was brought to the attention of the 

Commission that despite the end of the conflict 

significant issues of law and order still remain. 

There is apprehension in the minds of people 

due to continuing acts of extortion, abduction 

and other criminal acts by armed groups 

The commission recommends that specific 

measures be introduced to ensure the 

maintenance of law and order in these areas, 

particularly the disarming of any illegal armed 

groups. The Commission regards this as a 

matter of the highest priority. 

4. Administration and Language Uses 

Many of the people who gave evidence before 

the Commission expressed grave concern that 

they were expected to communicate with public 

officials or perfect documents in a language 

which they did not understand. In the light of 

the concern expressed by the members of 

the public, the Commission is of the view that 

immediate steps be taken administratively to 

rectify this problem. To achieve this objective, 

the Commission is of the view that interpreters 

could be used in public offices as appropriate 

to facilitate communication until long term 

programmes are put in place. 

5. Socio/Economic Livelihood Issues 

a) Encourage free movement of persons on A9 

to ensure greater participation in the economic, 

social and cultural activities 

b) Greater coordination and communication 

should be maintained between the GAs and 

security authorities in normalizing civilian 

administration. 


Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human 

rights through action to combat impunity. 

United Nations 


Distr. GENERAL 

E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 

8 February 2005 

Original: ENGLISH 

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 

Sixty-first session 

Item 17 of the provisional agenda 

PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 

Impunity 

Report of the independent expert to update the Set of principles to combat impunity, Diane 

Orentlicher* 

Addendum 

Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to 

combat impunity 

* The report was submitted after the deadline in order to take into account replies of all 

respondents as well as the results of the expert workshop held in November 2004. 

SYNOPTICAL TABLE OF THE UPDATED SET OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROTECTION AND 

PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH ACTION TO COMBAT IMPUNITY 

Preamble 

Definitions 

I. COMBATING IMPUNITY: GENERAL OBLIGATIONS 

• Principle 1. General obligations of States to take effective action to combat impunity 

II. THE RIGHT TO KNOW 

A. General principles 

• Principle 2. The inalienable right to the truth 

• Principle 3. The duty to preserve memory 

• Principle 4. The victims’ right to know 

• Principle 5. Guarantees to give effect to the right to know 

B. Commissions of inquiry 

• Principle 6. The establishment and role of truth commissions 

• Principle 7. Guarantees of independence, impartiality and competence 

• Principle 8. Definition of a commission’s terms of reference 

• Principle 9. Guarantees for persons implicated 

• Principle 10. Guarantees for victims and witnesses testifying on their behalf 

• Principle 11. Adequate resources for commissions 

• Principle 12. Advisory functions of the commissions 

• Principle 13. Publicizing the commission’s reports 

C. Preservation of and access to archives bearing witness to violations 

• Principle 14. Measures for the preservation of archives 

• Principle 15. Measures for facilitating access to archives 

• Principle 16. Cooperation between archive departments and the courts and non-judicial

commissions of inquiry 

• Principle 17. Specific measures relating to archives containing names 

• Principle 18. Specific measures related to the restoration of or transition to democracy and/or 

peace 

III. THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE 


• Principle 19. Duties of States with regard to the administration of justice 

B. Distribution of jurisdiction between national, foreign, international and internationalized courts 

• Principle 20. Jurisdiction of international and internationalized criminal tribunals 

• Principle 21. Measures for strengthening the effectiveness of international legal principles 

concerning universal and international jurisdiction 

C. Restrictions on rules of law justified by action to combat impunity 

• Principle 22. Nature of restrictive measures 

• Principle 23. Restrictions on prescription 

• Principle 24. Restrictions and other measures relating to amnesty 

• Principle 25. Restrictions on the right of asylum 

• Principle 26. Restrictions on extradition/non bis in idem 

• Principle 27. Restrictions on justifications related to due obedience, superior responsibility, and 

official status 

• Principle 28. Restrictions on the effects of legislation on disclosure or repentance 

• Principle 29. Restrictions on the jurisdiction of military courts 

• Principle 30. Restrictions on the principle of the irremovability of judges 

IV. THE RIGHT TO REPARATION/GUARANTEES OF NON-RECURRENCE 

A. The right to reparation 

• Principle 31. Rights and duties arising out of the obligation to make reparation 

• Principle 32. Reparation procedures 

• Principle 33. Publicizing reparation procedures 

• Principle 34. Scope of the right to reparation 

B. Guarantees of non-recurrence of violations 

• Principle 35. General principles 

• Principle 36. Reform of State institutions 

• Principle 37. Disbandment of parastatal armed forces/demobilization and social reintegration of 

children 

• Principle 38. Reform of laws and institutions contributing to impunity 

SET OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 

THROUGH ACTION TO COMBAT IMPUNITY 

Preamble 

Recalling the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes that 

disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged 

the conscience of mankind, 

Aware that there is an ever-present risk that such acts may again occur, 

Reaffirming the commitment made by Member States under Article 56 of the Charter of the 

United Nations to take joint and separate action, giving full importance to developing effective 

international cooperation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55 of the 

Charter concerning universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 

freedoms for all, 

Considering that the duty of every State under international law to respect and to secure 

respect for human rights requires that effective measures should be taken to combat impunity, 

Aware that there can be no just and lasting reconciliation unless the need for justice is 

effectively satisfied, 

Equally aware that forgiveness, which may be an important element of reconciliation, implies, 


insofar as it is a private act, that the victim or the victim’s beneficiaries know the perpetrator of 

the violations and that the latter has acknowledged his or her deeds, 

Recalling the recommendation set forth in paragraph 91 of Part II of the Vienna Declaration 

and Programme of Action, wherein the World Conference on Human Rights(June 1993) 

expressed its concern about the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations and 

encouraged the efforts of the Commission on Human Rights to examine all aspects of the 

issue, 

Convinced, therefore, that national and international measures must be taken for that purpose 

with a view to securing jointly, in the interests of the victims of violations, observance of the 

right to know and, by implication, the right to the truth, the right to justice and the right to 

reparation, without which there can be no effective remedy against the pernicious effects of 

impunity, 

Pursuant to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the following principles are 

intended as guidelines to assist States in developing effective measures for combating 

impunity. 

Definitions 

A. Impunity 

“Impunity” means the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of 

violations to account - whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings 

- since they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, 

tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making reparations to 

their victims. 

B. Serious crimes under international law 

As used in these principles, the phrase “serious crimes under international law” encompasses 

grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of Additional Protocol I 

thereto of 1977 and other violations of international humanitarian law that are crimes under 

international law, genocide, crimes against humanity, and other violations of internationally 

protected human rights that are crimes under international law and/or which international law 

requires States to penalize, such as torture, enforced disappearance, extrajudicial execution, 

and slavery. 

C. Restoration of or transition to democracy and/or peace 

This expression, as used in these principles, refers to situations leading, within the framework 

of a national movement towards democracy or peace negotiations aimed at ending an armed 

conflict, to an agreement, in whatever form, by which the actors or parties concerned agree 

to take measures against impunity and the recurrence of human rights violations. 

D. Truth commissions 

As used in these principles, the phrase “truth commissions” refers to official, temporary, 

non-judicial fact-finding bodies that investigate a pattern of abuses of human rights or 

humanitarian law, usually committed over a number of years. 

E. Archives 

As used in these principles, the word “archives” refers to collections of documents pertaining 

to violations of human rights and humanitarian law from sources including (a) national 

governmental agencies, particularly those that played significant roles in relation to human 

rights violations; (b) local agencies, such as police stations, that were involved in human 

rights violations; (c) State agencies, including the office of the prosecutor and the judiciary, 

that are involved in the protection of human rights; and (d) materials collected by truth 

commissions and other investigative bodies. 


I. COMBATING IMPUNITY: GENERAL OBLIGATIONS 

PRINCIPLE 1. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS OF STATES TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION TO 

COMBAT IMPUNITY 

Impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to investigate violations; to take 

appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring 

that those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly punished; to provide 

victims with effective remedies and to ensure that they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; 

to ensure the inalienable right to know the truth about violations; and to take other necessary steps 

to prevent a recurrence of violations. 


II. THE RIGHT TO KNOW 

PRINCIPLE 2. THE INALIENABLE RIGHT TO THE TRUTH 

Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events concerning the 

perpetration of heinous crimes and about the circumstances and reasons that led, through 

massive or systematic violations, to the perpetration of those crimes. Full and effective exercise of 

the right to the truth provides a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations. 

PRINCIPLE 3. THE DUTY TO PRESERVE MEMORY 

A people’s knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its heritage and, as such, must be 

ensured by appropriate measures in fulfilment of the State’s duty to preserve archives and other 

evidence concerning violations of human rights and humanitarian law and to facilitate knowledge 

of those violations. Such measures shall be aimed at preserving the collective memory from 

extinction and, in particular, at guarding against the development of revisionist and negationist 

arguments. 

PRINCIPLE 4. THE VICTIMS’ RIGHT TO KNOW 

Irrespective of any legal proceedings, victims and their families have the imprescriptible right to 

know the truth about the circumstances in which violations took place and, in the event of death or 

disappearance, the victims’ fate. 

PRINCIPLE 5. GUARANTEES TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE RIGHT TO KNOW 

States must take appropriate action, including measures necessary to ensure the independent 

and effective operation of the judiciary, to give effect to the right to know.Appropriate measures 

to ensure this right may include non-judicial processes that complement the role of the judiciary. 

Societies that have experienced heinous crimes perpetrated on a massive or systematic basis 

may benefit in particular from the creation of a truth commission or other commission of inquiry 

to establish the facts surrounding those violations so that the truth may be ascertained and to 

prevent the disappearance of evidence. Regardless of whether a State establishes such a body, 

it must ensure the preservation of, and access to, archives concerning violations of human rights 

and humanitarian law. 

B. Commissions of inquiry 

PRINCIPLE 6. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ROLE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 


To the greatest extent possible, decisions to establish a truth commission, define its terms of 

reference and determine its composition should be based upon broad public consultations in 

which the views of victims and survivors especially are sought. Special efforts should be made to 

ensure that men and women participate in these deliberations on a basis of equality. In recognition 

of the dignity of victims and their families, investigations undertaken by truth commissions should 

be conducted with the object in particular of securing recognition of such parts of the truth as were 

formerly denied. 

PRINCIPLE 7. GUARANTEES OF INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIALITY AND COMPETENCE 

Commissions of inquiry, including truth commissions, must be established through procedures that 

ensure their independence, impartiality and competence. To this end, the terms of reference of 

commissions of inquiry, including commissions that are international in character, should respect 

the following guidelines: 

(a) They shall be constituted in accordance with criteria making clear to the public the competence 

and impartiality of their members, including expertise within their membership in the field of 

human rights and, if relevant, of humanitarian law. They shall also be constituted in accordance 

with conditions ensuring their independence, in particular by the irremovability of their members 

during their terms of office except on grounds of incapacity or behaviour rendering them unfit 

to discharge their duties and pursuant to procedures ensuring fair, impartial and independent 

determinations; 

(b) Their members shall enjoy whatever privileges and immunities are necessary for their 

protection, including in the period following their mission, especially in respect of any defamation 

proceedings or other civil or criminal action brought against them on the basis of facts or 

opinions contained in the commissions’ reports; 

(c) In determining membership, concerted efforts should be made to ensure adequate 

representation of women as well as of other appropriate groups whose members have been 

especially vulnerable to human rights violations. 

PRINCIPLE 8. DEFINITION OF A COMMISSION’S TERMS OF REFERENCE 

To avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, the commission’s terms of reference must be clearly defined 

and must be consistent with the principle that commissions of inquiry are not intended to act as 

substitutes for the civil, administrative or criminal courts. In particular, criminal courts alone have 

jurisdiction to establish individual criminal responsibility, with a view as appropriate to passing 

judgement and imposing a sentence. In addition to the guidelines set forth in principles 12 and 

13, the terms of reference of a commission of inquiry should incorporate or reflect the following 

stipulations: 

(a) The commission’s terms of reference may reaffirm its right: to seek the assistance of law 

enforcement authorities, if required, including for the purpose, subject to the terms of principle 10 

(a), of calling for testimonies; to inspect any places concerned in its investigations; and/or to call 

for the delivery of relevant documents; 

(b) If the commission has reason to believe that the life, health or safety of a person concerned 

by its inquiry is threatened or that there is a risk of losing an element of proof, it may seek court 

action under an emergency procedure or take other appropriate measures to end such threat or 

risk; 


(c) Investigations undertaken by a commission of inquiry may relate to all persons alleged to have 

been responsible for violations of human rights and/or humanitarian law, whether they ordered 

them or actually committed them, acting as perpetrators or accomplices, and whether they are 

public officials or members of quasi-governmental or private armed groups with any kind of 

link to the State, or of non-governmental armed movements. Commissions of inquiry may also 

consider the role of other actors in facilitating violations of human rights and humanitarian law; 

(d) Commissions of inquiry may have jurisdiction to consider all forms of violations of human rights 

and humanitarian law. Their investigations should focus as a matter of priority on violations 

constituting serious crimes under international law, including in particular violations of the 

fundamental rights of women and of other vulnerable groups; 

(e) Commissions of inquiry shall endeavour to safeguard evidence for later use in the 

administration of justice; 

(f) The terms of reference of commissions of inquiry should highlight the importance of preserving 

the commission’s archives. At the outset of their work, commissions should clarify the conditions 

that will govern access to their documents, including conditions aimed at preventing disclosure of 

confidential information while facilitating public access to their archives. 

PRINCIPLE 9. GUARANTEES FOR PERSONS IMPLICATED 

Before a commission identifies perpetrators in its report, the individuals concerned shall be entitled 

to the following guarantees: 

(a) The commission must try to corroborate information implicating individuals before they are 

named publicly; 

(b) The individuals implicated shall be afforded an opportunity to provide a statement setting forth 

their version of the facts either at a hearing convened by the commission while conducting its 

investigation or through submission of a document equivalent to a right of reply for inclusion in 

the commission’s file 

. 

PRINCIPLE 10. GUARANTEES FOR VICTIMS AND WITNESSES TESTIFYING ON THEIR 

BEHALF 

Effective measures shall be taken to ensure the security, physical and psychological well-being, 

and, where requested, the privacy of victims and witnesses who provide information to the 

commission. 

(a) Victims and witnesses testifying on their behalf may be called upon to testify before the 

commission only on a strictly voluntary basis; 

(b) Social workers and/or mental health-care practitioners should be authorized to assist victims, 

preferably in their own language, both during and after their testimony, especially in cases of 

sexual assault; 

(c) All expenses incurred by those giving testimony shall be borne by the State; 

(d) Information that might identify a witness who provided testimony pursuant to a promise 

of confidentially must be protected from disclosure. Victims providing testimony and other 

witnesses should in any event be informed of rules that will govern disclosure of information 

provided by them to the commission. Requests to provide information to the commission 

anonymously should be given serious consideration, especially in cases of sexual assault, and 


the commission should establish procedures to guarantee anonymity in appropriate cases, while 

allowing corroboration of the information provided, as necessary. 

PRINCIPLE 11. ADEQUATE RESOURCES FOR COMMISSIONS 

The commission shall be provided with: 

(a) Transparent funding to ensure that its independence is never in doubt; 

(b) Sufficient material and human resources to ensure that its credibility is never in doubt. 


PRINCIPLE 12. ADVISORY FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS 

The commission’s terms of reference should include provisions calling for it to include in its final 

report recommendations concerning legislative and other action to combat impunity. The terms 

of reference should ensure that the commission incorporates women’s experiences in its work, 

including its recommendations. When establishing a commission of inquiry, the Government 

should undertake to give due consideration to the commission’s recommendations. 

PRINCIPLE 13. PUBLICIZING THE COMMISSION’S REPORTS 

For security reasons or to avoid pressure on witnesses and commission members, the 

commission’s terms of reference may stipulate that relevant portions of its inquiry shall be kept 

confidential. The commission’s final report, on the other hand, shall be made public in full and shall 

be disseminated as widely as possible. 

PRINCIPLE 14. MEASURES FOR THE PRESERVATION OF ARCHIVES 

The right to know implies that archives must be preserved. Technical measures and penalties 

should be applied to prevent any removal, destruction, concealment or falsification of archives, 

especially for the purpose of ensuring the impunity of perpetrators of violations of human rights 

and/or humanitarian law. 

PRINCIPLE 15. MEASURES FOR FACILITATING ACCESS TO ARCHIVES 

Access to archives shall be facilitated in order to enable victims and their relatives to claim their 

rights. Access shall be facilitated, as necessary, for persons implicated, who request it for their 

defence. Access to archives should also be facilitated in the interest of historical research, subject 

to reasonable restrictions aimed at safeguarding the privacy and security of victims and other 

individuals. Formal requirements governing access may not be used for purposes of censorship. 

PRINCIPLE 16. COOPERATION BETWEEN ARCHIVE DEPARTMENTS AND THE COURTS AND 

NON-JUDICIAL COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY 

Courts and non-judicial commissions of inquiry, as well as investigators reporting to them, must 

have access to relevant archives. This principle must be implemented in a manner that respects 

applicable privacy concerns, including in particular assurances of confidentiality provided to victims 

and other witnesses as a precondition of their testimony. Access may not be denied on grounds 

of national security unless, in exceptional circumstances, the restriction has been prescribed by 

law; the Government has demonstrated that the restriction is necessary in a democratic society 

to protect a legitimate national security interest; and the denial is subject to independent judicial 

review.

PRINCIPLE 17. SPECIFIC MEASURES RELATING TO ARCHIVES CONTAINING NAMES 

(a) For the purposes of this principle, archives containing names shall be understood to be those 

archives containing information that makes it possible, directly or indirectly, to identify the 

individuals to whom they relate; 

(b) All persons shall be entitled to know whether their name appears in State archives and, if it 

does, by virtue of their right of access, to challenge the validity of the information concerning 

them by exercising a right of reply. The challenged document should include a cross-reference 

to the document challenging its validity and both must be made available together whenever the 

former is requested. Access to the files of commissions of inquiry must be balanced against the 

legitimate expectations of confidentiality of victims and other witnesses testifying on their behalf 

in accordance with principles 8 (f) and 10 (d). 

PRINCIPLE 18. SPECIFIC MEASURES RELATED TO THE RESTORATION OF OR TRANSITION 

TO DEMOCRACY AND/OR PEACE 

(a) Measures should be taken to place each archive centre under the responsibility of a specifically 

designated office; 

(b) When inventorying and assessing the reliability of stored archives, special attention should be 

given to archives relating to places of detention and other sites of serious violations of human 

rights and/or humanitarian law such as torture, in particular when the existence of such places 

was not officially recognized; 

(c) Third countries shall be expected to cooperate with a view to communicating or restituting 

archives for the purpose of establishing the truth. 

III. THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE 


PRINCIPLE 19. DUTIES OF STATES WITH REGARD TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 

States shall undertake prompt, thorough, independent and impartial investigations of violations 

of human rights and international humanitarian law and take appropriate measures in respect of 

the perpetrators, particularly in the area of criminal justice, by ensuring that those responsible 

for serious crimes under international law are prosecuted, tried and duly punished. Although the 

decision to prosecute lies primarily within the competence of the State, victims, their families 

and heirs should be able to institute proceedings, on either an individual or a collective basis, 

particularly as parties civiles or as persons conducting private prosecutions in States whose law 

of criminal procedure recognizes these procedures. States should guarantee broad legal standing 

in the judicial process to any wronged party and to any person or non-governmental organization 

having a legitimate interest therein. 

B. Distribution of jurisdiction between national, foreign, international and internationalized courts 

PRINCIPLE 20. JURISDICTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL 

TRIBUNALS 

It remains the rule that States have primary responsibility to exercise jurisdiction over serious 

crimes under international law. In accordance with the terms of their statutes, international and 

internationalized criminal tribunals may exercise concurrent jurisdiction when national courts 

cannot offer satisfactory guarantees of independence and impartiality or are materially unable or 

unwilling to conduct effective investigations or prosecutions. States must ensure that they fully 

satisfy their legal obligations in respect of international and internationalized criminal tribunals, 


including where necessary through the enactment of domestic legislation that enables States 

to fulfil obligations that arise through their adherence to the Rome Statute of the International 

Criminal Court or under other binding instruments, and through implementation of applicable 

obligations to apprehend and surrender suspects and to cooperate in respect of evidence. 

PRINCIPLE 21. MEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING UNIVERSAL AND INTERNATIONAL 

JURISDICTION 

States should undertake effective measures, including the adoption or amendment of internal 

legislation, that are necessary to enable their courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over serious 

crimes under international law in accordance with applicable principles of customary and treaty 

law. States must ensure that they fully implement any legal obligations they have assumed to 

institute criminal proceedings against persons with respect to whom there is credible evidence 

of individual responsibility for serious crimes under international law if they do not extradite the 

suspects or transfer them for prosecution before an international or internationalized tribunal. 

C. Restrictions on rules of law justified by action to combat impunity 


PRINCIPLE 22. NATURE OF RESTRICTIVE MEASURES 

States should adopt and enforce safeguards against any abuse of rules such as those pertaining 

to prescription, amnesty, right to asylum, refusal to extradite, non bis in idem, due obedience, 

official immunities, repentance, the jurisdiction of military courts and the irremovability of judges 

that fosters or contributes to impunity. 

PRINCIPLE 23. RESTRICTIONS ON PRESCRIPTION 

Prescription - of prosecution or penalty - in criminal cases shall not run for such period as no 

effective remedy is available. Prescription shall not apply to crimes under international law that are 

by their nature imprescriptible. When it does apply, prescription shall not be effective against civil 

or administrative actions brought by victims seeking reparation for their injuries. 

PRINCIPLE 24. RESTRICTIONS AND OTHER MEASURES RELATING TO AMNESTY 

Even when intended to establish conditions conducive to a peace agreement or to foster national 

reconciliation, amnesty and other measures of clemency shall be kept within the following bounds: 

(a) The perpetrators of serious crimes under international law may not benefit from such 

measures until such time as the State has met the obligations to which principle 19 refers or 

the perpetrators have been prosecuted before a court with jurisdiction - whether international, 

internationalized or national - outside the State in question; 

(b) Amnesties and other measures of clemency shall be without effect with respect to the victims’ 

right to reparation, to which principles 31 through 34 refer, and shall not prejudice the right to 

know; 

(c) Insofar as it may be interpreted as an admission of guilt, amnesty cannot be imposed on 

individuals prosecuted or sentenced for acts connected with the peaceful exercise of their right 

to freedom of opinion and expression. When they have merely exercised this legitimate right, 

as guaranteed by articles 18 to 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 18, 19, 

21 and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the law shall consider any

judicial or other decision concerning them to be null and void; their detention shall be ended 

unconditionally and without delay; 

(d) Any individual convicted of offences other than those to which paragraph (c) of this principle 

refers who comes within the scope of an amnesty is entitled to refuse it and request a retrial, 

if he or she has been tried without benefit of the right to a fair hearing guaranteed by articles 

10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 9, 14 and 15 of the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or if he or she was convicted on the basis of 

a statement established to have been made as a result of inhuman or degrading interrogation, 

especially under torture. 

PRINCIPLE 25. RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF ASYLUM 

Under article 1, paragraph 2, of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, adopted by the General 

Assembly on 14 December 1967, and article 1 F of the Convention relating to the Status of 

Refugees of 28 July 1951, States may not extend such protective status, including diplomatic 

asylum, to persons with respect to whom there are serious reasons to believe that they have 

committed a serious crime under international law. 

PRINCIPLE 26. RESTRICTIONS ON EXTRADITION/NON BIS IN IDEM 

(a) Persons who have committed serious crimes under international law may not, in order to avoid 

extradition, avail themselves of the favourable provisions generally relating to political offences 

or of the principle of non-extradition of nationals. Extradition should always be denied, however, 

especially by abolitionist countries, if the individual concerned risks the death penalty in the 

requesting country. Extradition should also be denied where there are substantial grounds for 

believing that the suspect would be in danger of being subjected to gross violations of human 

rights such as torture; enforced disappearance; or extra-legal, arbitrary or summary execution. 

If extradition is denied on these grounds, the requested State shall submit the case to its 

competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution; 

(b) The fact that an individual has previously been tried in connection with a serious crime under 

international law shall not prevent his or her prosecution with respect to the same conduct if 

the purpose of the previous proceedings was to shield the person concerned from criminal 

responsibility, or if those proceedings otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially 

in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and were 

conducted in a manner that, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the 

person concerned to justice. 

PRINCIPLE 27. RESTRICTIONS ON JUSTIFICATIONS RELATED TO DUE OBEDIENCE, 

SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY, AND OFFICIAL STATUS 

(a) The fact that the perpetrator of violations acted on the orders of his or her Government or 

of a superior does not exempt him or her from responsibility, in particular criminal, but may be 

regarded as grounds for reducing the sentence, in conformity with principles of justice; 

(b) The fact that violations have been committed by a subordinate does not exempt that 

subordinate’s superiors from responsibility, in particular criminal, if they knew or had at the time 

reason to know that the subordinate was committing or about to commit such a crime and they 

did not take all the necessary measures within their power to prevent or punish the crime; 

(c) The official status of the perpetrator of a crime under international law - even if acting as head 

of State or Government - does not exempt him or her from criminal or other responsibility and is 

not grounds for a reduction of sentence. 


PRINCIPLE 28. RESTRICTIONS ON THE EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION ON DISCLOSURE OR 

REPENTANCE 

The fact that a perpetrator discloses the violations that he, she or others have committed in order 

to benefit from the favourable provisions of legislation on disclosure or repentance cannot exempt 

him or her from criminal or other responsibility. The disclosure may only provide grounds for a 

reduction of sentence in order to encourage revelation of the truth. When disclosures may subject 

a perpetrator to persecution, principle 25 notwithstanding, the person making the disclosure may 

be granted asylum - not refugee status - in order to facilitate revelation of the truth. 

PRINCIPLE 29. RESTRICTIONS ON THE JURISDICTION OF MILITARY COURTS 

The jurisdiction of military tribunals must be restricted solely to specifically military offences 

committed by military personnel, to the exclusion of human rights violations, which shall come 

under the jurisdiction of the ordinary domestic courts or, where appropriate, in the case of serious 

crimes under international law, of an international or internationalized criminal court. 

PRINCIPLE 30. RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE IRREMOVABILITY OF JUDGES 

The principle of irremovability, as the basic guarantee of the independence of judges, must be 

observed in respect of judges who have been appointed in conformity with the requirements of 

the rule of law. Conversely, judges unlawfully appointed or who derive their judicial power from 

an act of allegiance may be relieved of their functions by law in accordance with the principle of 

parallelism. They must be provided an opportunity to challenge their dismissal in proceedings that 

meet the criteria of independence and impartiality with a view toward seeking reinstatement. 

IV. THE RIGHT TO REPARATION/GUARANTEES OF NON-RECURRENCE 

A. The right to reparation 

PRINCIPLE 31. RIGHTS AND DUTIES ARISING OUT OF THE OBLIGATION TO MAKE 

REPARATION 

Any human rights violation gives rise to a right to reparation on the part of the victim or his or her 

beneficiaries, implying a duty on the part of the State to make reparation and the possibility for the 

victim to seek redress from the perpetrator. 


PRINCIPLE 32. REPARATION PROCEDURES 

All victims shall have access to a readily available, prompt and effective remedy in the form of 

criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings subject to the restrictions on prescription 

set forth in principle 23. In exercising this right, they shall be afforded protection against 

intimidation and reprisals. Reparations may also be provided through programmes, based upon 

legislative or administrative measures, funded by national or international sources, addressed to 

individuals and to communities. Victims and other sectors of civil society should play a meaningful 

role in the design and implementation of such programmes. Concerted efforts should be made to 

ensure that women and minority groups participate in public consultations aimed at developing, 

implementing, and assessing reparations programmes. Exercise of the right to reparation includes 

access to applicable international and regional procedures.

PRINCIPLE 33. PUBLICIZING REPARATION PROCEDURES 

Ad hoc procedures enabling victims to exercise their right to reparation should be given the widest 

possible publicity by private as well as public communication media. Such dissemination should 

take place both within and outside the country, including through consular services, particularly in 

countries to which large numbers of victims have been forced into exile. 

PRINCIPLE 34. SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO REPARATION 

The right to reparation shall cover all injuries suffered by victims; it shall include measures of 

restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction as provided by international law. In the 

case of forced disappearance, the family of the direct victim has an imprescriptible right to be 

informed of the fate and/or whereabouts of the disappeared person and, in the event of decease, 

that person’s body must be returned to the family as soon as it has been identified, regardless of 

whether the perpetrators have been identified or prosecuted. 

B. Guarantees of non-recurrence of violations 

PRINCIPLE 35. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 

States shall ensure that victims do not again have to endure violations of their rights. To this end, 

States must undertake institutional reforms and other measures necessary to ensure respect for 

the rule of law, foster and sustain a culture of respect for human rights, and restore or establish 

public trust in government institutions. Adequate representation of women and minority groups 

in public institutions is essential to the achievement of these aims. Institutional reforms aimed 

at preventing a recurrence of violations should be developed through a process of broad public 

consultations, including the participation of victims and other sectors of civil society. Such reforms 

should advance the following objectives: 

(a) Consistent adherence by public institutions to the rule of law; 

(b) The repeal of laws that contribute to or authorize violations of human rights and/or 

humanitarian law and enactment of legislative and other measures necessary to ensure 

respect for human rights and humanitarian law, including measures that safeguard democratic 

institutions and processes; 

(c) Civilian control of military and security forces and intelligence services and disbandment of 

parastatal armed forces; 

(d) Reintegration of children involved in armed conflict into society. 

PRINCIPLE 36. REFORM OF STATE INSTITUTIONS 

States must take all necessary measures, including legislative and administrative reforms, to 

ensure that public institutions are organized in a manner that ensures respect for the rule of law 

and protection of human rights. At a minimum, States should undertake the following measures: 

(a) Public officials and employees who are personally responsible for gross violations of human rights, 

in particular those involved in military, security, police, intelligence and judicial sectors, shall not 

continue to serve in State institutions. Their removal shall comply with the requirements of due process 

of law and the principle of non-discrimination. Persons formally charged with individual responsibility 

for serious crimes under international law shall be suspended from official duties during the criminal or 

disciplinary proceedings; 

(b) With respect to the judiciary, States must undertake all other measures necessary to assure the 

independent, impartial and effective operation of courts in accordance with international standards 

of due process. Habeas corpus, by whatever name it may be known, must be considered a nonderogable 

right; 

(c) Civilian control of military and security forces as well as of intelligence agencies must be ensured 

and, where necessary, established or restored. To this end, States should establish effective 


institutions of civilian oversight over military and security forces and intelligence agencies, including 

legislative oversight bodies; 

(d) Civil complaint procedures should be established and their effective operation assured; 

(e) Public officials and employees, in particular those involved in military, security, police, intelligence 

and judicial sectors, should receive comprehensive and ongoing training in human rights and, 

where applicable, humanitarian law standards and in implementation of those standards. 

PRINCIPLE 37. DISBANDMENT OF PARASTATAL ARMED FORCES/DEMOBILIZATION AND 

SOCIAL REINTEGRATION OF CHILDREN 

Parastatal or unofficial armed groups shall be demobilized and disbanded. Their position in or 

links with State institutions, including in particular the army, police, intelligence and security forces, 

should be thoroughly investigated and the information thus acquired made public. States should 

draw up a reconversion plan to ensure the social reintegration of the members of such groups. 

Measures should be taken to secure the cooperation of third countries that might have contributed 

to the creation and development of such groups,particularly through financial or logistical support. 

Children who have been recruited or used in hostilities shall be demobilized or otherwise released 

from service. States shall, when necessary, accord these children all appropriate assistance for 

their physical and psychological recovery and their social integration. 

PRINCIPLE 38. REFORM OF LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS CONTRIBUTING TO IMPUNITY 

Legislation and administrative regulations and institutions that contribute to or legitimize human 

rights violations must be repealed or abolished. In particular, emergency legislation and courts 

of any kind must be repealed or abolished insofar as they infringe the fundamental rights and 

freedoms guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Legislative measures necessary to ensure protection of 

human rights and to safeguard democratic institutions and processes must be enacted. As a basis 

for such reforms, during periods of restoration of or transition to democracy and/or peace States 

should undertake a comprehensive review of legislation and administrative regulations. 


EXCERPTS FROM THE PROGRESS REPORT 

ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERIM 

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LLRC 

The Inter-Agency Advisory Committee (IAAC) 

takes this opportunity to record the progress 

made so far on the implementation of the interim 

recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt 

and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). The 

Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission 

(LLRC) was established by HE the President 

pursuant to the Warrant dated 15 May 2010. 

The LLRC commended its public sitting on 11 

August 2010. On 13 September 2010, the LLRC 

submitted its interim recommendations to H. E. 

the President. The interim recommendations 

were based on extensive testimony received 

by the LLRC during its interaction with affected 

civilians following field visits to several locations 

in the conflict-affected areas, including places 

of detention, rehabilitation and IDP welfare 

centres. H. E. the President of Sri Lanka 

endorsing the importance of the objective behind 

the LLRC interim recommendations, supported 

the adoption in Cabinet of the Paper dated 

27th October 2010 to establish an Inter-Agency 

Advisory Committee (IAAC) to facilitate the 

implementation of the interim recommendations. 

The objective of the IAAC is to implement 

these recommendations of the LLRC through 

practical measures and to strengthen the related 

processes that are already underway. The 

progress on the recommendations of the LLRC 

is summarized as follows: 

(iii) Administration and Language issues 

The GoSL acknowledges the need to ensure 

language rights of all citizens particularly in 

the Tamil speaking areas of Sri Lanka. The 

Language Policy of Sri Lanka is enshrined in 

Chapter IV of the Constitution of Sri Lanka, as 

amended by the 13th Amendment and the 16th 

Amendment. It is also reflected by the vision of 

H.E. the President of Sri Lanka who has firmly 

advocated a ‘Trilingual Sri Lanka’. 

Members of the Tamil community from the 

North & the East have been enlisted to the 

Police Department in the year 2010, as there 

was an urgent need for such offices capable 

of performing duties in the Tamil language in 

the newly re-established Police Stations in the 

Northern and Easter Provinces: 

On 01.06.2010 Police Constable 265 

On 01.07.2010 Police Constable 54 

On 01.06.2010 Women Police Constable 16 

Total 335 

A further recruitment of Tamil speaking Police 

Officers will be done in future as follows: 

Sub Inspector of Police 50 

Women Sub-Inspector of Police 25 

Police Constable 350 

Women Police Constable 50 

Total 475 

Conclusion 

Whilst the IAARC offers its gratitude to His 

Excellency the President for all the directions 

that were given at all times to facilitate the work 

of the IAAC and the progress made so far on the 

recommendations, the IAARC also takes this 

opportunity to thank all stakeholders from civil 

society and from government, for their unstinted 

support and cooperation. While soliciting and 

looking forward to the continued corporation of 

all concerned in this national exercise of nation 

building, the IAAC reiterates its commitment to 

exploring further avenues towards the effective 

implementation of the interim recommendation in 

their full plenitude 

Full report can be accessed at http://www. 

srilanka-botschaft.de/Images_and_Basics/pdfs/ 

Circular/49.pdf 



Published in November, 2011 


100/19A 

Welikadawatta Road 

Rajagiriya, Sri Lanka 

0114-341514 

fax:0112866224 

© CHR- Sri Lanka 2011

The Commissioners of LLRC

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?