Kosovo's Post-independence Inter-clan Conflict - HUMSEC
Kosovo's Post-independence Inter-clan Conflict - HUMSEC
Kosovo's Post-independence Inter-clan Conflict - HUMSEC
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
<strong>HUMSEC</strong> Journal, Issue 2<br />
Kosovo’s <strong>Post</strong>-<strong>independence</strong> <strong>Inter</strong>-<strong>clan</strong> <strong>Conflict</strong><br />
mush Haradinaj respectively. Each political party has a clearly defined regional support<br />
base. AAK, for example, is supported by the <strong>clan</strong>s close to Haradinaj in the Dukagjini region.<br />
Drenica region is the home base of PDK since both the former PDK leader Jakup<br />
Krasniqi and former KLA leader and spokesman Hashim Thaci come from Drenica. 50 At<br />
the local level, the positions of mayors and municipal council advisors are distributed in a<br />
similar fashion.<br />
The schism in the political arena today is between LDK and PDK, with a fragile coalition<br />
between LDK and AAK. 51 While this coalition initially reduced the tensions in the Dukagjini<br />
region, the blood feud murder of Sadik Musaj and Enver Haradinaj and the anticipation<br />
of possible retaliatory attacks risk escalating the tensions between the two parties. As the<br />
<strong>Inter</strong>national Crisis Group reports, PDK and media allegations that LDK members from<br />
western Kosovo will testify against Haradinaj at The Hague are further fueling the fire. 52<br />
In the absence of a unifying leader at a national level such as former President Rugova,<br />
Kosovo politics will be fiercely contested after <strong>independence</strong>. One would think that the <strong>independence</strong><br />
would unite conflicting political parties so that they could jointly work for the<br />
common good of a prospering Kosovo. However, the schisms between the parties are deep,<br />
and differences will only be overcome with great difficulty in a post-<strong>independence</strong> setting.<br />
The intricate interplay of inter-<strong>clan</strong> relations based on political affiliations, former KLA or<br />
FARK affiliations, and <strong>clan</strong> balancing in the illegal trade and trafficking will define each<br />
party’s struggle for greater power and status. With feuding <strong>clan</strong>s and revenge killings in the<br />
background, the competition between LDK, PDK and AAK will be profoundly feverish.<br />
From today’s perspective, one could only speculate about the end result of this competition.<br />
In conclusion, the Code of Leke Dukagjini is enshrined deeply in the culture and lifestyle of<br />
the Kosovo Albanians. Even after <strong>independence</strong>, when the security dilemma particularly<br />
vis-à-vis Serbia is likely to decrease, Kosovo will still remain unstable because of the<br />
heated inter-<strong>clan</strong> relations. Clan-based kinship ties are likely to be the basis for the mobilization<br />
of manipulative elites who will struggle to gain wealth, power and status. The formation<br />
of a stable central government will be impeded by the interests of powerful <strong>clan</strong>s who<br />
permeate not only the political life but also reign in the “underground” world of the Albanian<br />
mafia. A stable government will be possible only if a solution can be found for Kosovo’s<br />
inter-<strong>clan</strong> conflict.<br />
50 <strong>Inter</strong>national Crisis Group, Kosovo After Haradinaj, at p. 18.<br />
51 <strong>Inter</strong>national Crisis Group, Kosovo After Haradinaj, at p. 19.<br />
52 <strong>Inter</strong>national Crisis Group, Kosovo After Haradinaj, at p. 21. <strong>Inter</strong>estingly, The Hague acquitted Haradinaj<br />
in Spring 2008.<br />
124