Kosovo's Post-independence Inter-clan Conflict - HUMSEC

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HUMSEC Journal, Issue 2 Kosovo’s Post-independence Inter-clan Conflict Despite primordial explanations of ethnic conflict, which blame seething “ancient hatreds” for inter-group violence, interethnic disputes result from a complex interplay of multiple causal mechanisms. These include frustrations associated with unequal distribution and unequal growth rate of wealth, power and status that could be either real or perceived. Ethnic entrepreneurs determined to fulfill their opportunistic goals of gaining power often manipulate the perceptions about the ethnic group they oppose. Other explanations for inter-ethnic violence focus on the role of fear and the associated security dilemmas. Ethnic violence is oftentimes labeled as irrational. However, Rui de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast’s game theory model shows that the actions leading to ethnic conflict are “rational, fear-driven support of violence by average citizens”. 24 According to their model, a member of group A perceives group B’s actions “as a given,” without differentiating that not all B members act the same way. Driven by fear and uncertainty vis-à-vis B leaders’ intentions, A members face a security dilemma. A members then behave in ways that produce violence. This could be different if A’s perception of B is not taken as a given. As in the case of Milosevic who feared losing power when the former Yugoslavia disintegrated, attempts by weak leaders to use violence as a tool of manipulation, and as way of stoking the population’s fear of victimization have powerful causal influence on ethnic conflict. 25 Jeffrey Ross proposes another model for the rise of ethnic violence. Two causal mechanisms work simultaneously. First, the existence of social, cultural, historical and economic discontent and the presence of a culture of protest and violence, which are mutually reinforcing, fuel perceived or real grievances. 26 Second, the failure of a counter-terrorism organization creates opportunities for the organizational development of terrorism and the trafficking and stockpiling of weapons and explosives. 27 When traditional channels for resolving social and political discontent do not address popular grievances, some people find an outlet for the expression of their grievances through powerful terrorist organizations. This complex interplay of factors then results in violence against a particular identity group. The Ross model, when applied to Kosovo, could explain the inter-clan violence that is likely to erupt after independence. Prior to the independence, the social, cultural, historical and economic discontent in Kosovo centered around (1) the unresolved status, (2) the still 24 Figueiredo, Rui de and Barry Weingast, The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict, in Walter; Barbara and Jack Snyder (eds.MFKKFBN), Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, at p. 292. 25 Figueiredo, Rui de and Barry Weingast, The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict, at pp. 271-275. 26 Ross, Jeffrey, The Rise and Decline of Quebecois Separatist Terrorism in: Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (Volume 18, Issue 4), 1995, at p. 291. 27 Ross, Jeffrey, The Rise and Decline of Quebecois Separatist Terrorism, at p. 288. 118
HUMSEC Journal, Issue 2 Kosovo’s Post-independence Inter-clan Conflict large number of missing persons, and (3) UNMIK’s “occupation” of Kosovo. It is likely that after independence the issue of missing persons will still drive popular unrest. After independence, the discontent associated with the “foreign occupation” will partially decrease. Discontent towards the international presence in Kosovo will continue as an international authority is likely to remain in charge of minority affairs and external borders. Furthermore, as evidenced during the March 2004 riots and, more recently, during the 2006 attacks against UNMIK Headquarters and the Assembly of Kosovo, a culture of protest does exist in Kosovo and is likely to persist after independence. 28 Similarly, the culture of violence enshrined in the Code of Leke Dukagjini will continue long after independence. Not only is the Code a basis for social interaction, but unless a new Anton Cetta and a new reconciliation movement come into existence, Kosovo’s social and political life will continue to be marred by blood feuds. Furthermore, the law enforcement authorities’ attempt to counter terrorist activities in Kosovo has completely failed. Adjusted to the particularities of Kosovo, the Ross model’s definition of terrorism could be redefined to include violence perpetrated by the Kosovo Albanian mafia as it protects its territory of operation and the supply chain of resources and materials to other criminal groups. Permeable borders and the diffusion of clan politics among law enforcement authorities, including border control, have contributed to the organizational strength of the mafia, which is now equipped with readily available weapons smuggled through Macedonia and Albania. After independence, it is likely that the mafia will continue to grow stronger. Powerful clans who control both the mafia and the government will continue to have an interest in a weak central government. The Ross model, therefore, suggests that it is plausible to expect that inter-clan violence will continue after independence as clans compete for wealth, power and status. IV. Clan-based Divisions After 1999 Inter-clan relations during the past eight years indicate a growing number of blood feuds. The “tit-for-tat” interactions between the Musaj and the Haradinaj clans - both very powerful clans from the Dukagjini region of Western Kosovo - exemplify Kosovo Albanians’ practice of blood feuds and their observance of the Code. The significance of this particular blood feud is high because of the political repercussions of a blood feud that entangles Kosovo political elite in endless retaliatory attacks. 28 Southeast European Times, UNMIK Headquarters in Pristina Attacked by Protesters, 29 November 2006. Available online at: http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2006/11/29/feature-01. 119
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Kosovo's Post-independence Inter-clan Conflict - HUMSEC

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