STATE V. REDDICK: Does Ramos Apply Retroactively on State Collateral Review?

<strong>STATE</strong> V. <strong>REDDICK</strong>: DOES RAMOS APPLY RETROACTIVELY ON <strong>STATE</strong>
COLLATERAL REVIEW?
Meghan Drago
INTRODUCTION
Following the decision made in <strong>Ramos</strong> v. Louisiana, the Louisiana Supreme Court has an
opportunity to establish a new precedent and provide a remedy for constitutional violations
existing in the Louisiana judicial system since 1898.
This casenote will consider the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision accrued in State v.
Reddick. First, it will discuss the factual settings and conclusions rendered by the district and
appellate courts. Second, it will present the legal history and background of the law applicable to
this case. Next, it will address the Court’s opinion and reasoning given in Reddick. Lastly, this
casenote will examine the effect this decision will have on both existing and future law and policy,
and whether the Court reached the correct conclusion.
FACTS AND HOLDING
It all began in 1993 when a jury, by a vote of ten to two, 1 convicted respondent Reginal
Reddick of second-degree murder for the murder of Al Moliere. 2 Following the finality of his
conviction in 1998, Reddick was sentenced to life imprisonment, without the benefit of parole. 3
1
“At the time of Reddick’s trial, the Louisiana Constitution required only ten out of 12 jurors to render a verdict.”
State v. Reddick, 2021-01893, p. 2 (La. 10/21/22), 351 So. 3d 273, 274 (citing La. Const. art. I, § 17 (1974)). This
rule was upheld as constitutional and enforceable under Louisiana law “until the Constitution was amended in 2018
to require unanimous verdicts in prospective cases, i.e., those in which the offense was committed on or after
January 1, 2019.” Id. (citing S.B. 243, 2018 Leg. Reg. Sess. (La. 2018)).
2
Id.
3
Id.
1

At the time the Supreme Court decided <strong>Ramos</strong>, 4 Reddick’s conviction and sentence were
already made final. 5 Therefore, on March 30, 2021, he filed an application for post-conviction
relief, requesting retroactive application of the <strong>Ramos</strong> rule to his conviction. Following the
Supreme Court’s decision established in Edwards v. Vannoy, 6 the District Court granted Reddick’s
application for post-conviction relief, finding that <strong>Ramos</strong> applied retroactively. 7 The Louisiana
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to review the decision. 8 Following the Fourth Circuit’s
refusal, the State filed a writ application with the Louisiana Supreme Court requesting review of
the lower court’s prior decisions. 9 The Court granted the writ to “resolve a circuit split as to
whether the new rule announced by the Supreme Court in <strong>Ramos</strong> v. Louisiana . . . applies
retroactively to cases on state collateral review.” 10 In result, the Court held that jury-unanimity
rule from <strong>Ramos</strong> does not apply retroactively in Louisiana on state collateral review. 11
BACKGROUND
This section of the casenote will address the background of the law relevant to this case.
First, it addresses the retroactive application of new criminal rules. Then, it will address the
constitutional jurisprudence surrounding the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury.
4
“In <strong>Ramos</strong> v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ----, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020), the United State Supreme Court
overturned Apocada [v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)] and held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as
incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant
of a serious offense and this requirement applies equally to state and federal criminal trials.” Id. at 2-3, 351 So. 3d at
274-75 (citing <strong>Ramos</strong>, 140 S. Ct. 1390 at 1395-96) (footnote omitted).
5
Id. at 3, 351 So. 3d at 275.
6
“[I]n Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. ----, 141 S.Ct. 1547, 209 L.Ed.2d 651 (2021), the Supreme Court declined to
apply the new rule announced in <strong>Ramos</strong> retroactively to final conviction on federal habeas review.” Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. (citation omitted).
9
Id.
10
Id. at 1, 351 So. 3d at 274.
11
Id.
2

A. Retroactivity of New Criminal Rules
Retroactivity jurisprudence is “concerned, not with the question whether a constitutional
violation occurred, but with the availability or nonavailability of remedies.” 12 Meaning,
retroactivity is not based on whether a constitutional violation occurred. 13 For example, the
Supreme Court in <strong>Ramos</strong> held “that all nonunanimous guilty verdicts violated the Sixth
Amendment.” 14 Therefore, the retroactivity question became “whether that violation will be
remedied in cases where the conviction was final when the case announcing the newly-recognized
right was decided.” 15
In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court established a new retroactivity analysis for cases on
federal habeas review, which focuses on concerns for federalism, comity, and finality. 16 The first
step of the inquiry requires distinguishing between old and new rules. 17 In other words, the court
must determine which date the conviction became final because new criminal rules exclusively
apply to all cases on direct review but not those case established as final. 18 After classifying the
rule as new, the court must determine whether the rule falls within one of the two exceptions
articulated by the Supreme Court: (i) a substantive “rule prohibiting a certain category of
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense,” and (ii) “watershed rules
of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal
proceeding.” 19 “In 1992, Louisiana adopted the Supreme Court’s multi-step framework established
12
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 290-91 (2008).
13
Id.
14
Reddick, 2021-01893 at 4, 351 So. 3d at 275.
15
Id.
16
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); see Withrown v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 699 (1993) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the “prudential concerns” or “equity and federalism”
articulated in Teague).
17
See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
18
Id.
19
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1990) (citations and internal quotes omitted).
3

in Teague to determine whether new rules of constitutional criminal law will be applied
retroactively to cases on both state and federal collateral review. 20
The Court in Danforth v. Minnesota further elaborated on the Teague decision. 21 In doing so,
the Court held that states could give greater retroactive effect to new rules in the state postconviction
context than the Supreme Court affords in the federal habeas context. 22 Furthermore,
the concerns of comity and federalism that carried greater weight in the Teague analysis are not
present during state collateral review. 23 Thus, the federal interest in uniformity does not outweigh
the States’ authority, as independent sovereigns, to make and enforce their own laws so long as
they do not violate federal constitutional guarantees. 24
Similarly, in Edwards, the Supreme Court held that <strong>Ramos</strong>’ unanimity rule should not apply
retroactively because it was not a watershed rule of criminal procedure falling within Teague’s
second exception. 25 However, the Court did not stop its analysis there. 26 Additionally, the Court
found, since adopting the new retroactivity framework established in Teague, that it failed to
identify any rule that fell within the watershed exception. 27 Thus, no new criminal procedural rule
had applied retroactively. 28 The Court reached a very narrow conclusion and held that there is no
possibility that any new procedural rule would ever apply retroactively on federal habeas review. 29
20
Reddick, 2021-01893 at 5, 351 So. 3d at 276 (citing State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitely, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1297 (La.
1992) (“noting that the considerations of finality recognized in Teague are ‘equally applicable in state proceedings
as well as federal proceedings’”)).
21
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 282 (2008).
22
Id. at 289 (citation omitted).
23
Id. at 279-80.
24
Id. at 280.
25
Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1559 (2021).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
4

Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court is required to apply “all new rules to cases on direct
review . . . and must apply all new substantive rules to cases on collateral review.” 30 Thus, “the
only choice left for the states is whether to apply new rules of criminal procedure to cases on state
collateral review.” 31
B. Sixth Amendment Right to Conviction by a Unanimous Jury
In the early years of Louisiana history, the Louisiana Supreme Court endorsed nonunanimous
verdicts for serious crimes. 32 It began in 1898, when Louisiana first endorsed nonunanimous
verdicts for serious crimes at a constitutional convention. 33 “According to one committee
chairman, the avowed purpose of that convention was to ‘establish the supremacy of the white
race,’ and the resulting document included many of the trappings of the Jim Crow era: a poll tax,
a combined literacy and property ownership test, and a grandfather clause that in practice exempted
white residents from the most onerous of these requirements.” 34 However, the delegates were not
only concerned with the prospect of African American voting. 35 A few days before the convention,
the U.S. Senate introduced an investigation into “whether Louisiana was systematically excluding
African-Americans from juries.” 36 As an attempt to avert national attention and to avoid the
likelihood of the Court striking down “any policy of overt discrimination against African-
American . . . juror[s] as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,” the delegates sabotaged
“African-American participation on juries in another way.” 37 In result, “the convention delegates
30
State v. Reddick, 2021-01893, p. 7 (La. 10/21/22), 351 So.3d 273, 277.
31
Id.
32
<strong>Ramos</strong> v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020).
33
Id.
34
Id. (citation omitted)._
35
Id.
36
Id. (citation omitted).
37
Id.
5

sculpted a ‘facially race-neutral’ rule permitting 10-to-2 verdicts in order ‘to ensure that African-
American juror service would be meaningless.’” 38
The Louisiana Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the Sixth Amendment requires
unanimity. 39 But does such requirement of unanimity apply to both “state and federal criminal
trials equally?” 40 In 1972, the Court attacked this unconventional scheme for the first time in
Apodaca v. Oregon 41 and Johnson v. Louisiana 42 (together “Apodaca”). In determining whether
unanimity serves an essential function of society, the four-Justice plurality in Apocada “concluded
that unanimity’s costs outweighed its benefits.” 43 Thus, it upheld the constitutionality of
nonunanimous verdicts. 44 Similarly, in Johnson, the Court held that nonunanimous jury verdict
satisfied the state’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 45 Although majority of the
justices in these two opinions recognized that the Sixth Amendment required unanimity, the
Supreme Court continued allowing nonunanimous verdicts in state trials; as a result, Louisiana
continued to enforce its nonunanimous verdict system. 46
It was not until several years later, in 2020, that <strong>Ramos</strong> overturned Apocada. 47 The <strong>Ramos</strong>
Court “explained the history of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of unanimity, and noted that it
applies equally to the states and federal system, promotes the fundamental notion of a fair and
reliable verdict, and is ‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice.’” 48
38
Id.
39
Id. at 1397.
40
Id.
41
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
42
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
43
<strong>Ramos</strong>, 140 S. Ct. at 1394.
44
Id.
45
Johnson, 406 U.S. at 362.
46
State v. Reddick, 2021-01893, p. 8 (La. 10/21/22), 351 So.3d 273, 278.
47
Id. 9, 351 So. 3d at 279.
48
Id.
6

THE COURT’S OPINION AND REASONING
Justice Crichton delivered the opinion of the Court, which granted the State’s writ
application to resolve a circuit split as to whether the new rule established by the Supreme Court
in <strong>Ramos</strong>, requiring a unanimous jury for criminal convictions, applies retroactively to cases on
state collateral review. 49 The Court, applying the framework founded in Teague, “but using the
authority expressly reserved to the states by the Supreme Court to determine which new rules of
criminal procedure will be applied retroactively on state collateral review, [found] that the <strong>Ramos</strong>
jury unanimity rule does not apply retroactively in Louisiana.” 50 The Court begins by
acknowledging “the strong reliance interests at stake and the high administrative burden that many
retrials would impose on [the Louisiana judicial] system.” 51 Further, citizens of the state voting to
amend the Louisiana Constitution to require unanimous jury verdicts, “d[id] so with prospective
effect only.” 52 Thus, this “decision of the people should not be disturbed by the judiciary, whose
role . . . [is] not to announce policy more rightfully reserved to the legislature.” 53
The Court relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards, which adhered to the Court’s
conclusion that the rule announced in <strong>Ramos</strong> was not watershed and therefore, did not warrant
retroactive application. 54 Critical to the Court’s analysis is this Court’s precedent which
emphasized that “‘[n]ew procedural rules do not apply retroactively on federal collateral
review.”’ 55 The <strong>Ramos</strong> rule is “momentous and consequential” just like previous Supreme Court
decisions that did not apply retroactively on federal collateral review, but this Court lacks any
49
Id. at 274.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1-2.
53
Id. at 2.
54
Id. at 11, 351 So. 3d at 280.
55
Id.
7

“good rationale for treating <strong>Ramos</strong> differently.” 56 Thus, the district court erred in deeming <strong>Ramos</strong>
retroactive. 57
Similarly, the Court rejected the respondent’s suggestion that the Court find that Louisiana
has a broader interpretation of watershed under Teague than that of the Supreme Court, while
heavily relying on the court’s previous criminal procedure application. 58 “[E]very time the
Supreme Court has examined whether a rule of criminal procedure is retroactive, it found it was
not” and Louisiana courts have consistently upheld those holdings. 59 Thus, the Court is “not
persuaded that a departure from such precedent is warranted here.” 60
Even though the Court declined to uphold the respondent’s watershed analysis, it also
rejected the state’s proposal that it find “no rule of criminal procedure can ever be retroactive in
Louisiana.” 61 Critical to the Court’s reasoning is its “authority under Danforth to retain the entirety
of the Teague approach, as adopted in Taylor, with one exception: replacing the “moribund”
watershed exception for new rules of criminal procedure with a consideration of factors that more
comprehensively take into account the totality of concerns that inform retroactivity.” 62
Focusing more on the factors that consider the totality of concerns that inform retroactivity,
the Court found that such concerns outweigh retroactive application of the <strong>Ramos</strong> rule. 63 First, in
determining the purpose to be served by the new rule, the Court concluded that <strong>Ramos</strong> greatly
emphasized the enormity of the right at stake, deeming jury unanimity to be ‘“fundamental to the
56
Id. at 11 (quoting Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1559 (2021)).
57
Id. at 12, 351 So. 3d at 281.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 12-13.
63
Id. at 16, 351 So.3d at 283.
8

American scheme of justice.”’ 64 Louisiana voters and the state legislature remedied the wrong
before the Supreme Court rules in <strong>Ramos</strong> in April 2020, however, only prospectively. 65 Second,
after establishing the purpose of the new rule, the majority proceeds to consider the
“reasonableness of reliance upon the old rule of criminal procedure and the duration of such
reliance.” 66 Despite the negative criticism of the Apocada decision exemplified throughout the
<strong>Ramos</strong> decision, it remained the Louisiana law relied upon until it was overruled by <strong>Ramos</strong> several
years later. 67 In other words, Apocada obtained enormous reliance by the judicial system of
Louisiana. 68 Thus, the Court found that the “thousands of cases tried during the nearly 50 years of
the state’s reasonable reliance on Supreme Court precedent upholding this procedure weighs
heavily against retroactive application of the <strong>Ramos</strong> rule.” 69 Lastly, while focusing upon the effect
on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of a new rule, the Court found that
applying <strong>Ramos</strong> retroactively to hundreds of cases involving individuals who were incarcerated
based on nonunanimous verdicts would pose practical problems that could impede the promotion
of justice. 70 The majority reasons that these extensive administration of justice concerns weigh
substantially against any benefit of retroactivity. 71 Thus, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
state and found the new rule of criminal procedure announced in <strong>Ramos</strong> requiring unanimity in
jury verdicts is not retroactive on state collateral review in Louisiana. 72
64
<strong>Ramos</strong> v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395-97. (“There can be no question that the Sixth Amendment’s unanimity
requirement applies to state and federal criminal trials equally.”).
65
Reddick, 2021-01893 at 14, 351 So.3d at 281 n.9.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 15, 351 So. 3d at 282.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 15, 351 So. 3d at 283.
71
Id. at 16.
72
Id.
9

An alternative view is well-established in Justice Genovese’s opinion. 73 He concludes that
<strong>Ramos</strong> was not a watershed rule and generally concurs with the majority that the <strong>Ramos</strong> “jury
unanimity rule does not apply retroactively to cases on [state level] collateral review.” 74 Differing
from the majority view, Justice Genovese believes that “only those defendants who were convicted
by non-unanimous verdicts due to racial animus are entitled to relief on collateral review.” 75
Therefore, a “non-unanimous jury verdict without racial animus would not qualify for relief on
collateral review.” 76 In his view, such racial animus is present “when the jury vote of an African
American is disenfranchised and discounted, which occurs when a jury can reach a verdict without
said African American vote under the prior nonunanimous verdict rule of law.” 77 Thus, Justice
Genovese finds that the lower courts decisions should be reversed, regardless of the date of
conviction, only if there is proof on collateral review by the defendant by a preponderance of the
evidence showing racial animus resulting in alleged non-unanimous verdict. 78 However, in this
case, since the defendant failed to do so, the lower courts must be reversed. 79
In Justice Griffin’s thorough dissent, she finds that the <strong>Ramos</strong> rule falls within the
watershed exception and should be applied retroactively on state collateral review. 80 The dissent
refuses to accept the majority’s adoption of a Teague/Linkletter hybrid test and its denial of
retroactive relief to those convicted by non-unanimous jury verdicts. 81 Instead of the majority’s
adoption of a Teague/Linkletter hybrid test, the dissent favors use of a holistic approach to the
73
Id. at 15, 351 So. 3d at 286 (Genovese, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74
Id. 351 So. 3d at 287.
75
Id. at 2.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 292 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
81
Id.
10

Teague watershed test, finding that <strong>Ramos</strong> applies retroactively. 82 The dissent reasoned that such
approach is “consistent with this Court’s treatment of Gideon v. Wainwright, as being the type of
case that presents a watershed rule.” 83 Hence, if the watershed inquiry relies solely on the analysis
of specific elements in a particular case, then even Gideon would fail such test. 84 Instead of the
majority’s analysis, the dissent provides that a case being judged holistically will meet all
watershed requirements and be applied retroactively if these four interrelated elements are met:
(1) it prevents an actual or generally understood impermissibly large risk of
erroneous convictions; (2) it can be said to be in the same category as Gideon in
having effected a profound and sweeping change in the law; (3) it is not narrowly
applicable to only a small subset of defendants; and (4) it can be said to touch on
fundamental aspects of our understanding of the basic procedural elements of
essential fundamental fairness. 85
In applying these four factors, the dissent argues that <strong>Ramos</strong> meets all four requirements
for a number of reasons and therefore, falls within the watershed exception. 86 First, the dissent
reasons that unanimous juries prevent erroneous conviction and notably, are more thorough in their
consideration of evidence. 87 Next, the dissent argues that <strong>Ramos</strong> is a “profound sweeping change
in the law which touches on basic fundamental fairness” that every citizen of Louisiana is entitled
to. 88 The decision rectified a regulation that had been established with the discriminatory aim of
curtailing the influence of Black jurors. 89 One delegate from the 1973 Convention recognized that
the judicial system discriminated against minority groups references as being ‘“ugly, poor, [and]
illiterate,’ but that juries ‘don’t convict nice-looking, intelligent, well-meaning, decent people.’” 90
82
Id. at 293.
83
Id. at 3, 351 So. 3d at 294.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 4, 351 So. 3d at 294-95.
88
Id. 351 So. 3d at 295.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 5, 351 So. 3d at 296.
11

This wording demonstrates that the original delegates were cognizant of the racially discriminatory
motive underpinning the non-unanimous jury system and its unconstitutional ramifications, yet
continuously upheld and enforced the system as if it were constitutional. 91 <strong>Ramos</strong>, as Gideon, were
the first attempts the Court made towards permanently abolishing a system that was racist in origin
and discriminated against marginalized minority groups. 92 The dissent emphasized the importance
of the jury verdict and reasoned that “[i]f the jury returns an erroneous verdict due to racial
prejudice or because it failed to listen to the reasonable doubt within a dissenting juror, then the
Gideon right is virtually worthless.” 93 Lastly, the dissent rejects the majority’s arguments that
because the people adopted a constitutional provision that only applies <strong>Ramos</strong> prospectively, we
should never apply it retroactively. 94 “When it comes to the power of the state, what is not
prohibited is allowed.” 95 As citizens of Louisiana, unanimous jury verdicts are “fundamental to
due process and fairness.” 96 Thus, if a right is absolute to ensure procedural fairness for future
cases, it is also absolute for past cases. 97 The dissent finds that <strong>Ramos</strong> possesses all four of these
qualities and is therefore, a watershed rule. 98
In summing up his argument, Justice Griffin concludes by asserting the need to eradicate
deliberate racism within our nonunanimous jury verdict system. 99 “The racially discriminatory
nature of convictions secured by non-unanimous verdicts does not change over time. Such
convictions were racially discriminatory in 1898. They were racially discriminatory in 1975. They
91
Id. at 5-6.
92
Id. at 6.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 7, 351 So. 3d at 296.
12

emain racially discriminatory today.” 100 Accordingly, the dissent finds that <strong>Ramos</strong> should apply
retroactively to all convictions by non-unanimous jury verdicts. 101
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Reddick does not significantly differ from the majority of
precedent cases. However, it will have a major impact on existing and future law and policy in the
state of Louisiana. First, although the majority’s conclusion that the new rule announced in <strong>Ramos</strong>
is not watershed 102 is likely correct, its reasoning is, respectfully, somewhat narrow, and restrictive.
T he Louisiana Supreme Court emphasizes that every time the United States Supreme Court has
examined whether a rule of criminal procedure is retroactive, it found it was not and Louisiana
courts have consistently upheld those holdings. 103 However, Louisiana state courts have their own
obligation and power to choose whether to apply new rules of criminal procedure to cases on state
collateral review. 104 Relying too heavily on this Court’s precedent will prevent the possibility of
establishing new precedent as the law develops and changes. Although the dissents holistic
approach might be too broad, it opens the door to new possibilities. In other words, rather than
basing a conclusion solely on this Court’s precedent, the holistic approach examines individual
aspects of the case in relation to jurisprudence and society generally. 105 Second, as Justice
Genovese said in his concurrence in part, although he does not deem <strong>Ramos</strong> broadly retroactive,
defendants convicted by a non-unanimous jury verdict tainted by racial animus are absolutely
entitled to relief, regardless of the date of their conviction. 106 However, the effect on the
100
Id. 351 So. 3d at 297.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 11, 351 So. 3d at 280 (majority opinion).
103
Id. at 12, 351 So. 3d at 280-81.
104
Id. at 1, 351 So. 3d at 284 (Weimer, J., concurring).
105
Id. at 3, 351 So. 3d at 294.
106
Id. at 1, 351 So. 3d at 287 (Genovese, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13

administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule is a valid concern, because of
the practical problems that could impede the search for justice. 107 In light of the history of nonunanimous
verdicts on both the federal and state level, the granting of a new trial wherein an
African American defendant can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant was
convicted by a non-unanimous jury verdict tainted by racial animus, will likely assist in the
abolishment of discriminatory biases. 108
Another compelling discrepancy between the majority and the dissent are the analyses
provided by each regarding the factors to consider when conducting a watershed analysis. 109
Although the dissent focuses on the non-traditional factors such as, the racially discriminatory
purposes behind the non-unanimous jury verdict system that has been prevalent throughout
Louisiana history, the majority opinion does not. 110 Further, the majority argues that the Court
should not apply <strong>Ramos</strong> retroactively, because the people adopted a constitutional provision that
only applies <strong>Ramos</strong> prospectively. 111 However, the dissent believes that if the right to
constitutional fairness is necessary for future cases, it is equally imperative for past cases. 112
The Reddick decision will have a significant impact on the procedural fairness of existing
and future law and policy. In many aspects, the decision is a loss for those who were and still are
facing time due to a conviction by a non-unanimous jury verdict. Additionally, if the Louisiana
Supreme Court finds that the <strong>Ramos</strong> rule is watershed and thus should apply retroactively, this
Court will be responsible for establishing a new precedent that once and for all puts an end to
107
Id. at 15-16, 351 So. 3d at 283 (majority opinion).
108
Id. at 1, 351 So. 3d at 287 (Genovese, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109
Id. at 14, 351 So. 3d at 282.
110
Id. at 3, 351 So. 3d at 294 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s application of the rule and instead use
holistic approach to the Teague watershed test and find <strong>Ramos</strong> applies retroactively).
111
Id. at 17, 351 So. 3d at 283 (majority opinion).
112
Id.
14

unconstitutional convictions. However, there are additional considerations that emerge when
evaluating the retroactive application of the <strong>Ramos</strong> rule and its potential implications for future
state laws and policies. If the Court were to determine that the <strong>Ramos</strong> rule is indeed watershed
and, as such, should be applied retroactively, the state would face the onerous task of retrying
every case that had previously resulted in a conviction by a unanimous jury verdict. This process
would not only place a significant economic strain on the Court but also inflict emotional hardship
on the defendants in each of these cases. The Court would be exposed to the risk of relocating
witnesses and evidence several years after the crimes originally occurred, with a substantial
investment of time, spanning weeks, months, and even years, required to retry these cases. In
result, this backlog of retrials would relegate other cases before the Court to a lower priority,
potentially resulting in additional constitutional violations, such as the defendants’ right to a fair
and speedy trial. Meanwhile, it is imperative for this Court to exert substantial endeavors in
eliminating the racial disparities ingrained within our judicial system, all while considering the
potential challenges that such eradication may entail.
15