Modernity, Pluralism and the Crisis of Meaning - Bertelsmann Stiftung

Modernity,
Pluralism and the
Crisis of Meaning
The Orientation of Modern Man
Peter L. Berger
Thomas Luckmann
Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers
Gütersloh 1995

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Contents
lletner lYeidenleld
Preface
Peter L. Betger, Tbomas Luchmann
Modernity, pluralism and the crisis of meaning -
what basic human needs of oricntation
must be satisfiedl ............9
1. The foundations of the meaningfulness
ofhnman life ............9
2. The meaningfuhre* ol .ocialrelrtion

Preface
Questions of cultural orientatioo are among the most urgenr issues
of modern society. lndividualism and pluralism lead to the consequence
that individuals more ancl more face the difficulty to define
standards and values guiding their own lives. IndividuaLs require
these values to be able to find orientation in a situation rvhich is defined
by options and the necessity to take decisions.
Three ccntral groups of questions clelineate crucial problems,
which the Bertelsmann Foumlation intends to tackle by creating a
new r,rngc o[ pro:c, rs on cuhural orrcntation:
- llow can individuals realize meaningful lives by chosing from
thc pluralistic rnultiplicity of optionsl
- How do human beings coorclinate the numerous roles and social
networks in which they interactl In other words: how do they
stabilizc thcir own identity)
V/hat value systems guide thcir ideas of good and cvil? In as
much :s individuals sharc conrnron value patterns we have to
raisc a consccutive question: *'hich communities do such individuals
fonn who sharc similar pattcrns of mearing and judge their
lives by the same value systcrns? And finally: what do these
comnrunities contributc to thc integration of the society as a
whole or to what extcnt do thcy endanger such integration?
How can modern societies provide dre required ligaturesl
Individuals who havc acquircd stable orienrations possess an cffcctive
panacea against cxistential thrcats to their self-perception. lhey
regard themsclves as people with an undoubted identity. And they

avail thenxelves of ethical standards which enable them to judge
their actions with regard to their effect on society as a whole
On all drree levels individuals have ceased to act according to what
hes traditionally been regarrled as self-evident and takcn for grantcd.
Thereforc the loss of the taken-for-granted has led to the possibility
and cven necessity to decide -hat is meaningful, good and sociaily
acceptablc. This decision is an individual one and it is debatrble if
thc cohesion of society suffcrs as a consequence ofthese decisions. In
addrtion the pluraiistic abundance of such decisions allows communities
to emerge which enjoy the loyalties of rheir members but do
not nccessarily take into eccount the welfare of socicty as a whole.
'fhe "culnrral
range of projects on orientation" started its series of
publications with a first volume on "'lhc loss of orientation - the
cohesion crisis in modern society" (in German language only). In a
next phase of the field of projects wc commissioned a number of
expcrtises. As a first result, Peter llerger (Boston) and 'lhomas
Lucknrann (Konstanz) present their analysis of the mechanisms
which lead to a crisis of meaning in nodern society. lhis study
emerged from a context of projects which are dealing with orienta
tion in the immediate social neighborhood and with the orientation
by communication in a workplacc environment and in company
hierarchies. other sub-projects focus on the legitimacy of political
iction and the limits to state control of social processes or on new
challenges due to the ever increasint complexity of knowledge and
the flow of information which modern individuals face.
Peter Berger and Thomas Lucknrann count among the ceuses for
the modern crisis of meaning processcs of modernization, pLuralism
and particularly with regard to Buropean societies - secularization.
fhjs leads to the conscqucnce that the validity of shared meaning
is difficult to mailtain for larger groups of individuals in society.
Patterns of meaning are being shared and maintained by smaller
communities. It is therefore crucial to distinguish in which way in
dividuals unite to form these communities. In addition, all of them
relate to the functional macro systerns in society like politics, eco-
6

nomy and science. Interaction between these levels and communities
is being regulated by intermediary institutions, media communication
and moralizing statements in everyday life. It will need further
enquiry to establish definitc knowledge on which institutions are effective
in this respect and how they perform their task. The result of
such a study can be evidence on the possibility to counteracr
centripetal tendencies in society.
Prof. Dr. Verner \üeidenfeld
Member of the Board of the
Bertelsmann Foundation

Modernity, pluralism and the crisis of meaning -
what basic human needs of orientation
must be satisfied?
Peter [.. ßetger
Tbomas Luchmann
1. The foundations ofthe meaningfulness ofhuman life
It is not apparent whether talk about the crisis of meaning in today's
world really corresponds to a new form of disorientation in the life
of modern pcopLe. Could it be that wc are merely hearing the Latest
repetition of an old lament? Is ir the complaint *'hich cxpresses the
feeLing of distress which has again and again afflicted humanity in
the face of a worid become unstcady? Is this thc old lament, that
hurnan life ls a life to*'ards dcath? ls this the voice of doubt, that this
life could find its meaning in a transcendent history of salvationl Or
is this despcration about the lack of such a meaningl \Vc are distant
in time from thc book of the Ecclcsiastes ('everything is noughtl
everything is in vainl") but not distant from the spirit of thc Chroni
cle of Bishop C)tto von Frcising written more than 850 ycars ago:
"ln
alL, wc are so depressed by thc mcmory of things past, the pres'
surc of thc present and the fear of future vicissitudes that we accept
the sentence of death that is in rrs and rnay become tired of lifc itself."
It is even further and all thc sanle not so far betwecn the conceptions
of human fate in history from Thucydides to Alben
Camus.

On t,hat basis are modern (and post-modern) critics of present day
society and culture convinced that the crisis of our tirnes is fundamentally
different from aLl past mkeries? These observers hardly
start from the assumption that thcre has been a radical change in the
human condition, the conditio humana. Rather they seem to suspect
a new social constitutior of the meaning of human life in modernity,
which has thrown meaning, and with it human life, into a his'
torically unique crisis. Such specüLations are powerfully suggestive
and may appear convincing, that does not mean, however, that they
will actually stand up to cmpiricaL investigation. Contemporary
sociological analysis tends far too easily !o assume the existence of
something like meaning and meaningfulness as ä fiotive of human
action and as a backdrop against which the modern crisis of meaning
is apparcnt. It is, therefore, necessary to begin with sonre anthropological
preliminaries. They shall seek to identify the general conditions
and basic structures of mexningful human life. Only in this
way is it possible to improve our understanding of chenges in particular
structures of meaning.
Meaning is constituted in human consciousness: in the conscious
ness of the individual, who is individuated in a body and who has
been socialized as a person. Consciousness, individuation, the specificity
of the body, society and the historico'social constitution of
pcrsonal identity are charact€ristics of our species, the phylo- and
ontogenesis of which need not be considered- Flowever, we will
provicle a short sketch of the generaL performances of consciousness
from which the multi-layered meaningfulness of experience and action
in human life is built up.
Conscior.rsncss taken in itself is nothing; it is always consciousness
ofsomething. It exists only in so far as it directs its att€ntion towerds
an object, towerds a goal. This intentional object is constituted by
the various synthetic achievements of consciousness and appears in
its gcner;l structure. qherher it bc perception. memory or imagi
nation: around the core, the theme' of the intentional object,
extends a thematic field that is delimited by an open horizon. This
10

horizon in which consciousness of ones own body is always given
can älso be themxtizcd. The sequence of interconnected themes -
lct us call them apprehensions' - is in itself stili without meaning.
It is however the foundation, on which rncaning can come into existence.
For, apprehensions which do not occur simply and independentLy
but which the ego turns its attention lowards acquire a
higher degrec of thcmatic definition; thcy become clearly contoured
"expcrienccs".
Expericnces taken nrdividr.rally wouLd stili bc without mcaning
Ilowever, as a core of expcricncc cletaches itself from the back'
ground of apprehensions, consciousness grasps the rclatioD of this
core to other expcnences. The srmplcst form of such relationships
are "equal', 'simi1ar", "diffcrcnt", "equally good', "different and
worse" etc. Thus is constituted thc most elementary level of meaning.
Me:rning is nothing but a complex form of consciousness: it does
nor exist independently. k always has a point of reference. Meaning
is consciousness of the fact th:t a relationship exists between
experiences. The inverse is also true: the meaning of experiences -
and, as wiLl be shon'n, of actjons has to be constructed through
'
relational" performances of consciousness. 1he experience current
ar a particular monent can be rclated to one in the immediate or
distant past. GeneralLy, each expcrience is related not to one other,
but to a type of experience, ä schenre of experience, a maxim, moral
legitimation ctc. won fron many experiences and cither stored in
subjective knowiedge or täkcn fronl a social store of knowledge.
As convoluted as this phcnomcnology of multi-layered performances
of consciousness mxy scenr, its results are the simple elemeots
of meaning in our daily livcs. l-or cxample, in the apprehension of a
flower a typical gestalt is tied in with a typical color connected to a
typical quality of snell, touch, and use. In directed consciousness
this apprehension becomes experience, this experience is grasped in
relation to other experiences ("so nrany flowcrs') or related to a clas'
sification taken from a social stock of knowledge ("an Alpine
flower') and may finally be intcgrated into a plan of action ("pick it

and take it to my lovcd one!"). In this process multiple types ("A1pine
flower", "loved one') are integratecl into a processual scheme
('pick n and take it to') and fused into a more complex, but still
everyday unit of meening. If finrlly this project is not simply put
into action because it confiicts with a morally founded maxim
("don't pick itl rare flowerl"), then a decision is arrived at and a
higher level meaning is constituted through the scquential evaiuation
of values and intcrcsts.
'l
his example already indicates the double meaning
'acting"
of and
"action".
Th€ meaning of the current act is constituted prospectively.
A completcd action is meaningful in retrospect. Action is guided
by a view to a prcconceived aim. This design is a utopia in which the
actor anticipates a future stete, assesscs its desirability and urgency
and considers the steps which will bring it about - insofar as the
process is not fanriliar through earlier similar actions and has not
bccome a habit.'Ihe rneaning ofthc acions,
"in the acr", is constituted
by their rclation to the goal. The completed acion, wherher
successful or not - but also the action projected as complete - can
be compared to other actions, can be undersrood as the fulfillment
of maxims, can be explained and justified es rhe execution of laws,
can bc excused as defying a norm, can be denied to others and in the
limit also to oneself. l he double meaning and the complex structure
of meaning are characteristic of all action but in day-to-day routine
!he chxracteristics may appear blurred.
Social action, of course, shares rhis structure of meaning but acquires
additional characteristic dimensions: it can be indirect or direct,
it can be mutual or unilateral. Social action can be directed towards
other pcople present or absent, dead or unborn. It can seek to
address them in their individuality, or as social types of different degrees
of anonynrity, or nrercly as social categories. It can be directed
towards obtaining a response or nor - there may, or may not be, an
answer. It can bc intended as unique or may aim to achieve regular
repetition or to be prolonged through time. The complex meaning
l2

of social action and social relations is constructed in these different
dimensions of nreaning.
In speaking of the constitution of nreaning in thc consciousness of
the individual it rvas already clear that this could not neen the iso
lated subject, thc s'indowless monad. Daily life is full of manyfold
successions of sociirl action and the personal identity of the individual
is formed only in this action. Purcly subjective apprchensions are
the foundation of the constitution of meaning: simplc layers of
mcaning can bc created in thc s.rbjcctive expericnce of a Peison.
Higher laycrs of meaning and a more complex strucnrrc of meaning
depend on thc objectification of subjective meaning in social action.
The individuaL is only able to make complicated Logical connections
and initiate and control differentiated sequences of action if he or
she is ablc to draw on the vealth of experience avaiiable in a social
contexr. In fact, elemcnts of meaning siraped by older streams of social
action ("traditions'), flow even in the lowest levcls of meaning
'Iypification,
of nrdividLral cxperience.
classification, patterns of expcrience
and schcnles o{ ection are elcnrents of subjectivc stores of
knowledge that are largely takcn over ftom thc social stock of
knowledge.
Certainly, subjcctive constitution of meaning is the origin of all
social stocks of knowiedge, historicai rcservoirs of meaning, on
which peoplc born into a particular society in a particular epoch
may dral.'lhe neaning of an cxperience ol action was born
''somewherc
, once upon a timc in the conscious, problenl
soLving" action of an individuai relative to his or her natural and
social environnrcnt. Howeverl si ce most problenrs with which the
nrdividual is confronted also arise in thc lives of other pcople, the
solutions to these problems arc not just subjcctively but also
intcrsubjectively rclcvant. Either the problcIrrs themselves arise {rom
interactive social action, so that the solutions must also be found in
common. Ihcsc solutions can also be objectified in one of a number
of possible ways, through signs, tools, buildings, but above all
ll

through thc cormnunicative fornx of a language an

'lhe
subjective
"solutions'
for problenrs of experience and action,
thc "primary" objcctifications of rreening rvhich became intersuLrjcctivcly
retrievable through conrrnunication with othcrs are social_
ly processed on different "paths" \ir'hich have varied enormously
across history. In institutionaLly controllerl "secondary' processes
much is ignored as too insignificant; other things are discarded as in
appropriate or even dangerous. A part of the objectifications of
nrcani g drawn on for processing are nerely stored away, dlose
*'hich are judged to be adequate or right are given a form of ordcr,
vhilc certain elements ac

diffusc cxpcrt knowledge in populariz,cd form and people appropriarc
picccs of this information and ;ntegrate it with thcir stock of
The arcas of rneaning are stratificd. The "lowest', simplest typifi
cations, relating to facts of namre and the social world, are thc foundations
of different parterns of cxperience and action. Stacked on
thcsc typifications are schenes of action orientatcd by maxirns of
action towards higher values. Supcrordinate
'conligurations
of valuc"
hrvc bcen developed since the old high culturcs by rcligious and
later phiJosophical experrs into value systenN. These clainr to nrean,
ingfully cxplain and regulatc thc conduct of life of thc inclividuai in
relation to thc community in both routines of daily life and in overcoming
criscs with reference towards realities transccnding every
day lifc (thcodicy).
The claiur of superordinatc conligurations of values and value sys,
rems r" fill rhe rnrir"ry of life wrrh nrerning i. nrosr rpp.rygnl in I
schenre drat brings together models for action in the most diverse
areas and fits them into a projection of meaning that srrerches from
birth to death. This scheme of mcaning relates the totality of a life to
a time that transcends dre life of the individual (e. g. 'erernity").
Biographical catcgories of ncaning, as wc call thcm, endow the
mcxning of short-range actiols with long,tern significancc. 1he
meaning of cvcryday routines does not disappear entirely but it is
subordinate to the "meanjng
of lifc". \(c will narne hcre, amongst
the many historical constructions of biographical schcnrcs, only rhe
small genrc of the exemplary lifc' and the larger genrc of the holy
life", rhc ancient hcroic cpic, and thc modern heroic legend
(e. g. Prince Eugene, Georgc Vashington, Baron von Richrhofen,
Antoine dc St. Exupöry, Rosa l,uxemburg, Stakhanov).
All institrrtions embody an 'original' action-nealing which has
proved itself in the definitivc rcgLrlation of social action in a parricular
functional area. Of particular irlportance are those institurions
whose task includes the sociaL processing of meaning- Most import,
ant of all are those institutions whose main functions consist in the
l6

coDtrol of the production of mcaning and the transmission of mean_
ing. Such institutions have existed in almost all socicties other thän
thc archaic. In dre old high culturcs, in the societies of the early mo'
dcrn period and latcr (e. g. in todays Iran) rcLigious moral instittr
tions have bcen closcLy tied to thc apparatus of domination They
coLrld aim relatively successfully at both the production and distri'
bution of a relativcly consistent hierarchy of meaning. If however
the conditions both of production and distribution of social meaning
approximatc ro an opcn market, this has considcrable consequcnces
for the 'nreaning
budget'. In that case a nunrbcr of suPPliers of
mcaning compctc for the favor c,f a public that is confronted with
the clifficulty of choosing the nrost suitable meaning from the wcalth
of me:nings available. Wc shall renrrn to this later.
Institutions have the task of storing and making a"ailable meaning
for the actions of the individual both in particular situations and for
en e[tire conduct of lifc. This function of institutions is however cs
scntially related to tire rolc of dre individual as a consumer but also
fionl*e'o.,rr r. : produ, cr of lrcanin6.
This relationship can be comparatively simplc Ln both archaic societics
and in most traditional high cultures. In such civilizations the
mcaning of indivrrhraLsphcres of actions is integratcd without major
ruptures *ith thc o"erall meaning of life conduct and this is itself rc
fcrred to a rclatively coherent value systcm. The conrmunication of
rneaning is joincd to thc control of the production of mcanirg. Ildu
cation or direct incloctrination sccks to ensure that the lndividual
only thinks and does what conforns to the basic norms of thc socicty.
And thc corrtrol and censorship of everything that is pubLicly
said, taught or preachcd aims to prevent the diffusion of dissidcnt
opinion. lnternal and external competition is auoided or eliminated
(not always succcssfullyl). l he |re:rning o{ actions and life conduct is
irlposed as a unquestioncd rule brnding on all. For examPle, the rclationship
of marricd couples and the relationship of parents to
childrcn is defincd unambiguously. Parents and children generally
conform; deviancc is clearly defincd as dcviance from thc norn.
17

In modern societies conditions are different. Of course, there are
still institutions which conmunicatc the meaning of actions for their
particular area of action; there are still value systcms which are administercd
by some institutions as nrcaningful categories of life con,
duct. Ho*'cver, as will be sho*'n, there are, by comparison with
premodern societies, differences in the consisrency of value systems
as in the internal and external conpetition over the production of
meaning, thc communication of rneaning, and its imposition. To return
once morc to the example: in modern societies it would be difficult
to find parcnts and children for whom the relationship is
equally binding on both parties and is de{ined unquestioningly by a
firm valuc system.
2. Thc meaningfulness of social relationships,
the concurrence of meaning and the general
conditions for crises of meaning
Socially objcctified and processcd stocks of meaning are "preserved"
in historical reservoirs of mcaning and "administered"
by institutions.
The actions of the individual are shaped by objective meaning
supplied from social stocks of knorvledge and communicated by the
pressure for compliance which emanates from institutions. In this
process, objectificd meaning is constantly in interaction with subjectively
constitutcd meaning and individual projects {or acion. IIowever,
nreaning can also be ascribed - one might even say, above all
- to the intcr'subjcctive structure of social relations in which thc
individual ac* and lives.
From the very beginning a child is incorporated into sociaL relationships:
with its parents and with other significant persons. These
relationships deveiop in regular, dircct and reciprocal actions. Strict-
l8

ly, an infant is not capable of action in the full meening of the word.
As an individuated organism i! has, however, the bodily and conscious
capacitics inherent to thc human species which it employs in
its behavior towards others.'Ihc actions of others relative to the
child are thcmseives largely dctennined by schemes of experience
and action that are drawn frotr s

with biographical categories and schemes of action and rhar rhe
others who enter inro sociai rclations with the child do not nrirror
its behavior even approximatcly. The typical consequences for the
development o{ thc child arc predictable! Pcrfect concordancc, as
projccted above, is never achieved, but rrchaic societics and the tra
ditional high cuitures were not far removed from it. The opposite
case has hovever no corresponding reaLiry: a sociery without any
kind of value system and sithout stocks of mcaning adapted to it is
hard to imagine as a "society . As a child one is born into commun-
,trc. uf life (l ebenrtemcinrhalrcnt whr,h rre - to \ärying exi.nrs
also conmunities of meaning. 'lhat means that even without a
univcrsally shared stock of meaning adapted to a single, closed valuc
systen conrmonalties of meaning can be developcd in communities
or drawn from the historical rescrvoir o{ meaning. These comrlon
meanings can then, of course, be contnrunicated to children relative-
Iy consistently.
Communities oflife are charactcrized by regularly repeated, dircctly
reciprocal action in durablc social rclationships. Thosc involved
place an institutionaily or other\r,ise secured trust in thc durability
of the cormnunity. Beyond these basic commonalties there are wide
differenccs between societies in the differcnt forms of conrmunities
which are institutionalized in them. The universalbasic form are life
communities into which ole is born. However, there are also lifc
communities into which one is adoptcd and those which one joins,
such as partners in marriagc. Some cornmunities of life form
thcftselves through adapting oncs life to the continuation of sociaL
relations that were originally not intended to be prolonged, others
rcquire initiation. Thc examplcs include holy orders which also
constitute themselves as conrmunities of rneaning, leper colonies,
retlrctuent homes! and Prisons.
Comnunities of life presupposc a minimum of cornmon meaning.
'fhis
measurc can in some societies and for some forms of conrmunity
be very minimal: it may concern only the coincidcnce of the
objcctive ncaning of the schemcs of day to day social action, as per-
2A

haps in ancient slave households or in nrodern prisons. Commu'
nities of life may also aspire to complcte unison in all layers of meanlng
including the categories of thc entire conduct o[ life as in some
monastic orders or in the ideal of certain tyPes of marriage. How
ever, most comntunities of life across diffcrent soci€tics and ePoches
aspire to a dcgree of shared nrcaning somevhere in between this
nlinimum and maxinrum.
l xpc.r:ron. clo

nity of meaning then their disagreemenr would be painful for both
partncrs and the crisis of meaning would escalate into a life crisis.
Let us renrain for an instant rvith our example. Let trs assume the
wife encountcrs other aging nrarried women who have arrived at a
similar perspcctive on their common aging, a perspective which does
not agrec *ith the dominant views shared by their hLrsbancls. In exchanging
thcir expericnces a conmunity of meaning might be
formed. In thc first variant of our example this community of meaning
remains as partial as does thc rlisagreement with the husband and
there{ore servcs as compensation rather than replaccment. In the second
variant any partiaL disagreement is interpretcd as "total" and
the new found community of meaning could take the place of the
broken rnarriage.
Vhere;r lif*.ommuniric\ mlr\l pre\ume a nrinimrrn ..rmmuniry
of meanrng, the inverse is not true. Communitics of meaning may
under certain circumstances become communities of lifc, they may
however bc built up and naintained exclusively through nrediared,
reciprocal action- These conrnrunities may be founded on different
not directly practical ievels of nreanrng and may concern different
realms of meaning, e. g. philosophical, such as the humanist circles
of the early modern period, scientific, such es the nlany E-Mail
cliques of today, or the "meeting of souls" of which farnous correspondenccs
tell, such as thar between H6loise and Ab6lard.
\Ve have scen that under certain circunrstances problenrs may occur
in the inter subjective construction of the personal identity of the
child to which the term subjective crisis of meaning nray be applicable.
lf the behavior of the child is constantly confronred in the
action of significanr adults with incongruent reacrions the child will
be able to discern thc objecrive social meaning of its actions only
with difficLrlty or not at all. If the child does nor receive reasonably
concordant answers to the question
"who
am I? posed throughout
its behavior, then ir nrust encounrer great difficulties in taking on
responsibility for itself. Even if under trore favorablc circumstances
the identity of a pcrson has been unproblemarically constructed, its
22

strength can be endangcred later Lry persistent, systematlc Lrlconsrstency
in the rcflection of its actions in the actions of others
Furl..rnrrr., we ha'e .ecn rh rr rrrrdcr , erta n ircun.r,rn, c. inter_
subjecrive criscs of meaning may occur. For different forms of
community of life different typicaL mcasures of coherence are to be
expected - and these diffcr from society to society and from period
to period. 1hc condition for a crisis of meaning is that the mcnbers
of a particular life-community accept unqüestioningly thc degree of
coincidencc of neaning expectetl of them, but are unable to match
it. ^s was already statcd, this discrcpancy between
"is' and 'should"
appears particularly often lf the idcals

cnrergcnce of crisis of meaning - trvo basic types of social structure
across all cpoches-
'l
he first type not particularly susceptible to crises of merning are
socicties which have a single and generally binding value systern into
which the different layers and rcalms of rncaning are well intcgrxrcd:
from cveryclay schemes of expericnce and action to the superordinate
categories of lifc conduct and crisis managerncnt directed
tovards extraordinary realiries. l he totaL stock of meaning is stored
and managed in social instrtutions.
Because the schemes of action objcctified and made mandatory in
social institutions are directed towards a common value system
superordinate to the specific nreaning it is assured in this type of socicty
that the institutions sustain thc order of mcaning in basic concordance
with practical life. lhcy do this directly and, so to speak,
in dctail, by imprinting thenlsclves or1 thc meaning of many day to
day actions; thcy do this, so to spcak, in the large by identifying biographical
categories of meaning with communities of life, in particular
those s4rich are entrusted wirh forrning the personal identity of
. Lrldrcn Brorurng inro nrenrbcr. of.ocicry.
Differcnt societies correspond to this basic type to different extents.
Archaic societies correspond lrost truely to this type. The complcx,
ancicnt high cultures are slightly less closc, but essential characeristics
of this type are to be found cven in the premodern socieries of
modern times. Like all other societies these societies have nrany
organizational problems and their members have every life problem
inraginable: in dealing with nature, work, domination, life and
death. Naturally there are also qucslons of meaning for the individual.
But these comparatively stable, often even static socicries
communicate an order of meaning which is consistent to a large
extent through congruent processcs of sociaiization and thc irxtitutionalization
of action. Thcse proccsses are located in meaningfully
rclated life communities ancl diffcrcnt social spaces. This basic
type may be simplified as an ideal type, however societics whose
structure even approximates to this type provide no ground for the
24

growth and extension of subjective and inter+ubjective crises of
meaning.
'l'hings
are diffcrent in societics in which shared and binding valucs
arc no longer given for everyonc and structuraLly secured and in
which these valLrcs do not pcrmeate all spheres of life equally and
bring them into concordancc. Thrs Ls the basic conclition for the
spread of both subjective and inter-subjective crises of rneaning. In
formulating this basic type of socicty "liable to crises" wc will again
neglect many dctails to identify in sinplification its structural char-
In such societies thcre may be a ualue systcn inherited by tradition
as a stock ol nreaning from bygone periods. This value system is
objectified in the socieral stock of knowledge and is here end there
'Ihere
still administered by specialized (rcligious) institutions. may
even bc more than one set of valucs "imported" fronr the stocks of
the musäc imagin:rire of meanings. Not wanting to dexl with the
question of so crlled pluralisn at this point we set to one side the
posibility that a multiplicity of value systems may coexist A society
may even be liable to crisis" if it contains only one single valuc system,
in the firll sense of the word, a single system consisting of ele
ments of mcaning (frorn schemes of experience and action all the
way to gener:rl categories of life conduct) incorPorating all spheres
of life arranged steprvise to{'ards superordinate valucs.
Even in such a societyavalue systcm wouldbeboth Present and not
presen!. In such a society the big instirutions (of the economy,
politics, and religion) have separated themselves from the superordinate
valuc systen and determine the action of the individual in the
functional arca that they administcr. Economic and political institutions
make obligatory dre instmncntal rational, objcctive meaning
of schemes of:ctjon in those areas for which they are responsible.
'On 'offer"
the sidc , so to spcak, religious lnstitutions valuerationaL
(wcrtrational) categories for life conduct. S(e use thc term
'
offer' even in thc case, assumed hcre, that society contains only one
ordcr of meaning orientated towards supcrordinätc valucs, not muf
25

tiple, courpcting systems. Because even in this case religiorrs institutions
transmit the higher ordcr categories capable of giving meaning
to the entirc conduct of Life, but even without competition from
othcr valuc systens these c:tetories may not be madc binding and
may not be inposed on the conduct of people. Overall, the institutions
of tilis type of society no longer carry a well-ordered srock of
meaning and value consistendy and bindingly into thc practice of
life.
A socicty is rnthinkable entirely without common values and
shared interpretations of reality. Vhat is the nature of values in
such a type of society, obvrously tending towards the modern, and
wherc are they to be found) It is certain that the scheDres of action
institutionalized in the different functional spheres have a binding
ancl objcctive meaning for those acting in them. In the organization
of action within a single sphere there is definitely a community of
meaning. 1'har however is not much by way of commonalties. The
objective meaning of institutionalized schemes of :rction is instrumentally
orientated towards the function of this area. Apart from its
generalizable aspect as instrumentally rariofial this institutionalized
scheme of action cannot be transferred between sphercs and it
certainly cannot be integrated into superordinate schenres of
meaning. lhe objective meaning of acrion cannor in itself be integrated
into cätegories ref€rring to rhe subject and simultaneously
directcd towards a superordinate value system. Only rcligious and
'quasi'
religious institutions communicate categories of meaning
with such a claim ro generality. This claim is however refuted by the
objcctive meaning of the schemes of action of the other "big" institutions.
'lhese meanings direcr t[e adion of the individual in most
arcas of daily lifc, whether rhey conform ro the superordinate
meanings of schemes of life cornnrunicared, for cxample by religious
institutions, or not. The claiü to integrate ones own life into a
superordinatc value system can be realized essentially only in a
sphere not touched by the othcr 'big'institutions,
in a sphere socialiy
defined as the private sphere'.
26

A minimum of shared meanings in a society is contained in the
teneral agrccment given to the
"firnctic,ning
of functions', ie. the
agreement that in each area of action condud should be directed
towards instrumcntally rational requircments. Ancl this minimal
consensus is sccured by the generäl äccePtance that in the Private
reserves of individual existencc and comnlunities of life separate
meanings of Life may be pursucd, distinct from those of other indi
viduals and groups. This minimum may be cxceedcd even in this
typc of societics. First, it is remarkable that the "big" institutions
bind their spccific meanings - beyond the rationality of the
organization of action within thenr to general valucs, such as for
"drc
example general interest". I-xceeding the mininlLrm in this way
may fulfill abo"e all legitimately purposes while the schemes ol
action thenxclvcs may remain untouched. Furthermore, secondly,
individr.rals and comrnunities of meaning may attenPt to difcct their
action evcn within a sphere adnrinistcred by a 'big' institution
towards supcrordinate
"values' going beyond its instrumentally
rational objectivc meaning. llowevcr, this can occur only in conflict
with the specific instrumental rationality.
'fhe
attenrpts by institutions to conn€ct to suPerordinatc values for
lcgitimatory purposes may prodrrcc only vapid fonnLriac and valueorientated
conduct of life may bc limited to the reserve of the private.
This would add to the conditions for the spread of subjective
anrl inter-subjectivc crises of nrcaning. However, this also creates,
simultaneously, the precondrtions for something clse, nanely the
coexistence of different value systems anclfragments of value systems
in the sanre society and thus the parallel existence of quite different
communities of meaning. The state which results fronr th€se preconditions
can be called pluralism. If it itself becomes a suPerordi
nate value for a socicty we may speak of modern plLrralism
27

3. Modernity and the crisis of meaning
If pluralism rvere defined as a state in which people who lead their
lives in vcry different ways are to bc found in thc same society, one
would not be dealing with a spccifically modern phenomenon. One
could find one or other variant o{ pluralism in almost all societies
other than the archaic. Ancient lndia as well as the India o{ today
was charactcrized by a pluralism of casts, medieval Europe by a
pluralism of estates- But in thcse examplcs the different forms of life
would still be related to a common value systen and thc interaction
bctween the communities of life would remain limited and strictly
regulrtcd. Even if one defincd pluralisrn as a state in which dif{erent
forrns of lifc were to be found in a society without these different
forms of life being referrcd to a common value system one would be
ablc to find examples, for instance the Roman Empire which in
economic and poLitical terms was a single sociery. But even here the
interaction between thc different groups and peoples - insofar as
they werc not regionally separatcd - was reglllated such that the differcnt
supcrordinate stocks of nreaning were uncoupled from the institutionalized
schcmes of action of the functional spheres. The different
groups could, therefore, interacr in the instrumentally rational
spheres o[ action while at thc same time remaining attached to
their orvn value systems- For example, the relations ofJews to non,
Jews rvere regulated
'fence
by the so-called ofthe law".
1f thesc regulations are no longer, or can no longer, be nraintained,
then a ncw situation is created, widr serious implications for the
takcn-for granted starus of value systems and overarching views of
the world. Thc ethnic, religious and orher groups and coDrmunities
of lifc, divided by different stocks of meaning, are no longcr spatially
.cp.]rrr.d (r. for o,ample in rrgrorr ut r rorierl or 'rrrc or in quar.
ters or thetrocs of a city), nor do they interact only through the
neutral tcrrain of strictly separated sequences of action in institutionalized
functional spheres. Encounters or, under certain circum-
28

stances, clashes betwcen diflerent välue systens änd views of the
world becomc inevitablc.
'l'hcre
ha'e bcen approximations to this state of affairs before, c. g.
in thc Ilellenic uorlcl. This form of pltralisrn is not necessarily
linkcd to the spread of crises of meaning, though particulariy in the
Hellcnic world there wcre also signs of this. This form of plLrralism
has become fully flcdged only in modcrn societics. Here, the ccntral
structural aspects of this pluralisnr havc been raisecl to the stätus of
an cnlightencd valuc above the diffcrent coexisting and contpeting
value systcnx. So, for examplc, tc'lerance is rcckoned the "enlightencd'
virtue par cxcellence, since onLy through tolerance can individuaLs
and conrmunities Live side by sicle and with one anodler,
whilst directing üeir existence towards different values. This
modcrn form of pluralisn is, ho*cvcr, also thc Lrasic condition for
tire spread of mbjcctive and inter subjective crises of meaning.
\Vhethcr modern pluralism neccssarily lcads to such crises is en open
question. Howevcr, one can say with certainty that in highly
devcloperl indusrrial countries, i-c. where mc,dernization has
progrcssecl furthcst and thc nülern form of pLuralism is fully
developcd, value systems and stocks of meaning are no longcr the
comnron property of ail members c'f society.
'l he individual grows
up in a norld in which there arc neither conrmon values which
deternrine action in different sphcres of life, nor a single rcality
identical lor all. The 'ndividual is incorporated into a suPcrordinate
system of meaning by thc cornmunity of life in which it grows up.
Howcvcr, this canrot be assuned to bc the nrcaring system of odler
pcople (Mitmcnschen). l hcse others may ha"c been shaped by quhe
different sysrens of nrcaning in the communities of life in which
they grew up. In Europc, shared and overarching systems of interprctation
werc already shakcn in the early phase of modcrnization.
The history of totalitarian ideologies in the last hundred
ycars has shorvn th:rt nothing, not cven radical regrcssion, can re
store such interpretativc schemes pcnnanently or make thcnr the
structLrral charactcristic of a modern society. lt is, by the way, also

questionable whcther fundamentalist attempts in rhe countries ofthe
so called Third Vorld will be more successlul regardless of the intensiry
rvuh *'hrch overarching and universally binding stocks of
meaning are defended today.
It has been notcd that such conditions pronrote the spread of subjective
and intcr-subjective crises of meaning. ßut while some conditions
accelerate such crises there are others which hinder them. The
palc superordinate values of modern pluralism do not have this
power. They nray have other useful effects in that they promote the
peaceful coexistence of diffcrent forms of life and value systems.
lhey are, howevcr, not suitable to dircctly counteract the spread of
crises of meaning. They tell the inclividual how to behave towards
other people and groups who differ in their view of life. They do
not, however, tell one how one should lead onc's life when the unquestioned
validity of the traditional order is shaken. That may be
achieved by diffcrent means. As the degree to which socially valid
conditioning of shared interpretations ol reality decreases different
communities of life can develop increasingly into quasi-autononrous
comnunities of meaning. insofar as these communities prove rhemselves
relatively stable they may preserve their nrembers from crises
of meaning. Stability is particularly important for the role played by
such life communities in the coherent formation of personal identity
of children grorving up in them, who may thereby be protected
from subjective crises of meaning. Concrete communities of life as
qüasr'autonomous conmunities of nreaning, and nrore stable,
"pure"
conrmurnitics of like minded peoplc (Gesinnungsgemeinschaften)
counteract the pa demic spread of crises of meaning. However, they
cannot transcend the preconditions which prornote the spread oF
cnscs of meaning anchored structurally in modern society. Iiurthemore,
to rcpeat this point, communities of ljfe nr which the dis,
crepäncy between the expectcd and factual community of mcaning
is too great can themselves become the trigger for inter-subjective
crises ofmeaning.
This dialectical relationship bctween the loss of meaning and the
30

nev creation of nreaning or between the erosion of nrcaning and its
rebuilding can most clcarly be observed in the case of religion.
'lhis
is, in any case, thr: most important form of a comprehensive pattern
of experiencc and values, systematically structurcd and rich in mean_
ing. For the largest part of human history a society was unthinkable
without a single rcligion encompassing everything and everyone
'lhc
gods of nry ancestors verc nanrrally also nry own gods; my
gods were naturally aLso the gods of all the members of my tribe or
ry town. Most archaic societies wcre like this. Across long periods
of time high culnrres with rnany differentiated social institutions
wcre like this as wcll. Then this unity between the individual, his or
her society and the gods, embodying thc highest authority in the ordcr
of vaiue, rvas shaken in diffcrcnt piaces and at diflerent types by
religious schisms. This happened long before the beginning of modernity,
as for exarnple in the exodus of lsrael from the unified sym
bolic order of the Middle East, or even more radically in the separation
of Christianity from the symbolic order of classical antiquity.
After such schisnrs there were rcpeated attempts to restore a super
ordinate sysrem of oreaning on a new basis, perhaps of a smaller
scope ("subculture' instead of culturc) - as in the unity of the tribe
of Isracl with its God or in the constant search for thc unity of the
Christian church.
Vith the concept of Christendom in the European middle ages an
anempt was made to irring together all the people in a certrin space
of power under a single, common and superordinate system ol
meaning, and to h,-,ld thcm there. \Vc know that this attemPt was
never entircly successful. \üithin Christendom nrinorities preserved
their special symbolic systerls -Jews, heretics, cults deriving from a
pagan part. At ti'res thc symbolic unity of Christendom was broke
up from without (lslam) or from within (Greek Orthodoxy, Albingensians).
It was most severely shakcn by the Rcformation- The consequences
of thn quake were not intended, for the reformers wanted
to restore and prcscrve a uni{ied Christendom on r ncw basis. The
schism of thc church foiled this attempt at thc European level.
l1

Alongside thc Orthodox church two new "Christcndoms"
emerged
- onc C:rtholic, the othcr Protcstant. The formula rvirh which the
religious wars in central Europc were ended - cuius rcgio, eius religio
- wis thc foundation for an attcnrpt to restorc symbolic unity at
least within small spaces of rule. Llowcver, due to the onset of mod
ernization cven this territorial solution was only short lived. Industrialization,
urtranization, nrigration and mass communications
could not be clcanly divided into Catholic and Protestant channels.
In nodcrn central Europc Catholics and Protestants (and increasingly
membcrs of many faiths, not to speak of incrcasing numbers of
people nithoLu religion) encounter each other and are mixed up,
e. g. through rrarriage.
The conccpt ofregio in thc formula of the Peace of Vestphalia thus
loses its spatial meäning. ltcgio becomes the sphcre of cotrmu
nication for a community of meaning and conviction rrsually not
limited to a particular area. One is Catholic by belonging to a
Catholic rcligious community and taking part in other Catholic
institutions evcn if one's
'lhese
neighbors are protestants. subcuf
tures, generally voluntary conrntunities of convrction, no longer
offer the security of earlier comnrunities of life and nreaning which
were embcdded in societai ordcrs of value and meaning. Never,
rheless, through various fornrs of comnrunication and social relations
they can save the individual from unmasterablc crises of
meaning. If they do not turn radically against socicty and are at ieast
toierated by it, they act, so to spcak, on aggregate to stenr the spread
of crises of mcaning in society. linlightened rulers wcre wise enough
to recognizc this and left their subjects to seek happiness where
they find it". It turned out that the hope tirat Catholics could be
loyal supporters of the Prussian crorvn was well founded.
Vhat has been said about religion holds, mutatis mutandis, for other
conprehcnsive orders of meaning. Moderniz-ation has made the
assertion ol thc monopoly of localized sysrems of nreaning and value
across entire socicties more tlifficult if not entirely impossible. Ar
the safle time it has creatcd üe posibility for the formation of
32

communitics of conviction transcending spacc (e. g. through comprchcnsive
ideologies) and from drcse stocks of meaning the shared
nreanings of smaller coolmunities mxy be derived. Despite this pos
sibility the overall deuelopmcnt cngenders, above all, a great degree
of insecurity; both in the orientation of individual actions and the
entire direction of l;fe.
Nevertheless, it 'ould be mislcading to draw the conclusion, from
this alone, that nrodern societies suffer from comprehensive crises of
rneaning. There are still people who cven under these conditions are
able to establish a meaningful relationship between the experiences
of thcir own lives and the various interpretive possibilities offcred to
them and who are therefore able to conduct their lives relatively
meaningfully. Furthertrore, there are the institntions, sub-cultures
and communities of convictiol wirich transport transcendent values
and stocks of mcaning into concrete social relationships and life
conrmunities and support rhenr there. The succcss of modern socicty
beyond thcse
"islands
of meaning" is duc to a legalization of the
rules of social iife and its "old fashioned nrorality", lurthermore
through the formal moralization of certain more or less professionalizcd
sphercs of action- Legalization means that the functionaL system
is rcgulatcd by abstract nonns, fixed in writing and binding on
ali members of a society. Moralization is an attempt to solve concrcte
cthical qucstions that appear in individual spheres of action.
|or example, in the USA academic disciplines such as "mcdical
etirics' or "business
ethics' have cmerged. Legalization ignores the
different value systenrs of thosc affected. The nroralization of professional
spheres does without a conrprehensive order of meaning.
Iloth creatc thc conditions in which people manage their daily lives
without a comprehensive and shared nroralrty.
Such a society can be comparcd rvith a system of traffic rules. One
stops on red and drives on grcen and the maintenance of these rrrles
is in the intcrest of all participants. One can therefore normally rely
on people abiding by the rules without the rules themselves being
legitinrated in deep moral tcnns. If the rules are inlringed, one can
33

ing those who have infringcd thc 'traffic rules" to reason, by laws
or by non state rules, rlaintained by trade associations or medical associations.
Char:rcteristically, groups with rival interest in democrätic
societies attcmpt to havc the "traffic rules' which are most important
for them legalizcd by thc state. Obviously, the analogy is
only partial: 'traffic rul""s" can rcfcr only to the practical issues of
individual spheres of social lifc. Lven there a moralizing, valueorientared
rhetoric must bc enrployed.
Particularly if groups with an intcrest in a particular set of rules
wish to use the denrocratic proccss to legalize these rules, then they
must seek to legitimize these rulcs by reference to vxlues relevant to
all of society - however vaguely thesc may be formulated.
Beyond the influence of the law and the "ethics'
ofparticular sphere
individuals are lcft to their own devices. Systems of ethics let
alone the laws which rcgulate conduct in professional life or in the
public sphere - arc of linle rrse in overcoming crises of meaning and
conflicts in person:l lifc. I lowcvcr, even if we ignore the fact that
the analogy wnh traffic rulcs is incomplete, it is in any case valid
only for thc 'normal
case . Vhat docs that mean? h means that the
analogy assumcs a society which has achievcd a high degree of economic
prospcrity, experiences no inrDlcdiatc threat from outside and
has netotiated relations betwccn diffcrent group interests relatively
peacefully. h is one of thc saddcning experiences of this century that
such
"normality'
is always fragile. lf conditions are "abnormal"
and
particularly if it is dcmanded of individuals that they should place
their interests bchind those of socicty as a whole, then "traffic ru1es"
are no longcr cnough. In such a situation, an overarching morality,
regardless of how it is founded, bccorncs e societal imperative.
\{rhat we have just claimed draws on a tradition of sociological
theory which can be traced back abovc all to Emile Durkheim and
the French school founded by hin. Flowever, it rejects one of their
basic assumptions. Durkheim bclicved that no society can survive
without an overarching morality; ire named that overarching
morat-symbolic c,rder 'religion".
\üe diverge frorn Durkheim in that

wc clo not accept this necessity for thc "norrnal case". lhe dialogue
with Durkheirn rcquires us to specify this "normal case" more pre
cisely. Durkheim devoted much effort to the study of the phenomenon
of sacrifice because he considercd that the willingness to sacri'
ficc oncs own interests and in extrcnris ones life for thc social whole
was a decisive characteristic for thc ability of a society to survivc.
Durkhcinr's assumption holds for a society rvhich is exposcd to an
cxistcntial üreat. But it rs precisely thß threat which is missing in
thc normal case . The traffic partlcrpants need to follow the ruies
in thcir orr,n interest; no willingncss ior sacrifice is presumed.
Modcrnization makes the occurrcrrce of such "normal cases" nruch
morc 1ikely than it was in carlicr pcriocls: rnodernizarion brings with
it cconomic growth which is typically associared with rclative political
stability. The citizenry is much lcss tcnrpted to question the legitinracy
of an order lvhcn its survival is sccured by matcrirl
prosperiy. However, it should bc cmphasized that it would be a
gravc crror to assume that this statc could be regarded as secure and
irreversible.
'l
hc rveakening and even the collapse of an overarching order of
nrcaning with the onset of modernity is hardly a novel theme. The
cnlishtcnmcnt and its successors n,clconrcd this process as thc overturc
for thc crcation of a new onler bascd on freedom and rcason.
'l
hc postrevohLtionary French traclitioralists and other conservative
thinkers have bewailed the same proc€ss as decadence and declinc.
Vhcthcr modcrnity and its conset1ucnce arc welcomed or rcjected
thcrc ;s widespread conscnsus on tbe facts of the matter. !üe feel thet
this conscnsus though not complctcly unfounded does unduly sinr
'lhcrc
plify a conrplcx situation. is widespread consensus not only
anrong* experts but also in conrnxrn sense understanding about the
cause, perhaps even the main crusc of this breaking apart of the
'l
conrprehensive order of meaning. his is to be found in the retreat
of religion. Religion here is not understood in the wider sense
enployed by DLrrkheim, i.e. as any comprehensive order of meaning
and world order, but rather in the narrower more corventionäl
t5

mcaning - religion, as belief in god, in another world, salvation and
the bcyond. $(ith reference to thc n)odern \Vest this implies that the
declinc of Christianity has causcd thc modern crisis of meenint.
This nor very original interpretation was accepted as fact and welcomed
by progrcssive philosophers anrl intellectuals and mourned
by almost all conservative ideological thinkers. Put simply the main
thesis of this argument, well established in the socioiogy of religion
as the "secularizetion
thesis' is that modernhy leads inescapably to
sccularization secularization in the sense of a loss of influence of
religious institutions on socicty as well as the ioss of credibility of
religious interpretations in peoplc's consciousness. Thus comes into
being a historically
"the
new species: nrodern person" who believes
that one can cope both in ones own life and in social existence without
religion.
The confrontation with this 'nrodern
person" hes become an important
topic for whole gcnerations of Christian theologians and a
central point in the progranrme of the Christian churches in western
countries. l;or this thesis, as well, a nLrmber of argrrmen* can be deployed.
Ilistorical evidence suggcsts that at Least since the 18th century
the social influence of thc church has declined, at leasr in western
Europe, and that important institutions (e. g. the enrire educational
systcm) have liberated thcmselvcs from their earlier religious
ties. In addition, the term 'modern person" is not entirely divorccd
from reality. It is likcly that there are a considerablc number of
peoplc who cope with thcir lives without religious faith (in the sense
defined carlier) or religious practice. Vhether this type of secular
exjstence is an absolute novelty is questionable. It is likely that there
have always been pcople who have found thcir happiness in this
v'orld without churches - before and after they came into existence.
But even disregarding this, dre equation of modernity and
secularization must be treated skeptically. I{ the secularization thesis
applies anywhcre, then in westcrn l-urope. (Even there it would
have to be questioned sr'hethcr thc institutional retreat of the
churches can be equatcd with the rctreat of rcligious interpretations
36

in consciousness.) Observers of the European religious scene (incLLrding
one of the two authors of this study) have for a long time
pointed out that declericalization shouLd lot be confused with the
loss of religion. In any case the convcntional secularizalion dlesis
rapidly loses credibility as soo as oue leaves \Western Europc.
A particular irritant for this theory is the state of religion in the
United States. American society crn hardly be described as unmodern.
I Io*'ever, religion is forccfully alive and present therc. And
this is true both at the institutional leuel as q'ell as in the consciousness
anrl life conduct of millions of peoplc. There are fcw signs that
this situation is changing in thc dircction suggcsted by the sccularization
thesis. Outside l:,urope and North America it is in any case
nonscnse. The so called l'hird Vorlcl is in fact shaken by thc onrush
of religious rnovements. The Islauric rereissxnce has attracted most
attention but it is far from bcing the only case. \Vorldwide one can
tracc thc success story of evangelical Protestantism, the most striking
chapter of which is Evangelism. l his new Protestantism spreads like
a prairie fire - in s-ide stretches of East and Southeastern Asia, in
Africa south of the Sahara and most surprisingly - in all countrics
of Latin America. Often it is precisely those layers of society
most touched by modernization which are most susceptible to reli
gious cndrusiasm. The troops of todays religious mass movcnrents
arc to bc found in the new citics of the Third Vorld, not in thc traditional
villages. People traincd at tbe nrodern universitics are olten
the lcading cadres ofthis movemcnt.
ln short: the European model of secularized modernity has only
limited export valLre. The most inrportant factor in the creation of
crises of meaning in socicty as in dre lilc of the individual is probably
not the supposedly modcrrr secularity but modern pluralisnr.
Modcrnity means a quantitative as lvellas qualitative increase in plu
raliz:uion.
'fhe structural causes of this fact are well known: population
growth and migration and, associated with this, urbanization;
pluralization in the physical, dcrrogr:rphic sense; the market economy
and inclustriaLization which throw together people of the

most different hinds and force them to deal with each other reasonably
peacefully; the rule of law and denrocracy which provide institutional
guarantces for this peaceful coexhtence. The media of mass
communication constantly and empharicaLly parade a pluraliry of
ways of life and thinking: both prlnted material riding on mass li,
teracy spread across the entire population by compulsory schooling
and the nes-est electronic media. If the interactions enabled by this
pluralization are not restricted by 'fenccs' of one kind or another,
rhis plurälism takes full effect, bringing with it one of its consequencesr
the "structural' crisis of meaning.
'lhe "fence
of the law" was alrcady mentioned. Rabbinical Judaism
erected this fence to distinguish practicing Jews from their profane
surroundings. It was this 'fence" which made possible the survival of
the Jewish community over many centuries in a mainly hostile
Christian or Islamic society- One nlight also sey: the "fence of the
law" protected those people livnrg within it from pluralism. This
protection collapsed with the emancipation of the Jews in wesrern
societies and the people affccted were consequently particularly
liable to crises of meaning. It is not mere happenstance lhat modern
Jewish thinkers and writers hav e con cern ed th emselves particularly intensively
with such crises of meaning. Conversely one can say that
any group that wishes to protect itself from the consequences of
pluralism must erect its own 'fence of the law'. As was mentioned,
there have been instances of pluralisur throughout history, for in,
stxnce in the large towns of late antiquity and probably at times
along the trade routes and the urban cenrers of Asia. The modern
processes of pluralization distinguish themselves from their predccessors
not only by their immense extent (much wider circles are
affected by them), they are also distinguished by their acceleration:
whiLst their effects progressively extend to "new" countries, they do
not remain static, in already highly modernized societies they are
accelerating.
Modern pluralism leads to a thorough relativization of systems of
values and schemes of intcrpretation. Put differently: the old value
38

systems and schemes of interpretation arc ' '.
decenonized The resulting
disorientation of the individual and of whole groups has for
years bccn the main theme of socixl and cultural criticism. Categories
such as 'alienation" and "anorrie' arc proposed to charäctcrize
thc difficulty experienccd by people trying to find their way in the
modcrn world. fhe weakness of such common place concePtions is
not that they exaggerate the crisis of meaning. Their weakness is
their blindncss towards the capacity of individuals as well as differ
ent conrmunities of life and meaning to preserve their own values
and intcrpretations. Existential philosophy from Kicrkegaard to
Sartrc has developed the most imprcssive conception of the alienatcd
human being. Other versions xrc to be found throughoüt recent
\festcrn literanrre (one need mention only Kafka). However, it cannot
bc doubted that this imagc of humanity applies to only a small
portion of the population in rnodern societies (though this portion
may be in certäin respecrs an important one). Most people in these
societies do not vander around likc characters in a Kafha novel.
They are not plagued by fear and are not tempted to make desperate
"condemned
lcaps of faith , nor do they co sider themselves
to
frcedonr'- One x-ay or anothcr, with or without religion, they cope
with their lives. It is important to understand how they mänagc this.
But before we attempt !o pursue this question we wish to return
oncc more to or.rr clain that pluralism is the cause of the crisis of
mcaning ir modernity. We must cxamine more closely the signifi'
cance for the stock of meaning end the process through which
meaning is lost, of the social psychological status of meaning and
knowlcdge as taken'for granted.
J9

4. The loss of the taken-for-granted
lf communities of life and mc:ning rcally overlap to the extent that
is demanded by social cxpectariols, rhen social life and the existence
of thc individual procced habitu:lly alnrost "by themselves". This
does not necessarily imply drat drc individuals have no life problems
or that they are happy with thcir fate. However, rhey a! least
"kno\ir"
about the world, how tr-, bchave in it, what is reasonable to
cxpect and, iast but not least, indiviclLrals know who they are. For
exrmple, the role of a slavc was presurnably never a pleasant one.
Nevertheless, however unpleasant it may have been the individuals
who occupied this role livcd in a steady and clearly identifiable
world in which they could orientate their behavior, rheir expectations
and their iden!ity rvith sonrc dcgree of confidence. They were
not lorced to daily rcdefine the nrcaning of their existence. This un
anbiguous definition of exntcnce in the world was shared by the
siaves ard their owners, though it must be assurned that the latter
felt more at ease in their cxistence than did the slaves. Neither rhe
slavc nor the slavc orvner were, as Sartre rvould say, "condemned to
freedom". (Thc possibilrty that the slaves might rebel or the slave
on'ner abandon his property to bccome a monk nccd not concern us
here - quite apart from the f:ct that such cases were rare.)
Modern pluralism undcrmines this conrnron-sense
"knowledge".
The world, society, life and personai identity are called ever more
into question. They may be subjcct to nrultiple interpretations and
cxch interpretation defines its own perspcctivcs of possible action.
No irterpretrtion, no rangc of possiblc actions can any longer be ac
cepted as the only true and unquestionably right one. lodividuals are
thus frequently faced with thc question whether they should not
have iived their lives in a completely different manner than they
have hitherto. 1'his is expericnced on dre one hand as a great liberation,
as an opening of new horizons and possibilities of life, leading
out of the confines of the old, unquestioned mode of existence. The
40

sanre process is, however, often exPerienced as oPPressive (often by
the sanre peoplc) - as a pressure on individuals to repeatedly make
sensc of the new and the unfamiliar in their realities. Thcre are
pcople who withstand tllis pressure; thcre are some who evcn seem
to rclish it. One might call thcnr v,rtuosos of pluralism. However,
the najority of people feel insccure and lost in a confusing world
full of possibilities of interpretation of l'hich some arc linked to al
rernative ways of life.
The concepts developed by Arnold Gehlen in his theory of institLr
lions help us to understand this anrbivaLent situation. Vc have already
made rcfcrence to this body of theory in the introductory
cirapter with reference tc, the inrportmce of institutions for hunran
oricntation in reality. Institutions are designed to relieve individuals
of thc nccessity of reinventing thc world and reoricntatiog thcm
selves in it evcry day. Instittltions create 'programmes" for the con
duct of social interaction and for the 'execution" of particular curriculum
vitae. They provide tcstcd parterns towards which peoPle
may rlirect behavior. By practicing these prescribed" nodes of be'
havior the individual learns to natch the expectations that go with
ccrtain roles: c. g. as husbancl, father, employec, tL\ Paycrl Particr'
pant in traffic, consumer. If institutions are functioning reasonably
norm:rlly, thcn individuals fuLfill the roles assigned to them by so'
cicty in the form of institutionalizcd schemes of action and lead their
livcs accorcling to insritutionally sccurcd, socially shaped curricula
which arc largely accepted unqucstioningly.
in their effccts institutions are substitutes for instincts: they allow
action nithcrut a1l alternatives having to be considered. Many societally
inportant social intcractions arc carried out quasiautomati
calLy. Every timc slaves receive an order from their mastcr they do
not need to consider whcthcr to obey or Dot. Nor does the slave
orvner pause to consider whether he is entitled to give orclers to his
slaves. Neither the slaves nor the släve owner queslion their own actions
or the actrons of dre other; typicälly, their action is unreflectivc.
Connecting Gehlen's theory of institutions with the social

psychology of Georgc I Icrbert Mcadc (to which the preceding discussion
of the formation of pcrsonal idcntity is also indebted) one
can say that the institutional
"programmcs'
are ' internaiized
'
ir individual
consciousness and dircct thc indivldual's acrions not as alicn
but as the individual's own mcanings.
'Programmes"
are internalized
in multi-laycred proccsscs: first in "primary sociälizätion", in
which the Ioundations are laid for the formation of personal identityi
then in "sccondxry
socializ-ation" which directs the individual
towards the rolcs of social rcality, above all in the world of work.
The structurcs of society bccomc structures of consciousness. Slave
and master do not mcrcly behave in conformity with their roles,
they think, feel and conccive of thcnxclves in ways that conform to
'I
their rolc behavior. hc srrbjectivc world of the individual does not
necessari)y have to coincide complctcly s,ith socially objectified reality
- this is impossible. In the process of socialization there are if
not real breaks then at least snrall cracks. In the fornration of personality
there can be at best an :pproxinration to the complete congruence
of meanings. A scanrless transition from primary to sec
ondary socialization js thc cxceprio in nrost societies, not the rule.
The individual has idiosyncratrc inrpulses and dares ro transfer
dreams into day to day life and to seek adventures outside the programmes
of socicty. Neverthclcss, even üis can be spoken of as
''nonnatity'.
Deviations from the institutional programmes and divergences
from the society's historical rescrvoirs of meaning (and re
serves of meaning) are relativc)y rare and remain limited to the indivrrlrul:
and rhi' rncan' th:u rl .y Jo nor enrer inro communicarrve
processcs anri that "censordlip" opcrares even at the lowest level of
objectification and conrmunication of "dangerous"
thoughrs. If
"censorship"
is unable to contain the deviation within the interior
life of the individual thcn special institutional programmes are applied
in the treatment of the deviant.
'lhis rrearment has both an external
and an internal aspect. DxternalLy tllc range of treatments extends
from the physical liquidation of those who have deviated from
the true path to loving spiritual care for "lost sheep". One way or
42

another the deviant bchavior must bc rendered harmless - harmless
for the execution of thc progrannre. fhe obstacle to the smooth
functioning of the machinery must be removed. The internal aspect
of this process of social controL is the attempt to stop deviant
thought and to restorc the previoLrs
'mindless"
acceptance of nor
malrty.
Instinrtions draw thcir power from the naintcnance ol unqlrestioned
vaLidity. An institution is endangered fronr the moment in
which the people Living within it or with it begin to think about institutional
roles, identities, schenres of interpretation, values and
ways of viewing thc worlcl. Conscrvative philosophers have always
sensed dris; senior police mcn know it from practical experiencc. In
the normal case" dangerous thought can be reasonably controiled.
However, pluralism makes this controL more difficult. 'Ihere is here
a cLear sociafpsychological dialectic - from liberation to burdensome
frccdom: it is extremely hard to be forced to lead ones own life
without being able to hold on to' unquestioned patters of interpretation
and norms of bchavior. This leads to a clamorous nostalgia
for the good oLd days of unfreedom. Liberation is an xmbituous
thing. As GehLen puts it: freedom is born out of alienation - and
Modern literaturc is full of examples ofthis. One need think only of
thc theme of "provincialism",
of thc biographical dialectic between
town and city, of thc many possiblc
'paths to freedom' (Arthur
Schnitzlcr). Madame Bovary suffers in her narrow, provincial world.
But if she had had the chance to move to Paris she would not have
remained happy for long. Alienatlon would have been the price of
her grcrter lre"dom. rhe l-,''clr. br"r cen,rrnly lrer "roorlcchilclrcn
would probably have conceived the idea that the old provincial
world had its good sides after all which at the time were so
taken for grantcd drat they were not noticed at ali. A physicalreturn
to that world is usually no longer possible. There is however no
shortagc of suggested routes for an internal return (religious, po'
litical, therapeutic), *.ays of healing the pain of alienation. Projects
43

aimed at restoring the good "old world" almost always include the
suppression or linitation of pluralism - and with good reason:
pluralism constantly suggcsts alternatives, alternatives force people
to think, thinking undermincs the foundation of all versions of a
"good
oLd world'; the assumption o[ its unquestioned existence.
Modernization inplies the radrcal transformatjon of all external
conditions of hunan existence. l he motor of this giant transformation,
as has often been said, is drc science-based technology of the
last centuries. In purely matcrial terms this dcvclopment hes
brought rvith it a huge expansion of the range of possibilities.
Vhereas in thc past a few technologies, passed on from generation
to generalion, wcre the foundation of material cxistence, there is
now an apparently endless and constantly improving plurality of
technological systems. Both individuals and huge organizations face
the nccessity of choosing one or other option from amongst this
plurality. This conpulsion for choice extends fronr trivial consumer
goods (which brand of tooth pastel) to basic technological alterna
tives (which raw nTaterial for the motor vehicle industryl). The increase
in the rangc of options also extends to the social and intellcctual
sphere. I Icrc, nodernization meam the change from an existence
dctermined by fate to onc consisting of a long series of possible
choices. l:ate previously determined almost atl phases of life, the individual
movcd frorr phase to phasc according to prcdetermined patterns,
childhood, rites of passagc, employment, marriage, child rear
ing, ageing, illncss and death. Fate also determined the internal life
of the individual: feelings, interpret;rtions of the world, values and
personal identity. The gods were "already preselt" at birth, as was
the sequence of social roles that followed. Put diffcrently: the range
of pregiven, unqucstioned assumptions exrendcd to lhe largest part
ofhuman existence.
Modernization fundamentalLy changed this. Birth and death are still
- only just - determined by fate. In parallel to the plurality of possible
choiccs at a natcrial level multilayered processes of modernization
open up x rarge of options at thc social and intellectual levcl:
44

which job should I take up) Vhom shall I marry? Ifow shorrld I
bring up nry children? Even the gods can be sclected fronr a range of
possible options. I can change my rcligious allcgiance, my citizenship,
ny life style, my image of nrysclf and my sexual habitus. The
rangc of taken for-granted assumptions shrinks to a relatively small
core which is hard to define.
'l hc technological economic founda
tions of this changc are at the levcl of the matcrial, but its social dinrcnsions
are intensified, above all, by pluralism. Pluralism not only
pcrmits one to rnakc choices (job, hud;and or ivife, religion, party), it
forces one to do so as the moclcrn range o[ consumer goods forccs
onc to choosc (Persil or ArieL, VV or Saab). One can no longcr
choosc not to choose: it has bccome in)possible to close ones eyes to
the frct that a decision that onc nrirkes could also have been made
diffcrcndy. Two central instirutions of modern society Promote this
transition from rhe possibility of choice to the comPulsion to
choosc: the ruarket econorny and denrocracy. Both institr.ltions are
foundcd on the aggregation of individual choice - and themselves
cncoürage cont;ouous choice and sclcctron. Thc ethos of dcmocracy
nrakcs choice into a fundamental human nght.
f ire taken-for-granred resides in thc reaLm of unquestioned, securc
knowledge. lhe loss of the taken for-granted unsettles this realm: I
know less and lcss. Instead I have :r ralge of opinions. Some of thesc
opinious condcnsc into sornething that one night call bclief. Thesc
are opinions for vhich I an prcparcd to make sacrifices in the lirrrit,
even today, to sacrifice my lifc, but probably no longer unquestioningly.
It lics in the nature of things that in the 'normal" life of so
cicty and the individual such linrit cascs are relatively rare ln the
'nornral
process of modernization i anr in any case no longer
forcecl to decide v.hcther I am preparcd to wager my life for faith or
evcn nrcre opinions. Unqucstioncd, secure knor'ledge dissolves into
a no longer very compclLing aggrcgate of loosely connccted
opinions. Firm interpretations of reaiity bccome hypotheses. Convictions
become matters of tastc. Conrmandments become sugges
45

tions. These changes in consciousness crcatc the impression of a certain'flaüress.
One can rmaginc the conscioLrsncss of the individual as different
levcls layered on top of each othcr. In the "depths"
(this term is not
r.rscd here in thc |reudian scnsc of depth psychology) lie those interprctations
drat arc taken for granted. This is the sphere of unquestioned,
certain knowlcdge. Alfrcd Schtitz called dris the level of the
"world-taken
for-grantcd'; Robcrt and Ilelen Lynd meant something
of the same kind with their concept of "of-course-statements".
The other pole, thc uppermost lcvcl of consciousness (uppermost in
the sensc of closest to thc "surfacc'),
is the sphere of insecurity, that
which is not taken for grantcd, opinions which I am in principle
prepared to revise or evcn retract. This sphcre is ruled by the motto
"chacrrn
ä son göut . In this layer rlodel, thc modernization of consciousness
appears as a loss of 'depth'. More engagingly one can
view consciousness as a huge coffee nraker the contents of con
sciousness of all types have evaporated upwards, the residual
grounds has senously shrunken, thc coffce has become prerty rhin.
The loss ofthe takcn-for-granted rvith allits social and psychological
consequerces rs most pronounced - as one wouid expect - in the
sphere of religion. Modern pluralism has undercut the monopoly
enjoyed by religious institurions. Vhether they like it or not the
religious institutions :rc suppliers in a nrarket of religious options.
The "church-going
peoplc has drvindlcd to a mernbership which
can in nany churches bc countcd on the fingers of two hands.
Membership in a particulxr church is no longcr taken for granted,
bur rather dre result of a delibcrate choice. Evcn those who decide to
renain with thc confession of their parcnts are making such a
choice: they could, after all, havc changed confcssion or religion or
simply left the church altogethcr. This fundamentally changes the
social position of the churchcs, whether their theological self-image
is willing to acknowledge dris state of aff:rirs or not. If they wish to
survive, churches increasnrgly necd to consider the wishes of their
membcrs. The church must provc irself in the free markct. The

pcoplc x'ho 'buy" a particular faith become a group of consuners.
Regardlcss of how stubbornly the thcologians refuse to acknowledge
it, the wisdom of thc old connercial nraxirn - "the customer is al-
ways right' - has forced itself on the churchcs. They do not always
abidc by this maxirn, but often enough they do.
'l
hc churches have increasing difficulty in hanging c'nto unmarketablc
dogmas and practices. lhc sanre process changes the relation
ship of thc churches to one anothcr. They can no longer count on
thc statc cither to drive the flock into church services or to deel with
their rivals. The pluralistic situxtill forces thc rival churchcs to get
aLong. Initially, this forced tolcr:rnce is grLrdging, later it is lcgitiruized
theologically (it bccomcs oecunrenical). The American church
historian Richard Niebuhr introducecl the corcept of 'dcnollinxtions"
which hc defined as follows:'A denomination is a church,
which has achnowlcdgcd dre right of othcr chr.rrches to exist." It is
no accident that the term "dcnon)rDation"
originated in thc USA -
fronr a society rvhich can be secn as rhe p;oneer of modern pluralisnr.
lhc increasing similarity of thc religious siruation in othcr
modern socictics n ith rhe situation in the USA cannot be explaincd
by a proccss of cultural Anericanization - as somc, for obvious
idcological reasons, wish to bclicve. The simiLarity is only superficially
due to American inflLrences. I* real cause is the global sprcad
of nrodern pluralism.
'l
hLs shift has i* correspondent rt the level of individual consciousncs.
Religion also "evaporatcs
rrpwards'; it loscs its status as taken
for granted. This shift creatcs for faith the status of 'possibility",
bascLl on the sentencc: I do rot halc !o bclieve vhat I know. 'l his
religious possibility' is usually ovcrlooked when theologians
lanrcnt thc trivialization of religion in modernity. Ilowever, such
drcologians are not keen to ednlit that they might wish to sce a situation
in which one could bc * Christian in the same taken'forgrantcd
way in which one is man or woman, one has brown or blue
cycs and suffers from hay fevcr since birdr. This posibility of faith
müst howcvcr be plausible particularly to protestant theologians.
47

Protestantisnr, fronr Lrrther's comprchension of conscience (Ver
ständnis des Ge\\'lsscns) to Kierkcgord's lcap of faith', has been the
modern religion par cxcelience. Ihcologians could acknowledge
these ideas with hopc rather thal pessimisl. From thc social scienti
fic perspective one nru$ howrvcr recotnize that modcrn society has
not scen a great accumulation of Kierkegaardirn "knighCs of fairh .
More typical is a typc of pcrson l,ith "Ohristian opinions" - a per
son who belongs ' sonrchow' to r church, but in a loose way, which
for theologians must be r.rnconlfortably closc to other realms of consun]ption.
'rcligious
People with
opinions change their opinions
relatively easily evcn if they do not thcrcforc aLways change their
membership in a "denomrnatiou
. lraditional Christian churches,
particularly il F.uropc, stiLl h.rvc grcrt difficulty in accepting this
change. They, in fact, wLsh to closc their eyes to it. For examplc, the
Roman Catholic ChLrrch refuscs to understand i*elf as a "denomination
. Those branches of Protcstantism which stillunderstand them
selvcs as appealing to thc population at large have similar difficulties.
The exceprion are disest:blishcd churches, above all in the Anglosa-ron
world, *'hich have exisred in a pluralistic situation from the
The loss of depth in religious consciousness can be traced (not coincidentally)
in the ^nerican languagc.
'l he nost common exprcssion
for belonging to a religion in thc United States is "religious
prcfcrence", as in 'my rcligious prcfcrcncc is I-utheran"; in German
this transLates into: "ich 7-jehe es vor, l,uthcrancr zu sein". By comparison,
the expression still comnrcn in Contincntal Europe is 'con,
fession" - "I anr of the Luthcran confession". The exprcssion
'con
fession" refcrs to bearing witness, cven to the wilLingness to make
the sacrjfice of a martyr. .lhe American cxprcssion, by contrast,
comes from thc realm of the languagc of consunption (and from the
realm of economic sciencc - "prcferences' "prcference
and scales"
detenninc the market for a commodity or a service). k implies a lack
of comnltment and refers to the possibility of prcferring something
else in future. It is a historical irony of the current European situa
48

tion, that, for cxarnple, Gennans also mean nothing more than a "religious
prefercncc' when they say that they are of the Luthcran con-
fession. Thc Ioss of the takcnJor-granted is today a global phenom-
5. Habituatcd meaning and crises of mcaning
Day-to day actions are carried on habitually. Their implicit rneaning
is untouched. Hard, thrcatening rinres can lead to the eppearance of
crises of nreaning in some areas of life. Even then orher arcas remain
under the inflLLcncc of old habinratcd rneanings. liven during civil
wars and earthquakcs people bmsh thcir teeth if thc water supply
has not beer cut off. Thc litcratrrrc c,n such periods, c. g. memoirs
about Gcrnrany in the last years of the war and its imnrediate after
n1ath cont^in impressive testimony of the rvay in which apocalypse
and norm:rlity coexist side'by side.
Even in hard tirnes, crises of meaning rarely afflict all arcas of life
sinultaneously and vith dre same forcc. Particularly when habituated
action has become difficult or irnpossible in many areas, it protects
x8ainst crises of meaning in those areas where one can continue
according to habit. In societies in rvhich crises of meaning occr.rr not
in the rvakc of serious catastrophcs and total wars the range of habitual
norrnality vhich is maintaincd is of course much wider. But
takenJor-granted habits are not just thrextened by serious events in
thc fate of the collectivity, but also by radical changc in the life of
the individual. In all societies there arc certain typical changcs which
may unlcash crises of meaning if thcy are not socially acknowledged.
In archaic and traditional societics there are ritcs of passage which
give mcaning to these changes. Puberty, sexual initiation, cntry into
a job, agc and death could be cxpccted with less uncertainty because
codes of behavior existed for dealing with these biographical breaks.
49

l he societal foundation of tue:ning c sured that these changes were
not experielced by the incli"idual pcrson as deep crises let alone
'lhc
existcntial threats. weakenirg or even complete absence of such
ritcs of passage in modern societies can be read as a symptom - and
a co-cause - of a slowly rising crisis of meaning. In part, this developrrr.nt
r. well i. oued ro moJern pluralizrtion.
'lo
clarify what has been saicl, let us consider two spheres of life in
the existence of the indjvidual that are particularly important bur
also crisis ridden: sexuality and occupatlon. That human sexuality
couLl alv'ays and everywhere lcad to crises of meaning is adequately
documented in popular sayings and the entirety of human literamre.
'l
he main theme of popular songs in all countries is lovc, love sickncss
and disappointed love. The institutions that were fonncriy rerluired
to dealwith such troubles are still in business today, foretrost
amongst these the churches. Ve will return to this point. Churches
were, however, never the only institutions which were and have renrained
active in this area. Relarional nerworks of interection -
rvhcrever thcy continue to cxist - belong to the social insritutions
which scrve for the producrion and communication of nreaning.
Young pcople in this or that fornr of sexual trouble mey still rürn to
a well treaning uncle, aunt, grand-parent or godparent. However
here as wcll, like for the churchcs, there has been a decided loss of
crcdlbility. Geographic and social mobility has very much weakenerl
the network of relational intcraction. Furthermore, it is more and
more likely that, for example, the well-meaning uncle not only lives
far away but is also hopelessly confused by his own love life. The
same can be said for problems in the arca of work - worrics about
suitable rraining, troubLes with the boss and with colleagues, unemployment
and at some point, usually in the middle of a career, the
incscapable rcalization that cvcrything has becn achieved that could
be hoped for and that from can at bcst hope ro evoid
downward social mobility.
In both areas, modern socicty has 'invented" new institutions for
the production and communication of meaning - psychotherapy of
50

different sorts, sexual and professional counsellors (both already present
within schools), special courscs and seminars for adult education,
departrnents of the welfare state, psychologically trained (or rather,
half trarned) personnei officcrs, and l:st but no! leasr the mass
media. The piest and the old aunt may sometimes sti1l be heLpfuL.
But it is more probable that 'modern pcople turn towards the new
institutions of orientation. For this purpose one often does not even
have to visit an office, an institution or a practice. Simply turning on
the television, one is faced with a widc range of therapeutic progranrmes.
^lternatively one goes to thc bookshop and chooses from
the shelves packed with Self-Help litcrature the volume that is best
tuned to ones cürrent difficulties, whcthcr they be in ones outer or
inner life.
A word on the mcdia of mass conrnrunication from publishing to
tclcvision: as has often and rightly been said these institutions play a
kcy rolc in modern mcaningful orientation - or more precisely in
the communication of meaning. lhey mediate between collective
and individual experience by providing typical interprerations for
problems which are dcfincd as typical. Vhatever other institutions
providc by way of intcrprctätions of reality and values, the media
select and peckage these products, transform them in the process and
decide on the form of dissemination.
Modern society has a nunber ofspecialized insritutions for the production
and communication of nrcaning. Even though an adequate
typology of these institutions and nn enalysis of their mode of operation
would be helpful, social scicntists have only tentatively begun
to deal -ith this problem. lly way of a first approximation one
could distinguish betwecn thosc instittrtions which offer their inter
pretivc scrvices on an opcn nrarkct (e. g. psychotherapy) and those
institutions which cater to a smaller, often strictly closed community
of mcaning and spirit (sccts, cults and communes with strictly
defined styles of life). The distinction into new and old institutions
of meaning-production has its uscs. There are old institutions (the
mos! important are the churchct who continue to cultivate their
51

established interpretations of rcality as best as thcy can and to offer
them competitively in a pluralistic situation. Newer instiutions
have to start from scratch, but thcy h;rve the "advantage"
that they
can take unrestraincdly fronr the traditional meanings of the different
cr.rltures and epochcs. llven though such institutions xre free to
draw on a single, well tlefined, ancicnt stock of meaning, they are
without exception highly syncrctic. Techniques of meditation
imporrcd from Asia are to be found alongside the newest practices
of psychotherapy, dizzrying scxual cxperiments alongside a restricted
petit-bourgeois ideal of f:rmily happiness. And all of this can be
distributed through the mass advcrtising nrcthods of late capitalism.
Juggling with these discrepant intcrpretations of reality requires a
ccrtain skill and consequently a number of professions have emcrged
specialized in this aptitude. These are the professions of the "knowledge
industries", as econonlists call this sector. Helmut Schelsky has
characterized them as occupations which arc conccrned with the
education, counseliing and plannirg of other people-
The institutions of meaning production have a range of possible
options. Hos'ever, in tcrnrs of the strategy they chose to enforce
their inrerpretive perspective in society they are limited to two main
possibilities. On thc onc hand thcy may enter the market in which
they must survive m compctition with old and new suppliers. On
the other hand they may mobiliz-e the state for their purposes. Produccrs
nray acquire a monopoly position through lcgislation - only
qualified psychologists may practice psychotherapy or their pro
duction attracts a statc subsidy - public health insurance pays for
psychotherapy - or thcir product may be dlstributed by means of
state - certain categorics of delinqrrcnts are obliged to submit to a
psychotherapist treatment. lhis dcvclopnrent does nor lack a certain
irony. The monopoly position which was taken from the churches
by the democratic, law-bound statc is now confcrrcd by thc democratic
w€lfare state on a number of new institutions for the production
of meaning. There arc no longcr established churches in the old
sense. Instcad there is official therapy, to paraphrase Philip Rief, a
52

'Ihis
therapeutic state. observation, however, leads to considerations
which lie beyond the theme of this essay.
One can dcscribe all these institutions elso in Arnold Gehlen's terminology
as "secondary
institutions". lly this is mcant that these
institutions no longer, as in the past, stand at the centre of society -
as the church once did "in thc nriddle of the village . Instead, they
pcrfonn limited and often highly specialized functions. A further
distinction may bc uscful in this contcxt: on the one side we find institruions
which cnable individuals to transport their pcrsonal vaiues
from privatc lifc into different sphcres of society and to apply them
in sLrch a way as to nrakc them a forcc shaping the rest of society.
On the other sidc there are institutions which trcat the individual
mercly as a more or less passive object of their symbolic serviccs.
Only the first mcntioned are 'intcrrnediary institutions' as they
have been known to sociology since Durkheim. lhcy are "intermediary"
in thc sense that they rucdiate betwcen the individuel änd
the pattcrns of cxperience and action established in society. Through
thcsc instirurlons, indi"idual pcople actively corltributc to the production
and processing of the social stock of meaning. It is the effect
of these institutions that the existing stock of mcining is not experienced
as rüthoritatively given and prescribcd lrut as an repertoire
of possibilities that has bcen shaped by the individual
members of socicty and which is opcn for further chauSes.
-l'he
distinction betseen intcrnrcdiary and non-rnternrcdiary insti
tutions cennot bc made in the abstract. It has to bc made through the
cmpiricial analysis of the concretc mode of operation of a sphere of
action. A local parish community, a psychotherapist group, even an
agency of the wclfare statc may be a true, mediating structure in the
midst of the pcoplc associated wilh it. l hc same fornr of institution
rlay, however, also appear as imposed, as a force alien or even hos
tile to the iife world of thosc indivLduals associatecl with it. Both
forms are "secolclary",
both conrnrunicate meaning- I Iowever, only
in the first mentioned fornr arc thcy suitablc to soften the negative
aspects of moclernization ("alicnation",
"anomie")
or cven to over-
53

conre crises of meaning. If such institutions take the sccond form,
they contribute to "alicnation'
.
One fLrrther rcmark should L'c made about the churches. Amongst
the prinrary institutions" of practically all premodern societics re
ligion takes a central place. This centrality was essenrial to Durkheirl's
conception of "religion". Religion was a symbolic remedy
spreacling throughout all of society, collecting all shared interpretations
of reality (repr6sentations collectives) into a cohercnt view of
the world, and in the process providing the foundation for e societxl
morality (conscience collecti"e) - both consciousness and consciencc.
As was already nrentioned, rcligious institutions in modern
societics can no longer claim this position. They are no longer the
'fhey
solc bcarers of supcrordinate ordcrs of value and meaning. are
increasingly reduced to secondary institutions. They are pushed
from the centre to rhe periphery of the 'village". The pompous ceremonial
buildings that stiil stand appcf,r as museums and the theologicaliy
legitimized self-definitions ("Catholicism",
"una
sancta',
"peoplc's
church") no longer fit the empirical facts. The chLrrches
abandon üeir (empty) public rolc and take on a private role in the
lives of thosc who still continue to be members of the church or
who havc recently joincd. lhis change in role need not be judgcd
merely ncgatively. Despitc losing its central role in society overall
- in some cases precisely because of this loss - the church can still
perfornl ao cxtremely positivc function as an intermcdiary institution,
positivc both in terms of the life of the individual and that of
society as x whole. For thc indiviclLraL the church can be the most
important community of meaning; through the church thc individ'
ual may establish a meaningful bridge between private Jife and par-
'lhe
ticipation in socieral institutions. church provides mcaning both
to family life and to citizenship. The church makes en important
contribution for society as a whole. It supports the stability and
crcdibility of the "big' institutions (above all the statc) and reduces
the 'alienation"
of individuals from society. That was of course
always thc big social role of religion. Flowever, today, when the
54

church perfornls its function as an intcrrnediary institution, it does
so without compulsion. By contrast with its former role, that is ä
significant diff erence.
The church may also fulfill an important, purely religious function
with no or minimal associated soci:l functions. This is true in the
case of a lonely old person, without family and a job and with politicaL
interests limited to occasional reading of a newspaper. For thcsc
people participation in church Life nray be of decisive importxncc -
in the church scrvice, in prayer, rn bible class and in other actions
which transccnd socially defnred rolcs, such peoplc may exPerience
thenselves as mcmbers of a comrlrrnity of nreaning. If the church
also fulfiLls social functions, these uray communicate meaning in the
manncr discussed above, or may rcmail effective only in thc private
spherc of thc church's members. I hc iatter functions were for a long
time cultivated by the Pietist and cvangelical branches of Protestänt
isrl. But even such 'privatizcd" religion may have indirect social
conscqucnces and these may be inrportant (as Ma-x \fleber already
rvas aware). For example, it is an open question to what extent a
famLly life regulated by religious values
'on
may influence the iob'
behavior (and thus thc economy) t,r bcha"ior in the political realm.
in any case, the church as an intermcdiary institution has immcdiate
social conscquences by directing thc rndividuaL !o think his Public
rolc through the church's view of the world and then to act in
ptLblic in concert with othcr nrenrbcrs of thc religious cornmunity of
mcaning. This role of the church otrvic,usly has a particular imPortancc
in dernocratically constitutcd societies. Alexis de Tocqueville
alrcady arrived at this conclusion iu his worh on democracy in the
United States.
Lct us sLrmmarizel The structurel con(litions for the spread of subjcc!i!c
and inter-subjective crisrs of rncaning that we have deduccd
lrom thcorctical considerations arc to be found in a1l western sociclics
of the present, though thcy manifest themselves quite differcndy.
The most irnport:nt oi thesc conditions is modern pluralism,
sincc it tcnds to destabilize the takcn-for-granted slatus of the systcnl
55

of meaning and value that oricntatcs action and underpins idcntity.
Neverthcless, modern socictics tlo not "normally" experience the
drarnatic spread of criscs of mcaning. Both subjcctive and intersubjectivc
crises of meaning occur much more cornmonly in such
societies, however they do not conclcnse into a general crisis of
meaning affecting al1 of society. 'I'his characteristic condition of
'nornrality"
in modern societics Dtay bc termed a latent crisis of
mcaning. The reasons for this condition are the various factors
which act xgainst thc conscqnences of nrodcrn pluralisnr most liable
to produce crises of mcaning. In our opinion thc most inportant of
these factors is a basic stock of intermediary institutions. These insti,
'Ur iorr. ..rvc ro gener Lre m"*rrrng' .rnJ r" .rrpport exisring meanings
in the lives of individu:rls and in the cohesion of communities. They
provide peoplc with orientation cvcn when society as a whole no
longer supports an overarching ordcr of meaning and values, but
instead acts as a kind of rcgulating instance for thc differenr systens
of value.
'lhose rules which arc valld for all of sociery serve ro
enable the coexistcnce and neccssary cooperation of different communltres
of nreaning, without inrposing on them a comnon order of
values.
Vc therefore suggcst dre hypothesis dtat as long as the immune
systenr of intermediary institutions rer:rains effective,
"normal" modern
societies will not suffer the pandenric spread of crises of mean,
ing. As long as thrs condition holds, the crisis-of-rneaning virus
which is at home in the organism of all modern socicties will be
suppressed. Howcver, if the immune system is sufficiently weakened
by othcr influences, thcre is nothing to stop the spread of the virus.
(Characteristically, it is the state which hclps to weaken inrermcdi
ary institutions - as a form of corlpetition?) This hypothesis seems
plausible to us, howcvcr simplificd its formulation, but it, of course,
rcquires careful cmpirical invcstigation. In the last section we return
to this.
56

illusions and possibilities
Complaints about the "decay of cülture", the loss of meaning in
moderniry", the' alicnation of hunranity in late capitalism', the'inflation
of mc:rning in mass society",'the disorientation of peoplc in
thc irodern rvorld" and suchlike arc hardly new. Theokrgians, philosophcrs,
sociol;gists, quitc apart fronr non academjc moral entrepreneurs
fronr far right to farleft havc been making thcse com
pLaints lor r nl.rmber of Benerations. Under different ideological
signs all inuginable renredies have bccn advertiscd for thesc illnesses
of the individual and society, from dre nroral strcngthening of the
individLral to the revolutionary transformation of the entire poiitical
econonric system. C)ur doubts about the most cxaggcrated
"diag'
noses" c,f thc cultural conrlition were hintcd at in the introductory
section. Lct us add here that q."e rceard the proposed "therapies"
with equal skepticism borh the radical-collectivist options which
are in the r:nd always totalitarirn as *eli as radical individualism
which is in thc cnd a solipsism.
'Lo
see whethcr a core of truth is to be found behind the ex:rggcrations
and whedrer thc diagnosis rrrs only in the seriousness of the
specifically nrodcrn crisis, we havc attempted to describc the organisn
in its healthy state. Ve first refcrrcd to the meaningfulness

clcments of meaning are absorbccl into social stocks of knowledge
and organize the conrnlunicarion of historicaL stocks of meaning to
the members of society, adapting to cw needs. Through institurions
societies preserve the basic elenrcnrs of their stocks of mcaning.
They communicate meaning to rhc individual and to the commu,
nities of lifc in vhich thc individual grows up, works and dies. l hey
determine subjective neaning in rvide areas of acrion, whilst the
objcctified meaning of these actions is dictated by the big institutions
of domination and the econorly. All dris gocs on in all socieries in
one way or another, but it occurs with diffcring degrees of succcss.
Vc therefore first pursued the qucstior whethcr there are gencral
reasons fbr these diffcrences.
Our first concern was wirh pcrson:rl identity, the individual reference
point of the mcaning of action and life. The personal identity
of dre child is shaped through sccing its behavior mirrored in the
actions of those closc to it. A certäin congruence in the actions of
these persons is thereforc the nrosr ir:rportant condition for the un
troubled development of pcrsonal identity. If rhis condition is not
nrct, the probabiiity of subjective criscs of meaning incrcases. Furthermore,
we have attcmpred to show rhat communities of life re,
quire a minimal ovcrlap in intcrprctations of reality. Only under
this condition can conmunities takc on a supporting role in the gcneration
and sustenance of rDcannrg in the life of their melrbcrs.
'lhe
degree of congruencc betwccn the expected community of
mca ing ard the community actually rcalized appeared of particular
inrportance. \ffc suggesr that the greatcr the degree of discrepancy,
the larger is the likelihood that intcr subjective crises of meaning
will result.
'When
we turned our atrention to nrodern societies it became clcar
thxt it is those features which make them different from their prcdecessors
rvhich also prevent thc stabilization of meaning. the mrin
tenance ol congruence ln thosc processes through which personal
identity is shaped bccomes morc difficult as docs the promotion of
shared meanings in life communitics. I'he frequency of both subjcc-
58

tive :rnd inter subjectivc criscs of nreaning is intelligiblc once we
considcr thc consequences of the structural charecteristics of nrodern
societies, in particular modern western societies. Taik of identity
crises and the mounting figurcs of the divorcc statistics confirm both
A gencral, fundamental feature of modern societies is the thorough
differentiation of actions (that 1n othcr types of societies were still
connected and related in meaning) into their own institutional
spheres: each of drcse airls for, ancl is largely successful in achieving,
autonomy in setting its own orrls, i. e. enrancipation fronr superordinate
social valLres. Schernes r-,f actjon defined by these sets of
instinrtions (economy, political clourin:uion, reLigion) have an objectificd
meaning that is related tc, thcir main function. Since, with thc
except;on of rcLigion this 1rea[ing is instrumentaliy rätional, it must
bc uncouplcd from subjective schtrlcs for nrterpreting life. lndivid'
rrals nrust subordinate themselves to the goals of the organization
rathcr than adapting the demands madc on them to thcir own conccptions
of yalue. The structural differentiation of modern socictics
is thus not compatible rith thc continued existence ofsuperordinatc
and generally binding systems of meaning and value. This is, howcver,
the condition for a socially guaranteed congruence in the formalion
of personal identity and fc,r a hi6h degree of shared meanings
'
1 lile comnunities.
To this rnust be added a furthcr characteristic of the structurc of
modern, above all western socictics, th:rt is ciosely related to thcir
basic characteristic. This is nrodcrn pluralism, a pluralism, in 'vhich
the protectivc fcnccs around the stocks of mcaning within communitics
oI lifc (thc 'fences
of the 1aw') can no longer be completely
maintained. Through the gaps in the fence people pear at what lies
beyond. l his lcads to the loss of the takcn-for-granted status in cer'
t:rin layers of rncaning which orientate action and life. \Ve hope to
have shown thar this is a typical cause of the outbreak of crises of
oleaning, 'l-here are t\|o extremc allcl contradictory reactions to nodern
pluralism.
59

One might say that thcre $,hcre some desperately attcnrpt to close
the holcs in the protectivc fcncc, othcrs rvish to tear down trore of
the fence. These reactions are forrndcd i| trvo diffcrcnt attitudes, not
only in individuals, but also in institutions, cornmunities and social
movcments. The "fundanrcutalist" position aims ro rcconquer all of
society for the old valLrcs and traditions. Politicians have again and
again attcmpted to exploit thc attitude link to this affect for their
own purpose, in westcrn socicties with little succcss. Prine Minister
John Major wnh his 'back to basics" is only the rnost recent politician
to have discovered thrs to his cost. Ily "contrast', reiativist positions
abandon the attempt to asscrt any kincl of common valucs and
stocks of meaning. Postnrodern thcorists nlake a virrue of necessity
and displace the pluralism of socicty cvcn to within the harassed individual.
Both reactions are wrong and may cven becontc dangerous. In irs
radical variant thc fund;rnrentalist position lcads to selfdestruction
*'hen it determines thc action of weak groups. Thc'other'is destroyed
if strong groups put this attitude intir action. In its moderated
form this attimrle leads to thc ghcttoization of the 'own' group
within society rs a B,holc. ihis rs hard to achieve and is associated
l'ith variable costs, as thc cxamples of rhe Pcnnsylvania Amish, the
Hassidic Iews in Nes, York, the Algcrians jn lirance, the Turks in
Berlin-Kreuzberg etc. dcnronstratc. Neither thc "fundamentalist"
nor the 'relativist" position can bc rcconciled with practical reason.
But the "relativist" position is cvcn internally inconsistent. If it rvere
put into action jt would lead to thc individual leaving socicty. A per
son who cqually accepts quite different mutually contradictory
norms will not be capablc of cohercnt acrion for which he or she
can assume responsibility. Such a pcrson willnot be able to givc rea
sons for acting in onc rvay r:lthcr thitn anodlcr; his or her actions
must appear completcly arbitrary ald no onc would be able to
expect that hc or she *-ould not conrplctely change in character in
thc next moment. lhcrefore, inclividuals no longer responsible for
their ac!ions cannot maintain rhc urutuaL obligation o{ social rela-
60

tionships.'fhc nrinimum of nutual respect that is essential for thc
existetce of communities of life and therefore for the whole of a so'
cicty would be lost. Howevcr, whcreas "fundamentalist' act on their
'rclativists"
beliefs,
remained confincd to tatt

proposed for thc supposedly scrious illness of modern society. ln
those cases in g,hich such curcs l crc acnrally atternpted by regimes
of totalitarian rcgression, it turncd out that the cures wcre more
deadly than the discasc.
Ilouever, one nccd not ever'r attcmpt to judge the advantages and
disadvantages of such a calcularion even handcdly, since its premises
are false. The reconstrüction of prernodern structurcs with a singie,
generally valid and t:rkel for-grantccl stock of meanings and values
cannot be contrasted with a socicty whose material wcalth is washed
over by a general crises of nrcaning. The artenrpts to restore premodern
structures of socicry, which are possiblc only with modern
means of compulsion, havc all failed in the short- or long run. But
this point is less important in this contcxt than the fact that the
image of the character of modern socictics is distorted. Precisely, in
those societies rvhose basic strucnrre provides thc conditions for the
emergence of crises of mcaning and thc possibility o{ these crises
spreading, specific countcracring processcs have produced structures
ivhich have prevented the unhindcred spread of crises of meaning
and prevented a crisis of mcaning affecting all of society. The most
important of these strucmres sc havc attcnpted to understand using
the concept of intermediary institutions . 1he previous section discussed
their strengths and weaknesses. To simplify: the basic structurc
of modern societies is thc causc of incipient criscs of meaning-
In nodern societies thcre are, howcvcr, also parrial srructures, above
all the "intermediary institutiorls" that prcvent these crises of mean
ing flaring up into criscs of the cntirc socicty. 'Ihey are norc or less
successful depending on their quality and qLrantity in modern societies.
Given similar basic stmi:tural conditions the failure of counter
ecting forces to develop or their dccisivc rveakening can lead to the
spread of crises of meaning, whereas strengthening these forces can
help to dam thc crisis.
Irronr this argunrent we can dcrlrrce one ofthe fcw, reasonably reaListic
methods with which socictics can deal 'drcrapeutically"
with
crises of meaning. One should have no illusions about the main
62

cause of crises of mcaning, i. e- the basic structures of modcrn so
ciety.
'lherc is no antidote to diffcrentiation and pluralim which
has not revealcd itself to be a deadly poison. Intermediary institu'
tions can only administer honrcopathic doscs. These cannot renrove
the caüscs, however they may softcn the äppearance of the illness
and incrcase the po-er of resistancc to it. They kccp the crisis of
meaning 'n its incipicnt form and prcvcnt it from fLaring up. fhe pa
ticnt is kcpt alive in a state s'hich apart from the constant tendency
to crises of mcaning is not partjcularly disagreeable.
Benecn thc impossibility ofthc rclativistic" reaction to moderniy
and the frightening possibilitics of funrlamentalism' , there is another
position. As best one can, one reconciles oneself to the negative
consequenccs of structural diffcrentiation and modcrn Pluralism.
Onc opposes the dangcr of the destruction of modern socicty
by totalitarian rcgression, but sees no reason to join in thc celebrx_
rion of,lodern plLrralism. This programme is modcst, but, wc feel,
realisticr intermediary institutions should be supportcd wherc they
do not cnrbody fundatrentalist attitudes, $'here they support the
''little
lifc *orlds" (a term coined by Benita Luckmann nrAny ye{rs
ago) of conrmunities of meaning and faith and where thcy develoP
' "little
their nrcrnbcrs as carriers of a pluralistic civil society'. In the
life worlds" thc various meanings olfered by agcncies for commr.rnicating
nlcanin8s arc not simply "consumed';
räthcr they arc appropriated
communicatively and selectively processed into elcments of
the comnrunity of meaning and lifc. This unspectacular bnt by no
means passivc basic position also has implications for mcdia policy
rv:ry bcyond the social and cuhural poiicies of the stätc. lt is the
','pon.l,rh
1 "Irh, leaJer'of tl..'gcr.,r'.ornnruni.rtirrg rr'c.rrrirrg.
c. t. the miss nredia, to supporr irtcrnrcdiary institutions within the
context r:f :r dcrcgulated market in mcaning. And this is a policy
which lics within the rcalm of the possible. In terms of content they
nus! stcl'r a middle -ay bctwccn the dogmatic collectivisnr of the
''firndrnrcntalists"
ard dre latrilc solipsism of "postmodcrnity".
In
nodern s,cstcrn societies social and cultural policy have nrany, in
63

part contradictory functions. If our considerarions are close to thc
mark, it shoulcl be clear in which direction the main social and
culnrral policy efforts of the srate - and rcsponsibie and capable
non-state agencies - should be ciirccted in dealing with the incipicnt
crlsis of meaning: to thc promotion and development of the intcrmediary
instirutions of a plurrlistic
"civiL
society" and towards supporting
them as sourccs of meaning for communities of life and
faith.
As was already said, thc idcntification of inrermediary institutions
is not aLways easy. Thcy can be rccognizcd in their effects, bur not
by thc way in which they refer to thcmsclves. Furthermore, thcrc is
no simple formula which tclls us how sLrch inslirtrtions can most effcctively
be supported. Howcvcr, these twin problems seem open to
solution by empirical research. l(hcther there is the will to actually
support these intcrrnediary institttions is another matter. This de
pends on both the big ideologies and thc little day,today policics of
the parties and thc comfiercial interests of the agencies responsible
lor comnuricating rneanings. A.adcnlics can at best gcncrate rhe
rvill of politics and business, thcy cannot be responsible for actually
directing such a commitment.
/- (rutlook
In the preceding discussion we have on a number of occasions
pointed to questions which could be ansvered only by extensivc
empirical research. Our discussion dealt with a many layered and
complex problematic: the strLrcture of meaning in modern societies,
from the anthropological basis of the constitution of meaning in
human action and life ro the spccific conditions of crises of meaning
in thc modern world. It is, thercforc, hardly surprising that the statc
of research in most of the varior.rs problern areas is characterized by
64

open rathcr than ansrvered questions. That means that aPart fron1
the rescarch questions \\,hich s'e havc already referred !o, a long
series of problcrns require clarificati

tiols of value into norrns of :rctions and maxinr, step lor step down
to the level of ordinary, cvcrlday action.
The analysis of systcnrs of valuc and meaning in rnodern societies
has to overcome particuiar difficultics. We have seen thrt it is not
possible to speak in modern socicties of a single and generally binding
order of values. k may be true that beyond the legalized systenl
of behavioral norns there are still clcnlents of a general morality.
However, qithout careful research it is not easy to decide -hat
these might consist of and whetlrer togcther they make up a framework
of established morality. lt ccrtainly seerns that there are a
multiplicity of moralities, distributed across different communities
of lifc ancl faith, which can bc iclcntified in the form of "partial catechisms"
and particularistic idcological programmes. To what extcnt
these diffcrent moralitics - we spcak here not o{ the ethics of par
ticular functional sphercs (medical ethics, business ethics etc.), which
*c h rve ;lready di'cu*.d - r.rre clcrrrenr. in c,rmmon rr an open
qucstion, to vhich the existing research has not given a satisfactory
answer. Even if rhere were no such comnron elements: it does not
follon' that people in modern socictics do not orientate their action
antl conduct of life towards supcrordinate values, values which havc
validity in their communities of Iife anct faith. Lven those acting
"immorally"
will generally conform to the prevailing morality by
attempting to hide or make excoscs for their breach of the noflIs
(hypocrisy is hotrage paid by vice to virtue).
In any case, individuals in modern society have to overcornc both
insecurity of meaning and uncertainty in moral jusrification. First,
thcy cannot assume that t hat they consider good and right is considcred
good and right by others; sccond, individuals do not always
knov what is good and right cvcn for themselves. The insti,
tutions have their instrumentally rational organization whlch objectively
dctermines action and pcrhaps some kind of specific cthics.
(lommunities of life vith diffcrcnr stocks of meaning are not divided
from onc another by high protcctive walls and communities of faith
run, so to spcak, crisscross across society. Furdrermore, through thc
66

means of mass communication thc different stocks o[ rneaning have
h".^-" """",. .,.""..ih1"
Research nrust be directed towards three levels c'f the production,
\ornmunicrlion ;rrJ re.eprior of rrleaninS: m,l\\ LonrDlunicrlion:
day-to'day conrmunication Rithin communities; internediary in-
,rir rr.on' whr,h rr'cdrrre b.rw.rn tlr" b,g ir.r. rlion.. commur,r."'
and the indivitlual.
'I
he ievelof m:lss conrmunication: the cofltents of mass communication
arc morally chargcd, in part implicitly ft. g. in advertising and
news reporting), sometimes more direcdy (e. g. in police films and
nature films), ancl sometirnes moral :spects of individual life and so'
ciety arc consciously addressed (c. g. television sermons, political
con1mentary). In this respcct there are some differenccs between
public" media organizations and purely private media, but we do
not yet kno{'how big this differencc really is. It is, however, clcar
that the nredii of nrass communicatioo are employed explicitly by
moral cntreprerrerrrs of different dcgrees for thcir own purposes, by
the state, by churches, by voluntary associations as rcpresentatives of
cornmunities of opinion *'ith qLrite diversc progranrmes (environmentalism,
protcction of cthnic, sexual or other mi11oritics).
The levci of the individual in thc daily life of commr.rnities of various
kinds: in evcryday verbal conrmunication (in thc family, at the
bar, in conversations betl'een ncighbors, at the workPlace and in
commLlnitics of opinion to thc extent that these are not already in_
termediary institutions of a higher lcvcL of organization and thercfore
to bc treated xt the next state) thcre is constant moralizing: in
conrpLaints, apologics, references to specific sets of norms, gossip ctc.
The moral aspccts of conmunication may refer to thosc present
(e. g. in munral rccrimination) or may be directed towerds absent
others (e. g. in gossip) or nray rcfer rn a general way to examples
(e. g. in argunrcnts bet*-een mcnrbcrs of a famiiy ovcr a case on television,
e. g. Maradona).
The lcvcL of intermediary institlrtions: this qucstion is, as was af
rcady argued, particularly problcnlatic since one must first answer
67

the qucstion as to what belongs to this category, but c:nnot do so
unctluivocally prior to bcginning rcscirch. Vith somc confidence
onc can say that the intcrnediary institutions include communitics
of opinion organized locally, e. g. ecological groups; institutions
srrch as the church, to the cxtcnr that they have local roots strong
cnougll to serve as sources of mcaning for communities of lifc; possibly
loctl party organizations; associations of various kinds. Vhich
of thesc organizations deservcs the title intermediäry institution can
onLy be decided when their local mode of operation has been examined.
If thcy do not mcdiate bctrvccn the big institution of society
and the individuals in their life communities rhen rhey ere nor true
intcrnrediary institutions.
In the ideal case intermcdiaq,
'l'hey
insrirutions areJanus faced. look
"upwards'
to the big institutions and
'
downwards' to rhe cxisrence
of the individual. lhen rhcy comrnunicatc not iust srocks of
meaning frorn thc "top' to drc "bottorn" but also, as is suggestecl by
the idca of "civil society', fronr thc "bonom" 'up'. k appears as
though this is quite rare; an examination of this sphere should be
able to conclude r','hether thc general skepticisn is justified equally
in diffcrcnt societies. An answer to this qucsrion would bc inrporrart.
On the basis of sorne rcscarch and prior considerations it seems
that onc nrust assume there arc usually large discrepancics between
the moralities offcred by thc state, the church and othcr'moral
entrcpreneurs', which reach dre individual via the nr:rss nlcdia, and
the valucs hcld by the indivicluals themselves- On the level of däy ro
day conrnrunication, e. g. in fanrilies,
'
rhcse moral options' are not
nerely consumcd . They arc processed conrmunicativcly, selected,
rejectecl and adaptcd to individual's own circumstances. Still the gap
that ya\,Ds between the moral recornmendations of thc media and
day to day rcality should not bc ünderestimated. If tolcrance is
preachcd
"from above" it rarely bccomes significant in thc attitucles
of indivicluals if it has not been absorbed inro the shared mcanings of
"their'
conmunity through cc'nrmon communicative effort.
With rcfcrence to intermediary instirutions the important qucstion
68

is, as was already said: do they really mediate xnd do they mediate in
both dircctionsl fhc empirical anss,/er to this question will deterrrrinc
whcthcr, on thc whole, rnodern societies can reign-in the ever
Iatcnt crisis of mcaning, as wc suspect they probably can. Only if
intcrmediary institutions cnsurc that the subjective patterns ofexperience
and action of the individuals contribute to the social negotiation
and objectification of meaning, will individuals not find thcm'
selves in the modern world as complete strangcrs; and only then will
it be possible to avoid the identity of the individual person and thc
intcr-sr.rbjcctive cohcrcnce of socicty being threatened or even destroyed
by crisis ridden modernity.
69

The authors
Pcter L. Berger
llronr 1955 56 Research Dircctor, Acadenry of the Protestant
Church, Bad Bo1l, Germany; fron 1956 58 ?rofessor at thc
\(oman's College, University of Nordr Carolina; frorn 1958 63
Director at the Institute of ChLrrch and Community, Hartford
Theological Instilutc of Church anrl Conrmunity, Hartford Theological
Senrinary; frarn 19637a Professor at thc Graduate Faculty,
Ncw School for SocialResearch, Ncw York; from 1920-79 Professor
at thc l{utgers University; from 1979-81 Prolessor at the Boston
Collegc; sincc 1981 Professor at the Doston University; since 1985
I)irector of the Institute for the Snrdy of Economic Cul!üre, Boston
University.
Publicrtions:
Invitation to Sociology: A Llumarristic Perspectivc, 1963; The Social
Construction of Reality (with Tironras Luckmann), 1966; The Se'
crcd Canopy: Elements of a Sociological lheory ofReligion, 1967i A
Rtrmor of Ängels: Modern Socicty and the Rcdiscovery of thc Supernatural,
1969; The Ilomeless Mind; Modernization and Consciousncss
(with Brigitte Berger and Hansfried Kellner), 1973;
Pyramids of Sacrifice: Pc,litical Uthics and Social Change, 19l5;
'thc
Heretical Imperative, 1979; Sociolc,gy Reinterpreted (with
I Iansfried Kellner); The l(ar Over the Family (with Brigitte
Bergcr), 1983; The Capitalist Rev

Thomas Lucknann
I:ro r 1958 60 Professor at the I Iobart CoLlege, Department of Anthropology
and Sociology, Gencva, N.Y.; from 1960-65 Professor at
the Graduate Faculty, Departnrcnt of Sociology, New School for
Social Rescarch, New York; lrom 1963 65 Co-Director of thc
N.l.M.H. Fellos'ship l'rogram; from 1965-/0 ?rofessor for Sociology
and Director of the Departrncnt of Sociology, from 1966-68 Man'
aging Director of the Departmcnt of Sociology at the Johann-
\f olfgang Goethe-University, FrankfLrrt/Main; since 1970 Professor
of Sociology, Univcrsity of Konstanz.
Publications:
The Social Construction of l{eality (with Peter L. Berger), 1966; The
Invisible Religion, 1970; Ihc Structurcs of the Life-\üorld I (with
Alfred schütz), 1973, II, 1984i sociology of Language, 1975; LebeDswclt
und Gesellschaft, 1980; Theorie cles sozialen Handelns, 1992.
72

The project
The Bertekmann lourulation ts targeted to be an operative, concepnrally
norking foundation. lt is obliged by its statutes and its
mandatc to promote innovation, raise ncw idcas to the level of prac
tice, help to identify solruions to pressing problems of our time. 'l he
projects are being conccptualizcd and inrtiated by thc foundation itse1f.
Starting fronr thc dcfinition of the problem to the practical implementation
the foundation runs its projects in close cooperation
l,ith competent partners in acadcnric, state and private institutions.
Followint rhis intcntion the Berrelsn)ann Foundation has initiated
the project Cuhrral Orientation.h wrll rnake efforts to elaborate so
Irrtions and conccpts in repll to thc crises of modern societies which
can be summariz-cd as a decline of orientation. It will be one of the
questions decisivc for our firture how we can overcome these crises
related to the transition of values änLl the loss of patterns of
mcaning.
Certainties of oricntation are erodrng, identities are being ques
tioned- Thc increasing velocity of social dcvelopmenr gives rise to
this tendcncy by an intensifiecl changc of familiar structures and
experience-bascd ccrtainties. Traclitional k'rowledge, which is being
passed on from one generation to thc next by the church, the state,
'.hool. or funrlic.. bc.orn.. .rrrrJatcJ ir rn evertrowing pr.e.

'fhe
traditional institutrons of orientation are being supplemented
by recently cnrcrgcd ones. Conflicts bctrvccn competing orienta
tions on thc supply side are rcsolvcd at the "market", different
definitions of one's lives may Lrc incompatible. Functional elites are
being called upon to contributc their share to dre stabilization of
social funrre. Effective orientation has to master the challenge of
reconciling individually meaningful concepts for life and necessities
to maintain the cohesion of socicty.
The Bertelsmann Foundation is ainrilg at responses to three
crucixl questions:
- \fhat can bc an cxplanation of this dcclinc of orientation?
- $(hich instiutions contribute to coherent and stable oricntations?
- How can a solution to dre oricntation crisis be designed)
As a first step in thc field of projects on "cultural orientation" the
volum on 'The loss of oricntation the cohesion crisis in modern
society" (in German language only) was releascd to open a series of
publications. The next phase consistcd of a series o{ expertises of
which the present snrdy by Pctcr L. Ilerger and Thomas Luckmann
was completed in the first instancc. \farnfried Detding (Munich)
will present his concept of thc immediate social environment and
orientation in cornmLrnication with ncighbors in a few months time.
Other sub-projec* consist of a study by Gerhard Schmidtchen
(University of Zurich) on oricntation in intra-firm communication,
an expertise by Martin Grciffcnhegen (University of Snrttgart) on
political legitimation and thc liurits of strte control and an investigatiofl
of the episte[rological conclitions of orientation under conditions
of an increased complexity of knowlcdge and information by
cerhard Schulze (University of ßanrberg).
The Bertelsnann Foundation publishes this volume in the intention
to provide a forum for a dcbate on the future of modern society
and perspectives of developnlent.
74

acnninties oforicntrtion arc eroding. identilies arc being
qucslioned. Thc incrcasing velocit)' ofsocial devclopment Srvcs
risc to this tendency by äD intcnsified chxngc offamiliar struclurcs
and expcricnce-bascd ocrtaintics. liaditional knowledgc, which
is bcing passed on fronr one gencration to the ncxt bythc church.
thc statc. schools or fanrilics. becomcs ouldalcd rn an evergrolring
pace.-fhe lradrlionäl institulions ol orientation are bcing
supplcmcnted by rcccntly emerged ones. Conllicts bciYeen
compcting orientation on thc supply side üe rcsolved at the
"mlrrkcl",
diflerent definitions ofonc's Lives may be incompatible
funclionaL elites rrc beil1g called upon to oontribulc their share to
thc shbilization oi sociirl lirture. Eilectivc orientation has
to nrastcr the challcngc ol'rcconciling individually meaninglül
concepts for lile and neccssities to mainlain tbc cohesion o1'
Pctcr L. tserger and I homas Luclmann count ämong the causes
lor thc modem crisis ofmcaning processes ofnodemizatjon,
pluraiism and particularly wilh rcgard 1o liuropean socrctlcs -
secularization. As a pfoblcm solving stratcgy, the authors suggcst
ihcir concept ofintcrmediale institulions which ücdjate bclwccn
thc individual and socicly.
BertelsmannFoundation Publishers
:
a