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The Other Side of Value: the Gross Profitability Premium - Q Group

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>O<strong>the</strong>r</strong> <strong>Side</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Value</strong>:<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>Gross</strong> Pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>Premium</strong><br />

Robert Novy-Marx<br />

Simon Graduate School <strong>of</strong> Business<br />

and NBER


Main results<br />

• <strong>Gross</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability is a powerful predictor<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cross-section <strong>of</strong> average returns<br />

– MMuchhstronger than h earnings i or free f cashflows hfl<br />

• HHas about b t as much h power as B/M<br />

– And is complimentary to book-to-market<br />

• GP/A negatively correlated with B/M<br />

• Helps distinguish “good growth” from ordinary growth


Implications<br />

• Obvious implications for portfolio construction<br />

• Challenge to popular <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>of</strong> value<br />

– PPr<strong>of</strong>itable fit bl firms: fi<br />

• Less distressed (FF 1993)<br />

• Longer durations (LW 2007)<br />

• Lower levels <strong>of</strong> operating leverage (CFG 2004)<br />

• Provide a unifying feature <strong>of</strong> most earningsrelated<br />

anomalies<br />

– AAnd dmany seemingly i l unrelated l t danomalies li


Why should pr<strong>of</strong>itability matter?<br />

• Berk (1995): High IRR� IRR� low valuations<br />

– So low values associated with high returns<br />

– Conditional on valuations, valuations pr<strong>of</strong>itable �� high IRR<br />

� Pr<strong>of</strong>itability premium<br />

• LSV (1994): mispricing � value premium<br />

– Sort on B/M partly sorts on <strong>the</strong> mis-valuations<br />

– Conditional on valuations, pr<strong>of</strong>itable underpriced<br />

� Pr<strong>of</strong>itability premium


Dividend discount model with<br />

clean surplus accounting<br />

• Fama-French (2006)<br />

• Ceteris paribus:<br />

– ↑ M �� ↓ r<br />

– ↑ Y � ↑ r<br />

– ↑ dB �� ↓ r


• Why hold all else equal?<br />

– Recursive formulation:<br />

– S iis economic i pr<strong>of</strong>its fi (“surplus”) (“ l ”)<br />

– X is expensed investment (e.g., R&D, advertising)


• Can also write as<br />

– Here N is rents to investment (“net gain”)


Why gross pr<strong>of</strong>itability?<br />

• <strong>Gross</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its are “cleanest” cleanest measure <strong>of</strong> true<br />

economic pr<strong>of</strong>itability<br />

• Earnings “punished” for growth growth-related related activities<br />

– Costumer acquisition<br />

• Ad Advertising, ti i commissions i i<br />

–R&D<br />

– DDevelopment l t<strong>of</strong> forganizational i ti lcapital it l<br />

• Free cashflows fur<strong>the</strong>r “punished” for CAPX<br />

– Even optimal investment


Prima facie evidence<br />

• Pr<strong>of</strong>itability predicts economic growth, growth<br />

even after controlling for valuations<br />

– AAno<strong>the</strong>r h di dimension i <strong>of</strong> f“ “growth” h”<br />

• <strong>Gross</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its-to-assets predicts:<br />

– <strong>Gross</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>it growth<br />

– Earnings g ggrowth<br />

– Free cashflow growth<br />

– Dividends and repurchases<br />

• Note: earnings and cashflows go <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r way


Pr<strong>of</strong>itability and Pr<strong>of</strong>itability Growth


Pr<strong>of</strong>itability and Earnings Growth


So is pr<strong>of</strong>itability relevant for AP?<br />

• Two stories why it might be<br />

– But <strong>the</strong>y don’t actually provide <strong>the</strong> answer<br />

• Ultimately an empirical question<br />

• Emphatic “yes” in <strong>the</strong> data<br />

– More pr<strong>of</strong>itable firms significantly outperform less<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itable firms


Portfolio sorts<br />

• If GP/A really predicts returns, returns should see it in<br />

simple trading strategies (and you do!)<br />

• Also show clear positive correlation between<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability and current valuation ratios<br />

– Thi This fact f t leads l d to t FF (1993) di discussion i th that t HML<br />

may reflect earnings-related risk<br />

– AAnd dwhy h GP/A GP/Ai isn’t ’tobvious b i iin <strong>the</strong> th data d t<br />

• But sort on GP/A, growth outperforms value


Insurance<br />

• For your value strategy<br />

– Levering to run pr<strong>of</strong>itability over value reduces<br />

return volatility!<br />

• <strong>The</strong> best kind insurance<br />

– It pays you<br />

• Negative average “premiums”<br />

• MMomentum t orthogonal th l tto joint j i tvalue l<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability strategy<br />

– HHas di diversifying, if i but b not hedging, h d i role<br />

l


“High” High Frequency Strategy<br />

Bigger spreads using better information<br />

• Rebalance monthly<br />

– EEnd d<strong>of</strong> fmonth th<br />

• Using most recent accounting data<br />

– Released quarterly<br />

• From 1972


“High High Frequency Frequency” Strategy


• 26% correlated with PEAD<br />

– Also some momentum<br />

• But significant information ratio relative to <strong>the</strong>se<br />

• And to low frequency pr<strong>of</strong>itability strategy<br />

• Highly persistent pr<strong>of</strong>its<br />

– So “cleaner” cleaner to analyze low frequency strategy<br />

• No PEAD, No momentum<br />

• Relation to value more clear


<strong>Value</strong>-pr<strong>of</strong>itability <strong>Value</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability relation<br />

• <strong>Gross</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its-to-assets and book-to-market<br />

negatively correlated<br />

• Univariate sort on GP/A sorts against B/M<br />

– Similarly, sorting on B/M sorts against GP/A<br />

•Suggests that:<br />

– Pr<strong>of</strong>itability strategies should perform better when<br />

constructed to control for valuations<br />

– <strong>Value</strong> strategies should perform better when<br />

constructed d to control l for f pr<strong>of</strong>itability<br />

fi bili


HML “decomposition”<br />

decomposition<br />

• Book-to-market sort used in HML sorts against<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>its-to-assets<br />

– So HML is long “real” real value value, but short<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability<br />

• I.e., short “good good growth” growth<br />

• Investigate by constructing:<br />

– HML that controls for GP/A<br />

– HML-like GP/A “factor” that controls for B/M


Effect is strong in large caps<br />

• Double sort on size and pr<strong>of</strong>itability<br />

• Pr<strong>of</strong>itability spread is smaller in large caps<br />

– Th Though h still till significant i ifi t<br />

• FF3 alpha almost undiminished in large caps<br />

– Sorting on GP/A still sorts against B/M<br />

• Especially among bigger stocks


Simple large cap pr<strong>of</strong>itability/value strategy<br />

• Each June select 500 largest non-financial firms<br />

• Rank on GP/A and B/M<br />

– BBuy ttop 150 by b rank-sum k<br />

– Sell bottom 150 by rank-sum<br />

• Large spreads (almost 8% per year)<br />

– Huge capacity<br />

– Low trading costs<br />

• Liquid stocks<br />

• Turns over only once every three years


• 7.5% per year in <strong>the</strong> biggest, most liquid stocks<br />

– Twice <strong>the</strong> spread <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> similarly constructed value and<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability strategies


• Long side<br />

Portfolios (End ( 2010) )<br />

– Top: Astrazeneca, GlaxoSmithKline, JC Penney, Sears and<br />

Nokia<br />

– Bi Big: WlM WalMart, tJh Johnson &Jh & Johnson, AT&TItlV AT&T, Intel, Verizon, i<br />

Kraft, Home Depot, CVS, Eli Lilly and Target<br />

• Short side<br />

– Bottom: Ivanhoe Mines, Ultra Petroleum, Vertex<br />

Pharmaceuticals, Marriott International, Delta Airlines,<br />

Lockheed Martin and Unilever<br />

– Big: Apple, IBM, Philip Morris, McDonald’s,<br />

Schlumberger Schlumberger, Disney, Disney United Technologies, Technologies Qualcomm, Qualcomm<br />

Amazon and Boeing


“Explaining” Explaining anomalies<br />

• Power<strong>of</strong>grosspr<strong>of</strong>its-to-assets Power <strong>of</strong> gross pr<strong>of</strong>its-to-assets suggests it<br />

might “explain” anomalies<br />

– A proximate proximate, not ultimate explanation<br />

• Anomalies might be taking positions in pr<strong>of</strong>itability<br />

• Like LRR strategies are a backdoor to size and value<br />

– Doesn’t explain why pr<strong>of</strong>itable firms outperform in <strong>the</strong> first place<br />

– Simple Fama-French Time-Series regressions to<br />

identify <strong>the</strong>ses positions<br />

• Pr<strong>of</strong>itability factor<br />

• Industry adjustments to HML and UMD


• Roughly 2/3 <strong>of</strong> improved pricing comes from <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability<br />

factor<br />

• <strong>O<strong>the</strong>r</strong> 1/3 from industry adjusting HML and UMD


Conclusions<br />

• <strong>Gross</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itability is a powerful predictor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

cross-section <strong>of</strong> average returns<br />

– Obscured by its negative correlation with B/M<br />

• Sort on B/M, looks like pr<strong>of</strong>itable stocks underperform<br />

• Presents an additional challenge to rational<br />

value stories<br />

• “E “Explains” l i ” <strong>the</strong> th abnormal b l performance f <strong>of</strong> f many<br />

seemingly unrelated strategies<br />

– Many anomalies take positions in pr<strong>of</strong>itability

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