ASME Message

Abstracts
JRIA keeps the collected DSRS in their own storage facility in cases where they can not return them to the
radioactive source manufacturers. However, generally speaking, such DSRS kept temporary in the storage facility of
JRIA have been returned successively to the manufacturer, through the discussion among relevant parties if necessary. In
Japan, by the system that JRIA receives disused sealed sources based on the sales contract mentioned above, orphan
sources are scarcely found. Nevertheless, in such case, they will be picked up and kept safely in storage facility of JRIA.
3, Long term Management Plan of DSRS in Japan There is no disposal facility for DSRS in Japan. But as we
explained above, it is not the serious issue which should be resolved soon. This is because i) almost all of DSRS are
returned to source manufacturers, ii) JRIA has still enough storage capacity, iii) and the number of DSRS stored in JRIA
is settled.
We understand the potential necessity of the disposal facility of DSRS depending on the number of stored DSRS.
But considering current situation, it is not required to construct the additional storage facility or the disposal facility for
DSRS in Japan. Of course, this view depends on the increase rate of stored DSRS and the capacity of the storage facility
in future. We would cooperate with the international society and keep attention to the status of DSRS in Japan for the
safety regulation of the radioactive source considering security aspects.
3) 40060 – The Deployment of the Mobile Hot Cell to Condition High Activity Disused Sealed Radioactive
Sources (DSRS) for Long Term Storage or Removal
Gerhardus R. Liebenberg, South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa) (South Africa)
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Waste Technology Section with additional support from the U.S.
National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) through the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund has funded the design, fabrication,
evaluation, and testing of a mobile hot cell intended to address the problem of high activity disused sealed radioactive
sources (DSRS) in obsolete irradiation devices such as teletherapy heads and dry irradiators.
Operations to condition high activity DSRS using the mobile hot cell has successfully been undertaken in various
countries since April 2009. The project was initially targeting the African continent but is now also expanding to other
parts of the world such as Latin America and Asia. The mobile hot cell allows for source removal, characterization,
consolidation, repackaging in stainless steel capsules as special form, and secure storage of high risk DSRS in modern
long term storage shields at single sites in each IAEA Member State.
The mobile hot cell and related equipment is transported in two shipping containers to a specific country where the
following process takes place: - Assembly of hot cell - Removal of high activity DSRS from working shields,
encapsulation into a stainless steel capsule to obtain special form status and placement into a long term storage shield -
Conditioning of any other spent sources the country may require. - Dismantling of the hot cell - Shipping equipment out
of country.
This presentation will discuss the design of the mobile hot cell as well as the deployment of the unit for
manipulation of high activity DSRS in various countries worldwide. As a result of this project, excess high activity
DSRS could be managed safely and securely and possibly be more easily repatriated to their country of origin for
appropriate final disposition.
4) 40266 – Problems with Packaged Sources in Foreign Countries
James Matzke, John Zarling, Cristy Abeyta, Joseph A. Tompkins, LANL (USA)
The Global Threat Reduction Initiative’s (GTRI) Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP), which is administered
by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), removes excess, unwanted, abandoned, or orphan radioactive sealed
sources that pose a potential risk to health, safety, and national security. In total, GTRI/OSRP has been able to recover
more than 19,000 excess and unwanted sealed sources from over 750 sites. In addition to transuranic sources, the
GTRI/OSRP mission now includes recovery of beta/gamma emitting sources, which are of concern to both the U.S.
government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This paper provides a synopsis of cooperative efforts
in foreign countries to remove sealed sources by discussing three topical areas: 1) The Regional Partnership with the
International Atomic Energy Agency; 2) Challenges in repatriating sealed sources; and 3) Options for repatriating sealed
sources.
5) 40085 – The IAEA's approach to the security of radioactive material
Robin Heard, IAEA
Over the past decade, the threat has increased of terrorism and other malevolent acts by terrorist groups and other
malicious non-State actors, involving the potential use of radioactive materials. This has led to an international effort to
build a nuclear security framework and regime, both for prevention and consequence management. Legally binding and
non-binding international instruments have been established that form the international framework for an effective
nuclear security regime. Adherence to and implementation of these instruments is vital for effective nuclear security.
IAEA implements a comprehensive programme to assist States in strengthening their nuclear security. The third Nuclear
Security Plan covers the period 2010–2013. Through the implementation of these plans, IAEA conducts advisory
services and provides technical advice, support and training. It also addresses the longer-term effort of development of
nuclear security guidance and it facilitates outreach and information exchange through databases, conferences,
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