ACYA Journal of Australia-China Affairs 2012

ACYA Journal of Australia-China Affairs
ISSN 2201-0831
Volume II
2012
第二编
中澳青年联合会学报

ACYA IS PROUDLY SPONSORED BY:
中澳青年联合会由以下机构荣誉赞助:
Published by the Australia-China Youth Association (ACYA)
由中澳青年联合会出版
Website/网站: www.acya.org.au
Twitter/推特: @a_cya
ABN: 47 895 900 364
Please direct all correspondence regarding the ACYA Journal of Australia-China
Affairs to neil.thomas@acya.org.au
请将所有关于 2012 年“中澳青年联合会学报”的信息发送至:
neil.thomas@acya.org.au
© Australia-China Youth Association 2012
© 中澳青年联合会 2012

CONTENTS
Editors’ Welcome & Acknowledgements 8
编辑致辞 9
Foreword: Dr. Wang Yi 10
前言:王毅博士 11
Introduction to the Australia-China Youth Association 12
中澳青年联合会简介 13
Profile of the 2012 ACYA Youth Scholars 14
2012 中澳青年联合会青年学者简介 15
SECTION I: Academic Essay – English 第一部分:学术文章部分-英语类作品
Normalisation of Australia-China Relations and the Role of the United States 18
Elizabeth Ingleson – ACYA Prize for Youth Scholarship (English)
Individualisation in China:Individualisierung, Consumerism, and State Legitimacy 25
Thomas Williams
SECTION II: Academic Essay – Chinese 第二部分:学术文章部分-中文类作品
中等强国的两难困境?试析澳工党执政以来的澳大利亚国内对华战略争论 36
赵寒玉(Zelda Zhao):中澳青年联合会青年奖学金(中文)
SECTION III: Opinion Article – English 第三部分:个人评论部分-英语类作品
From the Western to Eastern Frontier 48
Alice Dawkins – ACYA Journal Opinion Article (English) Prize
In Search of My Roots (Translation) 51
Sue-Lin Wong – ACYA Journal Opinion Article (Chinese) Prize
The Case for ―Face‖: Improving Australia-China Relations into the Future 56
Andrew Chubb
From a Steely Gaze to Protean Perspectives: Beyond 40 Years of Australia-China Relations 60
Neil Thomas & Thomas Williams
Australia, China, and the Sister City Dilemma 64
Lloyd Bradbury
Perspective of an Australian-Born Chinese 66
Jieh-Yung Lo
6 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS

目录
Phoenix Rising: Mary Bergstrom‘s All Eyes East 69
Joel Wing-Lun
The Future Leaders of Australia and China (Translation) 71
Oliver Theobald
Clean Energy and Emissions Reduction Technology: the Next Step? (Translation) 74
Wang Zikai
SECTION IV: Opinion Article – Chinese 第四部分:个人评论部分-中文类作品
寻根之旅 78
黄淑琳(Sue-Lin Wong):中澳青年联合会学报个人评论部分一等奖(中文)
从国境之西到国境之东:一个澳大利亚人对中国新疆省和黑龙江省的调查 (译文) 82
温丽丽(Alice Dawkins):中澳青年联合会学报个人评论部分一等奖(英语)
中澳关系未来发展: 未来几代中澳领导者 84
熙奥利(Oliver Theobald)
清洁能源和减排技术:澳中密切合作的下一站 86
王资凯(Wang Zikai)
―面子‖—改善未来的澳中关系(译文) 88
朱波(Andrew Chubb)
从钢铁合作到多面视角:澳中交往四十余年,何去何从(译文) 92
牛犇(Neil Thomas)& 卫涛(Thomas Williams)
中澳两国间友谊城市的困境(译文) 96
隆龙(Lloyd Bradbury)
澳籍华人如是观(译文) 98
罗介雍(Jieh-Yung Lo)
凤凰涅槃:玛丽•博格斯特罗姆的《聚焦东方》(译文) 101
黄智雄(Joel Wing-Lun)
SECTION V: Creative Work 第五部分:原创作品部分
不中不澳的灰暗天空 106
吴忠彦(Gareth Durrant):中澳青年联合会学报原创作品部分一等奖 / Creative Work Prize
中澳青年联合会学报 7

EDITORS’ WELCOME AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
On behalf of the 2012 ACYA Journal Sub-Committee, we would like to welcome you to the 2012 edition of
the ACYA Journal of Australia-China Affairs.
Building on from the pioneering success of the inaugural ACYA Journal in 2011, in 2012 the renamed ACYA
Journal of Australia-China Affairs made further strides in Australia-China youth engagement by instituting
the ACYA Prizes for Australia-China Youth Scholarship (English and Chinese) to attract a broad range of
quality submissions, conducting an academic referee process to ensure the value of published works, and
rendering the major Opinion Article section entirely bilingual in order to amplify the reach of the Journal
throughout both Australia and China.
The Journal represents a considered insight into the many debates that surround how best to define, explain,
and consolidate the relationship between our two different economics, societies, and polities, affording the
opportunity to aspiring Australian and Chinese leaders of both today and tomorrow to voice their informed
angles on ―40 years of Australia-China relations‖. In 2012, it is only fitting that the 40 th anniversary of the
establishment of diplomatic ties in December 1972 is a prominent theme, as amidst the helter-skelter multifaceted
growth of bilateral interactions such a landmark allows us the opportunity to analyse the past, assess
the present, and anticipate the future of our dynamic and important relationship. No doubt Australia and
China have much to gain from stronger linkages with each other, but how this is achieved, and through what
channels, will be an on-going debate, with the Journal serving as a means to pursue progress on this issue in
an open environment unencumbered by structural baggage and encouraging of critical debate and reflection.
Our congratulations go to all of the authors published in this Journal, and especially to both Elizabeth
Ingleson and Zelda Zhao, the inaugural winners of the ACYA Prizes for Australia-China Youth Scholarship
(respectively, the English Prize and Chinese Prize) – the clarity, thoughtfulness and ability with which you
articulated your views on the Australia-China relationship made for wonderful reading. We were also thrilled
by the sheer volume of high quality submissions made to this year‘s Journal, and it was with heavy heart we
had to make many very difficult choices regarding what we could and were not able to include. As such, we
would like to personally thank everyone who committed their time to making a submission, as regardless of
whether an individual piece was published or not it represents a vital contribution to the robustness and
vigour of the discourse day-by-day pushing the Australia-China relationship forward.
The Journal is also indebted to the contributions of many other parties. Firstly, to the many both English and
Chinese language academic referees who gave so kindly of their time and talents to review all of the
submissions we provided them, their efforts have made the Journal what it is. Furthermore, we are extremely
thankful towards Jason Huang and the Australian Studies Centre of Sun Yat-sen University for coordinating
the Opinion Article translations. Additionally, thanks must go to the Australia-China Youth Association, and
especially the 2012 National Executive, the institutional support of which was instrumental to the realisation
of our goals for this year‘s Journal. Finally, and needless to say, a major publication such as the 2012 ACYA
Journal of Australia-China Affairs would not be able to happen without a committed team working behindthe-scenes.
We would like to express our wholehearted gratitude for the exceptionally competent and
tirelessly enthusiastic efforts of all of the Sub-Editors on the 2012 ACYA Journal Sub-Committee. Bryan
Bong, Qin Hang, Karen Lee, Minwan Xu – without you this would not have been possible. Thank you.
We hope you enjoy reading the Journal as much as it was a pleasure for us to compile!
Michael McGregor Neil Thomas
Editor, ACYA Journal Sub-Committee Executive Editor, ACYA National Publications Director
8 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS

编辑致辞
我们代表 2012 中澳青年联合会(ACYA)学报小组委员会欢迎您阅读 2012 年《中澳青年联合会学
报》。
在 2011 年初刊获得了开创性的成功后,如今 2012 年新命名的《中澳青年联合会学报》又向中澳青
年间的交流互动迈开了巨大的一步:这包括通过今年新制定和颁发的“中澳青年联合会青年奖学金
(中文奖和英文奖)”来吸引大批高质量的投稿;启用专家评审模式来确保学报发表文章的质量;
以及在评论板块完全采用中英文双语模式使得学报能够在中国和澳大利亚得到更多的关注。
本学报发表于中澳建交 40 周年之际,为今天和未来的中澳领袖们提供了一个“百花齐放、百家争鸣”
的机会。正因如此,学报呈现了众多颇具深度的辩论,例如怎样恰当地去定义两个不同社会、如何
诠释和巩固双边关系等。在 2012 年,我们以为,中澳从 1972 年 12 月建交至今,只有采用“中澳建
交 40 周年”这个主题才最为合适。因为,在纷呈多面的外交形势下,这样一个里程碑式的时刻让我
们得以研究过去,审视现在,并寄望于这与我们休戚相关且生机勃勃的双边关系的未来。毫无疑问,
中澳都将受益于彼此密切的沟通与交流,但通过何种途径达成这一目的,仍然是双方一个任重道远
的话题。而本学报正是希望在一种不受形式限制、鼓励批判性思维、和开放辩论的环境中,创造一
个可以解决这一问题的实质性平台。
我们为所有能在学报中发表作品的作者,以及其中出色的中澳青年联合会青年奖学金英文获奖人
Elizabeth Ingleson 和中澳青年联合会青年奖学金中文获奖人赵寒玉表示热烈的祝贺。你们围绕中
澳关系发表的观点和作品清晰、全面,令人尽享阅读的乐趣。我们也惊叹于今年收到的海量的高水
平投稿,要在其中筛选收录作品是一项两难的选择。所以,我们在这里要感谢所有愿意花时间投稿
的作者,无论他们的作品是否入选,那些文字都从点点滴滴各方面为中澳关系的发展注入了活力。
学报的成功发行当然也承蒙其他各个团体的支持。首先,我们要感谢所有中英文学术论文部分的评
审人,没有他们倾尽全力地审阅所有的作品,学报无法取得今天的成就。其次,我们特别要感谢承
担个人评论部分翻译工作的黄锐和中山大学澳大利亚研究中心。另外,也要感谢中澳青年联合会,
尤其是联合会 2012 年全国执行委员会,他们从组织制度上大力扶持我们完成了今年的学报任务。最
后,众所周知,像《2012 年中澳青年联合会学报》这样一份主要刊物能成功发布,没有一支幕后的
编辑团队是不可能实现的。在此,我们特别要感激 2012 年学报小组委员会里所有热情能干的组员:
Bryan Bong(黄俊杰), 杭沁,Karen Lee, 徐敏婉 – 有你们,一切才有可能。谢谢。
我们衷心希望您在阅读学报时也能体会到我们编审时的愉悦之情。
Michael McGregor Neil Thomas (牛犇)
主编,中澳青年联合会小组委员会 执行总编, 中澳青年联合会全国刊物编审主管
中澳青年联合会学报 9

FOREWORD: DR. WANG YI
I would like to congratulate the Australia-China Youth Association (ACYA) on the successful publication of
the 2012 edition of its journal, coinciding with the 40 th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Australian
diplomatic relations. The publication represents a unique and significant contribution to this momentous
occasion as it gives a voice to talented youth with an interest in the bilateral relationship.
While much has been achieved in the past four decades to take bilateral relations to where they are now,
much more remains to be done for such relations to scale new heights, something that will not be possible
without the active participation of the young ‗leaders of tomorrow‘. It is therefore gratifying to witness the
groundbreaking work of ACYA in mobilising large numbers of young volunteers in contributing to the
enhancement of such an important cause. Indeed, the variety of articles showcased in this journal testifies to
the diversity of engagement with such work by young people from both countries, featuring different
perspectives, insights, and writing styles.
It is my sincere hope that such commendable initiatives as ACYA and the Australia-China Youth Dialogue
(ACYD) will not only be carried on further, but will be multiplied in the future by similar efforts involving
even greater levels of youth participation in the worthy cause of advancing bilateral friendship and
cooperation in the decades to come.
10 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
Dr. Wang Yi
Dr. Wang Yi teaches at Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia, and is the author of Australia-China
Relations Post-1949: Sixty Years of Trade and Politics, (available at
http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781409437284), the only complete account of the bilateral relationship that
covers the entire span of the diplomatic history between Australia and the PRC from the post-war years to
the present era.

前言:王毅博士
值此中澳建交 40 周年之际,我为中澳青年联合会(英文缩写为 ACYA)成功发布了它的 2012 年学报
表示祝贺。这份刊物为这个纪念时刻做出了独特和重要的贡献,因为它为对中澳双边关系有兴趣的
年轻一代提供了表达自己声音的平台。
尽管过去四十年间,中澳双边关系是因为许多人的努力和付出才取得了今天的成就;但是若要让双
边关系达到全新的高度,则需要更多的工作。这其中,身为“未来接班人”的年轻一代,更需义不
容辞地参与进来。所以,当我目睹 ACYA“史无前例”地带领大批青年志愿者参与到推动中澳双边关
系发展的活动中时,我深感欣慰。的确,这份学报中的各式文章见证了两国年轻人从多元化领域对
参与中澳事务的热情,也体现了他们不同的观点、看法和写作风格。
我衷心地祝愿,ACYA 与中澳青年对话(英文缩写为 ACYD)的美好初衷不但能薪火相传,而且在未来
数十年内,能通过青年参与者们类似甚至更出色的工作,将中澳双边关系发展提升到前所未有的高
度。
王毅博士
王毅博士现任教于澳大利亚布里斯班的格里菲斯大学,且是《解放后中澳关系:60 年间贸易与政策
研究》(阅读地址:http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781409437284)一书的作者。该书是迄今唯一
一本覆盖中国战后至今整个历史时期中澳双边外交关系的著作。
中澳青年联合会学报 11

INTRODUCTION TO THE AUSTRALIA-CHINA YOUTH ASSOCIATION
The Australia-China Youth Association (ACYA) has established itself as the premier Australia-China
engagement forum for young people.
Firstly, the Chapter network has continued to grow throughout 2012. Three new Chapters have come ‗online‘
this year – the Queensland University of Technology, Monash University, and the University of Adelaide.
These three Chapters join the existing network of 11 Australian university-based Chapters across Brisbane,
Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne, Adelaide, and Perth. Furthermore, and of equal note, ACYA has recently
introduced a regional Chapter in Nanjing, building upon ACYA‘s strong Chapter presence in Beijing and
‗boutique‘ Shanghai Chapter. It is not just the addition of new Chapters that has been impressive in 2012, but
the quality and enthusiasm of existing Chapters has been of particular note. Excluding weekly language
classes, we estimate there were well over 50 high-profile events organised across the ACYA network within
China and Australia in 2012, including lectures, debates, balls, dinners, KTV, AFL games, and cooking
classes.
ACYA‘s online presence has also strengthened this year. Our website (www.acya.org.au) now caters for
user-driven comments, allows chapters to update their own page, and features extensive new content.
Michael Dalic deserves particular recognition for this work. ACYA‘s social media presence has also
improved this year – well over 2,100 people are members of our main Facebook page, with several thousand
other members of individual Chapter Facebook pages. ACYA has also successfully delved into the Chinese
social media world of Renren and Weibo.
ACYA Executives have been sought for comment by news media outlets throughout 2012. For instance, SBS
News, Channel Seven, The Age, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Australian Financial Review, The
Australian, Triple J, ABC Radio, The China Daily, and Xinhua News have all either profiled ACYA
Executives or sought comment from ACYA regarding Australia-China current affairs. ACYA values its
ability to contribute to public debates involving Australia and China.
The publications portfolio has been a true highlight of 2012. The AustraliaBites and ChinaBites publications,
as well as the monthly e-bulletin, have been of outstanding worth to our members and a credit to their chief
authors – Neil Thomas and Joel Wing-Lun. The ACYA Journal of Australia-China Affairs, however, may
well be the highlight of ACYA publications for this year. The professionalism and quality of the Journal has
reached new heights since the inaugural edition last year.
The ACYA Journal is a fitting conclusion to a successful year for ACYA that has seen Chapter growth,
website and social media improvements, and of course, a growth in quality publications. This journal is a
true manifestation of the value of youth-oriented, volunteer-fuelled interest in Australia-China relations.
Congratulations to the entire ACYA Journal Sub-Committee. Happy reading to you all!
Jeffrey Sheehy Thomas Williams
ACYA National President (Australia) ACYA National President (China)
12 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS

中澳青年联合会简介
中澳青年联合会(ACYA)是一个为中澳青年交流建立的独特平台。
首先,今年分会的网络在不断扩大。三个新分会今年都先后“上线”了——分别是昆士兰科技大学、
莫那什大学以及阿德雷德大学。此三所大学加入了已经在布里斯班、悉尼、堪培拉、墨尔本、阿德
雷德和柏斯的其它十一所大学。另外同样的,中澳青年联合会在原先北京主会场和上海小众型分会
的基础上又新引进了在南京的一个区域性分会。2012 年令人震撼的,不仅仅是新成立的这三个分会,
还包括现有的高质量分会洋溢着的热情。除却每周的常规语言课程外,我们在 2012 年约有 50 余项
大型活动在中国和澳洲境内开展,其中包括教授课程、举办辩论会、策划舞会和晚宴、组织 K 歌、
澳洲足球比赛以及开办烹饪课程等。
中澳青年联合会的网上形式也在今年得到加强。我们的网站(www.acya.org.au)如今更关注用户的
评论,允许各分会更新自己的网页,并且着重发布活动的新鲜事,其中 Michael Dalic 功不可没。
中澳青年联合会的社交媒体功能也在今年得到进一步改进——我们的 Facebook 主页已经拥有了超过
2100 个会员,其它分会的 Facebook 主页也吸引了近千名会员。同时,中澳青年联合会还成功地进入
了由“人人网”与“新浪微博”引领的中国社交媒体界。
中澳青年联合会的执行们也在 2012 年被新闻媒体争相采访和报道。例如 SBS 新闻,七频道,《时代
报》,《悉尼先锋晨报》、《澳洲经济评论报》、《澳洲人报》、Triple J、澳洲广播电台、《中
国日报》、新华社等。它们或是刊登了执行们的简介,或是介绍了执行们就中澳事务发表的评论。
所以,中澳青年联合会致力于为中澳之间的公共对话做出贡献。
2012 年的一个真正的亮点是联合会的出版合集。《澳洲时下》(AustraliaBites)和《中国时下》
(ChinaBites)的出版,以及每月的电子简报,都为我们的会员提供了货真价实的讯息,这两项应
该归功于它们各自的主编:Neil Thomas 和 Joel Wing-Lun。中澳青年联合会学报也将成为今年出版
的特色。学报的专业性和高质量将在上期初刊的基础上登上另一台阶。
中澳青年联合会学报是对今年联合会分会扩展、网络媒体进步和出版水平提升的一个恰当总结。这
份学报真正诠释了中澳青年联合会以青年为主及自主研究中澳关系的价值取向。恭喜整个中澳青年
联合会学报小组委员会。祝君阅读愉快。
Jeffrey Sheehy (谢睿山) Thomas Williams (卫涛)
中澳青年联合会全国主席(澳洲) 中澳青年联合会全国主席(中国)
中澳青年联合会学报 13

PROFILE OF THE 2012 ACYA YOUTH SCHOLARS
ACYA Prize for Youth Scholarship (English) – Elizabeth Ingleson
Elizabeth‘s interest in the Australia-China relationship was sparked after
attending a public lecture given by John Mearsheimer in Sydney in
August 2010. He argued that Australia should be concerned about
China‘s economic and political rise and thus must prepare itself militarily.
The self-fulfilling prophesies, historical analogies, and conjecture
inherent in his argument triggered in Elizabeth a desire to understand the
mentality that underlies this thesis, and particularly Australian-American
differences in perspective.
This led Elizabeth to undertake Honours in History at the University of
New South Wales in 2011, and her thesis, entitled ―A New Enemy?
Foreign Affairs and America‘s Response to the ‗Rise of China‘, 1989-
2010‖, was awarded a First-Class. She is currently a PhD candidate in History at the University of Sydney,
for which she was the recipient of a Commonwealth Government Australian Postgraduate Award. Her
current research examines the rapprochement between the USA and China from 1972 until 1979, focusing
upon the trade relationship that developed during this period and particularly the ways that trade ties were
constructed for both economic and political purposes in the wider context of increasing globalization. She
was also selected as a delegate to the Australian National University‘s 2011 Asia Pacific Week conference.
Elizabeth can be contacted at eing9204@uni.sydney.edu.au.
ACYA Prize for Youth Scholarship (Chinese) – Zelda Zhao
Zelda Zhao is from Changsha in Hunan Province, China. She is currently undertaking graduate studies in
International Relations at the Peking University (PKU) School of International Studies (SIS). Her research
interests are great power politics in the Asia-Pacific and the relations between China and its neighbouring
countries. She is also an Assistant at the PKU Centre of International and Strategic Studies and the Director
of the PKU Youth Association of Foreign Affairs (YAFA). She has obtained BA degrees from both the PKU
SIS and the Waseda University School of International Liberal Studies in Japan.
Zelda has been closely following ACYA ever since first hearing of it through a YAFA event back in 2009, as
she believes that amongst other Western countries Australia is at the very fore of engaging with China, and
thus initiatives promoting friendship and communication between Australia and China are much needed. The
foundation for Zelda‘s prize-winning essay was born out of research for her graduation thesis on the
Australian strategic debate surrounding China, for which she has sought to gain a deep understanding of
Australian history, politics, socio-economics, and the development of Australia-China relations. Zelda‘s goal
is to continue to contribute towards building a cooperative relationship between Australia and China through
academic research and international cooperation. Zelda can be contacted at findyourwill1990@163.com.
14 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS

2012 中澳青年联合会青年学者简介
中澳青年联合会青年奖学金(中文)-赵寒玉
赵寒玉,来自中国南方的鱼米之乡——湖南长沙,1990 年
11 月生。现为北京大学国际关系学院 2012 级硕士研究生,
专业方向为大国关系、中国及周边国家关系研究。在北京
大学国际战略研究中心(CISS)任学生助理,并担任北京
大学青年外交学会(YAFA)理事长一职。本科获得北大国
际关系学院国际政治系和日本早稻田大学国际教养学部的
双学位。
早在 2009 年通过参加北大青年外交学会的活动,我有幸关
注和了解到了中澳青年联合会(ACYA),并一直收到 ACYA
发送的 newsletter 和有关中澳双方的资讯(ChinaBites & AustraliaBites),在此衷心感谢你们
为中澳交流做出的努力。澳大利亚处于西方国家面向中国的最前沿位置,虽然我还未曾亲历这片土
地,却一直对澳洲和中澳关系充满浓厚的兴趣和热情。在完成本科毕业论文(以澳大利亚对华战略
研究为主题)的过程中,我对澳洲的历史、政治、经济和社会文化,以及中澳关系的发展历程有了
更为深入的理解和全面的思考。有幸收录在贵学报上的这篇学术文章就在我毕业论文研究的基础上
完成的。我真诚希望在未来通过自身的学术研究和国际交流为促进中澳之间的友好合作关系贡献一
己之力。赵寒玉的联系邮箱是 findyourwill1990@163.com
中澳青年联合会青年奖学金(英文)- Elizabeth Ingleson
2010年8月,John Mearsheimer在悉尼的一场公开演讲点燃了Elizabeth对中澳关系的研究兴趣。当
时,Mearsheimer主张澳大利亚应该警惕中国的政治经济崛起——因为“中国不可能和平崛起”。他
说,由此澳大利亚应该为(而且是担心)中国日益强大的军事实力有所准备。正是这场就“中国威
胁论”展开的争论开启了一次自我应验的预言:Mearsheimer为了辩护自己观点所使用的历史类推以
及推论建立的基石,都触发了一个想去了解这个争论背后动机的愿望。更准确地说,一个想去了解
为什么美国和澳洲两国观察家就同一问题会持有不同看法的愿望。
上述经历成就了她在2011年新南威尔士大学完成的历史学荣誉学位论文。在那篇论文中,她回顾了
《外交》杂志中,美国“例外主义”思想在该杂志介绍中国问题时所扮演的角色。这篇题名为《一
个新的敌人?从1989年到2010年间杂志和美国对“中国崛起”的回应》的论文使她获得了研
究生涯的一等荣誉学位现在,Elizabeth是悉尼大学历史学系的一位博士研究生。兼修于美国研究中
心和历史系,她获得了联邦政府澳洲研究生奖学金。Elizabeth现在正研究关于1972年到1979年间中
国与美国的“友好外交关系”。她侧重探索在20世纪70年代当时日益重要的全球化趋势影响下,中
美两国由于政治和经济目的所建立的贸易联系。在2011年7月,她曾任澳大利亚国立大学“亚太周”
会议的特选代表,并在会上与世界各地代表讨论澳洲与其周边国家的相关问题。Elizabeth的联系邮
箱是eing9204@uni.sydney.edu.
中澳青年联合会学报 15

Photo/照片: Fudog, Eleanor Bennett
Bio: Eleanor Bennett is a 16-year-old internationally award winning photographer and artist who has been
featured in publications such as National Geographic, The Telegraph, The Guardian, BBC News, and on the
cover of various books and magazines. Her art has been exhibited in countries as diverse as the UK, the
USA, Canada, France, Spain, Germany, Indonesia, and Japan.
简介:Eleanor Bennett 是一名年仅 16 岁就在国际摄影界屡次获奖且成绩斐然的摄影师和艺术家。
她的作品曾被《美国国家地理杂志》、《每日电讯》、《卫报》、BBC 新闻频道争相报道,并被选为
多本书刊杂志的封面。她的佳作也曾在英国、美国、加拿大、法国、西班牙、和日本等地展览。

SECTION I
ACADEMIC ESSAY – ENGLISH
第一部分
学术文章部分 – 英语类作品

“The Short Term is Running Out”: Normalisation of Australia-China Relations
and the Role of the United States
Elizabeth Ingleson
This essay was awarded the 2012 ACYA Prize for Youth Scholarship (English), for a profile of Elizabeth
Ingleson please see the ‗Profile of the 2012 ACYA Youth Scholars‘ section above.
In October 1970, as the ‗bamboo curtain‘ isolating
communist China from the Western world was
falling, Australia‘s Foreign Minister, and soon-tobe
Prime Minister, William McMahon, received
advice from the Department of External Affairs.
He was warned,
―Our policy towards Communist China…has
always been based on the needs of the US alliance
in the short-term—but US policy is changing, and
the short-term is running out.‖ 1
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Australia had
severed diplomatic ties with China, a decision in
keeping with America‘s own China policies. But
by 1970, as American relations with China thawed,
this policy was becoming increasingly discordant
with the American position. Yet McMahon was
not inclined to change Australia‘s policy either as
Foreign Minister or later as Prime Minister. His
handwritten note in the margins of this document
argued to delay any decision. He wrote: ―This is
not the most prudent way to put it. Rather we
must proceed on the basis that we review all the
circumstances in order to decide what action
should be taken in our best interests‖. 2 In practice
this wait-and-see approach led to policy inertia. In
July 1971, when US President Richard Nixon
announced he would be travelling to China, the
Australian government was caught off-guard. Not
only had the McMahon Government maintained
its policy of isolation but it had also castigated
opposition leader Gough Whitlam for visiting
China just a few weeks earlier. Now, in the face of
America‘s opening to China, McMahon was left
1 ―Australia‘s Policy on the China Issue: Outline of Cabinet Paper‖,
28 October 1970, Document 143, Stuart Doran & David Lee (eds.),
Australia and Recognition of the People‘s Republic of China 1949–
1972, 2002, Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, p.
335.
2 Ibid, p. 335: annotation by McMahon, footnote 7.
18 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
red-faced and his China policy deemed out-dated.
The short-term had run out.
It was not until December 1972, with the election
of the new Whitlam government, that Australia
established diplomatic relations with China. For
over a year and a half, from July 1971 until
December 1972, Australia‘s posture towards
China was increasingly divergent from America‘s.
At a key turning point in the Cold War,
Australia‘s China policy had become inflexible to
the point of obsolescence.
On the 40 th anniversary of the normalisation of
relations between Australia and China, the
international system is once again in a period of
transition. This time it is a transition towards the
‗Asian Century‘. As Australia‘s forthcoming
foreign policy White Paper, Australia in the Asian
Century, indicates, Australia‘s relations with
China are being assessed within this wider context.
As is the nature of all transitions, this reworking
of the global order has sparked considerable
debate within Australia about the direction in
which its relationship with China, its largest
trading partner, will go.
China‘s increasing economic and military clout
within the Asia-Pacific region has led to
conjecture about whether Australia will eventually
have to choose between its alliance with America
and its relationship with China. This has been an
ongoing issue in Australian foreign policy since
the 1990s, mirroring increasing American
attention to the implications of China‘s growth
during this period. 3 Thus in 1995 future Prime
3 For American debates on China‘s growing power in the early 1990s
see, for example: Barber Conable & David M. Lampton, ―China: The
Coming Power‖, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71(5), 1992, pp. 133-49;
Nicholas Kristof, ―The Rise of China‖, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72(5),

Minister John Howard argued that Australia did
not ―face some kind of exclusive choice between
our past and our future, our history and our
geography‖. 4 And in 1998 Stuart Harris examined
the question, ―Will China divide Australia and the
US?‖ 5 This question persists today, fuelled by
comments such as those from a senior Chinese
official and former People‘s Liberation Army
member who in early 2012 publically called on
Australia to choose who it wanted to be its
―godfather‖ in the future. 6
Ultimately, Australia need not choose between the
United States and China. The international order,
and the Asian region in particular, is no longer
divided along bipolar lines. With both bilateral
and multilateral ties underpinning US-Chinese
relations, Australia stands in a strong position to
capitalise upon its links with both countries.
Moving beyond an either-or mentality will require
an assertive and independent foreign policy stance,
whereby Australia‘s decisions are informed by
nuanced self-interest rather than blind deference
to either country.
This article will explore these ideas by looking at
the development of the normalisation of Australia-
China relations, the results of which we now
celebrate forty years on. It will examine some of
the lessons that can be drawn from Australia‘s
decision to not recognise China until 1972 that are
still pertinent to Australian policymakers today.
Looking at the history of the non-recognition of
China illustrates the difficulties of balancing an
independent Australian foreign policy with a
strong relationship with the US. While
maintaining a strong relationship with the US is
vital to Australia‘s interests, allowing this to
consume our foreign policy outlook can not only
1993, pp. 59-74; Charles Krauthammer, ―Why We Must Contain
China‖, Time, 31 July 1995; Joseph S. Nye Jr., ―The Case for Deep
Engagement‖, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74(4), 1995, pp. 90-102; Gerald
Segal, ―East Asia and the ‗Constrainment‘ of China‖, International
Security, Vol. 20(4), Spring 1996, pp. 107-35.
4 John Howard, Australia‘s Links with Asia: Realising Opportunities
in our Region, 5 th Asialink Lecture and Asialink Birthday
Celebrations, 12 April 1995, available at
(accessed 11 July 2012).
5 Stuart Harris, Will China Divide Australia and the United States?,
1998, Sydney: Australian Centre for American Studies.
6 Philip Wen, ―Chinese Official: It‘s Us or America‖, Sydney
Morning Herald, 16 May 2012.
lead to poorer relations with other countries, such
as China, but also inadvertently weaken the very
alliance we seek to maintain. This article begins
however, with an overview of the global context
of the recognition of the People‘s Republic of
China (PRC).
Recognition: The Global Context
For two decades from 1949, the decision of
whether or not to extend diplomatic recognition to
the PRC was a contentious issue amongst much of
the non-communist world. Following the
Kuomintang‘s retreat to the island of Taiwan in
1949, China became divided between the
communist PRC on the Mainland and the
nationalist Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan.
Neither government countenanced the existence
of the other, and both hoped to reunify the country
under their own leadership. For the outside world,
this stalemate in the Chinese Civil War raised
questions about which government should be
officially recognised. Recognition of ‗two Chinas‘
was never acceptable to either Beijing or Taipei,
and thus a third country‘s recognition of one
government was rendered as non-recognition of
the other. This diplomatic recognition was
intertwined with questions of whether the PRC or
ROC should be seated as the Chinese
representative at the United Nations, and as a
Permanent Member of the UN Security Council.
The first countries to recognise the PRC were
predominately communist. For the noncommunist
world, the ideological threat that
communism posed encouraged policies of
containment and diplomatic isolation. Yet this
was often complicated by domestic economic
desires to trade with the Mainland. Many Western
countries overcame this dilemma by continuing to
trade with the PRC in limited areas, such as
agriculture, whilst not extending diplomatic
recognition. France, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand, for example, all maintained trade contact
with the PRC despite political non-recognition.
Yet recognition of the PRC slowly eventuated,
with the United Kingdom being the first
democratic country to extend official recognition,
albeit at the chargé d‘affairs rather than
中澳青年联合会学报 19

ambassadorial level, in 1950. Over the following
two decades many other countries, especially
those in Europe, followed suit, including France
in 1964.
By the early 1970s, with the gradual breakdown
of rigid ideological bipolarity, international
recognition of the PRC gained further momentum.
In October 1971, the UN General Assembly voted
to support a motion that saw Beijing replace
Taipei in the UN. By this stage, the United States
was in the process of negotiating the details of a
relationship with the PRC and the vote was, as
historian Warren Cohen describes, ―one of the
least painful diplomatic defeats the United States
had ever suffered‖. 7 Whilst the United States did
not extend diplomatic recognition to the PRC until
1979, from 1972, with the signing of the Shanghai
Communiqué, the Nixon administration lifted the
trade embargo and begun to openly negotiate with
China, beginning the rapprochement between the
US and China.
Despite these changes in America‘s, and most
other countries‘ policies towards China, in 2012
the debate about which China is recognised has
not ceased altogether. It continues to play an
important role in the foreign policies of countries
in the Pacific Ocean. Both the ROC and PRC vie
for diplomatic recognition from these islands,
making huge economic investments into countries
in exchange for diplomatic partnerships within the
UN and access to resources. 8 To this day, then, the
question of recognition remains a contentious one
in some parts of the globe.
“A Reluctance to Act in Advance of the United
States”: Australian Considerations Prior to the
Korean War
Understanding Australia‘s normalisation with the
PRC within this global narrative illustrates some
of the problems faced in Sino-Australian relations
today. The normalisation of relations between
7 Warren I. Cohen, America‘s Response to China: A History of Sino-
American Relations, 1990, New York: Columbia University Press, p.
198.
8 Tamara Shie, ―Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific:
Beijing‘s ‗Island Fever‘‖, Asian Survey, Vol. 47(2), March/April
2007, pp. 307-26.
20 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
Australia and China in 1972 followed over twenty
years of diplomatic estrangement. Throughout this
period, like many other countries, Australia
continued to trade with the PRC, whilst refusing
to recognise it as China, seeing the ROC in
Taiwan as the official governing body. However,
initially, between 1949 and 1953, the Australian
government was ambivalent about whether or not
to recognise the PRC. In early 1949, before the
Chinese Civil War had even ended, the Chifley
Labor government considered extending
recognition to the PRC. However by October of
that year, after the communists had won the war,
this decision had been cast to one side, partly a
consequence of particularly vehement politicking
during the 1949 election campaign. 9 Appearing to
support a communist country during the height of
the Cold War was not politically viable during an
election.
It was Robert Menzies who won the election, and
ties with Britain and the Commonwealth
complicated his decision about recognition,
particularly when Britain established relations
with the PRC in 1950. However Menzies decided
to delay a decision, making it clear to the British
that ―it is the question of timing that is important‖.
This timing, he indicated, was determined by ―a
reluctance to act in advance of the United
States‖. 10 Despite being ―British to his bootstraps‖
in many other regards, on this issue Menzies saw
that following the American position was of
greater strategic importance to Australia. Indeed
there is even conjecture, although no written
evidence, that during negotiations in Australia
about the ANZUS treaty, American Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles linked the establishment
of ANZUS to the non-recognition of the PRC. 11
However, the role of China in the Korean War
cemented the Australian government‘s resolve
regarding recognition. By the war‘s end in 1953,
9 E. M. Andrews, ―Australia and China, 1949: the Failure to
Recognise the PRC‖, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, Vol.
13 (January 1985), pp. 33-34.
10 Doran & Lee, op cit, 1, pp. 7-8: Cablegram to London, 20
December 1949, Document 4.
11 See: Andrews, op cit, 9, p. 38; A. Watt, The Evolution of
Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965, 1967, London: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 240-43; Henry Albinski, Australian Policies
and Attitudes towards China, 1965, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, pp. 106-07.

Australia‘s considerations about recognition were
informed by following America‘s position and,
tied to this, considerations about Taiwan.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Cold War
rhetorical fears regarding China reached their
zenith, with China perceived as Australia‘s
greatest threat. 12 At a time of polarised global
politics, the prospects for shifting Australia‘s
position away from America‘s became far harder.
Indeed, External Affairs Minister Richard Casey
wrote in his diary that he would have preferred
Australia to recognise China, although
acknowledged that it would be politically too
difficult for Australia to act independently of
America. 13 Despite these fears of China, it was
ironically one of Australia‘s major trading
partners throughout this period, particularly in
agricultural goods such as wheat, cotton, and wool.
For a middle power like Australia, nonrecognition
and a stymieing of the PRC‘s
accession to the UN was a strong enough signal of
support for the US position, whilst allowing
Australia to maintain its economic interests too.
1960s: Rising Concerns about “Tailing Along
Behind the Field”
By the 1960s, after the Sino-Soviet split, a number
of Australian commentators began to question the
government‘s policy of hostility and containment.
From the mid-1960s, the number of people calling
for change had expanded further, with analysts
such as Gregory Clark, Stephen Fitzgerald, Max
Teichmann, and Arthur Huck urging a rethink of
China policy. 14 However, this altering political
discourse did not translate into political change.
On the contrary, Australia‘s China policy became
further entrenched in 1966. It was in this year that
the new Holt government established an embassy
in Taipei. Up until this time, Menzies had
personally held back pushes for a Taiwan
embassy from within the Taiwan lobby, as well as
12 For an exploration of the social and political discourse on China at
this time, see: Lachlan Strahan, Australia‘s China: Changing
Perceptions from the 1930s to the 1990s, 1996, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 125-80.
13 T. B. Millar (ed.), Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R.
G. Casey, 1972, London: Collins, cited in Edmund Fung & Colin
Mackerras, From Fear to Friendship: Australia‘s Policies Towards
the People‘s Republic of China 1966-1982, 1985, St. Lucia:
Queensland University Press, p. 25.
14 Strahan, op cit, 12, p. 291.
from Liberal backbenchers and members of the
DLP. 15 Holt, however, did not fight it. There is
considerable debate about why Holt chose to do
this, with The Age newspaper describing it as
―political sycophancy‖ in order to reinforce
Australia‘s support for the American position in
the context of the Vietnam War. 16 Nonetheless,
this decision imposed considerable limitations on
Australia‘s ability to be flexible about recognition.
It further tied Australia to America‘s foreign
policy position at a time when the US was
reconsidering that very China policy.
America‘s changing foreign policy attitude
towards China gained momentum following the
March 1966 hearings of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. At these hearings, 15
prominent American China experts argued in
support of a new American China policy, summed
up, in a phrase coined by Doak Barnett, as
―containment but not isolation‖. 17 Similarly,
Richard Nixon published an article in Foreign
Affairs in 1967 that proved to be an influential and
important example of the new thinking of the
soon-to-be President. His tone was cautious and
took a long-term view of recognition, yet he
argued ―we simply cannot afford to leave China
forever outside the family of nations…there is not
space on this small planet for a billion of its
potentially most able people to live in angry
isolation‖. 18
By August 1969, America publically signalled
shifts in its policy, using Pakistani President Ayub
Khan as an emissary to China and loosening its
economic sanctions on China. During a visit to
Australia one month later, US Secretary of State
William Rogers discussed this policy shift at the
National Press Club in Canberra. Rogers made it
clear that America‘s policy towards China was
changing. He argued: ―Communist China has
obviously long been too isolated from world
15 Fung & Mackerras, op cit, 13, pp. 50-51.
16 Ibid, p. 53: Age, 14 June 1966.
17 Testimony of A. Doak Barnett to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Hearing, 8 March 1966, in Akira Iriye (ed.), US Policy
Toward China: Testimony Taken From the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Hearings—1966, 1968, Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, p. 127.
18 Richard Nixon, ―Asia After Viet Nam‖, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46(1),
October 1967, p. 121.
中澳青年联合会学报 21

affairs. This is one reason why we have been
seeking to open up channels of communication‖. 19
Indeed, throughout 1969 and 1970 Australian
diplomats abroad reported back on the changes
occurring throughout the world, and suggested
that Australia too begin rethinking its policy of
non-recognition. As Roderic Pitty points out, the
first diplomat to suggest a rethinking of
Australia‘s policy was, ironically enough, the then
20
Ambassador to Taiwan, Frank Cooper.
Following Canada‘s recognition of the PRC in
October 1970, Australia‘s ambassador to France,
Alan Renouf, wrote to the Secretary of the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Sir Keith Waller,
that Australia should be careful not to be ―tailing
along behind the field‖ regarding its China policy.
He warned that the government would, in that
case, be ―forced, in a rather miserable way, to do
what the majority of the world would in that event
have done‖. 21
Secretary Waller had indeed been working to
ensure that Australia would not be out of step with
the rest of the world, through a Policy Planning
Group established in 1970. The policy paper
issued by the group called for an ―urgent‖ review
of China policy. It pointed to Nixon‘s call for a
review of US policy and argued, ―we will be left
behind unless we too review our policy‖. 22
However both Prime Ministers Gordon and later
McMahon refused to heed this call. McMahon‘s
abovementioned note in response to the October
1970 advice from the Department of External
Affairs exemplifies this mentality.
Another important factor compelling change in
Australia‘s China policy at this time was its trade
relationship with China, particularly its wheat
trade. Australia‘s high reliance on the Chinese
19 United States Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 61(1575), 1 September
1969, p. 180, National Archives Internet Archive, available at
(accessed 2 July 2012).
20 Roderic Pitty, ―Way Behind in Following the USA over China: the
Lack of Any Liberal Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy, 1970-
72‖, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 51(3), 2005, pp.
442-46.
21 Doran & Lee, op cit, 1, p. 326: Letter from Alan Renouf to Keith
Waller, 15 October 1970, document 140.
22 Ibid, pp. 347-48: Department of Foreign Affairs, Policy Planning
Paper LP No. 2, 7 November 1970, Document 149.
22 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
market, with wheat exports to China reaching up
to one-third of total Australian wheat exports by
the mid-1960s, meant that it was potentially
vulnerable to China‘s purchasing choices. 23
However it wasn‘t until the late 1960s, as China
increasingly opened up towards the Western
world—signing deals for diplomatic recognition
with both Canada and Italy—that this
vulnerability came to the fore. In 1968, following
Canada‘s announcement that it intended to
instigate relations with China, China‘s normally
regular orders for Australian wheat came through
over three months late. The PRC had instead
increased its wheat imports from Canada. 24
Similarly, two weeks after Canada‘s recognition
came into force in 1970, China placed the largest
short-term wheat order Canada had ever
received. 25 Between 1968 and 1970, wheat sales
became a tool through which China could
persuade Australia to alter its foreign policy
stance. Indeed, in July 1971, when Opposition
Leader Gough Whitlam led his historic delegation
to China, Trade Minister Bai Xiangguo informed
him, ―if the Australian government changes its
policy towards China, we will give you the same
consideration as we have given Canada‖. 26
Prime Minister McMahon had attempted to gain
political mileage from Whitlam‘s China trip by
claiming that Whitlam was the ―Chinese candidate‖
in the upcoming election, and that Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai ―had Mr Whitlam on a
hook…and played him like a trout‖. 27 Yet a day
after Whitlam returned from China, President
Nixon announced his own intentions to visit
China within the year. This caused considerable
embarrassment for McMahon, yet even this did
not lead to a policy change. That the Australian
government still found itself unable to respond to
the shifting American position after July 1971,
when it had been made publically and explicitly
clear that the US was opening up to China,
exemplifies just how intractable Australia‘s China
policy had become. 28 For one-and-a-half years
23 Fung & Mackerras, op cit, 13, p. 90.
24 Ibid, pp. 102-03.
25 Ibid, p. 105.
26 Ibid, p. 111.
27 ―Chou Had Whitlam on a Hook Says PM‖, Sydney Morning
Herald, 13 July 1971, p. 1.
28 Roderic Pitty, op cit, 20, pp. 440-50.

Australia was not in step with US policy, contrary
even to Australia‘s own interests.
Thus, despite increasing calls for change from
within the Australian bureaucracy, visible signs
that American policy was shifting, and difficulties
in the wheat trade, the Australian Government did
not heed these messages. Ultimately, this showed
the Liberal-National Party‘s policy to be shortsighted
and inflexible. More importantly, it
prevented a more independent Australian
assessment of the region.
Discussion: What Lessons Can be Drawn from
the History of Australia’s Recognition of the
PRC?
Today‘s context, with the global centre of gravity
increasingly moving towards Asia, highlights
three pertinent lessons. First, Australia must
ensure a balance between its desire for support
and protection from ‗great and powerful friends‘
on the one hand, and its own independent interests
on the other. Holt‘s decision to establish an
embassy in Taiwan was driven by a short-term
desire to demonstrate a position in support of the
US, but in the long-term it bound Australia to a
very different trajectory to that of America, whose
choices remained self-determined. In 2012, as
Australia adjusts to the increasing political,
economic, and cultural significance of Asia, its
policies need to remain flexible and constructive.
The move to station 2,500 US Marines on
permanent rotation in Darwin, as part of the
Obama Administration‘s ‗pivot‘ towards Asia,
reflects a significant change in American foreign
policy. Strengthening ties with Australia, one of
America‘s major allies in the region, is a natural
consequence of this pivot. However, deeper
military ties with America will only remain in
Australia‘s strategic and political interests if it
does not become the sole lens through which
Australia‘s China policies and regional policies
are determined. As the recognition controversy
demonstrates, a policy position that ultimately
leads to intractability and inflexibility is not in
Australia‘s interests.
The second lesson to be drawn from the history of
recognition is the importance for Australian
leaders to listen to foreign policy experts. Despite
warnings from overseas ambassadors, and from
within the Department of Foreign Affairs,
McMahon refused to shift from his wait-and-see
position. Currently, there are calls being made
about the need to radically improve Asian
language skills to move towards deeper cultural
and political ties between Australia and its
neighbours: Ian Watt, Secretary of the Department
of Prime Minister and Cabinet, spoke in June this
year about the need for the Australian Public
Service to develop the skills necessary for an
Asian future. 29 Similarly, the soon to be released
White Paper will argue for Asian Studies to be at
the core of Australian education, rather than an
―optional extra‖. 30 This view is further expressed
in the Lowy Institute‘s June 2012 Policy Brief,
which also called for deeper political
understandings of China through professional
exchanges. 31 Ensuring its future workforce is
Asia-literate will be crucial for Australia‘s
continued economic competitiveness, as China
and other countries in the region will continue to
grow in size and importance.
The third lesson, stemming from these calls for
cultural ties, is that if a relationship is based
predominantly upon trade, then the trade itself can
become vulnerable when political difficulties arise.
The wheat debacle of the late 1960s and early
1970s was the consequence of merging Chinese
political and economic interests, with trade used
as a political weapon to encourage change in
Australia‘s policy. Resolving political issues
through trade hurt Australian wheat-growers yet
did not compel the government to change its
position. Today, trade still heavily defines the
Australia-China relationship. A well-rounded
relationship with China, going beyond trade, will
ensure that no one issue will dominate the
relationship altogether. The deeper the political
29
Verona Burgess, ―Readying to Meet an Asian Future‖, Australian
Financial Review, 29 June 2012.
30
Bernard Lane, ―Asian Studies No Optional Extra‖, The Australian,
14 July 2012.
31
Linda Jacobson, ―Australia-China Ties: In Search Of Political
Trust‖, Lowy Institute, Policy Brief, 28 June 2012, available at
(accessed 26 July 2012).
中澳青年联合会学报 23

and cultural ties, the more ways will be to avoid
the use of trade as a lever for political aims. Thus,
in a slightly contrary way, in order to protect trade
with China, there needs to be substantially more
to our China relationship than just trade.
Conclusion
The history of Australia‘s recognition of China
demonstrates the importance of moving beyond a
mentality of choosing between America and
China. It shows the pitfalls that come when a
singular viewpoint is adopted. The Cold War,
24 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
during which international power dynamics were
seen as binary and intractable, has ended.
Australia does not now face a zero-sum game. For
this reason, Australia must be assertive in
pursuing an independent policy that strengthens
ties with China as well as those with the US. The
Asian Century has not taken full flight just yet;
the short-term has not run out. Thus, the
anniversary of normalisation between Australia
and China provides an opportunity to remember
the past and reflect upon the lessons it provides
for the future.

Individualisation in China: Individualisierung, Consumerism, and State
Legitimacy
Thomas Williams (卫涛)
Tom Williams is a sociology student at Renmin University completing research for his Arts Honours at the
University of Western Australia. He is greatly enjoying living in the vivacious human vibrancy of Beijing, but
does occasionally long for the miracle of Australian beaches and sunshine.
Introduction
China is in the midst of a moral crisis. 1 Every day
elementary norms of coexistence (dixian lilun) are
flagrantly violated on an alarming scale. 2 These
quotidian transgressions are ubiquitous and
permeate all sections of society. 3 They are so
prevalent that what would otherwise be
reasonably considered unacceptable has become
normalised and routine. 4 Individual gain and
personal sensuous satisfaction are exalted as
ideals and their ruthless and amoral pursuit
without regard for others seems to be a given. 5
1 JW Ci, ―The Moral Crisis in Post-Mao China: Prolegomenon to a
Philosophical Analysis‖, Diogenese, Vol. 56(19), 2009; ZF Liu,
Daode Zhongguo, 1996, Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue
Chubanshe; DS Shao, Zhongguo Shehui de Kunhuo, 1996, Beijing:
Shehui Wenxian Chubanshe; XY Wang, ―The Post-Communist
Personality: The Spectre of China‘s Capitalist Market Reforms‖, The
China Journal, 47, 2002, pp. 1-17.
2 Ci, op cit, 1, p. 20; Whether they be food scares with school
canteens using runoff oil, companies, farmers, or middlemen putting
melamine in milk, or the selling of diseased, doctored, or spoiled
pork; or violations of traffic norms such as victims of traffic
accidents blaming Good Samaritans who stop to assist them, or the
couple who ran over an old lady and buried her alive so as to avoid
being prosecuted for drink driving; or unsafe working conditions
where workers are killed by their bosses over salary disputes, or
hazardous machinery not being replaced because it cheaper to replace
injured workers; or the failure to protect children‘s welfare such as
where people stood by as a father forced his daughter to eat faeces in
a public lavatory, or a father is hailed as an ‗eagle dad‘ (yingba) for
compelling his son to run naked in snow and placing the video on the
Internet.
3 Ibid; Whether that be at the lowest levels with farmers trying to
make extra profit by using harmful growth hormones in their crops,
or the city level with government officials buying a victim of their
son‘s abuses‘ forgiveness by paying her medical bills which she
could not afford, or at the highest levels with the corruption of the Bo
family – a mere representative of the epidemic corruption throughout
all levels of government.
4 Ibid; Saliently apparent in the Global Times‘ (a mouth organ of the
State) article stating that some corruption must be accepted in society,
that 70% of Chinese university students would use bribery to secure
someone‘s help (Z Chi, ―Daxuesheng Daode Xuanze Maodunxing
Yanjiu‖, Qingnian Yanjiu, 6, 2003, pp. 23-31), and that a very
common phrase when discussing social, political, or economic issues
with Chinese people is ―Zhongguo Jiushi Zheyang‖ (That‘s China).
5 J Wang, ―Culture as Leisure and Culture as Capital‖, Positions:
East Asia Cultures Critique, Vol. 9(1), 2001(a), pp. 66-104; S
Durvasula & S Lysonski, ―Money, Money, Money – How do
Attitudes Toward Money Impact Vanity and Materialism? – The
Crude hedonistic consumption has become a
provider of meaning and a primary source of
identity to the Chinese consumer, and a point and
measure of his/her material security. 6 Yet, in the
midst of these fundamentally destabilising social
issues, Chinese individuals, strangely, at a day-today
level, still manage to carry on with their lives
and the State‘s hold on power seems as strong as
ever. How is this so? How is it that the Chinese
individual can operate so normally within such a
crisis? What is the role of the Chinese individual
within this society of crisis? How has this role
changed over the course of the PRC‘s history?
What is the nature of individual-State relations in
modern China? Do they support State authority?
If so, how is this support engendered? What does
this mean for the Chinese individual living in a
crisis society?
These are broad and complex questions that
cannot be comprehensively answered in the short
space of this essay. Instead, this essay will attempt
to provide a socio-historical analysis of the rise of
the Chinese individual since the end of the Maoist
period and assess how the individual‘s growing
need and ability to participate in the market
economy has legitimised State authority. This will
be done through assessing the applicability of the
Yan-modified-Beck sociological theory of
institutionalised individualisation
(Individualisierung) to the Chinese context and
Case of Young Chinese Consumers‖, Journal of Consumer
Marketing, Vol. 27(2), 2010; S Rosen, ―The Victory of Materialism:
Aspirations to Join China‘s Urban Moneyed Classes and the
Commercialization of Education‖, The China Journal , Vol. 55, 2004,
pp. 27-51; exemplified in the case of the boy selling his kidney for an
iPad and iPhone.
6 Ci 1994, pp. 1-23; Wang, op cit, 5, pp. 83-90; UMH Rolandsen,
Leisure and Power in Urban China: Everyday Life in a Chinese City,
2011, Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, p. 145; an elucidating
demonstration of this can be found in the web phenomena of meimeis
Gao and Guo.
中澳青年联合会学报 25

using it to explain the Chinese individual‘s
behaviour as a reflexive search for identity and
material security outside of traditional social
structures which have been dismantled by the
State as part of its pursuit of modernity. As a
corollary to this, this essay will then analyse the
role that the Chinese individual‘s consumption of
culture as a commodity has had on how he or she
constructs his or her own bricolage-identity and
how this can be understood as a collaboration by
the Chinese individual with the State, as the
delineator of the social and commercial
framework in which it can take place, which
legitimises the State‘s authority.
The Concept of Individualisierung
The concept of Individualisierung as set out
initially by Beck in Risk Society: Towards a New
Modernity and then later developed further by
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim in Individualization:
Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and
Political Consequences, is a fifteen-faceted
analysis of the individual‘s response to the risk
and lack of security of identity inherent within the
second modernity as a result of the breaking down
of traditional institutions, the rise of globalisation,
and the increasing importance and impact of the
market economy. 7 These fifteen facets may be
considered as nuanced subsets of four broader
tenets within the process. 8 These being: (1) the
detraditionalisation or the losing of traditional
customs and social structures which proscribed an
individual‘s identity and provided material
security; (2) the disembeddment from previous
institutions that set the rules and guidelines for an
individual‘s role and place within society and the
rembeddment, whether voluntarily or not, in new
ones or ones of one‘s own making; (3) the
compulsory pursuit of a ‗life of one‘s own‘ and
7 C Calhoun, ―Beck, Asia and Second Modernity‖, The British
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 61(3), 2010, pp. 597-619; U Beck, et al,
2010
8 U Beck & E Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization: Institutionalized
Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences, 2001,
London: Sage Publications, pp. 23-29; YX Yan, ―Introduction:
Conflicting Images of the Individual and Contested Process of
Individualization‖, in iChina – The Rise of the Individual in Modern
Chinese Society, M Hansen and R Svarverud (eds.), 2010b,
Singapore: Nias Press, pp. 1-38; YX Yan, ―The Chinese Path to
Individualization‖, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 61(3),
2010a, pp. 489-512.
26 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
the development of a ‗do-it-yourself‘ biography;
and (4) the psychologicalization of risks due to the
precarious freedoms and uncertainties that the
individual faces. From these tenets it can be seen
that the concept of Individualisierung is distinct
from that of the neo-liberal understanding of
individualisation 9 in that it does not view the
individual as an ‗autarkic human self‘ who is the
―master of [his/her] whole [life]‖ and able to
―renew [his/her] capacity for action within [him-
/herself]‖, 10 but rather as a ―self-insufficient‖
―monad‖ who has been disembedded from most
previous all-encompassing social categories,
traditions, and institutions in industrial society,
such as family, kinship, gender, and class 11 that
had previously proscribed how to live, 12 and as
such is increasingly tied to others and reliant upon
them for assistance in the ―reformation of self‖ in
pursuing a new security of ―identity‖ 13 as a
response to the ―risks‖ of the modernisation
process, in particular the market economy 14 . 15
Individualisierung in China
Although the process of Individualisierung was
initially an attempt to explain the reflexive selfradicalisation
of the individual who had to
become less dependent on the welfare state as a
result of increasing globalisation in 1970s
16
Western Europe, by introducing certain
modifications suggested by Yan 17 – the so-called
Yan-modified-Beck concept of Individualisierung
– it provides a useful framework for
understanding the rise of the individual within
Chinese society and his/her responses to the risks
and identity crisis implicit within modernity 18 . 19
9
Hence my use of Individualisierung in Beck‘s original German so
as to avoid confusion.
10
Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, op cit, 8, xxi-xxii
11
U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, 1992, London:
Sage, p. 90.
12
Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, op cit, 8, pp. 23-4
13
Yan, 2010a, op cit, 8, p. 504
14
Beck, op cit, 11, p. 21; Calhoun, op cit, 7, p. 600.
15
These risks in the main being the precariousness of the job market,
the loss of social welfare (in China, the danwei or collective), and a
proscribed career path: Calhoun, op cit, 7, p. 600.
16
Yan, 2010a, op cit, 8, p. 506.
17
YX Yan, ―Introduction: Understanding the Rise of the Individual
in China‖, European Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 7(1), 2008,
pp. 1-9; Yan, 2010a, op cit, 8; Yan, 2010b, op cit, 8.
18
Individualisierung is a reflexive consequence of China‘s statesponsored
quest for modernity (Yan, 2010a, op cit, 8, p. 489), but the
modernity which it responds to is quite distinct from the second

These modifications are the dispelling of two
biases implicit within the concept of
Individualisierung that would otherwise confine it
to the Western European individual‘s particular
reaction to the second modernity: firstly, that it
arises as a response, and the antithesis to,
neoliberalism, liberalism, and classical
individualism; and, secondly, that it will occur
only in the context of cultural democracy and the
welfare state. As Yan and a number of other
scholars have demonstrated in a growing body of
scholarship, 20 the Chinese individual‘s responses
to the advent of the market economy,
globalisation of China, retreat of the State as the
provider of welfare, and the pressure on the
individual to become the social and economic
production unit for society 21 are at a basic level
comparable to the Western European experience
of Individualisierung.
Individualisierung in the Maoist Period
During the Maoist period the State attempted to
create a new pliable socialist subject whose sole
loyalty was to the Party, but in so doing the State
modernity of Beck‘s Europe (A Giddens, Conversations with
Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity, 1998, Stanford:
Stanford University Press, p. 96; R Mitter, Modern China: A Very
Short Introduction, 2008, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 101).
The second modernity of Europe can be understood as an ―epochal
break‖ with the institutional structures (such as states, parties, unions,
and business enterprises) that were created as a means for dealing
with the first modernity, whilst maintaining the core principles of the
first modernity, namely the market economy, (Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim, op cit, 8; Calhoun, op cit, 7, pp. 599-600). Chinese
modernity, on the other hand, is, in the main, a continuation of the
self-strengthening exercise to achieve ―a strong state, a wealthy
nation, and a prosperous individual‖ so as never again to be
humiliated at the hands of foreign powers and reclaim pre-eminence
on the world stage, as sparked by the May Fourth Movement in 1919
(Yan, 2010a, op cit, 8, pp. 494, 507; Ci 1994, p. 26; V Schwarcz, The
Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May
Fourth Movement of 1919, 1986, Berkeley: University of California
Press, pp. 1, 27; for a deeper discussion of the May Fourth
Movement and its historical antecedents and effect on Chinese
modernity see L Chen, Tradition and Modernity: A Humanist View,
2009, Leiden: Brill, pp. 79-88), and occurs in the context of
economic lack, a totalitarian political regime, and controlled
globalisation (Yan, 2010a, op cit, 8, p. 507). Thus is must be noted
that Beck‘s concept of Individualisierung is being applied divorced
from its original context in Beck‘s second modernity – a point which
Beck recognises himself (Calhoun, op cit, 7, pp. 599-600). In such
circumstances the analysis of the process of Individualisierung in
China must be confined to the four broad tenets identified by Yan.
19 Yan, 2010a, op cit, 8, p. 489.
20 MH Hansen & R Svarverud, iChina: the rise of the individual in
modern Chinese society, 2010, Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of
Asian Studies.
21 Yan, 2010a, op cit, 8, p. 490, paraphrasing Beck, op cit, 11, p. 90; J
Gittings, The Changing Face of China: From Mao to Market, 2006,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 253-4.
also disembedded the Chinese individual from
social structures that had proscribed his/her
identity and thus detraditionalised his/her way of
life. Following the founding of the PRC, each
individual‘s identity and material well-being
gradually became almost entirely contingent upon
their bureaucratic rank within the social
institutions created by the State. 22 Each individual
was assigned a class label that was patrilineal 23
and a residential status that restricted his/her
movement. 24 His/her ―place of…ancestral origin,
family origin, and class status‖ were recorded in a
household registration book (huji bu), along with
details of how he/she comported his-/herself in
daily life. 25 Individualism – understood as the
creation of personal identity – was equated with
bourgeois ideology and was to be abnegated
through altruistic practice, 26 thus placing the
collective as the source of identity over the
individual 27 and traditional Confucian family and
kinship associations. 28 The State defined role
models for individuals to aspire to 29 and strictly
regimented individuals‘ lives so as to leave little
time or physical space for self-definition outside
of the socialist cause 30 . 31 The State also
22
D Milovan, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System,
1967, New York: Praeger, p. 14, reinterpreting Stinchcombe‘s
concept of ―organised dependency‖ in A Stinchcombe, ―Social
Structure and Organizations‖, Handbook of Organisations, 1965,
Chicago: Rand-McNally, pp. 142-93; LL Li, X Yang & FW Wang,
―The Structure of Social Stratification and the Modernization Process
in Contemporary China‖, International Sociology, Vol. 6(1), 2002,
pp. 25-36.
23
L Pye, ―The State and the Individual: An Overview Interpretation‖,
The China Quarterly, Vol. 127, 1991, pp. 443-446; R Kraus, Class
Conflict in Chinese Socialism, 1981, New York: Columbia
University Press.
24
Yan, 2010a, op cit, 8, pp. 491-2.
25
L White, Polices of Chaos, 1981, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, p. 88.
26
For an interesting discussion on how Chinese culture calls for
conformity, humility, and selflessness through form and ritual, yet
fails to provide intimacy or an esprit de corps which leads to a need
to find it elsewhere in individually constructed experiences see L Pye,
The Mandarin and the Cadre: China‘s Political Cultures, 1988,
University of Michigan: Centre of Chinese Studies, Ch. 2.
27
Pye, op cit, 23, p. 450.
28
BY Liu, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, 1990, New York: Pantheon
Books, p. 16; Pye, op cit, 23, p. 16, 450. For discussion of the appeal
of this radicalism to Chinese youth dissatisfied with the traditional
family system see: P Chin, Family, 1979, Boston: Cheng & Tsui.
29
For example, see the recent canon of canards regarding the
infamous Lei Feng proliferating in Beijing. The fact that people were
able to suspend their disbelief that the life of such a lowly ranked
cadre could be recorded in such detail, not to mention the
impossibility of some photographs and diary entries, suggests they
were presented with material that conformed to their social
expectations (S Sontag, "The Image World", 2001, On Photography,
New York: Picador, p. 175).
30
MK Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China, 1974,
Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 230-5.
中澳青年联合会学报 27

orchestrated a number of political campaigns to
further break down traditional institutions and
sources of identity. The State, though in a halting
and incomplete manner, promoted romantic love,
gender equality, marital freedom, and
independence. 32 It ran ideological campaigns to
promote new socialist values, such as the Anti-
Rightist Campaign (1957), Socialist Education
Campaign (1963), and the ―Anti-Lin Biao, anti-
Confucius‖ movement (1974), and attacked
―feudalistic‖ traditional Confucian and patriarchal
cultural values, promoting the Maoist ideology of
ascetic altruism and collectivism in their place. 33
Thus, it is in the midst of this coercion of the
individual to conform 34 that we see the first steps
in the process of Individualisierung, for while
superficially the individual had been fettered, at a
deeper level his/her social norms were
detraditionalised and he/she was disembedded
from the institutions that had provided him/her
with his/her material well-being and proscribed
his/her identity. 35 Since these new social
structures that were erected in place of the old
proved to be as brittle as they were transitory, the
collectivisation of high socialism acted as the
halfway house to the Chinese individual‘s
eventual complete disembeddment after the death
of Mao and the end of the Cultural Revolution. 36
Individualisierung since the Reform Era
The process of Individualisierung came into full
stride with the Third Plenum of the Eleventh
Central Committee in December 1978, where the
economic policies of the Maoist Hua Guofeng –
31 J Farquhar, Appetites: Food and Sex in Post-Socialist China, 2002,
London: Duke University Press, p. 54. Chinese leisure studies
academics are even now ―reluctant to admit individuals the right to
spend their time in whichever way they please‖ even though this is
contrary to Karl Marx‘s definition of ―free time‖ (ziyou shijian) as
time a person may ―freely allocate‖ (keyi ziyou zhipei de shijian) and
spend on ―rest and recreation‖ (yule xiuxi) (QT Wang, L Xin & S Lei,
―Beijing Shi Jumin Xianxia Shijian Liyong Diaocha Yu Yanjiu‖,
Zhongguo Gongzhong Xiuxian Zhuangkuang Diaocha, HD Ma & JA
Zhang (eds.), 2004, Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, p. 144),
and Marxist theory forms the philosophical underpinnings of their
work. (Rolandsen, op cit, 6, p. 58).
32 Pye, op cit, 32, p. 455; Chin, op cit, 28.
33 R Madsen, Morality and Power in a Chinese Village, 1984,
Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 65-66, 68-72; J Spence,
The Search for Modern China, 1991, London: Norton & Company,
pp. 592,3, 635-6.
34 Whyte, op cit, 30, pp. 230-5.
35 Yan 2010a, op cit, 8, p. 493.
36 Rolandsen, op cit, 6, 103; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, op cit, 8, p. 1.
28 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
the ―two-whatevers‖ – were sidelined and
replaced by Deng Xiaoping‘s pragmatic economic
programme – an admixture of the Four
Modernisations and the then rehabilitated Chen
Yun‘s proposed economic policy of the 1950s,
which aimed to strengthen the nation and avoid a
return to, and repair the damage of, the Maoist
years. 37 This new programme strongly promoted
the growth of the market economy and introduced
broad, sweeping, and deep institutional reforms
and policy changes that weakened and disbanded
the institutions of high socialism that the Chinese
individual had been embedded in and dependent
upon.
The first significant changes took place in rural
China. Farmers, who had in the late 1970s at great
personal risk secretly abandoned their collectives
and started farming and dealing privately in an
attempt to escape crippling poverty, 38 were ahead
of a wave of State policy that systematically
dismantled collectives (whether economically
viable or not) 39 and promoted rural private
enterprise. With the endorsement of the Four
Modernisations in 1978, the State signalled that
―side-occupations‖ of farmers, essentially the
private farming and selling of produce, were not
to be interfered with, decreed that collectives were
no longer to be run by individuals, and admitted
Mao had not been free of ―all short comings and
errors‖ 40 – a direct break with the social structure
of the Mao Cult that had exalted Mao as the Red
Sun. 41 Following on from this, the State, in a
series of policy statements (the No. 1 Documents
of 1981-1986), 42 enabled individuals to pool
resources for business operations outside the
collective (1982), improved access of rural
residents to urban markets and private sector
37 Spence, op cit, 33, pp. 653-657; YS Huang, Capitalism with
Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State, 2008, New
York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 85-105.
38 The 18 households in Xiaogang, Anhui province who first secretly
and illegally experimented with a private farming system, which was
later to become known as the household responsibility system, and
who wrote a pact in their own blood that if they were caught the
ringleaders‘ children would be taken care of by other villagers, are
oft cited as the first bold step in the process of Individualisierung
(Yan 2010a, op cit, 8, p. 495; see also Huang, op cit, 37, p. 88).
39 For discussion of the economic loss involved in the dismantling of
successful collectives in Shanxi see Spence, op cit, 33, p. 712-3.
40 Quarterly Documentation, China Quarterly, Vol. 77, March 1979,
p. 168, as quoted in Spence, op cit, 33, p. 658
41 Spence, op cit, 33, p. 617.
42 As cited in Huang, op cit, 37, pp. 89-90.

development of non-agricultural activities (1983),
allowed for the contracting of land and supported
the development of considerable wage
differentials between employees and managers
(1984), and in 1985 instituted a contract system
for purchasing grain, rather than compulsory State
purchase. These reforms were the effective death
knell of the previously all-encompassing social
institution of the collective, 43 weakened the
socialist and egalitarian identity of the Chinese
individual as the joint owner of all land and
capital, and forced the individual to become
economically self-reliant and build an identity for
him-/herself either as an entrepreneur, famer, or
migrant worker 44 outside of the collective. 45
In conjunction with, and as a corollary to, these
rural reforms, the State also set about downsizing
and privatising unprofitable non-core state owned
enterprises (SOEs) and promoting market culture
and business practices 46 – the so called policy of
―grasping the big and letting go of the small‖. 47
Central Committee economic policy in 1984
disbanded collective leadership of work units and
gave power to managers to appoint factory heads,
punish incompetent workers by dismissal
43 In addition to these policy changes, the State had also been running
a propaganda campaign against collectives since the turn of the
decade. As an example of this see the People‘s Daily‘s denigration in
1980 of the Dazhai Model, up until then Mao‘s personally selected
model to be studied by all (Spence, op cit, 33, p. 697). This campaign
culminated in the dismissal in 1981 of then Politburo member, and
Mao‘s favoured agricultural expert and prime proponent of
collectives, Chen Yonggui.
44 For an expose of how the migrant worker exemplifies the process
of Individualisierung in China in having been geographically as well
as socially disembedded from traditional identity proscribing
institutions through travel from the village to the city, re-embedded
in social structures of his/her own creation in the urban environment,
and psychologized the risks inherent within the market economy due
to not usually being securely, or often legally, employed or residing
in his/her new metropolitan home, and how this has also
individualised to some extent the elderly and young villagers who are
left behind by having to resolve day-to-day problems without
reliance upon children‘s or parental support, see Yan, 2001a, op cit, 8,
pp. 497-8; YX Yan, Private Life under Socialism: Love, Intimacy,
and Family Change in a Chinese Village, 1949-1999, 2003, Stanford:
Stanford University Press; YX Yan, ―Individualisation of the Family
in Rural China‖, Boundary, Vol. 31(1), 2010c, pp. 203-229; and, S
Thogersen, S & A Ni, ―‗He is He, and I am I‘: Individual and
Collective among China‘s Rural Elderly‖, European Journal of East
Asian Studies, Vol. 7(1), 2008, pp. 11-37.
45 For a poignant example of this loss of identity and involuntary
disembeddment from security-providing institutions, see the plight of
over 400,000 ―urban exiles‖ who had been sent to Shaanxi during the
Cultural Revolution to learn from the farmers, but due to the
disbandment of the collectives, their inability to compete with local
farmers, and no housing to return to in the cities, were made vagrant
(Spence, op cit, 33, p. 713).
46 Yan, 2001a, op cit, 8, p. 498.
47 Huang, op cit, 37, pp. 168-171.
(something impossible under earlier ‗iron rice
bowl‘ policy) and reward competent workers with
promotions or bonuses. 48 Through various other
policy initiatives in 1989, 1991, 1995, and
culminating in the 15 th Party Congress in 1997, 49
privatisation of SOEs increased in scope and
intensity and led to the forced disembeddment of
an estimated 30 to 40 million workers 50 from the
work units which had been their sole source of
their material well-being and identity as masters
of the socialist China 51 . 52 This sudden need to
rely on oneself both for economic security and
personal identity due to privatisation of industry
along with the parallel privatisation of housing, 53
health care, 54 and education, 55 further exposed the
individual to the risks and uncertainties inherent
within the market economy and forced him/her to
take on a ‗do-it-yourself‘ biography
psychologicalising personal success or failure as
an individual responsibility. The ongoing result
was captured best in the literature of the reform
era, which described ―the individual human being
[as] essentially alone, and, for better or worse,
responsible for itself, without recourse to any allembracing
community or shared ideology‖. 56
48 ―Document Number One‖, China Quarterly, No. 101, March 1985,
pp. 133-4, as referenced in Spence, op cit, 33, pp. 700-2.
49 During which then-CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin declared
that the State: ―encourage[d] annexations, standard bankruptcies, layoffs
[,]…departures, cutting workers to increase efficiency…[and]
giv[ing] shape to a competitive mechanism of survival of the fittest
for enterprises‖: 1997, Renmin Chubanshe, p. 23, as cited in W Hurst,
The Chinese Worker after Socialism, 2009, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, p. 49.
50 R Garnaut, LG Song, S Teney, & Y Yao, China‘s Ownership
Transformation, 2010, Washington DC: International Finance
Corporation.
51 Yan, 2001a, op cit, 8, p. 499.
52 A phrase the captures well the sentiment of the period runs: ―When
Chairman Mao waved his hands, the entire nation sent the urban
youth down to the countryside (xiaxiang); when Deng Xiaoping
waved his hands, the entire nation jumped into the sea (xiahai: to
engage in private business); when Jiang Zemin waved his hands, the
entire nation stepped off their posts (xiagang: where laid off)‖, as
cited in L Zhang, ―The Individualization of Chinese Society‖, The
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 70(1), 2001, p. 312.
53 Housing, with the sponsorship of Li Peng, had been privatised at
the seventh National People‘s Congress in 1988 (Spence, op cit, 33, p.
730).
54 The State had gradually been re-emphasising self-responsibility
and self-reliance and then a shifting of the responsibility off the State
to provide medical services since the late 1970s; KH Mok, ―Retreat
of the State: Marketization of Education in China‖, Comparative
Education Review, 1997, p. 263.
55 Educational institutions had had to be increasingly self-reliant
during the 1980s to make themselves more responsive to market
forces; Ibid, p. 264).
56 A Wedell-Wedellsborg, ―Inside the Outsider: The Reappearance
in Chinese Literature of a Long Absent Type of Character‖, The
Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 2(1), 2008, pp. 68-83.
中澳青年联合会学报 29

The Consumption of Culture as a Form of
Identity Creation
With the dismantling of this all-embracing
community and loss of ideology, many Chinese
individuals have rallied around consumables as a
means to constructing a new identity. 57 This
identity is a bricolage of cultural constructs that is
reflected in, and frequently contingent upon, the
possession of culture as capital. 58 Culture 59 since
the 1990s has been commodified through the
market and is now a possessable, vendible, and
consumable social resource. The State sets the
framework that determines which social resources
can be consumed by sanctioning their
consumption. The dynamic relationship between
the State and individuals‘ permitted materialist
desires sets the tone of the marketplace and the
catalogue of cultural and other products that are
consumed. Participation in the consumption of
cultural capital as a means to new identity creation
is a form of collaboration 60 with and affirmation
of the State‘s role as the delineator of the
framework of that consumption. As such, through
consumerism and individual reflexive identity
creation within that consumerism, the State‘s
legitimacy to delineate the bounds of Chinese
individual identity creation is re-entrenched in the
modern context.
The Primacy of the State in Building the
Material Base for Mass Consumption
Following the legitimacy crisis of the Tiananmen
Incident, the State has repositioned itself towards
the Chinese population as the benevolent regulator
of the socialist market economy through which
people can experiment with new identities in the
form of consumerism. 61 Particular attention has
been paid by the State to recasting itself as legalist,
57 Song et al, op cit, 50, pp.162-3.
58 Wang, op cit, 5, p. 71.
59 I use culture in the sense that it ―is understood not as a fixed and
timeless entity but a series of practices, signs, and concepts that form
part of the complex terrain of an always contested national cultural
identity‖; G Sigley, ―Suzhi, the Body, and the Fortunes of Technoscientific
Reasoning in Contemporary China‖, positions: east asia
cultures critique, Vol. 17(3), 2009, p. 93).
60 Wang, op cit, 5, pp. 98-9, citing Gramsci at 97.
61 Wang, op cit, 5, p. 74; ZW Wang, ―Xiaofei Wenhua Yu Zhongguo
Xiandaihua‖, Xuexi Yu Tansuo, Vol. 161(6), 2005, p. 125; L Meng,
‗Zhongchan Jieceng De Xiaofei Yu Shenghuo‖, Lingdao Wen Cui,
Vol. 9, 2007, pp. 22-6.
30 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
particularly in relation to consumer protection,
through the enactment of a voluminous amount of
legislation during the 1990s, such as the
Customers‘ Civil Statute, Tourists‘ Civil Statute,
the Law of Consumer Rights Protection, Banking
Law, Statistics Law, Creditors‘ Law, Law of
Negotiable Instruments, Auction Law, Law
Punishing Financial Criminals, and the Law
Governing Lawyers. 62 The State has also set about
increasing the capacity of the population to
participate in consumerism as a means to
strengthening the nation ex increased economic
growth. 63 Article 36 of the Labor Law (1994)
ensured a 44-hour week, and the establishment of
‗Golden Week‘ holidays for Labor Day, National
Day, and Spring Festival (1999) increased the
amount of free time that could be used to
participate in consumption or other leisure
activities. 64 The liberalising of income tax laws in
1994 65 increased the amount of dispensable
income available to the Chinese individual, and
the lowering of interest rates, most notably in
1996, 1998, 2002, and 2009, highly
disincentivised saving as opposed to consuming or
investing. 66 The State has also educated the
Chinese populous about how to consume and
partake in leisure: either directly, through leisure
culture campaigns 67 such as the 1996 ―Civilization
62 As cited in Wang, op cit, 5, p. 92.
63 Wang, op cit, 61, pp. 123-6.
64 BH Wu, X Lan, AM Morrison & XY Leung, ―Frame Analysis on
Golden Week Policy Reform in China‖, Annals of Tourism Research,
Vol. 39(2), 2012, p. 846; Wang, op cit, 5, p. 74-5.
65
(accessed 29 May 2012).
66 (accessed
29 May 2012); Wang, op cit, 5, p. 93.
67 Another example is the 1996 Leisure Day Action Campaign, where
residents were told to partake in instrumental leisure activities such
as visiting museums, going to the movies, participating in sports,
sightseeing, learning English, taking driving lessons, and learning
how to use computers (Wang, op cit, 5, 77). The campaign was put
as ―learning how to become a modern and civilized Beijingese‖; a
programme in great contrast with the discourse of socialist spiritual
civilization of the Maoist years and raised intermittently during the
1980s – note the lack lustre and brevity of the Lei Feng campaign in
the 1980s because it didn‘t mesh easily with the goals of the Four
Modernisations (Spence, op cit, 33, p. 697). Wang argues that as a
result of this ―the concept of civil resident itself [now] incorporates
the new meaning of the civil consumer‖ (Wang, op cit, 5, p. 78) and
by linking leisure to certain commodities (driving/sightseeing – cars,
sport – equipment, visiting museums and the movies – fashion
apparel (being seen), computers – other technology devices), the
State was forwarding a Fordist model of consumption – work less,
spend more (S Crowther, ―Why I Favor Five Day‘s Work with Six
Day‘s Pay‖, World‘s Work, Vol. 39, 1927, pp. 613-616) – to
stimulate economic growth. Wang argues this will result in ―a
lifestyle that can spare no time for unproductive labor‖ (or is
―condemned to activity‖ in the words of Beck & Beck-Gernsheim,

Contract with Residents‖ orchestrated by the
Department of Propaganda of the City
Commission of Beijing, which equated modern
and civilized Beijingese with civil consumers, or
indirectly, through the implicit condoning by
omission to censure of lifestyle magazines such as
Vogue (Shishang), Cosmopolitan (Shishang),
Brandname Shopping Guides (Jingping Gouwu),
and Esquire (Shishang Xiansheng) 68 running
articles on how to participate in and define oneself
through consumer culture. Thus, as a means to relegitimise
itself, the State has actively enabled the
Chinese individual to participate in self-oriented
consumerism, especially the consumption of
commodified culture, 69 and in so doing it has also
acquired another ruling technology with which to
exert influence over the Chinese populace.
Culture as a Consumable Product 70
Although throughout the 1980s the culture market
was constrained and still mainly considered the
province of highbrow elites, 71 the insatiable
Sehnsucht of the market economy for new areas of
profitmaking to stave off falling rates of profit
engendered by its internal relations 72 inevitably
produced the conditions for the growth of a mass
op cit, 8, p. 24), because ―failure‖, in this instance to secure enough
wealth to indulge oneself, is personal.
68 Wang, op cit, 5, p. 76; Song et al, op cit, 50, pp. 162-3.
69 It is important to note here though, that in the discussion of the
commodification of culture and the redefinition of the Chinese
individual as a consumer citizen who participates in a ―democracy of
consumption‖ that not all Chinese individuals qualify as citizenconsumers;
Sigley, op cit, 59, p. 92. The phenomenon of ―consumer
democracy‖ where culture is commodified and an individual‘s
cultural value is judged by purchasing power rather than traditional
cultural refinement and elegance, marginalises those who compose
the production side of the consumption equation – the migrant
workers and other low cost labourers who make the production of
consumables possible, and excludes those who ―eke out an existence
in the ‗informal economy‘‖, those geographically isolated Chinese
and minority group members without access to the resources to
consume (Sigley, op cit, 59, pp. 94-5, 102). Despite this, though, it
must be recognised that even though capacity to participate in
consumerism is limited, and when it does occur it is viewed
negatively (A Anagnost, ―The Corporeal Politics of Quality (Suzhi)‖,
Public Culture, Vol. 16(2), 2004, pp. 189-202), the desire to
participate and seek an identity in consumption still persists (Ibid, p.
192) because the rural/materially lacking alternative has been
eviscerated of all value (Ibid, p. 206).
70 For a challenge to this thesis see Wang Yalin‘s survey of leisure in
Tianjin Chengshixiuxian (urban leisure), though note that Wang‘s
finding that only 10 per cent of Tianjin residents participate in
commercial leisure – consumption of commodified culture – can be
explained away by the narrow definition Wang gives to commercial
leisure and the availability of that type of commercial leisure in
Tianjin (see Rolandsen, op cit, 6, p. 141).
71 Wang, op cit, 5, p. 83.
72 Anagnost, 2004, op cit, 69, p. 195.
cultural industry. 73 In response to this, the State
began to desist from packaging culture as Marxist,
and instead utilised it as a ruling technology by
turning it into capital and economic activity in
itself. 74 This repackaging at a superficial level
reinforces State legitimacy by proliferating
crypto-Statist ―paleosymbolic scenes‖ (the private
and subjective meaning of scenes represented in
terms of and linked to public ideological contexts)
within advertising and associating it with
consumer behaviour, 75 but also, at a deeper level,
and here in very Gramscian terms, normalising the
State as the delineator of the framework of
cultural consumption, 76 a position which would be
entrenched through participation in that
consumption. 77
Examples of this commodification of culture, both
as a word and as a pursuit from the 1990s onwards
are multifarious: an automobile exhibition being
bedizened as an auto cultural festival (qiche
wenhua zhanlanhui), and the promotion of
―cultural tourism‖ (wenhua guanguang) in the
Year of Tourism (1997), 78 the high sale rate and
profitability of Jia Pingwa‘s salacious novella
Abandoned City (Feidu) – an example of the
commodification of culture as writing and
publishing were previously not profit-driven, 79 the
establishing of the Dannon Peking Opera Troupe
by the Beijing National Opera house as an honour
80
to donor Dannon Company, and the
73 Wang, op cit, 5, pp. 85, 89, 93.
74 Ibid, p. 83.
75 A Gouldner, The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology, 1982, New
York: Oxford University Press, p. 225, as cited in G Barme, ―CCP TM
& ADCULT PRC‖, The China Journal, No. 41, 1999, pp. 1-23.
76 In this sense it is not a coercive discourse but the communication
to the population of ―what kinds of behaviour are permissible and
which are not‖ (L McNay, Foucault: A Critical Introduction, 1994,
Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 94-5, as cited in Rolandsen, op cit, 6, p.
66). A specific example of this is consumer rights in China.
Consumer rights have been developed and facilitated by the State (D
Yijiang, ‗Corporatism and Civil Society in China: An Overview of
the Debate in Recent Years‘, China Information, Vol. 12(4), 1998,
pp. 44-67) and are asserted not, as their political cousins might be,
vis-à-vis the State, but vis-à-vis the market, ―with the endorsement
and encouragement of the state‖ (B Hooper, The Consumer Citizen in
Contemporary China, 2005, Working Paper No. 12, Centre for East
and South-East Asian Studies at Lund University, Sweden, p. 2) as
they support the State‘s reform agenda, and subsequently its
legitimacy to set that agenda (Ibid).
77 TJJ Lears, ―The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and
Possibilities‖, American Historical Review, 2001, p. 577.
78 Wang, op cit, 5, p. 84.
79 G Barme, ―Soft Porn, Packaged Dissent, and Nationalism: Notes
on China‖, Current History, Vol. 93(584), 1994, pp. 270-5.
80 Wang, op cit, 5, p. 86.
中澳青年联合会学报 31

efurbishment of cultural sites in Beijing such as
Xidan Theatre, Prospect Garden, and the Niu
Street District so as to foster economic growth as
part of the Founding the Capital through Culture
campaign (Wenhua Lidu). 81
The linking between cultural capital and identity
is also increasingly strong: the members of
Quanzhou‘s amateur photography club perceiving
identity as a photographer in the quality of the
equipment, rather than quality of the
photography, 82 the value of tea drinking being
perceived by Quanzhou‘s tea-sots as expense of
tea consumed as opposed to manner in which
appreciated, 83 and Chinese managers‘ social
image being contingent upon possession of the
right cultural artefacts or – in a heinously
misogynistic, but revealing, objectification of a
woman‘s virtuosity and dutifulness as social
capital – in his selection of a wife. 84
In such circumstances, the construction of a new
identity, a key step in the process of
Individualisierung, 85 becomes more and more
intertwined with the consumption of commodified
culture, thus making individuality in some ways
an economic matter that is carried out within the
market framework established and maintained by
the State.
Conclusion
This essay commenced by highlighting the rather
alarming moral crisis which is currently occurring
in China and questioning what the role of the
Chinese individual was in this context, and what
bearing this had on individual-State relations in
China. Through a socio-historical analysis of the
process of Inidividualisierung since the Maoist
period and its subsequent manifestation in
consumerism, this essay has posited that the
Chinese individual is in the midst of patchworking
a new bricolage-identity out of commodified
culture as a response to the dismantling by the
State of traditional identity proscribing social
81
Ibid, p. 88.
82
Rolandsen, op cit, 6, p. 154.
83
Ibid.
84
Song et al, op cit, 50, p. 166
85
Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, op cit, 8, pp. 26-27.
32 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
structures in its quest for modernity. Following on
from this, this essay has further argued that,
through the Chinese individual‘s complicity with
the State in generally confining the construction
of his/her identity within the bounds of the
commercial framework established by the State,
he/she has legitimised the State as having the
authority to establish and control that framework.
This has also endowed the State with an additional
ruling technology to exert influence over the
Chinese individual. As such, despite the moral
crisis, individual-State relations are, and will
continue to be, relatively stable so long as the
Chinese individual‘s economic capacity to partake
in and derive benefit from the socialist market
economy continues.

中澳青年联合会学报 33

Photo/照片: Awakening, Eleanor Bennett

SECTION II
ACADEMIC ESSAY – CHINESE
第二部分
学术文章部分 – 中文类作品

中等强国的两难困境?
试析澳工党执政以来的澳大利亚国内对华战略争论
赵寒玉 (Zelda Zhao)
这篇文章荣获了 2012 年“中澳青年联合会青年奖学金(中文)”,作者赵寒玉的简介请参考前文的
“2012 年中澳青年联合会青年学者简介”。
内容摘要
随着 21 世纪世界权力的重心逐渐从欧洲、北
美历史性地转移到亚洲、太平洋,作为亚太地
区中等强国的澳大利亚面临着史无前例的对外
战略挑战。第一大贸易伙伴为中国、传统军事
盟友为美国的澳大利亚,已经不得不思考,和解
决的首要战略难题演变为“是否应该在中美之
间做出选择?”。中澳关系在工党执政这五年
内经历的起伏震荡,也显示了澳大利亚形成一
个清晰明确、内在统一的对华战略的重要性和
必要性。本文通过对澳大利亚国内对华战略争
论的梳理和分析,发现争论的主要观点可被分
为澳“必须选择”和“不必选择”两大派,前
者认为“鱼与熊掌不可兼得”,在安全利益高
于经济利益的前提下,澳大利亚应该加强与美
国的同盟关系,制衡中国;而后者认为澳洲可
以不必在中美之间“二选一”:澳大利亚采取
“对冲战略”,在中美之间维系平衡,力求其
安全和经济利益的兼容;或者试图超越中美澳
三角框架,探寻在多边机制下构筑某种共治亚
太的开放性新体系。而后,作者将从国际和国
家两个层次上,分析引发这场战略争论的原因
以及影响澳对华战略的主要因素,最后对中国
方面提出可能的政策建议。
1. 问题的提出
《悉尼先驱晨报》,澳大利亚发行量最大的全
国性日报之一,于 2012 年 5 月 20 日刊发了一
篇题为“澳大利亚需要在中美之间做出选择
36 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
吗?”的文章 1 。其实,这个复杂而棘手的问题
早已在澳大利亚的高层决策者、政治家、国际
关系学者、战略分析家们的头脑中盘踞多时:
随着中国逐渐崛起成为一个经济和战略大国,
澳大利亚是否面临在中、美之间做出艰难选择
的困境?一个是澳大利亚最大的贸易伙伴(美
国国务卿希拉里·克林顿把北京戏称为澳洲的
“银行家” 2 )— 中国,一个是已经为澳大利
亚提供 60 年安全保障的坚实盟友 — 美国。
伴随着中国经济在全球的强势迅猛崛起,中国
国际地位的日益提升和影响力的扩大,各种区
域性和双边摩擦的不断涌现,以及美国做出的
战略重心东移、亚洲“ 再平衡”
(Rebalancing Asia)的战略调整,作为深深
扎根在亚太地区的中等强国(middle power)
澳大利亚,日渐感受到了战略决策压力的增大。
澳大利亚应该对华采取什么样的战略和政策?
澳大利亚是否应该,或者必须在中美之间做出
选择?澳大利亚对亚太地区的未来到底有何憧
憬?又有什么能力去塑造这一未来?这些重要
的疑惑在澳大利亚国内引起了广泛的思考和争
论,而这些充满争议的问题对中澳关系的发展
和前景具有极为重大的意义。这些问题正是本
文所要关注、研究和分析的主要内容 — 自
2007 年澳工党政府执政以来澳大利亚国内对华
战略的争论。本文试图探究的问题主要包括:
(1)澳大利亚国内的对华战略辩论有哪些主
要的观点和立场?(2)产生分歧和争论的原
1 Tom Hyland, “Explainer: Do We Have to Choose between
China and the US?”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 May
2012.
2
Ibid.

因有哪些?(3)决定或影响中澳关系的核心
因素是什么?(4)澳国内的争论对于中国发
展对澳关系又有什么样的启示?
2012 年正值中澳建交四十周年,在此期间中澳
关系在经济贸易、高层互访、国际合作、社会
文化交流、人员往来等众多方面取得了长足的
进步和发展,中国已成为澳大利亚最大的贸易
对象和海外出口市场,而澳大利亚也是中国主
要的自然资源和能源供应方。毫不夸张地说,
中、澳对于彼此国家的繁荣、发展、稳定都具
有重要意义。2008 年的全球金融海啸,澳大利
亚正是得益于中国的贸易和投资,才比其他国
家更能置身危机之外。但是,从实际情况看来,
中澳关系无论是在外交政策、实践,还是研究
方面,长期只关注于经贸领域,尤其是自然资
源、能源领域(当然还包括文化交流、教育科
技合作等低级政治领域 low politics),而忽
视政治、安全、战略等方面(高级政治领域
high politics) 3 。这一现状在学术上的反映
就是中国国内的研究对澳大利亚的对外政策、
中澳关系的关注极少,澳大利亚的对华重要性
被长期低估。
澳大利亚在国家实力和国际地位上远不及处于
国际政治权力金字塔顶层的超级大国美国;从
地缘政治的角度上说,也不及日本、朝鲜半岛、
东南亚地区与中国的紧密关联度,但澳大利亚
却处在西方发达国家对华的前沿位置上,并且
与中国不同的是,澳洲把对华关系视为重中之
重,如悉尼大学国际安全研究中心的主任阿
兰·杜彭特(Alan Dupont)所言,“如果打
比方说,在过去一个世纪澳大利亚是骑在羊背
上走向了繁荣,那么在本世纪决定澳洲繁荣与
否的关键,将是其驾驭中国龙的技巧” 4
。 所
以,应该加强对澳洲对华政策或对华战略的关
注与研究。
3
Stanley Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete: the Fate of
the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe”,
Dadaelus, 1966, Vol. 95 (3), pp. 862-915.
4 Alan Dupont, “Living with the Dragon: Why Australia
Needs a China Strategy”, Policy Brief, Lowy Institute
for International Policy, June 2011, p. 1.
此外,选择澳大利亚作为研究对象另一原因在
于:澳对华政策面临着结构性矛盾和平衡的挑
战,而澳大利亚的情况,代表了亚太地区的一
批中等力量国家(middle powers,例如日本、
韩国、东盟等)在中美两国在亚太展开大国博
弈的情况下,所普遍面临的战略选择难题。但
是有澳洲学者指出,当代中国研究者和分析家
的一个重要不足,就是缺少对亚洲中等强国态
度和力量的深度讨论 5
。所以,深入研究澳大利
亚国内的战略争论,有助于了解和剖析中等强
国在这个正经历着权力转移(power shifting)
的世界中,遭遇的战略困境和可能的政策与行
为选择。同时,也能够对中国如何及时调整自
身政策来积极塑造和应对亚太地区的发展趋势
提供有益的启示和建议。
2. 澳国内对华战略的争论和分歧
(-)主要观点和立场
1. 出台“对华战略”的必要性
澳洲国际关系和战略研究的学者曾明确指出,
面对国际形势和区域权力结构的变化,堪培拉
缺少与之对应的针对中国的清晰战略 6 。一个内
在统一的、可操作性强的对华战略对于澳大利
亚来说既是重要的,也是必须的。正由于对华
大战略的缺失,澳大利亚的对华政策时常呈现
出似是而非、自相矛盾的特点。例如,2009 年
的国防白皮书无法确定中、美哪个更可能成为
区域主导国家,但却挑选出中国来,对其国际
行为横加指点。白皮书反映出澳大利亚对华的
战略模糊性 — 一方面澳为双边关系深化而获
得的好处感到极为欣喜,另一方面却又启动了
澳洲和平时期最大的一项军事扩建,并且目标
直指“中国威胁” 7 。
阿兰·杜彭特(Alan Dupont)在其《与龙共
处:为什么澳大利亚需要一个对华战略》一文
中认为,对华战略的目的是将两国的获益最大
5 Ibid.
6
Alan Dupont, “Let's End Muddled Thinking on China”,
The Australian, 22 June 2011, p. 8.
7
Alan Dupont, op cit, 4, p. 3.
中澳青年联合会学报 37

化的同时,也能确保彼此都理解这一伙伴关系
的局限性,毕竟双方关系是建立在很多重合的
利益与极少重合的价值观之上的。而对华战略
形成的前提则是理解中国崛起的意义,以及对
中美关系动态发展的把握。
对于澳大利亚对华战略争论的一个焦点和核心
内容,其实就是本文开篇所引述的那个问题
— 澳大利亚是否需要在中、美之间做出战略
选择?对于这个问题的回答涉及对中美未来在
亚太区域,甚至全球范围内,的权力分配形势
的判断;涉及对中国战略意图的判断;同时也
涉及澳大利亚要在其中扮演何种角色的问题。
根据笔者从有限的材料中的参考和总结,争论
可以大致分为澳大利亚必须选择(也可以说是
“别无选择”)和澳不必在中美之间抉择这两
派观点,而持后者立场的又可再细分为两种思
路:一是采取“对冲战略”在中美之间保持平
衡;二是构筑某种“共治亚太”的新体系,澳
在其中发挥更为独立的角色。
2. 澳大利亚必须做出选择(或者“别无选择”)
澳大利亚著名战略学者和安全问题专家休·怀
特(Hugh White)教授曾表示,澳大利亚几乎
不可能兼得“鱼与熊掌” — 最大的贸易伙伴
和最强安全保障者,因为一切使澳洲享受经济
上殷实的东西,都在侵蚀着保证其战略上安全
的结构,因为中国对美国的权力挑战已经成为
一个事实,而非再是一种可能性 8
。 其认为,
决定亚太地区未来的关键因素是中美关系,对
澳大利亚而言,最好的结果是美国放弃在亚洲
的主导地位,与中国及其他大国共享权力,构
建一个“亚洲协调”,这种中美合作的状态建
立在美国让渡霸权的基础上。如果中美采取竞
争模式,尤其是陷入典型的安全困境和军备竞
赛,那么双方在亚太的冲突则在所难免。澳大
利亚应当努力说服美国放弃在亚太的主导权,
转而作为“集体领导”中的一员,留在亚洲当
8 休·怀特在 2010 年刊发文章引起澳国内战略辩论后,对澳媒
体发表了如上这一观点,可参见:Tom Hyland, op cit, 1;
Hugh White, “Power Shift: Australia's Future between
Washington and Beijing”, Quarterly Essay, Issue 39,
2010.
38 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
一个平衡者而非领导人的角色,但是这一工作
十分艰巨,或许也很难实现 9 。除非美国认真准
备与中国分享权力,否则澳大利亚不可能在中
美的亚太主导权争夺战中保持“骑墙之势”。
值得注意的是,休·怀特并非赞同澳大利亚在
任何国际形势下都应该坚持美澳同盟的观点 10
,
也不认为中国的崛起就意味着美澳同盟关系的
终结 11 ,但他明确指出,如果这种中美“共享
亚太”的理想结果难以出现的话,澳将面临非
常严峻的选择困境。
其实,澳大利亚在中美之间必须进行战略选择
的设定,包含了对中国崛起及其战略意图的基
本判断 12 :澳大利亚等西方国家,一方面,从
中国近年来所展现的一系列自信满满,甚至颇
具进攻性的外交行动中,解读出中国的大国雄
心和重获亚洲主导权的欲求;从中国人民解放
军(PLA)雄心勃勃的“远洋防卫”战略中,
读出对中国未来军事意图的深深担忧;另一方
面,也从北京对南海主权的积极申索和坚定捍
卫中,看到中国所承受的极大资源/能源脆弱
性。
从对中国的战略目的和资源不安全状态的分析
中可以得出三个概括性结论:
(1)中国作为一个强国的再崛起,将不可避
免地加剧与其他亚洲力量之间的紧张关系,它
们在西太平洋近海的竞争最为危险,因为那里
是中、美、日地缘政治和贸易利益的交汇点;
(2)战略上的不确定性注定将取代稳定成为
亚洲未来地缘政治的决定性特点;
( 3 ) 中 国 根 深 蒂 固 的 “ 例 外 论 ” 意识
(exceptionalism)使得其与其他国家的搭档
9
参见:Hugh White, “Our Role in Asia's Superpower
Shuffle”, The Australian, 4 September 2010.
10
其在文章中表明,“第一种选择,即坚决站在美国一边,其
实在中美竞争日趋激烈的今天,对于澳大利亚的挑战和风险也
变得愈发明显。在中美之间爆发战争的可能性不能排除的情况
下,美澳同盟关系的强化会使得澳大利亚承担更多的风险:在
冲突加剧的情况下,我们与中国的贸易联系会崩溃,与亚洲其
他国家的关系会变得错综复杂,为了增加对美军事支持,要扩
充军备、建立美军基地,在战争来临时派遣更多军队参与作战。
参见:Ibid.
11
参见:Hugh White, “As China Rises We Must Look
Beyond U.S. Alliance”, The Australian, 13 September
2010.
12
以下对中国崛起和其战略意图的相关分析主要参考自:Alan
Dupont, op cit, 4.

和平等变得更难,并强化了中国的“应得权利”
意识,和一直没有得以安慰的历史怨恨。
基于如上分析,不难得出如果澳大利亚必须在
中美之间做出选择,那么结果几乎是不言自明
的 — 除坚持与美国的同盟关系外别无他选 13
。
“强迫澳在中美之间做出选择,对于澳大利亚
和中国来说都是一件坏事,鉴于安全永远重于
贸易,澳洲几乎不可能做出偏向中国的选择,
如果一定要抉择的话” 14 。“如果要澳大利亚
在中美之间做出选择,结果是完全可以预料的。
它已经同美国加强了同盟关系” 15
。
但是,这种“二者必择其一”的思路,相对而
言并不是澳大利亚外交参与者(政府层面)和
战略、国际关系学界的主流观点,更多的文章
和讨论显示出的是下述看法。
3. 澳大利亚不必在中美之间抉择
(1) 采 取 “ 对 冲 战 略 ”( Hedging
Strategy 16
),在中美之间保持平衡
较多学者认为,针对澳大利亚经济、贸易利益
和政治、安全利益分别依靠于两个极可能在亚
太地区发生主导权之争的国家这一事实现状,
堪培拉应该采取一种“对冲战略”,对中美进
行两面下注,力求在两者之间维持平衡,以实
现澳国家利益的最大化。概括性地说,“对冲”
(Hedging)的精髓就在于将投资的风险尽可
能地分散化,避免“把鸡蛋都装在一个篮子
中”。针对国际关系的现实,像澳大利亚这样
的亚太中等强国,一方面尽力搭上中国经济起
飞的“顺风车”(bandwagoning),获取自身
13 James Cotton & John Ravenhill, “Middle Power
Dreaming: Australian Foreign Policy during the Rudd–
Gillard Governments”, Middle Power Dreaming: Australia
in World Affairs 2006-2010, Oxford University Press,
2011.
14
Alan Dupont, op cit, 4.
15
Sarah Serizawa, “An Australian Perspective on U.S.
Rebalancing toward Asia: An Interview With Rory
Medcalf”, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 30
April 2012.
16
对于 “Hedging Strategy”,国内学界现有“对冲战略”和
“两面下注”战略两种不同译法,含义完全相同,为了行文的
一致性,在此文中统一采用“对冲战略”的译法。
的经贸利益;另一方面,在政治、军事和安全
上 “ 投靠” 美 国 以 实 现 对 中 国 的 制 衡
(balancing),防止中国崛起导向新的霸权
主义或军事冲突。
阿兰·杜彭特(Alan Dupont)的代表性观点
被笔者概括为一种“合作型/联合型对冲战略”
的思路。其认为,对华软弱屈服和对华强硬对
抗都是错误的战略选择,运用“ 巧实力”
(smart power)和精明的外交,来防止亚洲
新霸权出现带来的损失才是更好的方式。澳大
利亚应该联合日本、韩国、印度和东盟,来阻
止中国称霸 21 世纪的亚洲。 17 杜彭特认为澳
大利亚应尽最大可能积极充当中美之间的调停
人、沟通者、润滑剂,以确保中美之间不会在
亚太地区进行一场毁灭性的霸权之争。
更具体地说,对于中国,澳大利亚可以联合区
域其他国家,共同说服北京再思考其在西太平
洋所追求的政治和军事战略。中国和其他国家
一样,都希望使其武装力量现代化,并保护其
合法安全利益,但是,中国在西太平洋维护其
利益的方式却事与愿违 — 疏离了近邻,引起
国际对中国长期战略的关注,激发区域内的两
面下注行为。美国对中国战略挑战的回应,很
可能会引发一场典型的军备竞赛,并把其他担
忧中国日益强大的军事力量的国家拖下水。
澳大利亚不应低估自身对中国的影响力 — 澳
现在既是关键原材料的稳定提供商,又是中国
学生、游客和投资者的吸引目标。中国将澳大
利亚视为有影响力的、施行积极外交政策的中
等强国,与美国的同盟使之具有更大的地区影
响力。澳政府应该用好这些杠杆,来提升日益
增加的对华利益,同时避免北京将澳洲与其盟
友美国拆散。同时,作为一个主要的供应者,
澳大利亚并有能力确保中国对能源和自然资源
安全的合理要求不会成为一场零和游戏。
对于美国,澳需要说服华盛顿,使之正确认识
到中国的资源焦虑感,和由此产生的保护西太
平洋海上航线的责任感。一支蓝水海军是中国
经济和战略力量增长的必要产物,就如同美国
17 Alan Dupont, op cit, 4, p. 8.
中澳青年联合会学报 39

海军的壮大预示着美国崛起为 20 世纪的大国。
任何妖魔化中国的尝试对于美国在亚洲的战略
利益都将是适得其反的,因为那将削弱中国领
导层中的温和派力量,鼓励中方加剧紧张局势
的对抗行为。此外,虽然美澳同盟仍旧是在这
个动荡世界中保卫澳洲安全的关键,同时也是
应对中国非和平崛起可能性的最好方式,但是
由于战略形势的急剧变化,同盟也需注入新思
维 — 不能将之变为一个“反华集团”,并且
应该改革以美国为轴心的轮辐模式(hub-
spoke mode),加强其他成员国之间的合作和
战略互动。
澳大利亚应该分别向华盛顿和北京说明:为避
免最坏的可能,双方需要对增强互信的稳定、
长期的承诺;实施预防性外交;建立一套危机
处理系统,有效避免地区争端和突发事件升级
为二者间的重大冲突。
洛依国际问题研究所(Lowy Institute for
International Policy)国际安全项目主任罗
里·梅德卡尔夫(Rory Medcalf 18
)虽然也不
认可对华遏制战略,但在防止中国成为地区霸
权的问题上却十分坚定。首先,他认为美国
“重返亚太”的象征意义大于实际战略意义,
只是象征着美国对其亚洲盟友和伙伴的承诺,
这些在亚太新增的力量,不会在与中国可能的,
或假想的,军事对抗中发挥实质性作用。其次,
很多亚洲国家都怀有对华的深刻担忧,它们对
中国力量强大和未来意图不明一种自然反应,
就是提升自身的海洋战略力量、探索与本区域
其他海洋国家的伙伴关系,澳大利亚亦莫能外。
很多中国分析人士把这视为一种“围堵”或者
“遏制”中国的战略,但 Medcalf 更倾向于将
之视为对中国力量壮大和意图不明的一种自然
反应。最后,他提出制衡中国、防止其取得地
区霸权的三大方面 — 开放性、包容性的地区
多边主义,如东亚峰会、东盟论坛、TPP 等;
美国在亚太地区的进一步“存在”和联盟;其
他区域力量的平衡战略(即对冲战略) 19 。
18 他曾任澳联邦政府外交官、情报部门的高级战略分析员。
19
详见 Sarah Serizawa, op cit, 15.
40 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
(2) 构筑“共治亚太”新体系,澳扮演更为
独立的角色
在建议澳大利亚应该在中美之间两面下注、寻
求平衡的观点之外,还有战略分析人士试图超
越这一中美澳三角框架,探索澳在这一历史性
的世界权力转移中发挥作用的新思路,而对华
战略在这一新框架中将更加积极有为。
曾任澳大利亚驻华大使的里克·史密斯(Ric
Smith 20 )的观点有一定代表性,其强调澳洲国
家利益的特殊性以及由此带来的独立性:澳不
是某个区域共同体的成员国,例如欧盟和东盟,
后者往往有相同的利益,可以在很多议题领域
中追求或采取相同的政策;澳洲与美国有长期
稳定的防务关系,但并非在所有问题上利益一
致;澳在国际贸易上与很多国家态度一致,但
在其他场合又少有利益趋同;„„澳大利亚很
乐于一直把自己视为“西方共识”的一部分,
“欧洲在亚洲的桥头堡”,甚至是“大英共荣
圈”的成员,但是世界形势在近十年来发生了
深刻变化,权力转移的帆船正在从北美驶向亚
洲。所以,好的对外政策不仅应为国家利益服
务,而且应该是富有远见和具有战略高度的 21 。
里克·史密斯认为,当前对于澳战略选择的很
多讨论,其实是在两个平行的轨道上,一方面
关注与中国关系中所获得的经济好处,论调乐
观;另一方面关注所感知的安全挑战,比较极
端的看法认为中美之间的冲突不可避免,澳大
利亚也一定会被卷入其中。但是此问题的关键
是构筑一个开放性的世界体系,由包容性的网
络组成,而非排外性的集团构成。开放的全球
贸易环境才符合澳大利亚的国际利益,但是这
一开放的世界秩序不能仅局限于贸易机制,应
该要确保没有遏制政策出现的可能,并能保证
所有主要国家,尤其是中国能融入国际社会。
亚太地区要成为一个可以包容两强的区域,构
建出新的均势局面,美国要能适应在亚太与另
20 他还担任过驻印尼大使、澳国防部秘书长等职务。
21 Ric Smith, Rediscovering Foreign Policy: Australia,
China and the US, Address to the Australia Institute of
International Affairs (AIIA), Western Australian Branch,
Perth, 27 March 2012.下文中 Ric Smith 主要观点的引述皆出
自此文。

一力量分权,适应成为一个平衡者而非主导者
的角色。澳大利亚完全可以避免在中美之间做
出选择。其对澳的战略建议是采取“双线并进”
的方式:一方面,保持与美国同盟关系的灵活
性和必要作用,并力争其他的美国盟友也采取
相同方式,但不要以中国为敌对目标;另一方
面,全面加强和深化澳、中在官方和非官方层
面的接触,提升澳大利亚人对中国的认识深度。
(二) 澳工党政府的实际选择
那么,澳工党政府现在实际采取的对华政策主
要偏向何种战略主张呢?笔者认为,工党政府
在外交实践层面上采取的是对中、美两面下注
的“对冲战略”,但在外交理念层面上,试图
超越对冲战略,以多边主义和共同安全原则为
基础,构筑一个包容中美、多国共治的亚太共
同体机制。
现任澳联邦总理吉拉德的一贯表态就是,中国
和美国对于澳大利亚而言,不是一个“非此即
彼”的问题,澳大利亚既可以维持与美国的、
建立在相同价值之上的、长期稳定的朋友和同
盟关系,同时又与中国保持积极的、建设性的
接触 22 。原霍华德政府的国家安全顾问安德
鲁·希尔(Andrew Shearer)说:“我们与中
国的贸易关系日加密切,这时也必须静悄悄地
进行两面下注” 23 。 高层智囊的言论也进一步
反映出澳洲政府在对华政策上采取的现实选择
是“对冲战略”。
但是,从前外长陆克文 2012 年 1 月在美国亚
洲协会的演讲中可以看出,工党政府的对华战
略导向,和对未来区域以及全球权力结构的设
想蓝图,超越了“对冲战略” 24
。 在题为“太
平洋和平的前景”的长篇演讲中 25 ,陆克文提
22
Matthew Franklin & Michael Sainsbury, “Julia
Gillard's US-China Balancing Act”, The Australian, 26
April 2011.
23
【美】潘文:《西方对中国崛起的反应》,《中国国际战略评论
2010》,第 137 页。
24
但难以判断的是,随着陆克文在 2012 年 3 月工党内部权力斗
争中的失败以及卸任外交部长一职,澳洲的对外政策是否会发
生大幅的转变。
25
Kevin Rudd, The Prospects for Peace in the
Pacific: The Future of the Expanded East Asia Summit,
出为未来世界创建一个“太平洋和平”(Pax
Pacifica),超越历史的局限。这一和平的基
础是共同安全的原则、对美中权力现实的充分
认识,以及对美同盟的延续。陆克文对建立一
个在多边机制和规则基础之上的亚太的呼吁,
反映出澳洲在努力避免中美在亚太推崇现实政
治的权力原则,从而产生不可逆转的战略竞争
和对抗。他反复强调中美之间某种形式的冲突
并非不可避免,而澳大利亚通过其“创新性的
中等强国外交”,也对构筑一个可以不重蹈历
史覆辙的未来充满信心。陆克文并不接受澳大
利亚在中美的权力博弈中进行被动的选择,而
是让澳大利亚积极参与地区未来治理形态和制
度安排(尤其是多边机制)的建构中,主动影
响中美双方的互动模式。
3. 澳对华战略分歧的原因及影响澳对华战略
的要素分析
(一) 国际层面
1. 中国的崛起与全球权力变化的趋势
随着中国超越美国和日本成为澳大利亚的最大
贸易伙伴和对外出口市场(中澳 2011 年的双
边贸易额是 1137 亿澳元,占澳对外贸易份额
的 23.2% 26
),中国在经济上的飞速崛起(尤其
是伴随美、欧经济体在 2008 年金融海啸、经
济危机之后的相对整体衰落)使得澳大利亚的
国家利益、对外关系发生了结构性变化 — 澳
的经济利益和战略利益在两百余年历史中首次
分离,这是在澳国内产生对华战略(乃至整个
对外战略)分歧和争论的主要原因。
Rudd’s speech at Asia Society's New York headquarters,
13 January 2012.
26 数据和图表来源:澳大利亚外交和贸易部网站, available
at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/chin.pdf
中澳青年联合会学报 41

2006-2011 年澳大利亚对华商品贸易进出口额
变化图(Source: Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/chin.pdf)
澳洲前总理罗伯特·孟席斯(Robert Menzies)
曾说过,澳大利亚的利益要始终与那些“强大
而有权势的朋友”绑在一起,与此同时,如果
没有这些朋友的支持,澳洲的国际政策也很难
有效。所以,几乎在澳大利亚的整个历史中,
对一个意气相投的同盟的“忠诚”一直是其对
外政策的口号。“中国崛起”对澳大利亚的真
正新意,就是这个国家最大的贸易伙伴和持续
增长的投资者不再是它安全的保障者,也不是
一个共享任何深层文化、价值和制度共识的国
家。从这个意义上说,随着中国的崛起,区域
内“强大而有权势的”并不一定会成为“朋
友”。由此,澳决策者面临的核心挑战,就是
面对一个中国从中崛起的新世界,如何制定政
策才能既保证澳的经济利益又确保其安全利益。
澳洲智库 2012 年所做的一项民意调查显示,
虽然中国与澳大利亚的相互依存度在不断加深、
经贸联系不断强化,澳洲也从中国的“欣欣向
荣”中获得了巨大的经济实惠,但是中国崛起
却很难不引发澳大利亚人的深切担忧和防范心
理 27 。虽然,澳大利亚也充分认识到了中国必
将在不久的未来取代美国,位居世界经济阶梯
的顶端 28
,但是政治体制、意识形态和政治价
值观的根本性差异,使得中澳关系始终存在着
27
详见 Andrew Shearer, “Sweet and Sour: Australian
Public Attitudes towards China”, Analysis, Lowy
Institute for International Policy, August 2010.
28
可见外长陆克文 2011 年 5 月在中国广东外语外贸大学的演讲:
Kevin Rudd, Australia-China 2.0, the Next Stage in Our
Economic Partnership, speech at Guangdong University of
Foreign Studies, 22 May 2011.
42 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
结构性的矛盾,也使得澳大利亚无法对中国抱
有战略和安全上的信任。尽管双方也展开了一
定的防务交流和合作,但却很难在战略关系上
有深入发展。
2. 美国的战略重心转移
美国因素一直对澳大利亚的对华战略和政策有
重要影响。美澳同盟始终是工党政府“外交三
大支柱”中的“顶梁柱”(另外两根是“融入
亚洲”政策和国际多边机制),澳政府也始终
把对美关系作为外交政策的基石。美国因素在
触发近年澳国内对华战略争论的问题上也起到
了关键的作用,这主要体现在美国战略重心的
东移,或者说美国“重返亚太”(strategic
‘ pivot’ back to Asia-Pacific ),启动
“ 亚洲再平衡” 战 略 ( Asia Rebalancing
Strategy)。随着世界权力从欧美到亚洲的历
史性转移,美国也重新将目光锁定在了亚太地
区,并将 21 世纪宣称为“美国的太平洋世
纪”,通过一系列的战略调整和力量重新部署
(包括从伊拉克、阿富汗撤军,高调介入中国
南海争端,加强区域同盟间的军事合作,扩容
TPP 成员范围等)来强化美国在亚太地区的
“存在”和主导地位,力图反驳“美国霸权衰
落”的论调。
但是,美国“重回亚太”的战略调整,明显加
剧了中美在亚太发生冲突和权力争斗的可能性,
“再平衡”战略所制衡的对象只可能是崛起,
并日渐强势的中国,中国日益增长的海外利益
和军事实力的壮大也在事实上挑战着美国的权
威,而战略互信的严重缺乏又已成为中美之间
的核心问题 29 。这在很大程度上加重了美国传
统盟友 — 澳大利亚所面临的战略选择困境,
使得“选美国还是中国?”的问题(the “US
or China?” question)变得更为尖锐。
(二) 国家层面
1. 国家特性和国家身份定位
29 详见王缉思,李侃如:《中美战略互疑:解析与应对》,北京
大学国际战略研究中心出版,2012 年。

国家特性往往对一国外交政策产生根本性的影
响,澳大利亚在对华战略上所遇到的决策难题,
便与其国家身份定位的困惑密切相关。因为在
很大程度上,一个国家的自我认知和自我定位
是其对外政策的基石。
澳大利亚的人口数仅占全球人口总量的 0.3%,
却占据一个覆盖地球陆地面积 5%的岛屿大洲,
东临太平洋、西临印度洋,虽然在地缘上如此
“与世隔绝”,却被深深卷入世界政治中,几
乎参与到了 1901 年以来世界的历次主要军事
冲突中 30
。但这个国家却始终面对国家定位的
困惑,在历史和地理的矛盾中寻求归属感。曾
任澳驻美和驻日大使的罗顿· 达尔林普尔
(Rawdon Dalrymple)曾写道,“很少有民族
像澳大利亚人这样在寻找自己的地区定位,并
在将自己努力融入本区域上遇到如此大的困难”
31 。
澳大利亚在世界中的位置难以确定:它的战略
前沿在东南亚和南太平洋,但首要战略盟友却
在 12,000 公里外的北美,主要贸易伙伴又在
8,000 公里以外的东北亚,而其历史和文化的
主要根基却在地球另一端的欧洲。故而,澳大
利亚有一种持续而强烈的对国际环境的不确定
感,这也促使其外交决策者总是采取积极主动
的姿态,对外政策总是带有一种澳大利亚要
“去塑造”或者“被塑造”的感觉。与此同时,
距离上带来的安全感又使得澳大利亚在外交决
策时有松弛感和自信,给予其一种愿意承担风
险的心理能力 32 。
澳大利亚至少具有四种不同的身份定位:
(1)西方国家 — 西方世界的一员,几乎共
享西方自由民主法治社会的政治制度、意识形
态和价值体系;
30
Allan Gyngell & Michael Wesley, Making Australian
Foreign Policy, 2 nd
ed., New York: Cambridge Press, 2007,
pp. 9-10.
31
Rawdon Dalrymple, Continental Drift: Australia’s
Search for a Regional Identity, England: Ashgate
Publishing Limited, 2003, p. 1.
32
Allan Gyngell & Michael Wesley, op cit, 30, p. 10.
(2)中等强国,作为世界第 13 大经济体(人
均 GDP 第五),澳希望在国际事务中发挥更积
极的作用;
(3)地区性角色 — 亚太地区的重要力量;
(4)“置身事外”的国家(孤立主义的国
家),距离的阻隔让澳洲始终存在一种类似
“光辉孤立”的思潮,追求独立而尽量避免国
际义务。
所以,澳大利亚的不同身份、所承担的不同义
务 — 与美国的安全关系、与东北亚的贸易联
系、处于东南亚与南太平洋之间的地理位置
— 决定了一个单一的、内在统一连续的、毫
无争议的国家角色定位,很难在一个可预见的
未来出现 33 。澳大利亚对外政策形成中的主要
张力,就来源于这些义务和角色定位之间的内
在冲突。对美澳同盟的坚持,对西方主导的国
际体系(包括各种国际机制和价值观体系)的
维护,都反映出澳大利亚作为西方世界一员的
身份认同;而希望在中美之间充当协调人角色,
或者期望构建一个亚太新体系的努力,又反映
出澳大利亚作为一个中等强国和重要区域性角
色的认同。澳在中美之间的张力,就是由于其
安全义务和作为一个西方国家的自我认知,但
这又与其贸易承诺和作为一个区域角色的认知
构成了直接的矛盾。
2. 政党政治
从霍华德的自由-国家党联合政府到陆克文-吉
拉德的工党政府的对外政策轨迹,可以发现,
其实澳大利亚的政党政治,或党派差异,对澳的
外交政策影响相对较小 34 。总算,有一些政策
选择是任何想要当选或争取连任的政党都会采
取的 — 以美澳同盟为核心的国防和外交政策,
以及推进与亚洲的经贸联系。
33
Ibid, p. 209.
34
James Cotton & John Ravenhill, “Middle Power
Dreaming: Australian Foreign Policy during the Rudd–
Gillard Governments,” Middle Power Dreaming: Australia
in World Affairs 2006-2010, Oxford University Press,
2011, p.1.
中澳青年联合会学报 43

但是,在澳大利亚的外交政策中仍旧长期存在
着战略取向的分野:一派认为,只有与 “我
们强大而有权力的朋友”(罗伯特·孟席斯
Robert Menzies 语)保持和加强联系才能在最
大程度上促进澳大利亚的利益;另一派的观点,
借用前总理保罗·基廷(Paul Keating)所言
就是,“澳大利亚必须在亚洲寻找其安全,而
不是从亚洲找安全” 35 。 前者观点可以理解为
澳大利亚必须采取结盟政策,与世界霸权(无
论之前的英国,二战后的美国)结成同盟关系,
以维护自身国家利益。而后者则强调澳大利亚
应该全面融入亚洲,立足亚洲,而非成为局外
者。另一个相关但稍有不同的分歧是:一个是
霍华德政府在 1997 年和 2003 年的外交白皮书
中所明确指出的 — 以双边关系为中心,并有
选择地参与多边议程;另一个是对澳洲外交政
策更为“国际主义”的立场——主要由工党领
袖伊瓦特(H.V. Evatt)和加雷斯·埃文斯
(Gareth Evans)所阐释 — 对一个蓬勃向上
的多边体系的支持,才能保障澳大利亚的未来。
在这一多边体系中,中等国家能够建立联盟促
进自身利益 36
。
这两种不同的外交思路,在澳大利亚的政党派
别中均有所体现:自由-国家党联合政府(主
要是自由党)倾向于采用第一种“与最强者结
盟”的外交思路,对外关系中主要以欧美为中
心,重视双边和安全合作。霍华德执政时期就
因为过分追随美国而受人诟病。而工党政府则
更倾向于第二种“重多边”的思路,更具有
“国际主义”的倾向,积极推进多边机制和议
程的完善。工党领袖保罗·基廷出任联邦总理
时即制定了全面面向亚洲的对外政策。由此,
或许不难预见到 2013 年澳大利亚联邦大选时,
这种基于政党政治的不同外交思路和政策取向
差异将使得澳对华战略的争论更加激烈。
3. 澳的外交和防务传统
联邦成立至今,澳大利亚一直抱有的一个外交
和防务的传统就是谨防近邻出现强国,对西太
35 Allan Gyngell & Michael Wesley, op cit, 30, p.11.
36
Ibid.
44 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
平洋附近出现的任何强大“邻邦”都异常敏感,
并把其视为澳大利亚的头号劲敌。从 20 世纪
30 年代开始,随着日本国力的不断上升和扩张
帝国的野心逐步显现,日本就被当作是澳大利
亚的最主要对手,防止日本南进成为澳的重要
外交和防务目标。二战后,随着美国对远东的
控制加强,澳将目光锁定东南亚地区,奉行
“前沿防御战略”,将东南亚作为其安全和战
略的前沿地带。到 20 世纪五、六十年代,在
东西方对峙的格局下,中国成为澳大利亚的最
主要“对手”,虽然这种敌对状态随着中澳建
交而有所缓和,但澳对中国的防范心理却没完
全消退。并且,在“911 事件”以及巴厘岛爆
炸之后,受到美国外交政策导向的影响,外交
政策“ 安 全 化 ” ( securitization of
foreign policy)的趋势在澳洲日益明显,国
家安全议程完全占据外交政策的优先地位 37
。
所以笔者认为,澳的这种外交和防务传统,对
于近年澳国内对华战略争论仍有实质性的影响,
并在一定程度上是支持澳强化与美同盟、制衡
中国以及“对冲战略”的一大思想基础。
4. 结论
随着世界权力重心在 21 世纪从欧洲、北美向
亚洲、太平洋的历史性转移,作为亚太地区中
等强国的澳大利亚,面临着史无前例的对外战
略挑战,而“是否应该在中美之间做出选择”
问题日益成为澳大利亚不得不思考和解决的首
要难题。中澳关系在工党执政这五年内经历的
大幅起伏震荡,也昭示着澳大利亚形成一个清
晰明确、内在统一的对华战略的重要性和必要
性。
本文通过对澳大利亚国内对华战略争论的梳理
和分析,发现在这一战略争论中主要的观点和
立场,可以被分为澳“必须选择”和“不必选
择”两大派,前者认为“鱼与熊掌不可兼得”,
在安全利益高于经济利益的前提下,澳大利亚
应该加强与美国的同盟关系,制衡中国。而认
为澳洲可以不在中美之间“二选一”的观点,
则可再分为两种思路,一种是澳大利亚采取
37
James Cotton & John Ravenhill, op cit, 34, p. 8.

“对冲战略”,在中美之间维系平衡,力求其
安全利益和经济利益的兼容;另一种则是试图
超越中美澳三角框架,探寻在多边国际机制下
构筑某种共治亚太的开放性新体系,以确保中
美在亚太的共融。工党政府的外交政策和实践
更多地体现出堪培拉事实上采取的就是对中美
两面下注,求取战略平衡,做中美“中间人”
的方式,但是在外交理念和蓝图构想上,澳洲
的决策者也在尝试着超越对冲战略,寻找外交
新思路。
引发这一场战略争论的原因,从国际维度上看,
主要在于中国的崛起(尤其是经济层面)使得
澳洲的国家利益和对外关系发生结构型转变,
而美国“重返亚太”的战略调整又进一步增加
了中美在亚太争夺主导权的可能,并给澳大利
亚的战略选择再度加压;从国家维度上看,澳
大利亚的国家特性、身份认同和国家定位的困
惑,外交思路上的长期分歧,以及防止近邻出
现强国的外交和防务传统,都在不同程度上促
使了战略争论的产生和进一步激化。
中国现代国际关系研究院院长崔立如指出,中
澳要创建更富成效、创新性和建设性的双边关
系的本质,在于克服“两个速度”的差异——
两国经济社会变迁速度、亚太格局转型速度与
两国战略关系跟进速度之间的差异 38
。 这一观
点无疑是非常中肯的。通过上文中对澳国内对
华战略争论的较为详尽的分析。我们不难发现,
若澳大利亚在战略选择上完全偏向美国,那么
对于中国的国家利益无疑是最为不利的。在澳
大利亚不可能放弃与美同盟而“倒向中国”的
现实基础上,澳洲的“共筑亚太新体系”的外
交创新思维可能是对中国而言最好的选择,而
“对冲战略”则是一个更为无奈的选项。所以,
北京应该向堪培拉释放更加积极的信号,不断
引导澳高层决策者对外交新思路表示赞同,而
非执着于“对冲战略”,并且更要避免造成逼
38
详见中华全球研究中心和中国现代国际关系研究院:《中国和
澳大利亚:关于双边关系的联合报告》,澳大利亚国立大学中华
全球研究中心出版,2012 年,第 xiii,xv 页。Australian
Centre on China in the World & China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations, Australia and
China: A Joint Report on the Bilateral Relationship,
Australian Centre on China in the World, February 2012.
迫澳大利亚在中美之间“非抉择不可”的情形
出现,因为,澳选择的结果不言自明。
对于中国而言,比较明智和富有远见的办法,
除了努力推进国内政治体制的进步、法治化、
透明化转型和社会的进步、发展以尽量消减外
界对中国战略意图的误判之外,应该尽量避免
出现像澳大利亚这样的亚太中等强国被迫在中
美之间选择的情形,共同推动外交和战略新思
维,对现有多边国际和区域机制进行扩容和完
善,实现中美之间的良性战略互动,与澳大利
亚一同构筑真正符合地区和平、繁荣、发展利
益的共同体。
中澳青年联合会学报 45

Photo/照片: Alice Dawkins

SECTION III
OPINION ARTICLE – ENGLISH
第三部分
个人评论部分 – 英语类作品

From the Western to Eastern Frontier: An Australian in Search of China in
Xinjiang and Heilongjiang Provinces
Alice Dawkins (温丽丽)
This article was awarded the ACYA Journal Opinion Article (English) Prize.
Alice Dawkins is an Asia-Pacific Studies/Law student at the Australian National University. She has recently
returned from a year studying abroad at Peking University on a Chinese Bridge Scholarship.
If Beijing is the central source of China‘s vast
network of interlocking cultures and customs,
Xinjiang (Kashgar) and Heilongjiang (Harbin)
stand as important tributaries on the far western
and eastern points respectively. Distanced from
Beijing by both kilometres and identity, if you are
seeking the China of taijiquan (Tai Chi), wulong
(dragon dances), and pandas doing gongfu
(Chinese martial arts), you are not going to have
much luck in these unique parts of the world.
In Harbin, you can slurp richly flavoured borscht,
knock back smooth-as-silk vodka direct from
Moscow, spot Russian signs dotted across the city,
and find scores of buildings simply dripping with
traditional Russian architecture. These buildings
are unfortunately all now slowly crumbling into
dereliction, their past majesty confined to grainy
black and white photographs scattered around
overpriced antique shops. Should you have even a
vaguely Caucasian face, the old dongbei (North-
Eastern Chinese) man sitting on the sidewalk will
call out ―preevy-et!‖ (hello!) and other Russian
greetings as you walk along the road.
In Kashgar, you will catch the whiff of lamb
kebabs cooking on every street corner and fill
your hungry stomach with buttery, doughy Middle
Eastern-style bread. You will see women adorned
with colourful headscarves embroidered in
ethereal gold thread – women who fill the streets
as they do their groceries at the sunny open-air
markets. Strolling through the busy crowds in the
Sunday livestock market, you will hear not a word
of standard Mandarin spoken, and the eyes that
glance at you with casual curiosity are not Han
Chinese eyes, but almond-shaped Central Asian
eyes of blue, green, or hazel. Watching the old
48 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
men with majestically long white beards eating
Xinjiang-style ramen noodles together, the
younger men body-wrestling with a herd of
stubborn cattle, and a group of wives making
lunch on trestle tables, the world stands still for a
moment with a sense of timeless community
atmosphere, the same buzz felt at fundraiser
barbecues and kids‘ weekend football games back
home.
The living energy and sheer vivacity of another
world that thrive in the air of Kashgar‘s bazaars
and winding old streets have long since departed
Harbin. With Harbin rapidly elevating its position
as a regional hotspot and talk-of-the-town in
northern China, the Russians and other ethnicities
of yesteryear‘s Heilongjiang Province are
increasingly scarce. Across the world, Harbin is
better known for its grandiose annual ice sculpture
festival than for the legacies of Russian culture
left in parts of the old city. In many ways,
Harbin‘s historical place in China as ‗The
Moscow of the Far East‘ has been consigned to
history. The spectacular Byzantine-style Sheng
Suofeiya Jiaotang (Saint Sophia Cathedral) in the
city centre now welcomes any layman through its
door as an architectural museum. The remaining
synagogues in the city have either been
transformed into youth hostels and trendy cafes or
just left to be, just now without a Jewish
population to serve. A sign at the largest
remaining synagogue mentions that the last
known Jewish Harbiner died in the 1980s. It is a
triste moment for a place that once boasted what
was considered the largest Jewish population in
the Far East.

Speak to any local in Kashgar and they will
undoubtedly tell you that the city is
unrecognisable from what it was even just three
years ago. A number of areas of the historic old
city have been demolished to make way for grey,
homogenous towers that have begun to symbolise
the modern era of a frenetic and faceless Chinese
construction style. For many Han Chinese, the old
city areas of Kashgar are not seen as a desirable
place to visit. As I took the twenty-seven hour
train ride from Urumqi, Xinjiang‘s capital, to
Kashgar, I started up a conversation with a lively
and wonderfully opinionated twenty-something
Han Chinese female passenger. But upon hearing
of my travel plans, she stared incredulously back
at me and told me quite frankly that if I stayed in
the Weizuren (Uyghur) part of town, I would
undoubtedly be raped, pillaged, and plundered by
all of its locals. She went out of her way to drive
me from the Kashgar train station to my
accommodation in the heart of the old city
alleyways, and sat locked in her car glancing
warily at her surroundings, refusing to drive off
until she saw me safely enter the front door of my
hostel.
Similarly, a chatty taxi driver in Urumqi told me
frankly: ―We Han Chinese and the Uyghurs used
to be like brothers. But because of the last few
years‘ events, now there is no such relationship‖.
It is a point worth considering that Muslim
Uyghurs and Han Chinese co-existing in such
close proximity in cities like Kashgar is seen as so
remarkable by outsiders. Travel further north in
Xinjiang to Tulufan (Turpan), a town deep in the
Taklamakan Desert, and you will find Buddha
grottoes and towering minarets, both equally as
ancient, standing just a few kilometres away from
each other.
Records of Russian Jews in the history of
Heilongjiang and Harbin are certainly not quite as
prominent as those of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, but
the Russian Jews' influence on the area is
profound. Harbin is a town that was originally a
campsite for workers on the China Eastern
Railway, a shortcut of the celebrated and
romanticised Trans-Siberian Railway. It is
humbling to consider that what is now a bustling
metropolis, of giant luxury fashion stores,
sumptuously lit up tower blocks, and neat
cobblestoned pedestrian streets, began as an
outpost constructed by Russian railroad workers
just last century. You have to look for it at a
deeper level, but in some aspects Harbin does
exhibit features of a ghost town, abandoned not in
population and resources, but rather in ethnic
diversity. The once significant numbers of
Russians may have dwindled, but typical Russian
hats and fur accessories remain on shop shelves.
Russian restaurants, furnished like scenes out of a
Chekhov play, continue to serve delicious, oldfashioned
fare to eager clientele, but that waitress
dressed in dubiously traditional Russian costume
will in fact be Chinese. Take a quick turn off the
main street and you will find the grounds of the
Jewish school remain intact, but the schoolyard is
deserted, with only the ghosts of youthful shrieks
and laughter.
Due to its location, Harbin was a meeting point
for both the direct and indirect effects of a world‘s
worth of events in twentieth century history: the
Russian Revolution and Civil War, the Japanese
invasion in China, European anti-Semitism, the
rise of the Communist Party, and the Cultural
Revolution. These events combined signalled the
systematic departure of Harbin‘s Jewish, and to
some extent non-Jewish, Russian residents to
other cities across China and eventually to other
countries.
The historical context is very different, but the
current situation of urban development and
―Hanification‖ in Kashgar begs the question of
whether Kashgar is also on its way to losing the
influence and significance of its ethnic groups.
Any traveller to the town on a Friday can witness
the sizable square around the Aitigaer (Id Kah
Mosque) fill to the periphery with Uyghur
worshippers. It‘s an incredible sight and homage
to the notion that religion is a strong element of
quotidian life throughout Xinjiang. To an outside
observer, however, one cannot shake the feeling
that this snapshot of culture comes with a use-by
date. With the growing numbers of Han Chinese
in Xinjiang cities like Kashgar, and a strong
march forward by the leadership to modernise the
中澳青年联合会学报 49

area, the elephant in the room of the Uyghur
culture‘s future sustainability cannot be ignored.
In fifty years' time, will this image of the Kashgar
Uyghurs at the Id Kah mosque only remain as a
creased photograph, and in the memories of the
old, like the experiences of the Russian Jews of
Harbin?
50 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
With thanks to the endless numbers of taxi drivers,
hostel owners, food stall sellers, and young people
in both Xinjiang and Heilongjiang, as well as my
teachers, who all put up with my clumsy spoken
Chinese and discussed many of these issues with
me at length.

In Search of My Roots
Sue-Lin Wong (黄淑琳)
This article was awarded the ACYA Journal Opinion Article (Chinese) Prize.
Translated into English from the original Chinese.
Sue-Lin Wong is in her fifth year of an Asian Studies/Law degree at the Australian National University. She
is currently in China on a Prime Minister's Australia Asia Endeavour Award.
Being Australian-Chinese, my so-called ‗identity
crisis‘ has always existed deep within myself.
Even though I can think of many reasons to
explain why I wanted to come to China, in my
heart of hearts it is certain that the most important
reason was that it was some type of quest. I used
to think that after I came to China I would easily
be able to find whatever it was that I was looking
for, but in fact my first experiences in China not
only did not help me find what I was looking for,
but on the contrary actually made me even more
confused. What am I searching for? Do my ‗roots‘
really lie in China?
I always seem to end up having the same sort of
conversation with all types of Chinese people:
―You‘ve come back! That‘s great, you can see
how your homeland has developed!‖
Did I really come back? Is it still coming back if
I‘ve never been to China before?
―Ah, your Chinese is so bad, don't you feel you‘re
unworthy of being Chinese?‖
Am I Chinese? Do you think that all people who
look Chinese can speak Chinese, that all white
people can speak English?
―How do Australians treat us Chinese people?‖
Don‘t Australians include ethnic Chinese people?
If I am born and raised in Australia, and my
family and friends are all in Australia, am I still
not an Australian?
In China, I not only often encounter these kinds of
questions, but also frequently have the
opportunity to talk about these kinds of topics
with overseas Chinese and foreign-born Chinese
from all over the world. Just this year, I was
chatting with some ethnically Chinese friends at a
party and we somehow started talking about: ―If
there was a drug that could transform a Chinese
into a white person, would you take it?‖ Some
friends answered ―definitely‖ right away, some
replied ―absolutely never‖, whilst some
hesitatingly said ―I don‘t know‖, and thus ensued
a fiery debate!
While I was living in a university dormitory in
China, I came to know ethnic Chinese from
countries such as Japan, Burma, Thailand,
Singapore, Malaysia, Sweden, Germany, France,
Britain, Denmark, Mauritius, Brazil, Panama,
America, and Canada. Late at night, we would
gather in someone‘s room and talk about all the
kinds of identity issues we had experienced. A tall
and well-built male friend had tears streaming
down his cheeks as he told us about his
experiences being bullied at high school in
America, and this Australian-Born Chinese girl
found herself realising she had had experiences
almost exactly the same as those of a Brazilian-
Born Chinese boy.
Listening to songs such as ―My Chinese Heart‖
and ―Waving the Red Flag‖, some of us feel really
proud, whilst some of us do not feel anything at
all. Sometimes, Chinese people remind us: ―Do
not forget, you are Han Chinese, descendants of
the dragon‖. We foreign-born Chinese often
discuss how best to answer such people – many of
中澳青年联合会学报 51

us think that perhaps a quote from the Asian-
American My Chinese New Year blog is closer to
describing the truth of our situation: ―It ended up
being one of the most healing experiences I‘ve
ever had – and not because I found a home in
China but because I found a community of
Chinese migrants around the world, the Chinese
diaspora. I finally found my home.‖
Of course, many foreign-born Chinese, and
especially those that have not been to China, have
somewhat of an aversion to this issue. In Australia
I have cousins who say to me, ―Sue-Lin, why are
you going to study in China? No matter how
much money you give me, I would never go to
China in my whole life!‖
For me, my curiosity was stronger than any sense
of disgust – I just had to go to China! But after I
arrived in China, I realised that the path to finding
my roots only became more and more complex.
Firstly, while many Chinese people are happy to
help me in solving my so-called identity crisis, the
problem is that many Chinese people also have a
particularly strong clan mentality, or at least one
far more intense than that held by Australians.
Furthermore, the overseas Chinese and foreignborn
Chinese I know in China all have their own
stories, backgrounds, and experiences, meaning
that they each have their own individual attitudes
and feelings towards China. Everyone has their
own thoughts and ideas about their ‗roots‘.
Personally, before the 2012 Chinese New Year,
my so-called ‗roots‘ were merely an abstract
concept to me: since I was young, people have
always told me to ―when drinking water, think of
its source – don‘t forget where you come from‖.
Al Cheng, founder of the American NGO
Searching for Roots in Canton, once said that
―strong roots build strong character‖, which for
me calls to mind the words of Youzi, one of
Confucius‘ most admired students—―a noble
person attends to the basic, as only after the basics
are established will the path to wisdom unfold‖.
What Youzi means here is that a ―noble person‖
will concentrate and devote him or herself to the
foundation of things, as for Youzi the concept of
‗basis‘ points to the very fundamentals of
52 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
humanity – filial piety – knowing where you are
from, showing filial obedience to your parents and
elders, and respecting your ancestors. Thinking
about my own experiences with an open mind, it
seems to me that in a sense this ‗basis‘ is ‗roots‘,
and that it is only after you know your roots that
you can truly grow to maturity. Thus I decided to
use my winter vacation to search for and visit
distant Chinese relatives whom I had never met
before, as both my paternal and maternal
grandparents moved to Malaysia from China in
the 1930s. Even though all of my parents‘
immediate relatives live in Southeast Asia, the
USA, or Australia, the descendants of the siblings
of both my paternal and maternal grandparents
still live in China.
I decided to go first to my paternal grandfather‘s
hometown of Fuzhou in Fujian Province and then
onto my maternal grandfather‘s hometown of
Chaozhou in Guangdong Province. It is a pity that
no one knows the hometown of either my paternal
or maternal grandmothers, but, looking at it from
another angle, because I do not know where they
are from, whenever I am taking the metro or
shopping in the supermarket I am always
wondering: could the passenger sitting next to me
or the supermarket sales clerk be a distant relative
of mine!?
On the train to Fuzhou, I suddenly realised that I
would not be able to recognise my relatives‘ faces,
so I texted my aunt to ask her what clothes she
would be wearing, as otherwise I would not be
able to find her at the train station! After I found
her and my other relatives at the station, we went
back to their home. They were especially good to
me, perhaps even too good to me, as I started to
get fat! During the two weeks I was there, I ate an
average of five meals every day, and even now I
still cannot fit into my old jeans! I lived in many
different relatives‘ houses in turn, gradually
getting to know my Chinese family. In some sense,
their lives are completely alien to mine – but in
other regards we are very much the same. For
example, I found that in the houses of my
mother‘s relatives, even though my mother has
never returned to her hometown, the taste of their
cooking was exactly the same as hers!

On a humourous note, I think that due to the
language barrier I brought a great deal of joy to
my relatives while I was there! Even though my
father and mother can both speak their own
dialects – respectively the Fuzhou and Chaozhou
dialects – because they do not share a dialect they
only use English to communicate, and thus my
younger brother and I cannot understand a word
of their dialects. Fortunately, my Chinese relatives
could speak Mandarin and were very tolerant of
the countless stupid mistakes I would make every
day! While I was staying at my first relative‘s
house, the older sister told me that because she
was going to attend her elder brother‘s wedding
the next day, she would prepare rice porridge for
me in the morning. My mind was spinning fast
trying to understand, and because in Chinese the
pronunciation of this type of rice porridge is the
same as ―Western meal‖, I replied to her ―Sister,
no need, no need, it doesn‘t matter, no problem, I
can eat Chinese food, you don‘t need to make
Western food specially for me!‖ And then when I
went to stay at the house of my second set of
relatives, they told me that we were going to have
white porridge the next morning, and because in
Chinese the pronunciation of white porridge is
similar to that of the traditional Chinese white
spirit baijiu, in my mind I was thinking: ―Baijiu?
This is a very strange breakfast, what are we doing
drinking baijiu in the morning, my relatives really
are pretty strange people! But the Chinese New
Year is approaching soon, so perhaps this is a
traditional custom for passing the New Year in
Southern China?‖ Because of my previous
misunderstanding with the porridge, I thought that
my best option would be just to silently respect
the traditional Southern custom of drinking spirits
in the morning! The next day when we were
eating breakfast I was constantly waiting for the
baijiu, but it never showed up and instead we just
had a lot of white porridge!
Language was not the only obstacle; there were
also many cultural differences.
The most common dialogue between my Chinese
relatives and I went something like this:
―Do you have children?‖
―No.‖
―Oh, you don‘t have children. Then, are you
married?‖
―No.‖
―Oh, you‘re not married, you should hurry up!‖
While attending the wedding of my elder male
cousin, the matchmaker who arranged the
wedding asked me the questions above and then
proceeded to worriedly ask me questions such as
what is my degree major, what university am I
studying at, what type of work do my parents do,
what dialects do they speak, do I have brothers or
sisters? When she was done she said: ―OK, leave
me with your phone number and I‘ll notify you
when I find a suitable partner for you. This is my
home phone number, this is my mobile number,
call me anytime, you‘re not young anymore and
the sooner you have a child the better. May you
give birth to a son soon!‖
Despite the many things that moved me during my
‗search for my roots‘, such as the
misunderstanding with the baijiu and the concern
shown for me by the matchmaker, what really
touched me was the experience I had in the
hometown of my paternal grandfather – Yixu, on
the outskirts of Fuzhou City. Yixu is a very
representative Chinese clan village.
In Yixu, every time I walked down the street I
would bump into a relative: ―Sue-Lin, this is your
grandfather‘s younger male cousin‘s wife, that is
your great-grandfather‘s younger female cousin‘s
grandson!‖ Three children of my paternal
grandfather‘s younger brother are still living in
Yixu and they took me to see our ancestral temple,
inside of which were the spirit tablets of dozens of
generations. Even though the temple was built in
1662, our ancestors could be traced back to 885
when a relative named Huang Dun followed
Wang Shenzhi (one of the founders of the Five
Generations of Fujian) from Guangzhou (in
Henan Province) to Fujian. In the temple, I found
all the names of my paternal grandparents, my
father, and all of his siblings. My relatives then
told me that my generation and all our further
descendants would also all have our own spirit
tablets!
中澳青年联合会学报 53

An economics professor at Beijing Normal
University has estimated that China‘s income
disparity between the rich and poor is steadily
deteriorating. China‘s Gini coefficient is now
almost 0.5 and experts generally believe that a
national Gini coefficient of above 0.4 is likely to
have a destabilising effect upon society. Whilst on
my journey to find my roots, I saw with my own
eyes how obvious is the gaping gap between the
rich and poor in China. Even though some of my
relatives who live in cities have a comparatively
good life, the houses of my relatives in Yixu had
no furniture, their walls had no paint, and the area
outside their houses and down to the street was
strewn with rat-infested rubbish. Furthermore, my
relatives all had to raise poultry and grow
vegetables themselves. One of my uncles was in
Yunnan Province searching for manual labour,
and so had no time over the Spring Festival to
return home for Chinese New Year. My elder
male cousin worked in the Yixu post office. My
elder female cousin, only a few years older than I,
was already married with children and working in
a nearby supermarket. But despite their poverty,
they were exceptionally warmhearted, generous,
and united, which made me think; is this the way
we live in Australia?
My aunt in Yixu told me many stories about our
family. When my paternal grandfather and his
younger brother were young, they relied on selling
oysters to make a living – it took them hours each
day to go out and find the oysters to bring back to
be sold in Yixu. In the 1930s, my family in Yixu
were almost dying of hunger, so as a twelve-year
old boy my paternal grandfather boarded a boat
bound for Malaysia in search of work. In
Malaysia he sold chillis by the side of the road,
and it was only when he was seventeen that he
was able to return home again for the first time.
When he then left again for Malaysia, as his boat
was leaving the dock his younger brother jumped
into the water and swam up to the side of the boat,
telling my grandfather that he wanted to go with
him to Malaysia. But my grandfather said to him:
―If both of us go, then who will take care of our
parents? Go home, give me a few years in
Malaysia to earn money for you all, and then I
will come back home to live with you‖. So my
54 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
grandfather‘s brother went home to wait for him,
but who could know that this wait would turn into
a lifetime.
From then on, despite it being my grandfather‘s
dream to return to China, historical reasons meant
that he never had the chance. My father once told
me that one night when he was young, when my
grandfather heard the Chinese song ―Only Mother
Is Good In This World‖ he started to weep silently
to himself. While my father was growing up in
Malaysia, he attended a Chinese primary school in
Malaysia where he was taught Libai‘s famous
poem Night Thoughts (below, as translated by
Herbert A. Giles):
I wake, and moonbeams play around my bed,
Glittering like hoarfrost to my wandering eyes;
Up towards the glorious moon I raise my head,
There lay me down – and thoughts of home arise.
Based upon the memories of my aunt, during the
1950s and 1960s my paternal grandparents would
send food parcels back to China, without which
my aunt reckoned our family there would have
starved to death. She also told me that her father –
my grandfather‘s younger brother – had still been
waiting for my grandfather all this time. My
grandfather passed away in the 1970s, but it was
only shortly after he died that Malaysia finally
changed its diplomatic policies towards China and
allowed Malaysians to travel there. After my
grandfather passed away, his brother was still
looking forward to my father returning home, but
it was only two years after the death of my
grandfather‘s brother that my family in Malaysia
finally found its way back to our hometown.
I was incredibly moved to hear such stories, but I
did not know how to answer all the complicated
questions I was asked by my relatives: ―How do
you feel coming back to your hometown? Do you
think we look alike? You must have a very deep
sense of identity with Chinese people now?‖
When I was about to leave, my friends asked me:
―How was your journey in search of your roots?
What feelings did it give you? What did you find?
How did you feel when you found your ‗roots‘?‖
Even when I was walking out the door, I still had

strangers asking me: ―You‘ve come home! How
does it feel? You‘re Australian, right? But you
must feel something towards China too?‖
How can I answer these types of questions!?
I do not know. There are too many questions, and
their answers too complicated. I only know two
things. Firstly, my experiences in China gave me a
unique type of feeling. Secondly, because of my
journey in search of my roots I now ponder a new
thought. If my grandfather‘s dream to return to
Chine had come true, if his fallen leaves had
returned to their roots, if the travelling man had
returned home, I would now probably be like my
female cousin. Born and raised in Yixu, never
even been as far Xiamen, maybe already married,
maybe already with children, working every
single day at the small village supermarket.
But did I really win the lottery of life?
中澳青年联合会学报 55

The Case for “Face”: Improving Australia-China Relations into the Future
Andrew Chubb (朱波)
Andrew Chubb is a PhD candidate in International Relations at the University of Western Australia and the
Founding President of the UWA ACYA Chapter.
Despite a long history of failing to treat Asian
people as equals, Australians are developing an
increasing admiration for what China has
accomplished. Our authorities, however, must do
much more to formally show China, and Chinese
people, due respect. Far from 'kowtowing', the
point of which was to abandon one's own dignity,
this means only abandoning pretensions to
superiority. Doing so will not only improve
relations between the two countries and friendship
between the two peoples, but it would also leave
us better positioned to be a genuine force for
world peace in the 21st century.
Whether we like it or not, China's national
narrative is one of recovery from past humiliation
at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialists.
Promulgated to every child through the country's
education system, and sustained through statesupervised
news media, this is often the lens
through which the country views the present. As a
result, Chinese people are often inclined to
interpret the words and actions of Western
governments in light of past denials of dignity and
equality. Australia is no exception, and with some
justification.
From the horrific racial violence of the
nineteenth-century Victorian goldfields, through
the White Australia Policy, to the Pauline Hanson
electoral phenomenon, Australians have a long
history of public antipathy towards our Asian
neighbours. More recently, Islamic fundamentalist
terrorists and (Boat-)Persons-of-Middle-Eastern-
Appearance have supplanted the ‗yellow peril‘ as
Australia's primary bogeymen, yet national
expressions of hostility and disrespect towards
East Asian people are still recent memories, even
amongst young people. It was only 16 years ago
that Hanson declared in her maiden speech to the
House of Representatives that she believed
56 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
Australia was ―in danger of being swamped by
Asians‖.
Skip forward to the present, and it seems that a
significant proportion of Australians now have a
healthy respect for at least one Asian country:
China. According to the 2012 Lowy Institute
survey of Australian public opinion on foreign
policy issues, 70% of Australians see Chinese
resource purchases as the major reason why
Australia avoided recession following the Global
Financial Crisis. The same survey found that 79%
of Australians think China – not the US – is
already the leading power in Asia, and 47% of
respondents said that they were comfortable with
this situation, up from 40% in 2008. Some
Australians, especially young people, even seem
to favour switching our strategic allegiance from
the US to China, with one-fifth of 18-29 year-olds
nominating China as Australia‘s most important
security partner.
Many Australians I speak to express admiration
for China's economic achievements and its ability
to carry out ambitious projects like the Three
Gorges Dam. Some even praise the authoritarian
one-party political system that frequently tramples
human rights in favour of ‗development‘. The
Lowy poll may have contained a hint of this; only
39% of young people (18-29) surveyed agreed
that democracy is the best form of government.
Whilst this is of course perhaps mostly
attributable to a general state of disillusionment
with our politicians, it is nonetheless consistent
with anecdotal evidence of pro-China views
amongst young Australians. Earlier this year, for
example, some Australian members of ACYA‘s
UWA Chapter reopened the long-dormant
Western Australian secession debate on Facebook,
advocating an alliance between an independent
state of WA and the People's Republic.

However, while opinions of China among parts of
the Australian population have skyrocketed,
perhaps dangerously beyond reality in some cases,
such growing respect has yet to be matched by
many of our leaders and institutions. This is not
simply a matter of empty formalities. In Why
Nations Fight, a ground-breaking study on the
motivations for war, Richard Ned Lebow found
national honour and standing to have been a
primary or secondary motive in 62 out of 94 wars
surveyed. And China, as Lebow noted in the same
book, is ―a country particularly sensitive to its
standing‖.
At a glance, this might appear to imply a threat –
give China face to contribute to world peace, or
else. But in reality, China's status anxiety is more
an opportunity than a menace. Lebow's study
found that in the modern international system, war
is becoming less and less viable as a means for
countries to improve their standing. Thus,
redoubling efforts to ensure China and its people
feel respected as equals in the world can enhance
the likelihood of China becoming, as Robert
Zoellick famously put it, a ―responsible
stakeholder‖ in the system.
So how can Australia do a better job of showing
China, the nation, due respect? Well, to begin
with, the country needs to do more to make
visiting workers, students, and businesspeople
from China feel welcomed unequivocally as
equals and not just cash cows. Although local
student initiatives like ACYA are building
understanding and fraternity between Chinese and
local students, Australian government policy lags
behind. Students who come from China to study
in Australian universities pay exorbitant fees, yet
they receive little in the way of tailored services
for their money. While Australian students who
go to China are offered English-language courses,
special canteens, and special accommodation, our
major universities barely have so much as a
Chinese-language sign to show the way.
Considering that many Chinese students who
study abroad will become future leaders and
professionals, it is clearly in Australia's national
interest to maximise the likelihood that such
people harbour positive feelings towards our
country. But in May this year Dong Shuting, a
Melbourne University student, wrote a heartfelt
opinion piece in The Age that gave voice to many
Chinese students‘ dismay at their shabby
treatment by Australian authorities – while their
fees subsidise local students and contribute
significantly to the Australian economy. ―We
come to accept and try to fit into a society so
wonderfully different to our own‖, Dong wrote;
―It is a shame that many of us don‘t feel that
acceptance and respect returned‖. Since then I
have participated in or overheard numerous
conversations between Chinese students who feel
gouged at every turn by the authorities.
The Melbourne public transport system is one
example of international students being ‗ripped
off‘ that Dong raised in her article. Extending
student discounts on Australian public transport to
international students would be a token
concession with real meaning; it is already the
case in Western Australia, and the federal
government could ensure the rest of the country
follows suit for a mere trifling sum.
Attending an Australian university is a dream for
many Chinese students, but the demands of
learning and writing entirely in English, as well as
adapting to local academic conduct standards,
proves difficult for many. Background courses on
research methods, plagiarism-avoidance, and
referencing contain vital information for any
student's success at university. But as these course
are taught at the very beginning of students'
university experience, international students take
these classes precisely when their Englishlanguage
skills are at their weakest. Australian
universities that have relatively large numbers of
students and academic staff from China could
offer these classes in Chinese language at minimal
organisational and financial cost. Aside from
being a sincere welcoming gesture, offering any
Chinese-language classes would give Australian
universities a selling point at a time when the high
Australian dollar is affecting Australia's
competitiveness in the international education
export market.
中澳青年联合会学报 57

Despite widespread discussion of the leaked US
State Department cable describing Kevin Rudd's
self-proclaimed ―brutal realist‖ advice to Hillary
Clinton regarding China policy, the former Prime
Minister remains hugely popular in China simply
because he can speak Mandarin. This suggests
how important language can be in creating
goodwill. At minimum, Australia should have
Chinese-language signage in all its international
airports – the places where visitors form their very
first personal impressions. And stationing
Mandarin-capable interpreters in airport customs
and immigration areas would not only build
goodwill and reduce confusion and stress on the
part of Chinese travellers upon their first arrival, it
would also help them comply with our strict
quarantine laws.
At present Chinese visitors can only expect to find
signs in their language on Chinese shops and
restaurants, or attached to tourist-oriented
businesses trying to sell them something at a
premium. The introduction of Chinese-language
signs in more public places might appear to be a
token gesture, but without a doubt it would greatly
increase Chinese people‘s sense of being
respected in Australia. Like the extension of
public transport discounts, it would be a move low
on cost but high in symbolic value.
The concept of ‗face‘ concerns the maintenance of
dignity among people. The idea of the Chinese as
a face-loving race is a tired cliché – after all, the
Geneva Convention affirms that all the world‘s
people want and deserve dignity. Yet it is true that
traditional Chinese culture places a relatively
strong emphasis on social harmony, and the
mutual maintenance of face is a crucial part of this.
And while few Chinese or Australian people take
President Hu Jintao‘s Harmonious Society project
seriously, harmony clearly is desirable in the
world of nation-states.
Face is not only something that can be lost, it can
also be saved or given, as the common Chinese
expressions liu mianzi and gei mianzi indicate. For
a country whose foreign policy, as US Naval
Institute scholar Yong Deng has argued, is
broadly driven by its craving for international
58 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
status, public displays of respect for China by
foreigners are gifts of face with great significance.
At the same time, against the historical backdrop
of assumed superiority by Westerners' societies,
public identification of shortcomings is often
perceived as a denial of respect because it implies
inadequacy and inferiority.
In recent years, while Australia‘s leaders have
professed to share a relationship of equality with
China, many have insisted on reserving the right
to publicly criticise the country‘s system of
government and associated human rights abuses
against Chinese citizens. Kevin Rudd, for example,
as Prime Minister, raised the issue of human
rights problems in Tibet in a lecture at Peking
University in April 2008. Coming just three weeks
after mobs in Lhasa had bashed and murdered
innocent Chinese people, Rudd's remark was
understandably not well received. Its brilliant
rhetorical formulation as being on behalf of a
zhengyou, or loyal friend who is capable of direct
admonition, was contradicted by its public
delivery in the heart of the Chinese capital.
When Tony Abbott visited Beijing in July 2012,
his keynote speech raised the Chinese people‘s
lack of freedom and right to vote. Public criticism
of China‘s human rights issues and undemocratic
political system represents, from the perspective
of much of Chinese officialdom and many
ordinary people, not merely a disagreement but a
partial withholding of recognition of the Chinese
government‘s legitimacy. In an October 2012
interview with the Asahi Shimbun, Wang Jisi,
perhaps China's leading foreign policy scholar,
noted that there remains a view that ―the world is
divided into democratic countries and
undemocratic countries and that China does not
have a legitimate place in the world because it is
an 'undemocratic' country‖. While Abbott and
Rudd's statements can be portrayed in Australia as
standing up for Australian values, their public
delivery on China's own soil is often seen, or
perhaps more felt, as a humiliation of not only the
CCP regime, but also the 20-odd per cent of the
world's people who live under it, and for whom it
is the national government.

This is not to suggest that the world's news
reporters should not shine their torches on China‘s
dark corners; they should. Neither does it imply
that foreign diplomats and officials should not
raise human rights issues with the China‘s leaders;
they should too, but in private, where their
statements of respect and equality will not be
contradicted by the public humiliation of their
interlocutors.
Commenting on Australia's foreign policy stance,
former Ambassador to China Geoff Raby has
pointed out that the PRC‘s leaders would expect
Australia and other regional powers to hedge
against the possibility of an aggressive People's
Republic. This is exactly what Australia has been
doing for many years, according to military
strategist Edward Luttwak, by ―quietly‖ weaving
together a network of close co-operative
relationships with major Southeast Asian
countries that also stand to lose out should China
become the dominant power in the region. But in
its recent decision to host 2,500 US Marines near
Darwin, the Gillard government associated
Australia closely with a loudly proclaimed US
―pivot‖ towards Asia that is more symbolism than
substance. Hedge, of course, but why would we
hedge loudly? Australia's symbolic gestures
should be gestures of friendship, impartiality, and
willingness to accord China dignity. This
approach might be described as Machiavellian,
but similarly hard-nosed principles pervade many
of China's classical texts on strategic thought.
Lastly, leaders from around the world, including
those representing the 112-year-old nation of
Australia, could generously give face to all
Chinese people by referring to their country's ‗reemergence‘,
rather than ‗rise‘. As Malcolm
Turnbull has observed, the Chinese see
themselves as ―a 3000-year culture, for almost all
of history the world's largest and strongest
country‖. In many ways they are right. From the
year 0 AD until at least 1820, for example, China
had a larger economy than all of the Western
European countries combined, and as recently as
the 15th century was sending flotillas of giant
ships around the Indian Ocean to explore and
collect tribute. Not only would the term ―re-
emergence‖ denote an understanding of China's
historical status as a great power, it would
acknowledge that the Chinese people are not
simply emerging from a primordial state of
poverty and weakness, but restoring themselves to
their ancestors‘ heights of collective wealth and
power.
James Packer, an Australian tycoon with
enormous investments in Macau casinos, has
argued that Australia needs to show ―gratitude‖
for China's business. I disagree. Chinese
businesses do not trade with Australia out of
kindness or concern for Australians' welfare. They
do so to make money and because it suits their
strategic purposes, as Sydney University's John
Lee has often observed in relation to the massive
iron ore trade between the two countries. What we
do need to show is formal respect and, yes,
considerations for the feelings of the Chinese
people, as one-fifth of humanity, both here and in
China.
These suggestions will likely provoke emotionally
charged accusations of ‗selling out‘ Australian
values. The question such critics must answer is
simple: which values? Acknowledging
linguistically the growing presence of Chinese
guests may be against Australia's time-honoured
tradition of stolid monolinguism, but does it
violate some principle we all hold dear? Is treating
international students, wealthy or otherwise, as
equals in our society for the duration of their stay,
or smoothing their transition to English-language
learning, contrary to the ‗fair go‘ ethos? Is it an
Australian value to use public humiliation of other
countries' leaders, with its connotations of one's
own superiority, to try to get them to change their
ways? Would properly recognising the ways 1.3
billion people view their past be something the
leaders of a tolerant, worldly country would never
countenance?
Why not give face to the Chinese? It does not
involve kowtowing, it costs next to nothing, it
means more to them than us, and it might even
contribute to world peace in the 21st century.
中澳青年联合会学报 59

From a Steely Gaze to Protean Perspectives: Beyond 40 Years of Australia-
China Relations
Neil Thomas (牛犇) & Thomas Williams (卫涛)
Neil Thomas is a Law/Arts student at the University of Western Australia and is currently studying in Beijing
on a Chinese Government Scholarship as well as serving as the ACYA National Publications Director.
Tom Williams is a sociology student at Renmin University completing research for his Arts Honours at the
University of Western Australia. He is greatly enjoying living in the vivacious human vibrancy of Beijing, but
does occasionally long for the miracle of Australian beaches and sunshine.
The Historical Development of Australia-China
Relations
When the then Opposition Leader Gough Whitlam
met with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to discuss
"matters of mutual concern" in the Great Hall of
the People in Beijing at midnight on 5 July 1971,
four days before the famed secret meetings
between Zhou and US Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, of which Whitlam knew nothing, he
became the first Australian politician to visit
China since Mao Zedong declared in 1949 the
founding of the People's Republic of China
(PRC). Sensing in the twilight of Mao's life that
China could soon become a key player in
Australia's future, and responding to Australian
Wheat Board lobbying against the Liberal
Government's hawkish China policies, which had
caused China to switch to importing grain from
Canada over Australia, Whitlam's initiative
ensured that Australia was well placed once he
became Prime Minister to follow the lead of
America and officially recognise the PRC as the
legitimate government of China on 21 December
1972.
Since then Australia-China relations have grown
exponentially, with China commanding the
attention and interest of successive national
governments, primarily due to the growing
economic compatibilities of resource-rich
Australia with industrially-developing China. In
1985, Bob Hawke cemented this vision for
Australia-China relations with the surprise move
of appointing Ross Garnaut as the Australian
Ambassador to China: not a seasoned China hand,
60 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
but his foremost economic strategist. In a sign of
what was to come, the first major Australia-China
investment project was approved in 1987 for the
Channar Iron Ore Joint Venture in the Pilbara
region of Western Australia. Then in 1989,
despite Hawke‘s deep personal abhorrence
towards the violence of the Tiananmen Square
Incident, his Trade Minister Neal Blewett became
the first Western Cabinet Minister to subsequently
travel to China, for a bilateral trade meeting. In
accordance with this continued desire to promote
economic prosperity, Paul Keating, in conjunction
with Australian academic Professor Peter
Drysdale, was instrumental in the orchestration of
both China and Taiwan joining APEC in the early
1990s and helping ease cross-Strait tensions. John
Howard, in a similar vein, overcame his fervent
neo-conservative convictions and ardent personal
involvement with the American administration to
carefully develop a pragmatic framework for
China engagement that recognised political and
social differences but continued to develop
common economic interests.
When Kevin Rudd came to power in 2007, as the
first Chinese-speaking Western leader and
overseeing an unprecedented China-driven
resources boom, there were high hopes on both
sides of the relationship for a new phase of more
intimate Australia-China ties. These expectations
were soon to prove unrealistic, however, as in
2009 a combination of Rudd's indelicate
diplomacy abroad, poor public relations
management at home, and a flurry of incidents
(such as the Federal Government's perceived
framing of a "China threat" in its Defence White

Paper, Chinalco's rejected bid for increased Rio
Tinto ownership, the Chinese corruption trial and
conviction of Australian national Stern Hu, and
Rudd‘s acrid accusations of Chinese zoophilia at
Copenhagen 2010) coalesced to bring about
perhaps the lowest point in bilateral relations thus
far. In spite of this, the economic forces driving
Australia-China trade remained resilient, with
2009 seeing the signing of an A$50 billion deal
between PetroChina and ExxonMobil to extract
LNG from the Gorgon field off Western Australia,
the largest Australia-China contract ever signed.
At present, official relations between Australia
and China have once again improved on the back
of continuing strong economic exchanges and a
reversion to Howard-era policies, with Australia's
security outlook maintaining its focus on the US,
based upon shared values and international goals,
as exemplified by Julia Gillard's agreement last
November to allow for a US Marines base in
Darwin as part of President Obama‘s ―Asia
pivot‖.
“At 40 There Are No Doubts”, Yet the Future
Remains Uncertain
In line with the quote from Confucius above, there
are no doubts now that the Australia-China
relationship is one that is economically thriving:
two-way trade has increased from A$100 million
in 1972 to A$100 billion in 2010, China is
overwhelmingly Australia‘s largest export market,
Australia is the largest recipient of outbound
Chinese foreign direct investment, over 100,000
Chinese students study in Australia, over 500,000
Chinese and 300,000 Australian tourists visit the
other country each year, with Chinese tourists
being the highest spending visitors to Australia,
and China adds an estimated A$10,500 to the
annual income of each Australian household. As
evinced by such figures, and more so their
trumpeting by officials as the symbolic
achievements of the Australia-China relationship
after 40 years, there is little serious question with
regard to the nature of the Australia-China
relationship: it is one of trade. The sheer size of
the Chinese population, coupled with a rate of
growth set to quadruple the Chinese economy in
two decades based on factors such as continued
rural to urban migration, increasingly realized
domestic economies of scale, huge latent
consumer market potential, heavy long-term state
investment in education, and the gradual
internationalization of the RMB, will mean that,
barring serious internal political instability or
ecological crisis, China will play the defining role
in Australia‘s future.
And yet, despite China‘s obvious importance and
forty years of bilateral ties, Australia as a nation
still lacks the clear vision and adequate
knowledge to formulate a comprehensive strategy
for our China relationship. Australian society is by
and large unknowledgeable and non-cognisant of
modern China (and Asia in general): only 4% of
Australian schools offer Chinese as a second
language, insufficient resources are invested in
establishing an Australian Studies project in China
commensurate to China's Confucius Institute
program in Australia, and prominent sections of
the Australian polity are uninformed and/or
opportunistic enough to manipulate a degree of
latent popular mistrust and cultural ignorance of
China to serve the gambit of short-term votegrabbing
(as exemplified by Tony Abbott‘s inept
remarks regarding Chinese investment in Beijing
on 24 July). Perhaps the most striking exemplar of
this disjunct between economic fact and sociopolitical
reality is that Australia sill lacks a regular
institutionalised elite-level political
communication mechanism with China, whilst the
UK, Canada, and Germany (as well as the USA)
all hold high-level strategic, security, and
economic dialogues with China, despite less twoway
trade occurring between them. The
consciousness of the Australian society and polity
– wedded by the electoral cycle and the mass
media – are still in the grips of an Euro-Asian
existential identity crisis, battling the imagined
notion that a close political and socio-cultural
relationship with China must necessarily come at
the expense of our alliance with the USA and the
Western values we share with them. Australia
needs to learn more about China, but ultimately
more about itself.
Australians, Quo Vadimus?
中澳青年联合会学报 61

Due to the sheer scale, rapidity, and impact of
China‘s economic expansion, the alienness and
opaqueness of the Chinese political system and its
relationship with Chinese business, and
uncertainty surrounding China‘s international
ambitions, there is a perhaps understandable
tendency within the Australian polity and society
to be hesitant about the rise of China and its
implications for Australia. In the face of these
unknowns (and in the wake of such events as the
2009 release of the Government Defence White
Paper, the WikiLeaks cables showing that Kevin
Rudd asked Hilary Clinton if America would be
ready to use force against China ―if everything
went wrong‖, China‘s increasingly assertive
foreign policy stance on territorial claims in the
South and East China Seas, the approaching oncein-a-decade
Chinese leadership transition, and the
anti-China ‗patriotism‘ credentials being flaunted
by candidates in early US Presidential election
campaigning), as we arrive at the 40 th Anniversary
the public debate surrounding the scalene
triangular relationship between Australia, the
USA, and China has been somewhat skewed to
represent Australia‘s future as a polar choice
between security and traditional values, as
represented by ties with the United States, and
continued economic prosperity, in the form of
moving closer to China.
To avoid vacillating in the limbo of the false
dichotomy between security and the economy that
has been unhelpfully promulgated and frequently
recycled as a stop-gap to cover a lack of China
knowledge and understanding by some prominent
participants in public discussion, it is of
paramount importance we turn to the question at
the heart of this debate: for what purpose does
Australia, as a people and a nation, pursue
economic growth?
This may at first appear irrelevant or even puerile
to query with regard to matters of international
relations, but the desire for growth is the default
standpoint from which assessments and plans for
Australia‘s future are made. There is not space
here to delve deeply into this fundamental
question of economic philosophy, but it is of vital
importance that it is raised, engaged with, and
62 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
clear attempts are made at answering it. For, if
Australia continues to move forward with the
implicit idealisation of economic growth fixated
on consumerism as the panaceatic end goal that
ultimately delivers the greatest good to the
greatest number, then we should openly recognize
this in order to make more astute international
security calculations and economic policy
decisions that deliver this outcome. If, however,
as the authors believe, the economy is a means
rather than an end in and of itself, then Australians
must collectively, rigorously, and openly explore
our national priorities and utilize our current
unique economic advantages such that we make
farsighted investments in scientific research and
human capital development so as to reorient
society away from the distraction of attempting to
satiate personal desires through transient hedonic
consumption towards self-cultivation and
individual empowerment through greater access to
quality education, increasingly inclusive, broadbased,
and meritorious social decision-making
structures, and the sustained pursuit of
technological advancement to provide for fuller
living capacity. In particular, in relation to China,
by ensuring Australia‘s continued prosperity
beyond the mining boom through strengthening
investment and economic diversification in nonresource
based service sectors such as information
and communication technologies, finance and
banking, and education, by fostering Australian
human capital through compulsory primary and
secondary Asian language education and relaxing
immigration quotas, stimulating Australia‘s
research and development sectors through greater
funding and liberalizing of legal regulations so as
to allow for the operation of commercial
incentives, and, in the words of former Australian
Ambassador to China Dr Geoff Raby, placing
―deep ballast‖ in Australia-China political
relations through regular institutionalised high
level government meetings
China, Australia’s Future, and You
Whilst it might at first appear easier and safer to
leave the determination and actualisation of
Australia‘s future in the Asian Century to
government, business, and other influential bodies,

in order to realize the necessary progress in
Australia‘s relationship towards China, Asia, and
ourselves, we cannot rely solely on our existing
socio-political structures and intercultural
resources to have the internal impetus to gain the
initiative in a changing world. We, as young
Australians, need to actively participate in the
development of the necessary social structures
that ensure the fostering of a new generation of
inter-culturally competent and experienced
Australians. Australia needs a generation of
citizens capable of effectively interacting and
building partnerships with Asian nations and
peoples in the fields of government, business, and
social exchange. This will promote greater Asia-
Australia integration, increasing the broader
Australian community‘s understanding of Asia
and Australia‘s place within it, and ensure the
leveraging of Australia‘s current economic
capacity to ensure long-term prosperity.
In light of this, it is gladdening to the authors to
see the growing number of youth-led
organisations that are promoting self-education
about and engagement with Asia at the national,
state, university, and secondary education level,
such as the Australia-Indonesia Youth Association,
the Australia-India Youth Dialogue, the Australia-
Japan Youth Association, and the Australia-Korea
Youth Association. With particular reference to
China, the Australia-China Youth Association
(ACYA) is Australia‘s only youth-led not-forprofit
organisation seeking to build a bilateral
youth community, promote cross-cultural
understanding and engagement, and act as a
platform for young people to develop and deliver
worthwhile initiatives. ACYA has achieved this
through its Australia- and China-based ACYA
Chapters, that regularly provide quality social,
networking, sporting, educational, publishing, and
volunteering opportunities and activities. ACYA‘s
Chapters operate on the three-pillared platform of
Education, Careers, and People-to-People
Exchange, with each initiative uniquely tailored to
fulfilling a particular need of the Australia-China
youth community. From its abstract beginnings in
2008 during a late-night soiree in the unassuming
student dormitories of a Beijing university,
ACYA has transformed into a strong, vibrant, and
expanding youth community and been the launch
pad for many other valuable platforms for
intercultural exchange, such as the Australia-
China Youth Dialogue, the Australia-China
Young Professionals‘ Initiative, and the Engaging
China Project. If you are a young person who
wishes to be a part of and contribute to the
Australia-China relationship, then ACYA is for
you. It belongs to all of us who wish to see the
Australian and Chinese people achieving new
heights of mutual understanding, appreciation,
and friendship.
As Ted Kennedy once said: ―The future does not
belong to those who are content with today,
apathetic toward common problems and their
fellow man alike, timid and fearful in the face of
new ideas and bold projects. Rather it will belong
to those who can blend vision, reason and courage
in a personal commitment to the ideals and great
enterprises of…Society.‖ Such will be the
challenge for Australian youth in the Asia Century.
中澳青年联合会学报 63

Australia, China, and the Sister City Dilemma
Lloyd Bradbury (隆龙)
Lloyd Bradbury is the Executive Director (Australia) of the Australia-China Young Professionals Initiative
and in 2011 represented Australia at the G20 Youth Summit in Paris.
There are many links that connect Australia and
China: a highly complementary trade relationship,
G20 membership, ministerial delegations, and a
history of Chinese migration to Australia
stretching back to the gold rush era, to name just a
few. One link, however, that will not immediately
spring to mind is that of the 82 Sister City Type
Relationships (SCTRs) in place between the two
countries – a catch-all term describing twin towns,
sister cities, sister states, and other similar
arrangements.
These relationships initially began to emerge
between large Australian and Chinese cities and
states/provinces during the late 1970s, in line with
China‘s opening up policies, and were founded
upon principles of international friendship and
cultural awareness. In recent years, much like the
trade aspect of the Sino-Australian relationship,
SCTRs have blossomed due to a high degree
complementarity in bilateral interests. Just as
Chinese city- and provincial-level governments
have been encouraged to engage with the world,
Australian cities and states have been under
pressure to ‗do something‘ with China. This has
resulted in the establishment of 39 of the 82
SCTRs that exist between the two countries
occurring since 2000, increasingly between
smaller Australian regional cities and Chinese
second- and third-tier cities.
Such a high volume of relationships begs the
question: are ratepayers getting value for money?
In these times of economic volatility, Australian
media have been quick to highlight any cases of
perceived wasteful spending. This has been clear
in the media‘s portrayal of expenses incurred by
the City of Melbourne in maintaining an office in
Tianjin, costing over A$2 million since 1998, and
Greater Dandenong Council sending a mayoral
delegation to Xuzhou at the cost of AU$6000.
64 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
Knowing that there are such high levels of
scrutiny, local governments are now discussing
SCTRs much more in terms of ‗returns on
investment‘ rather than friendship and cultural
exchange, the ideals upon which the sister city
movement was founded in the early twentieth
century.
This new commercially oriented dialogue on
SCTRs reflects a changing role of governments
across Australia and aims to reassure constituents
that their representatives are unimpressed with
expensive international ‗junkets‘. In this
environment, it is perfectly understandable that
city- and state-level governments should look to
achieve commercial and economic outcomes
commensurate to the time, money, and effort
invested in maintaining such relationships.
Indeed, it is heartening that there are a number of
examples where concrete commercial outcomes
have been achieved: the biannual NSW-
Guangdong Province Joint Economic Meeting, the
annual Tianjin Government Leaders Training
Program in Melbourne, and the establishment of a
Monash University campus in Victoria‘s sister
province Jiangsu.
Despite these high profile successes, however,
Victorian research conducted by Bruno Mascitelli
and Mona Chung argues ―few Sister City
relationships have progressed [to the point of
developing enduring economic associations]‖.
Clearly then, in the interests of improving this
track record, there is an immense opportunity for
success stories to be analysed and emulated across
both countries.
In conducting this analysis, however, it is
important that the desire for near-term commercial
outcomes does not overwhelm Australian sub-

national governments‘ relationship-building
efforts in China. In many cases, the most
successful examples of Sino-Australian city-level
engagement have been developed over decades,
rather than years, and started as friendships rather
than economic relationships – reflecting the
Chinese term for sister cities: friendship cities
(youyi chengshi).
This is precisely where the sister city dilemma lies
for Australian governments. While there is
significant domestic pressure to achieve economic
outcomes in the near-term, there is a juxtaposing
need to invest in bilateral relationships on a
cultural level over a period of time before such
outcomes can be realised. Australian governments
must therefore become more proactive in selling
the benefits of engaging with China to ratepayers,
whilst also being savvier in selecting cities in
China to partner with that will make long-term
economic sense.
As Australia and China mark 40 years of
diplomatic relations this year, it is important to
look for ways to increase breadth and depth in the
Sino-Australian relationship. SCTRs represent an
excellent opportunity to do just this, through
cultural, exchange, and dialogue-based activities.
Across the 82 SCTRs that are in place between
Australia and China today, the aggregate value of
such activities is immense.
In this light, it is critical that Australian
governments look at commercial outcomes
achieved by SCTRs with China as a measure of
success rather than a basis for a relationship.
中澳青年联合会学报 65

Perspective of an Australian-Born Chinese
Jieh-Yung Lo (罗介雍)
Jieh-Yung Lo is a Melbourne based writer. He is also the Deputy Mayor of the City of Monash and is
currently working on a documentary on the history of Chinese migration to Australia.
The first two questions and conversational
icebreakers I get in China are always ―Ni Shi
Yang Ren Ma?‖ ―Ni Hui Ting He Jiang Zhong
Wen Ma?‖
The direct translations are ―Are you a foreigner?‖
and ―Can you understand and speak Chinese?‖
It‘s always a fascinating experience for the
Chinese to meet someone with yellow skin and a
foreign English-speaking accent. You see, as an
Australian-Born Chinese, one is not considered
Chinese in any way. In the eyes of the Chinese in
China, we are nothing more than just foreigners.
You cannot even try convincing them that your
ethnic heritage is Chinese because it just will not
click. For someone like myself, who has a deep
connection with my cultural heritage due to
countless weekend Chinese language classes,
reading Chinese history, and hearing stories from
my parents, it was extremely frustrating and I
have never felt more left out.
Australia was known to the Chinese as Xin Jin
Shan, which translates to ―New Gold Mountain‖ -
as the United States was known as the ―Old Gold
Mountain‖. Between the 1850s and 1870s, large
numbers of Chinese people were working in the
Victorian goldfields and the smaller New South
Wales fields. When major gold fields were
discovered and more restrictive anti-Chinese
legislation was passed in Victoria, this resulted in
thousands of miners moving across the border to
NSW in 1859. The growing presence of Chinese
people on the diggings led to anti-Chinese
agitation, including violent clashes such as the
Lambing Flat Riots, the immediate result of which
was the passing of an Act in 1861 designed to
reduce the number of Chinese people entering the
colony. As immigration restrictions did not permit
Chinese labourers to bring their wives, my greatgreat-grandfather
married a local woman of
66 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
British heritage, with whom he travelled back to
China after successes on the Victorian goldfields.
Due to his newfound fortune, he was
unfortunately targeted and robbed back in China,
forcing him to travel back to Victoria.
Subsequently, he left his family and children
behind in Guangdong, remarried, and passed away
in Australia. Since then, all contact with him was
lost.
A hundred years later, both sides of my family left
China due to the Second Sino-Japanese War and
the ongoing Chinese Civil War. They arrived in
Vietnam in the 1940s, where both my parents
were born and grew up in Chinese communities in
Hanoi and Saigon. My maternal grandfather was a
dedicated military serviceman in the 19 th Route
Army of the National Kuomintang Government.
His experiences included fighting Chinese
Communist Party troops during the Long March
in 1934 and the first Battle of Shanghai in March
1932, more famously known as the January 28
Incident with the Empire of Japan. Due to the 19 th
Route Army‘s disagreements with Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek over the peace agreement with
Japan, the 19 th Route Army led a mutiny to
establish the anti-Kuomintang People‘s
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of
China. This was short-lived, as the Kuomintang
responded rapidly to the rebellion and the once
prestigious 19 th Route Army was defeated and
disbanded.
The defeat of the National Kuomintang
Government by the People‘s Liberation Army
forced its leader Chiang Kai-Shek to flee to
Taiwan in 1949. It was common for many former
allies of the Kuomintang and those who feared
communism to leave Mainland China, and thus
my family travelled to Vietnam in search of a new
beginning.

Both my parents had a very similar upbringing to
mine. Being Vietnamese-Born Chinese, they had
to endure the feelings and pressure of being a
minority group in a ‗foreign‘ country. In order to
survive, the Chinese community had to put their
differences aside and work together. China is well
known to the outside world for its diverse dialects
and sub-groups. You can travel from Fujian to
Guangdong or Beijing to Shanghai and experience
a dialect that is completely different to the other,
not to mention differences in customs and
perspectives. I have on countless occasions had to
write down what I wanted because I did not speak
or understand the local dialect. My grandparents
were amazed by the strong unity of the Chinese
community in Vietnam. Their children could not
be and feel any more Chinese, as the only way to
survive and thrive was to accept your culture and
heritage. It was amazing to see that the Chinese
community in Saigon was more united than the
Chinese nation as a whole at that time. War broke
out in Vietnam, which caused my family to flee to
Melbourne in 1977. Again it seemed destiny had
brought them to Australia.
I was raised in a very traditional Chinese family,
and my values and ethics are a convergence of the
two cultures. I consider this a privilege as it has
provided me with both personal fulfilment and
development. My mother has always told me from
a young age: ―Remember your heritage son. You
are a descendent of the dragon, be proud of our
country and its people‖. I was always left
speechless.
Multiculturalism has enabled migrant
communities to embrace and celebrate their
traditions and heritage, whilst respecting and
living out Australian values and lifestyles. While
this is the case, for many new migrants and
children of migrants such as myself, who possess
two identities, we face challenges in negotiating
between cultural identities as we attempt to
participate in Australian society. For many young
new arrivals, the complexity of these challenges
are heightened by the pressure to fit into their new
environment, which may often conflict with the
cultural norms and social expectations of their
country of origin and the values held by older
generations. It is important for the many young
Australians with culturally and linguistically
diverse roots to be supported in maintaining their
culture and language of origin. This is something
our Federal and State Governments do very well.
I could not help but shed a tear when visiting the
Great Wall for the very first time. For so long
China had closed its doors to the outside world.
The fact that China has opened up to the global
community is already such a change in traditional
thinking. It can be hard to grasp just how strong a
connection many Chinese people have with their
homeland: many simply leave because they have
no choice. And by leaving, they feel they have left
behind a negative legacy amongst their comrades,
a legacy that till this day still begins with ―Ni Shi
Yang Ren Ma?‖
What amazed me was that the Chinese people
living in China are not aware that Chinese
migration to Australia started back in the 1800s.
There is also limited knowledge here in Australia
regarding the history of Chinese settlers. As an
Australian of Chinese origin, I see it as my
mission to provide a historical education to both
Australians in the wider community and the
Chinese people living in China about the history
of Chinese Australians. In my view, this
knowledge presents a unique opportunity to
strengthen cultural and social understanding
between our two nations.
From a personal perspective, my travels to China
have brought me closer to my native homeland. I
believe this all started with the development my
parents provided for me, and my study of Chinese
during school and beyond. I have always been a
strong supporter of multiculturalism as well as its
policies and programs to assist migrants and
refugees. But what we do not see is that many
migrant communities are grappling with issues
such as loss of their cultural identities, intergenerational
problems - often due to a lack of
common language skills and experiences, and the
obvious difficulty of balancing two cultures.
I know many young people in my generation who
cannot even understand, let alone speak, their
中澳青年联合会学报 67

native tongue. Many migrant parents are worried
that their children will not be able to integrate in
the future, which has led to decisions to forsake
their native tongue at a developing age in favour
of English. What they fail to understand is that
individuals with a second language and cultural
identity are highly sought after in the workplace,
and research shows that people with these skills
are successful in a number of careers.
The success of young people in maintaining their
culture and language is often linked to the strength
of their parental relationships and guidance they
have received. As suggested by the Australian
Council of State School Organisations, a good
strategy for encouraging young people to maintain
their ancestral language is for one parent to speak
and read with the child in English, and the other
parent to speak and read with the child in the
mother language, so the child becomes adept at
operating equally in both languages.
For young people from migrant backgrounds,
maintaining and exploring one‘s culture of origin
can be a commitment that leads to great personal
development and fulfilment. More importantly, it
develops an understanding of other countries and
cultures, which in turn contributes to the rich
tapestry of our increasingly culturally enlightened
multicultural society. These individuals have a
great deal to offer the Australian community and
economy. They should be encouraged to maintain
and foster these important traits and talents, and to
contribute their knowledge and experiences to our
developing shared culture and increasingly
diverse global workplace.
So where does that leave me? All my life I‘ve
faced an internal battle of trying to understand my
identity. Yes, I was born in Australia, and
68 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
Australia is my home and my nationality, but deep
down, I share a strong bond with my ancestral
homeland. When I was elected as a Councillor for
the very first time, in November 2008 for the City
of Monash, I made the following statement:
―A few weeks ago my parents celebrated 31 years
since they first arrived from Vietnam. They had
that dream to come to Australia and live the
dream and I feel that me being elected and sworn
in today means they've lived it. I'm proud of my
cultural history and traditions. I'm proud of the
values that they taught me and I'm looking
forward to bringing them here to Monash
Council. Monash has done a lot of good work on
cultural and linguistic diversity and it was time
that diversity was reflected on this Council. I
would like to conclude with a proverb my parents
taught me: For everything you take from your
community, you must give twice as much back.‖
I actually have the honour of representing two
communities - first and foremost the residents of
Monash and, in addition, the wider Chinese
community. Since 2006, Monash has had the
highest percentage of Australian Chinese in
Victoria and I feel privileged to have become the
first Australian of Chinese descent to represent
and serve the City. This is my way of offering my
thanks and appreciation to this great nation that
has given so much to my family.
I do hope to be able to inspire young people from
migrant backgrounds to retain or take up their
native language and culture as it will further open
your perspectives and opportunities. To my
grandfather and great-great-grandfather, I am an
Australian-Born Chinese and could not be happier
and prouder of it!

Phoenix Rising: Mary Bergstrom’s All Eyes East
Joel Wing-Lun (黄智雄)
Joel Wing-Lun is a researcher at China Policy, Beijing, and Communications Director for the Australia-
China Youth Association.
As the end of the 2012 academic year approached,
the Chinese social media website Renren asked
graduating university students to ―share your
biggest regrets in college‖. Students posed in the
dormitories they would soon be departing with a
list of regrets scrawled on white A4 sheets of
paper. Responses ranged from ―never dated‖ and
―failed to lose weight‖ to ―never tried being gay‖
and ―still can‘t fly‖.
In many respects, the hopes and aspirations of
Chinese youth are the same as those of their
Western peers: to get a job, get the boy or girl,
and realise their personal and professional
potential. Yet as Mary Bergstrom reminds us in
All Eyes East: Lessons from the Front Lines of
Marketing to Chinese Youth, unique social and
economic conditioning and collective experiences
as the children of China‘s market reforms have
shaped the way Chinese youth perceive
themselves and the world around them, including
how they respond to local and international brands
and marketing.
That marketing in China is even possible is due to
seismic shifts in the social and economic
landscape since Chinese leaders began
dismantling the planned economy in the late
1970s and early 1980s. Yet as Ms Bergstrom
writes, the rapid pace of reform lead not only to a
gulf between those born before and after reforms
began, but also fissures between ―post-80s‖, the
first generation born under the one-child policy,
and their younger cousins born after 1990.
According to Ms Bergstrom, where ―the post-80s
led China in to a new mainstream marked by
choice and status, the post-90s took the post-80s‘
individualistic spirit to a new extreme‖ and are
notably more comfortable with sex, violence, and
online exhibitionism. Where post-80s may hope to
receive gifts of Swarovski or Louis Vuitton, post-
90s might ask for Red Bull or Durex condoms.
Growing up, post-80s boys were dubbed ―little
emperors‖ for the undivided parental attention
they commanded, yet entering their twenties, they
were confronted not only with a slew of
parentally-arranged blind dates and other matchmaking
endeavours, but also with odds
objectively stacked against them. In 2011, after 30
years of forcible family planning, for every 100
girls under the age of four, there were
approximately 123 boys.
Shifting demographics have shifted the balance of
power in a traditionally patriarchal society. By
2014, women‘s contribution to household income
is expected to reach 52%, and without needing to
leave home or save for an apartment, young
Chinese women have more disposable income
than ever before. Yet according to Ms Bergstrom,
for Chinese youth, beauty is ―not a lofty
declaration of self-actualisation‖, but rather a
means to get ahead in competitive job and
marriage markets.
Fashion, beauty products, and even cosmetic
surgery are seen as necessities for climbing or at
least keeping a foothold on the corporate ladder
both for women and, increasingly, for men. Ms
Bergstrom credits the increasingly competitive
marriage market for the rise of metrosexuals or
―city jade men‖, noting that growth in skin-care
products for men will be five times faster in China
than in North America in the period up to 2014.
All Eyes East is grounded in years of research in
the field: posing questions, peering into closets,
and generally hanging out with Chinese youth. Ms
Bergstrom‘s analysis of Chinese youth and their
relationship with the Internet, fashion, subcultures,
中澳青年联合会学报 69

and activism is astute and sure to be invaluable to
marketeers who have set their sights on the
Middle Kingdom. While emphasising the
spending habits of moneyed urban youth, she also
demonstrates familiarity with the aspirations of
those further down the food chain.
What is surprising is how the marketing matrix
serves to humanise a group whose behaviour and
values can appear alien to outsiders. Ms
Bergstrom‘s dogged pursuit of the Chinese youth
market has lead not only to an intimate
understanding of the brand allegiances of Chinese
youth, but also to an apparent respect for the
70 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
values and life experiences that distinguish them
from their Western peers.
While judiciously refraining from crystal ball
gazing, All Eyes East does provide glimpses of the
future. As Mao Zedong proclaimed to an earlier
generation, the future of China lies in the hands of
its youth. Ms Bergstrom‘s assertion that for
Chinese youth, modernisation and westernisation
are not one and the same, has implications beyond
the realm of marketing. Hearing what Chinese
youth are saying today will pay dividends in years
to come.

Future Development of the Sino-Australian Relationship: The Future Leaders of
Australia and China
Translated into English from the original Chinese.
Oliver Theobald (熙奥利)
Oliver Theobald began studying Mandarin at secondary school in 2004. He is the former President of the
ACYA Chapter at RMIT University and is now undertaking postgraduate studies at the John Hopkins
University – Nanjing University Centre for Chinese and American Studies.
This year marks the fortieth anniversary since the
establishment of diplomatic relations between
Australia and China, a notable milestone in the
history of the Australia-China relationship. The
last forty years have witnessed an earth-shaking
change to the bilateral relationship. Forty years
ago, Mao Zedong was still alive, the Cold War
was not yet over, and there was almost zero trade
between Australia and China. After thirty years of
development since China‘s reform and opening,
the face of China has changed beyond recognition.
We all know that China is now an economic
leader. The level of trade between Australia and
China has reached a previously unprecedented
scope, building increasingly intimate bilateral ties,
with trade volume increasing from US$100
million in 1972 to $US116.6 billion in 2011.
China has already become Australia‘s largest
trading partner, whilst Australia is China‘s
seventh most important trade and investment
partner. For Australia, a stable relationship with
China is presently of singularly vital importance
for future bilateral development.
However, over the last few years there seem to
have been more points of conflict between the two
countries than ever before. For example, Rabiya
Kadeer‘s visit to Australia, the criminal
prosecution in China of Rio Tinto employee and
Australian citizen Stern Hu, the issue of violence
against Chinese international students in Australia,
and the Rudd Government‘s Defence White Paper.
Indeed, China‘s prominence in our international
affairs will continue to grow in line with its
economic rise. Already, many in Australia are
becoming increasingly concerned with the
influence of both China‘s economic and military
power. According to the joint ANU-CICIR report
Australia And China: A Joint Report on the
Bilateral Relationship, the most effective way to
avoid conflict between the two countries is to
―encourage ever greater contact between a wide
range of people in both countries with the specific
aim of increasing mutual awareness and building
levels of trust‖. This report advanced mutual
exchange between governmental, commercial, and
nongovernmental organizations, and especially
―direct contact‖ such as civil interactions, highlevel
visits, sports exchanges, scientific and
technological exchanges, and so on. However, the
report failed to directly mention the importance of
bilateral youth relations. If Australia wants to
increase its level of contact with China and realize
its objective of becoming the Western country
with the deepest understanding of Asia, we need
to cultivate the political, commercial, and nongovernmental
leadership capabilities the next
generations of Australians.
Firstly, education plays an important role in terms
of equipping future Australian leaders with the
necessary knowledge and abilities. Australian
education policy should not only encompass the
teaching of Western knowledge to students, but
also include Asian history, culture, and language.
However, according to the Australia-China Youth
Dialogue‘s Submission to the Australian
Government White Paper on Australia in the
Asian Century, ―Australia‘s education system is
inadequately equipped to prepare our children for
the future‖. The latest data shows that only 3% of
Australian Year 12 students study Chinese and, of
中澳青年联合会学报 71

these, fully 94% have a Chinese language
background. Most students without a Chinese
language background give up learning Chinese
before they even reach Year 12. There are many
explanations for the low numbers of Chinese
learners. One aspect is that learning Chinese is
very difficult and students are worried that taking
Chinese as a subject will pull down their final
examination results. Another factor is that student
interest in Chinese is limited and many young
people are unaware that by studying Chinese they
gain access to many opportunities such as
exchanges, scholarships, internships, and
employment in China. Reversing this trend will
not be easy, but it would bring about abundant
returns and advantages. Thus far, funds invested
by the government have produced remarkable
returns, and thus we need to ensure we implement
more such policy reforms. For instance, the
government should make efforts to utilize video,
Internet, and social media to introduce students to
interesting news and anecdotes of Australians
working in China. For the purposes of increasing
their awareness of such knowledge, Australian
students and academics should become involved
in Australia-China communities on campus.
Furthermore, in order to improve the knowledge
and leadership skills of future leaders, we should
not only aim to inspire Australian students to
study in China but also further support young
Australians who are leading projects and events in
China. Over the last few years, the number of
Australian students going to study abroad in
China has been rising steadily. According to
Chinese Ministry of Education statistics, in 2010
there were over 1000 Australian students in China.
There already exist many opportunities to study in
China, and young people can apply for
scholarships through both the Australian and
Chinese governments. However, these scholarship
systems are typically not effective in raising either
the skills of youth leaders or Australia‘s
international image. This is because students
simply go to China to take a few courses and then
spend most of their spare time with other
foreigners or going out drinking. A more effective
scheme would be to facilitate these Australian
exchange students to take classes with Chinese
72 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
students and interacting more with Chinese
university students to give them a greater
understanding of Australian culture. This is
because most ordinary Chinese have little thought
of Australia apart from travel or seeing a kangaroo.
Therefore, there is ample room to ramp up
communication with Chinese students in order to
assist them in gaining an understanding of the
great variety inherent in the Australian culture and
education system, and discuss with them the
orientation of Australia‘s development in the
‗Asian Century‘. Chinese students are also
generally not particularly aware of the
opportunities available to them in Australia, such
as being a delegate to the Australia-China Youth
Dialogue (ACYD) or attending the ANU Asia-
Pacific Week. If more such exchange activities
were conducted, it would be a very effective path
towards not only generating greater interest in
Australia on behalf of Chinese students, but also
gaining constructive opinions from Chinese about
how Australia can maintain the positive
development of its relationship with China.
Finally, the government should support the
development of youth non-governmental
organizations, such as the ACYD and Australia-
China Youth Association (ACYA). These youth
organizations have strengthened Australia-China
cooperation, mutual trust, and youth leadership
skills, as well as created beneficial bilateral
networks and relationships. ACYA, officially
founded in 2009, has a particularly special
significance in Australia-China relations. Being a
grassroots youth organisation involving over 3000
members, ACYA is geared towards meeting the
needs of Australian youth who are interested in
China and Chinese youth who are interested in
Australia. Through the daily activities of its
networks and university branches in both
Australia and China, ACYA provides a beneficial
and advantageous public resource. The ACYA
website also provides a ―one-stop service‖ for
study, exchange, and employment resources. As
many young people are unaware of the
possibilities opened up to them through learning
Chinese, ACYA activities go a long way to
increasing their awareness of such opportunities.

For such reasons, ACYA deserves increased
support from the Australian Government.
In the coming forty years, the Australia-China
relationship will become increasingly significant
for both countries. Closer bilateral relations will
bring enormous potential benefits, and the major
contributions of youth in this regard cannot be
underestimated. Through youth cooperation and
education, we can manage differences that arise in
the development of Australia-China relations,
reduce diplomatic conflicts, and cultivate the next
generation of Australia-China leaders.
中澳青年联合会学报 73

Clean Energy and Emissions Reduction Technology: the Next Step in Closer
Australia-China Cooperation?
Translated into English from the original Chinese.
Wang Zikai (王资凯)
Wang Zikai is a graduate of Shanghai Jiaotong University and is currently a scholarship student researching
economics and emission reductions technology at the University of New South Wales. He represented China
at IMUSE 2009 and represented Australia at the 2012 World Student Environmental Forum.
With regards to greenhouse gas emissions and
climate change, both the Australian and Chinese
governments face equally heavy pressure from the
international community. Due to abundant and
low-priced fossil fuels, Australia relies heavily on
coal-generated power. According to 2009
statistics provided by British consulting company
Maplecroft, Australia‘s per capita carbon dioxide
emissions were the highest in the world at 20.58
tons annually. Owing to the development of its
coal-generated power and cement industries,
China‘s total greenhouse gas emissions overtook
those of the USA as early as 2006, with China
leaping to become the largest global emitter,
accounting for approximately one quarter of total
greenhouse gas emissions worldwide. A
comparison between China‘s carbon emission
ranking and overall economic ranking clearly
reveals the problems China is facing – heavy
industries with high energy consumption rates
creating a large volume of carbon emissions but
with residential electricity standards lagging
behind those of developed countries.
Both Australian and Chinese politicians are
broadly in agreement that greenhouse gas
emissions cause climate change. Being an island
country with a population of 21 million and
significant agricultural industries, Australia is
potentially more vulnerable to the effects of
climate change, such as continually rising
temperatures, bushfires, and storms. As has been
shown by scientific research, China is also
experiencing an increasing frequency of natural
disasters and extreme weather conditions that are
having an ever more frequent impact upon the
lives of Chinese people.
74 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
Continuing progress in and the increased
commercial market feasibility of emissionreducing
and clean-energy technology are in
reality determined by firm and effective policy
support. In order for the Chinese government to
realise its commitment to reduce emissions by 40-
45% of 2005 levels by 2020, the Chinese
government must continuously strengthen its
support of the popularisation of and rapid research
and development in emission reduction
technology. But such support is not all plain
sailing, as some academics deem the high-speed
development of China's solar industry in the last
five years as the ―Great Leap Forward" of the
industry, pointing out that behind such rapid
expansion lie a string of financial and
environmental problems. Also, following the 2011
Fukushima nuclear power accident in Japan, the
Chinese government temporarily ceased the
examination and approval of new nuclear power
projects, a move jarring to the ambitious nuclear
power programme set out a few years ago.
Furthermore, the inability of wind power to
contribute significantly to the Chinese national
grid reveals clearly the limitations of industry
policies and subsidies.
In the same way, the pressure faced in this area by
the Australian government is also very obvious.
From 1 July this year, the Australian government
began to levy a national carbon tax of A$23/ton
on high-carbon emission enterprises. This plan
received high praise from the international
community and was considered a landmark policy
in emission reduction. However, domestically,
despite Julia Gillard's claim that 90% of people
will be able to claim subsidies, many harbour

doubts and disagreements about the promises of
the scheme. Some research shows that the carbon
tax will increase average living costs for the
Australian public by approximately 0.7%, have a
negative influence upon consumer confidence,
and cause electricity bills to rise by 10%. Others
also doubt whether the government's promised
subsidies will be permanent. Some experts worry
that the cost of the carbon tax to mining
companies will be transferred to countries
downstream in the production process,
particularly in the iron ore industry, hurting
Australia‘s export performance. Data suggests that
the present carbon tax will increase the annual
cost of iron ore imports for China by RMB 10
billion.
According to a report by the International Energy
Agency (IEA), in order to realise the reduction of
global carbon dioxide emissions to 14Gt by 2050,
the most promising ways to cut emissions on a
large scale include the popularisation of carbon
capturing and storage (CCS), new energy
technologies, nuclear power technologies, and
improving energy efficiency.
IAE surveys indicate that there are over 3000 CCS
demonstration projects worldwide that are either
being developed or put into use, and which by
2050 could reduce global carbon emissions by
one-sixth. China alone is planning to invest at
least US$5 trillion in such projects in the future.
Further, both the Chinese and Australian
governments are facing very similar situations:
both countries mainly utilise fossil fuel energy
sources and CCS technology will be essential for
both to meet their emission reduction targets.
Though, whether either can successfully
implement CCS technology relates more to
whether the two countries are able to continue
utilising cheap and abundant coal resources.
Australia and China are both now conducting
experimental projects, as implementing CCS
technology on a large-scale will inevitably involve
many challenges with regards to funding inputs,
operational management, and laws and regulations.
Great potential exists for bilateral cooperation and
the realisation of mutual gains in this area.
Additionally, by way of comparison with China‘s
problem of excess installed wind capacity,
northern Australia‘s abundant wind power
resources and grid operation management
experience means that it could well serve as an
example for China as to how to resolve its issues
in wind-farm operations. Also, in the photovoltaic
field, many qualified Chinese personnel have a
study or research background in Australia, and
many Australian photovoltaic technology experts
are working as technological consultants in
rapidly developing Chinese companies (despite
many at present experiencing financial
difficulties). Furthermore, China should learn
from the Australian government‘s subsidies for
household solar installations, an possible method
for resolving the problem China faces of
exporting too much solar equipment whilst
domestic utilisation rates remain low. And another
Australian policy model amongst many that the
Chinese government could learn from is that of
course that of the carbon tax.
Given that it has been China‘s demand for energy
resources and raw materials to fuel its robust and
sustained development over the last decade that
has tightly bound together the relations and
interests of Australia and China, there is the
possibility that in the future a common position on
the reduction of greenhouse emissions and
collaboration on emissions reduction and clean
energy technologies will be able to advance both
public and civil cooperation to a new level.
中澳青年联合会学报 75

Photo/照片: Nicola Boyle

SECTION IV
OPINION ARTICLE – CHINESE
第四部分
个人评论部分 – 中文类作品

寻根之旅
黄淑琳 (Sue-Lin Wong)
这篇文章荣获了“中澳青年联合会学报个人评论部分一等奖(中文)”。
黄淑琳在澳大利亚国立大学上本科五年级。她的专业是法律和亚洲研究。因为取得了澳大利亚总理
奖学金所以现在在中国学习和实习。
作为一个澳大利亚华裔,我所谓的身份认同危
机一直深藏在我的体内。虽然我可以想出很多
原因来解释为什么我想来中国,但是在我心底
很确定,最重要的原因是一种寻找。我本以为
来中国之后,会很快找到我想寻找的东西。实
际上,在中国的经历不但没有帮我找到我想寻
找的东西,反而让我更糊涂,我到底要寻找什
么,我的“根”真的在中国吗?
我不断跟各种各样的中国人有这样的对话:
“你回国了!很好,你可以看一看祖国发展得
怎么样!”
我回国了吗?如果我从来没有来过中国,可以
算是回国吗?
“啊呀,你的中文那么差,你不觉得对不起中
国人吗?”
我是一个中国人吗?你以为凡是长得像中国人
的人都会中文吗?凡是长得像白人的人都会英
文吗?
“澳大利亚人对咱们华人怎么样?”
澳大利亚人不包括华人吗?如果我在澳大利亚
出生、长大,我的家人、朋友都在澳大利亚,
我还不属于澳大利亚人吗?
在中国,我不光常常碰到这样的问题,也常常
有机会跟来自各国的华侨、华裔聊这样的话题。
今年,我跟几个华裔在一个朋友的晚会上,不
知道怎么开始聊起来“如果有一种把华人变成
78 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
白人的药,你会不会吃?”有的人不假思索地
回答说,“肯定会”,有的人说“绝对不会”,
有的人很犹豫地说“不知道”;然后我们开始
争论,争论得很厉害!
在宿舍里,我认识了来自日本、缅甸、泰国、
新加坡、马来西亚、瑞士、瑞典、德国、法国、
英国、丹麦、毛里求斯、巴西、巴拿马、美国、
加拿大等国的华裔。半夜三更,我们会在一个
宿舍里聊到各种各样关于身份认同的话题。长
得很壮、很高的男生,给我们讲他在美国高中
被欺负的经历就会泪流满面;而一个来自澳大
利亚的华裔女孩会发现她的经历跟一个来自巴
西的华裔男孩在某种意义上是一模一样的。,
听到《我的中国心》、《红旗飘飘》这类歌曲,
有的人觉得很自豪,有的人根本没有什么感觉。
有时候,中国人会提醒我们:“别忘了,你们
就是炎黄子孙,龙的传人。”我们华裔会聊应
该怎么回答他们,有人觉得可能美国亚裔博客
的文章——《我的春节》里说的会更准确:
“在中国的经历是一次我这辈子从未经历过的
‘心灵疗伤’之旅,不是因为我在中国找到了
我的家而是因为我在中国找到了来自各国的华
裔。我终于找到了我的家”。
当然,有的华裔,尤其没有来过中国的华人,
对此问题会颇为反感。我在澳大利亚有几个堂
哥堂姐这样说,“淑琳,干吗要去中国留学?
不管你给我多少钱,我这辈子都不会去中国!”
其实,对我来说,好奇心比反感强得多,我非
来中国不可!但是来中国之后,我发现寻根的
过程变得越来越复杂。首先,很多中国人很乐

中澳青年联合会学报 79
意帮我解决我所谓的身份认同危机问题,但是
问题在于很多中国人的家族观念特别强,至少
比澳大利亚人的家族观念强得多。其次,我在
中国认识的华侨、华裔都有自己的故事、背景、
经历,因此都对中国有不同的态度和感觉。比
如说,我们谈“根”这个观念时,每个人都有
自己的想法。
对我来说,到 2012 年春节之前,我所谓的
“根”只是一个抽象概念而已。从小就有人会
告诉我:“饮水思源”、“不要忘本。”美国
非政府组织“寻根之旅”的创始人郑国和曾经
说过“强大的根系塑造强大的人格”,这个也
会让我联想到孔子非常欣赏的学生有子的话:
“君子务本,本立而道生”。有子的意思是说
“君子专心致力于事物的根本之处”,而对于
有子来说,这个“本”是指人道的根本:孝。
——知道自己从何而来,孝顺父母、长辈,崇
敬祖先。我自己也会天马行空地想,对我来说,
在某种意义上“本”就是“根”,如果你知道
你的“根”,才能真正成长。所以我决定利用
学校的寒假去寻找和拜访我从来没有见过面的
远房亲戚。我爷爷奶奶、外公外婆三十年代从
中国迁到马来西亚。虽然现在我爸爸妈妈的直
系亲属都在东南亚、美国和澳大利亚,但是我
爷爷奶奶、外公外婆兄弟姐妹的后代还在中国。
我决定先去福建的福州找爷爷的老家,然后去
广东的潮州去找外公的老家。我们不知道奶奶
和外婆的老家在哪里,这是很遗憾的事情;但
是换一个角度来说,因为不知道我外婆来自哪
里,所以坐地铁或者去超市买东西的时候,我
脑子里在想,坐在我旁边的乘客或者超市的售
货员会不会是我的远房亲戚呢?
坐火车到福州的时候,我突然发现自己还不认
识我亲戚的样子,所以我给我伯母发短信问她
今天穿什么样的衣服,要不然到火车站的时候
很可能找不到她!找到她和几个别的远房亲戚
之后,我们去了他们家。他们对我特别好,可
能对我太好了,所以我开始变胖!我在老家的
两个星期,每天平均吃五顿饭,到今天为止,
还穿不下我以前的牛仔裤。我轮流地住在各种
各样亲戚的家里,慢慢地认识了我中国的家人。
在某种意义上,他们的生活跟我的是截然不同;
但是在别的意义上,他们和我们大同小异。比
如说,我发现在我妈妈亲戚的家里,虽然我妈
妈从来没有回过她的老家,但是他们做的菜有
时候跟我妈妈做菜的味道是一模一样的!
自嘲一下,因为语言障碍的原因,我觉得我给
亲戚们带来很多欢乐!虽然我爸爸妈妈会说他
们自己的方言,福州话和潮州话,但是因为他
们的方言不一样,他们俩用英语沟通,因此我
和我弟弟完全听不懂他们的方言。幸好我的中
国亲戚既会普通话又很宽容!但我还是会每天
闹很多笑话。在第一个远房亲戚的家里,我姐
姐说因为明天要去参加你远房哥哥的婚礼,所
以明早我会给你做稀饭。我的脑子飞快旋转,
稀饭就是“西饭”,就是“西餐”。“姐姐,
不用,不用,不要紧,没问题,我可以吃中国
菜,不用专门给我做西餐。”到了第二个远房
亲戚家的时候,他们跟我说,明天早上我们要
喝白粥。在我脑子里,我觉得“白酒?这是一
种非常奇怪的早饭,干吗早上要喝白酒,我的
亲戚真是很神奇的人!但是,快要过年了,这
可能是南方过年的传统风俗。”由于上次的稀
饭误会,我觉得最好的方法就是不声不响地尊
重南方早上喝白酒的传统风俗。第二天吃早饭
的时候,我一直等我们的白酒。白酒没来,但
是我们却喝了很多白粥。
不单单有语言的障碍,也有很多文化差异。
淑琳跟她中国家人最常见的对话:
“你有孩子吗?”
“没有。”
“哦,你没有孩子。那,你结婚了吧。”
“没有。”
“哦,还没结婚,要抓紧时间。”
去参加我堂哥婚礼的时候,他们的媒婆先问上
面的问题,然后很担心地问我学习什么专业、
在哪里上学、爸爸妈妈做什么样的工作、他们
说什么方言、我有没有兄弟姐妹等等。然后,

她说“好的,留个电话号码,我找到合适对象
的时候会通知你。这是我家的电话号码、手机
号码,随时给我打电话,你已经不年轻了,你
越早生孩子越好。早生贵子!”
虽然我的“寻根之旅”当中白酒的误会、媒婆
为我着急等等事情都让我很感动,但是最让我
感动的经历还是发生在我爷爷的村子,就是我
爷爷的老家——义序,在福州的郊区。义序是
一个非常典型的宗族村子。
其实,在义序,每次走在路上,到处都能碰到
亲戚,“淑琳,这是你爷爷的堂弟的妻子,那
是你曾祖父的堂妹的孙子。”我爷爷的弟弟有
三个孩子都还在义序,他们带我去看我们的宗
祠,有几十代的灵牌,因为虽然我们的宗祠始
建于 1662 年, 但是我们的祖先可以追溯到公
元 885 年。 一个叫黄敦的人从河南光州固始
县跟着王审知迁到福建。在我们的宗祠里,我
找到了我爷爷、奶奶、爸爸和他兄弟姐妹的名
字。我的亲戚说以后我们这一代和我们的后代
也会有自己的灵牌!
北京师范大学的经济教授曾经说过中国的贫富
差距问题每况愈下。现在中国的基尼系数接近
0.5(基尼系数是一个 0-1 的比例),有关专
家认为 0.4 以上的基尼系数很容易导致社会不
稳定的后果。在我寻根的过程中,我亲眼看到
中国的贫富差距很明显。虽然有些城里亲戚生
活条件相对来说不错;但是在义序,我亲戚的
房子没有家具,墙上没有油漆,房子外面的路
边到处都是垃圾,垃圾里面有老鼠。而且,我
亲戚都自己养鸡、养鸭、种蔬菜;我的叔叔因
为在云南打工,所以过年的时候没有回家;我
的堂哥在义序的邮局工作;我的堂姐比我大几
岁,但是已经结婚有孩子,在附近的超市工作。
虽然他们很穷,但是他们非常热情、大方,而
且很团结;这个会让我想,我们在澳大利亚也
是这样的吗?
我的姑妈告诉我很多关于我们家人的故事。我
爷爷和他的弟弟小的时候,靠卖海蛎为生。为
了找海蛎会走路走好几个小时,然后返回义序
80 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
卖。上世纪三十年代的时候,我爷爷的家人都
快饿死了,所以当时十二岁的爷爷一个人上船
去马来西亚打工。爷爷在马来西亚的路边卖辣
椒,十七岁的时候第一次回国。离开时,当他
的船刚离开码头,他的弟弟就跳进水里,游到
船边,告诉我爷爷,他想跟他一起去马来西亚,
但是我爷爷跟他说,“如果我们两个人一起去,
谁来照顾爸爸妈妈?回家去,给我几年,我先
在马来西亚给你们赚钱,然后我会回家跟你们
一起过日子。”于是,他的弟弟就回家等哥哥
了,谁知,一等就是一辈子。
从那以后,虽然回国是我爷爷的梦想,但是因
为历史的原因,他再也没有机会回国。我爸爸
曾经告诉我,他小的时候,有一天晚上,我爷
爷听到了《世上只有妈妈好》这首歌,就开始
默默地流眼泪。我爸爸小时候在马来西亚上一
所华人的小学。在那里,老师教他们李白的
《静夜思》:“床前明月光,疑是地上霜。举
头望明月,低头思故乡。”
据姑妈回忆,在上世纪五十年代末和六十年代,
我爷爷奶奶会把食品寄回中国。姑妈说,如果
没有那样的包裹,他们那个时候会被饿死。姑
妈也告诉我,她的爸爸,也是我爷爷的弟弟,
一直等他的哥哥回国。我爷爷七十年代去世了。
他去世不久,马来西亚终于改变他们对中国的
外交政策,马来西亚人可以来中国。爷爷去世
之后,我爷爷的弟弟一直在期待我爸爸回来,
但是他去世两年之后,我叔叔才终于找到了我
们的老家。
听到这样的故事,我非常感动。但是我远房亲
戚问我比较复杂的问题时,我不知道怎么回答
他们。“回老家有什么感觉?你觉得我们长得
像你吗?你现在应该对中国人有特别深的认同
感吧。”离开老家的时候,我朋友问我:“寻
根之旅过得怎么样?寻根之旅给你什么感觉?
找到了什么?找到你‘根’的时候有什么感
觉?”出门的时候,还会有陌生人问我,“你
回国了!有什么感觉?你是一个澳大利亚人吗?
但是你应该对中国有感觉吧?”

怎么回答这样的问题?
我不知道。问题太多了,答案太复杂了。我只
知道两件事情。第一,我在中国的经历给我一
种感觉,一种特殊的感觉。第二,因为寻根之
旅,我现在考虑一个新的问题。如果我爷爷的
回国梦想实现了,如果他“落叶归根,游子回
乡”,我也可能会像我的堂姐一样,在义序出
生、长大,甚至连厦门都没去过,我可能已经
结婚了,有孩子,每天在这个小村子的超市工
作。
但是,我赢了生活的彩票吗?
中澳青年联合会学报 81

从国境之西到国境之东:一个澳大利亚人对中国新疆省和黑龙江省的调查
温丽丽(Alice Dawkins)
这篇文章荣获了“中澳青年联合会学报个人评论部分一等奖(英文)”。
由英文原文翻译至中文。
温丽丽是澳洲国立大学亚太研究与法学院的一名学生。她刚以“汉语桥奖学金”获得者的身份从北
京大学结束了为期一年的游学生涯回国。
如果说在中国,北京是联结文化与传统的巨大
网络的中心来源,那新疆(喀什)和黑龙江
(哈尔滨)分别就是位于远西和远东方位的重
要支流。在地理位置和身份方面,他们都距离
北京很远。如果你想要寻找中国太极,舞龙和
打功夫的熊猫(中国武术),那你并不会在这
些独特的地方碰到好运气。
在哈尔滨,你可以尽情享受纯正的墨西哥罗宋
汤和口感光滑如丝的伏特加酒,你会看到俄罗
斯的标志横贯整座城市,还会发现大量的具有
传统俄罗斯风格的建筑。这一类建筑,逐渐地,
零碎地进入某一些被遗弃的国家,正如那一类
只分散地存在于过高要价的古董店里的,具有
颗粒感的黑白照片。即使你长着一张只是类似
于白种人的脸庞,当你走过马路时,坐在路旁
的老东北都会用俄罗斯语言的“你好”或者其
他问候语向你打招呼。
在喀什,你可以在每一个街道的角落看到烤羊
肉串的小摊贩,然后你会吃到涂满黄油的,面
团状的中东风格的面包来填满你饥饿的肚子。
你会看到女人带上轻金丝刺绣的彩色头巾用作
装饰;你会看到在阳光下露天的市集里挤满了
出来购置杂货的女人。散步穿过周日的牲畜市
场,你甚至听不到一句标准的普通话,而那些
带着休闲的好奇心盯着你的眼睛也都不属于汉
族人,那是蓝色,绿色或褐色的,像杏仁般的
中亚人的眼睛。你会看到那些留着庄严的,长
长的白胡子的老人聚在一起吃新疆拉面,那些
领着一群牛的少年相互玩着摔跤,还有一群妻
子在支架台前准备着午餐。在一种不受时间影
82 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
响的群落氛围中,整个世界保持了片刻的宁静,
发出与募捐的户外烧烤活动和家乡里孩子们的
周末足球比赛中一样的嗡嗡声。
这种生长于喀什市集和曲折的老街里的空气中,
属于另外一个世界的生机活力已经远离了哈尔
滨。随着哈尔滨迅速地将其地位提升成热点地
区和中国北方的流行所在,本地的俄罗斯人和
以前在黑龙江省的其他民族的人就变得越来越
少了。在整个世界,哈尔滨以它一年一度的宏
伟的冰雕节更为著名,而不是那遗留在这座老
城市各个角落的俄罗斯文化遗产。从多个方面
而言,哈尔滨作为中国的“远东莫斯科”的历
史性地位也的确成为了历史。那位于城市中心
的拜占庭式的圣索菲亚教堂现在已成为一座欢
迎任何俗人踏入大门的建筑博物馆。城市里剩
余的犹太教堂要不就是被改造成青年旅社和时
髦咖啡厅,要不就是被废置,不再有犹太人前
来服务。在余下最大的一座犹太教堂里,有一
个签名,表明了所知的最后一个哈尔滨犹太人
在 1980 年代逝世。对于一座曾经以拥有远东
地区最多犹太人人口的城市,这真是一个悲哀
的时刻。
跟任何一个喀什的当地人谈话,毫无疑问他都
会告诉你,即使只跟三年前比,这座城市也已
面目全非。许多历史老城被摧毁,用作建设那
些象征着中国现代的,具有疯狂又毫无个性的
建筑风格的,灰色的同质化楼塔。许多汉族人
并不把喀什的老城区看做是令人骄傲的参观地
点。当我在那辆需要 27 小时从新疆首都乌鲁
木齐到达喀什的列车上时,我与一位二十多岁

中澳青年联合会学报 83
具有活泼且颇具己见的汉族女乘客开始了交谈。
听完了我的旅游计划,她难以置信地望回我,
并还算坦诚地告诉我说如果我住在城市里维族
人的地盘,我无疑会被他们所有人强奸和抢劫
掠夺的。她还特地开车把我从火车站送到了我
位于老城胡同中心的住所。她坐在锁好的车里
忧虑地观察着四周环境,直到我安全走进旅社
的前门才愿意离去。
类似地,一个善谈的乌鲁木齐出租车司机真诚
地告诉我,“我们汉族人和维吾尔族人以前就
像兄弟一样。但这种关系在过去几年的事件发
生之后就不复存在了。”这是值得思考的一点,
因为对于外来人而言,维吾尔族的穆斯林和汉
族人能在像喀什这样的城市里如此紧密地共存
是非同寻常的。往新疆更北方走就到了吐鲁番,
一个处于塔克拉玛干沙漠深处的城镇。然后,
你会发现那些同为古代遗迹的佛教洞穴和宏伟
的清真寺尖塔,竟只相距几公里之遥。
历史中黑龙江和哈尔滨的俄罗斯犹太人当然没
有像新疆的维吾尔族人那样的卓越,但俄罗斯
犹太人在当地的影响也是异常深远的。哈尔滨
这座城市一开始只是一个中国东部铁路修建工
人的集中营,是那段著名且具有浪漫主义色彩
的西伯利亚铁路的一段捷径。如今这个由庞大
的时尚奢侈商店,发着豪华光亮的摩天大楼和
整齐的圆石铺成的人行道所堆成的纷繁大都市,
也只是从上世纪的一个俄罗斯铁路工人建造的
前哨站开始的。如果这么想的话,这的确值得
我们谦虚看待。但你必须在更深的层次探索,
在某些方面,哈尔滨身上的确展示出弃城的特
征。这并不是表现在人口和资源方面,而是,
民族的多元性。曾经显赫的俄罗斯人数量或许
已经有所减少,但传统的俄罗斯头帽和皮毛配
饰仍在这里的商铺售卖。俄罗斯式的餐馆,装
修得像是出自于切科夫的话剧,依然为渴求的
顾客提供着可口的旧式食物。但那些疑惑地穿
着传统俄罗斯服饰的女服务员,其实,却都是
中国人。在主街道快速地走一圈,你会发现那
些犹太学校的庭院被完整地保留了下来,但都
已经废置,只存有像鬼魂般的年轻的笑声与尖
叫声。
由于其地理位置,哈尔滨是二十世纪历史中一
系列全球大事件的直接或非直接影响所在的交
汇点:俄罗斯革命和内战,日本侵华,欧洲反
犹太人,共产党的崛起和文化大革命。这些事
件组合在一起,象征着哈尔滨犹太人的系统性
离去。且在一定程度上,也象征着非犹太俄罗
斯人离开哈尔滨去到中国的其他城市,最后甚
至到别的国家。
现在的历史条件已经大为不同,但城市化的情
况和喀什的“汉化”回避了这个问题实质:喀
什的本地民族族群是否也正流失着它的影响力
和重要性。任何一个旅行者在周五来到这个城
市都可以看到艾提尕尔清真寺的外围广场填满
了数目庞大的维吾尔族信教者。这是一个难以
置信的场景,也是对宗教是新疆人日常生活的
一个重要元素的说法的敬重。然而,对一个外
部观察者而言,总感觉这样的文化印象并不是
永恒的,它是有一个有效期的。随着在如喀什
这样的新疆城市里有越来越多的汉族人,以及
由国家领导强势推进的本地现代化进程,在维
吾尔族文化里,那头房间的大象的未来可持续
性就无法被忽略了。
五十年以后,这幅喀什维吾尔的艾提尕尔清真
寺的场景是否只能留存在一张有折痕的图片里,
在那些老一代人的记忆里,就如在哈尔滨的俄
罗斯犹太人的经历一样呢?
感谢我接触的所有的出租车司机,旅社老板,
小吃摊的摊贩且在新疆和黑龙江的年轻人。当
然还要感谢我的老师们,他们不仅要忍受我笨
拙的中文,还详细地与我进行了许多相关事件
的讨论。

中澳关系未来发展: 未来几代中澳领导者
熙奥利(Oliver Theobald)
熙奥利于 2004 开始上高中中文课,他也是前任皇家理工大学的中澳青年联合会会长。现在为霍普金
斯南京大学中美中心研究生。
今年是中澳建交 40 周年,这将成为中澳建交
史上的一个里程碑。在这四十年里,中澳关系
发生了翻天覆地的变化。四十年前毛泽东还健
在,冷战也没有结束,而且中澳之间也几乎没
有贸易往来。但是改革开放以来,经过三十多
年的发展,中国的面貌已经焕然一新。我们都
知道,现在中国是一个经济龙头。中澳经贸也
达到空前的规模,往来更加密切。中澳贸易额
从 1972 年的 1 亿美元上升至 2011 年的 1166
亿美元。当前中国已经成为澳洲第一大贸易伙
伴,同时澳洲也是中国第七大贸易伙伴和重要
的投资方。对澳洲而言,中澳关系稳定是目前,
以及未来两国发展的一个至关重要的部分。
但是,两国这几年的冲突点似乎比任何时候都
多,如:热比娅访澳、力拓案、对华留学生的
暴力问题、陆克文政府的《国防白皮书》等等。
的确,随着经济的崛起,中国在国际事务中的
地位也将不断增加。在澳洲,很多人已经开始
对中国的经济和军事实力的影响越来越关注。
根据澳大利亚国立大学(ANU)的中华全球研究
中心和中国现代国际关系研究院(CICIR)的联
合报告 —《中国和澳大利亚:关于双边关系
的联合报告》,避免两国间冲突的最佳办法是
“鼓励两国广大民众怀着增加了解,建立互信
的明确目标进行更广泛的接触”。这个报告推
进彼此政府、商业、非政府等所有部门的交流,
尤其值得一提的是“直接接触”,如:民间往
来、高层互访、体育交流,科技交流等等。
然而,他们没有直接提出青年人在两国关系中
的重要性。如若澳洲欲增加中澳往来、并实现
“最了解亚洲的西方国家”的目标, 我们必
须培养下面几代人的澳洲政治、商业和非政府
领导的能力。
84 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
首先,在培养未来几任澳洲领导者应具备的必
要知识与技能方面,教育是个很重要的部分。
澳洲教育政策应该不仅教给青年西方知识,还
要包括亚洲的历史、文化和语言。但是,根据
中澳青年对话的《呈交澳大利亚政府亚洲世纪
中的澳大利亚白皮书》,“澳大利亚的教育系
统还远远不能培养适应未来竞争的下一代”。
最新数据显示,仅有 3%的 12 年级澳洲学生学
习中文,而且其中 94%的学生有中国教育背景。
绝大部分无中国背景的学生在升至 12 年级前
就放弃了学中文。对于汉语学习者数量下降的
趋势有几个特点:一方面是学中文的确很难,
而且他们担心中学毕业考试的成绩很可能会被
这一学科拖后腿。另一方面是学生的兴趣有限,
而且是很多年轻人意识不到学中文可以获得很
多机会,如:奖学金、在中国实习和工作,交
流活动等等。要改变这种趋势并不容易,但它
能带来丰厚的回报和利益。目前,政府的拨款
收到了巨大成效,因此我们需要实施更多的改
革措施。政府应该努力通过视频、网站和社会
媒体来向学生介绍澳洲人在中国工作的趣闻轶
事。澳洲大学生和学者也可以参与学校社区的
事务中,提高学生、老师和家长对知识的重视。
其次,为提高未来几代领导的知识技能和领导
技能,我们不仅仅要鼓励澳洲学生去中国留学,
也应支持更多的在华青年领导项目。近年来,
越来越多的澳洲学生去中国留学。据中国教育
部统计,2010 年在中国留学的澳洲学生已超过
1000 人。去中国留学的机会也已经很多,年轻
人也可以通过澳大利亚政府和中国政府先申请
奖学金,再到中国留学。但这样的奖学金制度
对于青年领导技能的培养和澳洲国际形象的提
升并没有多大作用。因为学生只是简单地去上
个课,而大部分课余时间只是去唱唱歌、和其
他外国朋友一起喝喝酒。一个更有效的方法就

是:让这些澳洲留学生走进中国的大学校门,
与中国的大学生一起交流澳洲文化。因为除了
旅游或者看到袋鼠的时候会想到澳洲,一般的
中国人对澳洲并没有太多的关注。因此,我们
可以与中国的大学生多多交流,帮助他们了解
澳洲文化和教育制度的多样性,并讨论在将以
亚洲为主导的世纪里,澳洲的发展方向。中国
学生其实也不太清楚在澳洲可以得到的一些机
会,包括中澳青年对话活动、ANU 亚太青年周
等。如果多进行这样的交流,这将是一条极具
影响力的道路,它不仅让中国学生对澳洲的文
化感兴趣,还能从中获得他们关于澳州如何与
中国保持良好发展关系的建设性意见。
最后,政府应该持支持非政府性青年组织的建
设,包括中澳青年对话论坛(ACYD)以及中澳
青年联合会(ACYA)。这些青年的组织提高了
中澳合作、互信以及青年领导技能,并创建了
良好的中澳关系网络。创刊于 2009 的 ACYA 对
中澳关系具有特殊的意义。作为一个拥有超过
2000 名成员的草根青年组织,ACYA 面向对中
国感兴趣的澳洲青年以及对澳洲感兴趣的中国
青年。ACYA 通过网络和中澳两国的大学支部进
行日常运作,提供公共利益资源。ACYA 的网站
也提供求职资源,留学资料和机会的"一站式
服务"。因为很多年轻人意识不到学中文可以
获得很多机会,所以 ACYA 的活动可以增加学
生学习中文的意识。因此,ACYA 值得接到受到
更加政府资助。
未来 40 年,中澳关系将对彼此更加重要。更
加密切的双边关系将带来巨大的潜在利益,同
时青年重要的建设性作用显然不能被低估。通
过青年合作和教育,我们可以整合中澳关系发
展中的分歧,降低往来冲突,并培养未来几任
中澳领导者。
中澳青年联合会学报 85

清洁能源和减排技术:澳中密切合作的下一站
王资凯(Wang Zikai)
王资凯毕业于上海交通大学,现在是一名在新南威尔士大学研究经济和减排技术, 并获得奖学金资
助的学生。他曾代表中国出席 2009 届的中美大学生交流论坛,也曾代表澳洲参与了 2012 年世界学
生环境论坛。
说起温室气体排放和气候变化,澳大利亚和中
国两国政府均承受着来自国际社会的压力。丰
富又廉价的矿石燃料使得澳大利亚对煤电高度
依赖。如果根据英国咨询公司 Maplecroft 在
2009 年提供的数据看,澳大利亚年人均排放
20.58 吨二氧化碳,已经成为全球人均二氧化
碳排放最多的国家。而由于煤电和水泥行业的
发展,使得中国在 2006 年温气排放已经超过
美国,跃居世界第一,约占全球排放总量的四
分之一。如果把中国碳排放量排名和中国经济
总量排名做个对比,不难发现中国所面临的问
题——过量的高能耗工业制造了大量的碳排放,
而居民用电标准却落后于发达国家.
澳大利亚和中国的政治家们均认同人为排放温
室气体导致的气候变化。作为一个拥有 2100
万人口的岛国, 澳大利亚更容易受到气候变
化的影响,如气温持续上升,森林火灾,干旱
和暴风。而在中国,科学家的研究已经发现,
天气灾害事件频率呈上升趋势,频繁的极端天
气正影响着中国人民的生活。
减排和清洁能源技术层面的不断进步与商业市
场层面的可行性实际上取决于坚定与有效的政
策支持。中国政府为实现已经做出的承诺——
2020 年排放量比 2005 年降低 40%-45%,必须
不断加强对减排技术研发和推广的支持。而这
种支持并不一帆风顺:有学者将中国光伏行业
在近 5 年的高速发展看作是光伏行业的“大跃
进”,并指出这种快速扩张背后所产生的一连
串财务和环境问题;在日本核电事故后,中国
政府亦暂停了核电项目的审批,这略显与几年
前指定的核电规划“不合拍”;风能电力无法
上网问题更凸显政策与补贴的局限性。
86 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
同样澳大利亚政府面临的压力亦非常明显。从
今年 7 月 1 日起,澳大利亚政府将对全澳高碳
排放企业征收每吨 23 澳元的碳税。此方案在
国际上收获的评价甚高,被认为是减排的一个
标志性行动。虽然吉拉德宣称"90%的民众都可
以获得切实补贴",但多方对此承诺存有不同
程度的怀疑和争议。有研究表明碳排放税将会
使澳大利亚民众的生活成本提高约 0.7%,影响
消费者信心;在所有日常开销中,电费将比现
水平增加 10%。有民众怀疑政府承诺的补贴是
否能够“永久到位”。有专家亦担心,澳大利
亚采矿企业碳税成本将转嫁给下游国家,尤其
是铁矿石行业。有数据证明目前的碳税将推高
中国铁矿石进口成本近 100 亿元。
根据 International Energy Agency(IEA)的报
告,为实现在 2050 年将全球二氧化碳总排放
量降至 14Gt,最可能的大规模减排方法包括推
广二氧化碳的封存与捕获(CCS)、新能源技术、
核电技术和提升能效。
在 CCS 方面,国际能源署有关调查显示,全球
现有 3000 余个 CCS 示范项目正在建设中或已
投入使用,到 2050 年,将可能为世界减少六
分之一的排放量。仅中国未来的项目计划投入
就将达到 5 万亿美元。而中国和澳大利亚两国
政府将面对的情况非常相似——两国均以化石
能源(矿石燃料)为主要能源,并且为实现减
排目标 CCS 技术不可或缺;此外,是否能顺利
实施 CCS 技术更牵扯两国是否能继续使用廉价
丰富的煤炭资源。澳中两国均正在实践实验性
项目,而在大规模实施 CCS 技术时,必将涉及
资金投入、运营管理和法律法规等方面诸多挑
战。

相比中国风电的装机容量过剩,澳洲北部丰富
的风力资源和电网运营经验更可能成为中国解
决风电运营问题的样本。在光伏领域,多位中
国光伏领域的人才均具备在澳大利亚学习和科
研的背景;而诸多澳大利亚的光伏技术专家也
在快速发展(尽管目前深陷财富泥沼)的中国
公司担任技术咨询的职位。此外,澳洲政府对
于家用光伏设备的补贴值得中国学习,这也许
是解决中国光伏设备出口多、本土实践少的一
个有效方案。 从政策方面看,澳洲政府正在
实施的碳税政策将是中国政府学习的模式之一。
如果说中国近十年间强劲持续的发展对能源与
原材料的需求把中澳两国的关系和利益紧紧地
关联在一起,那么今后一段时间在温室气体减
排问题上的共同立场和在减排、新能源技术上
的合作会有可能将中澳两国的官方和民间合作
推向一个新的高度。
中澳青年联合会学报 87

由英文原文翻译至中文。
“面子”—改善未来的澳中关系
朱波(Andrew Chubb)
朱波是西澳大利亚大学政治学与国际关系的博士生在读,也是该大学中澳青会的创始会长。
虽然澳大利亚人长久以来就没有平等地对待过
亚洲人,但是现在我们却越来越欣赏中国所取
得的成就。然而,我们的官方必须做出更多的
努力,正式地向中国和中国人民表示敬意。这
仅仅意味着我们需要摒弃高人一等的自负虚荣
思想,而并不需要像“磕头”一样卑躬屈膝,
那样就丧失个人的尊严了。这样做不仅能提升
两国之间的关系,增进两国人民之间的友谊,
更能让我们成为维护 21 世纪世界和平的一支
真正力量。
不论我们是否喜欢,中国把自己描述成一个受
过西方和日本帝国主义羞辱,正在复兴的国家。
这是该国教育系统给孩子们灌输的思想,继而
又通过国家监督的新闻媒体进行传播,那是该
国人民审视现实的窗口。因此,中国人民通常
倾向于把西方政府的语言和行动理解为无视中
国的尊严和平等,就像历史上一样。他们认为
澳大利亚也不例外,而且认为这是有凭有据的。
澳大利亚厌恶它的亚洲邻居的历史很长,从 19
世纪维多利亚州金矿的可怕种族暴动,到“白
人澳大利亚政策”,再到宝琳·韩森的选举现
象。最近,伊斯兰原教旨主义恐怖分子和“中
东外貌的人(船只)”代替了曾经的“黄祸”,
成为澳大利亚人的主要梦魇。但是澳大利亚从
国家层面表达对东亚国家人民的敌意和不尊重
却是最近才有的记忆,甚至在年轻人当中也是
如此。在不远的 16 年前,韩森在她于众议院
的首次演说中宣称:澳大利亚面临着“被亚洲
人吞没的危险”。
再看看当前的澳大利亚:很大一部分澳大利亚
人至少还是对一个亚洲国家——中国有正面看
法。2012 年罗伊研究院进行的澳大利亚公众对
88 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
澳外交政策看法进行了调查,70%的澳大利亚
人认为中国采购澳大利亚的原材料是澳大利亚
经济在此轮全球金融危机中免遭衰退的主要原
因。这个调查还发现,79%的澳大利亚人认为
中国,而非美国,占据亚洲主导力量;47%的
受访者表示对此能够接受,较之 2008 年的 40%
有所上升。有些澳大利亚人,特别是年轻人,
甚至还支持把我们的战略合作伙伴由美国变成
中国,有五分之一的 18 岁到 29 岁的年轻人认
为中国应该成为澳大利亚最重要的安全合作伙
伴。
我同很多澳大利亚人交流过,他们大部分都对
中国取得的经济成就及其建设伟大工程(比如
三峡大坝)的能力表示钦佩。有些人甚至赞美
那种为了“发展”而经常践踏人权的一党专制
的政治体系。罗伊的民意调查也有类似的发现:
仅有 39%受访的年轻人(18 岁到 29 岁)同意
民主是最好的政治制度。当然,这主要是由他
们对我国的政客失望而导致的,但是却显示了
部分澳大利亚人的亲华观念。比如,今年早些
时候,澳中青年联合会西澳大利亚大学分会部
分成员在脸谱网上重启了停止了很多年的分离
西澳大利亚的辩论,提议独立的西澳大利亚州
与中华人民共和国结盟。
虽然部分澳大利亚人对中国的好感一直在上升,
这种好感或许有些情况下是不切实际的,但是
我们的很多领导和机构对中国却没有同样程度
的好感。这并仅仅是一种空泛的礼节。在《国
家之间为什么战争》一书中,理查德·内
德·勒博对战争动因进行了突破性的研究。他
发现,在他研究的 94 场战争中,62 场战争发
生的第一或者第二动因是民族荣誉感和民族声

中澳青年联合会学报 89
望。勒博在他这本书中说,中国是“一个对声
望特别敏感的国家”。
乍一看,这似乎有点威胁的意味——“给中国
面子,推动世界和平;否则,它会制造混乱。”
但实际上,中国对身份地位的渴求与其说是一
种威胁,倒不如说是一个机会。勒博的研究发
现,在当代国际环境中,用战争来提高国家地
位变得越来越不可行。因此,努力确保中国和
中国人民感到他们在世界上受到平等对待,可
以促进中国变为罗伯特·佐利克所说的“负责
任的利益相关方”。
澳大利亚该如何更好地向中国这个国家显示自
己的敬意呢?首先,澳大利亚需要努力地使来
自中国的工人、学生和商人感到他们受到平等
地对待,而不光是被当做摇钱树。虽然本地学
生组织,像澳中青年联合会,正在促进和培养
中国学生同本地学生之间的理解和友情,澳大
利亚政府的政策却严重滞后了。来澳大利亚学
习的中国学生支付了高昂的学费,然而他们却
没有享受到相应的服务。虽然澳大利亚派往中
国的留学生可以享受到英语授课的课程、特别
的餐厅和特殊的住宿,我们的主要大学竟然连
中文标示的路牌都没有。
考虑到很多来澳大利亚留学的中国学生将来会
成为中国的领导和专业人才,这些人对澳大利
亚的好印象肯定对澳大利亚国家利益大有裨益。
但是,今年五月份的时候,一位墨尔本大学学
生董舒婷在《时代报》上表达了她的心声,这
也是众多来澳学习的中国学生的心声:他们的
学费资助了本地学生,促进了澳大利亚经济,
然而他们受到澳大利亚政府的待遇却是相当糟
糕的,这让他们充满失望。“我们来澳大利亚
是为了接受,并试图适应这样一个与我们中国
完全不同的社会,”董写道,“然而遗憾的是,
我们中的很多人并没有感到被接受,也没有感
到被尊重。”从那以后,我经常参与或者倾听
中国学生之间的对话,他们感到处处受到澳大
利亚政府欺骗。
董在她的文章中指出,墨尔本公共交通系统就
是国际学生被“欺骗”的一个例子。把澳大利
亚公共交通优惠政策扩展到国际学生将是有实
际意义的;这在西澳大利亚州已经成为现实,
联邦政府应该能够确保全国其他地方也遵循这
样的政策,澳大利亚政府是不缺这点小钱的。
进入澳大利亚大学学习是很多中国学生的梦想,
但是要求他们完全用英语学习和写作,并且适
应本地学术规范,对于很多中国学生来说并不
简单。研究方法,避免抄袭和参考文献等基础
课程对于学生在大学取得成功至关重要。但是,
他们一进大学就要学习这些课程,而且是在他
们英语水平最弱的时候。澳大利亚的大学中有
很多中国学生和来自中国的教职员工,他们都
可以用汉语教授这些课程,需要的组织和财政
支出成本都很小。在澳元升值压力之下,澳大
利亚在国际教育市场中的竞争力受到了影响,
如果澳大利亚能提供中文教授的课程,无疑会
给澳大利亚大学教育增添新的卖点,而不光光
是表示一下对中国留学生欢迎姿态。
凯文·拉德与希拉里·克林顿的谈话中谈到他
对中国政策所持的“无情现实主义”观点。虽
然这段美国国务院电报遭到披露,却没有影响
这位澳大利亚前总理在中国受到的欢迎,因为
他会说中文,这显示了语言对于产生好感的重
要性。至少,澳大利亚应该在其所有国际机场
挂起一些中文标识,因为这些地方是访客对澳
大利亚的第一印象。在机场海关和移民办事处
配备会说普通话的工作人员,不仅能够让访客
产生好感,减轻中国到访者首次来澳可能产生
的迷惑和压力,还能帮助他们严格遵守我国的
检验检疫制度。
目前,来澳中国人只能在中国商店和饭店看到
中文标识;他们也可以在以游客为目标的商业
场所可以看到中文,而这些地方都试图向他们
兜售一些有加价的商品。在更多的公共场所引
进一些中文标识也许看上去只是一种姿态,但
是毫无疑问,它将极大地提高中国人在澳受尊
重的意识。与扩宽公共交通优惠政策相似,这
些措施成本很低,象征价值却非常高。

“面子”这一概念关系到个人在人群中的尊严。
中国人是爱面子的民族早已是陈词滥调,毕竟
日内瓦公约确认了世界上所有的人都想要而且
应该享有尊严。但是,中国传统文化相对更重
视社会和谐,而且相互之间保持有面子就是其
中很重要的内容。虽然很少有中国人或者澳大
利亚人把胡锦涛主席的“和谐社会”运动当回
事,但是“和谐”确实是这个由民族国家构成
的世界所需要的。
面子不光光是可以丢失的东西,它还可以保留
和给予,正如汉语中的词语“留面子”和“给
面子”所阐释的。如美国海军研究所学者邓勇
所说,对于中国这样一个渴望国际声望的国家
来说,外国人对中国公开表示尊重是会被视为
极具价值的,极有面子的礼物。同时,由于西
方国家在近代的优越地位,对中国缺点的公开
批评会被认为无礼,因为这样的批评意味着中
国的不足和地位低下。
近些年,虽然澳大利亚领导人公开表示将与中
国享有平等的地位,但是很多人坚持保留公开
批评中国政治制度和人权问题的权利。比如,
陆克文总理 2008 年 4 月在北京大学做讲座的
时候提及了西藏的人权问题。在拉萨发生暴乱,
无辜中国人受到暴打和杀害后仅仅三周,陆克
文发表这样的讲话,显然是不受欢迎的。他把
自己称为中国的“诤友”,但是这位诤友却在
中国首都发表这样的讲话,显然是不合时宜的。
托尼.艾伯特在 2012 年 7 月访问北京,在他
的主旨演讲中,他提及中国人缺乏自由,缺乏
选举权利。对中国人权问题和不民主的政治制
度的公开批评,在大多数中国官员和普通百姓
看来,不仅仅是意见不同的问题了,这是对中
国政府合法性的质疑。2012 年 10 月朝日新闻
采访了中国知名外交政策专家王缉思,他表示,
仍然有人认为“世界被划分成民主国家和非民
主国家,中国在世界上没有合法的地位,因为
中国是一个‘非民主’国家”。虽然艾伯特和
陆克文的观点可以看做是代表了澳大利亚的价
值观,但是他们在中国国土上发表这样的公开
演说,会被视为是对中国共产党政权的侮辱,
90 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
是对这个国家占世界五分之一人口的民族的羞
辱。
这并不是说世界上的新闻记者就不应该用他们
的火炬照亮中国的黑暗角落,他们应该这样去
做;这也并不意味着西方外交官和其他政府官
员不该在中国领导人面前提及中国人权问题,
他们应该在私下里去做,因为这样中国人就不
会感觉到在公开场合遭受侮辱,丢了面子。
在评论澳大利亚外交政策立场时,前澳大利亚
驻华大使芮捷锐指出,中国领导人认为澳大利
亚和本地区其他国家一直在围堵中国。这恰恰
是澳大利亚这些年来一直在做的。根据军事战
略家爱德华.鲁特瓦克所说,澳大利亚一直以
来都在“悄悄地”地同东南亚国家编织一套围
堵中国的网络,因为中国如果成为该地区主导
力量的话,这些国家利益必将受损。在最近于
墨尔本引进 2500 名美国驻军时,吉拉德政府
认为美国仍然主导着亚洲,澳大利亚应该紧紧
跟随美国。围堵仅仅是象征意义,没有实质内
容。是的,我们在围堵中国,但是我们为什么
要大声叫嚷围堵中国?澳大利亚的象征姿态应
该是友谊的姿态,是愿意维护中国尊严的姿态。
这种围堵的方法是被认为不择手段的,是在耍
权谋;但它却是非常顽固的信念,它遍布中国
研究战略思想的经典兵书之中。
最后,世界各国的领导人,包括有着 112 年历
史的澳大利亚的领导人,都可以慷慨地给予中
国人面子,用中国的“复兴”来代称中国的
“崛起”。马克姆.滕布尔指出,中国人认为
自己“拥有 3000 年文化,历史上一直是世界
上最大、最强的国家”。是的,从很多方面来
看,他们是正确的。从公元元年到至少 1820
年,中国的经济总量比西欧所有国家加起来还
要多;而在 15 世纪的时候,他们就有一个编
队的大型船只游弋在印度洋,展示国威,接受
朝拜。“复兴”一词不光表示中国历史上就是
一个强大的国家,而且向人们说明,中国人并
不是从积贫积弱的状态重新崛起;它正在向世
人显示,中国人是在复兴祖先所拥有的财富和
力量。

詹姆斯.帕克是一个在澳门赌场有巨大投资的
澳大利亚大亨,他说澳大利亚应该对中国企业
表示“感恩”。对此,我不敢苟同。中国企业
并不是出于好意或者是关心澳大利亚才与澳大
利亚进行贸易的。悉尼大学的约翰.李指出,
正如中澳之间铁矿石贸易,中国人与澳大利亚
贸易是为了挣钱,因为这样做符合他们的战略
目的。考虑到占地球五分之一人口的中国人的
感受,我们确实需要做的,是向他们展示我们
对他们的尊重,而不是感恩。
这些建议很可能会激起国人的义愤,说我们
“出卖”了澳大利亚的价值观。批评我们的人
必须回答这个问题:我们出卖了什么样的价值
观?在语言方面关心越来越多来澳的中国人,
这也许会破坏澳大利亚由来已久的冷漠的单语
环境,但是这侵犯了我们所恪守的任何原则了
吗?在来澳国际学生留学期间平等对待他们,
让他们更好地适应英语教学环境,这些与我们
的“机会均等”的民族精神有任何相悖的地方
吗?为了让他国改变思想观念,公开羞辱他国
领导人,并且暗示本国领导人高人一等,这是
我们澳大利亚人的价值观吗?认可 13 亿人以
自己的方式看待其历史,这不是一个有度量的,
老成练达的国家的领导人所应该支持的吗?
我们为什么不给中国人面子呢?这并不需要我
们有“磕头”式的卑躬屈膝,而且几乎没有任
何成本。这意义对他们来说要大得多,而且还
有可能促进 21 世纪的世界和平。
中澳青年联合会学报 91

由英文原文翻译至中文。
从钢铁合作到多面视角:澳中交往四十余年,何去何从
牛犇(Neil Thomas)& 卫涛(Thomas Williams)
牛犇是西澳大学主修法律与文学的一名学生。他现在由中国政府奖学金支持在中国进修,同时他也
是中澳青年联合会全国刊物编审主管。
卫涛是中国人民大学的一名社会学学生,同时,他即将结束西澳大学的文学荣誉学位研究。他非常
喜欢北京朝气蓬勃的生活,但也偶尔会怀念澳洲奇美的沙滩和阳光。
澳中关系发展史
1949 毛泽东同志秘密会见美国国务卿亨利·基
辛格,当时澳大利亚反对派领袖高夫·惠特拉
姆并不知晓这一著名会见。而在 1971 年 7 月 5
日午夜,中国国家总理周恩来同志在北京人民
大会堂会见了高夫·惠特拉姆,并就“双方共
同关心的问题”进行讨论。高夫·惠特拉姆成
为 1949 毛泽东同志宣告中华人民共和国成立
以来,第一位拜访中国的澳大利亚政治家。在
毛泽东同志晚年,惠特拉姆意识到中国将在澳
大利亚未来占有一席之地,而当时澳大利亚小
麦局(Australian Wheat Board)也在游说反
对当时自由党执政政府对中国的强硬政策。正
是这些强硬政策使中国转而放弃澳大利亚,而
从加拿大进口粮食。惠特拉姆主动到访中国并
承诺一旦他成为澳大利亚总理,他将效仿美国
对华态度。他于 1972 年 12 月 12 日正式承认
中华人民共和国为合法政府。
自此以后,澳中关系的发展突飞猛进。拥有丰
富资源的澳大利亚与当时进行工业发展的中国
具有日益增加的经济互补性,所以中国赢得惠
特拉姆之后连续几届澳大利亚政府的注意力和
兴趣。1985 年,鲍勃·霍克任命郜若素为澳大
利亚驻华大使,郜若素不是身经百战的对华老
手,而恰恰是霍克最重要的经济战略家,这一
意外之举使澳中关系发展的前景更稳固了。澳
中第一个大型投资项目是位于澳大利亚西部皮
尔巴拉的恰那铁矿合资公司(Channar Iron
Ore Joint Venture),该公司于 1987 年获得
92 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
批准兴建,这一项目预示着澳中关系今后的发
展前景。1989 年,尽管霍克个人对天安门广场
事件感到极度痛恨,但是当时贸易部长尼
尔·布鲁维特仍获准前往中国参加双边贸易会
谈,尼尔·布鲁维特成为首位来访中国的西方
国家内阁部长。在这种推动两国经济繁荣的强
烈愿望推动下,保罗·基廷与澳大利亚籍彼
得·瑞斯德尔教授一起在 20 世纪初中国与中
国台湾加入亚太经济组织 APEC 的过程中发挥
了关键性的作用,两人还协助缓解了中国海峡
两岸的紧张局势。同样地,约翰·霍华德也克
服了他本人的新保守派信念和对美国政权的强
烈个人兴趣,与中国共同规划出一个既认识到
两国政治与社会差异,又能继续推进两国追求
共同经济利益的实践框架。
2007 年,陆克文掌权,成为第一位会讲中文的
西方政治领导。当此之时,我们可以预见由中
国推动的资源大开发之规模是前所未有的。在
这种背景下,澳中双方均热切希望能建立更密
切的双边关系。但这些期望迅速被证明是不现
实的。2009 年,陆克文缺乏谨慎的对外政策,
加之国内落后的公共关系管理机制,与当时所
发生的一系列事件联合导致澳中关系跌入迄今
为止最低落的低潮。这些事件包括澳大利亚联
邦政府在其国防白皮书中对“中国威胁”的渲
染,中国铝业拒绝里奥廷托公司对扩大所有权
的拒绝,中国庭审的腐败现象,对澳大利亚籍
公民胡士泰的判决,以及陆克文在 2010 年哥
本哈根爆粗口,尖刻辱骂中国等。尽管如此,
推动澳中贸易的经济力量仍然强劲,2009 年,

中国石油与埃克森美孚公司签订了关于在澳大
利亚西部的高更气田提取液态天然气的合同,
其价值高达 500 亿澳大利亚美元。这是澳中两
国签署的价值 500 亿澳大利亚美元,或者相当
于 GDP 5.4%的规模最大的项目。当前,在持续
强劲的经济交流推动下,以及重新采用霍华德
时代政策的背景下,澳中关系再次得到改善。
现在澳大利亚的所采取的安全战略以共同价值
观和国际目标为出发点,把焦点聚集在美国。
例如去年 11 月,茱莉亚·杰拉德同意让美国
在达尔文港建立驻军基地,这是奥巴马的“转
身亚洲”战略的一部分。
“四十而不惑”,但前路仍有未知之数
正如孔子的这句名言,澳中关系无疑带来了两
国经济的极大发展:双边贸易额从 1972 年 1
亿澳大利亚美元增长到 2010 年 1000 亿澳大利
亚美元;中国远远超越其他国家,成为澳大利
亚最大的出口市场;澳大利亚是中国最大的对
外直接投资目的国;在澳大利亚约有 20 万名
中国学生;每年到中国旅游的澳大利亚人为 20
万,到澳大利亚旅游的中国人为 50 万;中国
游客作为澳大利亚消费最高的游客,每年为每
一户澳大利亚家庭增加 10500 澳大利亚美元的
收入。这些数据以及政客们对这些数据的象征
意义的吹嘘,毫无疑问地表明,建交 40 年,
中澳两国关系的本质就是贸易二字。暂不考虑
中国国内严重的内部政局不稳现象以及生态危
机,根据一系列的因素,比如农村人口持续向
城镇迁移;国内经济日益受到重视;巨大的市
场消费潜力;国家在教育事业的长线投入以及
人民币的日益国际化,中国庞大的人口总数加
上 20 年内就能让中国经济翻两番的经济增长
速度,意味着中国将在澳大利亚未来发挥决定
性的作用。
但是,尽管中国具有明显的重要性,加上与澳
大利亚具有四十年的交往史,澳大利亚作为一
个国家,在为澳中关系建立一个全面的战略规
划方面仍然欠缺清晰的远见与足够的知识。而
澳大利亚社会对现代中国(以及对亚洲整体)
仍处于懵懂不知的状态:现在仅有 4%的澳大利
亚学校开设中文为第二外语;澳大利亚未提供
足够投资在中国建立澳大利亚学习项目,以与
澳大利亚孔子学院建设项目相呼应;许多澳大
利亚政治组织对中国一无所知或者投机取巧,
操控群众,在民众中形成一股潜在的不信任中
国,对中国文化不了解的力量。这些组织希望
通过这些力量赢取选票,而这钟举措无疑是鼠
目寸光的,是短期的。(譬如 7 月 4 日在北京,
托尼·艾伯特就对中国投资做了一番毫无技巧
的评论)或许,这些经济事实与社会政治现实
脱节的一个最突兀的原因在于澳中两国仍然没
有建立一个定期的、机构化的高层政治交流体
制。相比之下,美国,英国,加拿大与德国,
尽管与中国的贸易往来相对较少,但均与中国
建立了战略、安全、与经济对话机制。大众对
澳大利亚社会和政治组织的意识是与选举周期
和大众媒体紧密结合在一起的。这种意识仍处
在欧洲-亚洲存在主义认同危机的操控之下,
与一个凭空想象的观念苦苦相争。这一观念认
为澳大利亚如果和亚洲强国中国建立密切的政
治和社会文化联系,则必然导致澳大利亚失去
美国这个盟友,失去美澳共同认可的西方价值
观。澳大利亚需要进一步了解中国,而归根结
底,澳大利亚更需要进一步了解自身。
澳大利亚人,何去何从?
中国经济发展规模大,速度快,影响深远,而
中国政界却孤立且不透明,中国政界与商界的
联系紧密,围绕中国国际野心国际上还有种种
猜疑,这一切难免让澳大利亚政治组织与澳大
利亚社会对中国崛起及其将对澳大利亚带来的
影响感到些许迟疑。在面对这些未知之数的时
候(以及诸如 2009 年澳大利亚国防白皮书出
台,维基解密电缆透露陆克文询问美国希拉
里·克林顿道,如果“一切发展到不可收拾的
地步”,美国是否准备好向中国使用武力;中
国对南海与东海恐怖主义宣言采取的外交政策
日益强硬;中国执政团体十年一换之期迫近;
以及美国总统竞选早期,总统候选人夸耀其所
谓反中国的“爱国主义”言论),当此澳中建
交 40 周年之际,公众对澳、美、中不对等三
角关系的争论盛嚣尘上。而这一争论竟被扭曲
中澳青年联合会学报 93

成象征澳大利亚未来的一个极端抉择,而这个
抉择就是是否与中国靠近。如果澳大利亚选择
向中国靠近,则代表安全,而反之,即是选择
自身的传统价值观,这种价值观的表现形式就
是与澳大利亚与美国的关系和本国持续的经济
繁荣。
选择安全或者选择经济是一些别有用心的个人
在社会争论中为了掩饰其对中国的无知和不理
解而采取的权宜之计。这个计谋对我们毫无帮
助却总是周期性地出现。为了避免犹疑不决地
在安全和经济这一虚伪的二分论之间做一个选
择,我们应当转而回答这一场争论中最核心的
问题:澳大利亚,作为一个民族,作为一个国
家,究竟为什么追求经济的增长?
乍一看,这个问题似乎与我们讨论的国际关系
不相关,甚至于显得孩子气,但是追求经济的
增长是我们在规划澳大利亚未来的时候默认的
出发点。我们在此没有空间展开对这个根本性
问题的经济哲学的讨论,但是提出这个问题,
参与讨论,以及尝试做出回答的努力却非常重
要。盲目理想化的经济增长模式把消费主义放
在中心,认为解决一切问题的最终目的就是实
现为最多的人提供最大量的商品。如果澳大利
亚继续推进这种理想化的经济增长,那么我们
必须公开讨论这个问题,这样才能做出更多敏
锐的国际安全预测与经济政策决定,以真正实
现这一目的。但是,如果,正如作者所相信的,
经济增长并非是一个目的,而是一种手段,那
么澳大利亚人必须同心协力地、严格谨慎地、
开诚布公地探索国家发展的首要之事,运用我
们当前独特的经济优势,给社会重新定位。澳
大利亚独特的经济优势体现在例如我们在科学
研究和人力资源发展方面做出具有远见的投资。
我们应该提供更多高质量教育;建设包容性日
强,基础广阔,值得赞颂的社会决策机制;以
及持续追求技术发展,提供更完备的生活体系
等。通过这些举措使社会不再受那些妄图通过
短暂的享乐主义消费满足个人欲望,提升自我
修养和获取个人权利的思潮影响而分散注意力。
特别是在与中国的关系中,澳大利亚应通过加
强投资与经济多样化,尤其是在非基于资源的
94 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
服务行业,比如信心与通讯技术,银行与金融,
以及教育等领域的投资与多样化。澳大利亚也
应通过加强初级与中级亚洲语言义务教育,建
设澳大利亚人才资源;增加移民配额;通过加
大投资刺激研发行业的发展;放松法律约束以
允许更多的商业操作;以及,用前澳大利亚驻
华大使芮捷锐博士的话说,通过定期的、机构
化的政府间高层会谈,为澳中政治关系“奠定
基石”。通过以上措施,使澳大利亚的持续繁
荣不再仅仅依赖采矿大潮。
中澳未来与你
或许,把未来亚洲时代的澳大利亚决策与目标
实现放在政府、商界以及其他有影响力的机构
手中显得更加容易与安全,但是为了在澳大利
亚与中国、亚洲、与我们自身的关系中去的必
要进展,我们不能仅仅依赖于现存的社会政治
结构和跨文化资源在这样瞬息万变的世界中发
挥内部推动作用,发挥主动性。作为年轻的澳
大利亚人,我们应该积极参与推动社会结构的
必要发展,确保培养出新一代具有跨文化竞争
优势,经验丰富的澳大利亚人。澳大利亚需要
这样的一代人;他们能与亚洲国家和亚洲人民
在政府、商界、以及社会交流中有效互动,成
为伙伴。如此,能推动亚洲与澳大利亚的一体
化,提升澳大利亚社区对亚洲的认识,提升澳
大利亚在亚洲的影响,以及提升澳大利亚当前
经济实力的影响力,确保澳大利亚的长远繁荣。
鉴于此,作者很高兴见到由青少年发起的组织
数量不断增加,这些组织致力于提高亚洲教育
水平,并且积极参与亚洲国家水平,省市水平,
以及大学和高中教育范围的各项活动。譬如印
尼澳青年联 合 会 ( Australia-Indonesia
Youth Association ) , 印 澳 青 年 对 话
(Australia-India Youth Dialogue),日澳
青 年 联 合 会 ( Australia-Japan Youth
Association ) , 以 及 韩 澳 青 年 联 合 会
( Australia-Korea Youth Association )。
尤其与中国的中澳青年联合会(Australia-
China Youth Association [ACYA])更值得
一提。ACYA 是澳大利亚一个由青年领导的非营

利性组织,该组织致力于建设双边青年团体,
推动跨文化交流与了解,并为年轻人发展和实
现有价值的计划中发挥平台作用。ACYA 以开设
在澳大利亚和中国的分支机构为依托,定期举
办高质量的社会活动,社交活动,体育赛事,
教育,出版以及志愿者活动等。ACYA 的分支机
构以教育、职业和人文交流为三个平台与支柱,
每一个计划都能量身定制地满足澳中青年团体
的需求。2008 年一个深夜,ACYA 萌生于北京
一所大学中,一间聚集着几个谦逊年轻学生的
宿舍。自此以后,ACYA 转变成一个强大的,有
魄力且不断扩展的青年团体。它成为其他许多
跨文化交流平台的跳板,比如中澳青年对话
(Australia-China Youth Dialogue),中澳
青年精英领袖团(Australia-China Young
Professionals Initiative),以及参与中国
工程(Engaging China Project)。如果你是
一个愿意在中澳关系中做出贡献的年轻人,那
么 ACYA 是一个适合你的平台。它属于所有希
望中澳两国人民在相互理解、相互欣赏与建立
友谊上达到新高度的人。
正如爱德华·肯尼迪所说的:“未来不属于那
些满足于今日的人,那些对共有的问题无动于
衷的,在新想法与大胆工程之前胆小如鼠,畏
首畏尾的人无法掌握未来。未来是属于那些能
把远见、推理和勇气接合在一起,对理想社会
和社会的伟大工程有个人责任感的人手中的。”
而这也正是亚洲世纪下澳大利亚青年将面临的
挑战。
中澳青年联合会学报 95

由英文原文翻译至中文。
中澳两国间友谊城市的困境
隆龙(Lloyd Bradbury)
隆龙是中澳青年精英领袖团澳洲的总执行,并在 2011 年代表澳大利亚参加了在巴黎举行的 G20 青年
峰会。
澳大利亚和中国之间有很深的渊源:两国的贸
易关系高度互补,都是二十国集团成员国,有
部长级代表团往来,中国移民至澳大利亚的历
史可以追溯到淘金热时代,仅举几例。然而,
两国间有一种联系不会立马映入人们的脑海,
即两国间缔结了 82 对友谊城市。友谊城市统
指友谊城镇、友谊城市、友谊州/省及其他类
似关系。
20 世纪 70 年代末,中、澳两国开始缔结友谊
州/省关系,这种友谊州/省关系的建立以加强
国际友谊和文化认识为原则,也符合中国的对
外开放政策。近年来,由于双边利益高度互补,
中、澳两国的贸易关系有了蓬勃发展,两国间
的友谊城市关系当然也不例外。中国一直鼓励
其省级及市级政府积极融入全球事务,澳大利
亚的州政府和市政府也同样面临与中国建立联
系的压力。2000 年以来,越来越多的澳大利亚
地区级小城市与中国的二、三线城市缔结了友
谊城市关系,82 对友谊城市中有 39 对是在这
一期间建立联系的。
这么紧锣密鼓地建立联系不禁引出这样一个问
题:纳税人的钱花得是否值得?当下经济动荡,
澳大利亚媒体总能迅速指出它们所认为的浪费
型支出。有媒体报道,1998 年以来墨尔本市共
耗资 200 多万澳元来维持其在天津的办事处;
大丹德农议会派至徐州的一支市长代表团耗费
了 6000 澳元。鉴于这般高级别的审查,地方
政府在讨论友谊城市关系时关注的更多的是
“投资回报”,而不是 20 世纪初友谊城市运
动发起时所倡导的“友谊和文化交流”。
96 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
这种以商业为导向的友谊城市关系新对话反映
了澳大利亚各级政府角色的变化,同时,这种
新对话也旨在安抚选民:他们的代表并不为昂
贵的国际公费旅游所动。州政府和市政府为维
持这种友谊城市关系投入了时间、金钱和精力,
在这种情况下,它们期望收获与其投入相应的
商业和经济成果是完全可以理解的。
令人鼓舞的是,已经有很多实现的商业成果的
例子:新南威尔士州-广东省每年两次的联合
经济会议,每年一度在墨尔本进行的天津市政
府领导培训计划,在维多利亚州的友谊城市—
—江苏省兴建一个莫纳什大学的校区。
虽然取得了显著成果,但是布鲁诺·马斯特里
及莫娜·钟所做的研究指出“友谊城市关系
(在发展持久的经济联系方面)几乎没有进
展”。所以很明显,要改善目前的状况,中澳
两国有必要分析和借鉴成功案例。
在进行分析时,认清这一点很重要:澳大利亚
地方政府努力在中国搭建联系不能只为追求短
期商业成果。很多时候,中澳之间最成功的城
市交往不是短短几年就形成的,而是经历了几
十年的发展才形成的;此外,这种关系也往往
是从友谊关系(而非经济关系)发展而来的—
—这也体现了中国人所说的友好城市的含义。
这恰是澳大利亚政府所面临的友谊城市关系困
境。一方面,澳大利亚民众要求政府在短期内
取得经济成果,另一方面,在取得这种成果之
前,政府又需要在文化层面上对双边关系进行
长期的投资。因此,澳大利亚政府必须更加积
极地让纳税人看到其与中国交往的好处,与此

同时,在选择友谊城市时要更加明智,以期合
作能够带来长期经济成果。
在澳中建交 40 周年之际,有必要寻找方法以
提升两国关系的广度和深度。友谊城市之间的
文化、交流和以对话为基础的活动就是一个绝
佳的方法。如今,中澳两国 82 对友谊城市之
间的交流和对话活动创造的总价值是非常巨大
的。
鉴于此,澳大利亚政府应该以商业成果作为衡
量中澳间友谊城市关系成败的标志,而不是以
此为缔结关系的基础。
中澳青年联合会学报 97

由英文原文翻译至中文。
澳籍华人如是观
罗介雍(Jieh-Yung Lo)
罗介雍是一位来自墨尔本的作家。他同时还是莫那什市区的副市长,并正在制作一部关于中国移民
在澳洲的历史纪录片。
我在中国经常被问的头两个问题以及破冰话题
总是:“你是洋人吗?”“你会听和讲中文
吗?”
直译过来是“你是外国人吗?”和“你会听和
讲中文吗?”对中国人来讲遇见黄皮肤但是说
着一口外国腔的英文的人总是令人兴奋。你看,
澳籍华人,无论如何总是不被当做中国人。在
本土中国人眼里,我们只不过是外国人。所以
不用费力尝试说服他们你的祖籍是中国,因为
这根本没用。我上过数不胜数的周末中文培训
班,读中国史,听父母讲故事,对像我这样跟
自己的文化传统有很深连接的人来讲,以上所
述经验相当令人沮丧,我从未受过如此冷落。
对中国人来说,澳大利亚以“Xiang Jin Shen”
著称,意思是“新金山”,美国而以“旧金山”
著称。在 19 世纪 50 年代到 70 年代间,大量
中国人在维多利亚金矿区和新南威尔士州小矿
区工作。随着维多利亚发现大型金矿,更多反
华法案被通过时,促使成千上万矿工在 1859
年越过了边境。当越来越多的中国人出现在矿
区时,激起了反华风潮,包括冲突事件如蓝滨
滩暴动,直接导致 1861 年出台了一个方案,
降低进入殖民地的中国人的数量。因为移民限
制,不允许中国劳工带妻子过去,我的曾曾祖
父娶了一位当地英国女子,当在维多利亚金矿
区获得成功之后,她跟着我曾曾祖父一起回中
国。由于这笔新获得的财富,他很不幸地在中
国被盯上,被抢劫了,迫使他回到了维多利亚。
接着,他把妻子子女都留在广东省,再婚,并
在澳大利亚过世。从那时起,音讯全无。
98 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
一百年后,因为第二次中日战争(第二次世界
大战的一部分)和持续进行的中国内战,我父
母两边的家族都离开了中国。20 世纪 40 年代
时,他们到达了越南,我的父母都是在越南河
内和西贡的华人社区中出生长大的。我的外公
是一位有奉献精神的国民政府第 19 路军的军
人。他的经历包括在 1934 年长征期间与中国
共产党军队作战,1932 年三月上海的第一次战
役,以及 1932 年上海三月份的战争,史称一
二八事变。由于第十九路军在与日本和平协议
问题上跟总元帅蒋介石出现分歧,第十九路军
叛变,并成立了共和国反国民党人民革命政府,
可转瞬即逝,因为国民党很快就压制叛乱。闻
名一时的第十九路军战败,被遣散了。
国民党政府败给了人民解放军,迫使其领导人
蒋介石在 1949 年逃离去了台湾。对很多国民
党前同盟者或那些害怕共产党的人而言,离开
大陆去台湾是很普遍的。因此,我家在越南开
始迁移,去寻求全新的开始。
我父母的跟我有很相似的成长经历。作为越南
籍中国人,他们得承受在“外国”身为少数族
群的感觉和压力。为了生存,华人群体必须把
分歧放在一边,共同努力。中国方言众多,民
族多样,以此闻名于世。你可以从福建去广东
或者从北京去上海,期间会体验到截然不同的
方言,更不必提风土民情的差异了。我曾无数
次地写下我想要的东西,因为我不会说也听不
懂当地方言。我祖父母惊叹在越南的华人群体
的凝聚力。他们的孩子对自己中国人的身份再
认同不过了,因为接受自己的文化遗产是他们
生存发展壮大的唯一选择。令人惊叹的是,当
时在西贡的中国群体比整个中国更团结。在越

中澳青年联合会学报 99
南战争爆发,于是在 1977 年我家就逃到了墨
尔本。再次,仿佛是命运安排把他们带到了澳
大利亚。
我是在一个非常传统的中国家庭里长大的,我
的价值观道德观融合了两国文化。我认为这是
一个优势,因为它给我带来了个人成功发展。
从小我妈妈就告诉我:“儿子,要记得老祖宗。
你是龙的传人,要为国家和人民感到自豪。”
我总是无言以对。
多元文化使得移民群体在尊重和实践澳大利亚
价值观和生活方式的同时,又能欢欣接受他们
的传统和遗产。尽管如此,很多新移民和移民
后代,拿我自己做比方,拥有双重身份,当我
们尝试融入澳大利亚社会时,面临着两种文化
身份间的妥协。对很多年轻的新移民来说,适
应新环境的压力加剧了这些挑战的复杂性。他
们祖国的文化规范和期待,以及老一辈的价值
观跟新环境总是有很多冲突。很重要的一点是
要支持那些保持传统文化、会说母语、有着多
样文化多种语言背景的年轻澳大利亚人。我们
的联邦政府和州政府在这方面做得很好。
第一次登长城时,我禁不住热泪盈眶。因为中
国闭关自守太久了。实际上,中国对世界开放
已经是传统思维的一次转变。很难衡量许多华
人对祖国的那份深深的连接。无数人离开仅仅
是因为别无选择。也因为离开,他们觉得自己
在同志们中留下了一份负面的遗产。直到今天,
这份负面遗产的开头是这样的,“你是洋人
吗?”
让我吃惊的是,本土中国人不清楚从十九世纪
开始就有中国人开始移民去澳大利亚了。在澳
大利亚,人们对定居在此的中国人的历史也所
知有限。作为一名澳籍华人,我觉得这是我的
使命,提供历史教育,让更多的澳大利亚人和
本土中国人了解澳籍华人的历史。在我看来,
这样的认识,提供了独一无二的机会加深我们
两国间的文化社会了解。
对我个人而言,我的中国之行让我更亲近祖国。
我想这始于我父母提供给我的发展机会,以及
在校时就开始的中文学习。我一直很支持多元
文化论,同样也支持多元文化政策和项目,以
帮助移民和难民。但是我们没看到许多移民群
体正努力克服很多问题,比如文化认同丧失,
通常因为语言不通经历不同导致的代际问题,
以及平衡两种文化日益困难。
我认识很多同辈的年轻人,他们听不懂他们的
母语,更别提会说了。许多移民父母担心自己
孩子不能融入未来社会,这导致他们决定在如
今更青睐英语的时代牺牲母语。他们没明白一
点,会说第二外语,双重文化认同的人在就业
市场是相当受欢迎的。研究显示,拥有上述技
能的人在多个行业里都很成功。
那些保持自己的文化,会说母语的年轻人,他
们的成功离不开与父母的良好关系,以及他们
所接受的教导。根据澳大利亚公立学校组织委
员会所指出,鼓励年轻人会说母语很好的一个
策略是父母一方跟孩子说英文,另外一方说母
语,这样孩子就能同样驾驭两种语言。
对那些有移民背景的年轻人来讲,保持和探索
自己的文化源头,是一种承诺,会带来个人发
展和成就,更重要的是,会加深对其他国家和
文化的认识了解,转而为我们日益为文化所点
亮的多元社会锦上添花。那些人能为澳大利亚
社区和经济做出绝大贡献。应该鼓励他们保持
和培养自己重要的特点和天分,将自己的知识
和经验奉献出去,促进发展共同文化,投身于
日益多样化全球化的就业市场。
而我置身何处?一生当中,内在总有冲突,想
弄明白自己的身份。是的,我出生在澳大利亚,
澳大利亚是我家乡,我的国籍,但是在内心深
处,我和我的祖国家园有着深深的连接。当我
2008 年 111 月第一次当选为莫纳什的委员时,
我做了如下发言:
“数周前,我的父母庆祝他们从越南来到这里
31 周年,他们一直梦想来澳大利亚,一直活在

这个梦想中,而我觉得,今天我当选宣誓就职
意味着他们实现了这个梦想。我为自己的文化
历史和传统和我父母教导的价值观念感到自豪。
我期望着把他们带到莫纳什委员会。莫纳什在
提升文化和语言多样性方面做了很多好的工作,
是时候让这种文化多样性体现在这个委员会本
身。我想用我父母教我的一个谚语来结束今天
的讲话:‘积水之恩,当涌泉相报’。”
我非常荣幸能代表两个群体-首先也是最重要
的,莫纳什的居民,另外,更庞大的华人群体。
100 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
从 2006 年起,莫纳什的澳籍华裔的比例在维
多利亚最高,我很荣幸成为第一位澳籍华裔来
代表和服务这个城市。这也是我表达对给我家
庭很多扶持的伟大国家的感激之情的一种方式。
我真心希望能鼓励有移民背景的年轻人重拾或
花点时间学习他们的母语和文化,这会拓展你
的视野,增加机遇。对我的祖父和曾曾祖父而
言,我是澳籍华人,这是再幸福不过,且最自
豪的事情!

由英文原文翻译至中文。
凤凰涅槃:玛丽•博格斯特罗姆的《聚焦东方》
黄智雄(Joel Wing-Lun)
黄智雄是北京齐纳百思咨询有限公司的研究员,同时是中澳青年联合会的联络主任。
2012 学年即将走向尾声之际,中国社交媒体网
站人人网就“分享你大学最大的遗憾”邀请即
将毕业的大学生作答。学生们在空白的 A4 纸
上写下了自己的遗憾清单,并在即将别离的宿
舍里拍下照片。反馈内容丰富多样,从“从未
约会”,到“减肥失败”,到“没试过同性
恋”,再到“仍然不会飞”,不一而足。
从许多方面来看,中国青年一代的希望和抱负
与西方同龄人不谋而合:找到一份工作,找到
男朋友或女朋友,以及实现个人及专业潜力等。
然而,正如玛丽• 博格斯特罗(Mary
Bergstrom)在《聚焦东方:向中国青年人推
销的教训》中所提醒的,随着中国儿童的市场
改革,独特的社会和经济条件以及集体经验都
在影响中国青年一代的自我认知和世界认知,
也影响到他们对地方和国际品牌和营销行为的
反应。
市场营销在中国之所以有实现的可能,要归功
于中国领导人自上世纪 70 年代末和 80 年代初
开始取消计划经济体制的决策,这一决策带来
了中国社会和经济的巨大转变。然而,正如玛
丽•博格斯特罗所述,改革的快速步伐不仅导
致改革前生人和改革后生人之间的巨大代沟,
也在“80 后”,独生子女政策下出生的第一代
人和他们 90 年以后出生的表弟表妹们中间产
生了巨大裂痕。
根据玛丽•伯格斯特龙的观点,一方面, “80
后引领中国社会进入以选中和地位为代表的主
流,而 90 后将 80 后人的个人主义精神提高到
新的极致”,尤其明显更乐于接受性、暴力和
网络表现。另一方面,80 后期待收到施华洛世
奇或 LV 等作为礼物,而 90 后可能会要求红牛
或杜蕾斯安全套作为礼物。
80 后一代人在成长过程中往往被冠以“小皇帝”
的名称,因为他们要求父母给予全心全意的关
注,然而自从迈进 20 岁的门槛以来,他们不
只要应对父母安排的诸多相亲活动及其他说媒
活动,还要承受各种不利的客观情况。在强制
计划生育政策实施 30 年之后的 2011 年,4 岁
以 下 的 儿 童 中 女 孩 和 男 孩 的 比 例 大 约 是
100:123.
人口结构的转变已经改变了这个传统男权社会
的权力制衡。到 2014 年,女性对家庭收入的
贡献预计将达到 52%, 由于他们无需离开家庭
或者存钱买房,中国女青年的可支配收入高过
以往任何时代。然而在玛丽•伯格斯特龙看来,
对中国青年来说,美貌“并不是自我实现的崇
高宣言”,而更是一种在竞争激烈的工作和婚
姻市场上获得优势,超出他人的一种手段。
不只对女性,而且日益对男性来说,时尚、美
容产品、甚至整容手术都被视作在公司晋升阶
梯上往上爬升或最起码保住立足之地的必备条
件。伯格斯特龙女士将拼抢日益白热化的婚姻
市场的原因归因于都市美男或“都市玉男”的
兴起,她指出,在截止到 2014 年期间,男士
护肤产品在中国的销售增长会比在北美地区的
销售增长快 5 倍。
“聚焦东方”这一观点的提出以在该领域内多
年研究为根据:通过提问题、深层探究和与中
国青年共度时光的方式进行。伯格斯特龙女士
对中国青年、及他们与网络、时尚、亚文化和
中澳青年联合会学报 101

行动主义的关系的分析敏锐深刻,对将视线锁
定中国市场的商人具有无可估量的价值。尽管
强调了有钱的都市青年的消费习惯,她也展示
出对处于生存食物链底层的年轻人的抱负的深
刻了解。
市场行销组合该如何以一个行为和价值观不为
外界熟知的群体为本,这是令人惊讶的。伯格
斯特龙女士对中国青年市场的不懈探寻不只让
我们对中国青年的品牌忠诚有了更为深入的了
102 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
解,也能引导我们对中国青年不同于西方同龄
人的价值观和生活经验的尊重。
尽管我们很理智地没有使用水晶球预测,“聚
焦东方”的确让我们得以一瞥未来的倩影。正
如毛泽东对更早一代人的宣言,中国的未来取
决于年青一代。伯格斯特龙女士断言中国青年、
现代化和西方化并不完全是一回事,这一断言
的启示意义远远超出了市场营销的范畴。倾听
当代中国青年的声音会有利让我们在未来获益
匪浅。

中澳青年联合会学报 103

Painting/画: Matt
Bio: Matt is an accounting and law student at the University of Sydney. When not crunching numbers, he
can be found either surfing the net, or, if appearing offline, documenting Sydney via photography.
简介:Matt在悉尼大学攻读会计和法学学位。在不用和数字打交道的时候,他喜欢在网上冲浪;不
上网的时候,他则用摄影来记录悉尼。

SECTION V
CREATIVE WORK
第五部分
原创作品部分

不中不澳的灰暗天空
吴忠彥(Gareth Durrant)
这篇文章荣获了“中澳青年联合会学报原创作品部分一等奖”。
This article was awarded the ACYA Journal Creative Work Prize。
吴忠彥毕业于台湾国立大学,主修商业管理和性别研究。闲暇之余,他花了大量时间阅读中国现代
文学。
Gareth Durrant graduated from National Taiwan University with a degree in Business
Administration and Gender Studies, but spent most of his time reading modern Chinese
Literature。
宿舍内是禁烟的!带着女朋友上楼的大学生对
我提出了警告。但带女生回宿舍就可以的?
厌烦透了。
被一群死宅男包围了。系上的同学也没有好到
哪里去。我疑惑我为什麽要待在这里,这个破
烂的宿舍,这充满嫩孩子的大学,这令人疏远
冷漠的城市。
坐在楼梯的台阶上,我在宿舍的逃生门外喝啤
酒。烟蒂如雀斑。不晓得水泥上凌乱的污点是
自己还是我烟友的。其实没差,反正不是我打
扫的。宿舍里面的灯很亮,像医院 。但医院
不可能这麽脏。鞋子总是随便放,每一个鞋柜
上都有一层厚厚的灰尘。学生都在自己的房间
里玩电动,我在门外点起一根又一根的烟。半
夜的宿舍好安静但键盘滴滴的声音却在我耳边
嗡嗡叫,怎麽会变成这个样子?
本来只是很单纯的好奇,离开家门一去就是三
年。我绝对不是华人,也早已不是出国前的那
个嫩男孩。澳洲日益遥远,而台湾的生活也只
是一个锁住,又进不去的铁门。
在两边都不受欢迎的情况下还有哪里可去?天
下之大竟无我容身之处,或者并非不受欢迎而
是一种无法自在的焦虑。
106 ACYA JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA-CHINA AFFAIRS
大学老师视我们外国学生为参观者而不是正常
班上的学生。这是一种难以描述的感觉。受欢
迎,被尊重,这种种的客气、礼貌倒像是一种
拒人千里之外的冷酷——意思是「你不是我们
这一群」。我从来不想走在聚灯下引人注意,
只想拿个大学文凭然后拍拍屁股走人。我又不
是第一个留学生,说不定珀斯有我自己的分身,
正在讨厌着他的澳洲同侪,後悔他买的那张机
票。问题是离家太远太久了,感觉上永远回不
去从前的自在。用英文说吧,我是圈外人(out
of the loop)。无法插入话题,跟老朋友沟通
不了,我开始不能理解当时相处的原因。
不想睡但明天要上课,身体还是乖乖地爬起来。
走进那个又脏又亮的宿舍时随手关上那扇逃生
门, 黑暗被我锁在门外。在房间只停留了一
小会儿,拿了毛巾和肥皂准备去洗手间。三位
室友已睡了。离开房间後才发现忘记拖鞋,希
望没有人会看到。穿着夹脚拖鞋来上课,同学
都会开玩笑地问“你在渡假吗?”。若看到反
而不穿拖鞋洗澡一定会被指责。
我在北京学会了用中文呛人,不知道是因为生
活上的需要还是那时候中文终於从学生词,练
习对话到有辩论表达能力。有一次我中午跑邮
局一趟,前面的一位阿姨插队而後面的人装没
看到。

你不用排队吗?
只寄一封信,你们老外会很慢,我会很快的,
她自以为很有逻辑地回答我说。後面的人还头
头是道。我不管你要寄一封信,一个大包裹还
是为大家跳舞,你都要排队。
当那位阿姨回到我後面的位置去时我却感到这
场胜利是空虚的,在场的所有人一定觉得这位
老外是个争执琐事的人。坦白讲我还是有点得
意,但在他们的眼里拘泥的我刚刚对一个中年
女性发脾气却是完全无来由的。不管是呛人还
是和谐地融入别人的社会习惯,抑或是穿不穿
夹脚拖鞋来上课,我都是一个他者(other)。
洗手间的每一间浴室都散发着特殊的霉味。我
选择最里面的那一间, 因为已养成一个习惯。
喜欢把头放在角落里, 倚靠着墙。偷偷瞄浴
帘左右任一恻就会看到我站在那, 一只手握
住另一只手,双手放在背后。不晓得我为甚麽
开始那样站。舒畅的生活在哪? 若不能在家乡,
不可在祖国实现,那么到底还有哪? 似乎只
好在这不中不澳的灰暗天空下徘徊。 只好淹
没在这氤氤热水中,接受夹在两面瓷砖墙中的
感觉,赤裸却又温暖和安全。
中澳青年联合会学报 107