PDF version - US Army Center Of Military History

CMH Pub 70–81–1
Cover: On the Town, Jeffrey T. Manuszak, 1994

Introduction
The United States Army has a long tradition of humanitarian
relief. No such operation has proven as costly or shocking, however, as
that undertaken in Somalia from August 1992 to March 1994. Greeted
i n i t i a l ly by Somalis happy to be saved from starvation, U.S. troops
were slow ly drawn into interclan power struggles and ill-defi n e d
“nation-building” missions. The American people woke up one day in
early October 1993 to news reports of dozens of our soldiers killed or
wounded in fierce fighting in the streets of the capital city, Mogadishu.
These disturbing events of a decade ago have taken on increasing
meaning after the horrific attacks of 11 September 2001.
The Army began by assisting in relief operations in Somalia, but
by December 1992 it was deeply engaged on the ground in Operation
RESTORE HOPE in that chaotic African countr y. In the spring of the following
year, the initial crisis of imminent starvation seemed to be over,
and the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) turned over the mission
to the United Nations, leaving only a small logistical, av i a t i o n ,
and quick reaction force behind to assist. The American public seemed
to forget about Somalia. That sense of “mission accomplished” made
the events of 3–4 October 1993 more startling, as Americans reacted
to the spectacle of dead U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets
by cheering Somali mobs—the ve ry people Americans thought they
had rescued from starvation.
This bro chure, prepared to honor the tenth annive r s a r y of
Operation RESTORE HOPE beginning on 8 December, places the events
of the firefight of 3–4 October 1993 into the wider context of the U.S.
humanitarian, political, and military operation to rescue a people and a
state from anarchy and chaos. The dedication and sacrifices made by
U.S. soldiers, airmen, and marines in that war-torn country provide a
lesson in heroism that remains compelling a decade later.
This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military
History by Dr. Richard W. Stewart, Chief of the Histories Division and
a veteran of Somalia. We hope that his absorbing account—with its
list of further readings—will stimulate further interest in and study of
this extraordinarily important U.S. operation.
JOHN S. BROWN
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History

The United States Army in Somalia
1992–1994
Americans consider themselves to be a compassionate people, and
the United States Army has a long tradition of humanitarian relief operations
both within and outside the continental United States. Never has
this humanitarian impulse proven more dangerous to follow than in
1992 when the United States intervened to arrest famine in the midst of
an ongoing civil war in the east African country of Somalia. Ultimately
hundreds of thousands were saved from starvation, but unintended
i nvo l vement in Somali civil strife cost the lives of thirty American soldiers,
four marines, and eight Air Force personnel and created the
impression of chaos and disaster. How could a mission that had accomplished
so much have ended in such unhappy circumstances?
The Army ’s humanitarian relief eff o rts have generally been less
complicated and more successful. Soldiers provided vital support to
the stricken city of San Francisco in 1906 as it struggled to recove r
from the great earthquake and subsequent fires. National Guard units
in communities across the nation frequently rush to the scene of communities
hit by hurricanes, tornados, fires, or floods. In 1992, soldiers
from the XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, deployed
to restore order and bring in supplies in the wa ke of Hur r i c a n e
Andrew, which destroyed large sections of Miami, Florida. U.S. Army
personnel have also been involved in many overseas disaster relief and
humanitarian operations, generally as part of joint task forces. In
Operation SE A AN G E L in 1991, American soldiers assisted relief
e ff o rts in Bangladesh as it recovered from a disastrous cy c l o n e .
During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, also in 1991, U.S. Army special
operations soldiers rescued almost 400,000 Kurds from imminent starvation
in the mountains of northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey. The
national impulse to intervene—to help—is a powerful one, and the
U.S. military forces are uniquely suited to bringing to bear their skill,
manpower, and logistical power anywhere in the world.
Strategic Setting
American interest in the Horn of Africa region dates back to the
Cold War when both the Soviet Union and the United States competed
to gain allies and influence throughout the world. In the early 1960s
5

the United States established a presence, including communications
listening posts, in the northern part of Ethiopia and backed the traditional
regime of Emperor Haile Selassie. The Soviets, on the other
hand, replaced the weakened Italian influence in neighboring Somalia
and supporte d the author itarian r egi me of Somali strongm an
Mohammed Siad Barre, who took power in 1969. (Map 1)
After Siad Barre precipitated a disastrous war against Ethiopia ove r
the status of the Ogaden region in 1977, the situation in Somalia gr ew
worse. We s t e rn aid dried up, and Barre was forced to gr ow ever more
r e p r e s s ive to maintain his grip on powe r. He began a policy of systematic
kidnapping and murder against rival clan leaders that increased in
ferocity over time. Fi n a l ly, antigove rnment riots led to ove rreaction on
the part of Siad Barr e ’s bodyguards, who killed 65 civilians and serio
u s ly injured over 300 in 1990. His leg i t i m a cy in shambles, the army
and the people turned against him in a prolonged series of riots, political
maneuvers, and violence. Siad Barre was forced to flee the country
in January 1991 with some of his closest supporters. Almost immedia
t e ly, a resurgence of clan violence led to the virtual destruction of any
central gove rnment and to economic chaos.
As Somalia lapsed into sectarian and ethnic warfare, regional warlords
drew upon clan loyalty to establish independent power bases.
This situation led to a struggle over food supplies with each clan raiding
the storehouses and depots of the others. Coupled with a drought,
these actions brought famine to hundreds of thousands of the nation’s
p o o r. Although private and volunteer relief organizations establ i s h e d
refugee camps to try to prevent widespread deaths from starva t i o n ,
t h ey could not handle the massive amounts of aid and the requisite
security structure that were needed. International relief organizations
paid protection money to the warlords as they tried to distribute what
donated food supplies did arrive. More often than not, such supplies
never reached the hands of those who needed them but instead were
confiscated by the warlords who distributed or sold them to enhance
their own power and prestige. The general misery was only compounded
by the brutality of the Somali clans toward their rivals and
the sporadic outbreaks of actual fighting. The most visible elements of
the suffering—pictures of starving, fly - c overed children—appeared
n i g h t ly on American television screens. Fresh from its triumph in
Operation DE S E RT STO R M, the administration of President George H.
W. Bush felt it could not ignore the situation, despite the obvious risks
of intervening in a country still at war with itself.
The United Nations reacted to the worsening plight of Somalia in
early 1992. On 24 April it approved Resolution 751, which authorized
6

K E N Y A
GEDO
Baardheere
(Bardera)
JUBBADA
DHEXE
JUBBADA
HOOSE
DJIBOUTI
Webi Jub ba
DJIBOUTI
�
A WDAL
BAY
Kismaayo
(Chisimayu)
Hargeysa
Oddur
Baidoa
YEMEN
WOQOOYI
GALBEED
E T H I O P I A
BAKOOL
G U L F O F A D E N
Berbera
Burao
PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LINE
Beledweyne
(Belet Uen)
Jalalaqsi
Balli Doogle
Merca
(Marka)
SHABEELLAHA
HOOSE
TOGDHEER
HIIRAAN
Webi Shabeelle
Dusa Marreb
GALGUDUUD
� BANAADIR
MOGADISHU
SANAAG
SHABEELLAHA
DHEXE
SOOL
MUDUG
Galcaio
(Galkayo)
0
0
Bender Cassim
(Boosaaso)
Balamballe
Garoowe
(Garoe)
NUGAAL
BARI
I N D I A N
O C E A N
SOMALIA
1993
200 Kilometers
200 Miles
MAP 1

humanitarian relief operations in the stricken country and established
the United Nations Operations in Somalia, or UNOSOM. Almost
i m m e d i a t e ly, a small group of peacekeepers deployed to the country
and tried to sort out the confusing array of clans, private armies, and
relief organizations, all competing over the distribution of food relief
supplies. While some progress was made in the major cities, it wa s
apparent that significant amounts of the supplies destined for the interior
were being hijacked by the armies of the clans or by the relief
organizations’ security guards, hired by the UN and the relief agencies
to guard the convoys of food. Since UN and private volunteer organizations
were generally prohibited from hiring armed security forces,
t h ey instead hired local tribesmen as technical assistants—hence the
nickname “technicals.” The technicals were armed bodyguards, often
d r iving pick-up trucks or land cruisers with machines guns or other
heavy weapons mounted.
Operations
U.S. Relief Efforts
In response to the worsening famine, the United States decided to
assist the relief efforts by airlifting food from nearby Kenya to remote
airfields in the interior of Somalia for distribution, thus bypassing congested
ports and reducing the need to send out easily looted convoys.
For this purpose, the United States launched Operation PROV I D E
RELIEF on 15 August 1992. The actual ground distribution continued
to be accomplished by the international relief organizations already
established in the country. PROVIDE RELIEF was thus a limited attempt
to use U.S. expertise in logistics to help the relief effort without engaging
American military forces on the ground.
Problems of distribution within the country continued to hamper
the relief eff o rt. In the countryside, lawless gangs seized relief supplies
and used them to buy local loyalties while letting thousands
starve. In the cities, the warring political factions, supported by their
private armies, amassed food stockpiles as bargaining chips and signs
of their powe r. These rival entities, often barely controlled by their
clan leaders, terrorized the international organizations, stealing food
and killing whoever did not pay protection money.
Because of the increasingly chaotic situation on the ground, as a
security measure U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers from the 5th
Special Forces Group (Airborne) from Fo rt Campbell, Ke n t u c ky,
accompanied many of the relief flights. In the process they assessed
the dangers of various regions, conducted a low-key reconnaissance of
8

the airfields, and gathered basic information that would be useful for
any possible future U.S. ground involvement.
That involvement was not long in coming. Unable to explain to the
world why the United States, the “sole remaining superp ower” and
leader of the “new world order,” was not able to stop the starvation,
President Bush ordered U.S. forces to deploy to Somalia. Their mission
was to ensure that relief supplies reached the people who needed
them and thus to “break the cycle” of starvation and save lives.
RESTORE HOPE
The operation, code-named RESTORE HOPE, began on 8 December
1992 under the direction of a Unified Task Force, or UNITAF. The I
Marine Expeditionary Force from Camp Pendleton, California, formed
the bulk of the headquarters, with augmentation from all the services.
Commanded by Marine Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston, UNITAF included
U.S. and allied troops working together in one task force, but under
U.S. and not UN direction. And, like all modern humanitarian operations,
it was a joint, combined, and interagency effort. The role of the
U.S. State Department was critical. Once Ambassador Robert B.
O a k l ey was appointed as President Bush’s special envoy to Somalia,
he and General Johnston moved quickly to establish a close working
relationship. Although the United Nations continued to play an important
part in the politics within the country, especially in the delicate
negotiations between rival Somali factions, its role was soon overshadowed
by U.S. military and diplomatic powe r. Security Council
Resolution 794, passed on 3 December, endorsed the U.S.- led operation
and gave it its international flavor and legitimacy, but the UN simply
lacked the logistics, command and control, or intelligence capabilities
to undertake such a complex mission.
Marine Corps and Navy special operations elements moved into
Somalia in the early morning hours of 9 December, with the first 1,300
marines coming in by helicopter directly to Mogadishu airp o rt .
E m e rging from the ocean surf in the predawn hours, the Navy Seals
were immediately hit with the blazing lights of forewa rned media crew s .
L u c k i ly, the diplomatic gr o u n d work had been laid for U.S. troops to
a rr ive with no Somali resistance. Thereafter, Somali warlords quickly
a greed to cooperate with each other (at least for a time) and work with
the U.S. troops to establish a relative ly benign and secure env i r o n m e n t .
The technicals and all Somali heavy weapons began to be moved into
cantonment areas by the end of the month, and by mid-Fe b ru a ry most
h e avy weapons were either in such secure cantonment areas or move d
out of Mogadishu and hidden to avoid confiscation or destru c t i o n .
9

T he U. S. A r my co m p on en t of U NI TA F w as Ta s k Fo r c e
Mountain, initially commanded by Brig. Gen. Lawson Wi l l i a m
M a gruder III, the Assistant Division Commander, Maneuve r, of the
10th Mount ain D ivi sion, based at Fo r t Dr um, N ew York. He
remained in command until 22 December when the division comm
a n d e r, Maj. Gen. Steven L. Arn o l d, replaced him. TF Mountain
was built around the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, and at its
peak consisted of approx i m a t e ly 10,000 soldiers including two
i n fa n t ry battalions, an aviation brigade, and division art i l l e ry and
s u p p o rt assets. It was a sizable and eff e c t ive military force that ove rawed
the poorly armed Somali militia.
Coalition forces including large components from France, Italy,
Belgium, Morocco, Australia, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Canada soon
joined U.S. forces. During the course of RESTORE HOPE, some 38,000
soldiers from 23 different nations and representatives from 49 different
humanitarian relief operations worked together to put food into the
mouths of the starving people of Somalia.
The main challenge to the smooth flow of relief supplies continued
to be the riva l ry between feuding warlords, part i c u l a r ly betwe e n
the forces of General Muhammed Farah Aideed of the Habr Gidr
s u bc la n an d Al i Ma hd i Mo h am ed o f the Ab g a l su b c l an i n
M ogadishu. Aideed, prev i o u s ly a general in dictator Siad Barr e ’s
a rmy and a former ambassador to India, now headed the Somali
National Alliance (SNA) with pretensions to ruling the entire count
ry. His opponent, Ali Mahdi, was a former businessman and fa rm e r
with little military experience and only an ad hoc militia. Their feud
had led to open conflict from November 1991 to Fe b ru a ry 1992 and
o n ly added to the tragedy of Somalia by killing thousands of innocent
Mogadishu citizens. Backed by ove r whelming U.S. and allied
p owe r, Ambassador Oakley eff e c t ive ly established a cease-f i r e
b e t ween the two forces as a precondition to establishing a military
and relief presence in the interior of the country. Howeve r, it was not
in the UN chart e r, nor in the U.S. mission guidance, to disarm or
attack either faction. Ostensibly, the UNITAF forces were neutral
and there only to ensure that relief supplies flowed. They achieve d
this mission by late December, as the port and the airp o rt reopened
and relief supplies began moving quickly ashore. Over 40,000 tons
of grain were off-loaded by the end of December along with 6,668
vehicles and 96 helicopters for the military forces.
While Mogadishu maintained an uneasy calm, UNITAF forces
began to move into the countryside. To aid in coordination, the southern
part of the country, the area most marked by drought and famine,
10

was divided into nine humanitarian relief sectors (HRS). U.S. Marine
Forces (MARFOR) concentrated on Baardheere (Bardera) 1 and part s
of Mogadishu while the U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) of UNITA F
focused on providing security, often in conjunction with allied forces,
in four sectors: HRS Baidoa, HRS Balli Doogle (Baledogle), HRS
Merca (Marka), and HRS Kismaayo. (Map 2)
M ovement of U.S. units into their sectors occurred in a variety of
ways. Some U.S. Army units flew first into Mogadishu and then move d
out to their assigned relief sectors. On 28 December, TF 2–87, an
i n fa n t ry battalion task force, conducted a combined air assault operation
with the 1st Canadian Airborne Battle Group from their base in
M ogadishu into the town of Beledweyne (Belet Uen), some 180 miles
n o rth. Other units, such as TF 3–14, another infa n t ry battalion task
force, flew directly from the United States to the main airp o rt in its sect
o r, in this case Kismaayo, 250 miles southwest of Mogadishu. Rapid
changes in plans and missions caused many delays in deploy m e n t ,
shifts in the airflow, and last minute modifications to aircraft load plans
as units added, deleted, and changed types of equipment and quantities
of supplies. Howeve r, by early January most of UNITAF was in place
and conducting security operations throughout the nine relief sectors.
While conventional forces concentrated on major cities and
r egions, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) moved quickly to
establish a presence in the rest of the countryside, place liaison cells
with allied forces, and conduct civil affairs (CA) and psycholog i c a l
operations (PSYOP). In early January, Special Operations Command
Central, a major subordinate unit of U.S. Central Command (CENT­
COM), deployed a small element to Mogadishu to assume command
and control of all special operations forces in theater. This headquarters,
known as Joint Special Operations Forces–Somalia or JSOFOR,
was responsible for planning and conducting special operations in
Somalia in support of all UNITAF humanitarian relief efforts, not just
those in the U.S. sector. The main operational objectives of SOF in
Somalia were to make initial contact with indigenous factions and
leaders, provide information to UNITAF on potentially hostile forces
to aid in force protection, and provide area assessments to assist with
planning for future relief and security operations.
The JSOFOR was initially task organized with its headquarters in
M ogadishu, five Operational Detachment A (ODA) teams from the
1 Place names in this pamphlet reflect the Board of Geographic Names preferred
spellings. Equivalent British spellings, which were carried on 1:250,000 maps widely
used during the operation, are provided in parentheses at first mention.
11

K E N Y A
0
0
MAP 2
Hossingo
HRS
UNITAF
Area of Operations
February 1993
HRS BARDERA
Baardheere
(Bardera)
HRS KISMAAYO
Afmadow
ARFOR Area
Humanitarian Relief Sectors
Webi Jubba
Jilib
200 Kilometers
E T H I O P I A
Kismaayo
(Chisimayu)
Awdiinle
Webi Shabeelle
Baidoa
Buurhakaba
200 Miles
HRS ODDUR
Oddur
HRS BAIDOA
HRS BALEDOGLE
Qoryooley
HRS MARKA
Baraawe
Balli Doogle
(Baledogle)
Merca
(Marka)
Beledweyne
(Belet Uen)
HRS BELET UEN
� MOGADISHU
I N D I A N
O C E A N
Galcaio
(Galkayo)
PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LINE
Jalalaqsi
(Gialalassi)
Dusa Marreb
HRS GIALALASSI
HRS MOGADISHU

5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)—each consisting of approx im
a t e ly twe l ve cross-trained Special Forces soldiers—in Beledwey n e
(the Canadian sector), and another detachment in Baardeheere (the
U.S. Marine Forces sector), 200 miles to the west of Mogadishu. By
late Fe b ru a ry three additional detachments were in Kismaayo (the
U.S. Army sector) and one in Baidoa (the shared Australian-U. S .
A rmy sector).
Army civil affairs and PSYOP forces, other elements of the special
operations team, also provided critical support to U.S. relief operations
during RESTORE HOPE. The 96th CA Battalion (Airborne) deployed a
civil affairs tactical support team and six CA direct support teams that
p r ovided support to both Army and Marine forces. They interacted
with numerous international and private aid organizations, staff e d
humanitarian operations centers throughout Somalia, conducted medical
and engineer assessments of local facilities, and coordinated medical
and engineer civic action projects.
P s y c h o l ogical operations were also used ex t e n s ive ly to support
operations in Somalia. UNITAF established a Joint PSYOP Task Force
made up primarily of elements of the 4th Psychological Operations
Group (Airborne) from Fo rt Bragg, North Carolina, to ensure that
i n f o rmation operations were eff e c t ive ly integrated into all plans and
operations in theater. PSYOP troops ran a local newspaper (called
R a j o—the truth) and set up a radio broadcasting system. They also
provided tactical loudspeaker teams to U.S. and international forces. In
addition, the task force designed, printed, and distributed more than 7
million copies of 49 different leaflets, posters, and handbills.
On the whole, the relief mission proceeded well, with few incidents
of violence from February to May 1993. It seemed that life was
assuming some measure of norm a l cy. Markets reopened, trave l
became more common, and there was even some hope of restarting a
Somali national police force with promising initial results. Howeve r,
clan rivalry and U.S. reluctance to engage in long-term “nation-building”
operations soon doomed the effort.
Daily soldier life settled into a routine. Troops conducted mounted
and dismounted patrols throughout the cities in their sectors with
occasional brushes with bandits and unruly crowds. Carefully written
U N I TAF Rules of Engagement (ROE) limited their responses by
reminding the soldiers that this was not a wartime environment, that
all persons were to be treated with dignity and respect, and that only
the minimum force necessary for the mission was authorized. These
ROE did not in any way, howeve r, interfere with the right to defend
oneself or one’s unit. In one instance a noncommissioned officer shot
13

Over 7 million PSYOP leaflets were distributed during RESTORE HOPE.
and killed a young Somali who ran up to his vehicle carrying a small
box that the sergeant believed might be a bomb. Despite the tragic
nature of the event, charges against the soldier were dismissed under
legitimate self-defense grounds. However, in another instance, a
sergeant shot and killed an individual who had stolen his sunglasses.
His claim of self-defense was rejected, and he was convicted at a general
court-martial. On the whole, however, U.S. Army soldiers behaved
with care and restraint. By April the situation had stabilized enough
that the U.S. administration determined that it was time to turn the
mission over to the United Nations entirely.
Despite some setbacks and incidents, Operation RESTORE HOPE
succeeded in its goal of bringing an end to mass starvation. The heavily
armed UNITAF units quickly established security in their sectors,
and an uneasy truce kept the peace between the factions. There were
some warning signs on the horizon, however, as UN diplomats began
to press for a more active role of the military in confiscating weapons
and in forcing some kind of political settlement. “Mission creep”
began to enter the vocabulary of those serving in Somalia, and soon
after the United States turned over the mission completely to the
United Nations in May, the situation began to unravel.
14

UNOSOM II: Operation CONTINUE HOPE
While U.S. and allied forces maintained the peace in Somalia, U.S.
leaders were working hard to push the United Nations into establishing
a new mission in Somalia to take over the majority of the responsibilities
for running the relief eff o rt while allowing the United States to
reduce the size of its committed forces and handle only limited aspects
of security and logistics. On 26 March 1993, the United Nations
passed Resolution 814 which considerably broadened its mandate to
i n t e rvene in another country ’s affairs. The UN was now interve n i n g
militarily in a peacemaking role under Chapter VII of its charter. The
more frequently used Chapter VI addressed only the deployment of
peacekeeping troops to reinforce a previously agreed upon settlement
b e t ween wa rring parties. But Chapter VII dealt with peace enforcement
and not merely peacekeeping. The resolution underlined the
charters of the first UNOSOM mission and Operation RESTORE HOPE
and that of the new mission, UNOSOM II.
Turkish Lt. Gen. Cevik Bir was appointed commander of the
UNOS OM I I for ce , wi th U.S. A r my Maj. Ge n. Th omas M.
M o n t g o m e ry as his deputy. General Montgomery also retained his
position as commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia (USFORSOM)
under Marine Corps General Joseph P. Hoar, CENTCOM commander
in chief. Thus the U.S. forces retained their own national chain of
command while inserting themselves into the UN structure. Only if
the forces were committed to any combat operation would U.S. units
fall under the tactical control (TACON) of the United Nations. Even in
those circumstances, however, with the deputy commander of the UN
force an American, U.S. national interests would remain protected. By
October 1993 UNOSOM II consisted of over 16,000 peaceke e p e r s
from 21 nations. This number would jump to 29,732 soldiers from 29
nations by mid-November with the arr ival of over 17,000 additional
U.S. personnel as part of a U.S. joint task force.
The slow passage of Security Council Resolution 814 left all parties
with little time to plan for an orderly transition, set for 4 May. It
took time to fill the UN positions for the new force and, by all accounts,
the handover of the mission was poorly done with only 30 percent of
the UN staff in place on the date of transfer. Howeve r, despite the challenges
of transition, General Bir assumed command of forces in
Somalia on 4 May 1993 as UNOSOM II assumed the mission. In supp
o rt of UNOSOM II, the United States provided a substantial log i s t i c s
s t ructure (consisting of about 2,600 troops) and a small special operations
element. The U.S. military also provided a 1,100-soldier gr o u n d ­
15

ased quick reaction force (QRF) for UNOSOM II, consisting of a
b r i ga d e - l evel headquarters from the 10th Mountain Division from Fo rt
D rum. Jonathan Howe, a retired U.S. admiral, was appointed the new
UN envoy to Somalia with wide-ranging powe r s .
It quickly became apparent that Aideed had little respect for the
n ew organization, the UN, or Admiral Howe. On 5 June 1993, his
Somalia National Alliance forces ambushed and killed 24 Pa k i s t a n i
soldiers assigned to UNOSOM II. Another 44 were wounded. The following
day, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution
837 adopting a more aggr e s s ive military stance toward Aideed and
asking member states for more troops and equipment. In Mogadishu,
Pakistani and Italian forces conducted heavy armored patrols throughout
the city, concentrating on the areas near the ambush site. Also on 6
June, General Hoar asked the Joint Staff to send four Air Fo r c e
AC–130 gunships, special C–130 cargo planes modif ied for direct
ground support, to carry out air strikes against the Somalis. The gunships
deployed on 7 June and remained until 14 July, flying a total of
t h i rt y - t wo interdiction, reconnaissance, and PSYOP missions in supp
o rt of UNOSOM II. Eight of those missions were combat sort i e s
flown over the streets of Mogadishu between 11 and 17 June. As part
of the initia l str ike aga inst A ideed, three gunships flew ove r
Mogadishu on 11–12 June and used their 105-mm. and 40-mm. cannons
to demolish two weapons storage facilities and cripple Radio
M ogadishu, Aideed’s propaganda station, by destroying its transmission
capability. On 13, 14, and 17 June several additional AC – 1 3 0
missions concentrated on destroying weapons storage areas and vehicle
compounds belonging to Aideed and his key supporters. On 17
June Admiral Howe issued a wa rrant for Aideed’s arrest and authorized
a $25,000 reward. This only served to harden the political lines
in Mogadishu. Skirmishing between UN and U.S. elements and
Aideed’s Habr Gidr subclan continued, and on 12 July, in a direct challenge
to Aideed’s leadership, the American QRF attacked a major
Aideed compound with helicopter gunships. After the raid, a hostile
crowd near the compound killed four western journalists covering the
action, displaying their bodies for the world to see.
I m m e d i a t e ly, UNOSOM II Force Command focused its intelligence
and operational capability on locating, capturing, and arresting
Aideed and any of his supporters whom it deemed responsible for the
attacks of June and July. U.S. Task Force 3–25 Aviation was designated
the command and control element and established three teams to
conduct operations to capture Aideed: Team Attack, Team Snatch, and
Team Secure. Composed of attack, scout, and cargo helicopters with
16

On the Alert, Jeffrey Manuszak, 1994
snipers and a scout platoon, they were to conduct continuous intelligence
surveillance of Aideed, leading to an attack on his escort convoy
when he was traveling around the city and most vulnerable. Team
Attack would destroy the lead and trail vehicles, Team Snatch would
then capture Aideed, and Team Secure would provide ground security
by occupying blocking positions to prevent civilians from entering
while keeping targeted individuals in the ambush site. However,
despite several alerts, Aideed began lowering his profile in the city and
was seldom noted moving around.
Aideed did not take this personal threat to him lying down. On 8
August his forces detonated a mine under a passing U.S. Military
Police (MP) vehicle on Jialle-Siaad Street in Mogadishu killing four
U.S. MPs. As the military situation worsened, the UN Secretary
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asked the new U.S. administration of
President William J. Clinton to assist him in capturing Aideed.
On 22 August 1993, the new Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin,
directed the deployment of a joint special operations task force
(JSOTF) to Somalia in response to attacks made by Aideed supporters
upon American and UNOSOM forces and installations. The JSOTF,
17

named Task Force Ranger, had the mission of capturing Aideed and
his key lieutenants and turning them over to UNOSOM II forces. The
task would prove extraordinarily difficult, for Aideed had gone underground
after the AC–130 air raids and ground assaults on his strongholds
in June and July.
The command and control structure of TF Ranger evolved during
its time in theater. It eve n t u a l ly was a carefully wo r ked out arr a n g ement
that ensured coordination of American elements on the ground
without compromising its security or U.S. national interests. In accord
with the Goldwa t e r-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, the unifie d
commander (in this case, General Hoar) had command and control
over all U.S. military resources in theater, including the units supporting
UNOSOM II and TF Ranger. However, TF Ranger did not report
to General Montgomery, the U.S. commander on the ground in
Somalia who was dual-hatted as the UNOSOM II deputy commander.
I n s t e a d, General Hoar had the TF Ranger commander, Maj. Gen.
William F. Garrison, report to him directly. Thus, TF Ranger, as a
s t r a t egic U.S. asset, did not fall under the UNOSOM II commander
but rather remained strictly under American operational command and
control. For his part, after an initial misstep during a poorly coordinated
mission that hit a UN compound, General Garrison wo r ked to
ensure that he coordinated all TF Ranger operations with General
M o n t g o m e ry. He also closely tied in his force to the U.S. QRF by
exchanging liaison officers.
All major elements of TF Ranger were in Somalia by 28 August.
The task force consisted of special operations ground forces, special
operations helicopters, U.S. Air Force special tactics personnel, and
U.S. Navy Seals. During August and September 1993, the task force
conducted six missions into Mogadishu, all of which were tactical successes,
although in one instance the task force members mistake n ly
raided an unlisted UN facility and temporarily restrained some UN
employees. The raids were launched by day and night and used both
helicopters and vehicles to reach their targets. During one of these
operations, a raid near Digfer Hospital on 21 September, Osman Atto,
one of Aideed’s closest advisers and his chief financial aide, was captured.
The operation went smoothly, but for the f irst time the U. S .
Rangers received massed rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire from
n e a r by Somali militia. Although Aideed himself remained free, the
c u m u l a t ive result of these eff o rts was to seve r e ly hamper his movements
and eff e c t iveness. Howeve r, his forces were also showing a
greater willingness to engage TF Ranger elements with heavy small
arms and rocket fire.
18

The situation in Mogadishu worsened even as the raids continued.
In one of the most violent and costly incidents, on 8 September U.S.
and Pakistani soldiers were clearing roadblocks near a site known as
the Cigarette Factory when they were attacked by Somali militia using
106-mm. recoilless rifles, RPGs, and small arms. It took ex t e n s ive
fires from ground and aviation units to suppress the enemy fire. Later
that same day, near an abandoned allied checkpoint, the same clearing
element was again attacked by militiamen, this time joined by a mob
of approx i m a t e ly 1,000 Somali civilians. Six UNOSOM II soldiers
were injured. On 16 and 21 September two roadblock-clearing teams
were attacked on 21 October Road. The tea m a ttacke d on 21
September was a Pakistani element, and it lost an armored personnel
c a rrier and suffered nine casualties, including two killed. On 25
September a U.S. Black Hawk helicopter was shot down and three soldiers
killed: one from the 25th Aviation Regiment, Fort Drum, and two
from the 101st Aviation Regiment, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. U.S. and
Pakistani forces secured the area and evacuated the casualties under
fire. Particularly unsettling was the fact that the Somalis shot down the
helicopter using simple RPGs, normally used to attack armored vehicles.
This fact did not bode well for the helicopter raids of TF Ranger.
On 3 October TF Ranger launched its seventh mission, this time
into Aideed’s stronghold in the so-called Black Sea slum district, near
the Bakara Market to capture two of his key lieutenants. Helicopters
c a rrying assault and blocking forces launched around 1530 from the
task force compound at the we s t e rn end of Mogadishu airp o rt, with a
ground convoy moving out three minutes later. By 1542 the gr o u n d
forces had arr ived at the target location, near the Olympic Hotel. ( M a p
3) The blocking force quickly established perimeter positions while the
assault force searched the compound for Aideed’s supporters. Both
came under increasingly heavy enemy fire, more intense than during
p r evious raids. The assault team captured twenty-four Somalis and wa s
about to load them onto the convoy trucks when a circling MH–60
Black Hawk was hit by an RPG and crashed about three blocks from
the target location. Almost immediately, one six-man element of the
blocking force, as well as a small MH–6 assault helicopter and a modified
MH–60 Black Hawk carrying a fif t e e n-man combat search and rescue
(CSAR) team, went to the scene. The MH–6 crew arr ived fi r s t ,
landed in a narr ow alley in the middle of a fir e fight, and evacuated two
wounded soldiers to a military field hospital. Next, the six-man Ranger
blocking element arr ived on foot, followed by the CSAR helicopter. As
the last two members of the search and rescue team were sliding dow n
the fast ropes to the crash site, their helicopter was also hit by an RPG,
19

MAP 3
21 October Road
Armed Forces Street
V ia Lenin
K4 Circle
MOGADISHU
AIRPORT
HQ TASK FORCE RANGER
0
BLACK
SEA
National Street
�
Crash Site #1
AREA Olympic Hotel
V ia A g fo ye
H a w a l Wa d a g S t
V i a M o s c o w
Crash Site #2
Shalalawi St
MOGADISHU
3–4 October 1993
�
Stadium
0 1 Mile
1
Kilometer
Maxud Harbi
NEW PORT FACILITY
PAKISTANI HQ
Via Nigeria

ut somehow the pilot kept the helicopter steady until the two reached
the ground safely and then nursed the helicopter back to the airp o rt .
The situation now worsened. Ground f ire str uck two more
MH–60s, with one going down less than a mile south of the fi r s t
destroyed helicopter while the other limped to safety at the airport. A
Somali mob ove rran this second crash site and, despite a heroic
defense, killed everyone except one of the pilots, whom they took priso
n e r. Two defenders at this location, M. Sgt. Gary Gordon and Sfc.
Randall Shughart, were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor
for their sacrifice.
M e a n while, after loading the detainees on the ground convoy
trucks, the remaining assault and blocking forces moved on foot to the
first crash area, passing through heavy fire that wounded a number of
soldiers, and occupied buildings south and southwest of the dow n e d
h e l i c o p t e r. There they established defensive positions, laying dow n
suppressive fire to hold the Somalis at bay, and treated their wounded
while working to free the pilot’s body from the wreckage. Taking a different
route, the ground convoy force with the detainees loaded in
trucks attempted to reach the first crash site from the north. Unable to
find it among the narrow, winding alleyways, they came under withering
small arms and RPG fire. Finally, after suffering numerous casualties,
losing two 5-ton trucks, and sustaining substantial damage to the
other vehicles, the convoy commander decided to return to the airfield.
On the way, the returning convoy encountered a second convoy
consisting of the task force’s internal quick reaction element. This
pick-up force of Ranger and Special Forces support personnel had
left the airp o rt in hopes of reaching the site of the second crash. This
element loaded some of the casualties of the first convoy onto its
vehicles and both returned to base. About this time, the U.S. QRF for
the UN, a company of the 2d Battalion, 14th Infa n t ry, 10th Mountain
D ivision, also tried to reach the second crash site, but the soldiers
were pinned down by Somali fire. After a tough, dismounted fi r ef
ight near the K–4 traff ic circle, the QRF commander, Lt. Col.
William C. Dav i d, was compelled to move his small and outgunned
force back to the safety of the airp o rt to regroup and work with task
force personnel on a coordinated rescue plan.
While these elements moved back and forth through the suddenly
lethal streets of Mogadishu, the TF Ranger soldiers at the first crash
site were running short of critical supplies. They received a resupply
of water and ammunition from a helicopter that evening, but that
MH–60 was also hit with RPGs and barely managed to power back to
the airport before breaking down completely.
21

Sergeants Gordon and Shughart
The relief column was slowly being formed first at the airport and
then at the New Port area of the city. It took some time to assemble
tanks and armored vehicles from the Pakistani and Malaysian forces
nearby, explain the plan to them, and integrate their forces with the
2–14th Infantry elements. The time spent in coordination was vital,
however, for such a complex, multinational force operation. Armor was
essential as well, given the numerous roadblocks and RPGs flying across
the streets of the city. 2 Finally, after hours of planning and collecting
forces, the sixty-plus vehicle convoy of the 10th Mountain Division and
attached elements moved out of the New Port area north to National
Street, the Pakistani tanks in the lead. Closely followed by circling
AH–1 Cobra gunships, command and control UH–60s, and reconnaissance
OH–58A helicopters, the convoy moved in fits and starts along
National Street toward the crash sites. Accidentally, two of the
Malaysian armored personnel carriers with soldiers from the 2d Platoon,
2 General Montgomery had discussed additional mechanized and armored units
with CINCCENT in August and had formally requested a mechanized infantry team
with a platoon of tanks and an artillery battery in early September. However, CINC­
CENT deleted the artillery before forwarding the request to the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs and, despite the chairman’s recommendation for approval, Secretary of
Defense Aspin disapproved the request in late September.
22

C o m p a ny A, 2–14th Infa n t ry, turned south off National and we r e
a m bushed. The soldiers moved quickly into the cover of nearby bu i l dings.
It would be four hours before they were rescued. The rest of the
c o nvoy continued up National and turned north on Shalalawi Street past
the Olympic Hotel toward the f irst crash site. The 10th Mountain
“ L i g h t f ighters” in the Malaysian armored personnel carriers broke
through to the site at 0155 on 4 October. The combined Ranger–Special
Forces–mountain infa n t ry force wo r ked until dawn to free the pilot’s
b o d y, receiving grenade and small arms fire throughout the night. Close
fire support by AH–6 and AH–1 attack helicopters, in some instances
firing 2.75-inch rockets, helped keep the enemy at bay during those long
hours of darkness. Company A, 2–14th Infa n t ry, less its second platoon,
reached the second crash site, but no trace could be found of the lost soldiers
and aviators. As dawn broke, all the casualties from the first site
were loaded onto the armored personnel carriers; the remainder of the
force moved rapidly on foot south along Shalalawi Street to National
Street in what became known as the Mogadishu Mile.
With the armored personnel carriers providing rolling cove r, the
run-and-gun movement began at 0542 on 4 October. Somalis continued
firing at the convoy while U.S. helicopter gunships raked the cross
streets with fire to support the movement. The main force of the convoy
arrived at the so-called Pakistani Stadium in the northeast section
of the city by around 0630. Medical personnel gave emergency treatment
to the wounded, and all personnel were prepared for movement
to the hospital or the airfield. Thus ended one of the bloodiest and
fiercest urban firefights since the Vietnam War.
Casualties were heavy. TF Ranger lost 16 soldiers on 3–4 October
and had another 57 wounded, with 1 other killed and 12 wounded on 6
October by a mortar attack on their hangar complex at the airport. The
2–14th Infa n t ry suffered 2 Americans killed and 22 wounded wh i l e
the Malaysian coalition partners had 2 killed and 7 wounded and the
Pakistanis suffered 2 wounded. Various estimates placed Somali casualties
between 500 and 1,500.
The battles of 3–4 October were a watershed in U.S. involvement
in Somalia. The already complex mission and difficult env i r o n m e n t
took a dramatic turn with those events. The situation required constant
i n n ovation and rapid decisions from all the troops and commanders
involved, under conditions that did not allow the American soldiers to
t a ke advantage of their great technological superiority. Experience,
common sense, group cohesion, and superior tactical training were the
virtues that made survival in the new environment possible as the decision-makers
in Washington grappled with what to do next.
23

The Withdrawal from Somalia
In the aftermath of the 3–4 October battle, U.S. military presence
in Somalia increased signific a n t ly, although temporarily. A company
from the 24th Infa n t ry Division (Mechanized) was immediately dispatched
from Fo rt Stewa rt, Georgia, with Bradley fighting ve h i c l e s
along with an attached platoon of M1 Abrams tanks. They were soon
joined by the 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, with additional support assets.
Another unit of the 10th Mountain Division—the 2d Battalion, 22d
Infantry—arrived in Somalia soon after, along with a Marine expedit
i o n a ry unit (MEU) and additional special operations personnel
including more AC–130 gunships. These forces were organized under
a new Joint Task Force Somalia under the command of Maj. Gen. Carl
F. Ernst who was placed under General Montgomery’s tactical control
but remained under the operational control of the theater commander,
General Hoar.
H oweve r, it soon became clear that the Clinton administration wa s
focused on using those forces to facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. troops
rather than use them to punish Aideed. General Montgomery had clear
guidance: protect the force, protect the UN, and bring the force out
with a minimum of casualties. In a national security policy rev i ew session
held in the White House on 6 October, the president directed the
acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David G.
Jeremiah, to stop all actions by U.S. forces against Aideed except those
required in self-defense. He also reappointed Ambassador Oakley as
special envoy to Somalia in an attempt to broker a peace settlement and
then announced that all U.S. forces would withdraw from Somalia no
later than 31 March 1994. Short ly thereafter Secretary Aspin stepped
d own, taking much of the blame for what was deemed a failed policy.
For all intents and purposes, the United States was now determined to
w i t h d r aw from Somalia as quickly as possible. All additional forces
sent would be used solely for self-defense of U.S. soldiers rather than
for further off e n s ive operations.
Ambassador Oakley arr ived in Mogadishu on 9 October, determined
to obtain the release of U.S. helicopter pilot CW2 Michael
Durant, captured at the second crash site by Somali forces loyal to
Aideed. After intense negotiations, Aideed agreed to release the
wounded Durant and a prev i o u s ly captured Nigerian soldier on 14
October as a “goodwill gesture.” Despite this gesture and a unilateral
cease-fire declared by Aideed, it quickly became apparent that the U.S.
role in Somalia was ending and that the UN would receive no substantive
cooperation from the warlord and his clan.
24

Soldiers of Task Force Ranger take cover and return fire
during the 3–4 October battle.
After several months of comparatively limited activity and few
further instances of violence, U.S. forces began withdrawing. Most of
the American troops were out of Somalia by 25 March 1994, ending
Operation CONTINUE HOPE, the follow-on mission to RESTORE HOPE.
Only a few hundred marines remained offshore to assist with any noncombatant
evacuation mission that might occur in the event violence
broke out that necessitated the removal of the over 1,000 U.S. civilians
and military advisers remaining as part of the U.S. liaison mission. All
UN and U.S. personnel were finally withdrawn almost a year later in
March 1995.
All attempts to reconcile the Somali factions had proven futile,
and the international community gradually lost its patience with the
total lack of political results. Operation UNITED SHIELD, the final UN
withdrawal from Somalia, was completed on 3 March 1995. The
United States, as part of the international community, had made major
contributions to the Somalia humanitarian operations for over two
years. Starvation had been stopped and hundreds of thousands of lives
saved. The U.S. had accomplished much in the initial stages of the
operation, but the political situation had unraveled even as the food
supplies increased, allowing Somalia to slide backwards into disorder
and anarchy.
25

Analysis
The United States entered Somalia in December 1992 to stop the
imminent starvation of hundreds of thousands of people. Although it
succeeded in this mission, the chaotic political situation of that unhappy
land bogged down U.S. and allied forces in what became, in effect,
a poorly organized United Nations nation-building operation. In a
country where the United States, perhaps naively, expected some measure
of gratitude for its help, its forces received increasing hostility as
t h ey became more deeply embroiled into trying to establish a stabl e
g ove rnment. The military and diplomatic eff o rt to bring together all
the clans and political entities was doomed to failure as each subelement
continued to attempt to out-jockey the others for supreme power.
The Somali people were the main victims of their own leaders, bu t
forty-two Americans died and dozens more were wounded before the
United States and the United Nations capitulated to events and withd
r ew. American military power had established the conditions for
peace in the midst of a famine and civil wa r, but, unlike later in
Bosnia, the factions were not exhausted from the fighting and were not
yet willing to stop killing each other and anyone caught in the middle.
There was no peace to keep. The American soldier had, as alway s ,
done his best under difficult circumstances to perform a complex and
often confusing mission. But the best soldiers in the world can only
lay the foundation for peace; they cannot create peace itself.
26

Additional Readings
Allard, Kenneth. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Washington,
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995.
B owden, Mark. B l a ck Hawk Down: A Story of Modern Wa r. N ew
York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999.
C a s p e r, Lawrence E. Falcon Briga d e, Combat and Command in
Somalia and Haiti. B o u l d e r, Colo., and London: Lynne Rienner,
2001.
DeLong, Kent, and Tuckey, Steven. Mogadishu! Heroism and Tragedy.
Westport, Conn., and London: Praeger Publishers, 1994.
Hirsch, John L., and Oakley, Robert B. Somalia and Opera t i o n
R e s t o re Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Pe a c e k e e p i n g.
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995.
R e s o u rce Guide Unified Task Fo rce Somalia, December 1992–May
1993, Operation Restore Hope. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army
Center of Military History, 1994.
USSOCOM Histor y Off i c e . United States Spec ial O pera t i o n s
Command History. Tampa, Fla., 1998.
27

PIN : 080256–000