Tunnel safety concept for the new railway line Divača - Koper - DRC

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Bopp, R., Žigon, A., Žibert, M.: Tunnel safety concept for the new railway line Diva a - Koper supply and telecommunication cabling is provided. The track structure is designed as a slab track system sitting on tunnel invert concrete. Table 2: Overview of traffic characteristics 2.3 Operation of the new line The railway line will be used mainly by freight trains climbing the ascent from the port of Koper towards Diva a. Nevertheless the railway line is designed for both freight and passenger trains (see Table 2) in both directions driving in bundles of 3 to 5 trains. Type Number Length of train (max./average) Vmax Notes IC/EC 3 pairs of trains/day 400 m/250 m 160 km/h Pendolino 2 pairs of trains/day 82 m/82 m 160 km/h Freight trains direction 45 (fully loaded) or 750 m/500 m 120 km/h Ro-La to Koper 57 (dynamic ut. ) Freight trains direction 50 (fully loaded) or 750 m/500 m 80 km/h Ro-La to Diva a 63 (dynamic ut. ) In accordance with TSI RST HS only trains category B shall be used in passenger traffic on the new railway line. This category demands that in case of fire the train is capable of driving at least 80km/h for next 15 minutes ignoring emergency brakes and maintaining means of communication. Currently a 3kV DC (direct current) supply catenary system is planned. In future a 25kV 50Hz AC system is foreseen. Figure 4: Typical NATM tunnel cross section 3 Guidelines 3.1 European and national guidelines The main risks in railway tunnels are fire, collision and derailment. As a fire in a passenger train is a major and specific hazard in tunnels with potentially catastrophic consequences, discussions about tunnel safety 10. SLOVENSKI KONGRES O CESTAH IN PROMETU, Portorož, 20. – 22. oktobra 2010
Bopp, R., Žigon, A., Žibert, M.: Tunnel safety concept for the new railway line Diva a - Koper often concentrate on this type of incident. However this limited perception must be abandoned when a safety concept for a railway line as the Diva a -Koper line is developed. The elaboration of a tunnel safety concept is a quite complex task where an important number of aspects and subsystems must be considered. There are however only few guidelines on safety in railway tunnels which can be consulted. The most important are the technical specification of interoperability relating to ‘safety in railway tunnels’ in the trans-European conventional and high-speed rail system, the so called TSI SRT 0. These relatively new specifications define for a first time a minimal safety standard for railway tunnels in Europe. However TSI SRT specifies only few mandatory safety measures. In addition to the safety measures specified in the TSI SRT, the guidelines of the UIC Codex 779-9 0 concerning tunnel safety should be considered. The UIC document gives a good overview over a more general set of possible safety measures and provides additional information concerning the efficiency of different safety measures. Along with the European guidelines there are a number of national guidelines as for example the German EBA guideline 0 or the Swiss guideline SIA 197 0, 0. In Austria the guideline of the national fire fighting association has to be considered 0. These national guidelines ask to some extent for additional safety measures and they often do specify the needed measures in more detail. This may lead to a different set of safety measures when different national guidelines are used (see examples in chapter 3.3). In the absence of national guidelines and lack of most recent national experience in railway tunnel safety, as it is the case in Slovenia, the development of a specific railway tunnel safety concept is therefore a long process which has to involve a various authorities (see chapter 4.2). 3.2 Application of guidelines In the application of the different guidelines the following problems may appear: National guidelines are normally stricter than the regulations of the TSI SRT. When comparing different national guidelines different safety measures may result. 3.2.1 Comparison between TSI SRT and national guidelines The most important infrastructural safety measures specified in the TSI SRT are: Escape distance: The maximum distance of cross passages (in double bore tunnels or in tunnels with a parallel service and safety tunnel) or distance of emergency exits in single bore tunnels is stipulated in the TSI SRT (maximum 500 m for tunnels with a parallel tube or maximum 1000 m for a double track tunnel). Escape walkways: Lateral walkways inside the tunnel with a minimal width of 0.7 m must be provided. Rescue areas at tunnel portals: In the vicinity of the tunnel portals enough space for the deployment of the rescue services is needed. The TSI SRT defines a minimal area of 500 m 2 . The fact that some of the very long double bore tunnels planned or built in the last years, have considerably lower distances between cross passages (see table 3) shows that in the application of the TSI SRT and national guidelines different solutions may result. This is not only true for the distance of cross passages but also for the width of the escape walkway which is normally bigger than 0.7 m or the rescue areas at portals which are normally considerably larger than 500 m 2 as stipulated in the TSI SRT. Table 3: Distances of cross passages in long railway tunnels Tunnel Length Cross passages Special features Channel Tunnel 50.5 km 375 m lorry transport Lötschberg Base Tunnel 34.6 km 333 m underground emergency station Tunel de Guardarrama 28.4 km 250 m Great Belt Tunnel 8.0 km 250 m underwater tunnel 10. SLOVENSKI KONGRES O CESTAH IN PROMETU, Portorož, 20. – 22. oktobra 2010
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Tunnel safety concept for the new railway line Divača - Koper - DRC

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