opportunities missed, opportunities seized - Carnegie Corporation of

118 James E. Goodby
rear- gu ard action against neo - Sovietism . In December 1992, the Russi an Congress
resolved to reex amine the status of Sevastopol . Dif ficulties had aris en over
use of the port of Sevastopol by the Russi an navy and over division of the Black
Sea fleet bet ween Russia and Ukraine. Russi an vice president Alex ander Rut skoy
angered Ukraini ans by ex travagant pronouncements about Russi a’s rights in
Crimea and with respect to the Black Sea fleet.The Russi an Congress also insisted
that the U. S . - Russi an umbrella agreement for Nunn - Lugar assistance, signed by
Bush and Yelt sin in June 1992, should be subject to its approval , thus calling into
question the whole basis for Nunn - Lugar cooperation . 1 3 This reflected cons ervative
and nationalist suspic ions that the Americans were gaining unfair advantages,
including access to state sec ret s, through cooperation in the nuclear field.
Ukraini an hopes that independence would autom atically bring economic support
and security assurances from the West also had not been met by the summer
of 1 9 9 2 .This, too, caus ed a feeling of disillusionment and some despair in a soc iety
where economic distress was serious and stri kes were being called in protest.
Nor were the political rumblings only from Ukraine. Ka z akhstani of fic i als also
were having second thought s. Hearing the speeches being made by politic i ans in
Kiev and Mos cow, they reconsidered their own readiness to renounce nuclear
weapons. Only in Belarus, where 70 percent of the fallout from Chernobyl had
been deposited and where nationalist feelings were not strong,did the Lis bon Protocol
and the NPT continue to en joy strong support.
The policy of the Bush administration in its last weeks in office was to insist
that agreements had been signed and the United States expected they would be
carried out. The Congress strongly supported this policy. Nunn-Lugar legislation,
in fact, required that the administration certify that recipients of assistance
were committed to compliance with arms control agreements into which they
had entered. A strategy to ensure that this would happen would have to be developed
by the incoming Clinton administration.
Key Decisions—Phase II
The starting point for the Clinton administration’s review of policy toward
Ukraine was the Lisbon Protocol, which required that Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan eliminate all the nuclear weapons located on their territories. In
March 1993, Clinton decided to maintain the policy of denuclearization that he
had inherited from Bush,and he issued instructions to that effect.Very little help
would be given to these states until t hey had fulfilled t heir promises to ratify
START I,including the Lisbon Protocol, and had acceded to the NPT. For an administration
that regarded nonproliferation as one of its highest foreign policy
priorities, this was a quite natural strategy. As was the case with the Bush administration,
at no time was there any consideration given to adopting the position
that Ukraine should become a nuclear power. Ukraine’s basic security
problems were seen as economic and social, not matters that could be cured by
acquiring a nuclear deterrent.
It quickly became apparent that the Clinton administration’s hard line toward
Ukraine was not working. The perceived lack of support from the United States