PDF: Factbook (9MB) - UK Ultraspeed

Factbook 

Expanded 2nd Edition, October 2006

Contents 

UK Ultraspeed Factbook | Expanded 2nd Edition, October 2006 

1 Introducing UK Ultraspeed: 500km/h ground transport for Britain 1 

2 Summary of preliminary business case 17 

3 The transport, economic and environmental benefits of UK Ultraspeed 69 

4 UK Ultraspeed evidence to the Eddington Review 89 

5 Study on macro-economic and UK competitiveness benefits of Ultraspeed 152 

6 Summary of key technological and strategic advantages of Ultraspeed 169 

7 Summary of speed, power consumption and emissions comparisons with rail 180 

2

1 


Introducing UK Ultraspeed: 

500km/h ground transport for Britain 

3


UK Ultraspeed 

500km/h ground transport for Britain 

Welcome to UK Ultraspeed, the strategic transport 

network designed to transform the economic 

geography of Britain with 500km/h (311mph) 

intercity travel. 

This factbook provides information on the Transrapid 

maglev (magnetic levitation) system which Ultraspeed 

will use and on how it will be deployed to create both 

North:South and East:West ultra high speed links 

with a single trunk route. 

These are some of the transformations UK Ultraspeed 

can deliver. This factbook presents data on the 

demand and operational economics underpinning the 

viability of the system, and on the means of 

constructing, financing and legislating for Ultraspeed. 

Welcome aboard. 

Alan James 

Project Leader 

www.500kmh.com 

4 

UK Ultraspeed uses the Transrapid magnetic levita- 

tion [maglev] system. Tested to aviation standards 

under the most rigorous certification programme ever 

applied to ground transport, Transrapid is the only 

system in the world safety-certified to carry passen- 

gers at up to 500km/h on the ground. 

A sustained, decades-long R&D programme has 

delivered the world’s fastest, safest, most reliable and 

most advanced high speed ground transport system, 

as detailed in the timeline 

to the right. 

London to Birmingham in 

30 minutes. 

Heathrow to the brownfields of 

the North East in less time than it 

currently takes from Heathrow to 

Canary Wharf. 

All the major cities of the English 

North linked by a journey of less 

than an hour from Tyneside to 

Merseyside. 

Scotland’s central belt tightened 

by a journey of only a quarter of an 

hour from Glasgow to Edinburgh.


What is UK Ultraspeed? 

UK Ultraspeed is a proposed new national ground 

transport system, designed to drastically reduce 

journey times between major cities in Britain by 

operating at speeds of up to 500km/h (311 mph). 

What technology is used by UK 

Ultraspeed? 

UK Ultraspeed uses the German Transrapid 

magnetic levitation (maglev) system. Transrapid is the 

only ground transport system in the world certified 

to carry passengers in regular commercial service at 

speeds up to 500km/h. 

5 

The world’s first Transrapid maglev to enter revenue 

service commenced public operation in Shanghai, China 

on 1 January 2004. The system connects Shanghai with 

its remote Pudong International Airport. Units conveying 

up to 600 passengers depart every few minutes. Millions 

of passengers have made the 267mph journey, which 

takes eight minutes. By car, the same journey can take 

up to an hour.


UK Ultraspeed indicative journey times 

Origin Intermediate Calling Points Destination 

6 

Approx 

Journey 

London or Heathrow (LHR) - M25/M1 Park & Ride 10 mins 

London/LHR - Birmingham 30 mins 

London/LHR Birmingham Manchester 50 mins 

London/LHR Birmingham, Manchester Liverpool 60 mins 

London/LHR Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Teesside Newcastle 100 mins 

Newcastle Teesside, Leeds, Manchester Liverpool 60 mins 

Manchester - Liverpool 10 mins 

Manchester - South Yorkshire 15 mins 

Glasgow - Edinburgh 15 mins 

Glasgow 

Edinburgh, Newcastle,Teesside, Leeds, 

Manchester, Birmingham 

London/LHR 160 mins 

Edinburgh - Newcastle 35 mins


Who is developing UK Ultraspeed? What work has already been done? 

What happens next? 

Transrapid unit on maglev guideway 

UK Ultraspeed is a British-led project, developed 

with the full support of Transrapid International, the 

Joint Venture between the German multinationals 

Siemens and ThyssenKrupp, who own the maglev 

technology. The Ultraspeed team first assembled in 

2002 under Project Leader, Dr Alan James. Bringing 

together Transrapid technology specialists with UK 

experts in transport economics, engineering and 

project finance, the team conducted a detailed £2m 

pre-feasibility study during 2003 and 2004. 

Following the exceptionally positive reception for the 

team’s proposals and pre-feasibility results, the UK 

Ultraspeed Project Development Body was formed 

in 2005. Seeking always to work in partnership with 

Government and the project finance community, the 

objectives of the Body are: 

• to help define the project in detail, to 

maximise its benefits for Britain; 

• to help refine the project through 

definitive studies of its 

implementation in Britain; and 

7 

• to help create the mechanisms that 

will be required to build, finance and 

operate Ultraspeed in Britain. 

The information presented in this Factbook is distilled 

from: 

• the technical expertise derived from 

the research and development of 

Transrapid in Germany; 

• the practical experience of the 

world’s first ultra high speed 

maglev system in China; and 

• the results of the pre-feasibility study 

in Britain. 

Although Ultraspeed has been designed on demand- 

first principles, this Factbook leads with an introduction 

to the Transrapid system, in order to familiarise British 

readers with the key principles of maglev technology, 

before then turning to our proposals for its application, 

as UK Ultraspeed, in the specific economic, geographic, 

environmental and transport context of Britain. 

The study concluded that ultra 

high speed intercity ground 

transport is technically and 

financially viable in the 

United Kingdom


The UK Ultraspeed team for the pre-feasibility study 

Company Area of Expertise Function 

Expert 

Alliance 

The Railway 

Consultancy 

Transrapid 

International 

(Siemens 

& ThyssenKrupp) 

Faithful & 

Gould (Atkins 

Group) 

Project leadership & 

strategy, communications, 

political/policy liaison. 

Market demand analysis, 

ridership forecasts and 

demand-led route model.ling. 

Maglev technology, 

preliminary specification, 

integration and costing of 

maglev elements. 

Project & Cost 

Management, Engineering. 

Stephen Syrett Project Finance & PFI. 

Norton Rose Legal & Planning. 

Strategic brief for the system, combining issues of UK economic competitiveness 

and regional development with strategic 

transport needs. 

Developed the brief by detailed analysis of demand for an 

Ultraspeed network, taking into account origin, destination 

pairings, access, modal shift and abstraction/competition issues, peak 

traffic flows etc. Defined a network and timetable to meet this demand. 

Responded to this initial requirement by defining all Transrapid technology 

elements needed to deliver the system. Simulated the entire network then 

supplied preliminary cost estimate for maglev elements. 

Cost estimation and preliminary scheduling for all design, 

engineering & construction works required to deliver the system specified, 

at generic level by Transrapid, in the specific context of the UK. Produced 

combined estimate of these costs and all maglev elements. 

Based on experience of leading other major infrastructure projects to 

financial close (including recently the HSL Zuid High Speed Line for the 

Dutch Government), developed PPP model to provide basis for future 

negotiation with public and private sector funders of the project. 

Taking all the above intro account, provided legal advice on the Hybrid Bill 

mechanism required to enable Ultraspeed to be empowered, procured, 

financed and delivered. 

The study workflow ensured that UK Ultraspeed was founded on demand-led principles. 

Technology and engineering are developed in response to a route model based on a clear 

demand analysis and on ridership forecasts derived from it. Ultraspeed is not a technology-led 

project. It is driven by demand and shaped by the clear requirement for improved strategic 

transport capacity in the UK. 

8


What is Transrapid maglev and how 

does it work? 

Ultraspeed uses Transrapid magnetic levitation, not rail, technology. This leapfrogs the much slower (300km/h) 

high speed rail systems by which many of Britain’s competitors will be constrained for the next 100-150 years. 

Transrapid is not a train, it does not have wheels and it does not run on rails. It is a completely new transport 

system. It uses electro-magnetic force to levitate passenger carrying vehicles above a guideway, to steer them 

along it and also to propel them at cruising speeds of up to 500 km/h (311mph). 

Transrapid is the product of a decades-long strategic R&D effort by German industry and State partners. 

Tested to aviation standards under the most rigorous certification programme ever applied to ground 

transport, Transrapid is the only system in the world the safety-certified to carry passengers at up to 500km/h 

on the ground. 

1 

A fixed guideway housing a long stator linear motor. 

This can be built at ground level, or elevated up to 

20m above the ground, thus passing over existing 

infrastructure without complex and costly civil 

engineering. 

In common 

with all Transrapid 

systems, Ultraspeed 

consists of three main 

elements, all of which are 

fully integrated with 

each other. 

2 

Transrapid vehicles, comprising up 

to 10 sections, which are capable of 

seating up to 1,200 passengers in 

total, although around 840 passengers 

per vehicle will be a UK norm. The 

vehicles levitate above the guideway 

and are steered along it by electro- 

magnetic ‘cushions’. They are propelled 

and braked by variable electrical current 

passed through the linear motor. 

9 

3 

A highly automated Operational Control 

System [OCS]. This engineers in levels of 

safety and reliability which are impossible to 

achieve in rail, air or road transport. The OCS 

constantly monitors every vehicle’s speed 

and position and adjusts propulsion power 

supplied through the guideway to ensure 

that every vehicle operates at the prescribed 

speed for each route section.

The guideway and its associated vehicle positioning 

system combine the critical functions of guidance, 

power supply, operational control, signalling, and 

safety monitoring into one holistic and highly 

automated failsafe system. This integration engineers 

out most of the human and system-fragmentation 

factors which cause accidents and delays in rail, air 

or road systems. 

Transrapid is proven in daily service. The world’s first 

commercial Transrapid route opened in Shanghai in 

January 2004 and has since carried millions of 

passengers, typically operating at 99.98% availability. 


10 

99.9% 

availability

Every few minutes Transrapid vehicles in China 

convey up to 600 passengers at 431km/h (267mph) 

and pass at closing speeds in excess of 800km/h 

(500mph). 

On 12 November 2003, a Shanghai Transrapid 

carried its passengers to a new world record for 

standard-specification ground transport vehicles: 

501km/h (311mph). Maximum speed is not used in 

daily service due to the relatively short route length of 

30km (19 miles). 

12.11. 2003 

World record 

501 km/h 

311 mph 


11

The linear motor 

The heart of the Transrapid system is the linear 

motor. This is most easily envisaged as a traditional 

rotating electric motor whose stator coils have been 

unrolled and laid lengthways along the underside of the 

guideway. The linear motor is installed in sections and 

extends the whole length of the guideway: around 

800km Northbound and 800km Southbound in the 

case of Ultraspeed. Laid underneath the guideway, it 

is immune from the effects of rain, snow and leaves 

which can bring other transport systems to a halt. 


Schematic showing the linear motor installed underneath the guideway 

With the linear motor in the guideway, there is no 

motor in the Ultraspeed vehicle itself, which means 

no polluting exhaust, no engine noise, no vibration. 

The guideway itself is the motor. Transrapid vehicles 

are propelled along it by the electrical current which 

passes through it. Their acceleration, cruising 

speed and braking is controlled by the frequency of 

the current supplied to the linear motor by the 

operational control system. 

12 

The guideway 

itself is the motor 

Transrapid vehicles do not sit on the guideway 

like a train, they wrap around it – making derailment 

impossible.

Levitation magnets are mounted on the underframe 

of the vehicle. These are attracted upwards towards 

the guideway, but never make physical contact with 

it. Guidance magnets are mounted laterally on each 

side of the underframe. These steer the vehicle along 

the guideway – again they never physically touch it. 


13 

Schematic of Transrapid levitation 

and guidance magnets (shown red) 

on underframe wrapping round the 

guideway. The linear motor is housed 

in the stator pack under the guideway 

(shown green). The levitation magnets 

on the bottom of the underframe are 

attracted up towards the stator pack 

when it is energised, thus levitating the 

entire vehicle. The guidance magnets, 

mounted laterally, steer the vehicle 

along the guideway. 

Close-up of levitation and guidance magnets (shown 

red) wrapping round the guideway. This schematic 

also shows the one centimetre separation gap 

between the vehicle and the guideway. 

This is monitored and adjusted several thousand 

times a second by on board sensors and the 

Operational Control System to ensure both safety 

and smoothness of ride.


Integration of guideway, vehicles, propulsion, operational control 

and safety systems 

Transrapid does not require drivers. In common with 

all Transrapid systems, Ultraspeed will be operated 

by System Controllers in centralised control facilities. 

They oversee a highly automated Operational Control 

System [OCS], which directs every aspect of network 

operations. This engineers out human error, the pre- 

dominant cause of accidents and disruption in other 

transport systems. 

A key function of the OCS is to regulate the power 

supply for propulsion and braking. 

Once a vehicle is levitating, electric power is fed 

along the guideway to propel it. A travelling magnetic 

field passes through the linear motor, pulling the 

vehicle forward with it. The electrical frequency is 

precisely controlled to supply maximum power 

exactly where it is needed – for acceleration and 

hill-climbing zones for instance. Once cruising speed 

14 

is reached – and 500km/h is attained in just over 

four minutes – precisely enough power is supplied 

to maintain exactly the right speed for each specific 

route section, bearing in mind its curves and gradients. 

Braking is achieved by simply reversing the process, 

the travelling magnetic field is slowed down, thus 

retarding the vehicle and bringing it smoothly to a halt. 

The power supply and all other safety-critical 

elements are designed to provide multiple redun- 

dancy – with several layers of back-up engineered-in. 

Naturally the system is designed to deal even with 

the massively unlikely event of total power failure. 

Backup power on board each vehicle will keep it 

levitating, so it will always glide to a smooth, pre- 

programmed and precise halt at the next station or 

access point. 

Schematic of braking curves in normal 

and failsafe operation.

The integration of the operational control and power- 

supply functions produces significant safety benefits. 

Only the motor section in which the vehicle is 

actually travelling is powered up – with the next 

segment only switching on as the vehicle nears the 

section boundary, and so on, all the way along the 

route. The section behind each vehicle is switched off, 

so that it is physically impossible for the 

following vehicle to run into the one in front. As the 

speed increases, so the length of the powered-off 

section behind is increased to ensure the correct 

separation between services. This provides a higher 

built-in level of safety than even the most demanding 

ERTMS Level 3 EU specification for high speed rail 

systems – and such systems have proven impossible 

to retrofit over the UK’s classic rail infrastructure. 

Operational Control System: the precise location and velocity of 

every vehicle is controlled andmonitored by the guideway and 

by a second, independent, radio-based positioning system. 

This controls speed, separation and schedule more precisely 

than any other transport system 

A radio-based positioning system also feeds back 

to the Control Centre the precise location of every 

vehicle (to within a matter of centimetres) as well as 


15 

its exact speed. This gives the OCS an 

unprecedented level of direct command and control 

over the network. Schedule, separation and speed 

are maintained with a degree of precision impossible 

in any other mode of transport. 

Transrapid vehicle passing points in the straight position 

The same safety-led design principles apply to the 

points at junctions. Bendable steel guideway sections 

are set to provide either a straight-ahead route – which 

can be taken at maximum speed – or a ‘branch off’ 

route, which necessitates slowing down to a lower 

speed. In setting a branch off route, the OCS feeds 

precisely the right amount of power to the guideway, 

so it is impossible for a vehicle to approach the junction 

too fast. When the points are actually being switched 

from one route to another, the preceding sections are 

completely powered down, so that no vehicle at all 

can approach before the route ahead is clear.


Why has UK Ultraspeed selected 

the Transrapid system? 

Transrapid vehicles pass in Shanghai – closing speed over 860km/h (530mph) 

Transrapid is the most comprehensively integrated 

transport technology available. It has been designed 

and exhaustively tested to be not only the fastest 

ground transport system in the world, but also the 

safest. Engineered in Germany, under the world’s 

most rigorous certification regime, and now proven in 

intensive daily operation in China, 

Transrapid is a major step forward in transport 

technology. Yet the Ultraspeed project is not defined 

or driven by technology. The objectives of Ultraspeed 

are broader, to create a step change in capacity, 

16 

competitiveness and sheer speed to: 

• enhance Britain’s environment; 

• empower Britain’s economy; 

• transform Britain’s transport. 

UK Ultraspeed selected Transrapid because it 

delivers the best possible solution for Britain. 

The remainder of this Factbook looks in detail at how 

Ultraspeed proposes to deploy the Transrapid system 

to deliver maximum benefits for Britain.

2 


Summary of the Preliminary Business Case 

17


Introduction to this chapter & status 

of findings presented here 

This chapter presents key results from the work 

carried out by various members of the UK Ultraspeed 

[UKU] team between 2002 and 2004. The information it 

contains supported the initial presentation of 

Ultraspeed to the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in 

September 2004. 

The work which produced the outputs discussed 

here was undertaken between 2002 and 2004, 

during various stages of a detailed pre-feasibility 

study of the Ultraspeed proposition. 

Whilst this work was briefed and conducted on 

the most prudent and cautious possible basis, the 

findings presented are, of course, subject to all the 

caveats and margins of error associated with 

pre-feasibility results. 

18 

That noted, however, the UKU team is confident that 

the findings presented here are robust. The business 

case has been built ‘demand-up’ (not ‘technology 

down’) and the entire London-Scotland route 

hypothesis has been technically specified and 

simulated in outline over its whole length, on the 

foundation of 1:50,000 cartography. 

This process has produced solid results in areas such 

as specification of Transrapid technical equipment 

and guideway elements, fleet size and operating 

pattern, power consumption, maintenance and 

renewals. As a general principle, given the integrated 

and pre-specifyable nature of most of the core 

elements required to implement UKU, the estimates 

presented here are firmer than those which might 

presented at a similarly early stage in a comparably- 

scoped road or rail project.


2A: UKU initial demand study 

Key findings of the Railway 

Consultancy market study (Feb 

2003) into a UKU corridor linking 

• Newcastle 

• Leeds 

• Manchester 

• Birmingham 

• London and Heathrow 

UK Ultraspeed explanatory notes and abridging 

commentary are presented in these italics throughout 

these appendices. 

This was the first very high-level study undertaken from 

a Transport Economics perspective. Its objective was 

to aggregate rail, air and road data to identify existing 

overall demand in the English sections of the UKU trunk 

route and to make ‘order of magnitude’ projections of 

likely link-loads between proposed UKU access points in 

the conurbations served. 

This study (and the more advanced study excerpted 

at 2B) are fully supported by complex multi-variable 

modelling tools whose dynamic interactions and 

outputs are impossible to represent faithfully in the 

static medium of text. These models are now 

being used dynamically by the Ultraspeed team in 

the Project Development Study. The UKU team has 

refined the models as work progresses. 

19 

One high-level observation. The exercises described 

here and in 2B are classical transport economics 

studies, conducted using prudent methodology to a 

cautious brief. Such studies cannot, by their nature, 

capture the extremely large macro-level effects of 

entirely new patterns of demand and entirely new 

patterns of underlying economic activity which would 

be occasioned by the arrival of Ultraspeed (which 

will be comparable, in terms of its transformational 

effects, to the coming of the railways in the 1830s 

– 1850s). The Ultraspeed team is aware that various 

UK agencies are now proposing to include these 

effects in “full equilibrium” modelling when 

assessing strategic transport projects and their 

economic development benefits. We positively 

welcome this, and confidently expect that the result 

would be a very substantial improvement over the 

already impressive projected demand/revenue 

performance of the Ultraspeed system.


Current Demand in the UKU Corridor 

Estimates have been made for car, coach, rail and air for trips in the corridor to be served by Ultraspeed. 

The number of trips per day is as follows: 

14 Newcastle Leeds Manchester Birmingham Heathrow London 

Newcastle 

Leeds 2622 

Manchester 1231 6691 

Birmingham 1867 3236 3693 

Heathrow 560 554 1052 1415 

London 3393 6159 6135 140237 

Typical overseas 

destinations 

2387 730 5553 5964 Not relevant 

These trips were then disaggregated into 30 representative origin-destination pair sub-zones for demand 

model development. 

Notes on Current Demand table. The final line item is included to capture destinations outside the UK served by air 

from Heathrow and accessed by passengers travelling via Heathrow from points further north proposed to be served by 

Ultraspeed. In the Manchester case, therefore, 6K go to ‘London Proper’, 1K have 

destinations in Thames Valley/West London zones, for whom a “Heathrow” terminal would be an attractive domestic access 

point and 5.5K pass through Heathrow Airport on their way to air-served destinations. 

This high-level disaggregation aids understanding of the ‘London end’ dynamics of the Ultraspeed route – 

a broad brush “London” zone is too blunt an implement for some purposes. 

South:North flows were assumed at this stage to exactly mirror the North:South flows presented above. 

UKU does not connect London to Heathrow or Heathrow to overseas destinations, therefore these two flows were disre- 

garded as not relevant. 

20

Traffic Forecasts for UKU 


Analysis was then undertaken of the relative attractiveness of UKU versus other forms of transport over the 

nominal 30 origin-destination pairs used for this high-level modelling exercise. The analysis took full account 

of modal shift disincentive on the accepted basis. 

The analysis was underpinned by a rail-benchmarked pricing model. This took peak and off-peak fare levels 

from rail – not air – competitors and used incentivised pricing techniques proven in rail practice to spread 

demand into the off-peak hours. 

These factors produced the following estimate of link loads per hour between UKU terminal points (‘stations’ 

in rail terms). [FYI: Low Moor is a point in the West Yorkshire conurbation, connected to the M62 and E-W 

rail, assumed as a terminal location for this exercise.] 

Total trips per link per hour peak offpeak 

demand capacity demand capacity 

Newcastle – Low Moor 652 980 672 980 

Low Moor- – Manchester Airport 1020 1960 1023 1960 

MAN Airport – Birmingham Intl. 1392 2940 1430 2940 

Birmingham Intl – London & LHR 1808 2940 1886 2940 

Note on Link Loads table: capacity was calculated, at this early stage, on the basis of 6-section Transrapid vehicles. Later 

demand work underlined the need for a system planned from the outset for the maximum technically achievable capacity 

of 10-section vehicles operating a 10 minute ‘clockface’ timetable pattern south of Manchester; with 4 services an hour 

to/from Leeds, and 2 services per hour each way North of Leeds. 

The first version of a draft Ultraspeed timetable was then produced embodying this clockface principle in its metro-style 

10 minute pattern at Birmingham. This was in advance of any map-based route definition work being undertaken, on the 

purely hypothetical basis that a generally straight and flat high speed alignment suited to Transrapid operations could be 

engineered between the limited number of stopping points under discussion. 

21


The UKU timetable assumed for modelling was 

From the North East 

Tyneside dep. 07.00 07:35 

Teesside arr. 07:48 

dep. 07:50 

W Yorkshire arr. 07:26 08:06 

dep. 07:29 07:39 07:59 08:09 

E Manchester arr. 07:52 08:22 

From the North West 

dep. 07:54 08:24 

Merseyside dep 07:46 08:16 

NE & NW services merge 

Manchester 

Apt. 

arr. 07:46 07:56 08:01 08:16 08:26 08:31 

dep. 07:49 07:59 08:04 08:19 08:29 08:34 

Potteries arr. 08:15 08:45 

B’ham Internat. 

jJunction point 

dep. 08:17 08:47 

arr. 08:09 08:19 08:29 08:39 08:49 08:59 

dep. 08:12 08:22 08:32 08:42 08:52 09:02 

Heathrow arr. 08:39 09:09 

London Hub arr. 08:50 09:00 09:20 09:30 

Note 1 on Draft Timetable: UKU has the ability to link Liver- 

pool and Manchester Airports into one ‘Superhub’, 

de-stressing London’s airports and providing a genuine 

world gateway in the North to enhance global 

competitiveness of the ‘Greater North’ macro-region. 

Capacity could be engineered in to run ‘shuttles’ (with a 9 

minute journey time) between the two points, in addition 

to the two southbound services per hour currently shown. 

It may be advisable to extend some/all of these services 

northwards (a) to provide links into the new Airport England 

from the hinterland whose economy it is there to boost and 

(b) to put fare-paying passengers onto these 

services, thereby overcoming the problem that airports 

22 

cannot charge passengers for what will be perceived as a 

simple inter-terminal shuttle journey. 

Note 2 on Draft Timetable: the original London terminal 

assumption was for interchange with CTRL, National Rail 

and London Transport at St Pancras. However, subsequent 

thinking has evolved to favour Stratford (Thames Gateway). 

This has a number of advantages. 

• Using the Lee Valley gives UKU a relatively easy route 

to the London terminal point from the M25 ring. The 

capital savings compared to routing into St Pancras 

will be considerable. 

• This still affords direct connection to Channel Tunnel 

(Eurostar) and the Kent High Speed Commuter 

traffics using CTRL, but with the added benefit of a 

shorter point-to-point journey time from any CTRL (or 

continental) station and any UKU access point north 

of London. 

• With the UKU branches from Stratford and Heathrow 

meeting around the M10/St Albans area, 

interconnection with both Thameslink and Midland 

Main Line is still achieved, but once again with shorter 

point-to-point times, thanks to saving the 

unnecessary (and relatively slow) maglev and rail 

miles into and out of St Pancras. 

• Underground, DLR and classic rail connections to 

much of the broader London metropolitan 

catchment area are arguably better from Stratford 

than from the Euston Road. Tube & rail connections 

to the City and Westminster are good, and the West 

End is easily accessible via the Jubilee Line. 

Connection to the employment growth zone 

anchored by Canary Wharf and driven eastwards by 

the Thames Gateway regeneration is significantly better. 

• Assuming CrossRail is built, its route will link the 

two UKU southern termini, Heathrow T5 and 

Stratford, o the heart of London. This will offer UKU 

passengers feeder/distributor journeys in a vastly 

superior ambience and with journey times which will 

comparable favourably to those available by tube 

from the Euston Road.

Generated Traffic 

We have currently taken the level of generated traffic 

to be 15%, which is a commonly-used figure. One 

might reasonably expect a higher figure for transport 

improvements making a significant change to 

accessibility (such as this). Initial analysis shows that 

up to 30% may be possible, but we are cautious 

about using this at present, because the input 

elasticities are not really applicable for such large 

reductions in the difficulty of travel. More work is 

proposed in this area. [cf UKU commentary on 

‘full equilibrium’ modelling in the introduction to this 

appendix.] 


Observations on the traffic patterns modelled 

In general, traffic to/from the W Midlands is a little 

weak, because Birmingham International is too far 

from too many people, and not well-enough 

connected. The Low Moor site in Yorkshire has 

similar problems. 

Evolving UKU strategy addresses this problem by 

modelling two terminals in a conurbation (generally at 

‘each end’ of it). This avoids direct competition with 

much of the traditional heavy rail traffic 

originating from city centre main stations, whilst 

capturing traffic from the now-important edge of 

conurbation catchments that have developed since 

the Victorian rail infrastructure was built. 

23 

Volume 

Using a logit-based multi-modal model, we have 

estimated peak and offpeak traffic flows for UKU, 

and the revenues deriving therefrom. 

• ‘Base’ traffic levels in each 

direction are approx. 2,000 

passengers per hour on the core 

section South of Birmingham, 

tailing off to approx. 700 per hour 

North of Leeds. 

• This is a maximum of at least 

25,000 ppd each way 

Virtually all Newcastle – Heathrow and Manchester 

– Heathrow air traffic transfers to UKU. About 15% 

of revenue is attributable to trips from the regions 

to foreign destinations – generally abstraction from 

feeder air services. 

In this connection, UKU strategy has always as- 

sumed that Ultraspeed will be able to offer airport 

feeder distributor services which are attractive to the 

airlines themselves, not just to airline passengers. 

UKU services: 

• will be faster gate-to-gate than 

most domestic air services into/out 

of Heathrow (no taxi/ATC delays);

• plans to offer full through 

checking of passengers and 

baggage to FAA/CAA security 

standards, with every UKU 

terminal having an IATA code and 

being equipped with state-of-the- 

art remote check-in facilities 

(probably on a Common User 

Self-Service multi-airline basis, to 

avoid the overhead issues which 

killed off-airport check-in at 

Paddington); 

• will have energy costs per ASK 

(available seat km) typically about 

half that of airlines; 

• will not require expensive aircrew; 

• can serve many intermediate 

centres of population, not just one 

feeder/distributor airport; 

• can operate every 10 minutes, not 

just ten times a day, carrying four 

to six times as many passengers 

on every service than a typical short 

haul airliner; 

• will offer airlines passengers greater 

levels of comfort and service than 

can be provided on board an 

aircraft; 

• can be code-shared and fully 

integrated in oneWorld and/or 

Star Alliance networks/frequent flyer 

programmes. 


24 

To this end, the UKU team plans to work with Ama- 

deus in developing its reservation, ticketing, depar- 

ture control, inventory and passenger management 

software. Amadeus is the world leader in Global 

Distribution System and a key enabler of the world 

airline economy. 

In the peak, we have a typical modelling problem in 

mixing passenger groups – any sensible fares strat- 

egy does not capture car trips for people travelling 

alone, unless the business is paying. 

Offpeak, UKU fares well in abstracting the remain- 

ing Central London traffic out of car, except for the 

Yorkshire zone, where the circuitous and difficult-to- 

access nature of the Low Moor terminal, combined 

with the less-congested A1M, mitigates this. 

Yorkshire issue now addressed with better terminal 

locations.

Integration 

Integration with Rail 

Good integration of UKU with other modes of 

transport will be a crucial factor in the success or 

otherwise of the scheme. Because UKU is predicated 

upon the use of new technology, it is constrained 

to run only between its own dedicated terminals as 

a separate mode, and cannot make use of existing 

infrastructure. 

Accepting, then, that the UKU network must be 

technically separate from other modes, good modal 

integration is the means by which the benefits of UKU 

can be spread most widely, and not just be relevant 

to areas in the immediate vicinity of the terminals. 

While UKU might at first sight be thought of as a 

threat to conventional rail services, by capturing some 

of rail’s principal inter-city flows, it may in fact lead 

to a greater use of rail, by enhancing the perceived 

value of the surface public transport “offer” as a 

whole. If surface public transport increases its market 

share (at the expense of air and private car travel), 

with UKU the principal main mode, and rail as the 

principal access mode, total rail traffic might increase 

as a result. 

There would, of course, be a dramatic shift in rail 

travel patterns. Some Intercity rail routes which most 

closely parallel the UKU route could suffer declining 

ridership, although this would free up premium rolling 

stock to serve other routes, in close integration with 


25 

UKU trunk services. Conversely, many routes radiat- 

ing from the UKU terminals would experience vastly 

increased demand. Managing this considerable shift 

in the allocation of resources among existing rail 

routes will require detailed forecasting, thorough plan- 

ning and extensive co-ordination with Network Rail or 

its successors. 

Further thought on this issue has evolved since this 

was written and is included in later sections. 

Access 

Feeder services need to: 

• be frequent throughout the day; 

• be accessible to a wide 

catchment area; 

• provide good physical interchange 

at the relevant UKU station, 

including for baggage. 

Although the private car can provide access to such 

terminals, the space required to park significant 

numbers of vehicles may be difficult to find at those 

terminals, and the requirement to provide a car-park 

shuttle bus (as at some airports) is not recommended 

for the shorter trip lengths appropriate here. However, 

some provision for car-parking will have to be made, 

in order to ensure access from smaller places within 

the catchment area which cannot sustain good- 

quality public transport. 

Where terminals are located near airports, an 

upgrade of existing public transport links to city

centres to provide greater capacity may be adequate, 

but in most cases, longer distance rail services to 

other surrounding areas will require development of 

new links. Access to Heathrow from the surrounding 

rail network (other than central London) is particularly 

poor, for example, and new links to the south and 

west will be required. 

Network Rail now has improved regional access to 

LHR in hand. The Railway Consultancy is – helpfully 

– part of the advisory team. 

The demand model has indicated that Birmingham 

airport is inconveniently located for many parts of the 

West Midlands, and generates fewer UKU trips than 

might be expected. Frankfurt Airport provides a good 

example of how effective integration of a major 

transport terminal with both local and inter-city rail 

services can be achieved. 

On the other hand, Newcastle Central and 

Manchester Airport are all well-served by public 

transport having the characteristics noted in the 

bullet points above. Heathrow functions well in having 

excellent international connections, whilst Low Moor 

is physically able to have a large car-park, but suffers 

the potential problem of all park and ride sites that 

car-drivers may simply keep driving on past them. 

More work is required on the potential of Low Moor 

to attract trips from Central Leeds by car as well as 

public transport, and on the highway consequences 

of this. Connection of it to a Bradford tram system 


26 

possibly using the trackbed of the old line to 

Dewsbury (or a reinstated heavy rail service) could 

also help significantly. 

These high-level observations on access have 

informed evolution of UKU strategy since. 

Other Features of Integration 

Through ticketing between modes is highly desirable. 

The current rail fares structure is greatly in need of a 

radical overhaul. It is far too complicated, inflexible, 

and yet not sophisticated enough to handle easily 

any but the very simplest of travel requirements. In 

view of the complex travel patterns of many people 

these days, coupled with the ultimate flexibility of 

the private car, this has to be considered a serious 

disincentive to rail travel and cannot go unchallenged. 

Developments such as the Swiss EasyRide system 

should be watched closely. 

Study Conclusions 

Clearly, the overall feasibility depends as much on 

the costs as on the demand. However, the demand 

forecasts set out here indicate that a significant annual 

revenue can be generated by a new high-speed land 

transport system such as UKU. Although (as usual) most 

traffic is abstracted from other modes (chiefly rail), 

environmental gains would also be generated from 

abstraction from both domestic air and car traffic. The 

scheme would also provide some congestion relief for 

both key trunk roads/motorways and rail main lines.


Demand and capacity bases for UKU Demand Study 

This subsection outlines the underlying sources, methods and assumptions underpinning 

the model for the first UKU study. 

Current Demand Air 

Used CAA UK Airport Statistics 2001 

Tables - Domestic Air Passenger Route Analysis 

- International Air Passenger Route Analysis 

Current Demand Road 

Used National Road Traffic Survey (RTS) table 

“Average Daily Motor Vehicle Flows for Major 

Sections of Motorway Network: 2001” 

Assumed a proportion (70-80%) of the motorway 

traffic that is relevant for each of the corridors, i.e. 

which does not come from origins or go to 

destinations further away. 

Assumed a through traffic proportion on the relevant 

corridor. The initial 10% assumption was based on 

findings from the M1 Multi-Modal Study 

(Leicester-Nottingham-Darby area), but was later 

amended to the following percentages: 

• 10% for motorways with a high 

density of exits and in conurbations 

• 15% for motorways with a medium 

density of exits going through urban 

and rural areas 

• 20% for motorways with a low 

density of exits in rural areas 

For each O-D pair a percentage was estimated to 

work out the proportion of the total flow between the 

two locations in the O-D pair. This estimate is based 

on the distance between the two points and their 

population. 

27 

Current and Future Capacity Air 

Used the “Regional Air Services Co-ordination Study 

2002” (RASCO) for the airports outside the London 

area and the South-East document of the ongoing 

consultation “The Future of Air Transport in the UK” 

The regional study provides more information on 

current capacity and evolution of passenger numbers, 

while the SE study does not give many details about 

the current capacity of the London airports. 

Current and Future Capacity Road 

Used German Highway Design Manual (HBS 2001). 

Assumed 10% HGVs on a 3 lane motorway as base 

case to obtain figures for possible hourly flows for 

vehicle speeds between 80 km/h and 100 km/h (50 

mph to 62 mph) and above 100 km/h. Given these 

assumptions lane capacities can be obtained by 

dividing the above figures by the number of lanes on 

the motorway. 

To work out daily flows, a peak hour proportion of 

10% was assumed, i.e. the total daily flow is ten 

times the peak hour flow. 

In terms of future motorway capacity only the two 

scenarios of widening stretches of the M1 and the 

M6 were considered. Achievable capacities can be 

worked out using the figures from above. 

Note: M6 now re-planned as the new Midlands- 

Manchester Toll Motorway.

Future Demand Road 

Used the 1997 National Road Traffic Forecast central 

scenario annual growth percentages, which are 

given for five-year periods to work out the additional 

demand. 

No impact has been assessed for the possible 

impact of road charging on travel behaviour. At a 

strategic level, anything which forces car drivers to 

make a “hard” cost decision about car use (rather 

than simply continuing to ignore the real costs or 

running the vehicle) will enable drivers to more overtly 

draw travel cost comparisons, which will be to the 

advantage of UKU. 


28 

Future Demand Air 

Used the 2000 Air Traffic Forecasts mid-growth 

scenario to work out the demand for the different 

market segments. Annual growth percentages were 

determined on a trial-and-error basis by trying to 

model the forecast number of passengers at the end 

of the forecasting period (2020). This percentage was 

then applied for the entire range of the UKU study 

(2003-2028). 

Future Demand Rail 

Used a figure from the SRA’s 2002 Strategic Plan to 

conduct a graphic analysis of demand evolution. A 

mid-point index with 2003 as its base was calculated 

for the end of the UKU forecasting period (2028). 

This figure was then used to determine an annual 

percentage growth factor to be applied over the 

entire 2003-2028 period.

GCOST Input 

General 

• the cost matrix is symmetric 

• the same mode or combination of 

modes is assumed for travel to/from 

a zone from/to an airport 

• access/egress to/from the 

airport from more rural zones was 

assumed to be by car, while public 

transport (train/tram/bus etc.) was 

assumed for urban zones 

• some flights only depart from 

certain London airports, which 

is why for some zones different 

airports were used depending on 

the destination 

Access/Egress 

Assumed three general access/egress time categories: 

• 2 min for car 

• 5 min for public transport 

(bus/tram/metro) 

• 10 min for rail 

Waiting 

Used usual waiting time formula for all modes. 

Service frequencies were taken from timetable 

publications. For some urban bus journeys, a general 

service frequency of 10 min was assumed. For 

international flights a frequency of 180 min (3 hrs) 

was assumed. 

For air an additional wait of 45 min for domestic and 

120 min for international flights was added. 


29 

In Vehicle Time 

The IVT was taken from timetable publications for 

public modes and from the Route 66 software pack- 

age for the car. In case of slightly differing journey 

times for specific journeys an average time was used. 

For international flights, a general journey time of 

180 min was assumed. For international flights not 

starting from London, an additional 60 minutes was 

added for the connecting domestic flight portion. 

Interchanges 

The number of interchanges includes all the in- 

terchanges necessary on the access and egress 

journeys to/from the airport, one interchange onto 

the plane and one interchange off the plane. For 

international flights five interchanges were generally 

assumed. For international flights not starting from 

London, another two interchanges are added for the 

connecting domestic flight. 

For some rail journeys in the Manchester area there 

are alternating direct and connecting services to the 

airport. In this case half an interchange was 

assumed. For the calculation of the waiting time, 

however, both services were taken into account, 

i.e. a half-hourly direct and a half-hourly connecting 

service would provide a 15 minutes interval.

Fares 

Car 

For car travel, a general price in [pence per km] was 

assumed. Therefore, for the time being only the 

distances are indicated. 

Public Transport 

Tram/Metro/Underground fares were taken from 

operators’ web sites and so were fares for some 

airport bus links. Other urban bus fares were 

assumed at 60p single. Where applicable, it was 

differentiated between peak and off-peak fares. 

Rail 

Half the Cheap Day Return fare was assumed for 

off-peak rail journeys and half the Standard Day 

Return fare for peak journeys. Fares were taken partly 

from web-based journey planning systems or from 

fares manuals. 

Air 

Off-peak 

Where available, budget airline fares were used for 

off-peak travel; otherwise BA flights were chosen. 

Fares were looked up for booking four weeks in 

advance. Where several fares were available, an 

average was calculated. 

Peak 

BA flights were chosen for peak travel throughout, 

booking one day before travelling out and coming 

back the same day. Where several fares were 


30 

available, an average was calculated. 

For international flights a general fare of £200 was 

assumed for modelling purposes. 

For BA flights quotations for airport taxes were taken 

from their web site. For budget airlines a general 

airport tax of £15 was assumed.


2B: UKU North demand study 

Second UKU demand study produced by 

The Railway Consultancy (April 2004) covering a 

“Northern Economic Ringmain” route: 

• Glasgow 

• Edinburgh Airport 

• Edinburgh Parkway (SE Bypass 

location with rail access) 

• Newcastle Airport 

• Gateshead 

• Teesside 

• Leeds 

• Manchester East 

• Manchester Airport 

• Liverpool (John Lennon 

International) Airport 

This study builds substantially on the Feb 2003 work. 

The study was aligned with ongoing broader work by 

the UKU team and received a funding contribution 

from One North East for the aspects of work directly 

carried out by the Railway Consultancy. 

In addition to this study, ONE also commissioned an 

independent review of the potential macro-economic 

effects of a very high speed transport system on this 

“Northern Ringmain” route. This study was carried 

out by Centre for Urban and Regional Development 

Studies at Newcastle University. 

Background 

Given capacity constraints in other modes, 

considerable interest has been expressed in recent 

31 

years in the development of a high-speed ground 

transportation system in Britain. In 2002, a study 

conducted by Expert Alliance for the Northern 

Regions examined the potential for a route between 

London and Newcastle via Birmingham, Manchester 

and Leeds. This study focusses on a purely North of 

England route between Glasgow, Edinburgh, 

Newcastle, Teesside, West Yorkshire, Manchester 

and Liverpool. This report covers an initial 

assessment of the potential demand, revenue and 

time savings associated with such a route, and needs 

to be read in conjunction with a report commissioned 

from Newcastle University’s CURDS unit looking at 

wider regional economic benefits. A preliminary route 

has been identified as part of this work, but detailed 

engineering feasibility has not been undertaken at 

this stage. 

1 Introduction 

1.1 During 2002-3, an initial feasibility study was 

undertaken by the Railway Consultancy and others 

within the Expert Alliance consultancy grouping, for the 

Northern Regions. This examined the demand 

and revenue case for UK Ultraspeed (UKU), a maglev 

system linking Newcastle, W Yorkshire, Manchester 

and Birmingham with London and Heathrow. The 

business case for this looked reasonably promising, 

and was taken further by others through the political 

process.

2 Development of the 

Preferred Route 

2.1 Defining a route for a fixed-track transport 

system has to take into account the balance between 

good access for key traffic objectives, and minimising 

the costs of construction and operation by finding an 

alignment which is preferably flat and straight and at 

ground level. Inevitably, there are trade-offs. 

2.2 Data was available from the technical 

suppliers of UKU (Siemens and Thyssen-Krupp) on 

acceleration and braking rates, and the extent to 

which these were affected by gradients and curva- 

ture. This highlighted the requirement to minimise the 

latter; maglev technology can cope with gradients 

of 10% (at the expense of extra power consump- 

tion) but curves (either vertical or horizontal) require a 

reduction in speed, as follows: 

Min horizontal curve radii: 

Absolute min. 350m 

For 200 km/h 705m 

For 400 km/h 2825m 

For 500 km/h 4415m 

Min vertical radii (crest/sag): 

Absolute min. 600/600m 

For 200 km/h 5145/2575m 

For 300 km/h 11575/5790m 

For 400 km/h 20575/10290m 

For 500 km/h 32150/16070m 

2.3 ONE had defined their key objectives in 

a route serving the major conurbations of Tyneside 

and Teesside, linking these with other centres such 

as Glasgow, Edinburgh, West Yorkshire, Manchester 

and Liverpool. Our earlier work had identified the 

critical nature of finding terminal sites with good 

local access, including by public transport, as this is 

essential to service the volumes of demand which a 

successful UKU system will serve. 


32 

2.4 Where there were alternative alignments 

available, we also invariably chose that option which 

was as different as possible from existing transport 

networks. There are several good reasons to do this, 

but the most important is that it maximises the 

potential for the new route through minimising 

competition. Although the supporting evidence 

remains weak, it seems reasonable to assume that 

the maximum perceived benefit of new infrastructure 

is achieved if there are noticeable gains to a 

significant number of people, as opposed to very 

minor gains for a larger market. We also believe that 

the maximum regeneration possibilities are likely to 

arise from serving directly a number of places 

previously marginal to transport networks. For 

instance, Teesside has been off the main East Coast 

railway line for the last 150 years, which is 

presumably to its detriment. 

2.5 Other reasons to be different include a 

consideration of what each mode is good at. UKU’s 

speed can best be taken advantage of through 

longer sections of high-speed running. Between 

Newcastle and Edinburgh, we therefore preferred 

a direct (and shorter) route, leaving the railway to 

serve the intermediate markets of Morpeth, Alnwick, 

Berwick and Dunbar. 

2.6 With detailed geographical knowledge, the 

route has been defined to a corridor around 100m 

wide. The exact alignment within this will need to 

be developed by estimating engineers, in order to 

minimise costs and to maximise system characteristics 

by straight flat sections. A number of potential issues 

have already been isolated, as worthy of further 

investigation. For instance, a short tunnel will be 

needed under the Lammermuir Hills, and it may be 

possible to construct this as single-track, depending 

upon possible timetables and the cost differential of 

providing two tracks.

2.7 Route problems arise particularly in urban 

areas. Although Transrapid has an operating speed 

in such conditions of 250 km/h, we have conservatively 

used 200 km/h, in order to take account of very 

detailed issues which are likely to arise during the 

Project Development Study. 

3 UKU Operations 

3.1 A number of operational assumptions 

needed to be made, in order to progress the analysis. 

The system was assumed to be open for 360+ days 

of the year, and up to 18 hours per day. It has been 

assumed that maintenance can be carried out during 

the remaining six hours. 

3.2 Pricing was assumed to be used, in order to 

flatten out the peaks of demand, thereby minimising 

the critical peak vehicle requirement. A depot facility 

will be essential, although the size and shape of the 

required site, and its obvious need to be next to the 

chosen alignment, make this a non-trivial issue. 

3.3 Station stops of 2-3 minutes have been 

assumed, depending on the volume of passengers 

at the terminal. Although this system is for longer- 

distance journeys, for which a seat will be expected, 

vehicles will also need to have a sufficient quantity 

and size of doors to enable multiple simultaneous 

passenger movements. A seat reservation system is 

likely to be installed, but this requires good information 

and passenger control at the terminals. 

3.4 This stage of the study has assumed a 

simple half-hourly service calling at all the relevant 

stations, with the exception of the second West 

Yorkshire station, whose location needs much further 

work. The cumulative distances and journey times 

assumed are as set out below. These have been 

derived from the routeing work noted above, and are 


33 

therefore more accurate for Glasgow-Teesside than 

for Teesside-Liverpool. 

minutes 

kms terminal arrive depart 

0 Glasgow 0 

56 Edinburgh Airport 10 12 

77 Edinburgh Parkway 20 22 

226 Newcastle Airport 52 54 

241 Gateshead 60 63 

296 Teesside Park 75 77 

402 Leeds 94 97 

451 Manchester East 112 114 

473 Manchester Airport 119 122 

512 Liverpool Airport 132 

4 Capacity of Existing Modes 

in the UKU Corridor 

4.1 Britain’s existing transport infrastructure 

is nearing capacity in many places. Congestion is 

an endemic feature of the roads (and, increasingly, 

the railways), and this is a contributory factor to the 

reduction in reliability affecting all modes. 

4.2 Unfortunately, relatively little investment in 

capacity-enhancing measures has taken place in 

recent years. The 1991 ‘Roads for Prosperity’ 

programme did not materialise, whilst the latest 

phase of road-building generally has yet to produce 

anything concrete. Railtrack’s mismanagement of 

the railway infrastructure after years of British Rail’s 

‘managing down’ left the railway very vulnerable to 

increases in the demand for train services, an issue 

brought to a head after the Hatfield accident, when 

the true extent of poor maintenance and under- 

investment was revealed. Although air travel has 

increased hugely, and a number of terminal buildings 

have had to be enlarged, few if any new runways 

have been built, and there have been significant 

problems associated with the introduction of the new 

national air traffic control centre.

4.3 In some ways, however, the urban areas 

of Northern England and Central Scotland have not 

faced these pressures to the same extent as the 

South East of England. Nevertheless, the same 

issues do occur - road congestion may not give 

severe delays for hours on end, but peak-period 

delays are inevitable, not only in many city centres, 

but also on key arteries such as the M62. Standing 

on trains during peak periods does occur, particularly 

in those urban areas which have grown quickly in 

recent years – Edinburgh and Leeds are cases in 

point. Air journeys have had extra time added, in 

order to increase the probability of a right-time arrival. 

4.4 The key characteristics of, and capacity 

improvements relevant to, travel conditions in the UKU 

corridor examined in this study are as set out below. 

Road 

4.5 The key roads in the UKU corridor 

investigated here are (from North to South) the M8, 

A1(M)/A19 and M62. We also obtained data on the 

A1/A697/A7/A74 cross-Border routes, but these are 

relatively less important for this scheme. The major 

routes, however, are currently carrying between 

59,000 and 97,000 vehicles per day, figures which 

are at the upper range of motorway capacity, if only 

during peak periods. 

4.6 Some road-building is likely, following 

recent announcements, but the balance between the 

road-building and environmental lobbies makes this 

a difficult area for Government. It is envisaged that 

the A1 will be completely converted to motorway 

standard between Doncaster and Scotch Corner, but 

the effect on journey times may be small. We have 

not assumed further congestion charging schemes, 

although this remains at least a possibility, perhaps 

for Edinburgh in particular. 


34 

Rail 

4.7 Existing service levels on the railways in this 

corridor are actually quite high. Edinburgh and 

Glasgow enjoy a 15-minute ‘turn up and go’ frequency 

service, with a journey time of around 48 minutes; 

this is supplemented by slower trains on the route 

via Shotts, and 2-hourly GNER services between 

Glasgow and London via Newcastle. 

4.8 GNER operate the main East Coast Main 

Line (ECML) service with high-speed trains, typically 

running half-hourly South of Newcastle and hourly 

North thereof. In addition, TransPennine express 

operate every 1-2 hours from Newcastle to Liverpool, 

with additional services joining at York and Leeds, 

to provide a 15-minute frequency service between 

Leeds and Manchester. However, these trains are 

effectively semi-fast, and take around three hours 

from Newcastle to Manchester. 

4.9 Virgin introduced ‘Operation Princess’ 

for its CrossCountry services in September 2002, 

comprising a roughly-doubling of service frequencies, 

achieved using new rolling stock, albeit with only 

minimal journey time increases. At their extremities, 

some cuts are being implemented to improve 

performance, but the overall package remains 

considerably improved on the pre-2002 timetable. 

Importantly, this includes an hourly service between 

Edinburgh and Leeds via Newcastle. 

4.10 There have been plans for an ECML 

upgrade, but recent funding difficulties have meant 

that this is largely shelved, with only minor piecemeal 

improvements likely. A high-speed rail line between 

London and the North has also been examined by 

the SRA, but the current planned opening date for 

this is understood to be 2040, by which time UKU 

could have been operational for over 20 years.

Moreover, the key element of the SRA’s proposal was 

a new link to Manchester, with the business case for 

further extension (e.g. to North East England) looking 

weaker and hence less probable. Importantly, part of 

the benefit of any such scheme (as with UKU) is the 

freeing up of capacity, to enable more freight to be 

carried on the railways. 

Air 

4.11 Government forecasts indicate that demand 

will exceed capacity at a number of regional airports 

over the next 30 years, but it is unclear as to what 

measures are expected to resolve this situation, as 

the following data shows: 

Current 

Pax 

Current 

Cap 


Pax Cap 

2015 2030 2015 2030 

Manchester 19.1 23 39 60 40 [?] 

Newcastle 3.4 6 6.3 9 [?] 10 

Leeds 1.5 2.5-3.0 4 6.7 [?] [?] 

in million passengers per annum 

Sources: - Regional Air Services Co-ordination Study (RASCO), 

DfT (2002) 

- The Future of Air Transport in The UK 

– A National Consultation, SE Document, DfT (2002) 

- CAA UK Airport Statistics 2001 

5 Estimating the Demand 

for UKU 

Demand Forecasting 

5.1 In order to provide demand forecasts, four 

key questions have to be answered: 

• How many people want to travel? 

• Where do they want to travel to? 

• What mode are they likely to use? 

• Which route are they likely to use? 

35 

Traditionally, these have been referred to as trip 

generation, trip distribution, mode choice and net- 

work assignment problems. 

5.2 To answer these questions, a multi-modal 

model was constructed of trips in the proposed UKU 

corridor. Base data on trip distribution has been 

taken from a variety of sources, as set out below. 

The model then estimates the likely use of UKU 

based on the physical and perceived characteristics 

of journeys made by the different modes available, in 

a fashion which in fact does not assume any particular 

technology. These calculations have been carried 

out for a range of Origin:Destination pairs covering 

the key urban areas in the corridor, for each of which 

assumptions have been made about typical journey 

times, waiting times, fares etc. Sensitivity tests can 

be carried out to examine the impact of these 

assumptions. 

5.3 The model was then applied to a situation 

including the new travel option (UKU), and forecasts 

derived from the expected take-up of UKU services. 

The structure of the model was a single-stage logit 

model using generalised costs entered through our 

GCOST TM software, with a geographical zoning 

system using around 5 zones per urban area, and 

a car availability variable being used to segment the 

overall market. Non-car-available trips were only 

offered the possibility of coach and rail, thereby 

further reducing the possible impacts of the IIA 

(Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) problem 

inherent in a single-tier logit model. 

5.4 The model required both existing trip data 

and data on travel opportunities, which are described 

below, prior to an explanation of how the model was 

calibrated and used for demand forecasting. It was 

a development of the model used in our earlier work,

in which we retained data for the London-Newcastle 

variant, to enable to us to examine more easily other 

route options in the future. 

Existing Trips 

5.5 Trip data was assimilated from different 

sources for the existing modes of car, coach, rail and 

air, to provide an indication of current demand levels. 

This was then scaled up to a forecast, as explained 

overleaf. 

5.6 Car data was developed from link flow data 

on key arteries, as published by the Department for 

Transport for motorways and other trunk routes, 

supplemented by similar data obtained from 

Northumberland CC for routes through the Borders. 

Unfortunately, this data had to be split down using 

our judgment, to exclude traffic which was entirely local 

(and therefore not available to UKU competition) and 

also that which was travelling to regions not 

proposed to be served by UKU (e.g. the South West) 

(also assumed not to be available to UKU). Our 

judgment was based on evidence provided in the M1 

multi-modal study, which confirmed quite how little 

motorway traffic was indeed long-distance in nature 

– typically only around 10%. However, this is clearly 

an area in which better information would provide 

greater confidence in the results. 

5.7 Coach data was calculated from applying 

an estimated load factor to the inter-urban coach 

services provided by National Express, timetables 

for which are readily available; however, its minimal 

mode share meant that we excluded it from the 

modelling. Standard coach data does not, however, 

include demand from the charter coach market, 

since we believe this market is generally aimed at 

tours for those for whom time is not a key issue but 

changing modes is. 


36 

5.8 Rail data was applied using a similar method. 

Assumptions were made about train loadings, and 

the proportion of passengers travelling between the 

urban areas along the UKU route, on the relevant train 

services. At least here train services only call at specific 

points, so the assumptions are less critical; however, 

for reasons of confidentiality, the ideal datasets (rail 

ticket sales data, or the Strategic Rail Authority’s 

national rail model) was unavailable. 

5.9 An appropriate set of point-to-point air 

passenger data was purchased from the CAA, 

providing airport:airport flows. Once clarification had 

been reached about interlining, this dataset is 

considered to be reasonably robust. 

5.10 The datasets were then added together, 

adjusting to reflect their different time-periods 

(annual/daily etc). However, travel demand has been 

growing, and continues to grow, more quickly than 

GDP, and account needs to be taken of the likely 

growth in the period before UKU might open. Data on 

forecast growth of the car, air and rail modes was 

obtained, and is set out in Table 5.1 overleaf. For 

reasons of simplicity, we have taken the forecast rail 

mode growth as that likely to be applicable for this 

study, partly because it is most closely aligned to the 

inter-urban market in which this study is most 

interested. The forecast rail growth (which is the 

median of car, rail and air forecasts) has therefore 

been used to apply (unweighted) to the basket of 

all three modes, between 2003 and 2015, which is 

the earliest one might reasonably expect UKU to be 

opened. 

5.11 It should be noted that, at this early stage 

of analysis, we have not attempted to apply different 

growth rates to different market segments of the 

population (although one might expect the growth

ates for different journey purposes to vary). Moreover, 

one would in reality expect the trip patterns for those 

with and without a car available to vary, but data has 

not enabled us to do this at this stage. 

5.12 With these caveats, but taking into account 

the estimates of current demand for the different 

Evolution of Travel Demand 

Index (2003=1) 

Year Car [based 

on distance 

travelled] 

Air Londonregional 


mppa Air intraregional 

37 

modes in the corridor to be served by UKU, and 

growth to 2015, the base number of trips per day 

used for modelling is as set out in Table 5.2. These 

trips have then been disaggregated between the 50 

sub-zones used for modelling. 

Table 5.1. Forecast Travel Demand Growth by Mode 

mppa Air intnl mppa Rail 

annual growth factor 1.034 1.037 1.04 1.029 

2003 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 

2004 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.03 

2005 1.03 1.07 27.70 1.08 11.70 1.08 158.50 1.06 

2006 1.05 1.11 28.64 1.12 12.13 1.12 164.84 1.09 

2007 1.07 1.14 29.62 1.16 12.58 1.17 171.43 1.12 

2008 1.08 1.18 30.62 1.20 13.05 1.22 178.29 1.15 

2009 1.10 1.22 31.66 1.24 13.53 1.27 185.42 1.19 

2010 1.11 1.26 32.74 1.29 14.03 1.32 192.84 1.22 

2011 1.13 1.31 33.85 1.34 14.55 1.37 200.55 1.26 

2012 1.14 1.35 35.00 1.39 15.09 1.42 208.58 1.29 

2013 1.16 1.40 36.19 1.44 15.65 1.48 216.92 1.33 

2014 1.18 1.44 37.43 1.49 16.23 1.54 225.59 1.37 

2015 1.19 1.49 38.70 1.55 16.83 1.60 234.62 1.41 

2016 1.21 1.54 40.01 1.60 17.45 1.67 244.00 1.45 

2017 1.22 1.60 41.37 1.66 18.09 1.73 253.76 1.49 

2018 1.23 1.65 42.78 1.72 18.76 1.80 263.91 1.54 

2019 1.25 1.71 44.24 1.79 19.46 1.87 274.47 1.58 

2020 1.26 1.77 45.74 1.85 20.18 1.95 285.45 1.63 

2021 1.27 1.83 1.92 2.03 1.67 

2022 1.28 1.89 1.99 2.11 1.72 

2023 1.29 1.95 2.07 2.19 1.77 

2024 1.30 2.02 2.14 2.28 1.82 

2025 1.31 2.09 2.22 2.37 1.88 

2026 1.32 2.16 2.31 2.46 1.93 

2027 1.32 2.23 2.39 2.56 1.99 

2028 1.33 2.31 2.48 2.67 2.04 

Sources: National Road Traffic Forecasts GB, 1997 

Air Traffic Forecasts for the UK, 2000 

SRA Strategic Plan 2002


Table 5.2. Assumed 2015 Summary Travel Demand Matrix 

from/to Glasgow Edin Air Newcastle Stockton Leeds Manchester Liverpool 

Glasgow 15831 856 660 1007 1487 795 

Edin Air 15831 4208 960 1237 1394 622 

Newcastle 856 4208 3396 2334 1422 508 

Stockton 660 960 3396 2912 1220 638 

Leeds 1007 1237 2334 2912 8145 2033 

Manchester 1487 1394 1422 1220 8145 6960 

Liverpool 795 622 508 638 2033 6960 

Model Set-Up 

Zoning System 

5.13 It is important to choose carefully the 

locations for which detailed trip information is 

required. The selection of city-centre locations will 

tend to favour rail, whereas the selection of suburban 

locations will favour car, although the choice of a 

suburb near an airport may make air unrealistically 

competitive. We have therefore examined a number 

of locations within each urban area, and undertaken 

our analysis for each of these. Typically, we have 

taken a city-centre location, and one in each of the 

four compass points, with the total demand for travel 

to/from that urban area being split between the 

different zones on the basis of our judgment. 

5.14 Detailed assumptions have been made 

about the exact location of zones, and the access 

modes assumed to be used to reach the main mode. 

However, as an example, the sub-zones used for 

analysis of the Tyneside area were Monument, 

Ponteland, Whitley Bay and Sunderland University. 

Car Ownership 

5.15 Around one-quarter of British households 

do not have access to a car. Clearly, their travel 

38 

choices are different from those with multiple car 

ownership. Our modelling approach takes this into 

account by giving different segments of the 

population different mode choices. Separate 

modelling is carried out for the different groups (the 

size of which was estimated from overall Census 

data), and the results summed. 

Journey Purposes and Time Periods 

5.16 Ideally, one should model transport at a 

disaggregated level, enabling one to examine the 

decisions made for trips made for different journey 

purposes, as it is the latter which reflects best 

people’s propensity to use different modes, routes 

and so on. However, journey purpose data is 

relatively difficult to obtain. As a proxy, we have 

therefore modelled (3-hour) peak and offpeak 

conditions separately. At one level, this reflects the 

split between commuting and business travel (in the 

peaks) and shopping and leisure travel (offpeak). 

5.17 However, the peak:offpeak split also reflects 

relative journey quality, since car times tend to be 

longer (owing to road congestion) but public 

transport waiting times less (owing to higher 

frequencies) in peak periods. Consideration of peak 

and offpeak conditions separately is therefore vital.

Elements of Generalised Cost 

5.18 Our modelling uses an objective assessment 

of the elements of journeys between a range of origin 

and destination zones. The GCOST TM model formulation 

used requires the calculation of generalised cost by 

all relevant modes for all the relevant Origin:Destination 

pairs. The basis of the model is: 

5.19 Generalised Cost = b 1 ·A + b 2 ·W + b 3 ·R + 

(f/VOT) + b 0 

where b 1 , b 2 & b 3 = weighting parameters 

A = access time 

W = waiting time 

R = running (in-vehicle) time 

F = Fare 

VOT = Value Of Time 

b 0 = error term 

5.20 Previous research has indicated that the 

weightings for both access and waiting time were 

around 2, but have recently fallen. These falls are 

attributed respectively to an increased number 

of passengers accessing rail stations by car, and 

increased train frequencies leading to a reduction 

in the consequences of missing any particular train. 

Whilst we have used a value of 1.8 for access/egress 

time, we retained a value of 2 for waiting times. This 

is because the hourly/half-hourly frequency typically 

provided (or proposed) across the North of England 

for rail and UKU services is not sufficient to provide 

the ‘turn-up-and-go’ local service, where the lower 

weighting might be applicable. In fact, a quick 

sensitivity test suggested that this choice of value 

made little difference to the results. 

1 Generalised cost is the key theoretical concept underlying 

transport behaviour, and attempts to represent in one 

concept the elements of travel choice which represent the 

difficulty of travel; in layman’s terms, it may be considered 

as an ‘index of hassle’. 


39 

Access and Egress 

5.21 Access times were calculated on the basis 

of estimated walk times to/from the relevant car 

park, bus stop, station or terminal (access by bus 

to rail/UKU stations or airports is required for some 

trips by those without a car available). We have also 

made estimates of egress time, at trip destinations; it 

is important to remember that people make door-to- 

door journeys, not station-to-station journeys. 

5.22 Waiting times have been calculated on the 

assumption that passengers wait half the headway for 

services running every 15 minutes or more frequently, 

and a further quarter of any additional headway 

above that. In formulaic terms, this is represented: 

W = 1 . H for H < 15 min and W = 7.5 + H - 15 for H> 15 min, 

2 4 

where: W= waiting time 

H = headway between services 

5.23 This leads to an average wait of 18.75 

minutes for an hourly service, a figure which is 

designed to reflect many passengers timing their 

arrivals, but some being unable to do so, and having 

to wait (or otherwise waste time). 

In-Vehicle Times 

5.24 Public transport in-vehicle times have been 

taken directly from timetables, whilst car journey 

times were taken from the Route 66 software 

package. However, in our experience this does not 

represent well variations in traffic speeds, so we have 

added a nominal 10% to peak journeys, to account 

for the effects of congestion. At this stage, more 

detailed information was not available. 

5.25 In addition, for all car trips of over four hours 

in length, half an hour has been allowed as a break.

5.26 In the future, peak car journey times are 

expected to increase. In general, smaller increases are 

expected outside the key urban areas. It was therefore 

assumed that all car journey times would increase by 

10% by 2015 (the earliest possible opening date for 

UKU), compared to the calibrated conditions. We did, 

nevertheless, assume that the relativities between 

different journey times as indicated by Route 66 

remain valid. 

Fares and other Charges 

5.27 For public transport, peak and offpeak fares 

can vary significantly. We therefore selected which fare 

types we considered representative of the different 

time periods, before attempting to collect the relevant 

data. Rail fares were taken from fares manuals (and 

also assumed to apply to UKU), whilst air fares were 

taken from websites. 

5.28 The costs of using private cars were estimated 

from applying a typical petrol price of 70p/l to an 

average fuel consumption rate of 40mpg and the 

distance between the places modelled (see below). 

This may be slightly on the high side, given the urban 

and sometimes congested nature of most of the trips 

being considered. These assumptions lead to a petrol 

cost of around 8p/mile, which was increased to 9p to 

cover oil, tyres and the other minor marginal operat- 

ing costs which are noticed by car users. No attempt 

was made to include any element of car capital costs, 

since these are typically not perceived by car users. 

5.29 Parking costs are always a source of some 

difficulty in transport modelling, since spaces are 

normally available at different prices at different 

walking distances from one’s destination, so a degree 

of averaging is inevitable. Even more difficult is the 

treatment of those trips with free parking available, 

and these may constitute a relatively high proportion 


40 

of trips; for instance, work by SDG in Central 

Manchester suggested that 55% of a.m. peak, and 

22% of offpeak drivers do not pay for parking. Further 

to our previous experience, modelling was based 

on peak parking charges of £2 in the central zones 

of the key urban areas (£1 offpeak). In all cases, it is 

assumed that car-parking charges are equally split 

between the outward and return journey legs, so 

that the actual charges paid are double the figures 

quoted. 

5.30 The error term b0 was taken into account in 

a number of ways. First, a series of mode constants 

were applied to the relevant modes, based on our 

experience. These effectively disadvantaged rail at 

the expense of the other three modes modelled (car, 

air and UKU) by ten minutes. 

5.31 Secondly, the probabilistic nature of the logit 

model used to allocate traffic between the various 

modal alternatives also reflects the variability of 

individual circumstances. However, this was further 

mitigated in this case by the relatively small size 

of the local zones used, which enables city-centre 

zones (near stations) to be distinguished from suburban 

zones (where rail trips require a notable access journey 

leg to reach the station in the first place). 

5.32 The model also requires the use of the Value 

Of Time parameter, in order to reflect people’s 

behaviour in trading off time against monetary cost. 

Although the national average value was £6.38/hour 

in 2002/3, a value of £7/hour was taken for peak 

trips, to reflect the above-average wage rates 

applicable to those making longer journeys. (Note, 

however, that the national value was taken for 

appraisal purposes, in order to avoid any discrimination 

in the allocation of resources between regions). In the 

offpeak, a value of £5 was taken.

5.33 However, it must be acknowledged that this 

does cause some problems within a multi-modal model 

including air travel. The model does not calibrate well, 

and finds it difficult to allocate trips to the air mode, 

even before the introduction of UKU. Only when 

Values of Time reach around £50/hour does the 

model allocate significant numbers of trips to air, but 

this may actually reflect reality, since peak-period air 

fares are normally borne by businesses for higher- 

earning employees. We did not, however, feel it 

appropriate to use such a high VOT throughout the 

model, given the dominance of car- and rail trips, 

with much lower values. 

5.34 Calibration of any model must be undertaken 

carefully. Although any variable can be amended in 

order to get the output to fit observed values, it is 

not appropriate to amend any variables except the 

following: 

• values of time (which reflect local 

conditions); 

• mode constants (which reflect local 

people’s innate preferences for one 

mode over another); 

• the logit model parameter (which 

reflects the way in which local 

people might compare the optimum 

option with one which is apparently 

sub-optimal). 

• Whilst we have used the 

calibration process for checking 

unusual data values, for adjusting 

uncertain values, and for examining 

the sensitivity of the results, it has 

proved very difficult to obtain data 

against which to calibrate the 

model, so it must be acknowledged 

that this remains a weak part of the 

work carried out to date. 


41 

6 Demand Forecasting Results 

Traffic Abstracted from Other Modes 

6.1 Using the multi-modal model as set out in 

section 5, we have estimated peak and offpeak traffic 

flows for UKU, and the revenues deriving therefrom. 

Figures quoted below are model outputs, reflecting 

the aggregation of trips between all the pairs of zones 

examined. 

Link Flows 

6.2 Link flows represent the patronage figures 

expected at particular points along the route. As 

expected, the maximum link flows occur between 

Edinburgh and Leeds. (3-hour) peak flows are 

forecast to reach over 6000, whilst offpeak flows 

reach around 9000 passengers. The peak one-hour 

flow is therefore forecast to be as much as 3000 

passengers, whilst offpeak flows are around 1000 

passengers per hour. 

6.3 As a sense check, we compared these 

figures against the input data. With a typical average 

road daily flow of 60,000, one would expect around 

12,000 in the three-hour peak period. To this should 

be added perhaps 1000 rail and 500 air passengers, 

giving a total of 13,500 passengers in the corridor. 

Results indicating UKU achieving loadings of around 

3000 suggests a mode share in the corridor of 20%, 

which does not seem unreasonable. 

6.4 Across the day as a whole, the maximum 

link flow is around 21,000 ppd, with all the route 

exceeding 11,000 ppd, except for Manchester Air- 

port – Liverpool, which is forecast to have about half 

this number of passengers (see Figure 6.2). Unfor- 

tunately, a comparison with the capacity assumed 

shows an imbalance: even if the half-hourly service 

were formed of 10-car UKU sets (with a capacity of

Glasgow 

Edinburgh Airport 

Edinburgh Parkway 

Newcastle Airport 

Gateshead 

Teesside Park 

Leeds 

Manchester East 

Manchester Airport 

Liverpool Airport 

around 1600 seats/hour), these would struggle to 

cope with the 3000 pph expected in the peak hour. 

Running more services would, of course, further 

increase both demand and operating costs, and 

more work is needed to find the optimum balance 

between supply and demand, perhaps using yield 

management techniques. 

Figure 6.2. Summary of 

UKU ‘Northern Economic 

Ring Main’ Route 

Patronage figures are for each direction 


56kms; 14000 pass/day 









42 

Figure 6.1. Forecast 

Link-Loadings of UKU 

‘Northern Economic Ring 

Main’ Route 

25000 

20000 

15000 

10000 

passengers 

5000 

per day 

0 

Leeds 

Glasgow 

Ncle Air 

Ed Airport 

Teesside Man East Man Airpt 

Ed Parkway 

Gateshead 

6.5 Although trips are predominantly abstracted 

from the railways, a more detailed examination shows 

that one-third of them are forecast to reduce road 

congestion by attracting car drivers. The apparent 

predominance of car-available trips in Figure 6.1 is 

owing to the fact that the trips attracted from car are 

longer-distance, whilst a greater number of (different) 

short-distance trips are expected to transfer from rail. 

Terminal-Level Forecasts 

6.6 The terminals at Glasgow, Leeds and 

Edinburgh Parkway are forecast to be the busiest, 

all with over 10,000 departing passengers each day 

(and, of course, a similar number arriving) (see Figure 

6.3). To put this in context, the equivalent rail stations 

typically have double this patronage at present. The 

Newcastle Airport terminal is forecast to be rather 

quiet, but further work is needed to see if passengers 

from other parts of North Tyneside might use this in 

preference to the terminal at Gateshead. 

car- available 

captive to p.t.

15000 

10000 

5000 

originating 

0 

pass/day 


Figure 6.3. Terminal-Level Forecasts for UKU ‘Northern 

Economic Ring Main’ Route 

Changes from Previous Work 

6.8 Our previous work highlighted the importance 

of minimising access time for UKU. As a result, the 

Edinburgh, Tyneside and Manchester conurbations 

are all now suggested to be served by two UKU 

terminals. This will also be necessary for West 

Yorkshire, but thus far we have not identified the 

second site, and this analysis assumes a terminal in 

Central Leeds only. 

6.9 This phase of work has also added a terminal 

on Teesside, which is a major urban area currently 

relatively poorly served by other public transport 

modes. Teesside Airport is of relatively minor 

importance for domestic air traffic, whilst Darlington 

acts as the mainline railhead for Teesside proper, 

requiring passengers to access it either by car or 

local rail services. A terminal located directly within 

the main Teesside area should help to redress some 

of the regional economic imbalances created over 

100 years ago when the main Anglo-Scottish railway 

line was laid down through Darlington. 

Leeds 

Glasgow 

Liv Airpt 

Edin Edin AirptNcle 

PkwyAirptTeessideMan 

Man EastAirpt 

Gateshead 

43 

car- available 

captive to p.t. 

6.10 This study has not generally matched the 

highest-revenue flows found in our previous work, 

which concentrated on a route to/from London via 

Birmingham. The commercial significance of those 

two centres suggests that extension of the route 

considered here into the South East of England is 

essential, if revenue maximisation is the key rationale 

for the project. That is particularly the case, given the 

strength of the high-yield business market to/from 

London. Balancing this, economic development and 

competitiveness benefits at macro-economic level 

are at their greatest furthest from London. 

Observations on the Traffic Patterns 

6.11 The two weakest terminals on a North-only 

‘Ringmain’ route are at Newcastle Airport and 

Liverpool Airport. The former of these is poorly sited 

for much of the Tyneside area, although could come 

into its own if UKU services were extended to London, 

replacing domestic flights. The Liverpool terminal is 

also somewhat distant from the city centre, and is of 

course at the end of the route, therefore suffering from 

only having traffic in one direction.

6.12 Elsewhere, UKU competes at a detailed 

level with the other modes. For instance, in the 

Teesside area, it fares well for trips to/from the core 

area and beyond (e.g. Redcar), but poorly for those 

trips from other centres such as Hartlepool, where 

road (in particular) has better access and shorter 

journey times to Newcastle, which do not require a 

‘dog-leg’ journey via Teesside Park. 

6.13 Revenues are, of course, dominated by 

the longer-distance flows with higher fares (where 

car-owners, as well as those without a car available, 

are attracted to UKU), even if passenger numbers are 

concentrated on the shorter flows (e.g. Glasgow- 

Edinburgh) where non-car-owners are predominant. 

Generated Traffic 

6.14 In the absence of much research on this 

parameter, traditional transport planning assumes 

(rather weakly) that a further 15% of revenue will 

accrue, in addition to the traffic flows modelled 

directly. This additional revenue is due to the 

generative effects of new systems, as people make 

trips they did not otherwise make. The actual level 

of generation might reasonably be thought to vary 

depending upon the scale of the changes to 

existing journeys, with larger changes in travel time 

more likely to lead to changes in behaviour. 

6.15 One might reasonably expect a higher figure 

for transport improvements making a significant 

change to accessibility (such as this). Initial analysis 

shows that up to 30% may be possible, but we are 

cautious about using this at present, because the 

input elasticities aren’t really applicable for such large 

reeductions in the difficulty of travel. Our assumption 

is therefore on the cautious side, for a system such 

as this which could conceivably change travel 

patterns and inter-urban connectivity dramatically. 


44 

More work is proposed in this area. 

6.16 A further key issue about which sensitivity 

analysis might be conducted is the age and 

socio-economic status of the populations of different 

urban areas. Even at this level of aggregation, 

significant differences (which themselves impact on 

travel demand) occur in population structure. 

6.17 The model calculates revenue by mode. As 

UKU is a new mode, all of its revenue is new, and 

can be attributed to the UKU system, for the 

purposes of financial appraisal. For economic 

appraisal, however, revenues attracted from other 

public transport modes cannot be treated as an 

economic benefit, as they are only a transfer. We 

therefore quote separately the revenues transferred 

from car (which are about £150m of the revenue 

abstracted from other modes). At this stage, we have 

also made an indicative estimate of safety and 

environmental benefits, consequent on the ex-car 

demand, although we recognise that transfers from 

air travel are, in reality, likely to lead to the greatest 

environmental benefits. Further work on this is needed. 

6.18 Initial modelling was carried out using a 

UKU fare similar to the existing rail fare. However, 

sensitivity testing has taken place using fares 10% 

higher and 10% lower, with the following impacts: 

Peak offpeak 

10% higher -£25m -£15m 

10% lower +£25m +£15m 

(figures are p.a.) 

6.19 These figures were not calculated by 

applying conventional elasticities at an aggregate 

level, but rather all fares were changed within the 

model itself. This is therefore not a result driven by 

different responses of different market segments. 

Instead, the outcome relates to the relative

competitive position of UKU, given the different fares 

and journey time characteristics of its competitors in 

the peak and offpeak periods. However, further 

improvements in revenue could no doubt be 

achieved through yield management systems, and 

more work is needed to determine exactly the level of 

that improvement. 

6.20 Good integration of UKU with other modes 

of transport will be a crucial factor in the success or 

otherwise of the scheme. Because UKU is predicated 

upon the use of new technology, it is constrained 

to run only between its own dedicated terminals (of 

which there are relatively few) as a separate mode, 

and cannot make use of existing infrastructure. Much 

more work is needed to determine the optimum 

arrangements for through-ticketing, service coordination 

and so on, but these really are important, since few 

passengers will access UKU terminals on foot. 


45 

6.21 The demand levels and revenues quoted (even 

for abstracted traffic) are in the medium-term, following 

a period of traffic build-up which would be expected to 

take 3-4 years. Generated traffic would probably take 

even longer to reach its long-term levels, as businesses 

and individuals take time to adjust to completely new 

economic conditions. Reference should be made to 

the CURDS report on longer-term and wider economic 

benefits for more on this. 

Social Benefits 

6.22 In transport projects, the largest benefits are 

usually time savings. In this case, our preliminary 

estimate of these is about £600m p.a. which, with 

the usual Department for Transport assumptions 

about the growth in the Value Of Time, leads to 

an NPV of around £10bn. Further (environmental) 

benefits also accrue in respect of the transfer from 

car and air to UKU, but we cannot calculate these at 

present, since detailed information on the energy use, 

noise, air quality impacts etc. per passenger-km for 

UKU is not available to us.

7 Study Conclusions and 

Recommendations 

Conclusions 

7.1 The demand forecasts set out in this report 

indicate that a significant beneficial impact can be 

expected from a new high-speed land transport 

system such as UKU, in a ‘Northern ring main’ 

alignment running from Glasgow to Liverpool via 

Newcastle. The value of time savings alone (a key 

benefit to Britain, against which Government 

commitment might reasonably be justified and 

leverageed) is also large – around £500m p.a. 

7.2 Although (as is usual for high-speed lines) 

much traffic is abstracted from other public transport 

modes (chiefly rail), environmental gains would also 

be generated from abstraction from both domestic 

air and car traffic. Road congestion relief is expected 

from many of the inter-urban road links of Northern 

England. The scheme would also provide some 

congestion relief for both key trunk roads/motorways 

and mainline railways. 


46 

Recommendations 

7.4 The results presented in this report indicate 

that the scheme is sufficiently promising to be worth 

progressing to the next level of detail. However, much 

further work is needed, especially in the following 

areas: 

• improved base trip matrix data, 

including differentiation between trip 

patterns for those with and without 

a car available; 

• timetable optimisation; 

• consideration of a possible terminal 

at Sunderland Parkway; 

• identification of the best location for 

a second West Yorkshire terminal; 

• identification of the preferred 

corridor for Teesside – Liverpool, 

at a more detailed level; 

• engineering feasibility of, and costs 

for, the whole preferred corridor; 

• identification of a funding 

mechanism; 

• development of a business case, 

taking into account both costs and 

revenues; 

• identification of a mechanism to 

develop the project. 

2 At current prices. In reality, higher figures will apply when UKU opens; at current growth rates in the value 

of time, this would be expected to be at least 20% higher than this value.


2C: Demand – consolidating inputs 

Consolidating inputs (June-August 

2004) by The Railway Consultancy. 

This updates findings of Feb 2003 and 

April 2004 studies in the light of the 

route development, service pattern 

and timetabling work conducted in 

Summer 2004 in connection with the 

No 10 process. 

This consolidation work was necessary to under- 

stand, interpret and update the results of the two 

previous pieces of work. These had studied different 

UKU routes designed for different macro-economic 

purposes and had overlapped only in the ‘Northern 

Way’ section. 

The Railway Consultancy combined demand data- 

sets from two different iterations of the UKU model: 

• v6 (England North-East to London 

& Heathrow – the Appendix A work) 

which had been updated in the light 

of ongoing work in July 2003 

• v8 (Scotland – NE – Yorks – Manc 

– Merseyside – the Appendix B 

work) which was last updated in 

producing the Northern Economic 

Ringmain Route Study in April 2004. 

Although these two datasets analysed two different 

routes, with some differences in terminal location 

assumptions, it was possible to produce an 

indicative set of link loads for the combined UKU 

Scotland – London/LHR route. These key driver 

47 

figures for capacity and timetable planning have been 

adjusted to compensate for differences in the model 

bases and remove the modelling effects of overlap 

between the two studies (the Newcastle Airport to 

Manchester Airport section). Naturally the figures will 

be subject to detailed scrutiny – and the model to 

further refinement – during project development. 

Link Loads 

UKU Link leaving 

Peak 

hour 

Ave. 

offpeak 

hour 

Glasgow 1800 750 

Edinburgh Airport 2400 850 

Edinburgh Parkway 3200 1300 

Newcastle Airport 3200 1400 

Gateshead 3400 1600 

[Sunderland Parkway] 3400 1600 

Tees Parkway 3400 1600 

Leeds 3700 2000 

West Yorks Parkway 3700 2000 

Manchester East 2500 1300 

Manchester Airport 2600 1400 

[Newcastle-under-Lyme] 2600 1400 

Wolverhampton 2900 1600 

Wednesbury 3200 1800 

Birmingham International 3800 2100 

St Albans Parkway – Stratford 1600 1100 

St Albans Parkway – Heathrow 1600 800 

N.B. Local traffic within conurbations is assumed not 

to be permitted

Market share 

Responding a request for headline market share 

percentages in key markets, The Railway 

Consultancy re-aggregated the more detailed set of 

origin : destination pairs which drive the UKU model 

to produce the following ‘metro area to metro area’ 

market share numbers. 

It should be noted that figures set out in this table 

do not take into account any market growth caused 

by UKU. 

O:D pair 

Note 1: West Midlands market share is radically improved 

from the Feb 2003 (Appendix A) numbers by virtue of two 

new stations at Wolverhampton and Wednesbury affording 

better access, in catchments current not ideally served by 

any mode, especially rail. 

Note 2: as a general principle, note the market-dominant 

performance of UKU in longer distance markets, where 

UKU speed and frequency provides an attractive alternative 

to domestic air travel, in addition to abstracting traffic from 

rail and road. 

Pricing Assumptions 

Total 

trips 

Existing rail fares have been used as the basis for 

UKU fares, with high peak fares (typically taken from 

Ordinary Return rail fares) contrasting with significantly 

lower offpeak fares (typically calculated assuming 

Saver Return or Cheap Day Return rail fares). 

This remains constant between both A and B 

studies: as noted earlier, a more finely graduated 


UKU 

trips 

% 

share 

Glasgow-Edinburgh 14600 4800 33 

Tyneside-Greater London 4000 2600 65 

West Yorkshire-Greater 

Manchester 

7500 2300 31 

West Yorkshire-Greater London 6200 1800 29 

Greater Manchester-Greater 

London 

7500 3400 

West Midlands-Greater London 13000 5500 42 

45 

48 

fares model may improve revenue by providing 

more flexible yield management tools with which to 

compete with premium airfares, ultra-budget off peak 

travel by coach etc. etc. 

Ridership and Revenue 

After discounting the overlap effects between the two 

models, The Railway Consultancy affirmed to the 

UKU team, on the basis of all modelling assumptions 

currently in force that an estimated ridership volume 

in the region of 40m p.a. would be achievable and 

that it would be prudent to plan the PFI model on the 

basis of minimum revenue in the region of £700m per 

annum, for the full London/LHR – Scotland system, 

rising to £1bn to £1.3bn on the basis of reasonable 

assumptions regarding passenger fares mix, high- 

value/high-speed freight and logistics income, the 

deployment of sophisticated yield maximisation 

systems and the release of demand suppressed 

under current transport provition. 

Note re Impact of UKU on Conventional Rail 

UKU is expected to abstract traffic from air, 

conventional rail and car. The impacts of UKU on the 

existing rail network are not as straightforward as 

might initially be thought. 

Certainly, one would expect a loss of InterCity rail 

business between the largest cities, such as 

Manchester and London. That, in turn, would lead 

to a reduction in frequency (perhaps back to hourly 

between London and Newcastle, Leeds and 

Manchester, half-hourly between London and 

Birmingham, and trimming back of Virgin 

CrossCountry services North of Newcastle). 

However, existing InterCity rail journeys actually have 

fairly short (c. 100-mile) average trip lengths, as they 

carry many passengers on journeys between towns 

and the regional centres (e.g. Peterborough-London).

Very few of these passengers will find UKU useful 

since, in order to achieve headline end-to-end journey 

times, it has relatively few stations. Similarly, some 

passengers find interchange very onerous, and are 

likely to remain on the rail network in order to continue 

with journeys which might be quicker with UKU, but 

only by changing. [UKU will capture] higher-yield 

business traffic, so some worsening of financial 

performance on [competing rail] franchises seems 

inevitable. 

In addition, some trip redistribution is possible, at 

the expense of conventional rail. For instance, as 

Manchester will become the same journey time from 

London as Rugby, some London commuters might 

choose to move from Rugby (using rail to commute) 

to Manchester (using UKU) (subject to their ability to 

pay higher fares). 

However, secondary rail routes providing access to 

the UKU terminals are likely to benefit from 

substantially increased traffic as a feeder mode, as 

long-distance journeys become easier within a 

working day. For instance, rail travel between 

Hartlepool and Stockton might increase (from a low 

base!) because long-distance trips to/from Hartlepool 

(via Stockton) will get much quicker. 

The InterCity service reductions likely will also throw 

up new capacity. First, there will be some surplus 

high-quality trains, which will enable increases in 

services to places with aspirations for them; it 

could also enable the strengthening of some (e.g. 

CrossCountry) services which are currently nearly full. 

Perhaps more importantly, the removal of some high- 

speed services from the conventional rail network will 

free up considerable track capacity. High-speed 

services can take up a disproportionate amount of 

track capacity on a mixed-traffic railway line, with 


49 

each high-speed train preventing several medium- 

speed services operating. This additional capacity 

freed up would be available for more long-distance 

freight (e.g. containers) and inter-urban traffic (e.g. 

to/from Northampton), some of which is currently 

prevented from operation due to the lack of 

capacity (particularly on the West Coast Main Line). 

Some rail capacity upgrades currently being 

considered (e.g. Peterborough-Lincoln-Doncaster, for 

freight) would not be needed, with the consequent 

savings, although (probably smaller) amounts of 

money may need to be spent on secondary lines with 

increased demand. 

In summary, then, the impacts are complex, 

but we would anticipate a poorer commercial 

performance from the InterCity passenger operating 

budget, but improvements in the secondary 

passenger and freight operating budgets, and 

savings in capital expenditure. Clearly, much more 

work is needed to determine the exact outcome. 

Linking from underlying demand study to route 

development 

The above inputs to the overall UKU process were 

produced by The Railway Consultancy during 

Summer 2004, when their primary role was to 

produce an initial route hypothesis (Route Plan 

Stephenson) for the full UKU route. 

Another critical output of the Railway Consultancy 

process was an order-of-magnitude revenue 

forecast, against which a PFI proposition could be 

developed. 

The next sections of this chapter describe how this 

process was carried forward.

2D: Route 

development 

Evolution of Route Plan Stephenson & 

Route Plan Brunel 

The table presented later in this section is a 

representative sample of work carried out by The 

Railway Consultancy to produce an initial hypothesis 

for the overall UKU route, on the basis of which: 

• headline technical specification of 

the route could be carried out by 

Transrapid International [TRI] to 

include: 

- guideway configuration, including switches, 

terminal layouts, depot layouts; 

- all technical elements mounted in, on and 

alongside the guideway; 

- power and substations; 

- operational control system (OCS, including 

all associated vehicle positioning sub- 

systems etc.) 

• a route simulation could be 

conducted by TRI which itself then 

produced: 

- a speed profile for the route; 

- journey times achievable within this profile; 

- headways (gaps between services) 

within the parameters of the technical 

specification; 

- number of vehicles needed to provide the 

timetable required to meet demand; 

- system power consumption. 

Faithful & Gould [F&G] could then conduct an 

exercise to arrive at a preliminary estimate of costs to 

implement the system in Civil and E&M terms in the 

UK context. 

The objective here was to bring into play the 

formidable advantage of the sheer predictability and 


50 

and pre-definability of the holistically designed 

Transrapid system. To reach the point where 

TRI could start the specification and simulation 

process, a route hypothesis is required. 

The Railway Consultancy were therefore 

briefed to produce such a hypothesis on the 

basis of close cartographic work at 1:50,000 

scale. The brief called for an alignment making 

very conservative use of natural geographic 

features and, by extension, optimised for 

ridership catchment ahead of outright speed. 

This hypothesis was then termed Route Plan 

Stephenson and circulated to TRI and F&G. 

The next iteration of the process calls for TRI to 

develop a second hypothesis, which optimises 

the route for speed (basically by ‘ironing out’ 

bends). Known as Route Plan Brunel, this 

second hypothetical route also removes some 

of the minor stopping points, optimising for 

speed and system efficiency. 

It is important to remember that both Route 

Plans are purely hypothetical until work on the 

Project Development Study defines and refines 

an actual route in the physical landscape, and 

in the market context of Britain. It must be 

stressed that no investigation has been 

undertaken at this stage into land acquisition 

and availability. This is for the Project 

Development Study.


Step 1: Route Plan Stephenson mapped & main features described 

Working from 1:50,000 OS maps, The Railway Consultancy maps and describes the first iteration 

route hypothesis: Route Plan Stephenson. The table shows 40km of the total 768km. 

1:50000 LAND Guideway curves (> 6km rad), height to guideway surface & gradient 

map line cum. contour diff km diff contour sect grad curvature type pier ht surface ht diff sect grad Notes 

mm km m km m m/km 1 in rad (m,dirn) m m m m/km 1 in % 

0 0 G 1 1 Stratford 

9 0.45 3 0.45 3 7 150 G 1 4 3 7 150 0.67 under A12 

19 0.95 3 0.5 0 0 LEVEL G 1 4 0.1 0 LEVEL 0.00 under A106 

30 1.5 4 0.55 1 2 550 E2 7 11 7 13 79 1.27 top of flyover over Strat-Tott rail line 

58 2.9 5 1.4 1 1 1400 G 1 6 -5 -4 -280 -0.36 under A104 

82 4.1 6 1.2 1 1 1200 1500 R E3 11 17 11 9 109 0.92 over London-Chingford line (on embankment) 

110 5.5 7 1.4 1 1 1400 E3 11 18 1 1 LEVEL 0.00 over Gospel Oak-Barking line (on low viaduct) & A503 

140 7 8 1.5 1 1 1500 G 2 10 -8 -5 -188 -0.53 

180 9 9 2 1 1 2000 G 0 9 -1 -1 LEVEL 0.00 under A406 

240 12 10 3 1 0 3000 G 0 10 1 0 LEVEL 0.00 under A110 

270 13.5 20 1.5 10 7 150 E1 5 25 15 10 100 1.00 

281 14.05 20 0.55 0 0 LEVEL 1700 L E1 5 25 0.1 0 LEVEL 0.00 

297 14.85 20 0.8 0 0 LEVEL 3000 L G 1 21 -4 -5 -200 -0.50 tunnel portal 

311 15.55 20 0.7 0 0 LEVEL 3000 L T -9 11 -10 -14 -70 -1.43 

352 17.6 20 2.05 0 0 LEVEL T -8 12 1 0 LEVEL 0.00 

364 18.2 30 0.6 10 17 60 T -7 23 11 18 55 1.83 

380 19 30 0.8 0 0 LEVEL G 1 31 8 10 100 1.00 tunnel portal 

392 19.6 40 0.6 10 17 60 E2 7 47 16 27 38 2.67 

403 20.15 50 0.55 10 18 55 E2 7 57 10 18 55 1.82 

409 20.45 60 0.3 10 33 30 E1 5 65 8 27 38 2.67 

413 20.65 70 0.2 10 50 20 G 0 70 5 25 40 2.50 

418 20.9 70 0.25 0 0 LEVEL C -2 68 -2 -8 -125 -0.80 

421 21.05 60 0.15 -10 -67 -15 E1 5 65 -3 -20 -50 -2.00 

424 21.2 50 0.15 -10 -67 -15 E3 11 61 -4 -27 -37 -2.67 

426 21.3 40 0.1 -10 -100 -10 E5 18 58 -3 -30 -33 -3.00 

432 21.6 40 0.3 0 0 LEVEL E5 19 59 1 3 300 0.33 

437 21.85 50 0.25 10 40 25 E4 14 64 5 20 50 2.00 

441 22.05 60 0.2 10 50 20 E3 10 70 6 30 33 3.00 

444 22.2 70 0.15 10 67 15 E1 4 74 4 27 37 2.67 over Hertford loop rail line in cutting 

453 22.65 70 0.45 0 0 LEVEL E1 4 74 0.1 0 LEVEL 0.00 

456 22.8 60 0.15 -10 -67 -15 E4 14 74 0.1 1 LEVEL 0.00 

460 23 60 0.2 0 0 LEVEL E4 14 74 0.1 1 LEVEL 0.00 

465 23.25 70 0.25 10 40 25 E2 7 77 3 12 83 1.20 

471 23.55 80 0.3 10 33 30 E2 7 87 10 33 30 3.33 

505 25.25 90 1.7 10 6 170 E2 7 97 10 6 170 0.59 

509 25.45 100 0.2 10 50 20 C -2 98 1 5 200 0.50 under A1005 

517 25.85 100 0.4 0 0 LEVEL C -2 98 0.1 0 LEVEL 0.00 

520 26 90 0.15 -10 -67 -15 E2 8 98 0.1 1 LEVEL 0.00 

524 26.2 90 0.2 0 0 LEVEL E2 8 98 0.1 1 LEVEL 0.00 

526 26.3 100 0.1 10 100 10 C -2 98 0.1 1 LEVEL 0.00 under A111 

531 26.55 100 0.25 0 0 LEVEL C -1 99 1 4 250 0.40 

534 26.7 100 0.15 0 0 LEVEL G 3 103 4 27 37 2.67 

536 26.8 110 0.1 10 100 10 T -4 106 3 30 33 3.00 

539 26.95 120 0.15 10 67 15 T -10 110 4 27 37 2.67 

552 27.6 120 0.65 0 0 LEVEL E2 7 127 17 26 38 2.62 over A1000 

558 27.9 120 0.3 0 0 LEVEL E2 7 127 0.1 0 LEVEL 0.00 

573 28.65 120 0.75 0 0 LEVEL G 0 120 -7 -9 -107 -0.93 

576 28.8 110 0.15 -10 -67 -15 3000 L E2 7 117 -3 -20 -50 -2.00 

582 29.1 100 0.3 -10 -33 -30 E2 10 110 -7 -23 -43 -2.33 

603 30.15 90 1.05 -10 -10 -105 E3 11 101 -9 -9 -117 -0.86 over A1081 

611 30.55 90 0.4 0 0 LEVEL E3 11 101 0.1 0 LEVEL 0.00 

640 32 100 1.45 10 7 145 E3 10 110 9 6 161 0.62 over A1 

646 32.3 110 0.3 10 33 30 E2 8 118 8 27 37 2.67 

650 32.5 120 0.2 10 50 20 4000 R E1 4 124 6 30 33 3.00 inad clearance over minor road 

660 33 120 0.5 0 0 LEVEL 4000 R G 0 120 -4 -8 -125 -0.80 

663 33.15 110 0.15 -10 -67 -15 4000 R E2 8 118 -2 -13 -75 -1.33 

666 33.3 100 0.15 -10 -67 -15 4000 R E5 17 117 -1 -7 -150 -0.67 

669 33.45 100 0.15 0 0 LEVEL 4000 R E5 17 117 0.1 1 LEVEL 0.00 

675 33.75 110 0.3 10 33 30 4000 R E2 7 117 0.1 0 LEVEL 0.00 

678 33.9 110 0.15 0 0 LEVEL E2 7 117 0.1 1 LEVEL 0.00 

681 34.05 120 0.15 10 67 15 C -3 117 0.1 1 LEVEL 0.00 under minor road 

686 34.3 120 0.25 0 0 LEVEL C -3 117 0.1 0 LEVEL 0.00 

690 34.5 110 0.2 -10 -50 -20 4000 L E1 5 115 -2 -10 -100 -1.00 

697 34.85 100 0.35 -10 -29 -35 4000 L E1 6 106 -9 -26 -39 -2.57 

702 35.1 90 0.25 -10 -40 -25 4000 L E2 8 98 -8 -32 -31 -3.20 

713 35.65 80 0.55 -10 -18 -55 4000 L E2 7 87 -11 -20 -50 -2.00 over B5378 

730 36.5 70 0.85 -10 -12 -85 4000 L E2 7 77 -10 -12 -85 -1.18 over B556, M25 

761 38.05 70 1.55 0 0 LEVEL G 1 71 -6 -4 -258 -0.39 

764 38.2 70 0.15 0 0 LEVEL G 1 71 0.1 1 LEVEL 0.00 

769 38.45 70 0.25 0 0 LEVEL G 1 71 0.1 0 LEVEL 0.00 

791 39.55 70 1.5 0 0 LEVEL E1 5 75 4 3 375 0.27 under London-Sheffield rail line, on embankment 

51


Step 2: Physical gradient profile produced 

Working from the table above a gradient profile is produced plotting the guideway surface (red) against the 

land surface (blue). This gives the team a clear, graphic representation of the route hypothesis. Beware, 

because of the difference in scales (meters of vertical elevation plotted against kilometres of linear distance) 

there is a strong visual distortion of the graph results. Gradients can look positively Alpine, whereas (in the 

geography represented here) the reality is only the Lea Valley and Epping Forest! 

Nevertheless, the first hypothesis does throw into focus key factors which will require detailed attention under 

the Project Development Study. Here, for instance, Route Plan Stephenson makes an assumption of a 

shallow ‘discretionary’ tunnel under the built up area between km 14.85 and km 19.60. 

400 

350 

300 

250 

200 

Elevation (m) 

150 

100 

50 

0 

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 

Questions and issues flagged here, for example, 

include: could an acceptable elevated solution be 

found? Would that compromise the curvature 

profile? How would that interact with the gradients 

and curves before and after the stretch in question? 

Magnified to a workable scale, this gradient profile 

represents in graphic form the type of guideway 

construction required to create a reasonably level (i.e. 

within Transrapid spec) profile. As broken down in the 

centre column of the table in Step 1, guideway types are: 

G at grade 

B bridge 

C cutting 

T tunnel 

E1 elevated guideway 3-6m 





Distance from Stratford Terminal (km) 

52 

It should be noted that the height of pier and length of 

guideway beam sections achievable within standard 

specifications for the Transrapid system mean that: 

• UKU can cross overhead most 

obstacles on standard guideway, 

whereas rail or road would require 

a bridge. 

• In general, UKU requires bridges 

only when crossing very deep or 

very wide valleys or obstacles. 

• A final advantage in this connection, 

standard specifications for elevated 

Transrapid guideway allows UKU to 

cross most roads, railways and 

watercourses it encounters with 

little or no disruption or re-routing 

to the pre-existing infrastructure. 

Route Plan Stephenson reflects 

this, and makes specific note where 

this is not the case (in general only 

for minor roads).


Step 3: Transrapid first iteration 

Working from Route Plan Stephenson, Transrapid International then produce a preliminary route layout, 

showing all Transrapid technical elements and their relationship to one another along the Route Plan 

Stephenson alignment. 

The linear layout schematic is impossible to include in this text format. It is used and presented graphically. 

The layout is then translated into a Bill of Quantities. 

The preliminary layout allows a first iteration of route simulation to be run. This simulation, in essence, adds 

the hypothetical data relating to UK specifics to the considerable bank of generic data about system 

parameters and performance already in TRI’s possession. 

The key output of the simulation is the speed profile for Route Plan Stephenson. This translates the curves, 

gradients and terminal locations posited in the route plan into a graphic profile of available speeds. This 

produces marginally different profiles for North-South to South-North, due the different impacts of acceleration 

and braking zones. For Route Plan Stephenson, the first iteration speed profile is as follows. 

53


For clarity, uni-directional graphs are also produced. The following chart shows the Northbound profile, 

with the Southbound flow removed. 

From this simulation, it can clearly be seen that the initial hypothesis has thrown up some less than ideal 

results. Curves in the high speed section between St Albans and Birmingham International prevent 500 km/h 

running in the section where the largest number of passengers would benefit most by travelling at the highest 

possible speed. Two stops in the North West Midlands and a drastic speed-restricting curve in the Potteries 

(around km 270) prevent optimal running. The Pennine, North Yorkshire and Northumberland alignments are 

also sub-optimal, the latter two interrupting what could clearly be long stretches of maximum speed operation. 

54

500 

km/h 

Step 4: Next iteration: 

Route Plan Brunel – 

optimising for speed 

The UKU team then identifies and develops solutions 

for critical areas and produce a second iteration of 

the hypothetical route, largely by ‘de-kinking’ the 

bends and removing some stops. This second route 

hypothesis is known as Route Plan Brunel and 

assumes a route some 4% shorter at 768.5km (in 

large part due to straightening and, in lesser part, to 

different assumptions on terminal locations). 

Again it should be stressed that ‘Brunel’ is as 

hypothetical as ‘Stephenson’: it is for the Project 

Development Study to prove and test these and other 

hypotheses in topographic and engineering reality. 

The basic conceptual difference between the two is 

an assumption that a straighter route will be 

engineered. In most instances (such as in the 

Northamptonshire area) the differences are marginal 

between the two hypotheses (basically straightening 

bends that already have very long radii). 


0 km 800 

55 

In other instances, such as the ‘Potteries Kink’, some 

rethinking is necessary. Here Route Plan Stephenson 

sought an alignment which threaded curvaceously 

through existing infrastructure; Route Plan Brunel 

implies a more direct engineering approach. ‘Brunel’ 

prefers bridging valleys, as a means of getting over 

the Pennines, whereas ‘Stephenson’ prefers longer 

tunnels. ‘Brunel’ requires an engineering solution to 

allow through services to pass Teesside at 500km/h, 

‘Stephenson’ simply stops every service at that point, 

producing slower trip times in general. 

Again it must the emphasized that it is for the Project 

Development Study to analyse the costs and benefits 

of all these issues, weighing, as it were, the pragmatism 

of Stephenson against the vision of Brunel. 

TRI take the second hypothesis produced by the 

team and perform a second simulation run. This is 

the first (of many) optimisations that TRI and the UK 

team members will undertake. The objective is to 

refine the alignment to a closer fit with optimum 

Transrapid system parameters. The results are obvious. 

Following only one optimising iteration at a conceptual level, approximate estimate journey times representing 

a step-change in UK transport are achieved. 

30 mins Heathrow to Birmingham 

100mins London – M25 – Birmingham – Manchester – Leeds – Teesside – Tyneside 

Both route hypotheses were then used as the basis for cost estimation by Transrapid and Faithful & Gould. 

Their results are presented in the following section. 

“Brunel” speed 

graph following 

TRI simulation 

run on this 

optimised route


2E: Cost estimate – Transrapid elements 

General note on estimating 

quantities and costs. 

It is helpful to think of a Transrapid guideway as 

essentially a very long bridge (768km long in the case 

of the Brunel hypothesis). The guideway consists 

of beams (the bridge ‘deck’) mounted on guideway 

supports every 25m on average (the bridge ‘piers’). 

The guideway supports can be of varying heights 

(from 1.2m – for ground level guideway – to 20m, the 

maximum achievable height for standard guideway: 

above this elevation a conventional bridge is required). 

In essence, the objective is to produce a Brunellian 

‘billiard table’; a guideway surface that is both straight 

and level. This permits most efficient operation of a 

Transrapid system. In general terms, the UKU 

approach will be to achieve this by “altering the 

length of the legs under the table” – i.e. using 

different height guideway supports to compensate 

for changes in land elevation wherever this can be 

accommodated within standard Transrapid 

parameters. This approach informed the 

cartographic work on which the initial route 

hypothesis was based. Again as a matter of general 

principle, this approach involves less intrusive civil 

engineering than would be the case for a high speed 

rail line, for instance. 

56 

The elements supplied by Transrapid International 

include all the technical components that are 

mounted in, on or alongside the ‘bridge’. These 

are referred to as “TRI costs” in the following tables. 

Transrapid vehicles are also supplied by TRI, but are 

identified separately. 

The civil engineering and associated costs of building 

the ‘bridge’ itself were then estimated by Faithful & 

Gould. These are referred to as “F&G costs” in the 

following tables. 

Bill of Quantities and Cost Estimate 

for all Transrapid elements 

To produce a Bill of Quantities, Transrapid translate 

the physical route hypotheses received into a 

specification for all the technical elements. High-level 

route-specific parameters, such as number of 

stations and maximum speed requirement dictate 

key features, such as the number of electrical substa- 

tions required. 

For the Stephenson route hypothesis, the TRI 

specification was then summarised as set out in the 

following table.


German English Result 

Gesamtstreckenlänge 

(35% ebenerdig, 65% 

aufgeständert) 

(Einzelspur) für Depot und IH 

Total system length 

35% at grade, 65% on guideway supports) 

Single guideway for depot and maintenance 

facilities 

Anzahl Haltestellen Number of stations 16 

durchschnittlicher 

Haltestellenabstand 

57 

800km 

15km 

Average distance between stations 50 km 

(min 8km; max 148km) 

Höchstgeschwindigkeit Maximum speed 500 km/h 

Takt Frequency (each direction) 6x hourly between St Albans & Manchester 

Anzahl Unterwerke Number of substations 28 

4x hourly Nth of Manchester 

2x hourly Nth of Leeds 

Anzahl H-Umrichter Number of high-tension rectifiers 282 (power supply for main route) 

Anzahl M-Umrichter Number of medium-tension rectifiers 8 (power supply for depots etc) 

Anzahl Fahrzeuge Number of vehicles 35, each of 10 sections 

Anzahl Weichen Number of guideway points (switches) 79 

Schiebebühne (15 m) Traversers 

Depot/IH-Anlagen Depot/Maintenance facilities 4 

Betriebsleitzentren Operational Control Centres 3 

Dezentrale Leittechnik 

Decentralised control technology installations 

4 (moves vehicles from track to track in 

depots) 

62


A similar exercise was conducted for the 768km of the Brunel Route scenario. 

These Bills of Quantities were then discussed in detail with TRI’s two parent companies, Siemens and 

ThyssenKrupp, and an indicative estimate of cost agreed on a cost-per-km basis. The technically more 

elegant Brunel solution produces an indicative cost of £6.5m per km, compared with the Stephenson 

solution’s £6.7m. The Brunel route is also shorter, largely due to de-kinking. The results are tabulated below. 

Needless to say, all estimates presented here are subject to verification during the Project Development Study, 

in the course of which detailed alignments will be specified. The TRI estimates set out below include the 

costs of the Operational Control System (basically the software which enables the system to function 

Route Section 

Stephenson (£m) Brunel (£m) 

KM TRI costs KM TRI costs 

Stratford - St Albans 39.50 264 38.05 247 

Heathrow - St Albans 32.10 215 30.50 198 

St Albans-Bham International 128.45 859 123.93 806 

Bham Int-Wolverhampton 37.30 249 33.15 216 

Wolverhampton - Man Airport 90.75 607 85.90 558 

Man Airport-Leeds 72.95 488 69.30 451 

Leeds -Tees Parkway 103.95 695 101.80 662 

Tees Parkway-Gateshead 55.55 371 50.40 328 

Gateshead - Edinburgh Pkwy 164.70 1,101 162.60 1,057 

Edinburgh Parkway-Glasgow 75.45 505 72.90 474 

Totals 800.70 5,354 768.53 4,996 

The capital estimates cited above do not include the cost of vehicles which are also to be supplied by TRI: 

these are treated as a separately identified capital items (see below). The operational efficiencies of the Brunel 

scheme allow for a smaller vehicle fleet to be deployed. At an estimated indicative cost of £5.8m per section 

of vehicle, the following results: 

Route Vehicles Req’d Section per Veh. £m per section Fleet (£m) 

Stephenson 36 10 £5.8 £2,088 

Brunel 30 10 £5.8 £1,740 

Given the holistic integration of infrastructure, vehicles and operating technologies in the Transrapid system, 

the capital cost estimation exercise also allowed TRI to produce reasonably firm operational prognoses, 

including the key factor of electrical power consumption. These results are presented later. 

The technical parameters underlying the technical specification on which the TRI cost estimates are based 

also has a bearing on the civil engineering of the guideway, notably in terms of points (switches) and 

substations required. This information was passed on by TRI to Faithful & Gould [F&G] 

Having produced these key inputs, TRI’s feed into the pre-feasibility work was concluded, save for iterative 

refinement in dialogue with other team members. 

58


2F: Overall capital cost estimates 

Preliminary civil engineering and associated cost estimate by Faithful & Gould 

Faithful & Gould (F&G) received from Transrapid the Bill of Quantities for the technical elements required and 

all relevant details of the two route hypotheses, such as guideway elevation etc. 

In order to produce a cost estimate that is comparable on a like-for-like (“track and technology”) basis with 

the West Coast Main Line Upgrade – the most recent applicable UK North-South intercity benchmark – F&G 

produced a cost estimate on an appropriate basis, excluding extraneous items. This delivered the following 

results. 

Route Section 

Stephenson (£m) Brunel (£m) 

KM F&G costs KM F&G costs 

Stratford - St Albans 39.50 429 38.05 363 

Heathrow - St Albans 32.10 541 30.50 343 

St Albans-Bham International 128.45 1,026 123.93 940 

Bham Int-Wolverhampton 37.30 757 33.15 309 

Wolverhampton - Man Airport 90.75 861 85.90 708 

Man Airport-Leeds 72.95 1,819 69.30 857 

Leeds -Tees Parkway 103.95 777 101.80 730 

Tees Parkway-Gateshead 55.55 759 50.40 466 

Gateshead - Edinburgh Pkwy 164.70 2,151 162.60 1,435 

Edinburgh Parkway-Glasgow 75.45 692 72.90 611 

Totals 800.70 9,810.2 768.53 6,760.9 

It is important to note that this estimate, produced to 

enable like-for-like comparison with UK rail scheme 

has broad exclusions, as follows: 

• Development Study costs 

• Legal & parliamentary Fees 

• Estate, Local Planning,etc Fees 

• Public Consultation costs 

• Land take & rights issue costs 

• Third party compensation 

• Professional & other adviser fees 

to Feasibility stage 

• Strategic enabling works, including Utilities 

and the like 

59 

• Environmental, Ecological & 

Geotechnical studies 

• Earthworks, including land reclamation 

• Demolitions 

• Utility & LA service diversions 

• Depots 

• Stations 

• Project Contingencies ( suggest a 

20% allowance) 

• VAT and other Taxes 

The ‘narrow’ estimate described above produced the 

following results when combined with TRI costs.


Estimate 1: Combined capital costs with exclusions to enable 

comparision with WCML 

Route Section Km Route Plan Stephenson Km 


£(millions) £(millions) 

TRI costs F&G costs Combined Cost/km TRI costs F&G costs Combined Cost/km 

Stratford - St Albans 39.50 264 429 693 17.5 38.05 247 363 611 16.0 

Heathrow - St Albans 32.10 215 541 756 23.5 30.50 198 343 541 17.7 

St Albans-Birm Int 128.45 859 1,026 1,885 14.7 123.93 806 940 1,745 14.1 

Birm Int-Wolverhampton 37.30 249 757 1,006 27.0 33.15 216 309 524 15.8 

Wolverhampton - Man Airpt 90.75 607 861 1,468 16.2 85.90 558 708 1,266 14.7 

Man Airpt-Leeds 72.95 488 1,819 2,307 31.6 69.30 451 857 1,308 18.9 

Leeds -Tees Pkwy 103.95 695 777 1,472 14.2 101.80 662 730 1,392 13.7 

Tees Pkwy-Gateshead 55.55 371 759 1,130 20.3 50.40 328 466 793 15.7 

Gateshead - Edin Pkwy 164.70 1,101 2,151 3,252 19.7 162.60 1,057 1,435 2,492 15.3 

Edin Pkwy-Glasgow 75.45 505 692 1,197 15.9 72.90 474 611 1,085 14.9 

Totals 800.7 5,354.0 9,810.2 15,164.2 18.9 768.5 4,996.0 6,760.9 11,757.0 15.3 

On the basis of this comparable estimate, Ultraspeed 

on the Brunel hypothesis produces 250% the speed 

of the 200km/h WCML programme at around 83% of 

the capital cost. It also produces 29 billion 

Available Seat Kilometres [ASK] of new transport 

capacity (around 2.51 ASK per £1 of capex), 

whereas the Upgrade programme on the WCML 

(minus the capacity the line had before) produces 

around 0.05 ASK of new capacity per £1. (This 

assumes WCML spend at £12.03bn and new 

capacity created at 633 million ASK.) 

60 

Faithful & Gould then produced a much more 

inclusive capital cost estimate, reducing the 

exclusions to only the following: 

• Development Study costs 

• Legal & parliamentary fees 

• Estate, Local Planning, etc fees 

• Public Consultation costs 

• Land take 

• Third party compensation 

This much more inclusive basis of cost estimation 

produces the following overall capex figures when 

combined with the TRI cost estimate. 

Estimate 2: Combined capital costs on an inclusive basis 

Route Section Km Route Plan Stephenson Km 


£(millions) £(millions) 

TRI costs F&G costs Combined Cost/km TRI costs F&G costs Combined Cost/km 

Stratford - St Albans 39.50 264 670.7 934.8 23.7 38.05 247 690.0 937.4 24.6 

Heathrow - St Albans 32.10 215 995.5 1,210.1 37.7 30.50 198 851.6 1,049.9 34.4 

St Albans-Birm Int 128.45 859 1,412.5 2,271.4 17.7 123.93 806 1,426.2 2,231.8 18.0 

Birm Int-Wolverhampton 37.30 249 1,134.5 1,383.9 37.1 33.15 216 507.3 722.8 21.8 

Wolverhampton - Man Airpt 90.75 607 1,339.2 1,946.0 21.4 85.90 558 1,224.9 1,783.3 20.8 

Man Airpt-Leeds 72.95 488 2,596.6 3,084.4 42.3 69.30 451 1,409.4 1,859.9 26.8 

Leeds -Tees Pkwy 103.95 695 1,085.5 1,780.6 17.1 101.80 662 943.3 1,605.1 15.8 

Tees Pkwy-Gateshead 55.55 371 1,103.8 1,475.3 26.6 50.40 328 780.7 1,108.3 22.0 

Gateshead - Edin Pkwy 164.70 1,101 2,992.1 4,093.4 24.9 162.60 1,057 2,238.1 3,295.1 20.3 

Edin Pkwy-Glasgow 75.45 505 1,063.5 1,568.0 20.8 72.90 474 1,095.5 1,569.4 21.5 

Totals 800.7 5,354.0 14,393.9 19,748.0 24.7 768.5 4,996.0 11,167.0 16,163.0 21.0 

The £21m cost per km produced on this basis (Brunel) is very comfortably under the only UK high speed rail 

precedent, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, which is projected to cost £46m per route km. 

Whilst the estimate above still notably excludes land acquisition costs, the ‘cushion’ between £21m and £46m 

per kilometre gives substantial comfort that the system can be delivered well under the CTRL 

benchmark. Additional comfort is provided here by the minimal land-take of the Transrapid system: built 

elevated where environmentally appropriate as little as 2.1m2 of land is required per linear metre of guideway 

(with the space underneath remaining usable for its original purpose). This compares with 7 or 8 times as 

much land-take for a high speed rail line and around 45 times as much (up to 96m2 per linear metre) for a 

motorway with two three lane + hard shoulder carriageways. A final point relating to land take. In the north 

in particular, it is envisaged that much of the UKU alignment will run over RDA or EP-owned brownfield land. 

Given the substantial public benefit generated by Ultraspeed, we assume that HMG will wish to see 

favourable land deals achieved in these areas.


2G: Operational performance 

and operating costs 

A preliminary assessment of UKU operations 

Again largely because of the holistic nature of the design and operational specification of the Transrapid 

system, the Ultraspeed team enjoys the advantage of being able to predict the operational regime with greater 

certainty than would be the case with other, more fragmented, technologies. 

Taking the Brunel scenario as the basis of calculation, and working on the timetabling assumption of ‘clock- 

face’ patterns, at 10 minute frequencies south of Manchester, we can predict the following with a reasonable 

degree of certainty. 

Key Factor Ultraspeed Parameters 

Number of services per hour in each direction 

Vehicles required 

Capacity per vehicle 

Hours of operation 

61 

6, every 10 minutes on the core section. 4 North of Manchester. 

2 North of Leeds. 

30 @ 10 sections each (including maintenance 

rotations). 300 sections (carriages) in total. 

840 assumed (700 standard and 140 premium). Up to 1200 

would be achievable in super-economy configuration. 

18. But multiply hourly operations by 16.5 to allow for lesser 

frequencies at each end of the day. 

Days of operation 364 per annum (not Xmas day) 

In revenue service, each vehicle covers an annual 

average of 

1.17million km (rail units typically cover around 0.5m km) 

Pilots/Drivers required 0, automated failsafe control system 

On board staff required 

All staff numbers quoted on FTE basis, including shift 

rotations needed to cover 7 day a week operations. 

Terminal staff required 

(assuming 14 terminals) 

Fleet maintenance staff required 

(assuming 300 vehicle sections) 

Infrastructure maintenance staff required 

(assuming 768km total route) 

Back office, contact centre etc. 455 

Operations control centres required 3 

Operations control staff required 45 

773 

713 

267 

320


Given our high degree of pre-knowledge of O&M issues for Transrapid systems and assuming a revenue of 

£700m on the basis of narrow transport economics and disregarding order of magnitude upshifts likely to be 

caused directly by the implementation of Ultraspeed itself, the high-level operational expenditure scenario is as 

set out in the following table: 

Item £ p.a. % of revenue 

Power: at NETA mid-market wholesale, UKU being a NETA market participant. £ 51,270,820 7.32% 

Total Staffing (on board & shore) £ 62,268,531 8.90% 

Maintenance £ 54,850,106 7.84% 

All other operating expenditure £ 59,500,000 8.50% 

Grand Total £ 227,889,457 32.56% 

The advantages of the Transrapid system are clear from just a couple of comparisons with airline economics, 

using 2003/2004 published figures for UKU comparators BA and easyJet. 

Key costs as % of traffic revenue 

Item UKU % BA % (2003-04) EasyJet (H1:2004) 

Fuel/Power costs 7.32% 13.32% 14.87% 

Staffing costs 8.90% 28.88% 14.09% 

All Ops costs 32.56% 103.35% 98.50% 

Compared to the airlines, maintenance costs are extremely competitive too. With its 141 billion Available Seat 

Kilometres, BA spent around 0.36p per ASK maintaining its aircraft fleet in FY 2003-2004. At 29 billion ASK, 

Ultraspeed will spend around 0.18p per ASK on annual maintenance for the infrastructure as well as 

the vehicles. 

62


2H: The Ultraspeed Hybrid Bill 

Preliminary professional opinion by 

Norton Rose on Hybrid Bill process 

Legal Process 

For such a major project it is necessary to empower 

an entity (nominated undertaking) to acquire land 

and associated property rights on which to build the 

infrastructure and to grant the nominated undertaking 

appropriate planning and other consents. Like any 

other major infrastructure undertaking the nominated 

undertaking also needs to be regulated. Subsequently, 

to ensure value for money and to comply with EU 

procurement rules the major works and equipment 

packages will need to be let through a competitive 

tender process. 

The most likely and appropriate legal process for the 

project is by way of a hybrid bill. This has been used 

(as described below) in similar circumstances and 

typically the legislative process can be completed within 

two years from start of the parliamentary process. 

A hybrid bill has the benefit of dealing with the 

planning process within committees of the House 

rather than through public enquiries. Following Royal 

Assent a nominated undertaking may be granted 

rights to develop the project, subject to the regulatory 

regime set up pursuant to hybrid bill provided it gives 

certain contractual undertakings in relation to 

development and operation of the project. The 

nominated undertaking will then set about procuring 

the project. 

63 

Hybrid Bills - Parliamentary Procedure 

Introduction 

A hybrid bill is a bill which, although introduced into 

Parliament as a public bill, has characteristics of a 

private bill. 

Hybrid bills may be introduced by the Government or 

by a backbencher, the most relevant recent example 

of which being the Channel Tunnel Rail Link Bill which 

received Royal Assent in 1996. A list of hybrid bills 

introduced since 1985 is contained in Annex 1. 

Examination of Hybrid Bills 

After a public bill has been introduced into either 

House, it is scrutinised by the clerks in the Public Bill 

Office of that House. If it appears that private 

interests may be affected in such a way that the 

standing orders relating to private business apply to 

it, the bill is referred to the Examiners of Petitions for 

Private Bills, and the second reading of the bill may 

not be taken until the examiners’ report has been 

received. The duty of the examiners is to decide 

whether the bill is of such a nature that the standing 

orders for private business apply to it and, if so, 

whether those standing orders have been complied 

with. If none of the standing orders apply, or if the 

examiners report that the applicable standing orders 

have been satisfied, the bill proceeds to its second 

reading in the same manner as an ordinary public bill. 

If the examiners report that the standing orders are 

applicable and have not been complied with, the

eport is referred to the Standing Orders Committee, 

and no further progress can be made with the bill 

until the House has agreed to a report from that 

committee recommending that the standing orders 

should be dispensed with. When the House has 

agreed to this report, the bill may move on to its 

second reading. 

Where it is envisaged that the standing orders for 

private business will apply, steps should be taken in 

advance to ensure that the orders relating to notices, 

deposits of documents and consents have been 

satisfied. 

Second Reading 

The procedure for second reading of a hybrid bill is 

the same as for a public bill. The House which is 

considering the bill is called upon to either affirm or 

reject the principle upon which the bill is based. 

The procedure is almost identical in both Houses 

of Parliament. The member who is in charge of the 

measure moves that the bill be now read a second 

time. The main provisions of the bill are explained 

and it is recommended to the House. A debate may 

ensue in which the opponents of the measure have 

an opportunity of expressing their objections to the 

principles which underlie the bill. 

If the bill is rejected on its second reading it cannot 

be reintroduced in substantially similar terms in the 

same session. 

Hybrid Bill Committee Procedure 

After a hybrid bill has been read a second time, an 

order of the House is made providing for any peti- 

tions against the bill to be deposited by a given date 

and for the bill to be committed to a select commit- 

tee. The select committee is normally made up of 

members chosen by the House and the Commit- 


64 

tee of Selection. However, the Channel Tunnel Rail 

Link Bill was sent to a committee of nine members 

chosen entirely by the Committee of Selection. When 

the bill is reported from the select committee it is 

recommitted to a standing committee or a committee 

of the whole House who then consider it in the same 

way as a public bill. 

If no petitions are deposited against the bill by the 

due date, or if deposited petitions are withdrawn 

before the date of the first meeting of the select 

committee, the bill proceeds like any other public bill. 

Select Committee Procedure 

In general, the proceedings of the select committee are 

the same as in a committee on an opposed private 

bill. Any individuals or organisations who have 

deposited their petitions within the specified period 

and who have locus standi are entitled to be heard 

before the select committee; but only on matters 

which give them locus standi. These petitioners 

make their cases first, calling witnesses if necessary 

who are normally examined under oath. After the 

petitioners have made their cases the member in 

charge of the bill is entitled to be heard against the 

petition, including the petitioners’ standing, and in 

favour of the bill. Once all cases have been heard, 

the committee considers the clauses of the bill and 

reports it to the House with or without amendments. 

The committee may also make a special report to 

the House if it wishes to express its own view on the 

subject matter of the bill. 

Post Select Committee Stages 

Once a hybrid bill has been reported from the select 

committee it is recommitted to a standing committee 

or a committee of the whole House. This committee 

stage and the subsequent report and third reading 

stages are the same as for any other public bill. After

completion of these stages, the bill is sent to the 

second House for consideration where it must 

complete its stages in the second House as it has 

already done in the House in which it originated. 

As such there is further opportunity for objectors to 

petition and appear before a select committee. 


Annex 1: List of hybrid bills introduced since 1985 

Title Date of first reading Date of Royal Assent 

Museum of London 7 Nov 1985 26 Mar 1986 

Channel Tunnel 17 Apr 1986 23 Jul 1987 

Norfolk and Suffolk Broads 18 Nov 1986 15 Mar 1988 

Chevening Estate (Lords) 20 Nov 1986 15 May 1987 

Dartford-Thurrock Crossing 1 Apr 1987 28 Jun 1988 

Caldey Island 29 Nov 1989 1 Nov 1990 

Agriculture and Forestry (Financial Provisions) 8 Nov 1990 25 Jul 1991 

Severn Bridges 27 Nov 1990 13 Feb 1992 

Cardiff Bay Barrage 4 Nov 1991 5 Nov 1993 

Channel Tunnel Rail Link 23 Nov 1994 18 Dec 1996 

65


2I: Principles for next stages of 

Project Development 

Taking all the above work into account the UK 

Ultraspeed team then scoped the type of Project 

Development Study necessary to progress the 

project. These principles have guided all work 

conducted in 2005 – 2006 by the project team and 

have guided our deepening discussions with 

Government and its agencies, and our engagements 

with other political, policy and business stakeholders, 

following up Ultraspeed being positively received by 

the Prime Minister. 

Study Objectives 

The objectives of the detailed Project Development 

Study proposed are to test that Ultraspeed: 

• is technically achievable in the UK 

context; 

• is fundable as a capital project on 

a best practice contemporary PPP 

basis; 

• is capable of cost-effective, timely 

and realistically feasible delivery in 

the UK economic, policy, transport 

and planning context; 

• is capable of cost-effective 

operation as a system capable of 

attracting millions of passengers 

every year for decades to come; 

and 

• optimally delivers strategic macro- 

economic benefits to Britain. 

66 

To achieve this, the Project Development Study will 

encompass the following main workstrands: 

• Refine the capital case to produce 

an order of costs to ±15%. 

• Create accurate forecasts for the 

revenue operation of a system 

created by a capital investment of 

this strategic magnitude. 

• Formulate the PPP/PFI structure 

optimally suited to deliver the 

private sector investment required 

to build the system and identify 

credible likely participants in such a 

development partnership. 

• Generate targeted communications 

outputs, to ensure that vision for the 

system is effectively communicated 

to (and through) the political, 

planning, funding and broader 

public audiences with the power 

and opinion-leadership capacity 

to ensure that the project 

progresses from study to 

implementation.

Study Outputs 

Developing from the corpus of knowledge developed 

in the pre-feasibility phase, the UK Ultraspeed project 

team will deliver a holistic package of information in 

form of a detailed study analysing the implementation 

of a Transrapid system in a UK context. The outputs 

of the study will answer the following clusters of 

questions: 

• Strategy: what is the purpose of an 

ultra-high speed transport system, 

taking into account: 

- UK transport issues? 

- Major transport project precedent from 

within the EU? 

- Economic development issues? 

- Regeneration issues? 

- Inward investment issues? 

• Strategy: how should the 

advantages of an ultra-high speed 

transport system be communicated 

to the audiences whose support is 

vital, including: 

- The EU? 

- UK Government Departments and 

Civil Service? 

- The RDAs and other regional and 

sub-regional stakeholders? 

- The investment and banking community? 

- The public? 

• Technology: The Transrapid system: 

how will it work when applied to 

form the UK Ultraspeed system, 


- General operational parameters? 

- Capacity, service pattern and timetable? 

- System control and safety assurance? 

- Maintenance regime? 

- Alignment and terminal distribution? 


67 

• Routing: what scenarios exist for 

routing the system, taking into 

account: 

- Potential city centre and edge-of- 

conurbation terminal sites? 

- Interconnection with existing rail systems? 

- Interconnection with existing road 

networks? 

- Interconnection with airports and airlines 

and associated issues of through-checking 

of passengers and their luggage? 

• Phasing: how should the 

development of the system be 

phased taking into account: 

- Financial market issues? 

- Potential development of a Phase 1 

section in advance of the main system to 

de-risk the project and therefore reduce 

financing costs of downstream sections? 

• Capacity: what is the total capacity 

of the system in various scenarios? 

• Demand: what total number of 

passengers will use the system in 

each scenario, taking into account: 

- End to end journey opportunities and 

journey time? 

- Point to point journey opportunities and 

journey times along the proposed routes? 

- Abstraction from existing modes 

of transport? 

- Modal shifts? 

- Stated preference research? 

- Generation of new traffic? 

• Revenue: using the routing 

scenarios developed above, what 

farebox income is likely to be 

generated from passenger carriage 

by the system? 

• Revenue: what revenue will be 

generated from the transport of 

freight?

• Environment: what environmental 

benefits will flow from the 

construction and operation of the 

system and how will they be 

quantified and communicated? 

• Economy: what economic benefits 

will flow from the construction and 

operation of the system and how 

will they be quantified and 

communicated? 

• Ramp-up: what is the likely ramp- 

up period from system opening to 

the revenue levels modelled being 

attained? 

• Operational Costs: what 

percentage of revenue income will 

be consumed by operational costs, 


- System maintenance? 

- Staffing? 

- Marketing? 

- All other relevant costs? 

• Capital investment: what level of 

capital investment will be required 

and how can it best be sourced 

from the private sector. 

• Funding model: how could the 

required capital investment be 

prudently delivered, taking into 

account: 

- International experience of PFI/PPP on high 

speed infrastructure schemes? 

- PPP/PFI models designed to maximise 

control, transparency and accountablility 

and minimise risk? 

- Potential to offset payments from the public 

sector to the operator (eg Availability 

Payments) by all farebox revenue passing 

from the operator to the public sector? 

- Quatum of such potential offset? 

- Potential EU, National Government and 

Regional funding inputs, based on major 

project precedent from within the EU? 


68 

- Development vehicle: given the above, what 

corporate and partnership structures would 

ensure the most cost-effective construction 

of the system? 

- Delivery guarantees: what structures and 

systems would be put in place to ensure 

on-time and on-budget delivery of the 

capital project? 

• Operational vehicle: what corporate 

and partnership structures would 

ensure the most cost-effective 

revenue operation of the system? 

• Availability guarantees: what level 

of operational availability could be 

guaranteed? 

• Punctuality guarantees: what level 

of punctuality could be guaranteed? 

• Guarantee enforcement: what type 

of enforcement regime could be put 

in place to ensure the above 

guarantees are met and how would 

non-compliance be dealt with? 

• Construction: what are the issues 

involved in system construction 

and how long would it take, on the 

basis of reasonable engineering 

assumptions to be refined by 

detailed work at a implementation 

stage? 

• Local content: what measures 

could be undertaken and what 

corporate structures adopted to 

ensure that significant UK local 

content is included in the 

construction and operational 

packages, in line with major project 

precedent from within the EU and 

internationally? 

The above principles have guided several interlocking 

strands of work, the results of which are presented in 

the remaining chapters of this Expanded Factbook.

3 


The transport, economic and environmental 

benefits of UK Ultraspeed 

69


Transforming Britain’s Transport 

UK Ultraspeed is not driven by technology. Transrapid 

has not been selected for Ultraspeed on the grounds of 

its technological or engineering advantages, powerful 

though they are. Ultraspeed has been designed to use 

the Transrapid maglev system because it is a compelling 

solution for Britain. 

At the very fundamental level of basic geography, the 

distribution of Britain’s cities is ideal for very high speed 

intercity ground transport. Britain has a significant number 

of very large conurbations which are separated by 

distances from around 50 to around 200 kilometres of 

relatively sparse population. 

Where major centres of population lie too close together, 

such as Amsterdam/Haarlem/Rotterdam area, then 

very fast intercity transport simply does not fit with the 

population patterns. Where they are thousands of 

kilometres apart, such as the East and West Coasts of 

the USA, then flying is the most competitive option, 

despite the time penalty at each end for airport formalities 

and the link journeys from city to airport and vice versa. 

In Britain, though, basic geography ideally hits the ‘sweet 

spot’ for ultra high speed ground transport. Firstly, most 

journeys are long enough to exploit the maglev speed 

advantage over all other ground transport.Yet secondly, 

they are also mostly short enough for the inherent speed 

of air travel to be undermined by the time wasted by 

airport formalities, crowded taxiways and air traffic 

control delays which effectively triple the actual airborne 

time of short haul flying in the UK. 

Furthermore, it is not just the distribution of Britain’s cities 

that is relevant – it is also their sheer size. Not only do 

they lie an ideal distance apart to benefit from ultra fast 

connections between the conurbations, there are also 

large enough markets within the conurbations to support 

the intensive, rapid service Ultraspeed will provide. An 

international comparison between two routes of roughly 

the same length (around 300 km) illustrates the point. 

70 

Comparing the 

two satellite images 

illustrates it well: 

the UK has brighter, 

bigger and better- 

spaced conurbations 

than along 

major corridors in competitor countries – ideal pre- 

conditions for Ultra High Speed ground transport. 

The sheer speed of the Transrapid maglev technology 

– as opposed to 300 km/h traditional wheel-on-rail TGV 

style trains, let alone ‘classic rail’ or motorways – has 

another major advantage in UK geography. Ultraspeed 

can offer journey times that are faster than air travel 

between most of the major centres of population along 

Britain’s North:South spine, with a single main route. 

the quantum of infrastructure required. 

Hamburg 

UK 300 km key population centres Germany equivalent 300 km 

Greater London 7.1 million Hamburg 1.7 million 

West Midlands 5.3 million 

no major 

midway 

centre 

Greater Manchester 2.5 million Berlin 3.4 million 

14.9 million 5.1 million 

Source: UK 2001 Census & 2004 German Federal Government figures 

– 

This means that 

Ultraspeed is 

significantly more 

efficient and cost- 

effective than any 

other North:South 

strategic transport 

solution on the 

basic measure of 

Berlin

• The existing North:South motorway network 

is split into Eastern and Western corridors 

– the A1(M) and M1/M6 routes, supported in 

the West by the M40/M42 alternative to the 

West Midlands. 

• The existing North:South rail network is split 

into East Coast and West Coast main lines. 

• Both the rail and motorway routes are linked 

by East:West routes across the Pennines 

– the M62 and various rail options between 

the Northwest and Yorkshire. 

So where rail and road each require three routes to 

serve the major centres of population, Ultraspeed will 

serve most of these centres with one mainline system. 

This fundamental aspect of the Ultraspeed case is also 

strong when compared with potential High Speed Rail 

solutions. Recent work by WS Atkins indicates that, 

again, three TGV-style alignments would be required to 

deliver attractive journey times to the North West, 

Yorkshire and the North East. This is simply a factor of 

the slower speed (300 km/h) of wheel-on-rail technology. 

The Atkins best-case ‘Option 8’ scenario (the only 

scenario offering a national set of journey times remotely 

comparable with Ultraspeed) illustrates the point. For 

comparison’s sake we take the TGV style train Atkins 

envisage running in 85 minutes on a new direct Ligne 

a Grande Vitesse from London to Leeds and contrast it 

with Ultraspeed between the same points. 

Comparative indicative journey times and 

stopping patterns 

500 km/h Ultraspeed 300 km/h TGV 

London 0 mins London 0 mins 

M25 Parkway 10 mins 

– 

Birmingham Hub 30 mins 

serves no 

intervening 

major 

markets 

– 

Manchester Hub 50 mins – 

Leeds 70 mins 85 mins 

WS Atkins High Speed Line Study for SRA/DfT: Option 

8 foresees a London-Birmingham alignment, which then 

diverges into an eastern branch to Leeds and the North 

East and a western branch to the North West, which itself 

then again diverges in the Potteries into Manchester and 

Liverpool branches. 


71 

So not only is Ultraspeed faster end-to-end, but the 

sheer speed of maglev creates more connections 

between more places than high speed rail is capable of 

delivering. 

Because the proposed wheel-on-rail route splits into 

separate branches, several Ultraspeed journeys are 

simply not possible on even the ‘best case’ TGV-style 

network. These include the vital ‘Northern Way’ backbone 

needed to create a globally competitive super-region from 

the three regions of the English North, as well as several 

rapid East-West connections between key city-regions 

within that area. The table below illustrates. 

Route 

Tyneside – Teesside – 

Leeds – Manchester – 

Merseyside 

In short, wheel-on-rail as currently proposed only 

answers a North:South brief. Ultraspeed can deliver a 

better and faster North:South solution whilst also 

providing a strategic East:West link across the North of 

England. Yet the 800km Ultraspeed network would be 

up to 200km shorter overall than the ‘Option 8’ high speed 

rail proposals. Using the Channel Tunnel Rail Link 

precedent of £48 million per route km, this would indicate 

that just the additional TGV-style infrastructure required 

would cost up to an additional £9.6 billion. 

Ultraspeed delivers 

Ultraspeed 

journey time 

60 mins 

Leeds – Manchester 15 mins 

Merseyside – Manchester 

10 mins 

all these 

journeys are 

not possible 

on the 

‘best case’ 

TGV-style 

rail solution 

currently proposed 

North:South more comprehensively 

than high speed rail 

East:West for no additional cost 

both N:S and E:W with more and 

faster journeys 

both N:S and E:W with less total 

infrastructure

High performance enables Ultraspeed 

to meet strong demand 

Basic economic geography tells us where major markets 

are located, detailed modelling was carried out at pre- 

feasibility stage to predict how these markets will behave 

when Ultraspeed transforms connections between them. 

Detailed forecasts for Ultraspeed were produced by 

breaking down markets which could be served by 

the route into origin:destination pairs. For example, 

Sunderland to Reading is one such pair: the passenger 

has a choice of rail, air, road or Ultraspeed for intercity 

transport between a North-East hub and a London hub 

and choices regarding the ‘feeder’ journey from the origin 

point to the Northern hub, as well as the ‘distributor’ 

journey from the London hub to the ultimate destination. 

For illustration, the private car can accomplish the journey 

door-to-door with no ‘modal shift’ between different 

types of transport, but will take up to eight hours. By 

contrast, an Ultraspeed journey will require the passenger 

to use private or public transport to reach one of the 

North East terminals and again for the distributor journey 

from the Heathrow Ultraspeed terminal, but the total trip 

will take only around three hours overall. 

By splitting a journey into its component parts, the 

methodology thus fully takes into account the impacts 

of modal shift, speed and convenience on passenger 

choice. In essence, the model balances the positive 

incentive of speed against the disincentive of inconvenient 

modal shifts. The model also takes into account 

competition with, and likely abstraction from, existing 

modes of transport and makes prudent forward 

assumptions for key factors such as the cost of travel by 

each mode and the impact of increasing congestion. 

A hypothetical Ultraspeed timetable – based on 

technically feasible journey times – was then produced, 

so that the model would be able to reflect the ‘shrinking 

of distance’ caused by Ultraspeed’s significantly 

increased speed and considerably reduced journey 

times. As an example, a portion is reproduced here, 

dealing with the route section between the English 

North East and London. 


72 

Sample indicative timetable used for demand 

modelling 

From the North East 

Tyneside dep. 07.00 07:35 

Teesside arr. 07:48 

dep. 07:50 

W Yorkshire arr. 07:26 08:06 

dep. 07:29 07:39 07:59 08:09 

E Manchester arr. 07:52 08:22 

From the North West 

dep. 07:54 08:24 

Merseyside dep 07:46 08:16 

NE & NW services merge 

Manchester 

Apt. 

arr. 07:46 07:56 08:01 08:16 08:26 08:31 

dep. 07:49 07:59 08:04 08:19 08:29 08:34 

Potteries arr. 08:15 08:45 

B’ham Internat. 

jJunction point 

dep. 08:17 08:47 

arr. 08:09 08:19 08:29 08:39 08:49 08:59 

dep. 08:12 08:22 08:32 08:42 08:52 09:02 

Heathrow arr. 08:39 09:09 

London Hub arr. 08:50 09:00 09:20 09:30

It should be stressed that this timetable is indicative, 

designed only to serve as a basis of demand modelling at 

pre-feasibility stage, although the journey times it includes 

are perfectly feasible. However, a number of key features 

of the Ultraspeed service proposition are already clear at 

this stage: 

• 10 minute frequency on the core route section 

south of Manchester. 

• Regular ‘clockface’ service pattern – 

every ten minutes at the same minutes past 

the hour at Birmingham, with the pattern 

carried back northwards up the route as far 

as possible. 

• Manchester Airport as Ultraspeed’s 

key hub, through which Ultraspeed’s North: 

South and trans-North services pass. 

The sample timetable is also simplified for 

presentation purposes. It does not, for instance, show 

the full Tyneside – Merseyside East:West ‘Northern Way’ 

service that would ‘fill in’ between North:South paths 

over the Northern England route section. Detailed work 

during the pre-feasibility phase refined the service 

pattern in the light of demand and technical issues. 

Further refinement will also be undertaken during the 

Project Development Study phase. 


73 

Key issues include: 

• Inclusion of an M25 ‘Beltway’ stopping point 

to enhance access to North London and the 

Home Counties. 

• Integration of Anglo-Scottish services. 

• Integration of intensive shuttle services in 

addition to intercity traffic on peak demand 

sections, or to join two major economic or 

transport poles into a single effective unit 

(Liverpool & Manchester Airports, for instance). 

• Refining the balance between overall speed 

and the number and location of terminals, to 

make Ultraspeed both optimally fast and 

optimally accessible for the greatest possible 

number of passengers in the widest possible 

catchment areas. 

Taking ongoing refinements and the total daily market for 

intercity travel between specific origin:destination zones 

into account, overall demand for Ultraspeed was 

forecast. Sample results are shown here. 

Key origin:destination pairs 

Total 

Daily 

Trips 

Ultra 

speed 

Trips 

% 

market 

share 

Glasgow – Edinburgh 14600 4800 33% 

Tyneside - Greater London 4000 2600 65% 

West Yorkshire – Greater 

Manchester 

West Yorkshire – Greater 

London 

Greater Manchester – Greater 

London 

7500 2300 31% 

6200 1800 29% 

7500 3400 45%

Detailed ‘link loading’ analysis was then performed, to 

determine how many passengers would use Ultraspeed 

services between various points. This table shows, 

for example, that in a peak hour, 3,700 people are likely 

to travel southbound on Ultraspeed from a West 

Yorkshire Parkway terminal towards Manchester 

and points beyond. 

Link Loadings (Southbound) 

Clearly this number is made up of a proportion of 

passengers who are attracted by an Ultraspeed trip of 

only a few minutes over the Pennines to the Manchester 

area. Others will be travelling further, attracted by fast 

intercity journey times to the West Midlands and the 

London area. Still others will be using Ultraspeed to 

connect to international flights at Manchester, 

Birmingham or Heathrow airports. In short, the single 

Ultraspeed system is doing many jobs, meeting a wide 

variety of passenger needs. 


Peak 

Hour 

Average 

off-peak 

hour 

Glasgow 1800 750 

Edinburgh Airport 2400 850 

Edinburgh Parkway (A720/A1) 3200 1300 

Newcastle Airport 3200 1400 

Newcastle/Gateshead 3400 1600 

Tees Valley Parkway 3400 1600 

Leeds 3700 2000 

West Yorkshire Parkway (M62) 3700 2000 

Manchester East 2500 1300 

Manchester Airport 2600 1400 

Wolverhampton 2900 1600 

Wednesbury 3200 1800 

Birmingham Hub (International Apt & 

Rail Stn, M6/M42, NEC) 

3800 2100 

M1/M25 Parkway – Stratford 1600 1100 

M1/M25 Parkway – Heathrow 1600 800 

74 

doing many jobs, 

meeting a wide variety of 

passenger needs 

Fare levels 

Ultraspeed revenue modelling projected off-peak ‘entry- 

level’ fares comparably priced with ‘Saver’ travel on rail 

or with budget air tickets. Finely graduated premium fare 

levels, whose supply will be optimised against demand by 

real time inventory control and yield management, will be 

available. These will offer increasing degrees of flexibility 

and access to Premier Class on-board accommodation. 

Fundamentally, Ultraspeed will be accessible to all. The 

forecast average fare over all journeys on the entire 

system on the base-case projection is under £20. Shut- 

tle fares will be available for as little as £5 between city 

pairs such as Liverpool – Manchester, Tyne – Tees and 

Glasgow – Edinburgh. Early-purchase return fares from 

the English North to London will be available for 

between £25 and £40. This already compares extremely 

favourably with the real cost of motoring from, say, 

Manchester to London and back, which the AA estimate 

at around £190 for a four seat family car – a figure which 

will increase substantially if road charging is introduced. 

Ultraspeed envisages revenue sharing collaboration with 

airlines and their marketing alliances to create seamless 

integration of their international services with Ultraspeed 

feeder/distributor services into any of the airports on the 

route. Ultraspeed services could operate as full code- 

shares and as ‘points earning sectors’ in airline loyalty 

programmes. The precedent exists – the airlines have 

abandoned Paris-Brussels as a viable air sector and sell 

Thalys TGV journeys with airline flight numbers. 

Total ridership 

Taking all the factors influencing passenger behaviour into 

account, the ‘base case’ demand for Ultraspeed is forecast 

to be at least 40m passengers per year. It is expected 

that this baseline figure will be very significantly exceeded, 

especially as Ultraspeed will itself create new travel patterns 

that are simply too slow or impractical today. For the sake 

of prudent forecasting, however, this suppressed demand 

was not factored in to the baseline case.

Total revenue 

On the exceptionally conservative base-case ridership 

projection, plus income derived from high-speed, high 

value freight (such as postal and courier traffic) total 

annual income will be a minimum of £700m and will 

exceed £1bn per annum on the basis of reasonable 

assumptions regarding fares mix, yield management 

and the release of demand suppressed under current 

transport provision. 

Operational efficiency 

With no major moving parts, and no friction between 

vehicles and guideway, Transrapid has very low 

maintenance costs. 

Whole-lifecycle costs for vehicle and guideway renewals 

are also considerably lower than rail. Highly automated 

failsafe operation also makes for very low staffing costs. 

The viability of Ultraspeed is thus underpinned by the 

fundamental efficiency of the maglev technology itself, 

as illustrated here. 


75 

Key Factor Ultraspeed Comparator 

Total operations 

costs as % of 

total traffic revenue 

Total drivers/pilots 

required to produce 

± 30bn Available Seat 

Km (ASK) of UK 

domestic transport 

capacity 

Total System Control 

staff required to cover 

full three shift operation 

of national system 

Total staffing costs 

as % of total traffic 

revenue 

Vehicle maintenance 

cost per ASK 

Total maintenance 

costs per ASK 

(full costs for 

vehicles and 

infrastructure) 

±35% 

0 

3 control 

centres with 

max 46 staff 

±8% 

±18p 

±36p 

Airlines: typically 

90%+ 

Airline/Rail/Coach 

many thousands 

Rail: 1,000 signal 

boxes, several 

thousand staff 

Budget airline: 

±14% 

Full service airline: 

±28% 

Full service airline 

Passenger fleet: 

±36p 

ICE Rail system: 

±118p

Capital Cost 

Results from the pre-feasibility study are presented 

below. 

Capital cost of maglev elements 

It is emphasized that costs are estimated to ±30% at 

pre-feasibility stage and are subject to refinement in 

subsequent studies. However, fully integrated design of 

Transrapid guideway and all its associated propulsion, 

control and switching sub-systems means that these can 

be estimated very precisely even at such an early stage. 

Similarly, tightly pre-designed operations and 

maintenance regimes mean that terminal, control centre 

and maintenance functions are known and the 

physical facilities needed to house them can be 

accurately scoped. Given this, early-stage Ultraspeed 

figures can be presented with a greater degree of 

confidence than would be the case with a similarly-sized 

major rail or road project. Significant variation would 

occur if, for instance, detailed studies recommended a 

different number of stations. 


76 

Depending on final route layout and service pattern 

requirements, the total capital cost for the Transrapid 

elements specified above (again as a pre-feasibility 

preliminary estimate subject to refinement and confirmation 

by later studies) is in the range of £4.9bn and £5.4bn. 

These figures exclude the fleet of gliding stock. The 

assumption driven by the demand model is that 

Ultraspeed vehicles will each consist of 10 sections 

(carriages in rail terms) capable of seating 700 in 

economy and 140 in premium accommodation – or 

up to a maximum of 1,196 passengers in all-economy 

configuration. Again depending on final route layout and 

service patterns, between 30 and 36 ten-section units 

will be required. With a preliminary estimate of £5.8m 

per section (again subject to refinement and confirmation 

by later studies) total fleet costs will be in the range of 

£1.7bn to £2.1bn. It is worth noting that the total fleet 

is only half the size that wheel-on-rail would need to 

provide similar transport capacity (greater speed means 

more intensive utilisation). 

German English Result 

Gesamtstreckenlänge 

•35% ebenerdig 

•65% aufgeständert 

•Einzelspur für Depot & IH 

Total route length 

35% at grade 

65% elevated 

Single track in depots 

800km 

Anzahl Haltestellen Number of stations 16 

durchschnittlicher Haltestellenabstand Average distance between stations 50 km (min 8km; max 148km) 

Höchstgeschwindigkeit Maximum speed 500 km/h 

Takt 

Frequency (1 way) 

mainline services only 

15km 

6 per hr M25 to Manchester 

4 per hr north of Manchester 

2 per hr north of Leeds 

Anzahl Unterwerke Number of substations 28 

Anzahl H-Umrichter Number of high-tension rectifiers 282 (power supply for main route) 

Anzahl M-Umrichter Number of medium-tension rectifiers 8 (power supply for depots etc) 

Anzahl Fahrzeuge Number of vehicles 30-36 each of 10 sections 

Anzahl Weichen Number of guideway points (switches) 79 

Schiebebühne 

Traversers (moves vehicles from track to 

track in depots) 

Depot/IH-Anlagen Depot/Maintenance facilities 4 

Betriebsleitzentren Operational Control Centres 3 

Dezentrale Leittechnik 

Decentralised control technology 

installations 

4 

62

Capital cost of non-maglev elements 

The pre-feasibility study then estimated (again to 

preliminary ±30% levels) the design, engineering, 

construction and associated capital costs that would 

be incurred when translating the Transrapid system 

specification into an actual built network in the specific 

geographic and construction market context of the UK. 

With the major exclusion of land acquisition plus other 

marginal items which cannot accurately be predicted at 

an early stage (development study costs, legal, 

parliamentary and planning fees, public consultation 

expenditures and third party compensation) Faithful 

& Gould estimated non-maglev elements in the range 

of £11.1bn and £14.4bn, again dependent on precise 

route alignment. 

Combined total capital cost 

Combining the pre-feasibility estimates for both maglev 

technology and generic project delivery elements, with the 

major exclusion of land, the total costs of building the 

Ultraspeed infrastructure (to ±30% pre-feasibility 

standards) range between £16.0bn and £19.8bn. 

Capital cost per route km 

The £16.0bn to £19.8bn range discussed above 

equates to a total capital cost per double-track route km 

(i.e. one northbound and one southbound guideway for 

one kilometre) of between £20m and £24.75m. 

This compares favourably with the only available UK 

precedent, the slower, 300km/h, Channel Tunnel Rail 

Link high speed rail line through Kent and Essex to 

London. The total out-turn cost for this project, when it 

opens in full in 2007, is projected to be between £46m 

and £48m per double-track route km, including land. 

The CTRL benchmark implies a ‘cushion’ of between 

£21.25m and £28m per route km for land acquisition 

and the other marginal costs currently excluded from 

estimates. 

Additional comfort is provided here by the minimal 

land-take of the Transrapid system. Built elevated, to 

do so where environmentally appropriate as little as 2.1 

square metres of land are required per linear metre of 

guideway (with the space underneath remaining usable 

for its original purpose). This compares with 7 or 8 times 

as much land-take for a high speed rail line and around 

45 times more land-take for a motorway with two three- 

lane + hard shoulder carriageways (up to 96m 2 per linear 

metre). A final point relating to land take. In the North 


77 

in particular, it is envisaged that much of the Ultraspeed 

alignment will run over brownfield land owned by the 

RDAs or other public sector bodies. Given the sub- 

stantial public benefit generated by Ultraspeed, we 

assume that HMG will wish to see favourable land deals 

achieved in these areas. 

45 times less land 

than a three lane motorway

Measuring benefits 

Cost:benefit analysis is a vital tool in ensuring that a 

proposed investment delivers value to the public. Whilst 

these measures are typically used to evaluate projects 

that are fully or largely funded by the public sector 

– which is not the case with Ultraspeed – the project 

team positively welcomes scrutiny against a wide range 

of such metrics. 

£2bn of economic benefit 

to the UK, every year, 

in journey time savings alone. 

To give only one example, Ultraspeed delivers 

approximately £2bn of annual economic benefit to the 

UK, using DfT ‘value of time’ figures for journey time 

savings alone. As project development progresses, 

we look forward to further quantification of Ultraspeed 

benefits against such measures as congestion relief, 

emissions reduction and the ‘strategic economic impact’ 

metrics put forward in recent DfT/RDA joint work on 

Surface Infrastructure of National Economic Importance. 

The ‘Northern Way’ foundation document quantifies a 

£29bn annual productivity gap between the North of 

England and the UK average. It also identifies strategic 

transport as the key intervention required to solve the 

problem. Ultraspeed will make a significant contribution 

in this domain by creating a more sustainable balance 

between London and the economies of the English 

North and Scotland. We look forward to dialogue with 

Government to define appropriate metrics for analysis of 

project benefits. 

Project finance model 

The pre-feasibility study concluded that a Public Private 

Partnership model would the best way to fund, construct 

and operate Ultraspeed in the specific conditions of 

the UK. PPP/PFI is the natural mechanism, taking into 

account, on the one hand, the solid commercial case for 

Ultraspeed, the system’s inherent operational efficiency 

and cost-effectiveness and, on the other, its ability to 

deliver transport, regional economic development and 

national competitiveness benefits in the public good. 


78 

Pre-feasibility work recommended a PFI strategy with 

the following objectives: 

• to minimise any direct UK Government 

borrowings and provide the best structure to 

allow the funding to be treated as outside the 

PSBR; 

• to meet the required parameters of value for 

money and affordability; and 

• to permit significant funds (both debt and 

equity) to be raised on attractive terms from 

the financial markets based on an agreed 

PPP model. 

To achieve these objectives it is vital that the underlying 

financial and corporate structure and the related 

financial security package is appropriately structured 

and, secondly, that the project is phased into 

manageable sections. Phased delivery will: 

• allow funds to be raised in manageable 

tranches to avoid impacting on the overall 

appetite of the financial markets; 

• reduce the overall cost of finance by removing 

any perceived ‘technology risk’ early in project 

roll-out; and 

• avoid any possible overloading of the 

construction market, thereby allowing a 

strong competitive process. 

Distilling best practice from UK and international PFI 

deals, including the notable recent precedent of the 

‘High Speed Line Zuid’ in the Netherlands, pre-feasibility 

analysis concluded that private sector franchisees 

competing to build and operate the system can be 

expected to shoulder all of the following key risks: 

• costs of bidding and competitive process; 

• technology design, delivery and 

commissioning; 

• fund raising; 

• construction and completion of the network; 

• operation and maintenance of the system 

for a pre-defined concession period after 

construction; and 

• hand over at the end of concession period.

Government would, of course, remain responsible for 

those elements which only Government can provide, 

such as the legislative process to enable construction 

and the definition and delivery of appropriate planning 

and environmental regimes. PPP rail projects worldwide 

have also demonstrated that, in the vast majority of 

cases, it has been either impossible and/or not cost- 

effective to pass patronage risk to the private sector 

on a competitive basis. With this in mind, the PFI model 

recommended by pre-feasibility work is based on an 

‘availability payments’ structure. Under such a regime, the 

operator (or ‘Nominated Undertaking’ in Hybrid Bill terms) 

would receive payment on a regular and pre-defined basis 

for making the Ultraspeed system available and providing 

Ultraspeed service to rigorously specified and pre-agreed 

standards. It would be a condition of the contract that 

payments would only be made provided: 

• that the system had been constructed and 

completed to pre-defined required 

specifications; and 

• that, once the system is operational, a 

pre-agreed performance regime – including 

standards for frequency, punctuality and 

quality of service – continues to be met. 

Failure to meet these requirements would lead to 

deductions from the availability payments and ultimately 

termination of the concession. The availability payments 

would be fixed (except agreed inflation factors) 

throughout the life of the concession as part of the 

competitive process. Such an availability payment 

structure has been used on major rail projects, including 

the recent PPP in the Netherlands where project finance 

was raised in the international financial markets without 

difficulty and on highly competitive terms. 

Subject to confirmation during further study, precedent 

suggests that the availability payment structure could be 

treated as a form of current account expenditure, and 

not impact on the PSBR, as an availability payment is a 

form of contractual payment to pay for defined services 

(ie provision of the defined system and the commitment 

to operate and maintain the system over the concession 

period under an agreed performance regime). There are 

precedents for such an approach on the majority of major 

UK PFI infrastructure projects, such as the contractual 

arrangements under PFI hospital concessions where 

“usage” payments have been agreed on a similar principle 

to the proposed availability payment structure. 


79 

Value for money would be secured by a full competitive 

process for all generic elements of the project, whilst the 

unavoidably single-source elements of maglev technology 

and associated project IPR, for which all PFI bidders would 

submit ‘level playing field’ bids,would be subject to best 

value scrutiny. It should be noted that there would not be 

a requirement for any upfront grant, or payment, from the 

public sector as has been the case on some PFI light rail 

projects (eg Nottingham and Manchester tram projects). 

The availability payment stream from the public sector 

would be partially, and in the long term potentially fully, 

compensated by the patronage revenues as well as the 

other accruing economic benefits, as discussed elsewhere 

in this Factbook. 

Based on the above, we are confident that the majority 

of the required debt and equity could be raised in the 

financial markets on competitive terms. In this 

connection, it should be noted that Partnerships UK 

state that, up to 2005, 689 PPP/PFI or similar type 

projects have been signed in the UK with a capital 

value of approx £44.175bn. The majority of the major 

contracts have successfully raised funds from financial 

markets on highly attractive long terms. 

Empowering Ultraspeed 

Pre-feasibility studies concluded that a Hybrid Bill provides 

the best legislative means of empowering the delivery of 

Ultraspeed. Recent precedent – both Channel Tunnel Rail 

Link and Crossrail – indicates that the Hybrid Bill procedure 

is the best available tool for progressing major infrastructure 

projects of strategic significance. The Hybrid Bill process 

also aligns well with the timescales and the best value 

competition and procurement imperatives of the PPP 

process. The legislative and the PPP processes should 

run in parallel so that, when both are completed with the 

parallel actions of Royal Assent and Financial Close, power 

to deliver the network is vested in an appropriate Project 

Delivery Entity, simultaneously with the PPP deal coming 

in to force to enable that Entity to draw down the 

finance to build it.


Empowering Britain’s Economy & Enhancing 

Britain’s Environment 

One system, one technology, 

multiple benefits 

We have seen how UK Ultraspeed can deliver both 

North:South and East:West strategic transport with less 

infrastructure and faster journey times than a hypothetical 

‘best case’ high speed rail solution. This reflects the 

minimum objective of the project – to provide 

Britain with the world’s most advanced ground transport 

network. But radical improvement in transport is only 

one of the principles on which the project is founded. UK 

Ultraspeed is designed not only to deliver a step-change 

in Britain’s transport, but also to empower Britain’s 

economy and enhance Britain’s environment. 

The system has been envisioned on a comprehensive, 

inter-city scale, but is designed to deliver economic 

benefits at many levels. Clearly 500km/h (311 mph) 

maximum speed has a dramatic effect on journey times 

between regions, but equally impressive acceleration 

and braking also slashes trip times between cities in 

the same region. The common factor is sheer speed, 

transforming access to and between key centres of the 

UK economy. In headline terms, Ultraspeed will deliver 

economic benefits on the following levels: 

Metropolitan: significantly accelerating some journeys 

across or around major metropolitan areas. 

Regional: effectively transforming pairs of cities into 

single economic entities, thus enabling them to compete 

as ‘more than the sum of the parts’ in the global 

economy. Also, in regions with two or more distinct 

economic poles, Ultraspeed connections will create 

cohesion on a regional scale. 

Super-regional: overcoming the historic divisions 

between regions caused by distance. In the case of the 

‘Northern Way’, Ultraspeed will effectively combine three 

regions – the North West, Yorkshire and the North East 

– into one globally competitive super-region capable of 

punching above its weight in the global competition for 

investment, jobs and wealth creation. 

80 

National: Ultraspeed will create a more sustainable 

balance between London and regional economies of the 

Midlands, the English North and Scotland, by transforming 

these areas as business locations, by making them as 

accessible as London itself. 

International: Ultraspeed will make the superlative 

international connections of Britain’s airports – including 

Heathrow – more easily accessible to and from the 

North than many locations within the M25 are today. 

Ultraspeed benefits on a metropolitan 

and regional scale 

This section uses the ‘fit’ between Ultraspeed and three 

key strategic issues at London/SE level (the Thames 

Gateway programme, the 2012 Olympics, and access to 

Heathrow) to illustrate a number of benefits. Many of the 

points discussed here using London/SE examples also 

apply in other parts of the country. The London focus 

here is merely one example, later sections look in detail 

at Northern and national issues. The one-off situation of 

2012 highlights further strategic synergy – between 

Ultraspeed and the London Olympic and Legacy 

agendas – with the proposed terminal in Stratford 

serving the heart of London’s Games. It should be 

stressed that the Ultraspeed business plan does not 

depend in any way on the 2012 Olympics, but there are 

certainly potentials worth exploring. 

It is not proposed to construct an Ultraspeed route 

into the traditional centre of London. Rather, in the 

East, Ultraspeed supports the major regenerative push 

eastwards into the Thames Gateway, serving London via 

seven rail, tube and DLR connections from a terminal at 

London’s best connected transport hub at Stratford. To 

the West, Ultraspeed both serves London and enhances 

national access to the UK’s premier world gateway at 

Heathrow Airport. 

Thus, even at the essentially local level of terminal 

location the international dimension is firmly in mind. 

Taking Stratford as an example, in addition to its superb

local feeder/distributor links, a terminal at the Thames 

Gateway hub allows Ultraspeed to offer direct 

connections between the North and the Continent, via 

Channel Tunnel Rail Link. Such a connection would 

stream several million additional passengers a year 

through Stratford and would thus significantly enhance 

the revenue performance of the CTRL PFI. There would 

be a similar, mutually beneficial, relationship between 

Ultraspeed and the proposed Crossrail route from 

Stratford, through Central London, to Heathrow. 

As the following table illustrates, Ultraspeed can provide 

a very rapid shuttle service from Stratford at the foot 

of the Lee Valley to a strategic Park & Ride location at 

the M25/M1 junction. Whilst this route section primarily 

serves the intercity and inter-regional requirements of 

Ultraspeed, it would also facilitate access to the Olympic 

Park from areas to the North of London. As such it 

aligns perfectly with the Olympic transport strategy. 

Origin Intermediate 

Calling Points 

London Thames 

Gateway:Stratford 

(Olympic Hub) 

– 


Destination Approx. 

Journey 

Time 

M25/M1 

Park & Ride 

Heathrow Airport – M25/M1 

Park & Ride 

Heathrow M25/M1 

Park & Ride 

London Thames 

Gateway:Stratford 

(Olympic Hub) 

M25/M1 

Park & 

Ride 

London 

Thames 

Gateway 

Birmingham 

International 

Rail and Air 

Hub 

M6/M42 NEC 

10 mins 

6 mins 

20 mins 

30 mins 

81 

Ultraspeed is also uniquely placed amongst new high 

speed ground transport initiatives to meet the 

unmovable deadline of the Olympics. It is a proven matter 

of historical fact that a short point-to-point Transrapid 

system designed for intensive shuttle traffic can be built 

in less than three years. The 30 km Shanghai route was 

designed and built in less than two years from signature of 

contract in Spring 2000 to its maiden trip on 31 

December 2002. After a period of trial running, the 

system opened to the public precisely one year later: 

in all, under three years from contract to public 

operation. Obviously this was achieved under Chinese 

planning law, not British. However, the Olympic deadline will 

itself imbue domestic planning with both urgency and 

pragmatism. Transrapid systems are proven to be 

deliverable to the tightest of schedules: London need be no 

exception.


Even looking at a narrowly-defined short-route, high-capacity, shuttle, there is a compelling case for Ultraspeed, 

as tabulated here. 

Key factors of a potential shuttle between the 

2012 Olympic site and the M25/M1 junction 

Route length 39.5 km 

Vehicle capacity 1,200 max 

Frequency (max) 

every 10 

minutes 

Observations 

The rapid acceleration and braking abilities of Transrapid, coupled to high pointto-point 

speed allow Ultraspeed to provide an intensive ‘shuttle’ service between 

the Olympic site and the key road junction to the North of London. For other 

modes of transport, this is already bordering on an ‘outer suburban’ route length. 

With interior layouts configured for maximum density, a single Ultraspeed can seat 

as many people as 24 road coaches with 50 seats each. 

With up to 6 Ultraspeed departures each way every hour, 288 road coaches (and 

their drivers) would be needed simply to provide the same number of seats each 

hour at both terminal points. 

Journey time 10 minutes Ultraspeed journeys will be up to 10 times quicker than road transport in congested 

urban locations. This actual journey often exceeds 100 

minutes by road at peak times. In real world terms this means that just three to 

five Ultraspeed units – configured to provide a fast, frequent and very high capacity 

shuttle – can deliver the same practical journey 

capacity between the same origin and destination points as several hundred road 

coaches or several thousand private cars. 

Daily total capacity 

(both directions 

combined) 

Comparator: 

Ultraspeed (1200 seat) 

Road coach (50 seats) 

Car (5 seats) 

180, 000 pax 

259, 000 pax 

47,400 ASK 

400 ASK 

40 ASK 

This examination of how Ultraspeed could serve the 

specific transport needs of the 2012 Olympics reveals 

many of the generic benefits of speed, frequency and 

capacity that would apply in any application on a city- 

to-regional scale. The principles illustrated here over a 

39.5km ‘Olympic Shuttle’ route would also apply in 

even fuller measure over short route sections between 

city pairs. 

• The roughly 50km route between Liverpool and 

Manchester also has a 10 minute journey time 

– due to a straighter, faster alignment. 

• The Glasgow to Edinburgh and Teesside to 

Tyneside routes both offer point-to-point journey 

times under 15 minutes, although they total 

75 km and 55 km respectively. 

The potential ‘Olympic Shuttle’ route provides a typical 

illustration of the benefits of frequency and capacity that 

Ultraspeed can deliver on a metropolitan scale. But the 

sheer speed of Ultraspeed means that more benefit is 

delivered by planning on a larger, regional scale. 

in Ultraspeed intercity configuration of 840 seat units, 18 hour operation. 

in ‘shuttle’ configuration with 1,200 seats, 18 hour operation. 

In 10 minutes 1,200 Ultraspeed seats will cover 39.5km, making a total of 1,200 x 

39.5 = 47,400 Available Seat Kilometers [ASK] per single trip. 

In 10 minutes the 50 seats on a road shuttle coach would cover a maximum of 

8km, assuming – optimistically – that it is able to travel at the urban speed limit 

(30mph / 48km/h) for the entire time. [50 x 8 = 400 ASK] 

Subject to the same urban speed limits, a 5-seater car produces only one tenth 

the usable transport benefit (measured in ASK) as the coach and less than one 

hundredth of Ultraspeed [5 x 8 = 40 ASK] 

82 

• The Stratford to M25/M1 Parkway section can be 

extended to Heathrow. This will provide a sub- 

30 minute link between the world’s best 

connected airport and Europe’s most significant 

economic development zone in the Thames 

Gate-way. This will be a major benefit for both, for 

the Games period and, of course, for decades 

afterwards. 

• With only an additional 17 minute journey 

time from an M1/M25 P&R terminal, Ultraspeed 

will reach the major transport hub of Birmingham 

International Airport and Rail Station, the M6/ 

M42 junction and the NEC with its high capacity 

car parks. Not only would this serve the 2012 

agenda by unmistakably linking London’s 

Olympics with the country beyond the capital, it 

would also put in place a world-beating public 

transport backbone between the First and 

Second cities whose benefits would endure 

to 2112 and beyond.

Benefits at regional, super-regional and 

national levels 

Flexible technology delivers benefits 

over a wide geographic range 

Ultraspeed offers the fastest journeys possible by any 

mode of transport both between conurbations 

separated by hundreds of kilometres and on shorter 

routes between city pairs only 50 km or so apart. This 

derives from Transrapid’s combination of 500 km/h 

maximum speed with an ability to accelerate and brake 

much faster, and over a much shorter distance, than 

even the best contemporary high speed trains, such as 

the German ICE. 

As the acceleration curves illustrate, Transrapid reaches 

300 km/h in only 5 km, whereas the ICE requires 28km 

to reach the same speed. By this distance, of course, 

the Transrapid vehicle is travelling at 500 km/h – and has 

been for the last 5.3 km, maximum speed being reached 

at 22.7 km. 

The time taken to accelerate is also important. 

Transrapid will reach 300 km/h in only 2 minutes and 9 

seconds. High speed trains will take at least four times 

longer to reach the same speed. 


83 

Still from video taken on board the 14:40 Transrapid 

departure from Shanghai. 

The speedometer shows 300km/h attained at 

precisely 14:42:09. 

The standing passengers are testimony to the 

smoothness of both ride and acceleration. 

Shanghai’s Transrapid goes on to achieve its 

cruising speed of 430 km/h at 3m 14sec after 

departure. 

It is this performance over relatively short distances that 

enables UK Ultraspeed to bind city-pairs such as Liverpool 

and Manchester, Teesside and Tyneside, or Glasgow and 

Edinburgh into single supercities, effectively combining 

the strengths of both halves to compete more powerfully 

in the global economy. 

A compelling precedent exists from Scandinavia, where 

a strategic infrastructure intervention – the new fixed link 

between Copenhagen and Malmö – has combined 

major cities in two countries into a new European 

metropolis of 3.6 million population. Independent studies 

have identified a very significant increase in inward 

investment into the area. Similar or greater benefits 

would be expected by linking any two major UK 

economic centres, ideally with an internationally-served 

airport also connected directly to the route 

(as Copenhagen airport serves the new super-region 

of Trans–Øresundia).

“Infrastructure investment creating a new and 

competitive metropolis.It is worth noting that since the 

opening of the Øresund Bridge, there has been a 

noticeable positive upturn in inward investment in the 

region [and] unemployment has recently started to 

decline [...] 

The bridge is the result of successful public-private 

partnership that has already had a measurable impact 

on mobility, labour and housing markets in the wider 

Øresund region, fostering the development of a “bi-national, 

integrated and functional metropolis with strong 

backing from its citizens” 

Prof R Burdett: Proof of Evidence re Thames Gateway 

Bridge, May 2005 

Last year [2004] the Øresund Region attracted 76 

inward investment projects. This corresponds to a 

Scandinavian market share of 38%, and positions the 

region as the third biggest receiver of investment 

projects in Europe only superseded by London and Paris 

[…] 

The increase in investment projects in Skåne (the 

Swedish province linked to Denmark by the bridge) and 

Skåne’s continually rising share of inward investment 

projects in Sweden, can, in part, be ascribed to the 

ongoing integration of the Øresund Region and Greater 

Copenhagen’s strong position in the European market. 

Copenhagen Capacity, Sept 2005, citing Ernst & Young 

‘European Investment Monitor’ 


84 

Building super-regions 

At the super-regional level, Ultraspeed will deliver most 

powerfully on the ‘Northern Way’ agenda. Here the point 

of departure is that England’s ‘Greater North’ (the North 

West, Yorkshire & Humber and the North East) is £29bn 

less productive than the UK national average, every year. 

Combining inputs from the Regional Development Agencies 

and from across Central Government, Northern Way policy 

clearly identifies strategic transport as a top priority: 

Regions prosper when they are well connected; 

world-class transport links are essential elements of 

competitive advantage. Manchester Airport is the 

North’s only major international gateway; congestion 

on the road and rail routes serving the airport will 

start to limit its ability to serve the North’s 

businesses. Thus [...] we must improve surface access 

[...] to Manchester Airport along with preparing a 

Northern Airports Priorities Plan to identify how to 

secure the growth of all the North’s airports. 

[W]e must also invest in creating better integrated 

public transport services within and between our city 

regions; these are key to efficient labour markets and 

to enable those living in the deprived communities to 

access jobs elsewhere. [...] We see a need to invest 

in better...links between the city regions centred on 

Manchester and Leeds in particular and to boost the 

capacity of the M62 corridor. 

Northern Way Growth Strategy: 2004 

The UK public sector has mapped the Northern Way 

and has set out the policy aspirations. Ultraspeed 

provides the most comprehensive means to translate 

them into a built, financed and operational reality. With 

the East:West route section offering a 60 minute link 

across the whole North (Merseyside – Manchester 

– Yorkshire – Teesside – Tyneside) Ultraspeed delivers 

the Northern Way, the Truth and the Light. The whole of 

this ‘Greater North’ (£161bn GDP and 15 million people, 

according to 2003 RDA figures) would be connected 

to Manchester Airport with a maximum of 45 minutes 

journey, delivering in reality Manchester Airport’s stated 

aspiration “to make our public transport links the best 

of any airport in the world.” (Manchester Airport Ground 

Transport Strategy, 2004).

Expanding the Northern Way to include the Scottish 

Central Belt further reinforces the super-regional 

economics. Adding the metropolitan centres of 

Edinburgh and Glasgow (and one or both of their major 

airports) creates a ‘Golden Banana’ with the global 

economic ‘clout’ to rival the now over-ripened fruit of the 

Bristol – Stuttgart – Barcelona parabola. The numbers 

are conclusive. Preliminary independent macro- 

economic study by CURDS, University of Newcastle, 

analysed the potential impact of Ultraspeed over a 

Glasgow – Edinburgh – Tyneside – Teesside – 

West Yorkshire – Manchester – Merseyside route. 

They measured the effect of an ultra-high-speed 

connection between these centres, by comparing the 

overall economic power of these city-regions to that of 

today’s Greater London, both before and after the 

construction of such a link. 


85 

City Region 

(examples) 

macro-economic power expressed 

as a percentage of the Greater London 

region’s current status 

current position with Ultraspeed 

Greater Manchester 32.1% 78.5% 

West Yorkshire 17.0% 33.9% 

Tyneside 15.3% 33.6% 

Glasgow 18.1% 47.1% 

CURDS: University of Newcastle; report for One North East, 

2004 

As the CURDS team themselves conclude, the positive 

effect of Ultraspeed in currently peripheral economies 

is to “reduce the friction of distance to around one third 

of its current levels [...and...] for the first time in over a 

century, [...to] create the very real possibility of a major 

realignment in the UK’s economic geography” [ibid] 

“the very real possibility 

of a major realignment in 

the UK’s economic geography”

Rebalancing Britain 


In short, UK Ultraspeed has the potential to rebalance Britain, to engender a more sustainable relationship between 

Britain’s world city – London – and the regional economies of Scotland and the English north, by helping create 

world-class locations, with world-beating access, outside the capital. Nationally, Ultraspeed is thus designed to act 

as an anchor and a catalyst for the broader economic development thrust to ‘re-profile’ peripheral economies, to 

make them more accessible to the global economy and, thereby empower them to attract and retain investment in 

the face of ever fiercer global competition. 

Represented graphically, a potential inward investor’s comparative analysis of the attractions of London and South 

East against the North of England as a business location is likely, today, to produce the profile on the left. Ultraspeed 

‘reprofiles’ regional balance to the status shown on the right. 

Comparison of UK economies against global 

location criteria for inward investment 

without Ultraspeed 

Performance of best location worldwide against a 

criterion from investor perspective = 100 

Performance of worst location worldwide against a 


Status 2005 

Good global links to London, but poor North – South 

transport hampering access to North. 

North as ex-industrial zone offers readily available property 

and reasonable inward investment incentives. 

Higher quality of life in North, London quality of life 

compromised by overheating and overcrowding. 

London offers no significant inward investment incentives – 

it doesn’t need to. 

North out-scores London on many aspects, but market 

access and transport are always the decisive factors. 

86 

Comparison of UK economies against global 

location criteria for inward investment with 


Performance of best location worldwide against a 


Performance of worst location worldwide against a 


Status after Ultraspeed is embedded as a foundation of 

Northern economic competitiveness: 

Good global links to London continue. 

Ultraspeed transforms North – South transport to best- 

in-world levels. 

Trans-North link creates ‘Greater North’ super-region l 

eading to increase in competitiveness. 

Super-regional connection empowers the growth of a world 

air gateway in the North and for the North. 

Greater North can thus reduce incentives as the region 

becomes more attractive. 

De-stressing London/SE improves Quality of Life in 

that region 

At the ‘Greater North’ level, the Ultraspeed mission is to change the variables; to make the brownfields 

of Teesside, for instance, as accessible to Heathrow in time terms as Canary Wharf on today’s public 

transport (around 85 minutes). Similar ‘reprofiling’ benefits will also apply in Scotland, with 

Ultraspeed ‘levelling up’ regional economies to the standards of the best.


Economic and environmental benefits in balance 

Empowering economic growth and thus engendering a more sustainable balance between North and South is, in 

itself, a major environmental gain at a strategic level. A connected, competitive North takes pressure off the 

stretched housing, land and water resources of the South, whilst bringing Northern surpluses of these national 

strategic assets into long term play. But Ultraspeed also performs at an immediate, short term, level – 

the fundamentals of the Transrapid technology make significant contributions to reducing the environmental costs 

of transport whilst simultaneously delivering increased economic benefits of speed, connectivity and capacity. 

Flexible route parameters minimise environmental intrusion 

87 

Transrapid can ascend & descend gradients of 

1-in-10 (10%). 

Typical high speed rail alignments have a maximum 

gradient of only 1-in-25 (4%). 

These flexible routing parameters allow 

Ultraspeed to ‘fit’ UK landscape with few 

major civil engineering works. 

Construction in Shanghai illustrates how a very high speed 

Transrapid alignment can be built actually inside the central 

divide of a major highway. 

With a cant of maximum 12˚, flexible alignments 

alongside or above existing transport corridors are 

possible, thus reducing new environmental intrusion. 

The M62 over the Pennines is a typical location where colocation alongside a motorway could be beneficial. The 

environmental incision was made when the motorway was built, Ultraspeed would simply make additional and more 

sustainable use of the existing transport corridor. 

In Transrapid, 300 km/h is typically attained after 5 km, in the urban fringes. At this speed the guideway can curve 

sharply in precisely half the turn radius of a high speed rail line. This enables the route to thread in and out of 

terminals with much greater flexibility than a rail line. It is also much more economical in land take. Such flexible 

routing enables Ultraspeed to follow brownfield alignments where available, thus minimising new environmental and 

visual intrusion in heavily populated areas. 

Turn radii at 300 km/h 

Transrapid 1.6 km 

TGV 3.2 km 

Matching the flexibility in vertical layout, lateral alignment is also 

extremely advantageous compared to high speed rail routes, 

allowing for much tighter curvature at comparable speeds.


Environmental benefits in design and operation 

Transrapid systems also reduce the environmental burden of travel through efficient design and operation. To cite a 

few key examples: regenerative braking returns power to the grid when vehicles decelerate; precise control and 

distribution through the linear motor ensures no excess propulsive power is supplied to zones where it is not 

needed. Further benefits are tabulated below. 

Factor Ultraspeed Comparator 

Noise dB(A) at 25m from route 

at typical speeds in urban/rural areas 

Energy consumption: watt-hours 

per seat km at 300km/h 

CO2 emissions in grams per seat-km 

Using German electricity generation 

mix input data. Carbon-free generation 

would enable absolute zero emissions. 

Electromagnetic field in vehicle (µTesla) 

effects along/under guideway are even 

weaker 

73 @ 200km/h 

88.5 @ 400km/h 

88 

TGV: 85 @ 200km/h 

Suburban train: 80 @ 80km/h 

TGV: 92 @ 300km/h 

34 ICE: 51 

23 @ 300km/h 

33 @ 400km/h 

100 

Source: TRI summary of independent tests by German Federal agencies 

By connecting more places, in fewer and faster vehicles, 

with more seats per vehicle, operating along a single 

route, the overall power requirement to provide a given 

number of Available Seat Kilometres in a given period of 

time is exceptional. Whilst detailed analysis will not be 

possible until the next stage of study, preliminary results 

show Ultraspeed consuming approximately half the 

overall power of a slower high speed rail service from 

London to Northern destinations. Road or short haul 

air simply cannot enter this equation – London to 

Manchester by car in an hour is manifestly technically 

impossible; providing a similar quantum and frequency 

of service by air would massively exceed airport and air 

traffic control capacity. 

most advanced, most reliable and most 

sustainable intercity transport system in the world 

Finally, Ultraspeed delivers economic advantage at the 

international level whilst simultaneously reducing a 

pressing environmental burden of national importance. 

By offering journeys that are quicker, more frequent and 

more comfortable than domestic air travel, Ultraspeed 

has the potential to replace much short haul air travel 

in the UK. Firstly this reduces atmospheric pollution, 

with as little as 20% of the emissions being achievable, 

ICE: 30 @ 300km/h 

Car: 60 

Shorthaul flight 190 

colour TV: 500 

hairdryer or electric stove: 1000 

depending on aircraft type, route length and electricity 

generation mix. Secondly, and equally importantly, this 

also frees up thousands of runway slot pairs each week, 

most notably at the notoriously congested Heathrow. 

A third tier of benefit then results by liberated airport 

capacity becoming available for use by medium and 

long haul traffic, which is both environmentally more ef- 

ficient and economically more beneficial, as it enhances 

Britain’s international connections. 

Environment and economy in 

balance – and a step change in Britain’s 

transport 

In conclusion, UK Ultraspeed offers a unique 

package of environmental benefits, whilst 

simultaneously creating very significant economic 

benefits for Britain. The ultimate goal of the UK 

Ultraspeed project is to deliver all of these economic 

and environmental gains, whilst cementing Britain’s 

competitive advantage in the global economy with 

the most advanced, most reliable and most 

sustainable intercity transport system in the world.

4 


UK Ultraspeed evidence to the Eddington 

Review 

89

Table of Contents 

Executive summary 91 

Preface: strategic transport is strategic economics 92 

What are the features of a successful location? 95 

Locations deliver performance 95 

Locations deliver a competitive operating environment 95 

Locations deliver an enabling infrastructure 95 

Adaptation to change is also critical 96 

Globalisation – trends and implications 96 

Globalisation trends 96 

Implications for successful locations 98 

The UK’s current competitive position 99 

Measuring the UK’s performance 99 

Other measures of the UK’s performance 100 

Threats to the UK’s future performance 101 

Threat 1: Peripheral UK – the centre of gravity shifts 

to eastern Europe 101 

Threat 2: Disconnection – Disparities in the UK’s 

regional performance 104 

Threat 3: Eroding connectivity – An inadequate 

enabling infrastructure 107 

How can threats to the UK’s competitiveness be 

addressed? 111 

UK Ultraspeed: a strategic transport approach to 

enhancing UK competitiveness 112 

Problems in assessing broad economic benefit 

of strategic transport 113 

Analysing the economic impact of strategic transport 

transformation 116 

Regional scale analysis: Baltimore – Washingto 116 

maglev 

Inter-Regional scale analysis: Shinkansen HSR 117 

in Japan 

Super-Regional scale analysis: a North England 

& Scotland high speed supercorridor 119 


90 

Transport and investment location decisions 121 

The background to investment location decisions 121 

Transport as a first order location selection criterion 122 

Transport’s second order impact on location 1: 

Labour market 123 

Transport’s second order impact on location 2: 

Social inclusion 124 

Strategic transport investment: 

impacts on existing transport 125 

Indirect effects on air transport 126 

Indirect effects on rail 127 

Indirect effects on metro and light rail 130 

Indirect effects on bus and coach 130 

Indirect effects on car 131 

Alternative mode expenditure savings 131 

Savings in air infrastructure expenditure 133 

Road traffic speeds and capacity 133 

Environmental sustainability – emissions reduction 134 

Safety benefits 136 

Strategic transport and strategic economics: 

setting the benchmark 137 

Capacity 137 

Cost of capacity 137 

Connectivity & Speed 138 

Operational efficiency and whole-lifecycle economics 139 

Safety 140 

Impacts on other transport modes including capacity 

liberation, investment deferral and environmental impact 

reduction. 141 

Conclusion: draft matrix for evaluation 

of strategic transport projects 143 

Sources and references 144

Executive Summary 

This document starts with a review of factors 

affecting the UK’s ability to sustain its success in the 

global economy, that is to say to build and maintain 

competitive advantage over other locations. Although 

historic performance has been sound, the UK cannot 

take future performance for granted. It must continue 

to innovate in creating the right environment for 

business. As the Chancellor put it, when visiting, 

China, the world’s emerging economic superpower: 

In the last industrial revolution Britain realised all too 

late that other countries were not only catching up 

with us but doing better in applying technology to 

products and processes. (This time) we can and 

must make the major changes necessary to compete. 

In the last industrial revolution Britain 

realised all too late that other countries 

were not only catching up with us but 

doing better in applying technology to 

products and processes. 

(This time) we can and must make the 

major changes necessary to compete. 

Gordon Brown February 2005 

The Chancellor at 431km/h (267mph) on a Transrapid maglev, identical 

to those to be used by UK Ultraspeed, during his February 2005 visit to 

Shanghai. 


91 

We offer a high-level reading of globalisation, in the 

context of EU expansion, and assess UK 

competitiveness before examining threats to it, 

both external pressures of globalisation and internal 

‘disconnections’ and ‘eroding connectivity’ between 

London and the regions. In this connection, 

strategic transport infrastructure is analysed as key 

component of the ‘location offer’ that enables 

countries, regions and cities to compete, and 

dangers flowing from Britain’s recent historic under- 

investment in such infrastructure are discussed. 

UK Ultraspeed itself is then briefly discussed, 

sketching a potential future for UK strategic transport 

that is not about demand reduction, capacity 

management or incrementalism but about a non- 

marginal, strategic investment likely to engender 

radically different economic performance, 

competitiveness and infrastructure outcomes. In this, 

UK Ultraspeed stands, to a degree, as a specific and 

advanced embodiment of the generic benefits of high 

speed ground transport. However, it should be borne 

in mind that no wheel-on-rail option would be as fast, 

as safe, as reliable, as nationally and regionally 

comprehensive, as operationally efficient, as 

economical, as low in land-take, as rapid to build, 

or as impactful as a ‘locational brand anchor’ for an 

economy at the forefront of progress. The same 

goes for roads, only more so. 

These caveats noted, we discuss how intervention 

‘on a UK Ultraspeed scale’ can serve both to reduce 

the persistent, and widening, gaps between the

egions and also to enable London to further 

reinforce its position as the pre-eminent world city. 

Impacts on, and interactions with, existing 

infrastructure and economic drivers are examined in 

some detail, these effects being vital to rounded and 

holistic policymaking in the strategic transport field. 

The UK has now reached a critical point on its 

competitive trajectory, as the transition to a fully 

global economy unfolds. A bold, well-founded, 

strategic transport initiative will meet this challenge 

by reducing regional disparities, by relieving the 

capacity constraints that hinder growth and by 

enabling the Midlands, the North and Scotland to 

share more equally the next phase in the UK’s 

development. From the evidence, we conclude that 

strategic transport is key determinant of locations’ 

ability to compete in the global economy and that a 

step-change in its UK provision will very significantly 

increase Britain’s ability to compete. 

In short, enhancing strategic transport will be vital 

in generating absolute competitive advantage for the 

UK. We conclude by recommending benchmarks 

against which proposed strategic transport 

investments should be evaluated and highlighting 

areas for Government action. 

Preface: strategic 

transport is strategic 

economics 

UK Ultraspeed is a strategic transport project, but 

its main driver is strategic economics. By delivering a 

step change in connectivity and access to, from and 

between the major city-regions of the UK, Ultraspeed 

is explicitly designed both to enhance UK national 

competitiveness in the global economy and also to 


92 

spread the locational advantages of London 

(the archetypal world city) to regional economies in 

London’s shadow where peripherality is endemic. 

UK Ultraspeed therefore warmly welcomes this 

opportunity to submit evidence to the Eddington 

Review, as it considers precisely these questions and 

the role that strategic transport plays as a 

determinant contributor to UK competitiveness in the 

global economy. 

The bulk of this document deals, as requested by the 

Eddington team, with generic issues of both strategic 

and transport economics, rather than specifically 

with Ultraspeed. Full project-specific information is 

available at www.500kmh.com. However, to provide 

context for readers unfamiliar with Ultraspeed, the 

remainder of this preface offers a very brief headline 

summary of the project. 

Using 500km/h [311mph] Transrapid maglev 

technology, Ultraspeed is designed to transform 

intercity travel in Britain. 

As the table shows, faster-than-air journey times will 

make the English North and metropolitan Scotland 

as accessible to the UK’s key gateways to the global 

economy as London, the M25 Belt and the Thames 

Valley are today. 

Illustration 1: Transrapid maglev


As the table shows, faster-than-air journey times will make the English North and metropolitan Scotland as 

accessible to the UK’s key gateways to the global economy as London, the M25 Belt and the Thames Valley 

are today. 

Origin Intermediate Calling Points Destination Approx. Journey 

London or Heathrow [LHR] – M25/M1 Park & Ride 10 mins 

London / LHR – Birmingham 30 mins 

London / LHR Birmingham Manchester 50 mins 

London / LHR Birmingham, Manchester Liverpool 60 mins 

London / LHR 

Birmingham, Manchester, 

Leeds, Teesside 

93 

Newcastle 100 mins 

Newcastle Teesside, Leeds, Manchester Liverpool 60 mins 

Manchester – Liverpool 10 mins 

Manchester – S Yorkshire 15 mins 

Glasgow – Edinburgh 15 mins 

Glasgow 

Newcastle, Teesside, Leeds, 

Manchester, Birmingham 

London / LHR 160 mins 

Edinburgh – Newcastle 35 mins 

Table 1: Ultraspeed Journey Times. 

As the journeys highlighted in grey illustrate, East:West journeys are also enabled as a fundamental and integral function of this 

essentially North:South network. 

As the map shows, Ultraspeed provides a North: 

South high speed backbone between key city-regions 

and major air gateways, notably Heathrow, and the 

rail link to the Channel Tunnel. 

But Ultraspeed uses the sheer speed advantage of 

500km/h maglev not only to create a North:South 

spine, but also to create an East:West trans-Pennine 

link between the key city-regions of the English 

North. This is mirrored further North by an East:West 

connection across Scotland which effectively creates 

Glasburgh/Edingow, a single ‘super-city’. 

The trans-Pennine ‘s-shape’ enables Ultraspeed to 

support the Northern Way policy objective of trans- 

Illustration 2: UK Ultraspeed Indicative Route 

forming three currently separate regional economies 

into one world-league competitor for investment and 

jobs, with similar benefits expected from tightening 

Scotland’s central belt.


Ultraspeed thus provides strategic East:West connectivity as an integral element of a North:South trunk route. 

By contrast, TGV-style wheel-on-rail solutions with their much inferior maximum speeds, braking and 

acceleration, require direct (and thus more costly) lines from each Northern destination to London. This may 

actually strengthen the ‘drain’ to London and deepen disadvantage in the Northern economies as it does 

nothing to improve connections between, and economic agglomeration within, the key regional centres. 

To conclude this preface, the following table summarises key data relating to UK Ultraspeed. 

Item Data 

Route length 800km, designed for phased finance and construction 

Design speed 500km/h (311mph) 

Vehicle fleet 

Headway Every 10 minutes each way 

Capacity 

Passenger traffic 

Freight traffic 

Operations 

94 

30-36 10 car Transrapid maglev units, each conveying 840 

passengers (up to 1,200 possible in all-economy configuration). 

Approx 30 billion Available Seat Km (ASK) of new transport 

capacity created p.a. 

Min 40 million passengers per annum, on conservative demand 

modelling 

conveys standard airfreight containers and time-critical postal, 

courier and logistics traffics 

Highly automated Operational Control System requiring a total 

of 46 staff to control the entire network, no drivers/pilots in 

vehicles 

Revenue ±£1bn p.a. on conservative fare and yield modelling 

Efficiencies 

Capital cost 

(±30% estimate) 

Project Finance 

Total operations costs 35% of revenue (~2.5 x better than airlines) 

Total maintenance costs 33% of high speed rail 

Integrated systems design enables route sections to be built & 

operating in 2 years. 

£20m – £25m per route km (excluding land acquisition). NB: 

requires 7-10 x less land than High Speed Rail and 45 x less 

than a motorway 

PPP on current account ‘availability payment’ model akin to 

‘usage fees’ for hospital and school PFIs etc. Delivers on-time 

system construction and on-spec system operation with no 

up-front Government payments or grants.

Locations – countries, regions or cities – are diverse 

and categorising them is difficult. What makes 

certain locations more successful than others is open 

to debate. However, there is growing consensus 

that, in the long-term, successful locations exhibit 

three interdependent and mutually supporting 

characteristics. 

These characteristics are brought together in Figure 

1. This provides a useful way of understanding the 

multi-dimensional nature of the issues involved. 

Together, they comprise what can be described as 

a location’s “offer”. 

Figure 1: Location offer framework 1 

Ability to achieve sustained 

performance 

Competitive operating 

environment as the basis 

for sustained performance 

Enabling infrastructure to 

underpin a competitive 

operating environment 


What are the features of a successful 

location? 

P erform anc e 

Economic 

Social 

Environmental 

O perating environment 

Sector activities 

Demand conditions 

Business strategy and rivalry 

Agglomeration 

Infras truc ture 

“Hard” 

“Soft” 

• Communications 

• Labour 

•Transport 

• Education 

•Utilities 

•Policy and regulation 

• Property 

• Tax and incentives 

• Image 

Locations deliver performance 

Successful locations deliver positive performance 

outcomes. Typically, these are measured in terms of: 

• economic development (activity, investment, 

jobs and incomes) 

• social development and quality of life (social 

and cultural services and amenities) 

• environment development (preservation 

and enhancement of the environment, built 

form and public realm). 

95 

Locations deliver a competitive 

operating environment 

A critical characteristic is the provision of an environment 

at a location that is ‘right’ or ‘competitive’ for activity 

and investment. Successful locations engender high 

levels of proximity and connectivity as well as intensive 

economic, social and information interaction between 

businesses and individuals. This enables them to 

capture and exploit the agglomeration economies 

of clustering, which is a source of absolute location 

advantage. 

Porter has been among the strongest advocates of 

clusters as critical to locational competitiveness. 

Clusters reap competitive advantages due 

to ‘externalities’ that go beyond a single 

firm and foster higher productivity within 

that cluster: critical mass; efficiencies in 

doing business such as easy access to 

specialised suppliers, infrastructure and 

other resources; and a fluid interchange 

of information and technology. 

(Porter 1997) 

Locations deliver an enabling 

infrastructure 

The diversity, availability, quality, reliability and cost of 

infrastructure to underpin activity and investment are 

critical. This infrastructure comprises two 

components: 

• “hard” infrastructure (communications, 

transport, utilities and property) 

• “soft” infrastructure (labour, education, 

policy and regulation, taxation and overall 

image).

Infrastructure affects, and provides the basis for, 

the competitiveness of a location’s operating 

environment and, ultimately, its performance. 

The importance of infrastructure is frequently 

underestimated, because its presence is simply taken 

as a ‘given’. 

However, in the long run, it is the presence of 

enabling infrastructure that is likely to make the 

greatest difference to a location’s ability to succeed 

and sustain its success. 

Adaptation to change is also 

critical 

Whilst superior performance, a competitive 

operating environment, and enabling infrastructure are 

certainly necessary, they are not sufficient conditions 

for long-term success in their own right. Established 

locations, such as the UK as a whole or London, as 

a world city, which currently play well-defined and 

well-understood roles on the global economic stage 

are likely to continue playing them into the future. 

However, they cannot expect to retain their position 

without adapting to change. To remain successful, 

locations must restructure and repackage what they 

offer – or they face the prospect of decline. 

In the long term, locations which are able to anticipate 

change and deliver a superior offer are likely to rise 

thorough the spatial hierarchy – those unable to do so 

are likely to decline. So, adaptation to change is critical 

to ensure future success. This means planning and 

making the right strategic choices. 

The most profound and pervasive of these changes 

is the process of globalisation, which is redistributing 

the location of activities and investments. In turn, 

globalisation is reshaping the relationship between 

nations, regions and cities and their respective 

national and international hinterlands. 


96 

All of these forces are at play in the UK and have a 

direct and immediate bearing on strategic transport 

decisions about how best to connect the economies 

of the UK with each other, with key air gateways 

to the global economy, and how best to create a 

sustainable balance London and the economies of 

the regions. 

Globalisation – trends 

and implications 

The global economic landscape has changed 

dramatically over the last century and especially in 

the last two decades. Globalisation has become 

the defining feature of our times and is increasingly 

becoming the key driver for change. 

Globalisation trends 

The overall path of globalisation is made up of a 

number of interrelated trends. Figure 2 shows the 

most significant of these. 

There has been liberalisation and opening up of 

economies by governments, based on open market 

principles. This has been accompanied by prolif- 

eration of international investment agreements at 

the national, regional and interregional levels, which 

has been intensifying. In 2004, both the number 

of national policy measures affecting foreign direct 

investment and the number of economies involved 

both increased. 2 

Accompanying this, there has been a remarkable 

increase in computing and related technology 

development and their application, all underpinned by 

substantive unit cost reductions in computing power 

and coupled with a convergence in information and 

communications technologies (ICT). This 

convergence has led to the growth and development


of high value-added, internationally oriented, and increasingly specialised, ranges of services activities such as 

telecommunications, computers, software, pharmaceuticals, education and television. These activities now 

account for more than half of total GDP in rich economies. 

Together, these trends have facilitated the execution of business on a global scale and led to the rise of 

multinationals. More open economies coupled with the integration of technology and production techniques, 

such as Just in Time and real time logistics ‘track & trace’ information, have made it increasingly possible for 

business to co-ordinate and control operations across different international locations from a single ‘home’ 

location. This enables individual components of the overall production process to be distributed, taking 

advantage of the infrastructure and operating environment advantages (based on availability, quality, cost etc.) 

available at a range of different locations to meet corporate cost reduction and market share objectives. 

The evidence of global business can be seen in the rapidly increasing participation of multinational companies, 

both in terms of the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) and of the activities of foreign affiliates relative to 

their parent organisation. 

Indicator 

FDI 

Value at current 

prices (US$ bn) 

97 

Annual growth rate (percent) 

2004 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2004 

Inflows 648 22.8 21.2 39.7 2.5 

Outflows 730 25.4 16.4 36.3 18.4 

Inward stock 8,920 16.9 9.5 17.3 11.5 

Outward stock 9,732 18.0 9.1 17.4 11.5 

Foreign affiliates 

Sales 18,677 15.9 10.6 8.7 10.1 

Total assets 36,008 18.1 12.2 19.4 11.9 

Exports 3,073 22.1 7.1 4.8 20.1 

Employment (000) 57,394 5.4 2.3 9.4 7.9 

Table 2: Selected indicators of globalisation 3 

Continued globalisation is highly likely to continue to drive the global expansion of multinational activity into the 

future. 

Renaissance of market 

enabling policies 

Technological 

development and ICT 

convergence 

Figure 2: Global trends and implications 

G loba lis a tion 

Rise of multinational 

activity and 

investment 

L oc a tio n needs 

Increased 

competition for 

activity and 

investment 

More efficient operating 

environment 

Wider and deeper pool 

of human capital 

Enhanced connectivity 

and linkages

Implications for successful locations 

The increased role and importance of multinational 

business has led some to suggest that location is 

no longer important and that business can operate 

without restriction of place. The evidence points to 

the reverse being true. 

As economic activity has become more global, only 

a limited number of locations appear capable of 

responding and providing a basis which enables 

multinationals to orchestrate their activity and 

investment on a global scale. Equally significant is 

that multinationals are displaying a distinct preference 

for certain locations over others to host their 

investments. 

Thus while globalisation suggests that the 

location and ownership of production is 

becoming geographically more dispersed, 

other economic forces are making for 

more pronounced geographical 

concentration of activity both within 

particular regions and countries. 

(Dunning 1998 b) 

Collectively, the pace, depth and impact of 

globalisation is creating a new milieu in which 

locations need to operate in the future, requiring 

new responses. 

Prime among these responses has been an 

increased emphasis in attracting activity and 

investment in order to provide performance outputs, 

especially in terms of sustainable job, income and 

wealth-creating opportunities. 

Attracting investment has become a central component 

of economic development policy in developed and 

developing countries across the world. The result has 

been a generalised increase in competition between 

locations at the national, regional, city and more local 

level for such investment. 


98 

The increased competition between locations can be 

seen in the growth in the number of locations giving 

increased attention to competitiveness as a policy 

issue and the issues it comprises. It also reflects 

in their establishing investment promotion agencies 

(IPAs) and increasing the budgets allocated to 

agencies that already exist. 

While IPAs are most prevalent at the country level 

(such as Trade & Investment UK), they exist at 

regional level (e.g. Scottish Development International 

and many RDAs’ IPA arms) and at city level (Think 

London). 

The sophistication being employed to attract and 

retain activity and investment is also increasing, with 

the more progressive and able IPAs assuming the 

role of ‘location entrepreneurs’. The international 

marketing and promotion of locations is becoming 

standard practice. Indeed, the brighter organisations 

are deploying many of the same selling tools and 

techniques as business, although the public sector 

background of some agencies hinders the truly 

entrepreneurial ‘locational brand-building’ that is 

required. 

Government and IPAs are also becoming more 

involved in directly addressing the requirements of 

business, improving the quantity and quality of the 

‘offer’ in locations. 

Reflecting global trends, they are focussing attention 

on increasing the efficiency of their operating 

environment. 

To support this they are taking steps to enhance 

key elements of their enabling infrastructure, notably 

by enhancing the knowledge and skills levels of the 

population and by providing access to high quality 

transport and communications infrastructure.

The provision of high quality, strategic transport 

infrastructure is a priority for many of Britain’s 

locational competitors. France, Germany, Italy, the 

Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Japan, Taiwan and 

Korea are amongst countries which have built, or 

are building, wheel-on-rail high speed rail (TGV-style) 


But, most interestingly of all, the absolute pace- 

setter in the global economy – China – has 

announced an extraordinarily comprehensive 

programme to construct over 8,000km of new high 

speed ground transport infrastructure. Whilst a 

proportion of this is likely to be delivered to the 20th 

Century (300km/h) benchmark established by the 

TGV, a proportion will be implemented to the 21st 

Century standard of 500km/h made possible by 

maglev technology. 

It is emblematic that the signature city of the global 

economy, Shanghai, should be the first to the adopt 

signature transport technology of the 21st Century. 

The world’s first ultra high speed ground transport 

entered service in 2003 between the city and its 

remote Pudong Airport. An intercity extension of this 

first route to the city of Hangzhou (total route approx 

200km) is now under active development. 

Illustration 3: Transrapid units pass at a closing speed in excess of 800km/h 

in Shanghai. The Shanghai-Pudong Stage 1 maglev route is the world’s most 

reliable transport system, operating to a timetable defined to the second at 

99.9989% availability. On the extended Stage 2, these maglev units will 

each convey hundreds of passengers a distance roughly equivalent to London 

to Derby in around 30 minutes. (London to Derby takes 1h40min by rail, 

3h07m by road 3 . 


99 

The UK’s current 

competitive position 

The UK government was one of the first to place 

competitiveness at the centre of its economic policy 

making. Implementation of reforms – macroeconomic, 

competitive and regulatory – has created an open, 

investment-friendly, flexible and efficient location for 

business. The result is that across many indicators of 

performance the UK economy has performed well. 4 

Measuring the UK’s performance 

Economic growth and increasing productivity are two 

key measures of the UK’s success. 

Over the last decade, in particular, the UK’s relative 

macroeconomic performance has been impressive. 

GDP growth has been strong and cyclical 

fluctuations have been less pronounced than in other 

major economies. 

Figure 3: UK relative GDP growth performance 5 

5.0 

4.0 

3.0 

2.0 

GDP 

1.0 

annual compound growth (percent) 

0.0 

USA 

France 

1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-1995 1995-2004 

Notes: (a) Covers EU15 excl. Denmark, Sweden and UK 

UK 

Euro zone 

(a) 

Germany 

Japan 

Since 1990, this GDP performance has been driven 

by a significant increase in productivity underpinned 

by higher levels of labour force utilisation in the 

economy (hours worked per employee, employment 

rate, and labour force participation rate). 

Productivity levels are now comparable with those of 

other countries.

Figure 4: UK relative GDP productivity performance 6 

120 

110 

100 

90 

80 

70 

50 

USA 

GDP 60per 

France hour worked (2000=100) 

Japan 


Other measures of the UK’s performance 

The current strength of the UK’s economy is also evident in other measures of performance such as its global competitiveness 

ranking, inflow of foreign direct investment and attractiveness as a business location. 

Table 3: Developed countries: most attractive business locations, 2005-2006 7 

Indicative performance measure UK position 

WEF Competitiveness ranking (2005-06) Rank 13 (of 117 countries) 

IMD Competitiveness ranking (2005) Rank 22 (of 60 countries) 

UNCTAD Global FDI inflows (2004) 

1980 1981 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 

Notes: (a) Covers EU15 excl. Denmark, Sweden and UK 

UNCTAD Most attractive global business location (2005-06) 

Responses from experts 

Responses from multinational companies 

100 

Euro zone (a) 

Rank 3 (of 216 recipient countries) 

US$78,399 mn = 12.1percent of world total 

Rank 6 (21percent of all responses) 

Rank 8 (13percent of all responses) 

Ernst & Young Most attractive global business location (2005) Rank 6 (of top 10 with 13percent of responses) 


Germany

Threats to the UK’s 

future performance 

The is no assurance that the UK will continue to 

perform at its current level. 

The process of globalisation continues unabated, 

which, in itself, presents both opportunities and 

challenges. Over and above these global-level issues, 

the UK must respond to and surmount three significant 

additional threats to its future performance: 

• a shift in the centre of economic gravity to 

the east of Europe, with the result that 

the UK, and especially its regions, become, 

or are perceived to become, more peripheral; 

• wide disparities in regional performance, 

with overheating evident in London and the 

South East whilst the rest of the country, 

especially the northern regions, becomes 

increasingly disconnected; and 

• emerging weaknesses in the UK’s enabling 

infrastructure, notably transport, due to 

persistent underinvestment, resulting in 

reduced linkages and connectivity, with 

congestion leading to longer journeys which 

are both unreliable and unpredictable. 

Threat 1: Peripheral UK – the 

centre of gravity shifts to eastern 

Europe 

There have been successive, albeit lumpy, 

enlargements of the European Union (EU) since it 

was first created. The most recent of these in 2004 

saw the EU10 of Eastern Europe joining the 

existing EU15 in Western Europe. This new Europe 

is absorbing a population of more than 100 million 

people with an average level of GDP that is roughly 

half of the previous EU level. It also has the biggest 

Single Market in the western world. Its total GDP 

now matches the US and has a population which, at 


101 

450 million, is 50 per cent larger than that of the US. 

Internally, it has also resulted in a shift in Europe’s 

economic centre of gravity away from the UK, France 

and Germany, the heart of EU15, to Poland and the 

Czech Republic. 

Before the eastward enlargement occurred, all of 

the EU10 countries began the process of liberalising 

foreign trade during early economic reforms, through 

the removal of longstanding restrictions and 

established trade and other cooperative agreements. 

This established, embedded and expanded the size 

of the Single Market. 

EU10 accession now means that the Eastern 

European economies are now looking more like those 

in the old Western EU countries. Effectively, they all 

have the same trade policies, competition rules and 

product standards. This has three important 

strategic benefits for business. 

• It provides greater access to the larger 

Single Market, with increased opportunities 

for realising economies of scale. 

• It enables businesses to restructure and 

re-organise their supply and logistics chain 

to take advantage of increased economies 

of scale as happened with the introduction 

of the Single Market in the EU after 1993. 

• It provides businesses access to lower 

cost oil and gas resources and lower cost 

but high value for money labour, due to high 

skills levels. 9 

As a result, there has been a shift eastwards within 

Europe in terms of both trade and investment. Trade 

between what was then the EU10 candidates and 

the rest of the EU has been growing at double-digit 

rates every year, which is above that of the EU’s 

largest economies e.g. Czech exports (measured in 

dollars) have grown by 230 percent since 1993, and 

Hungary’s by more than 400 percent).

Businesses have been taking advantage of the 

benefits offered by the larger Single Market and lower 

cost resources and high labour skills labour. This is 

evident in the engineering sector and manufacturing 

of intermediate goods and clothing. The result is that 

Investment has been increasing in the EU10 countries. 

In 1980, total foreign investment inflows amount to 

just over 0.5 percent of European investment inflows. 

By 2004, this proportion had risen to over 9 percent. 

The majority of this investment has been 

concentrated into three Eastern Europe economies 

(Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic). In 2004, 

these three countries accounted for nearly 73 percent 

of all investment inflows into the EU10 countries. In 

part, this reflects the fact that the other accession 

countries have both smaller populations and lower 

per capita incomes. It also reflects weaknesses in 

these countries’ enabling infrastructure, making them 

less attractive locations for business activity and 

investment 

The rapid expansion of trade and investment has 

helped to boost catch-up growth in most of the EU10 

countries. Over the last ten years, the new members 

have grown by an average of almost four per cent a 

year, twice as fast as the EU15 countries. 

Figure 5: Foreign investment in EU10 as a proportion of total European 

investment inflows 

10 

9 

8 

7 

6 

5 

4 

FDI 

Percent 

3 

inflows (a) 

of Europe 

2 

1 

0 

1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 

Notes: (a) Includes EU 25 and other Europe (Gibraltar, Iceland Norway, and Switzerland) 


102 

The shift in Europe’s centre of gravity to the East 

away from more traditional locations of the UK, 

Germany and France is also evident in business’ 

perceptions. 12 

The European Cities Monitor shows that nearly early 

a quarter of the companies sampled (23percent) have 

relocated or outsourced operations to another 

country in the past three years, with the new EU 

countries in Central Eastern Europe being the 

location. This is followed by a country in Western 

Europe. One in six companies (17percent) plans 

to relocate or outsource operations in the next two 

years. Again, the new EU countries are identified as 

the likely location. 

Similarly, the latest European attractiveness survey 

reveals that executives’ assessments of Poland and 

the Czech Republic have improved. Poland’s image 

as a superior global investment destination is ahead 

of the three most traditionally attractive countries 

(Germany, the UK and France). This was based on a 

positive assessment of its low labour costs, 

availability of industrial sites and potential increase 

in labour productivity. The Czech Republic has also 

made progress and is now placed ahead of France, 

due to businesses’ positive assessment of its low 

labour costs – rated second only to Poland. 

The survey suggests that emergence of the Eastern 

Europe countries and their benefits in terms of the 

opening up of their markets and low costs combine 

to place them among the top ten considered 

destinations for new investment or expansion 

projects in Europe. Poland leads, as plans to invest 

have doubled (16percent compared with only 8 

percent in 2004). 

Investors draw a new map of Europe 

which is extending to the East. (Ernst & 

Young 2005)


The survey also suggests that for Western Europe, the picture for new or expansion investment is less certain. 

The Western Europe region was only cited as a potential destination by 29percent of investors. Germany, the 

highest rated Western European country, was cited by 7percent of potential investors, ahead of the UK, Spain 

and France. 

Figure 6: The most attractive global countries 2005 17 

Northern Ireland 

Scotland 

Wales 

South West 

South East 

London 

East of England 

West Midlands 

East Midlands 

Yorkshire & the Humber 

North West 

North East 

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 

Figure 7: Top 10 destinations for new investment or expansion projects in Europe 16 

Rom ania 

France 

Spain 


Slovakia 

Czech Republic 

Hungary 

Germ any 

Russia 

Poland 

Gross value added per head (index UK=100) 

103 

2003 

2000 

1995 

0 5 10 15 20 

Percent citation for each country (a) 

Notes: (a) Base: 368 respondents who declared having investment or expansion projects in Europe


Threat 2: Disconnection – Disparities in the UK’s regional performance 

A further weakness in the UK’s overall performance relates to wide disparities in regional performance. These 

disparities are most pronounced between London and the South East on the one hand and the ‘Northern 

Way’ regions (North East, the North West and Yorkshire and Humberside). These regions are, in contra- 

distinction to London, characterised by less competitive economies, lower international profiles, and more 

challenging social and environmental agendas. This is despite the fact that the UK’s regions and cities are all 

generally exposed to the same national-level policies. 

Gross Value Added (GVA) and gross disposable household income (GDHI) provide illustrations of the 

differences in regional performance. 

GVA gives an indication of the value of the economic activity generated through the production of new goods 

and services. Between 1995 and 2004, London and the South East consistently had the highest GVA per 

head. For London, GVA per head rose from £15, 735 in 1995 to £24,955 in 2004 (varying between 146 and 

152 per cent of the UK average during these years). 

Figure 8: Regional gross value added per head (workplace based) 17 


Scotland 

Wales 

South West 

South East 

London 


West Midlands 

East Midlands 

Yorkshire & the Humber 

North West 

North East 

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 

Gross value added per head (index UK=100) 

GDHI gives an indication of the financial resources households have available to spend on goods and 

services. Between 1995 and 2004, London and the South East consistently had the highest GDHI per head. 

For London, GDHI per head rose from £71,064 in 1995 to £112,551 in 2003 (varying between 120 and 123 per 

cent of the UK average during these years). 

Although in London incomes are likely to be skewed by a small proportion of the population earning 

exceptionally high (city-type) salaries, it is still outperforming the rest of the economy. It is worth noting that 

it is precisely because London is a successful ‘world city’ location, that such salaries are there to be earned, 

that the people who earn (and spend) them have clustered there, around the businesses agglomerated there. 

104 

2003 

2000 

1995


In sharp contrast, it is also worth pointing out that GDHI is still lower in the peripheral regions despite the cost 

of living itself being lower in these areas: UK regional disparity is not a simply proportional correlation, it’s an 

absolute reality. 

Figure 9: Regional gross disposable income per head 18 


Scotland 

Wales 

South West 

South East 

London 


West Midlands 

East Midlands 

Yorkshire and the Humber 

North West 

North East 

Regional disparities are not confined to these two performance measures. The pattern is repeated in a wide 

range of other measures. These include, for example: 

• Education and skills. The northern regions perform relatively poorly with the largest number of people 

in the northern regions with no qualifications, while the South East and the West have the lowest. 

• Enterprise. There is a low level of small firm start-ups in high value, high skill service sectors in the 

northern regions, while London and the South East have the highest. 

• Travel to work. People working in London make much more use of public transport than those 

working in other regions, with nearly 45 per cent of all those who work in London using public 

transport to get there. 

• Industrial property and office rental costs. London and the South East have relatively high cost 

industrial (nearly 80 percent above the UK average in 2005) and office accommodation (over 180 

percent of the UK average in 2005). 

• Developed land left unused and/or derelict. The northern regions, notably Yorkshire and the 

Humber, had the highest percentage of previously developed land that was vacant and the highest 

percentage of developed land that was derelict, while London had the lowest. 

These inter-regional disparities clearly indicate that the UK’s performance over the past 

decade was primarily driven by London’s outstanding success as a world city. 

There is general agreement that London, and the City of London in particular, is the pre-eminent world 

position for a range of activities, foremost among these is its role as financial and business services activities. 20 

Its position and performance is directly attributable to agglomeration economies generated by a combination 

of the clustering of financial and business services activities and to the access to hard and soft infrastructure 

which supports clustering, in the form of: 

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 

Gross disposable household income per head (index UK=100) 

105 

2003 

2000 

1995

• the large pool of specialist skills 

• positive regulatory environment 

• world class telecommunications system 


• accessibility to international financial markets and customers facilitated by world class inter- and 

intra-city transport networks. 

London also consistently ranks as the most favoured city business location in Europe. ‘Second capital’ 

cities in general are the next most favourably rated. By comparison, all of the UK cities rate poorly. 

Table 4: The best European cities to locate a business 21 

Ranked City Rank (a) 

1990 (b) 2003 2004 2005 

London 1 1 1 1 

Paris 2 2 2 2 

Frankfurt 3 3 3 3 

Brussels 4 4 4 4 

Barcelona 11 6 6 5 

Amsterdam 5 5 5 6 

Madrid 17 7 7 7 

Berlin 15 8 9 8 

Munich 12 10 8 9 

Note 

(a) 30 cities included. 

(b) 1990, only 25 cities were included. 

The South East, as London’s immediate economic hinterland, benefited considerably from the strength of 

London’s economy. The South East and London are now suffering from increasing traffic congestion, 

increasingly unreliable transport and overheating. London is also becoming increasingly disconnected from 

the regional economies outside the South East. This is a risk to the UK’s future competitive performance. 

In contradistinction to London, the UK’s regional cities are underperforming by comparison with their 

counterparts in other European countries, which have higher international profiles. The European regional 

cities of Rotterdam/Amsterdam, the Ruhr, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich, Lyon/Grenoble, Turin and Milan 

consistently outperform UK regional cities. 22 They act as motors of growth for their respective regions. As a 

result, their respective national economies are less reliant on the unique contribution of the capital city. 

Closing the gap between capital cities and regional centres is seen as an essential pre-requisite to creating 

more prosperous regions as a whole, given the interrelationships between regional cities and their respective 

regional hinterlands. 

In this connection, it is worth noting that, by 2010, all the European cities cited in the last-but-one paragraph 

as outperforming their UK counterparts/competitors will be connected to high speed ground transport 


106


Threat 3: Eroding connectivity – An inadequate enabling 


For much of the 1980s and 1990s the UK public sector has consistently invested less than other economies 

in the country’s enabling infrastructure. This reflects a combination of government decisions to control capital 

budgets and the privatisation of activities (e.g. railways) previously delivered by the public sector. The result of 

this underinvestment is a run down of the UK’s public sector capital stock. 

The share of Government investment in GDP has increased in recent years. Successive Spending Reviews 

indicate increased investment as a priority for the remainder of the current decade. Nevertheless, even if the 

planned increases occur, investment as a proportion of GDP will remain below that of other countries’ 

investment. The OECD goes so far as to suggest that the increase may be inadequate to correct years of 

neglect. 

This consistent underinvestment threatens the efficient functioning and competitiveness of the current 

operating environment. More importantly, it will hold back future performance improvements. 

Figure 10: Government expenditure on investment 24 

Average annual per cent of GDP, 1995 prices 

Transport infrastructure, in particular, is critical to the functioning of a modern economy. The most successful 

locations (countries, regions or cities) have the transport infrastructure to move goods, services and people 

quickly and efficiently. Inter- and intra-location connectivity are important and intermodal links are critical to 

facilitate greater economies of specialisation and agglomeration. They facilitate face-to-face communication, 

supplementing communication through ICT or ‘virtual infrastructure’’. 25 Importantly, the corollary is that the 

lack of, or comparatively poor standard of, transport infrastructure will constrain future performance and 

productivity improvements. 

In the UK, the transport has been subject to a disproportionate level of government underinvestment. 

Other major economies invest about 1percent of GDP each year on transport infrastructure over the past two 

decades. By comparison, the UK has invested about 30percent less than this per capita. 

107


This underinvestment in transport has occurred at a time when there has been a general growth in transport 

by all modes, particularly in passenger transport. The result is that transport infrastructure is now operating 

close to, at, or often technically even in excess of, capacity. 

There is growing congestion, especially in the road network, and the quality and reliability of various modes of 

transport it supports have been deteriorating. This is currently being reflected in the poor rating of the UK in 

international comparisons on survey-based measures regarding the quality of transport infrastructure. 26 

The combination of low levels of investment, in both the public and private sector, 

coupled with rising incomes, and therefore increased demand for transport services, contributed 

to the growth in road congestion and unreliable networks. 

(DTI, November 2003) 

The consensus is that the UK’s infrastructure is such that it will constrain the country’s future performance and 

productivity improvements. 

Probably the area where insufficient infrastructure investment has most impinged on 

long-term growth prospects is transport. (OECD 2004) 

This under-investment was recognised in the government’s Ten-Year Plan for Transport published in 2000. 

This forecast more investment by 2010/11. However, many of its original targets have now been now been 

dropped or downgraded. 

Transport investment has been increasing over the past five years and there have been some improvements. 

The 2004 Spending Review has provided for a further £0.5 billion permanent annual uplift to the 10 Year Plan 

from 2006-07. An additional transport reform package of £1.7bn for railways is being provided over and 

above the provision in the 10-year plan. 

£ Bn 

Notes 

* Figures for these years are provisional and subject to review 

** Excludes spending by devolved administrations 

Figure 11: Public and private transport investment 27 

108

Despite current increases and future commitments, 

concerns remain over whether the gap that exists 

between the UK and competitor countries can be 

bridged. There is little sign yet that transport 

investment at the current level is making a significant 

difference. There is a well-founded fear that the 

quality of the transport network is unlikely to improve 

materially in the foreseeable future. 

The efficiency of Britain’s (world-leading) international 

air and (first rank) sea connections are being 

threatened by capacity constraints and congestion 

on national and regional road and rail access routes. 

UK business, principally through the CBI, has made 

clear that lack of investment in transport constitutes a 

major source of weakness and places a considerable 

burden on UK business, and has called for it to be 

addressed as part of an agenda to meet the 

opportunities and challenges of globalisation. 28 

Most firms believe the transport system 

generally has deteriorated in the last five 

years and is set to worsen in the future. 

Transport problems are also affecting the 

quality of service companies can offer to 

customers and the reputation of the UK 

as a place to do business 

(CBI 2005) 

Road congestion, in particular, has led to increased 

demands being placed on a rail network which has 

relatively little flexibility in terms of alternative routings 

(for instance, 40percent of all freight trains use the 

West Coast Main Line). 

The classic rail network is capacity- 

constrained on key routes and, 

particularly since the Hatfield accident in 

2000, has suffered from poor reliability 

and variable condition, reflecting the 

patchy history of network development 

under private ownership, and variable 


109 

renewal and upgrade in the public sector. 

(Steer Davies Gleave, 2004) 

Despite recent improvements in train service 

punctuality and infrastructure asset condition, and 

the introduction of new rolling stock, the rail system is 

still performing below its potential in the current 

competitive transport situation. Whilst the demand 

for services is very strong (2004-5 saw annual growth 

of 7 percent in passengers and approximately 10 

percent in freight), bottlenecks are now becoming 

apparent on secondary routes, as well as main arteries. 

It is not at all clear that, in the absence of a 

strategic solution to the higher-order problem of 

surface transport capacity, HM Treasury will sanction 

investment required to overcome the more localised 

and fragmented problems of rail congestion. As an 

early indicator in this connection, fares are already 

being allowed to rise faster than inflation, not only 

in order to raise revenues, but also to choke off 

demand and/or push it from peak to shoulder and 

off-peak periods. 

A number of major strategic decisions (such as the 

HST2 High Speed Train replacement and the 

potential East Coast Main Line upgrade) are 

imminent in the next few years, yet there is increasing 

unease that these will be taken against the backdrop 

of a rail system that will not have fully addressed 

current problems, let alone have developed strategic 

solutions to future needs. 

A perhaps even more significant factor militating 

against attempting to resolve capacity constraints 

by work within the existing rail system, is that such a 

retro-fitting approach over exceptionally busy 

infrastructure is highly disruptive and expensive, and 

can under-deliver on capacity, speed and technology.

The ‘downgraded upgrade’ of the West Coast Main 

Line conclusive demonstrates the point. For the third 

time, Britain has failed to deliver even a comparatively 

modest 225km/h railway. On the West Coast, the 

APT was terminated with extreme prejudice in the 

1980s and now 225km/h Pendolini are constrained 

to 200km/h for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile 

GNER’s very call centre number – 08457 225 225 

– doggedly recalls the 20 year-old, still unfulfilled, 

promise of a 225km/h East Cost Main Line. (That 

GNER have now renamed their 225 fleet ‘Mallard’ 

in honour of Gresley’s 1938 200km/h steam record 

holder rather suggests that they, too, have 

abandoned hope.) 

Meanwhile, projects strongly supported by the 

business community (such as Crossrail) are not 

progressing as quickly as many hoped or expected. 

This gives business leaders further cause for concern 

and contributes to a generally depressed perception 

of transport from a business perspective. 

The recent GfK NOP survey for the CBI highlights the 

importance of transport for business in the UK – 97 

percent indicate transport is very important or 

important to their business. This includes local, 

national and international (notably European) 

connections especially for the physical delivery of 

product to customers, timely receipt of supply inputs, 

provide accessibility to customers and allow for staff 

travel as part of their job. 

The survey results also suggest businesses consider 

that the transport infrastructure has deteriorated over 

the past five years. Businesses report the highest 

levels of dissatisfaction with public transport, road 

links and rail links to the UK regions and to airports 

and ports, mainly arising from a combination of 

congestion, lack of access and lack of capacity. 


110 

A major concern is that the poor state of UK 

transport infrastructure is having a significant 

negative impact on businesses in terms of: 

• productivity through supply chains, 

especially those in regional locations such 

as Scotland; 

• the ability of staff to do their jobs; 

• the quality of service they are able to offer 

customers; and 

• their reputations and the wider reputation of 

the UK as a place to do business. 

Overall, the businesses in the survey estimate 

transport created problems result in inefficiencies 

amounting to approximately 5 percent of their 

turnover. In a global economy where businesses 

relocate internationally to extract single-digit 

efficiencies from their processes or supply-chains 

and distribution systems, the potential for long-term 

damage to the UK economy can hardly be overstated. 

In response, businesses report they are adopting 

flexible working practices (different hours, shifts 

and home working and use of staff travel planning), 

delivery patterns (changing delivery schedules and 

logistics processes) and transport modes (from road 

to rail) or road routes. Some businesses (17 percent) 

even report relocating all or some of their operations, 

either within the UK or, more worryingly, overseas. 

Despite implementing these responses, businesses 

consider there is a limit to which they can continue to 

offset transport difficulties. In next five years, they 

expect both that their transport use will increase 

but also that the UK’s transport infrastructure will 

deteriorate further, resulting in transport-related cost 

pressures continuing to rise. To alleviate transport 

problems, businesses believe greater investment in 

transport infrastructure is needed.

Other analysis further emphasizes these constraints, 

showing that transport needs grow faster than GDP, 

the elasticity (response rate) being about 1.5. With 

UK GDP forecast to grow in the 1.5-2 percent p.a. 

range, transport demands are likely to grow at 3 

percent p.a. This is unlikely to be achieved on the 

UK’s congested road network, at or close to capac- 

ity. The railways are, therefore, potentially faced with 

being swamped by traffic transferring from the roads 

– if only a further 1 percent of Britain’s road traffic 

transfers to the railways, this will generate 10 percent 

additional rail demand. 

Although a large number of proposals for transport 

network development lie on the table, the vast 

majority of these are small in nature (although not 

particularly cheap). Large-scale motorway building 

is now probably politically unacceptable, whilst 

few of the railway schemes being discussed offer 

large increases in capacity. Even those that do (for 

instance, where train lengths are doubled) may only 

do so with performance risks, and may not offer the 

improvements in frequency or speed which potential 

customers might find truly attractive: 

This empirical evidence from our study is 

supported by a wider research literature, 

which emphasises agglomeration 

economies, in particular access to 

airports, the significance of exports, and 

the importance of face-to-face contacts 

in addition to virtual communication. It 

is less clear that the relevant bits of UK 

government have taken fully on board 

the significance of connectivity both 

internal and external to economic 

competitiveness. Such issues need to 

be placed more clearly on the 

competitiveness agenda and the 

stakeholders should be more frequently at 

the table. Improving the regional 


111 

transportation infrastructure, improving 

rail connections with the capital and 

exploiting the potential of the major 

northern airport in Manchester all need to 

be encouraged. The continental 

experience is that it is an investment 

which pays off in terms of urban and 

national competitiveness. 

(OPDM January 2004) 

How can threats 

to the UK’s 

competitiveness 

be addressed? 

The confluence of globalisation and the emerging 

threats to future economic performance, as 

discussed above, place the UK at a vital transition 

point. Strategic choices made now will influence the 

UK’s role and position on the global stage for the 

next 20 years. The UK must address simultaneous 

strategic challenges, including: 

• how best to develop an overall location 

offer that provides absolute advantages 

over other locations and successfully 

delivers enhanced performance through 

a competitive operating environment and 

supportive enabling environment; 

• how best to avoid becoming more 

peripheral in an expanded Europe; 

• how best to rectify and overcome 

disconnection between a globally-oriented, 

but overheating, London and South East, 

and the rest of the country, notably the 

North; and 

• how best to rectify and overcome eroded 

transport infrastructure connectivity and 

linkages.

Development of strategic transport systems that are 

explicitly designed to address these broader economic 

concerns is clearly central to any rounded and 

sustainable solution to the UK’s competitive challenges. 

UK Ultraspeed: a strategic transport 

approach to enhancing UK 

competitiveness 

UK Ultraspeed has indeed been conceived explicitly 

to meet the strategic challenges faced by Britain, 

designed both to avert major threats and to 

transform the economy, lifting the country ahead of 

international rivals. 

Ultraspeed is about transforming the quality, speed 

and capacity of strategic transport, about 

comprehensive East:West and North:South 

connectivity, about sheer competitive advantage. 

In this respect, Ultraspeed is qualitatively and 

quantitatively different from other interventions which 

may be considered by the Review. 

• Piecemeal infrastructure enhancement and 

demand suppression measures may offer 

partial solutions to problems of congestion. 

• Road charging will certainly raise revenue 

and spread demand, but without 

investment in inspiring and progressive 

public transport alternatives to the car, it will 

be perceived as a regressive tax: all pain 

and no gain. 

• A 300km/h (186mph) TGV system merely 

catches up with 30-year old French 

technology, delivers less speed, 

capacity and inter-regional connectivity, 

consumes more land, requires more 

intrusive civil engineering, makes more 

noise, and does nothing to mark Britain out 

as a leading-edge destination for investment. 30 

• Air capacity improvement may allow 

for some enhancement of regional 

inter-connection to key international air 

routes, but no conceivable investment in 


112 

this area will deliver capacity equivalent to 

an A380, every 10 minutes from Heathrow 

to every major city along the UK’s economic 

backbone. 

Ultraspeed, by contrast, is holistic not piecemeal in 

approach, represents genuine public transport gain 

to offset road charging pain, plays leap-Frog (not 

catch up) with our continental locational rivals, and 

provides the UK with the world’s best-integrated 

surface-and-air transport system for both passengers 

and high speed freight. 31 

Ultraspeed thus provides a step change in transport 

infrastructure: directly removing transport capacity 

constraints and empowering the regions by providing 

their key cities with vastly enhanced intercity 

connectivity and access to air gateways. This 

facilitates regions’ access to, and integration in, the 

national and global economies, and enables them to 

share the benefits cascading from London’s 

world-city pre-eminence as closely and as directly as 

the South East does today. 

By the same token this reduces not only 

congestion stresses on London and the South East, 

but also helps counter the negative long-term 

effects of nationally unbalanced development, which 

is now overstretching the South’s land, housing and 

water resources whilst ‘regeneration by bulldozer’ is 

increasingly common in a depopulating North. 

A better connected and integrated economy, 

encompassing all the UK’s regions becomes more 

attractive as a location for business activity and 

investment relative to Europe as whole. As the UK’s 

economic balance gradually tilts to the North, so the 

economic centre of gravity of Europe will shift west: 

a win for the UK’s regions on a national scale, and an 

international-scale win for the UK as a whole against 

European locational competitors.

Problems in assessing broad 

economic benefit of strategic 

transport 

Quantifying such benefits is not easy. Studies directly 

assessing the role, and the broad economic impact 

or locational competitiveness benefits of. strategic 

transport investment are extremely scarce. 

Traditional transport cost:benefit analysis tends to be 

much narrower in its assumptions, and is therefore 

of limited or no use given the remit of the Eddington 

Review. Needless to say, broadly-scoped economics 

studies of strategic transport interventions on the 

scale of UK Ultraspeed are rarer still. 

Typically, traditional assessments begin with the 

premise that any benefits from transport infrastructure 

investment come from a transformation of 

accessibility benefits into economic development 

rather than into a gain in competitiveness. This is 

deemed to occur through positive allocation 

externalities in specific markets, which are amenable 

to improved accessibility. The scale, spatial and time 

distribution of these externalities will affect the size 

and scope of economic development, relative to the 

quantum of the transport investment. 

Examples of externalities exist in labour market 

economies, in economies of industrial agglomeration, 

and in transport market economies. An example of 

the latter is when two disjointed networks are linked 

by a newly constructed facility, thereby opening up 

for trade between previously non-trading markets. 

Another example is when a new freight terminal 

enables inter-modal connections (say, between truck 

and rail), which improves Just in Time production, 

thereby reducing inventory costs to producers. 

There are assessments of the components of 

locational competitiveness which use a framework 


113 

similar to that in Figure 1. However, these do not 

directly consider the links between, and the 

contribution of, transport infrastructure investment to 

competitiveness. 

Neither do studies of this nature usually consider 

existing infrastructure too deeply when assessing 

impacts of new investment. Often the availability 

of good quality transport networks (before the new 

project is delivered) is simply assumed, rather than 

treated a key input that itself needs to be 

systematically included in the analysis. 

Transport infrastructure investment should not be 

treated in isolation – it does not happen in isolation 

in the real world. Rather, analysis should consider 

the nature of the investment, its “place” in, and 

connections to, not only existing hard infrastructure 

networks but also the much broader ‘soft’ networks 

of investment promotion, regeneration and economic 

development. 

This is to go beyond current thinking, where: 

Transport is conventionally perceived as a 

second order variable, in that 

transport infrastructure has to be present 

for development, but it is not as 

important as other considerations relating 

to location. These include the availability 

of high quality labour, government 

incentives and grants, suitable site 

locations, complementary businesses in 

the local area, and access to markets. 

Transport is not a sufficient condition 

for development, yet if transport is not 

present, then it is seen as a constraining 

factor on development. 

(Llewelyn-Davies et. al. 2004) 

An overview of existing literature 32 exploring the links 

between transport and competitiveness in the 

context of economic development suggests that

national programmes of public transport investment 

lead to positive rates of social return measured in 

terms of performance, such as economic growth and 

productivity improvement. 

However, the general conclusion is that the such 

investments’ contribution to the sustainable rate of 

economic growth in a mature economy, with well 

developed transport systems, is likely to be modest. 

This conclusion of a modest impact overall is based 

on the assumption that further (marginal) transport in 

an already reasonably developed infrastructure is 

unlikely to be the most cost-effective means of 

promoting greater efficiency of the operating 

environment. However, this is, in turn, usually based 

on the assumption that: 

• the proposed transport investment is 

marginal in nature and, hence, only benefits 

a particular region rather than a high pro 

portion of the country (displacing resources 

within the country); 

• there exists unused capacity in the 

transport system within the country; and 

• the transport system in question does 

not suffer from any severe blockages or 

congestion. 

For UK Ultraspeed, none of these assumptions 

holds, since: 

• it will involve strategic (non-marginal) 

investment in construction of national-scale 

transport infrastructure with a strong 

international dimension via connections to 

air gateways; 

• the UK currently endures considerable 

transport capacity constraints, with 

associated bottlenecks and congestion, 

which have a detrimental effect on the 

country’s performance; and 

• transport is frequently cited by business and 

by non-investors (i.e. investors withdrawing 

from Britain or preferring a rival location) as 

a critical factor (and often the critical factor) 

negatively affecting national attractiveness 

as a business location. 


114 

Many assessments also point out that traditional 

cost-benefit analysis is unlikely to adequately or fully 

estimate the total net impact of a large strategic 

transport investment on the scale of UK Ultraspeed 

– some impacts will be intangible, while others will be 

catalytic and/or unpredictable. This is because: 

• The nature, extent and location of the 

impacts will be dependent on specific 

local circumstances – history matters. 

Without careful management, and 

without appropriate supporting policy 

designed to maximise regenerative gains, 

transport infrastructure improvements 

may not benefit locations that exhibit low 

performance levels. This is a function of the 

“two-way” effect. Transport systems 

operate in two directions and any ensuing 

benefits can flow to regions which already 

have a competitive operating environment. 

Consequently, the effects tend not to be 

evenly diffused but are more limited to 

discrete points of existing activity and 

investment. 

• Location-specific competitiveness and 

performance improvements are seldom 

achieved through transport investment in 

isolation. They will also be conditional on 

implementation of appropriate policies 

and initiatives in other areas, such as land 

use, regeneration, investment promotion 

and economic development, all of which 

impact location competitiveness. 

Linking transport policy with non- 

transport policies (such as those 

connected with urban development and 

business location) has been shown to 

enhance the effectiveness of both the 

transport and non-transport objectives. 

Likewise, where such co-operation is 

absent, policies have been less successful. 

(McQuiad et. al. 2004) 

The studies reviewed generally argue there is scope 

for improving approaches to the identification of 

the national benefits of major strategic transport

schemes. Supplementing this, there is a clear need 

for using good practice appraisal methodology and 

for rigour in the weighting of wider objectives in the 

appraisal framework. 

Where a wider approach is adopted, the benefit to 

cost ratio is likely to increase – in the case of a 

putative high speed rail line in the UK, incremental 

benefit estimates ranged from 3 to 30percent. 33 

The standard British assumption, that 

national economic growth would not 

be changed by transport projects, would 

not necessarily apply to a project of this 

scale. Evidence from overseas, including 

in densely populated countries such as 

Japan and the Netherlands, is that when 

undertaken systematically, analysis of 

high speed rail economic impacts 

indicates them to be higher than 

revealed by narrow cost-benefit analysis 

alone. This will be particularly true if its 

construction could help relieve the very 

severe transport bottlenecks that Britain 

is likely to suffer from in the medium term 

if we do not undertake significant 

investment in strategic transport infrastructure. 

(Steer Davies Gleave, 2004) 

Finally, there is the question of phasing and roll- 

out to take into account. A project of the scale of 

Ultraspeed cannot be delivered in one step. Finance 

and construction has to be phased to avoid over- 

stretching the appetite of either of these markets. 

This is far from a handicap, but rather provides 

perhaps the largest strategic opportunity of all to 

engender economic transformation. 

Building the London-Birmingham-Manchester section 

first is likely to be most attractive in purely ridership 

terms. However, building a Stage 1 section 

connecting two Northern cities and an airport, then 

progressing to a network link all the Northern nodes, 


115 

before building southwards from Manchester, allows 

those Northern locations to ‘get ahead of the game’. 

This phasing requires an overt political choice to 

enable currently marginal economies to boost their 

own locational competitiveness and to enhance their 

own global economy access, through Manchester 

and Edinburgh/Glasgow ground-air hubs, before 

exposing this revitalising ‘Greater North’ to the power 

of a London economy now minutes, not hours, distant. 

Clearly, such a choice would also imply a 

proportionally greater public sector emphasis in the 

PPP for the first stages, reflecting a development 

logic that is designed to deliver strategic public 

benefit rather than simply to target maximum ridership. 

There is a second upside too: building initial sectors 

in the North (where much of the proposed alignment 

is over public-owned brownfields and where the 

regenerative impact would be greater) will be cheaper 

and quicker than construction in the more crowded, 

and more contested, South. Delivering North-first 

not only demonstrates ‘do-ability’ in the UK context, 

it also de-risks the entire project by proving 

construction and the operational regime. 

This in turn reduces, and eventually potentially 

eliminates, any risk premium attached to private 

sector project finance. And it does so in a helpful 

order – project finance becomes cheaper as 

construction moves on to the more expensive 

Southern sectors.


Analysing the economic impact of strategic 

transport transformation 

As the discussion above has shown, there is little readily-available methodology which adequately tackles 

transport issues from the broad economic perspective rightly adopted by the Eddington Review. We are, to a 

large extent, breaking new ground. 

Nevertheless, we can offer three examples, which provide useful points of departure for understanding 

strategic transport interventions of the kind proposed by Ultraspeed. 

We therefore summarise findings from three analyses of high speed infrastructure – two prospective and one 

retrospective – which move from a regional, through an inter-regional, to a super-regional scale. In this, they 

helpfully roughly mirror the phased, scaling-up, roll-out that Ultraspeed (and any other infrastructure 

programme of a similar scale) would adopt. 

Regional scale analysis: Baltimore – Washington maglev 34 

This is one of the Transrapid projects shortlisted in 2005 for further development studies funded by the US 

Federal Railroad Administration. Its proposed route (from Baltimore, via BWI airport to Union Station in 

downtown DC) has close parallels with potential Merseyside – Manchester Airport – Manchester, or Glasgow 

– EDI – Edinburgh Stage 1 routes for UKU. 

For information this is a city-centre to city-centre system with its Baltimore terminal sited for maximum 

regenerative effect in a quarter which has a ‘Gateshead-like’ relationship to the main urban focus. Its 64km 

(40 mile) alignment offers 16-19 minute journeys, compared to 90 minutes by freeway at peak times and 55 

minutes off-peak. 

Performance measure Baltimore-Washington argument 

Summary Maglev represents an intercity transportation option that can compete effectively with autos 

and airlines in select markets and has the potential to help alleviate transportation congestion, 

reduce energy consumption, improve air quality, enhance economic activity and development 

opportunities, and help stimulate more efficient regional land use patterns. 

Direct economic effects The revenues and other benefits from the project far outweigh the capital costs (US$ 3,496m) . 

Area of impact Short term 

construction 

(US$ mn) 

116 

Near inception in 2010 

(US$ mn) 

Project completion in 

2020 (US$ mn) 

Local sales 3,550 290 910 

Household earnings 1,550 90 280 

State and local Taxes 107.5 7.9 44.5 

Jobs Employment 

36,210 36,210 3,570 9,190 

Connectivity The high-speed connections provided by Maglev will improve Baltimore’s regional 

competitiveness and improve linkages to the nation’s Capitol and BWI Airport. 

Easy and quick access to jobs in Washington, D.C. by Maglev service will increase the 

attractiveness of living in downtown Baltimore. An analysis of housing and transportation costs 

for the City of Baltimore and Washington D.C. revealed that living in downtown Baltimore and 

commuting to Washington D.C. for work via Maglev would be economically feasible and in 

some cases less expensive than living and working in Washington D.C.


Performance measure Baltimore-Washington argument 

Capacity Operating with 5-car units accommodating 676 passengers at 7.5 minute peak-hour 

headways, the Baltimore-Washington system provides a transport capacity equivalent to 4,916 

cars. To accommodate this traffic under US standards an 8-lane freeway would be required. 

Such a road would consume over 100m2 of land for each linear metre of route. Built elevated, 

Transrapid maglev land-take is only 2.1m2 for each linear metre. It is also worth noting that 

capacity is only part of the picture: speed is vital too. The road ‘alternative’ (no matter how 

impractically wide) is still 3 to 5 times slower. 

NB: the UK Ultraspeed system will use 10-car maglev units conveying between 840 and 1,200 

passengers, and will therefore provide still higher capacity. 

Sector growth The Maglev project provides a unique opportunity for the local high-tech companies in the state 

to develop transit-oriented high-technology manufacturing industries. 

Location decisions Improved regional access by Maglev service will increase the attractiveness of locating or 

expanding businesses in Baltimore. This could be especially true for the functions of the 

federal government and back office functions of other businesses whose client base or 

activities are intertwined with Washington D.C.-based establishments. 

Property development The Maglev system will support goals of the Smart Growth Areas Act by concentrating 

development in corridors currently served by utility, roadway and other costly infrastructure. 

Significant travel time savings from improved access and connectivity will enhance the value 

of property around the stations, particularly in downtown Baltimore where land around the 

proposed station area is currently underutilized. 

Tourism Maglev will increase inter-regional travel and tourism allowing for more tourists to visit both 

cities’ attractions. Baltimore will increase its number of visitors by drawing from the millions of 

tourists that visit Washington D.C. annually. 

Particularly noteworthy is the observation under ‘Sector growth’ that a cluster of maglev-associated industry 

is likely to develop around a Stage 1 route. It is an obvious, but frequently overlooked, benefit to a first-mover 

region that the Operational Control Centre will unavoidably locate there, that guideway and vehicle engineering 

industry will cluster around the first route section, along with associated high-skill, high-value employment in 

system design, build and operation. 

Clearly US priorities are somewhat different (notably the actually rather dumb ‘Smart Growth Areas Act’ which 

risks overloading arterial corridors) but many of the observations would hold true in the UK. 

Inter-Regional scale analysis: Shinkansen HSR in Japan 37 

Moving from the two-cities-one-airport scale of Baltimore-BWI-DC, to the world’s longest established high 

speed wheel-on-rail network, Japan’s intercity Shinkansen, also provides some useful findings. 

Performance measure Shinkansen post investment experience 

Policy basis The early development of the Shinkansen network, particularly the Tokyo to Osaka line, was 

primarily driven by capacity constraints in the existing rail system. 

The topography and economic geography of Japan creates the need for very high capacity 

corridors between the main cities. 

Population growth The average annual population growth rate in Japan was 1 percent, while the rate for cities at 

which the Shinkansen stopped was 1.6 percent. 

Increases in population were also noted in municipalities near a city with a station 

Employment growth There were also substantial increases in the number of employees employed in banking 

services, real estate agencies and some other service businesses such as research and 

development, higher education and political institutes, collectively called the “information 

exchange industries”. 

The impact of the high speed rail line was less significant in regions where commodity 

industries, such as agriculture or manufacturing, were dominant. 

117


Performance measure Shinkansen post investment experience 

Sector growth Japanese cities serviced by the Shinkansen experienced 16 to 34percent higher growth in 

retail, industrial and wholesale activities than those cities not served by the train by allowing 

regional centre based businesses to conduct sales and marketing in the major metropolitan 

areas. 

Location decisions A high-speed rail station in a city attracted business interests and development, including high 

technology industry and finance and insurance institutions though direct access to information 

services and educational institutions was also a requirement for such entities. 

Property development In regional centres with a high-speed rail station, new development was concentrated near the 

station with vacant former-industrial sites experiencing high rates of development. 

Specific examples of the influence on urban development of high-speed rail are cited for the 

cities of Kakegawa and Anjo, Kariya & Chiryu. 

Tourism The six prefectures of Tokyo experienced an increase in the number of tourists following 

opening of the Shinkansen and, specifically, the Jate Prefecture increased tourist numbers from 

20 million in 1976 to more than 30 million in 1985. 

It is noted above that property development tends to cluster around high speed transport nodes. 

The following Skinkansen illustrations provide a graphic representation of the regenerative power of high 

speed infrastructure when combined with brownflield development. 

Shinagawa Station: 1997 

118 

Shinagawa Station: 2003 

Yokohama Station: construction Yokohama Station: now 

Illustration 4: Property development around Shinkansen terminals 

In Europe a prime example is Lille Europe, a typically 

dirigiste French approach which successfully created 

a major business and convention zone around the 

pivotal point of the London – Paris – Brussel – 

Köln – Amsterdam high speed rail TENS network. 

Net result: although Paris is now less than an hour 

from Lille, it has largely avoided economic ‘drain’ 

to its more powerful locational competitor and has 

developed strong new clusters in logistics and 

biotech to offset the decline in its traditional 

industries, notably textiles. 

Illustration 5: Lille Europe

Super-Regional scale analysis: 

a North England & Scotland high 

speed supercorridor 38 

Finally, UK Ultraspeed’s own proposals for a Northern 

‘economic ringmain’ – along the Northern Way 

corridor from Merseyside , via Manchester, Leeds 

and Teesside to Tyneside and then on to Edinburgh 

and Glasgow – prompted One North East to 

commission a strategic analysis by CURDS at the 

University of Newcastle. 

This study did specifically address questions of 

relative locational competitiveness and how the 

arrival of high speed ground transport infrastructure 

impacts upon this. 

The CURDS/Railway Consultancy report has already 

been submitted to the Review. Its key findings are 

summarised here. 

• Speed matters. Accelerating journey times 

to between twice and five times as fast as 

current rail links could produce “significant 

implications for economic geography”. 

• Inter-city commuting between cities on the 

system will become viable, as faster 

journey times “decrease the friction of 

distance” to around a third of current levels, 

by creating “virtual proximity” between 

currently distinct city-region economies. 

“The largest likely commuting impact is 

between pairs of areas which are very 

different in terms of their job opportunity 

and housing availability”. 

• A North-first approach allows the North 

England + Scotland to increase its 

locational competitiveness, both as a whole 

on a super-regional scale, whilst all the 

cities served also grow in their own right. 

The following table analyses the effect, on some 

of the city-regions served, of introducing very high 

speed connections along the Northern Way corridor 


119 

and onward to Edinburgh and Glasgow. 

‘Current status’ is the 2004 economic potential of 

these cities compared to London (using metrics 

developed by CURDS for ODPM). The right hand 

column projects the economic transformation that 

occurs when the cities in question are connected to 

an ultra high speed network. 

In a broad sense this is a measure of locational 

competitiveness on a UK-wide scale. 

City region Current economic 

potential as % 

of London 

Greater 

Manchester 

With UKU 

Northern 

Ringmain Route 

32.1% 78.5% 

West Yorkshire 17.0% 33.9% 

Tyneside 15.3% 33.6% 

Glasgow 18.1% 47.1% 

Table 4: Impact of high speed infrastructure on locational competitiveness 

Transformations on this order of magnitude led 

CURDS to conclude that: 

The improvements in relative accessibility which 

would follow for the Cities of the North as a result of 

being linked together by an HSGT network are real 

and substantial. For one city in particular, Manchester, 

the result is dramatic, and suggests at least the very 

real possibility of a major re-alignment in the UK’s 

economic geography. Whereas the existing situation 

is that the cities with the second and third highest 

economic potential, Birmingham and Manchester 

respectively, have each only approximately one-third 

of London’s economic potential, the ‘Northern ring 

main’ network catapults Manchester’s economic 

potential to almost four-fifth’s of London’s (its value 

being 78.5% of London’s). Although no other 

individual city reaches above half of London’s 

potential, this result suggests that perhaps for the 

first time in over a century, a Northern urban 

agglomeration, with Manchester as its ‘capital’, could

egin to be seen to rival the economic power of 

London. 

Although not as dramatic as Manchester’s rise, the 

other Cities of the North would all derive very 

considerable economic advantages from the 

Northern ring main UKU network. Glasgow jumps from 

less than one-fifth of London’s economic potential at 

present to just under half its potential (47.7%), 

Tyneside jumps to 36.3% of London’s potential, and 

Leeds to 33.9%, putting both above the level of 

Manchester’s existing level of economic potential. 

Closer integration between the cities due to 

connection to an HSGT network should intensify 

current patterns of integration and specialisation. The 

two key dimensions of this are the Manchester-Leeds 

relationship and Edinburgh-Glasgow. Manchester is 

clearly the strongest of the Northern English cities, with 

only Birmingham matching its position as second to 

London. Manchester has pretty much a full range of 

professional business services and is relatively strong 

in sectors such as international banking which are 

virtually absent from the other core cities. Leeds’ 

rapid service growth in recent years has been largely 

at the expense of the other Yorkshire cities, and to 

some extent Newcastle and Teesside. Leeds thus 

has a base of general business services, such as 

accounting, where the larger practices have been 

moving to integrated offices across Leeds and 

Manchester, with a few secondary offices in Newcastle. 

Leeds has also been able to build some areas of 

specialisation such as legal services, in some cases 

building on local market strengths such as building 

societies or their demutualised offspring. Clearly 

further strengthening of the Manchester-Leeds link 

would offer an opportunity for greater critical mass 

and potential further specialisation between the two, 

although the balance of growth might depend on 


120 

factors such as opportunities for office development 

in Manchester and train routes to London. Manchester 

Airport strongly favours development at the 

Manchester end of the corridor: it is already seen as 

the airport of choice for many businesses in Leeds. 

Liverpool is in many ways already tightly linked into 

the Manchester economy, and has benefited from 

some decentralisation of back offices and 

specialisations such as marine insurance. Further 

improvement of the Manchester-Liverpool link would 

appear to reinforce this position, although Liverpool 

airport might benefit as well from the perception of 

being an additional terminal for Manchester. 

This system of three cities would potentially strengthen 

their share of business services in competition from 

Sheffield, and the Midlands cities, and also from 

Newcastle, and so-doing provide much stronger 

competition for Birmingham and build a greater 

independence from London. 

Noting, however, the ‘two-way street’ effects of 

improved connectivity and accessibility, CURDS 

concluded that a North-first approach has significant 

merit, given the existing realities of the UK economy, 

dominated by London. 

Our research suggests that for the economic 

development benefits to the cities of the North to be 

maximised, it would be necessary for their improved 

inter-connectivity to take place before they were 

inter-connected with London; otherwise it is 

distinctly likely, given what we know of the 

distributional implications of major improvements in 

transport connectivity, that the considerable 

economic developments benefits of improved 

connectivity would be disproportionately appropri- 

ated by London, given its overwhelmingly dominant 

starting position. 39


Transport and investment location decisions 

As discussed in the previous section, radically upgraded transport connections to, and between, city-regions 

can produce very significant economic gains. In large part this is a result of increasingly accessible locations 

becoming more attractive for investment. 

In order to understand the role that transport plays in this, it is helpful first to look broadly at the process of 

locational decision-making. 

The background to investment location decisions 

A general theme of literature on this subject is that locational advantage is that businesses select locations 

which offer specific advantages for specific operations. Hence the investment location decision process 

typically involves investors, with their differing needs and differing investment drivers, weighing locations 

against evaluation criteria that are to some degree specific to their business. However, there is a general set 

of criteria that are considered by most investors during the course of their investment decision process. 

At the fundamental level, one constant location requirement demanded by investors is political and economic 

stability – typically the extent to which a location is stable at country level. Investors will also look for open, 

coherent and transparent economic, industry and investment policies. In combination, these provide an 

operating environment in which the investor can make long-term planning and investment decisions. Beyond 

these, there are other common sets of location criteria, which are tabulated below in order of importance. 

Location criteria Main location issues 

Market Size, nature and purchasing capacity of demand at the location and the surrounding 

economic ‘hinterland’ – the market. 

Openness to trade and investment. 

Existence of clusters of foreign investors or activity. 

Communications and transportation Availability, quality and cost of communications, ICT and transport infrastructure 

(road, rail, port, air) – supports accessibility to and connectivity with other location 

issue considerations such as the economic hinterland, labour, suppliers and social 

facilities. 

Labour issues Availability, quality, flexibility and cost of labour. 

Availability and quality of education and training facilities – includes willingness of 

institutions to provide tailored education and training packages. 

Issues of productivity, turnover and militancy/industrial relations can be second order 

considerations. 

Operating infrastructure Availability, quality and cost of basic utilities (electricity, gas, water, waste 

management, etc.). 

Property Location, range, availability and quality of land and/or property. 

Property costs and contractual conditions. 

Nature, availability and quality of property ‘catalyst’ projects. 

Supplier access Availability, quality and cost of suppliers for critical resource inputs. 

Taxation and incentives Level of corporate taxation. 

Availability and nature of specific grants, low-interest loans, tax breaks or other 

offsets. 

Environment and quality of life factors Availability and quality of the physical and social facilities and their attractiveness 

- especially for expatriate staff and staff recruitment. 

Table 5: Business location selection criteria in order of importance 40 

Cost of living - including housing and schooling. 

121

This ranking of location criteria (distilled from a wide 

range of evidence) clearly identifies the importance 

business places upon market access. Market access 

is supported by the availability of interconnected 

communications and transport infrastructure, such 

as surface links to airports, rail and motorway links 

to ports etc. Within this, both current and expected 

levels of services provided by this infrastructure 

(e.g. quality, reliability, time, and cost) are crucial 

components. 

Improvements in infrastructure, especially transport 

infrastructure can be expected to have a positive 

effect on productivity and prosperity through their 

influence on investment location decisions. This 

is likely to become still more important in the future, 

since modern businesses operate supply chains, 

which place a high premium on availability, quality, 

speed and reliability of transport infrastructure. 

Changes in world markets and the increase in 

globalisation have lead to increasing complexity in 

business structures. Tighter delivery and 

stockholding, through practices such as Just-in- 

Time, and an increasing demand for added value in 

components have all increased the logistical 

demands of businesses. 

More businesses are becoming reliant on externally 

sub-contracted transport services, which can offer 

lower costs through economies of scale and scope 

in both transport and other services (such as 

pre-assembly). 

As a result, the impact of transport upon freight 

businesses themselves, as well as on actual final 

manufacturing or service firms, is becoming 

increasingly important. The existence of networks 

of these freight companies is itself becoming more 

influential in business location, with hub locations of 


122 

such firms becoming more attractive. 

The composition and importance attached to various 

location criteria will vary depending on the type of 

investor and their:– 

• Stage in the decision process i.e. from 

long-listing of potential (country) locations 

to the final short-list of sites (within a 

particular country). Having decided on 

the UK, for instance, high-technology 

industries will currently tend to limit 

consideration of regional alternatives to 

South East, with proximity to Heathrow and 

the M4 corridor being critical. 

• Country and cultural background. 

• Industrial and commercial activity and 

characteristics – excellent air transport, 

and convenient, reliable access to it, is vital 

to businesses operating on an international 

scale, for instance. 

Transport as a first order location 

selection criterion 

In the light of the above, there is general consensus 

that transport infrastructure issues need to be 

considered in context: the premise being that 

transport infrastructure is indeed a location issue, 

absolutely necessary to deliver locational success, but 

not sufficient on its own to create locational success. 

This has been the starting point for a wide body of 

research which argues that the role of transport in 

influencing location decisions within a country 

(between regions) is marginal. 

We believe this approach to be erroneous and partial. 

Firstly it does not take into account step-change in 

locational performance which can be engendered by 

genuinely strategic transport infrastructure 

investment, such as CURDS discovered. Secondly 

its fundamental assumption is that, in general, 

transport costs account for only a small proportion of

total business costs. In the UK, in the global 

economy, it looks increasingly likely that this 

assumption is just plain wrong. 

A study by the OECD (2002) into transport and 

regional development noted that although the 

average cost of transport as a cost of production in 

developed countries typically varies between 2 and 4 

percent, this is itself an understatement due to 

hidden transport costs, including costs of own- 

account transport (vehicles operated by firms to 

deliver their own goods), costs of petrol and cars 

for employee travel and the value of the time spent 

travelling by staff. 

The report states that transport is more important to 

business decisions than basic cost percentages 

suggest, and that surveys of factors affecting 

business location typically give a high ranking to 

accessibility and transport-related factors. 

The extent of the understatement in costs is 

assessed by KPMG (2004), suggesting that, for 

manufacturing operations, transportation is a major 

factor, representing up to 17 percent of total 

location-sensitive costs. 

Another issue is that total transport costs are likely to 

be understated, because traditional measures omit 

supplier input costs from third party logistics 

providers, to whom increasing number of businesses 

are subcontracting out the movement of supplies and 

finished product, as discussed above. 

All in all, it is probable that transport is far more 

influential in location decisions than basic cost figures 

would suggest. The evidence is mounting. 

• The CBI find that business perceives the 

failings of UK transport as a 5% “national 

ineffeciency tax” on turnover – this is 

presumably in addition to the costs willingly 

borne for transport services they perceive 

as ‘normal’. 


123 

• KPMG find that transport may represent up 

to 17% of location-specific costs. 

• CURDS find that radical transport upgrade 

can at least double a city-region’s economic 

potential compared to the capital. 

• Ernst & Young find that the Øresundia – a 

super-region and an investment location 

entirely created by a new strategic 

transport link between Malmö and 

Copenhagen – was Europe’s third most 

successful inward investment location 

in 2004, outranked only by London and 

Paris, and captured 38% of total inward 

investment into Scandinavia. 41 

In short, it is clear that the economics of locational 

competition and transport are fundamentally interwoven. 

From the evidence, we conclude that strategic 

transport is a first order determinant of locations’ 

competitive advantage. It follows that real 

step-change in its provision (from ‘inadequate’ to 

‘standard-setting’) at regional, super-regional and 

national-scale will deliver significant competitive 

advantage for the UK in the global economy. 

In addition, transport also has a significant, second- 

order, role to play in enabling locations to deliver 

against other, vital, investment criteria. We give two 

examples below – labour market and social inclusion. 

Transport’s second order impact 

on location 1: Labour market 

Transport infrastructure has an obvious role to play 

in reducing travel time and increasing the labour pool 

from which businesses can draw. Transport can be 

used as a tool to boost labour supply, through 

increasing workplace accessibility and therefore 

labour market size. 

The OECD (2002) report concludes that accessibility 

is one of the wider benefits from transport 

infrastructure investment, and that improvements in

accessibility can increase the market size for labour. 

Transport infrastructure can play an important role 

in supporting industry clusters by increasing labour 

catchments areas and enhancing intra-area 

interactions. It can also be instrumental in inducing 

labour itself to move. As CURDS put it: 

One important consideration will be the 

extent to which the greater 

connectedness helps to create deep 

labour market pools in which relative 

competitive advantage can build up. The 

key issue here is the extent to which 

high-speed links widen and deepen travel 

to work areas, and in particular, change 

the commuting behaviour of professional 

workers in knowledge intensive business 

services. Clearly the high speed link itself 

is not the only consideration, with the 

quality of local feeders to the high speed 

terminals having an important influence 

on the extent to which the potential 

benefits from an agglomerated labour 

pool will be realised. 42 

Transport’s second order impact on 

location 2: Social inclusion 

Evidence suggests that both enhancing business 

locations and improvements to transport can help to 

increase social inclusion. 43 

The right employment location and transport 

provision can have positive social inclusion impacts 

by connecting workers and potential workers in 

vulnerable social circumstances to employment. 

Conversely, the wrong location and/or lack of 

transport can reduce employment accessibility, with 

negative inclusion impacts. For example, the location 

of a bank call centre in an out-of-town location with 

ample car parking but poor public transport to the 

site will limit the employment opportunities for those 

without private transport. 


124 

The evidence suggests that transport infrastructure 

investment can have positive effects on social 

inclusion within a region, through increased 

accessibility and mobility. Conversely the lack of, or 

underinvestment in, adequate infrastructure has a 

negative impact. And it is typically precisely those 

groups – including those without access to private 

transport, the low skilled and the low paid – whose 

integration into the economy lies at the heart of social 

inclusion policy, who are disproportionately excluded 

if transport infrastructure falls short. 

Promoting inclusion through accessibility requires 

improvements to the planning and delivery of local 

transport and the location of employment and key 

services in accessible locations. Deep integration of 

appropriate strategic economic criteria in this domain 

into both Local Transport Plans and Social Inclusion 

policymaking would therefore be desirable.

Strategic transport 

investment: impacts 

on existing transport 

Strategic transport does not happen in a vacuum. 

Any investment in new transport systems will have 

impacts on existing rail, road and air networks. 

The UK is in a uniquely advantageous position to 

ensure that the net impact is positive, as it starts from 

a position where, with the exception of Eurotunnel, 

Manchester’s second runway, CTRL and Heathrow 

T5, very little genuinely strategic transport 

infrastructure investment has taken place since the 

M25 concluded the era of motorway building. 

Thus the impact of new strategic systems will be 

upon, and is likely to be generally positive for, 

‘classic’ rail, road and air infrastructure of some 

vintage. The UK is not in the position of some of our 

locational rivals, where investment in a new 

generation of strategic transport would cannibalise 

the previous generation. Ultra high speed maglev 

would, for instance, seriously erode the economics 

of previous generation high speed rail in Germany. 

This does not apply in the UK. 

Other than CTRL, Britain simply does not possess 

high speed infrastructure from the ‘heavy metal’ 

TGV-era whose operational economics would be 

problematised by building a 21 st Century system. 

And CTRL would clearly benefit from a North:South 

project which connected it (at Stratford, say) to a 

broader, national, catchment. For Government, as 

the key stakeholder in the CTRL PFI, the obvious 

ridership and revenue benefits of connecting CTRL 

to the catchments of Birmingham in 30 minutes and 


125 

to the cities of the English North in around an hour 

would clearly provide considerable comfort. 

On the contrary, the challenge for Britain is to ensure 

that, whatever strategic transport investment are 

made, they maximise the beneficial impact on existing 

transport infrastructure and minimise the negative. 

This specifically includes the financial benefits of 

deferring the costs of lower-order investment in 

tactical, and/or ‘patch-up & catch-up’ schemes. 

The table below sets out the main impact areas, and 

impact issues within them, which should be borne 

in mind when assessing new strategic transport 

programmes. 

Impact area Main impact issues 

Direct financial Investment cost of construction 

Operation and maintenance 

Disruption during construction 

Indirect Transport cost and time changes 

Additional 

environmental and 

safety changes 

Alternative mode expenditure 

savings 

Travel and transport volumes 

(induced) and mode usage patterns 

(transfer) 

Competition effects on other 

transport modes 

Congestion volumes and patterns 

Environmental sustainability – noise 

and air pollution, greenhouse gas 

and other emissions etc. 

Safety changes – incidence and 

costs of accidents 

Table 6: Impacts of strategic transport investment on existing systems 

Direct impacts are discussed elsewhere. Headline 

numbers relating to the construction and operation 

of Ultraspeed are cited in the following chapter. 

The remainder of this Chapter focuses on indirect 

impacts. This is where the interaction between new 

and existing infrastructure is at its most complex. 

We do not yet claim a complete or detailed 

understanding in this domain, but we do offer 

indicative, rounded NPV values in this section, as 

guide to policy-making. (For this purpose we have

assumed prudent 30 year terms at 6%. Recently 60 

year terms and 3.5% rates have emerged as values 

in strategic project finance. In NPV terms, values 

roughly double from those we cite if the more gener- 

ous assumptions are used.) 

In this section we make reference to specific UK 

Ultraspeed values, which are known to us, whereas 

generic values for other potential strategic transport 

projects are not. Here again, the benefits delivered 

by Ultraspeed can stand to an extent for the generic 

benefits that other potential investments might also 

deliver – although to a lesser degree. 

Indirect effects on air transport 

The vast majority of domestic air traffic in Britain is 

to/from the London airports, with a proportion of this 

being interchange traffic to/from international trips. 

Particularly with competition from low-cost airlines, 

however, the established carriers have been 

struggling to maintain profitability on the domestic 

routes. Whilst Anglo-Scottish air traffic may well be 

currently economic, shorter-distance flows are already 

thought to be uneconomic, and maintained to ensure 

market presence, and to provide international 

opportunities for travellers from the North of England. 

Air services to/from Manchester have already been 

reduced in frequency and plane size since the 2004 

Virgin rail timetable improvements, as have London- 

Paris services following Eurostar improvements, 

thereby emphasising the competitive nature of this 

market. This suggests that a similar response would 

be expected upon the introduction of UK Ultraspeed 

services, especially if these were (as planned) 

integrated with air services via the Heathrow terminal. 

Part of the reason for this is that landing charges 

at the key airports (notably Heathrow) do not vary 


126 

significantly with plane size, since they are dependent 

upon runway and gate utilisation. International 

(especially inter-continental) flights are, therefore, 

much more lucrative for airlines than short-haul 

domestic flights. The increased airport catchments 

area enabled by UK Ultraspeed might permit also 

operators to provide fewer but larger planes. 

The other key factor here is airport capacity, with 

expensive further developments already proposed 

at Heathrow and Stansted – avoiding these could 

theoretically be a significant benefit flowing from 

Ultraspeed or, to a lesser degree, from a similarly- 

scoped HSGT project, although many of the costs 

potentially avoided could accrue to BAA, a private 

company. 

While some low-cost carriers may survive on English 

routes, and full-fare carriers on a number of key 

Anglo-Scottish routes not well-served by UK 

Ultraspeed (such as London-Aberdeen), we would 

expect wholesale reductions in domestic air services. 

We would expect the planes not required for these 

services to be used instead on new international 

services, and/or the slots to be used for higher- 

earning intercontinental flights with larger aircraft. 

At a stroke this both increases UK international 

connectivity – itself a key competitiveness benefit 

– and decreases the most environmentally and 

economically inefficient form of aviation, very short 

haul domestic. 

With the airlines suffering relatively little, or actually 

positively benefiting, from Ultraspeed – by using 

planes and slots to fly to more lucrative destinations 

– the proportionate impact on airport capital 

expenditure is expected to be larger. For instance, 

whilst the impact on airline profits may roughly neutral 

in NPV terms, airport development expenditure of

several billion pounds might be avoided or deferred 

– a far more significant impact. Moreover, increasing 

fuel prices and environmental concerns also make 

for an uncertain future for air travel at present. 

Government and others might welcome the 

opportunity to delay investment in more terminals 

until the long-term picture becomes clearer. 

For information, Ultraspeed indicative planning 

suggest the potential to free up 450-600 runway 

slots a week at Heathrow and around 800 per week 

in total at other UK airports by substituting domestic 

air services with ground transport that is both more 

frequent, more comfortable and often faster than the 

jets it replaces. 

Indirect effects on rail 

The impacts on the rail industry are complex, 

reflecting both that UK Ultraspeed competes with 

some rail services but is complementary to others, 

and that there are second- and third-order effects, 

as well as the obvious ones. 

On the key InterCity routes with which UK Ultraspeed 

will compete, effects will include: 

• a reduction in passenger traffic and hence 

revenue; 

• a reduction in service levels and hence 

operating costs; 

• a reduction in the attractiveness of the 

rail mode for those passengers (chiefly on 

medium-distance intermediate-length trips) 

who will not have a UK Ultraspeed option, 

and hence a reduction in their revenue; 

• the liberation of capacity for other 

passenger traffics, for example at London 

termini; and 

• the liberation of mainline capacity for rail 

freight operations. 

Each of these needs to be considered in turn. 


127 

Although both the East Coast (EC) and West Coast 

(WC) rail main lines, with which UK Ultraspeed will 

compete, are busy, rail passenger traffic is inevitably 

peaked both temporally and geographically. The use 

of the mode for commuting and other time-sensitive 

traffics in particular creates costs which cannot be 

avoided in the way this occurs in the airline industry, 

where there is no fares regulation. 

Although the capacity of a typical InterCity train is of 

the order of 500 seats, average loadings on the two 

main lines are generally between 150 and 200. 

However, at present, WC loadings are presently 

nearer 125, following service frequency improvements 

for which patronage has not yet built up. 

UK Ultraspeed units are expected to have a capacity 

of around 800 seats so, even with very significant 

trip generation, abstraction from conventional Inter- 

City rail services will be extensive. Whilst marginal 

traffic reductions might be managed by reducing 

the number of carriages, such large-scale demand 

reductions are likely to lead to service reductions. 

For instance, Birmingham now has up to 4 trains per 

hour (tph) to/from Euston, whilst Manchester has 

recently gained half-hourly services to/from London, 

and Leeds is about to get them. None of these look 

likely to be sustainable in the light of UK Ultraspeed 

competition. 

However, hourly services would be expected to 

survive, to serve the intervening markets. For the 

ECML, these are quite significant – for instance, 

Peterborough and Doncaster are both well-distant 

from the UK Ultraspeed route and serve as 

substantial interchange stations, from East Anglia 

and Lincolnshire/Humberside respectively. Direct 

train operating costs would therefore be expected to 

fall, although total rail costs would of course fall more

slowly, as there are a number of fixed costs (not least 

the costs of maintaining infrastructure for 100mph+ 

running) which will not be significantly affected. 

A second-order effect is that passengers on some of 

the flows to/from intermediate stations will be 

affected as service frequencies are reduced. However, 

this is not necessarily as negative a factor as it might 

appear, since some of these markets could be more 

attractively served if not as part of larger operations. 

For instance, Milton Keynes currently enjoys a high 

level of service to/from London, part of which is 

composed of InterCity services to/from Birmingham, 

on which Milton Keynes passengers have to seek 

spare seats not used by West Midlands passengers. 

The services run to/from Birmingham, because there 

is some demand for this. However, with UK 

Ultraspeed taking most of the Birmingham business, 

the railway would be expected to reconfigure its 

services, with additional London-Milton Keynes (or, 

more probably, Northampton) fast services using 

the capacity liberated by withdrawal of some of the 

Birmingham trains. Reduced costs, improved 

reliability, and times and seating matched more 

closely to Milton Keynes demand could make the net 

impact on the railway relatively small. 

However, capacity issues may be as important as the 

impact on the railway’s operating budget. The case 

for a high-speed link between London and the North 

of England/Scotland is not driven solely by a desire for 

the higher speeds per se, much as these do provide 

an economic benefit. Perhaps of more importance is 

the fact that the existing networks (rail and road) are 

approaching, if not already at, their capacity. 

The extent of the capacity constraints on the rail 

network is commonly misunderstood and 

underestimated. A key problem is the relatively 


128 

paucity of places where services can overtake one 

another. The East Coast route, in particular, suffers 

from this because it is largely double-track (as 

opposed to the West Coast route, which has 

considerable sections of 4-track). As the speeds 

of fast passenger services increase, they catch up 

slower-running (passenger and freight) services more 

quickly, so that the capacity of the line can actually 

fall, unless all trains are speeded up. As an example 

of a benefit flowing from abstraction of ridership from 

current rail intercity to new HSGT, the expensive 

treatment of particular bottlenecks – such as the 2 

track Welwyn viaduct – could be postponed 

(perhaps indefinitely) if a number of InterCity trains 

were removed from the route. 

In addition, a number of Britain’s major stations are 

clearly at capacity. This includes virtually all London 

termini (except Waterloo, which is to gain the spare 

Eurostar platforms in 2007), Birmingham New Street, 

Glasgow Queen Street and Leeds (the East end). 

Manchester Piccadilly could handle considerably 

longer trains on many services, but relatively few new 

services per se, whilst plans are already afoot to add 

extra platforms at both Edinburgh’s Waverley and 

Haymarket stations. This therefore suggests that the 

French approach of delivering high-speed rail solutions 

with TGV trains using new lines in the countryside but 

existing lines on the approaches to major stations may 

be impractical in the British context. 

Indeed, removal of some InterCity services would 

free up valuable platform capacity – for instance, at 

King’s Cross and Euston, where outer-suburban and 

regional traffic continues to grow. Without removal of 

these InterCity services, expensive solutions are 

going to be needed to cope with this regional 

traffic – for instance, around ¼ of the benefits of the 

Thameslink 2000 project (total cost around £4bn)

might reasonably be attributable to the relief of 

congestion at King’s Cross. 

In addition, the increasing demands of rail freight 

traffic are also putting pressure on the national rail 

network. About 40% of Britain’s freight trains use the 

WCML, and additional tracks are currently being laid 

in Staffordshire to accommodate increases in this. 

Container and intermodal traffic is particularly buoyant, 

and travels long distances on the main lines. With 

some InterCity passenger services removed, some of 

the proposed capacity enhancement measures (for 

instance, the upgrading of the Peterborough-Lincoln- 

Doncaster route as an alternative to the ECML) could 

be avoided. 

The position on regional routes is potentially exactly 

the opposite to that on the main lines, although the 

figures involved are all considerably smaller. Effects 

will include: 

• an increase in revenues for traffic accessing 

the UK Ultraspeed terminals; 

• an increase in operating costs to 

accommodate this extra traffic; 

• a (second-order) increase in revenues from 

passengers making intermediate journeys 

on lines with higher frequencies 

necessitated by UK Ultraspeed links; and 

• the requirement for some capacity 

enhancements to accommodate this 

extra traffic. 

Where UK Ultraspeed terminals are linked to the 

national rail network, an increase in local rail trips (to 

access UK Ultraspeed) is forecast. However, whilst 

UK Ultraspeed proposes an integrated transport 

system, in some places this will be achieved by links 

to local light rail schemes. In these places national 

rail will not benefit. For instance, achieving rail 

access trips to the proposed UK Ultraspeed 

terminals at the North and South ends of the West 


129 

Midlands may be more difficult than those currently 

achieved through linkages to WCML rail services at 

Birmingham New Street. 

Many regional rail services are formed of 2-car 

vehicles, with a capacity of around 120 passengers. 

Although average loads may be as low as 40 

passengers, peakiness generates considerable cost, 

and many peak trains are overcrowded. Although 

long-distance traffic has historically been less peaky 

than local traffic, this is to do with its long duration, 

and the very fast journeys possible with UK Ultraspeed 

will undermine this. For instance, business trips from 

Sunderland to London, arriving at 1000, may coincide 

on their first stage with peak journeys from Sunderland 

to Newcastle, arriving at 0800. 

However, in general, we expect local UK Ultraspeed 

terminal access trips to be complementary to the 

regional network, and to add to its profitability, with 

revenues rising faster than costs. Even if some 

train lengthening is required, this will not have 

significant implications for key cost drivers such as 

infrastructure maintenance, and we see relatively few 

places where additional capacity might be needed, 

since we believe train lengthening should be 

sufficient to cater for much of the extra demand. 

Train lengthening would only generate minor 

requirements for platform lengthening, even if the 

potential second-order service frequency benefits 

were therefore reduced to a minimal value. 

An added complication: it is difficult to providing an 

appraisal of the net costs and benefits of the 

introduction of UK Ultraspeed when it is currently unclear 

how the railway will manage forecast traffic growth if 

UK Ultraspeed (or something similar) is not built. 

Long-term Government funding plans for the national 

rail network are not clear at present, although may

ecome so with forthcoming long-term spending 

reviews. In the meanwhile, Network Rail progresses 

piecemeal with small capacity enhancements at 

bottlenecks, leaving the Route Utilisation Study 

planning process to highlight the strategic issues. 

One must also be very careful in how the impacts 

of UK Ultraspeed on the national rail system are 

assessed. With concerns on environmental issues, 

petrol prices, road congestion, lorry driver hours, and 

so on, the rail system currently has a bright future. 

Traffic growth is expected in almost all sectors. The 

majority of that traffic growth is unaffected by any 

changes which construction of UK Ultraspeed might 

imply, so a clear distinction must be made between 

the impact of UK Ultraspeed, and the differential 

financial position of the railway in (say) 2025. The 

railway is likely to be financially stronger than now in 

either scenario. 

However, as an initial order of magnitude, and 

assuming 30 year, 6% terms, the costs and benefits 

to the railway industry of introducing a national 

strategic high speed transport system may be 

approximately as follows: 

Impact Inter-City 

£m NPV 

Changes in key 

revenues 

Changes in operating 

costs 

Changes in secondorder 

revenue 

Changes to 

passenger capacity 

enhancement costs 

Changes to 

freight capacity 

enhancement costs 


Regional 

£m NPV 

Total 

£m NPV 

-6,000 600 -5,400 

1,300 -100 1,200 

-1,300 100 -1,200 

500 -50 450 

500 0 500 

Total -5,000 550 -4,450 

Table 7: Estimated impacts of UK Ultraspeed on rail 

130 

Indirect effects on metro and 

light rail 

London Underground (at Stratford) and the light rail 

schemes serving UK Ultraspeed terminals (at 

Newcastle and in the West Midlands) would expect to 

benefit significantly from access trips, although there 

are issues of peak demand. Stratford and Gateshead 

are both on key sections of their respective systems, 

and additional train mileage might be required in order 

to ensure that overcrowding was not excessive. 

However, the practicalities of doing so at Stratford 

might prevent this, since the Central line is already 

very near its 33tph fully-laden capacity. Conversely 

a connection to Stratford significantly enhances the 

commercial case for CrossRail. 

Indirect effects on bus and coach 

UK Ultraspeed will be a long-distance system, with 

strong image values (as a heavy-metal TGV would 

also be, but to a lesser degree), and the numbers of 

passengers likely to access its terminals by bus will 

probably be relatively few in number. However, we 

would expect some terminal workers to arrive by bus, 

providing a small fillip to local bus patronage. 

Long-distance coach travel on scheduled services is 

generally at the bottom end of the transport market. 

Although specific commuter and regional coach 

services take advantage of weak railway competition 

(e.g. Gravesend-London and Edinburgh – Jedburgh 

– Newcastle), the inter-city coach network has 

developed to serve the price-conscious, time- 

insensitive passenger. Students and old-age 

pensioners therefore constitute significant market 

segments. However, more advanced revenue- 

maximising ticketing and yield-management systems 

are gradually allowing rail companies to advertise low 

fares whilst retaining journey time advantages. This

strategy, which UK Ultraspeed will follow and further 

develop, is presumably directly competing against 

coach. UK Ultraspeed has the added advantage that 

the time savings it offers are potentially so large as 

to permit trips not possible in the time available on 

slower modes (e.g. weekend trips away). 

With the unit of capacity of the coach mode being 

only 50 seats, though, it seems probable that most 

routes (even those in direct competition with 

UK Ultraspeed) would continue to survive, since the 

market niche they need to find and fill is so small. 

Nevertheless, one would expect some frequencies 

to fall, thereby further reducing the attractiveness 

of coach as a mode. But with this mode being 

provided entirely within the private sector, and using 

relatively little infrastructure, impacts for the 

Government and its agencies are small. 

Indirect effects on car 

Of course the main mode of transport in Britain is the 

car, although its dominance is only overwhelming in 

the shorter-distance markets in which UK Ultraspeed 

will not compete. Already, conventional rail has the 

largest mode share for trips of around 200 miles. 

But even at shorter distances, the speed benefits of 

UK Ultraspeed will at least in part make up for the 

need to access its terminals, and modelling suggests 

significant numbers of journeys on medium-distance 

flows such as Manchester to Birmingham and Leeds. 

A transfer of traffic from car to UK Ultraspeed is 

therefore expected, although whether this is sufficient 

to make any material difference to road infrastructure 

maintenance costs is unclear. We assume not for 

present purposes. 

The financial impacts on Government depend upon 

whether or not road pricing is introduced. If it is, 

there may be changes in income, similar to those 


131 

currently made by them for shadow tolls on the M6 

(toll). Even if road pricing is not introduced, 

Government may, however, note a small reduction 

in income from road fuel duties, which should be 

included in the appraisal of any strategic transport 

programme which abstracts a proportion of its traffic 

from the car. 

(Note, though, that car operating cost savings are 

not relevant for a public-sector appraisal since they 

are received directly by individuals choosing to travel 

instead on UK Ultraspeed). Considerable benefits 

would, nevertheless, be expected from road 

congestion relief, since demand is peaky, and 

reductions in peak demand can save significant 

proportions of the total congestion. 

Difficulties are, however, likely to arise with access to 

the UK Ultraspeed terminals. Even with substantial 

investment in, and service integration with, local 

public transport networks, many intending 

UK Ultraspeed passengers will drive to the terminals. 

The local traffic and car-parking problems already 

evident at and around many airports and major rail 

stations will have to be managed very carefully, and 

capital expenditure is likely, if these problems are to 

be limited to acceptable levels. 

Alternative mode expenditure 

savings 

Rail demand has, in the last few years, grown sig- 

nificantly. Not all of this can merely be attributed to 

the regaining of market share lost in the immediate 

aftermath of the Hatfield accident, as new trains and 

service enhancements have also featured strongly. 

Demand in 2004-5 was 7 percent higher than in 

2003-4, but network capacity is being reached in a 

number of places, and demand is already higher than 

planned capacity (i.e. through overcrowding) on a

number of routes. Growth on some of the 

corridors potentially served by UK Ultraspeed has 

been even stronger. For instance, demand on the 

Euston – Manchester service is understood to have 

grown by over 30 percent on completion of the line 

upgrade, whilst the entire Leeds – Manchester 

corridor has enjoyed growth of over 10 percent p.a., 

with trips specifically between those cities having 

risen by around 20 percent in the last year. In 

addition, freight demand continues to rise, not only 

with the longer hauls of coal traffic, but also in the 

intermodal and container markets. 

Unfortunately, these levels of growth are unsustainable 

within the existing infrastructure. Whilst additional 

carriages can be added, at relatively marginal cost, 

to existing services, adding more trains on to the 

network often needs enhanced network facilities. 

For instance, passing loops to enable faster trains to 

overtake slower ones may need to be reconstructed, 

British Rail having removed many such facilities 

during the 1980s, as part of a (successful) cost 

reduction initiative. 

Network Rail, as custodians of the national rail 

infrastructure, has a major task in managing existing 

work programs. These include: 

• replacing a large quantity of signalling as 

sets approaching life-expiry; 

• coping with the maintenance consequences 

of high traffic levels; 

• completion of the West Coast Main Line 

upgrade; 

• restoration of network capacity after 

Railtrack’s under-spending which 

culminated in the Hatfield incident; 

• network extensions in Scotland and Wales 

(e.g. Larkhall and the Vale of Glamorgan 

lines respectively); and 

• the removal of some network bottlenecks 

(e.g. the Allington chord at Grantham). 


132 

Route Utilisation Studies are currently in hand, in 

order to address the balance between demand and 

capacity on the network. Although detailed 

management solutions do help in the short-term, 

most of these studies acknowledge that significant 

physical works will be needed in the medium term. 

The avoidance of a program of route upgrades 

designed to enhance capacity on a major route could 

therefore be a considerable benefit to the railway. For 

instance, works on the East Coast Main Line (ECML) 

are likely to include infrastructure enabling more trains 

of both high-speed passenger and medium-speed 

freight services to run simultaneously. However, the 

potential removal by UK Ultraspeed of some of the 

need to accommodate so many fast trains could 

significantly reduce the scale of works needed whilst 

simultaneously actually adding capacity – since 

railway capacity is as much defined by the variation in 

speeds between the fastest and the slowest services 

as it is by the speed of any one type of train. 

The potential benefits to the rail industry of the 

avoidance of such works may best be examined 

through an example. Earlier thoughts about the 

ECML included the upgrade of the route from 

Peterborough to Doncaster via Lincoln for freight 

traffic. This was likely to have had a capital cost in 

the order of £200m. Whilst the end-to-end speeds 

for freight trains were likely to be similar to those today 

(where such trains often have to be put into passing 

loops or sidings for fast passenger trains to overtake), 

there are a number of operating disadvantages too. 

For instance, the route is 22 kms longer, which would 

impact on fuel consumption, even if a more consistent 

speed profile could be achieved. 

It is factors such as these which lead us to estimate 

an NPV saving to the InterCity sector of the rail

industry of £500m in capital works avoided by the 

introduction of UK Ultraspeed. Similarly, there were 

additional costs estimated at £50m NPV for regional 

services, where extra traffic to/from some of the UK 

Ultraspeed terminals would require capital works. 

Savings in air infrastructure 

expenditure 

If a significant number of domestic flights can be 

substituted by UK Ultraspeed, then there could be 

substantial benefits from delaying expenditure on 

additional airport capacity in South East England, 

which is expensive to provide. Although the airport 

works themselves are funded by BAA, which is a 

private sector company, the Government inevitably 

becomes involved in supporting expenditure on road 

and rail access, despite the planning process requiring 

substantial BAA contributions towards these. 

As runway capacity is determined by the number of 

flights, substitution of a number of smaller planes on 

domestic services by larger ones on long-haul flights 

is a benefit to the airport operator in itself. With the 

requirement for the extra capacity not needed, a 

wider economic analysis could therefore include the 

postponement of the capital expenditure and/or the 

(e.g. landtake) disbenefits. Even the postponement 

by only 5 years of a £100m programme of such 

works provides a benefit to Government alone of 

£25m in NPV terms. 

Road traffic speeds and capacity 

The key strategic issue that the UK Ultraspeed 

project addresses is that Britain simply does not have 

enough transport infrastructure. On the road 

network, this manifests itself in road capacity 

enhancements generally failing to deliver potential 

congestion relief benefits, because the additional 

road-space created is merely filled up by additional 


133 

demand, previously suppressed by the low traffic 

speeds. Specifically on the motorway network, the 

extra demand is often for relatively short-distance 

trips, themselves seeking some congestion relief from 

the conventional road system. 

Road traffic in recent years has generally grown at 1- 

2 percent p.a. 44 However, unlike the railways, where 

capacity is measured in terms of defined train paths 

(the number of which can be controlled, in order to 

maximise capacity), the road network’s capacity is 

more fluid. It varies with the flow put on it, and is 

typically greatest at speeds of 50mph. Extra demand 

added leads to a reduction in both the average 

speed and the capacity of that link. As a result, extra 

infrastructure tends to be considered not when any 

specific capacity has been reached, but when the 

deterioration in journey times warrants it. Time 

savings are therefore the primary benefit from most 

road schemes, as new infrastructure enables 

traffic to flow once again at faster speeds and greater 

volumes. 

From a Government perspective, there may therefore 

be benefits to the road sector from the introduction 

of UK Ultraspeed. The Highways Agency capital 

budget expenditure budget might, for instance, be 

lowered – or perhaps have elements of work post- 

poned. As an example, in 2003, Balfour Beatty were 

awarded a £148m contract to widen junctions 12-15 

of the M25 and provide a spur to Heathrow Terminal 

5, at a cost of around £8m/km. Even the postpone- 

ment by only 5 years of a £100m programme of such 

works provides a benefit to Government of £25m in 

NPV terms. 

These figures are clearly much less than the 

potential time savings. However, it can be argued 

that the time savings generated to road users are

also not unambiguously positive in nature. Despite 

the quantum step in transport capacity provided by 

UK Ultraspeed, the net benefits in this area are unclear 

– other than the capital expenditure avoided (see 

above), is the enabling of additional short/medium- 

distance road trips on the existing road network a 

benefit or not? 

Environmental sustainability 

– emissions reduction 

UK Ultraspeed’s predicted ridership of 40mppa 

(million passengers per annum) is taken from a 

number of existing modes – air, rail, bus/coach and 

car – and some is newly generated traffic. On a 

modelled average trip length of 160km, Ultraspeed’s 

customers travel an annual total of 6.4 billion 

passenger km in the first stabilised year of operation. 

Environmental impact tends to be measured in terms 

of passenger-km rather than Available Seat Km to 

facilitate comparisons with the car. The following 

calculations are therefore presented on that basis. 

As an electrically powered system, Ultraspeed has 

the potential to produce absolute zero emissions 

if its electricity is generated by a renewable and/or 

nuclear mix. Even assuming today’s generation mix, 

Transrapid systems emit only 0.33 kg of CO2 per 

pass-km. Ultraspeed’s performance compared to 

other transport systems is tabulated below. 

Transport mode CO2 emission 

(kg/passenger-km) 

Coach 0.038 

Train 0.049 

Car (a) 0.130 

Air 0.141 

UK Ultraspeed (b) 0.01 

Notes: 

(a) assuming 1.4 passengers per car 

(b) a notional figure, assuming UK Ultraspeed uses 100 percent 

renewable/nuclear energy. Assuming a fossil fuel-led 

generation mix Transrapid achieves 0.033. 

Table 8: Comparative pollutant emissions by transport mode 45 


134 

Even assuming today’s Transrapid energy practice 

(i.e. fossil fuel-led generation mix), UK Ultraspeed will 

achieve considerable air pollution savings, especially 

for trips transferred from domestic air. Transporting 

air passengers by maglev would produce around 

0.11kg less CO2 per km. 

For example If only two return flights per day between 

London and Manchester were removed following the 

introduction of UK Ultraspeed, and if each of these 

carried only 100 passengers (both of which are very 

conservative assumptions), then 3,900 tonnes of 

CO2 would be saved every year. 

In reality, not only would one expect a greater 

reduction in air capacity than that, but it would also 

certainly apply to other airport:airport pairs, 

including London to Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh 

and Glasgow, and Birmingham, Manchester or 

Leeds to Edinburgh and Glasgow, Newcastle to 

Birmingham etc. 

Allowing for a total of 80 flights per day (40 return 

pairs) to be substituted by UKU services, the CO2 

emissions reduction case is likely to be of the order of 

magnitude set out in the following table. 

For the purposes of this calculation, we assume an 

average trip (flight) length of 400km for the 

passengers whose passenger-km transfer from air to 

Ultraspeed. Whilst detailed modal transfer 

projections are a matter for detailed study at a later 

stage, this average is reasonable on the assumption 

that the majority of the passengers transferring will be 

from the 300km London-Manchester and (in much 

lower numbers) London-Leeds routes, with 

substantial minorities from the (500km) London- 

Newcastle and (600km) London-Edinburgh or 

Glasgow routes, with a small minority coming from 

inter-regional services.

CO2 reduction by mode substitution: Air to Ultraspeed 


flights per day substituted by UKU 80 

pax per flight 100 

pax per day 8000 

km average trip length per passenger on these flights 400 

pass-km per day 3,200,000 

pass-km per year (assume 364 days) 1,164,800,000 

CO2 kg per pass-km 0.141 

Total CO2 per annum (kg) 164,236,800 

Total CO2 per annum (tonnes) 164,237 

Sequestration cost £/tonne £ 20.00 

Sequestration cost per annum £ 3,284,736 

Passenger KM transfers to UKU 

pass-km per year 1,164,800,000 

CO2 kg per pass-km (using current generation mix) 0.033 

Total CO2 per annum 38,438,400 

Total CO2 per annum (tonnes) 38,438 

Sequestration cost £/tonne £ 20.00 

Sequestration cost per annum £ 768,768 

tonnes saved p.a. 125,798 

percentage of CO2 emission rate by UKU compared to Air 23.40% 

Sequestration cost saved £ 2,515,968 

NPV (assuming 30 year 6% rate) £ 34,631,875 

Table 9: Emissions reduction due to mode transfer from air to Ultraspeed 

Following the same calculation, and using the mode-switch results of Ultraspeed pre-feasibility demand 

studies, the benefits of CO2 emission attributable to the major passenger-km mode-transfers from more 

polluting modes to maglev is likely to be of the order of magnitude set out, rounded, in the following table. 

Mode-switch from: 

Assuming today’s generation mix Assuming zero-emissions mix 

Tonnes CO2 emissions 

reduced p.a. 

Sequestration 

savings NPV 

135 

Tonnes CO2 emissions 

reduced p.a. 

Sequestration 

savings NPV 

Air 126,000 £35m 163,000 £44m 

Car 208,000 £43m 207,000 £57m 

Rail 32,000 £9m 96,000 £26m 

Total 366,000 £87m 466,000 £127m 

Table 10: Total CO2 emissions reductions by mode transfer 

We would anticipate that TGV-style solutions would show benefits in a similar order of magnitude per 

passenger-km transferred. However less overall transfer would take place due (a) to wheel-on-rail journey 

times that are not air-competitive over longer routes and (b) the fact that some of the city-pair links made by 

UKU, over which road and rail traffic is abstracted, are not made under TGV proposals. 

This latter is due, as discussed previously, to 300km/h TGVs requiring two or more separate routes to stand 

any hope of being air-competitive over the North:South axis. This rules out the provision of fast East:West

links between city-pairs. Leeds – Manchester is a 

15 minute hop on Ultraspeed, for instance, but TGV 

alignments force either a dog-leg via Birmingham 

or mean abandonning the passenger to make the 

Trans-Pennine journey on classic infrastructure. 

Either way, it would take at least four times longer. 

Existing transport modes also contribute to other air 

pollutants, including CH4 and NOx. This is an area 

in which research is continuing, and requires both 

the assessment of the extent to which falls in these 

pollutants might occur as a direct result of policy 

changes such as UK Ultraspeed, and the per-unit 

valuation of such falls in pollutant levels. Nevertheless, 

initial indications are that the total climate change 

impact is around 2.7 times that attributable to CO2 

alone (IPCC). We are not yet in a position to estimate 

sequestration savings (or a similar measure), but NPV 

values from the CO2 reduction exercise factored up 

give NPV benefits in the order of £200m. 

Strictly-speaking, any environmental calculations 

should also include (as a negative item) the demand 

generated by the existence of the new system, and 

access to it. However, UK Ultraspeed has extremely 

low environmental consequences, so we one could 

reasonably make a nominal deduction of around 10 

percent to the annual savings figures. 

These savings would contribute to the UK 

Government’s Kyoto commitments, which are 

currently being met by expensive measures such as 

the installation of power station desulphurisation 

equipment (despite road vehicles being the fastest- 

growing sector for emissions). Benefits of a greater 

amount to the Exchequer therefore seem likely, as 

well as the political/longer-term environmental 

benefits of minimising global warming. 


136 

Safety benefits 

Whilst public transport modes are generally safe, 

travel by road is less so. Latest figures show that 

around 3,200 people were killed on Britain’s roads 

in 2004, the lowest figure for over 50 years, but still 

probably 100 times higher than the total for the 

passenger fatalities on all other modes. 

Conventional transport appraisal using HEN2 and its 

successors values lives lost at around £1.5m each, 

with serious injuries at £20,000 and slight injuries at 

£2,000 each. These figures are supposed to include 

allowances for lost output, as well as the direct costs 

of police and hospital services etc. 

Using the previous modelling assumptions, UK 

Ultraspeed is expected to abstract about 2bn annual 

pass-kms from car, equivalent to 1.5bn vehicle-kms 

at an average 1.4 persons/car. A simple pro-rating 

down from total annual 500bn vehicle-kms 46 

suggests a direct impact saving of 9 deaths, rounded 

down to 7 deaths, given the inherently-safer nature of 

motorways, with which UK Ultraspeed is competing. 

Similar calculations for the 31,000 serious injuries 

and 246,000 slight injuries suggest savings of 75 

serious injuries and 600 slight injuries per annum. 

Using the valuations noted above, the annual road 

safety benefits would therefore be around £13m, or 

nearly £180m in rounded NPV terms. The relatively 

low value is due to the vast majority of car trips being 

local in nature, and trips for which UK Ultraspeed 

does not compete.


Strategic transport and strategic economics: 

setting the benchmark 

The previous analysis paints the background. The 

conclusion: 

Transport, in and for itself, is a key determinant 

of the UK’s ability to compete as a location 

in the global economy. Significant investment 

in transport it is essential, if past sound 

performance is to be sustained and enhanced 

in the future. 

That was the point of departure for UK Ultraspeed, 

and remains a prime driver of our project 

development. This is a project planned – as a 

strategic transport intervention – to meet the 

strategic economic challenges facing the UK. 

We therefore conclude this evidence to the Eddington 

Review by setting out a number of the key benefits 

a strategic transport programme on the scale of 

Ultraspeed should be planned to deliver and identify, 

where appropriate, actions Government might 

consider taking to facilitate their delivery. 

We are, of course, aware that the Review has a 

broad (non project-specific) remit and equally aware 

that some of Ultraspeed’s benefits could be 

delivered, although typically only partially or to an 

often far lesser extent, by other possible strategic 

transport schemes. 

We thus offer this concluding analysis in an 

ecumenical spirit. For us, a number of understandings 

have emerged during project development – some 

qualitative, others quantitative – of how, and to what 

extent, a strategic-scale transport programme should 

137 

deliver its benefits in the strategic economic context 

of 21st Century Britain. We therefore simply put 

these forward as ‘benchmarks’ which Government 

may wish to incorporate into its own thinking. 

These benchmarks are intended for to be applied 

only to strategic transport projects. Other measures 

are more suited to weighing the costs and benefits of 

smaller-scale, or incremental proposals. 

Capacity 

Any strategic transport investment on a national 

scale, must deliver new transport capacity measured 

in tens of billions of new Available Seat Km [ASK] per 

annum. The full Anglo-Scottish Ultraspeed delivers 

approximately 30 billion new ASK p.a. 

Cost of capacity 

New annual ASK of capacity delivered per pound of 

capex should be a key criterion for evaluating 

strategic transport investment. With an order of 

magnitude capital cost in the region of £25 – £29bn 

(including land), each new ASK created by 

Ultraspeed costs between 83 and 97 pence. 

Observation to Government. 

The annual GVA underperformance of the three 

Northern Way regions compared to the English 

average is £29bn 47 . The one-off costs of 

implementing Ultraspeed are in the same £29bn 

order of magnitude. A clearer invitation to rectify 

structural macro-economic deficit through 

strategic transport is hard to envisage!

As a comparator, if one takes a capital cost of £8bn 

for the West Coast Main Line upgrade and a 

(generous) figure of 1 billion new ASK created, then 

each new ASK delivered cost £8. Whilst a lower 

capex figure may be argued by excluding ‘catch up 

costs’ for previously neglected maintenance, it can 

also be argued that the London-Manchester trunk 

of WCML in 2006 actually has a lower capacity than 

after initial electrification in 1966, due to the inefficient 

use of paths on a 70mph railway by 125mph trains 

with unhelpful stopping patterns and the use of many 

paths by shorter trains. 

Strictly speaking the comparison should be 

Ultraspeed excluding land versus WCML, because 

the WCML upgrade did not involve land purchase. 

On this measure, UKU delivers 1 ASK of new 

transport capacity for 53 pence, versus between £8 

per new ASK for WCML (assuming 1bn new ASK 

created) and £32 per new ASK (assuming 0.25bn 

new ASK created). 

Whatever numbers one adopts in the specific case 

of WCML the generic principle holds: attempting to 

retrofit new technology over old (and intensively used) 

infrastructure is always more expensive than building 

a new system. 

Turning to TGV-style high speed rail on a 

strategic scale, there is another important point. 

Some investments, which might traditionally be 

viewed and assessed on a self-contained basis, 

should more correctly be evaluated as part of the 

larger project, if they are fundamentally 

interconnected with them. 

We expressly make the case that if, for instance, 

a TGV-style high speed rail route proposed using 

existing infrastructure to access classic rail stations 

in cities, then the costs of providing the additional 


138 

capacity on the (often already massively congested) 

city approaches should be included in the cost. As 

should the cost of upgrading and automating classic 

rail signalling and control systems to the ERTMS 

Level 3 standards safety demands. 

It is worth noting that the only TGV-style route yet 

built in the UK [CTRL] found it impossible to use 

existing infrastructure to approach London, the high 

speed alignment had to be built all the way in to the 

city. Given their well known capacity constraints, 

one suspects that this would also be the case in 

Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds and Edinburgh. 

French TGV economics – based on using classic 

infrastructure at marginal cost for the ‘final 10 km’ 

– is unlikely to work in the UK, so UK-specific real 

and full costs must be included when evaluating 

such projects. 

Consideration for Government. 

Regarding both the above points, prioritise the creation 

of new transport capacity and its cost-effective delivery 

in evaluation metrics for strategic transport. New ASK 

per £1 of capex a helpful high level measure. 

Connectivity & Speed 

To support strategic rebalancing, strategic transport 

investment on a national scale must be capable, 

when fully implemented, of air-beating 48 or air- 

competitive journey times as follows: 

• North:South high speed connections from 

Heathrow and London to the Midlands in 

around 30 minutes; and 

• onward to Manchester/Liverpool in an hour 

(including stopping in the Midlands and the 

braking/acceleration penalty of doing so). 

• East:West connections (at a 

‘superegion-making’ level) along the 

Northern Way spine from Merseyside to 

Tyneside in an hour, stopping in Manchester, 

Yorkshire and Teesside en route.

• Cross-border connection to Glasgow via 

Edinburgh (or vice versa) so that the final 

Scottish destination is reached from London 

in under three hours 

• Connections at a ‘region-making’ level 

between key city pairs (e.g. Glasgow – 

Edinburgh, Tees – Tyne or Liverpool – 

Manchester in around 15 minutes) 

In order to deliver the maximum benefit on a national 

level (leaving aside the obvious advantages of 

operational efficiency) all the above should be 

delivered with one system. That is to say one route 

of the shortest possible length and one fleet of 

vehicles capable of both high cruising speeds 

between regions and rapid accelerate – high speed 

– brake cycles between adjacent city-pairs. 

Providing East:West trans-Pennine connection 

creates the Northern Way super-region with, as we 

have seen, dramatic macro-economic results. 

Building this connection as an integral part of the 

North:South infrastructure avoids having costly, 

separate or branching routes to NorthWest, 

NorthEast and Yorkshire (as modelled by Atkins for 

the SRA/DfT high speed rail study). Such a 

fragmented approach does nothing to assist whole- 

North agglomeration and competitiveness. It would 

require up to approximately 200km more 

infrastructure (depending on alignment). Worse, it 

risks actually increasing South – North imbalance, by 

making it easier to commute to 21st Century London 

from the North whilst leaving rail links across the 

North firmly in the 19th Century. It also fails to open 

up numerous inter-regional journey opportunities 

(Teesside – Birmingham, or Glasgow – Newcastle for 

example) which a North:South + East:West 

integrated solution provides. 

The existing DfT metrics for the financial value of time 

(both waiting and in vehicle, factored for business 


139 

and leisure travel) provide a good basis for evaluating 

the benefits of speed. For information, using these 

metrics, Ultraspeed will produce journey-time savings 

benefits of approximately £2bn per annum 


Agree predictive metrics for forecasting strategic 

macro-economic benefit flowing from strategic 

transport investment at city, regional, super-regional 

and national levels. Then evaluate infrastructure 

investment against these metrics, positively weighting 

a given project’s ability to deliver maximum economic 

benefit and the maximum with minimum quantum of 


By extension this implies establishing benchmarks 

for journey times between specified locations – some 

terminal-to-terminal and some origin–destination 

pairs requiring specified numbers of modal shifts. 

Positively weight higher speed, given its importance 

in creating agglomeration effects. Failure to provide 

given connections (for instance where the network 

architecture of the infrastructure layout itself prohibits) 

should be strongly negatively weighted. 

Operational efficiency and wholelifecycle 

economics 

Strategic infrastructure has a strategic lifespan. The 

railways of the 1830s to 1870s are still with us today: 

the original capital cost of their putting them into 

service is now but a small proportion of the entire 

cost of keeping them in service, maintaining them 

and upgrading them over time. 

Today’s strategic transport investment will also deliver 

its benefit over a decades-to-century horizon, with 

the PPPs that pay for it presumably aligned with 

at least the front-end of this timescale. Over this 

extended chronology, the whole-lifecycle cost of 

operating and maintaining the project will be more

important than the capital cost of building the system 

(both in a providing a firm operational underpinning 

to the PPP and in ensuring the sustainable 

commerciality of operation which will attract sound 

operating partners into long term PPP commitment 

in the first place). 

It is therefore imperative that whole-lifecycle costs 

are evaluated rigorously when assessing projects’ 

viability. A key measure is whole-system 

maintenance costs per ASK (i.e. the costs of 

maintaining all infrastructure and vehicles per 

seat-km of available capacity created by the system). 

For information, Ultraspeed whole-system 

maintenance costs are approximately 36p per ASK. 

By comparison, a contemporary best practice high 

speed rail system – using ICE3 – is approximately 

£1.18 per ASK. This is simply a benefit of non- 

contact technology with no major moving parts 

versus the wear and tear of 20th century wheel-on-rail. 

Over and above this, the costs of ongoing fleet 

refurbishments etc should be accounted for. 

Another useful measure – which provides a ready 

evaluation of the underlying operational efficiency, 

and hence cost-effective PFI-ability of, any proposed 

system – is total O&M costs as a percentage of 

total traffic revenue. For information, Ultraspeed’s 

total O&M costs are approximately 35% total traffic 

revenue, for airlines the proportion is typically 90%+. 

Genuine figures for UK rail are impossible to produce, 

given the complex system of intercharging between 

TOCs, ROSCOs, Network Rail and Government. 

Finally another helpful metric is ‘availability for 

service’. This measure is especially vital in a PFI 

structure which is based on ‘availability payments’, 

where the franchisee (or Nominated Undertaking in 

Hybrid Bill terms) receives a pre-determined, fixed 


140 

and predictable payment in return for constructing 

the system to given schedules and standards and the 

operating to a tightly defined operational regime. For 

information, the Transrapid system Ultraspeed will use 

is currently operating at 99.9989% availability in China. 


Ensure whole-lifecycle costing of the whole system 

is fully evaluated in assessing major infrastructure 

schemes (i.e. the entire costs of maintaining in 

normative operational condition for a desired overall 

duration all of the infrastructure, the vehicles that use 

it, and the ICT which controls both). Also ensure 

operational efficiency is fully evaluated, using income: 

cost and availability measures. 

Safety 

A basic premise for future strategic transport 

investment, both to maximise the effective use of 

capacity and for safety reasons per se, must be 

that traffic should be under automated control and 

that human error should be engineered out as far 

as possible in the fundamental design of the system 

itself. This removes both the predominant cause of 

accidents and the cause that is least susceptible to 

eradication by post hoc engineering or education. 

For information, Ultraspeed will be under the highly 

automated, multiply redundant, failsafe control of the 

Transrapid Operational Control System (OCS) 49 . Only 

three control centres with a 3-shift total of 46 oversight 

staff are required to operate the entire Anglo-Scottish 

system. There are no drivers. Guidance, propulsion, 

power supply, signalling, route-setting and dynamic 

feedback are one system in Transrapid, whereas they 

are fragmented and in inherently less safe human 

hands in all other transport systems. Given this holistic 

integration of OCS functions, Transrapid already sets 

the absolute world benchmark for transport safety.


Agree benchmark for system safety at highest 

technically possible standards of automation, integra- 

tion, fail-safety and redundancy. When evaluating 

projects, include the costs of upgrading systems to 

this standard where they do not already provide it. 

Again this must include costs of system upgrades on 

sections of classic infrastructure used by generally 

high speed systems. 

Impacts on other transport 

modes including capacity 

liberation, investment deferral and 

environmental impact reduction. 

Britain‘s international air links are vital to national 

competitiveness in the global economy, but capacity 

at all London airports is at a premium. Also domestic 

air services into Heathrow which provide connections 

to/from international services are frequently 

uneconomic and make extremely inefficient use of 

capacity at that airport. Congestion on the ground at 

Heathrow also means that gate-to-gate journey times 

from there to Manchester (for instance) are often 

slower than HSGT could provide. 

Strategic transport investment must integrate 

Britain’s key world gateway, Heathrow, with the 

national economy beyond London and the South 

East. It must also support the broadly-shared policy 

objective of promoting the growth of Manchester 

Airport as a world-league gateway in the North and 

for the North. This will in itself reduce over time the 

number of ‘dog-leg’ journeys that involve a Heathrow 

connection and is of vital importance in promoting 

self-standing Northern economic growth. Similarly, 

one or both of metropolitan Scotland’s main airports 

should be directly connected to both the Edinburgh 

and Glasgow ends of the central belt catchment. 


141 

Any strategic transport investment will impact on the 

existing low-to-medium speed rail network. There 

will be some fall in demand, and revenue from, longer 

distance intercity services where HSGT offers direct 

competition, but considerable capacity will be 

liberated for both more path-efficient ‘semi-fast’ 

services with denser intermediate stopping patterns 

and for freight. There will be some cost savings from 

service reduction, but, on the other hand, decreased 

revenues. This shown discussed in detail at Table 8. 

Environmental benefits can be expected in hundreds 

of million pound range in NPV terms, as discussed 

previously. 


Agree benchmarks/targets for passenger-km to be 

transferred from short haul air to ground transport. 

Agree benchmarks/targets for other mode 

transfers and capacity liberation on other modes. 

Agree benchmarks/targets for net overall transport 

emissions reductions post-implementation. 

Regarding air integration (the single most-important 

benefit UK domestic strategic transport can deliver) 

set benchmarks for access times to airports. 

Apply all the above to evaluation of strategic 

transport projects. 

To ensure best possible macro-economic results, 

benchmarks should be set at the highest achievable 

(i.e. Ultraspeed) level. For information, Ultraspeed 

places the entire Northern Way corridor (from 

Merseyside to Tyneside) within 15 to 50 minutes of 

Manchester Airport, both Edinburgh and Glasgow 

within 10 minutes of Edinburgh Airport. Liverpool, 

Manchester, the Midlands and the Thames Gateway 

are between 20 and 60 minutes from Heathrow. 

Naturally modelling should include terminal-to-airport

times on a core layer, with local origin-to-airport trips 

on a second layer. 

Air integration benchmarks and targets should also 

include freight. For information, whilst Ultraspeed 

does not convey heavy freight or maritime containers 

(merely frees up capacity on the rail network for such 

traffic) it is designed to accept standard airfreight 

containers, trans-shipped direct from aircraft and to 

transport them at 500km/h. The same goes for mail, 

courier and high value light freight and logistics. 

With the entire Ultraspeed network within 60 minutes 

one of the connected major air freight hubs, 

Ultraspeed would give Britain the fastest, and best 

integrated distribution system for time-critical freight 

of any nation on earth. This on its own is a 

substantial locational advantage for the entire UK 

(and particularly so for those regions who air-hub 

access is currently slow). 


Agree benchmarks for freight impact of strategic in- 

frastructure investment (both capacity liberated on rail 

and network-intrinsic). Apply in evaluating projects. 


142


Conclusion: draft matrix for evaluation of 

strategic transport projects 

Summarising all the above, we urge Government to apply broad strategic economic metrics when evaluating 

strategic transport projects, in addition to traditional transport economics, cost:benefit analyses and measures 

of PFI-ability. We propose a draft matrix for this purpose. We express this in order of magnitude terms, either 

annually, or using 30 year, 6% NPV terms where relevant (60 year 3.5% terms roughly double the NPV 

numbers). We use informed estimates for non-UKU commentary. 

Evaluation items Target Order of Magnitude Commentary / indicative levels 

Strategic economic impact metrics 

Connectivity metrics 

Transform economic potential of 

connected city-regions and lift overall 

national GDP 

Number of agreed target city 

interconnects created 

÷ total km infrastructure 

143 

Example: remove GVA undershoot for 

North England 

= ~£400bn(!) +NPV 

UKU:~10/800 = 0.0125 

TGV (Opt 8): ~5/1000 = 0.0050 

Capacity 10s of billions new ASK p.a. UKU ~30 bn ASK 

Costs of capacity £1 per ASK UKU sub-£1 per ASK 

Speed metrics 

Time saving metrics 

Max speed ÷ total km infrastructure 

required to deliver air-competitive 

journeys on key routes x number of routes 

over which air-competitive or better 

Step change in frequency and journey time. 

Up to 5x rail and 8x road speeds 

UKU: 500/800 x 7 = 4.37 

TGV: 300/1000 x 3 = 0.90 

UKU on DfT value of time metrics: 

~£27bn +NPV 

Impact on other modes Single-digit billions of pass-km transfer mode target broadly neutral NPV 

Environmental impact 100s K-tonnes CO2 reduction p.a. UKU ~£300m +NPV 

Safety impact Reduction in death & injury UKU ~£180m +NPV 

Benchmarks/Targets/Coefficients 

Safety automated, integrated, redundant & failsafe 

O&M sustainability Total O&M costs 35% of revenue 

Air integration 

All key points within 60 mins of major hub. 

Target >1,000 times practical air capacity on 

key routes 

Air freight Seamless transfer & high speed distribution 

UKU = 1.0 

ERTMS 3 = 0.8 

Classic rail = 0.3 

Road = 0.1 


High speed rail = 0.33 


High speed rail = ? 


High speed rail = ? 

It is, of course, a matter for the Review, and for Government, to decide which metrics are selected, and how 

they are weighted and applied. It is vital only that the UK identifies and swiftly delivers those projects which 

build absolute competitive advantage for the UK. 

Whatever the evaluation criteria and however they are weighted, UK Ultraspeed looks forward to meeting 

and beating Government’s expectations. 

06 January 2006.


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1 UK Ultraspeed, based on, among others,: Coopers 

& Lybrand Deloitte (1991), Begg I. (1999); 

PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002), Porter M. E. 

(2003); Martin, R. (2003); ODPM (2003); Llewelyn- 

Davies et. al. (2004); and HM Treasury (2005). 

2 UNCTAD (2005) reports a total of 271 new 

measures were adopted by 102 economies. The 

majority (87percent) of these regulatory changes 

were to make conditions more favourable for 

multinational companies to enter and operate. 

3 Sources for journey times: Transrapid International, 

National Rail Enquiries, AA 

4 Detailed assessments of the UK’s performance are 

set out in DTI Economics Paper No. 6 (2003), DTI: 

Economics Paper No. 3, (2003), OECD Economic 

Survey of United Kingdom, 2005 (2005). 

5 OECD Productivity Database, July 2005. 

6 OECD Productivity Database, July 2005. 

7 Sourced from: IMD (2005), WEF (2005), UNCTAD 

(2005 a) UNCTAD (2005 b) and Ernst & Young (2005). 

8 The EU 10 comprise: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 

Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta. 

9 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002). 

10 Brysch (2004). 

11 UNCTAD FDI database. 

12 Cushman & Wakefield Healey & Baker (October 

2005) and Ernst & Young (July 2005) 

13 The 2005 European Cities Monitor was carried 

out by the market research company Taylor Nelson 

Sofres for Cushman & Wakefield Healey & Baker. 

Taylor Nelson Sofres interviewed Senior Executives 

from 501 European companies, by telephone in 

June/July 2005. 


148 

14 The 2005 European Attractiveness Survey was 

carried out by the market research company CSA for 

Ernst & Young. CSA interviewed 672 international 

business executives by telephone between March 

and April 2005. 

15 Ernst & Young 2005 European Attractiveness 

Survey (July 2005). 

16 Ernst & Young 2005 European Attractiveness 

Survey (July 2005). 

17 Based on data from Office of National Statistics: 

Gross Value Added at current basic prices by region 

1989 to 2004 (2005). 

18 Based on data from Office of National Statistics: 

Gross disposable household income per head 

indices by NUTS2 area at current prices by region 

1989 to 2004 (2005). 

19 The performance of the regions has been 

extensively detailed in Frontier Economics for 

Regional Economic Performance (REP) Team, 

sponsored by HM Treasury, DTI and ODPM 

(September 2004) and for DTI (April 2005). 

20 For example in Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte (1991), 

Llewelyn-Davies (1996), Centre for Economics and 

Business Research and Observatoire de l’Economie 

et des Institutions Locales (1997) Pricewaterhouse- 

Coopers (1998, 2000, 2002), Yeandle M. and 

Berendt A (November 2005). 

21 Cushman & Wakefield Healey & Baker (October 

2005 and September 2004). 

22 The relative performance of the regional cities in the 

UK and Europe is detailed in ODPM (January 2004) 

and ODPM (June 2003). 

23 OECD (October 2005). 

24 DTI (May 2003).

25 The importance of location connectivity was 

argued in ODPM (June 2003 January 2004). 

26 IMD (2005), WEF (2005) both report the UK rates 

poorly on transport infrastructure and infrastructure 

measure, more generally. 

27 DTI (May 2003). 

28 CBI (2005a). 

29 GfK and NOP (2005) survey among businesses 

with over 50 employees and across adults working 

full or part time for the CBI. 

30 For maglev-vs-high speed rail comparison, see UK 

Ultraspeed Factbook (2005) 

31 For supporting argumentation on these matters, 

again see UK Ultraspeed Factbook (2005) 

32 See, for example the studies by effects by 

SACTRA (1999), DoTRS (2002); OECD - IM2 

Working Group (2002), Llewelyn Davies et. al. ( 

2004) and Steer Davies Gleave, 2004. 

33 Steer Davies Gleave (2004) conducted a 

re-evaluation of the WS Atkins appraisal conducted 

for the SRA of the case for a high speed rail line from 

London to northern England and Scotland. Using a 

combination of international good practice appraisal 

criteria and more realistic assumptions for 

construction and operating costs produces a higher, 

although still conservative, benefit to cost ratio of 

2.31 (NPV £16,182 to 2.47 (NPV £18,131) com- 

pared with the WSA base case of 1.29 (NPV £2,469 

to 1.42 (NPV £3,521) 

34 Sourced from the Louis Berger Group, Inc.: 

December 2003 

35 Cost Comparison – Maglev With Freeway, Light 

And Heavy Rail, Baltimore-Washington Maglev 

System Study, KCI Technologies Inc, 2004 


149 

36 KCI, op cit (comparative capacity calculation cited 

in detail below. US and UK standards for the 

provision of adequate/appropriate road capacity 

differ, but the principle illustrated holds – it is 

impossible, in pragmatic terms, to build sufficient 

road space to provide transport capacity equivalent 

to that of a very high speed ground transit system.


150

37 Sourced from ), DoTRS (2002) and Steer Davies 

Gleave (2004). 

38 CURDS and The Railway Consultancy, for ONE 

(2004) cited by UK Ultraspeed in support of 

submissions to the No 10 Policy Directorate, the 

Prime Minister, and the Secretary of State for 

Transport (2004 and 2005) 

39 CURDS, op cit 

40 UK Ultraspeed, based on investor decision based 

research with international investment location 

consultants and broker agencies, and surveys of 

investment location decisions. 

41 Ernst & Young: European Investment Monitor, cited 

by Copenhagen Capacity Sept 2005 

42 CURDS, op cit 

43 For a detailed discussion of the interplay between 

transport and social inclusion see OEDC (2002) and 

McQuaid et. al. (2004). 

44 Transport Statistics Great Britain (2005). 

45 Existing data collected by Climate Care and used 

in appraisals by the Railway Consultancy sources as 

follows: coach and car www.co2.org.uk; train 

Hansard (24/11/05); air www.climatecare.org.uk. 

46 Transport Statistics Great Britain (2005). 

47 The Northern Way Moving Forward: First Growth 

Strategy Report, Sept 2004. 

48 “Air-competitive” is defined as faster from a given 

origin point to a given destination point than travel 

by air including the time taken to access the airport 

or ground transport terminal, check in, board, taxi 

(air only), complete the core journey, taxi (air only), 

disembark, reclaim baggage and onward travel to 

final destination. Ultraspeed is ‘air-beating’ i.e. faster 

point-to-point than scheduled domestic air 


151 

services (even on a narrow ‘gate to gate’ measure) 

over Heathrow-Manchester and Heathrow-Leeds and 

beats ‘Board-to-reclaim-bag’ air timings to Teesside 

and Newcastle. Ultraspeed is ‘air-competitive’ on 

the broader measure define above to Edinburgh and 

Glasgow. 

49 See UK Ultraspeed Factbook

5 


Study on macro-economic and UK 

competitiveness benefits of Ultraspeed 

“UK Ultraspeed would make the UK look like Germany – 

an investor could put their investment in one of 10 places 

that are all equally well connected.” (Location adviser) 

152

About this report 

Report origin 

ILSA was commissioned to consider the business 

response to and the locational competitiveness 

impact of UK Ultraspeed in mid May 2006. 

This Final Report comprises the main output. 

Report structure 

This Final Report comprises: 

• The completed interviews, which are 

described in Section 1. 

• The current location pattern of business 

investment across Europe as a whole, and 

across the UK. This is set out in Section 2. 

• Factors in the business investment 

location decision process and the role 

and the relative influence and importance 

of transport and logistics infrastructure. 

This is described in Section 3. 

• The impact that UK Ultraspeed might 

have in influencing foreign investment flows 

within Europe and across the UK. This is 

presented in Section 4. 

Basis for the findings 

The findings and assessment use a combination of: 

• In-depth interviews with a cross section 

of business intermediaries and investors. 

These interviews were undertaken in 

confidence and on a non attribution basis. 

• Analysis of foreign investment inflow data. 

• Scenario modelling of future foreign 

investment inflows into the UK assuming 

UK Ultraspeed exists and the impact it 

might have on the distribution of foreign 

investment inflows across the UK. 


153 

Summary of findings 

Foreign investment inflows 

Within Europe as a whole, the Western 

European countries receive the majority of foreign 

investment inflows. 

While the UK is positively regarded by investors as 

one of the most favourable locations, its share has 

been falling – from 19.8% in 1995-99 to 14.8% in 

2000-04. 

London and the South East, dominate as the main 

locations for foreign companies. 

The role and importance of transport in location 

decisions 

Labour (especially skills), market access and 

transport and logistics infrastructure are the key 

issues in the investment location decision. 

Services sectors and research, science and 

knowledge based functions are most dependent on 

and influenced by transport and logistics infrastructure 

where face-to-face networking is important. 

Road, rail and air are equally important modes of 

transport for all sectors and activities – air has greater 

significance for those sectors or activities where 

networking is more critical to business operations. 

Investors’ expect the transport and logistics 

infrastructure at any potential location will be of a 

minimum standard, in terms of its key features, to 

meet access and operational requirements – it is

therefore a prerequisite for a location decision. 

The features of transport and logistics infrastructure 

in the location decision are speed of service and 

accessibility, with speed becoming more important in 

the future. 

Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK are 

the most attractive investment locations in Europe 

from a transport and logistics infrastructure 

perspective. In a UK context, London and the South 

East country are considered the most attractive. 

There is a pervasive view that the UK’s transport and 

logistics infrastructure is poor and has been 

deteriorating with rail and road related problems most 

frequently mentioned. 

Investors in the UK would most benefit from the 

development of an efficient, high speed and efficient 

transport solution; although a more radical solution 

may be needed for the UK to re-gain its position as a 

competitive location. 

The potential impact of UK Ultraspeed 

UK Ultraspeed is seen as potentially being able to 

offer the radical solution needed and provide the 

catalyst to provide the basis for a fundamental 

transformation of the UK economy that other 

transport solutions, such as high speed rail, will be 

unable to provide. 

UK Ultraspeed will have a positive impact on the UK’s 

relative attractiveness as an investment location. It 

will also positively affect the relative attractiveness of 

the UK regions outside London, the South East. 

Our scenarios suggest UK Ultraspeed could generate 

between £30.3 billion to £60.7 billion additional foreign 

investment over a baseline projection of £164.5 billion in 

2024. Within the UK, this would be differentially 

distributed in favour of the northern regions. 


154 

Authors’ thanks 

ILSA would like to express our appreciation to all the 

individuals who participated in the interviews for their 

candid views and inputs during our discussions. 

Report authors 

Sean M Duggan 

Director, ILSA Consulting Limited 

in association with 

Andrew Charlton 

Centre for Economic Performance, London School 

of Economics and Oxford Investment Research 

Nicholas Davis 

SAID Business School, University of Oxford and 

Oxford Investment Research


1 About the interview discussions 

Interview characteristics 

ILSA completed 25 in-depth interviews, with 

individuals representing: 

• Business representative organisations 

(4) – providing a perspective on behalf of 

their UK business members. Of particular 

interest from these discussions is their 

policy advocacy position on 

competitiveness and transport related 

issues. 

• Development and investment promotion 

agencies (6). – providing a location supply 

position on the development needs and 

priorities of the UK and their region and 

their experience of factors influencing 

investment to locate specific regions and 

cities in the UK. This included discussions 

with agencies likely to be affected by the 

introduction of UK Ultraspeed. 

• Location advisers (8) – providing insights 

of the location decision process from the 

investor’s perspective, based on their 

experience of the issues that underpin these 

decisions and their knowledge of 

conducting location screening reviews in 

the (in the UK, Europe and globally) for a 

range of different investor clients. A number 

of the advisers interviewed also had 

previous experience of working for 

development and investment promotion 

agencies in the UK and Europe, either 

directly or as a consultant. 

155 

• Investors (7) – affording first hand 

experience of the location decision 

process for the companies they represent, 

the issues considered to make these 

decisions. These discussions also gave 

more specific insights into the role and 

importance they attach to transport and logistics 


These interviews were undertaken in confidence. 

We have reproduced any comments or views from 

individuals recorded during the interviews on a non 

attribution basis. 

A word of caution 

The small number of interview discussions completed 

means that the results should be treated with caution 

and not necessarily wholly representative. 

Nevertheless, the results appear generally consistent 

with other research based on larger survey sample 

sets or wider reviews of existing literature, to which 

this report also refers as appropriate.


2 Foreign investment inflows 

Foreign investment into Europe 

and the UK 

Table 1 shows that within Europe as a whole, the 

Western European countries receive the majority of 

foreign investment inflows. Collectively, countries 

in Western Europe accounted for 94.6% of foreign 

investment inflows over the five year period to 2004. 

This share is a little above that of 94.2% for the 

previous five years to 1999. 

Table 1: Share of foreign direct investment into Europe 

Country 

Western Europe 

% share 

1995-1999 

% share 

2000-2004 

Belgium 16.0 19.2 

United Kingdom 19.8 14.8 

Germany 8.7 13.9 

France 11.4 10.5 

Netherlands 9.4 8.1 

Spain 4.7 7.5 

Ireland 2.9 4.9 

Italy 1.7 3.8 

Switzerland 3.0 2.6 

Sweden 8.6 2.5 

Denmark 2.5 2.1 

Finland 1.7 1.4 

Austria 1.3 1.3 

Portugal 0.6 1.1 

Norway 1.7 0.6 

Greece 0.3 0.2 

Eastern Europe 

Poland 2.1 1.8 

Czech Republic 1.2 1.3 

Hungary 1.5 0.8 

Slovak Republic 0.1 0.5 

Croatia 0.3 0.4 

Estonia 0.1 0.2 

156 

Slovenia 0.1 0.2 

Latvia 0.1 0.1 

Lithuania 0.2 0.1 

Serbia and Montenegro 0.1 0.1 

All Europe Total (percent) 100.0 100.0 

All Europe Total (US$ billion) 1,266.32 1,999.33 

Total Western Europe 94.2 94.6 

Total Eastern Europe 5.8 5.4 

Source: Foreign direct investment net inflow data from 

World Bank. 

In Western Europe, the traditional locations of 

Belgium, UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands 

dominate. The data in Table 1 demonstrate this. 

Taken together, these five countries accounted for 

65.3% of foreign investment into Europe in 1995-99, 

which increased to 65.9% in 2000-04. 

While the UK is positively regarded by investors as 

one of the most favourable locations, its share has 

been falling – from 19.8% in 1995-99 to 14.8% in 

2000-04. 

The UK is still the most successful 

location in Europe and still has a very 

strong location offer. But, in terms of 

mobile projects, the UK is losing its edge 

to other locations, especially in Eastern 

Europe. (Location adviser interview) 

France and the Netherlands, exhibit a similar fall in 

their share of investment inflows. By comparison, 

the share of foreign investment accounted for by 

Germany and Belgium has increased. 

Table 1 also indicates that Spain, Ireland and, to 

a lesser extent Italy, are emerging as competitive 

investment locations in Europe. Together their share

of total inflows increased from 9.6% in 1995-99 to 

16.2% in 2000-04. 

Eastern Europe as a whole has not recorded an 

increasing share of foreign investment inflows. 

However, as Table 2 shows, there is increased 

interest in these countries. This is reflected in the 

growing number of investment projects locating in 

countries such as Poland and Hungary and Romania. 

Table 2: Top 15 European investment locations 

Country 

% 

share 

2003 

FDI 

projects 

2004 


% share 

2004 

Change 

in share 

2003-04 

UK 23.5 563 19.5 -17 

France 16.2 490 17.0 5 

Germany 5.7 164 5.7 -1 

Poland 2.4 148 5.1 115 

Hungary 4.4 139 4.8 9 

Spain 6.2 121 4.2 -32 

Russia 5.6 116 4.0 -29 

Czech Republic 4.7 112 3.9 -17 

Belgium 3.9 107 3.7 -6 

Sweden 3.8 97 3.4 -12 

Romania 1.0 91 3.2 205 

Slovakia 1.2 83 2.9 131 

Ireland 2.4 76 2.6 11 

Denmark 2.3 70 2.4 6 

Bulgaria 1.5 64 2.2 48 

Others 15.2 347 15.4 - 

Total 100.0 2,885 100.0 - 

Source: Ernst & Young in association with CSA: Emerging 

Economies Stake Their Claim, European Attractiveness Survey, 

July 2005 

Table 2 also confirms the predominant position of the 

UK, France and Germany as investment locations in 

Europe. 

157 

Foreign companies’ impact 

in the UK 

Data on foreign direct investment inflows are only 

available at a national level. Nevertheless, it is possible 

to indicate where foreign investment is locating within 

the UK by examining the location of foreign owned 

assets and employment by foreign owned companies. 

The data, shown in Table 3, demonstrates the pre- 

dominance of the UK’s south as a location. Together 

the four southern regions accounted for 77% of 

foreign companies’ total fixed assets and 73% of 

foreign companies’ employment in 2004. Within this, 

London and the South East, dominate as the main 

locations for foreign companies. 

Table 3: Share of foreign capital and jobs (2004) 

UK region 

Total fixed 

assets (£bn) 

of foreign 

firms 

% share 

of foreign 

assets 

Total 

employees 

of foreign 

firms 

London 152.1 43 2,693,626 40 

South East 81.1 23 1,431,429 21 

South West 17.6 5 211,438 3 

Eastern 21.6 6 569,525 9 

W.Midlands 24.7 7 412,735 6 

E. Midland 8.5 2 212,524 3 

North West 13.5 4 283,574 4 

Yorkshire 

and Humber 

24.9 7 636,592 10 

North East 6.2 2 118,301 2 

Scotland 7.2 2 130,327 2 

Total 357.5 100 6,700,071 100 

Regional totals 

South 272.4 76 4,906,018 73 

Midlands, 

North, 

Scotland 

85.1 24 1,794,053 27 

% share 

of foreign 

employment 

Source: Aggregates from foreign firm data from database of 

foreign investors in the UK. Data includes all majority foreign 

owned firms with more than 10 employees.


3 The role and importance of transport 

in location decisions 

Issues in foreign inward investment 

location decisions 

The location decision process usually involves 

assessment of a number of different location issues. 

At the fundamental level, one constant location 

requirement that investors look for is political and 

economic stability. Investors will also look for open, 

coherent and transparent economic, industry and 

investment policies. In combination, these provide an 

operating environment in which the investor is able to 

make long-term planning and investment decisions. 

Regulation and the policy environment 

are the biggest factors when we look at 

where to invest. (Investor interview) 

Beyond these considerations, a consistent set of 

location issues is evident. A list of these in broad 

order of importance is set out in Table 4. 

Table 4: Common investment location decision issues 

Location criteria Main location issues 

Market Size, nature and purchasing capacity 

of demand at the location and the 

surrounding economic ‘hinterland’ – 

the market. 

Communications 

and transportation 

Openness to trade and investment. 

Existence of clusters of foreign 

investors or activity. 

Availability, quality and cost of 

communications and transport 

infrastructure (road, rail, port, air) – 

supports market access. 

Labour issues Availability, quality, flexibility and 

cost of labour. 

Operating 


Availability and quality of education and 

training facilities. 

Issues of productivity, turnover and 

militancy/industrial relations can be 

second order considerations. 

Availability, quality and cost of basic 

utilities (electricity, gas, water, waste 

management, etc.). 

158 

Property Location, range, availability and quality 

of land and/or property. 

Property costs and contractual 

conditions. 

Nature, availability and quality of 

property ‘catalyst’ projects. 

Supplier access Availability, quality and cost of suppliers 

for critical inputs. 

Taxation and 

incentives 

Environment 

and quality of life 

factors 

Level of corporate taxation. 

Availability and nature of specific grants, 

low-interest loans, tax breaks or other 

offsets. 

Availability and quality of the physical 

and social facilities and their attractiveness 

– especially for expatriate staff and 

staff recruitment. 

Cost of living - including housing and 

schooling. 

Source: ILSA case experience and literature review. 

The composition and importance attached to these 

location issues will vary depending on the type of 

investor and their: 

• stage in the decision process 

• country and cultural background 

• industrial and commercial activity and 

characteristics. 

All of these factors should be important 

to any company. The weight of each 

factor varies from firm to firm, and 

depends upon such variables as the type 

of product or service being manufactured 

and the size of the company. 

(Location adviser interview). 

The results of the interview discussions in Table 5 

are broadly consistent with the issues listed in 

Table 4. These emphasise the importance of labour 

(especially skills), market access and transport 

and logistics infrastructure as key issues in the 

location decision.

Table 5: Views on the most important factors influencing investment 

location decisions 

Location issue % of responses 

Labour 80 

Market access 72 

Transport & logistics infrastructure 64 

Property/land 44 

Policy/tax environment 36 

Other infrastructure 24 

Quality of life 20 

Investment promotion 13 

Source: Interview responses. 

A review of the importance of transport in investment 

location decisions for the Department for Transport 

(January 2004), comes to a similar conclusion about 

investment location issues and the relative role of 

transport infrastructure. 1 This suggests that wider 

empirical research in the UK highlights market 

access, skilled labour business property and 

transport links as key drivers of business location. 

It also argues that market access and skilled labour 

are generally the most important factors, especially 

for higher value adding companies and that transport 

reinforces this by facilitating access to workers. 

1 McQuaid R.W., Greig M., Smyth A. and Cooper J: 

The Importance of Transport in Business’ Location Decisions, 

for UK Department for Transport, January 2004 

Transport and logistics 

infrastructure dependent sectors 

For some sectors and functions, transport and 

logistics infrastructure has a greater influence on the 

location process. Interviewees were therefore asked 

about what they thought were likely to be most 

dependent on this kind of infrastructure. 

Our discussions suggest services sectors and 

research, science and knowledge based functions 

are most dependent on and influenced by transport 

and logistics infrastructure (Table 6). The important 


159 

issue identified here is that these activities, and to 

a lesser extent multinational and HQ functions, are 

more reliant on face-to-face networking and have a 

tendency to cluster in particular locations, as a result. 

Table 6: Transport and logistics dependent sectors/activities 

Sector/activity % of responses 

Business/financial services 25 

Research/science/knowledge based 21 

Multinationals/HQ functions 13 

Transport/logistics and warehousing 13 

Delivery dependent/FMCG 13 

IT based 8 

In-bound tourism 8 


For all of these sectors and functions, our discussions 

highlight the relative importance of different modes of 

transport and logistics infrastructure available. Road, 

rail and air are considered equally important (Table 7). 

Table 7: Most important mode of transport and logistics infrastructure 

Mode of transport and logistics 


% of responses 

Road 33 

Rail 30 

Air – especially international 28 

Sea – for particular types of sector/activity 4 

Multi modal links 2 

Local/urban – intra-city 2 


For air infrastructure, our discussions also suggest 

that this will be of greater significance for those 

sectors or activities where networking is more critical 

to business operations (e.g. services and knowledge 

activities). Road and rail infrastructure, while equally 

relevant for all sectors, is seen as more important for 

manufacturing and distribution related activities. 

The decision by the Royal Bank of Scotland to locate 

its new headquarters near Edinburgh Airport is a

clear indication of the importance of air connectivity. 

(Business representative organization interview) 

Where sectors and activities with a high reliance on 

transport and logistics infrastructure, our discussions 

suggest this will be further reinforced over time. 

Transport will become more of an 

important issue as a lot more high-end 

activity occurs, requiring more face to face 

contact and hence more executive travel. 

(Location adviser interview) 

Our discussions also highlight an unusual 

characteristic of transport and logistics infrastructure 

as an investment location issue. It appears investors’ 

expectations are that the transport and logistics 

infrastructure at any potential location will be of a 

minimum standard, in terms of its key features, to 

meet access and operational requirements. As a 

result, it can appear that transport and logistics 

issues rate as a secondary issue. However, the 

reality is that such issues need to be met as a 

prerequisite for a location decision, especially where 

there are equally competitive location alternatives. 

Transport and logistics infrastructure is 

never the primary criteria for investors 

but there’s an expectation that its there. 


A similar observation also emerged from a MORI 

survey for the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 

(2003). 2 This found that more than 85% of senior 

business people believe that the standard, expressed 

in terms of quality, of transport infrastructure is an 

important consideration in deciding where to invest. 

An equivalent GfK NOP survey (2005), also for the 

CBI, reported 97% of business respondents 

regarded transport as very important or important to 

their operations. 3 

2 Reported in Confederation of British Industry: The UK as a 

place to do business: is transport holding the UK back? 

October 2003. 

3 Confederation of British Industry: The business of transport, 

November 2005. 


160 

Important features of transport and 

logistics infrastructure 

Our discussions examining the features of transport 

and logistics infrastructure of importance to the 

location decision suggest that speed of service and 

accessibility are the most critical (Table 8). Reliability, 

cost and interconnectivity (between different modes 

of transport), while broadly equivalent in order of 

importance, rate less highly. Availability and quality 

are of least important to investors. 

Transport is not generally a key cost to 

businesses, especially if you are talking 

about moving people around – it’s a 

marginal cost, a second order condition. 


Table 8: Most important features of UK transport and logistics infrastructure 

for investors – current 

Transport and logistics features % of responses 

Speed of service 64 

Accessibility 60 

Reliability 48 

Cost 44 

Interconnectivity 44 

Availability 24 

Quality 16 


Table 9 shows that in the future the most important 

features of the UK’s transport and logistics 

infrastructure for location decision purposes will 

remain broadly the same, in order of priority. 

However, the issue of speed will become more 

important factor relative to the other features.

Table 9: Most important features of UK transport and logistics infrastructure 

for business – future 

Transport and logistics features % of responses 

Speed of service 68 

Reliability 36 

Accessibility 36 

Cost 32 

Interconnectivity 28 

Quality 24 

Availability 20 


Attractive locations for transport 

and logistics infrastructure 

When asked to identify the most attractive locations 

from a transport and logistics infrastructure perspective, 

the interviewees were consistent in suggesting Western 

Europe countries were the most attractive (Table 10). 

In particular, they identified the traditional recipients of 

foreign investment as being among the most attractive 

i.e. Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK. This 

is largely consistent with the foreign investment inflow 

across Europe in Table 1. 

In contrast, Eastern European countries were not 

generally considered attractive from a transport and 

logistics perspective. 

Table 10: Most attractive location in Europe in terms of transport and 


Most attractive European location % of responses 

Western Europe 84 

Germany 20 

France 17 

Netherlands 12 

UK 12 

Belgium 7 

Ireland 5 

Switzerland 5 

Finland 2 

Italy 2 

Denmark 2 

Eastern Europe 14 


161 

Poland 5 

Czech Republic 2 

Hungary 2 

Eastern Europe – country not specified 5 


The results in Table 10 are consistent with a CSA 

survey of international investors for Ernst & Young. 

This identified the same four countries as their 

preferred location based on transport and logistic 

factors, with Germany ahead because of its central 

location in Europe. 4 

4 Ernst & Young in association with CSA: Emerging Economies 

Stake Their Claim, European Attractiveness Survey, July 2005 

In a UK context, locations in the south of the country 

are considered the most attractive. Nearly half of 

interviewees identify London, in particular, as the 

most attractive location for transport and logistics 

infrastructure. This suggests a similar pattern to 

distribution of foreign companies’ assets and 

employment shown in Table 3. 

A number of northern locations were also identified 

as attractive locations, with Manchester most 

frequently mentioned. Interestingly, interviewees did 

not mention Scotland as an attractive location. 

Table 11: Most attractive location in the UK in terms of transport and 


Most attractive UK location % of responses 

The south 66 

London 49 

South East 15 

M25 2 

The north 33 

Birmingham 10 

East Midlands 2 

Manchester 15 

North 2 

North West 2 

Newcastle 2 

Source: Interview responses.

Gaps and weaknesses in the 

UK transport and logistics 


Our discussions reveal a pervasive view that the UK’s 

transport and logistics infrastructure is poor and has 

been deteriorating. Linked to this is a concern that the 

situation is making business more difficult and part of 

the reason why investors are increasingly considering 

Europe as a location for future investment. 

All too often transport fails in the UK. 

European competitors are renowned for 

having a reliable transport system. 


Table 12 sets out the variety of reasons as the cause 

of the UK’s poor transport and infrastructure 

performance. Most interviewees point to an 

infrastructure that was increasingly unfit for purpose 

in a modern and internationally competitive economy. 

This is seen as reflecting a combination of gradual 

deterioration, overuse and increasing congestion. 

The UK’s transport system at the moment 

is pathetic, it’s beyond pathetic it’s tragic. 

(Investor interview) 

Rail and road related problems were most frequently 

mentioned during our discussions. By contrast, the 

air and sea infrastructure was rarely mentioned 

suggesting an adequate level of satisfaction with 

these transport modes. 

Table 12: Gaps and weaknesses in the UK’s transport and 


Identified Weaknesses % of responses 

General weaknesses 38 

Overall poor/deteriorating/limited/weak/ 

unreliable 

Fragmented 7 

Underinvestment 2 

Lack of integrated planning/poor planning 2 

Rail related 31 


27 

162 

Rail – generally 17 

Rail infrastructure – inconvenient /poor 7 

Rail – congestion 5 

Rail – poor regional services 2 

Road related 24 

Road – congestion 15 

Road – generally 7 

Road – policy related 2 

Air related 2 

Air – regional connections to Europe/US 2 

Sea related 2 

Sea – cost/reliability 2 


The responses on rail related gaps and weaknesses 

in Table 12 reflect other evidence pointing to the UK’s 

relatively poor transport and logistics infrastructure. The 

latest Global Competitiveness Report, for example, 

ranks the UK as 25th of 117 countries in terms of 

railway infrastructure development. 5 This places it 

below many of its main European location 

competitors (France, Germany, the Netherlands and 

Belgium rank 3rd, 4th, 9th and 11th respectively) and 

even below emerging competitors in Eastern Europe 

(the Czech Republic is ranked 11th and the Slovak 

Republic is ranked 22nd). 

More generally, interviewee’s concerns are similar to 

those reported by the CBI, which also argues that 

the UK’s transport systems are poor and in decline. 

The CBI regards improvement of the UK transport 

infrastructure as second in the list of 10 priorities to 

improve the UK’s competitiveness. 6 

Transport in the UK is just generally 

poor quality – there is a genuine need 

to invest in transport infrastructure. 


5 World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Report 

2005-2006 

6 Confederation of British Industry: The business of transport, 

November 2005 and Confederation of British Industry: Transport 

policy and the needs of the UK economy, March 2005

UK transport and logistics 

infrastructure changes needed 

Most of the discussion on potential improvements to 

the transport and logistics infrastructure that would 

benefit investors centres on the development of an 

efficient, high speed and efficient transport solution. 

Interviewees typically expressed this in terms of high 

speed rail. This is seen as a minimum necessary 

response to support the UK’s competitiveness with 

other locations. 

The current transport infrastructure is not 

hindering growth, but its not helping either 

– there has to be radical and new thinking 

about transport. (Business representative 

organization interview) 


163 

However, such is the state of the UK’s transport 

system, that many interviewees consider a high 

speed rail solution is insufficient. Some suggested 

that it was time to invest in a more radical solution 

– radical enough not just to maintain the UK’s 

competitiveness as a location, but to put it into a 

leading position. 

Doing more of the same (in terms of 

transport) is not sufficient – there needs 

to be something radical. (Location 

adviser interview)


4 The potential impact of UK Ultraspeed 

Responses to the UK Ultraspeed 

proposal 

After seeing UK Ultraspeed presentation material 

during the discussions, interviewees regard 

UK Ultraspeed as potentially being able to offer the 

radical solution needed. 7 Although subject to 

debate, interviewees see UK Ultraspeed as providing 

a catalyst for change by: 

• giving the UK a differentiator over other 

competing locations 

• giving investors more location options 

within the UK outside the London and the 

South East 

• providing the basis for the development of 

cluster based economic centres of gravity in 

the Midlands, the North and Scotland to 

compete with London and the South East 

• bringing into use underused assets, 

such as labour skills, outside London 

and the South East and simultaneously 

reducing capacity constraints within 

London and the South East. 

The UK has to be at the forefront of 

transport technology to maintain its 

competitiveness … Maglev is a leapfrog 

technology that will make the UK 

vastly more competitive in the 

international market for FDI. 


Collectively, these changes are seen as providing 

the basis for a fundamental transformation of the UK 

economy that other transport solutions, such as high 

speed rail, will be unable to provide. 

164 

UK Ultraspeed presents an elegant 

solution that TGV will never be able to 

provide. (Development and investment 

promotion agency interview) 

7 ILSA gave interviewees a copy of the UK Ultraspeed summary 

publication and the UK Ultraspeed Factbook. ILSA also presented 

the UK Ultraspeed Strategic Economics video on DVD 

during the discussions. 

Potential changes for the UK 

Our interviews provide the basis for considering the 

impact that UK Ultraspeed might have for the UK as 

an investment location relative to Europe. 

UK Ultraspeed is more transformational 

than just transport – it would 

fundamentally change the way people 

see the UK. (Development and 

investment promotion agency interview) 

The results in Table 13 suggest that UK Ultraspeed 

will have a positive impact on the UK’s relative 

attractiveness as an investment location. 

Table 13: Attractiveness of the UK relative to Europe if UK Ultraspeed existed 

UK attractiveness % of responses 

Much more attractive 24 

More attractive 36 

Slightly more attractive 32 

No difference 8 

Less attractive 0 


Potential changes in the 

UK’s regions 

The results in Table 14 suggest that UK Ultraspeed 

will also positively affect the relative attractiveness of

the UK regions outside the south (London, the South 

East, South West and Eastern regions). The interview 

respondents were unwilling or unable to make further 

distinctions on the impact that UK Ultraspeed might 

have for specific UK regions. 

It (UK Ultraspeed) makes a profound 

difference in the UK context – it 

competitively opens up locations 

(outside London and the South East). 

(Development and investment promotion 

agency interview) 

Table 14: Attractiveness of the UK’s north relative to the south if UK 

Ultraspeed existed 

Attractiveness of the north vs the south % of responses 

Much more attractive 48 

More attractive 21 

Slightly more attractive 24 

No difference 8 

Less attractive 0 


Implications for future foreign 

investment inflows 

Implications for the UK 

The north-south split is currently 80-20; 

it’s potentially 60-40 or 50-50 with 

something like Ultraspeed. 


Based on current foreign investment inflow trends, 

we have developed three parallel scenarios 

estimating foreign investment inflows into the UK, 

with 2024 as a nominal future date. 

Baseline Scenario 

Our Baseline Scenario provides a trend estimate 

calculated from the global growth rate of foreign 

investment applied to Europe. 

We assume that UK Ultraspeed investment does not 

take place and that the UK will continue to attract a 


165 

declining share of foreign investment within Europe. 

The rate of the UK’s decline is based on the average 

decline from 1995-99 to 2000-04 set out in Table 1. 

A discount value of 0.33 has also been applied to 

reflect a more gradual decline in the UK’s 

attractiveness over time. 

Scenario A 

Scenario A assumes that UK Ultraspeed takes places 

and makes the UK more competitive as a location for 

foreign investment relative to Europe. 

In this scenario, our estimate of the flow of foreign 

investment resulting from the UK being more 

competitive is based on the twin assumptions that: 

• 10% of foreign investment flows into Europe 

are mobile (i.e. not already tied to a specific 

location because of M&A or particular 

supplier considerations). This proportion 

of foreign investment could, therefore, 

potentially switch to the UK. 

• The UK will attract a percentage of this 

Scenario B 

mobile investment based on the proportion 

of our interview responses indicating that 

UK Ultraspeed would make the UK much 

more attractive (24% of responses reported 

in Table 13). 

Scenario B also assumes that UK Ultraspeed takes 

places and makes the UK more competitive as a 

location for foreign investment relative to Europe. 


investment resulting from the UK being more 

competitive is based on the twin assumptions that: 

• 20% of foreign investment flows into Europe 

are mobile (i.e. not already tied to a specific 

location because of M&A or particular 

supplier considerations). This proportion 

of foreign investment could, therefore, 

potentially switch to the UK.

• As in Scenario A, the UK will attract a 

percentage of this mobile investment based 

on the proportion of our interview responses 

indicating that UK Ultraspeed would make 

the UK much more attractive (24% of 

responses reported in Table 13). 

UK foreign investment inflow 

estimates 

Using these assumptions, our estimates in Table 15 

suggest that: 

• the UK will receive just over £164.5 billion 

foreign investment in the Baseline Scenario 

• in Scenario A, UK Ultraspeed will add £30.3 

billion (18.4%) to the Baseline inflow 

• in Scenario B, UK Ultraspeed will add £60.7 

billion (63.8%) to the Baseline inflow. 

Table 15: Scenario projections of inward investment flows to the UK (2024) 

UK Without 

UKU Baseline 

(£bn) 

UK foreign 

investment 

inflow total 

Additional UK 

foreign 

investment 

inflow 

attracted 

by UK 



Scenario A 

(£bn) 



Scenario B 

(£bn) 

164.5 194.8 225.1 

na 30.3 60.7 

Source: ILSA analysis using UNCTAD foreign investment inflow 

data and interview responses. 

Implications within the UK 

I’d say up to 20% of firms with new 

projects could consider other places in 

Britain if Ultraspeed existed. 


ILSA has also developed three parallel scenarios 

estimating how foreign investment inflows in 2024 

might be distributed across the UK’s regions. 

The scenarios use the trend projections for foreign 

investment inflow to the UK set out in Table 15. 

166 

UK Baseline Scenario 

Our UK Baseline Scenario assumes that the foreign 

investment inflow of £164.4 billion in 2024 follows 

the same regional distribution in 2004, as set out 

in Table 3. 

UK Scenario A 

UK Scenario A assumes that UK Ultraspeed takes 

places and makes the UK more competitive as a 

location for foreign investment relative to Europe. 

This adds £30.3 billion in foreign investment inflows 

to the UK Baseline Scenario of £164.4 billion. 


investment within the UK is based on the twin 

assumptions that: 

• The additional foreign investment inflow 

of £30.3 billion represents mobile foreign 

investment (i.e. not already tied to a specific 

UK region because of M&A, links to specific 

elements of infrastructure, particular client 

or supplier locations or because of the 

influence of other restricting factors). 

This foreign investment could, therefore, 

potentially switch to alternative locations in 

the South or the North. 

• The North will differentially attract this 

UK Scenario B 

mobile foreign investment based on the 

proportion of our interview responses 


the North much more attractive (48% 

of responses reported in Table 14). 

The balance of mobile investment follows 

the same regional distribution in 2004, as 

set out in Table 3. 

UK Scenario B also assumes that UK Ultraspeed 

takes places and makes the UK more competitive as 

a location for foreign investment relative to Europe. 

This adds £60.7 billion in foreign investment inflows 

to the UK Baseline Scenario of £164.4 billion.


investment within the UK is based on the twin 

assumptions that: 

• The additional foreign investment inflow 

of £60.7 billion also represents mobile 

foreign investment (i.e. not already tied 

to a specific UK region because of M&A, 

links to specific elements of infrastructure, 

particular client or supplier locations or 

because of the influence of other restricting 

factors). This foreign investment could, 

therefore, potentially switch to alternative 

locations in the South or the North. 

• The North will differentially attract this 

mobile foreign investment based on the 

proportion of our interview responses 


the North much more attractive (48% 

of responses reported in Table 14). 

The balance of mobile investment follows 

the same regional distribution in 2004, as 

set out in Table 3. 

UK regions foreign investment 

inflow estimates 

Transport to and from London and its 

airports is the reason why we’d go to the 

South East next – but if UKU existed, we 

wouldn’t hesitate in heading north, where 

property prices are lower but skills are 

just as readily available. 



167 

Based on these assumptions our estimates in Table 

16 suggest that: 

Under the UK Baseline Scenario, the UK will receive 

just over £164.5 billion foreign investment inflows. 

Of this: 

• the UK’s southern regions account for 

$115.4 billion (70.2%) of total inflows 

• London and the South East maintain its 

economic centre of gravity and account for 

£107.3 billion (65.3%) of total inflows 

• the UK’s northern regions account for £49.1 

billion (29.8%) of total inflows. 

In UK Scenario A, £18.3 billion of the additional £30.3 

billion foreign investment flowing to the UK will be 

differentially distributed across the regions. 

Under this scenario: 

• the UK’s southern regions attracts £126.6 

billion (64.9%) of the total inflows 

• London and the South East economic 

centre of gravity shows a relative decline, 

and account for £117.7 billion (56.0%) of 

total inflows 


billion (35.1%) of total inflows. 

In UK Scenario B, £36.6 billion of the additional 

£60.7 billion foreign investment flowing to the UK will 

be differentially distributed across the regions. 

Under this scenario: 

• the UK’s southern regions attracts £137.5 

billion (61%) of the total inflows 

• London and the South East economic 

centre of gravity shows a relative decline, 

and account for £127.9 billion (56.7%) of 

total inflows 


billion (39.0%) of total inflows.

Table 16: Scenario projections of inward investment flows within the UK (2024) 


Region Without UKU UK Baseline With UKU UK Scenario A With UKU UK Scenario B 

£bn % share £bn % share £bn % share 

London 70.0 42.6 76.7 39.4 83.4 37.0 

South East 37.3 22.7 40.9 21.0 44.5 19.7 

South West 8.1 4.9 8.9 4.5 9.6 4.3 

Eastern 9.9 6.0 10.9 5.6 11.9 5.3 

West Midlands 11.4 6.9 6.7 8.6 22.0 9.8 

East Midland 3.9 2.4 5.7 2.9 7.5 3.4 

North West 6.2 3.8 9.1 4.7 12.1 5.4 

Yorkshire and the Humber 11.5 7.0 16.8 8.6 22.2 9.9 

North East 2.9 1.7 4.2 2.1 5.5 2.5 

Scotland 3.3 2.0 4.9 2.5 6.4 2.8 

Totals 164.5 100.0 194.8 100.0 225.1 100.0 

Additional foreign investment to the 

north from UKU 

na - 18.3 - 36.6 - 

Source: ILSA analysis using UNCTAD foreign investment inflow data and interview responses. 

The pattern of these results is broadly consistent with the modelling results of CURDS (P Benneworth et al) 8 . 

Their work suggests that establishing extremely rapid links, such as UK Ultraspeed provides, between the 

major urban centres of northern England and Scotland (Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh 

and Glasgow) could provide a counter-weight to London. 

The P Benneworth et. al. report also argues, in a similar way to the results set out in Table 16, that the impact 

would have significant positive economic potential implications city locations outside London. In particular, it 

would allow the northern cities to narrow the gap with London. 

8 P Benneworth, D Bradley, D Charles, M Coombes and A Gillespie, The economic geography implications of major improvements 

in rail times between the cities of ‘the North’, CURDS report for One North East, August 2004 

168

6 


Summary of key technological and 

strategic advantages of Ultraspeed 

169


A proven system: chronology of 

Transrapid maglev 

UK Ultraspeed uses the Transrapid magnetic levitation [maglev] system. Tested to aviation standards under 

the most rigorous certification programme ever applied to ground transport, Transrapid is the only system in 

the world safety-certified to carry passengers at up to 500km/h on the ground. 

A sustained, decades-long R&D programme has delivered the world’s fastest, safest, most reliable and most 

advanced high speed ground transport system, as detailed in the timeline below and overleaf. 

1969 

1977 1979 1980 1983 1984 1987 

Research Phase 

Underlying R&D into 

core principles of 

magnetic 

levitation [maglev] 

by German industry, 

to Federal 

Government 

research remit 

1977 

1989 1990 1991 1993 1995 1997 

Development Phase 

Third generation 

Transrapid (07) 

passenger maglev 

enters service. 

First passenger- 

carrying 

Transrapid 

demonstrator 

(TR05) licensed for 

operation. 

Intensive operation 

tests, max 2,476km 

in a single day 

Construction 

begins of world’s 

largest maglev 

R&D and test track 

facility in 

Emsland [TVE]. 

Key technology decision by Federal German Government 

to develop only maglev using long stator linear induction 

motor, the technology which lies at the core of Transrapid. 

Safety case: 

certificate of 

readiness for 

application obtained 

Second generation 

Transrapid (06) 

passenger maglev 

commissioned 

at TVE. 

TR07 attains 

450km/h (280mph) 

& endurance 

running of 1,664 

km non-stop in a 

single day. 

170 

TR06 in 

service 

at TVE. 

TVE 

opened to 

general 

public, for 

80km 

maglev 

trips 

TVE test track 

completed. 

German maglev 

legislation 

completed and 

complied with 

1999 

Fourth-generation 

(pre-series) maglev 

vehicle TR08 enters 

service at TVE.

Nov Nov Nov 

2001 2002 2003 

Full commercial service 

First guideway 

beam erected in 

Shanghai. 

Full speed 

(430km/h +) 

commissioning 

of fifth- 

generation 

(production) 

Transrapid 

maglev vehicles 

in Shanghai 


World record 

(501km/h) for 

commercial ground 

transport set in 

Shanghai during 

shakedown period, 

during which fare 

paying passengers 

were carried in 

normal timetabled 

service. 

Jan 

2004 

Full commercial 

service starts in 

Shanghai, with a 

Transrapid maglev 

leaving each 

terminus station 

every 15 minutes 

at peak times, 

accelerating to 

431km/h and 

decelerating to stop 

in 7m:20s. 

171 

May 

2006 

7 millionth fare-paying passenger 

rides Shanghai system. 

System availability established 

at 99.9%. Timetable 

tolerance ± 1 second. 

Transrapid entered fully automated commercial service 

in Shanghai on New Years Day 2004. At time of writing 

the Shanghai system has delivered 70,901 maglev 

journeys, 2.1 million maglev km and 216 million 

passenger km, whilst over a million have now ridden 

TVE, accumulating tens of millions of passenger km. 

All public operations in Shanghai and at the test track 

have been accomplished with zero accidents.


An advanced system: safety and 

operational benefits 

• Transrapid maglev is the only ground transport 

system in the world to have a whole-system safety 

case, covering vehicle, guideway, propulsion, 

guidance, signalling, positioning feedback and 

operational control. In Transrapid, these are all 

one integrated system, thus totally avoiding the 

fragmentation and interface risks which cause 

accidents and failures in other transport systems. 

• This total fail-safe integration of all aspects of 

Transrapid system design engineers in today levels 

of safety that are significantly in excess of the most 

demanding EU ERTMS aspirations for rail over the 

next 30-50 years (even ERTMS Level 1 could not 

be retro-fitted over the West Coast Main Line and 

was abandoned). The maglev vehicle is a ‘slave’ 

of an intelligent guideway, positioning & control 

system. The guideway is the motor, the signalling 

system and the power supply. No two adjacent 

sections of guideway can be powered-up 

simultaneously. Collision is impossible. Real-time 

feedback and regulation of propulsion power 

supply ensures ultra-precise control over speed 

and separation of vehicles. At any given location a 

Transrapid vehicle will operate within ±1km/h of the 

design speed range for that location. 

• Transrapid maglev is the only high speed ground 

transport system in the world to have a safety case 

permitting the Transrapid maglev is the only high 

speed ground transport system in the world 

designed always to coast to rest in a pre-planned 

location (station or safe evacuation zone) in the 

event of total power failure. It is also the only 

high speed ground transport system in the world 

designed using the commercial aviation philosophy 

to always reach the next safe point in the event of 

a systems failure. NB: multiple redundant power 

systems prevent such extreme eventualities 

– none has ever occurred in operations. 

172 

This picture of the Chancellor travelling at 431km/h (267mph), with other 

passengers standing, graphically illustrates both the sheer normality and the 

exceptional smoothness of Transrapid in ultra-high-speed maglev service. 

• Transrapid maglev is the only high speed ground 

transport system in the world in which every 

revenue earning passenger service also checks the 

precise alignment of the guideway (to fractions of a 

millimetre, several thousand times a second). 

Standard guideway is designed and engineered to 

require zero major maintenance over an 80 year life 

span. This is a benefit of non-contact technology, 

completely engineering out most of the cost of 

infrastructure maintenance compared to other 

ground transport systems, such as high speed rail. 

• Non-contact maglev technology enables the 

fastest acceleration and braking of any long 

distance mass ground transport system. 

Transrapid reaches 300km/h in 4.2 km and 97 

seconds, typical TGV-style high speed trains can 

take up to 6 minutes and over 21km to reach that 

speed. The maglev can then continue to acceler- 

ate, reaching 500km/h in around 21km in only 4.2 

minutes. This technology-based total 

outperformance of rail, enables the same 

Transrapid network and vehicles to serve both 

longer 100km+ intercity runs (where outright 

cruising speed is decisive) and denser sub-70km 

trips between tightly spaced urban centres. This fits 

Transrapid very closely to UK economic geography.


A comprehensive system: best fit 

with Britain 

UK Ultraspeed route: all major cities along N:S spine connected; E:W links 

included. Approx 800km total infrastructure. Every city connected to every 

other city on network. 

Combining these performance attributes enables 

a comprehensive network, connecting more major 

centres, to be built with less total infrastructure. 

This is best illustrated graphically. This a fundamental 

advantage of 500km/h Transrapid compared to the 

300km/h High Speed Rail proposals advanced by 

The Railway Forum and others – see map right. (Rail 

proposals are all broadly based on the ‘Option 8’ 

solution developed by Atkins for SRA/DfT a few 

years ago) 

In the rail proposals, two fundamental constraints of 

wheel-on-rail HSR (300-330km/h maximum practical 

speed and routing parameters incompatible with 

economic construction across the Pennines) com- 

bine to produce the sub-optimal solution illustrated 

in the map on the right, above. 

173 

Rail proposals: approx 1,000km. Slower to all 

destinations. Requires at least 2x fleet. Only London 

connected to all other cities. 

Not only does the rail solution require up to 200km 

more infrastructure at the capital level, operationally 

it requires a fleet of 25 units to operate a (slower) 

service from Leeds and Manchester. Assuming 15 

minute clockface intervals along two separate routes 

to London and v.v. Ultraspeed’s single route requires 

only 12 maglev units to provide the same frequency 

of service.


An evolving system: projects now 

under development 

In China, where Transrapid maglev is now proven 

by daily operation, the Chinese State Council has 

approved the proposal to build a full-scale intercity 

extension from the current terminus at Long Yang 

Road, directly through the most intensely urbanised 

environment on earth to Shanghai’s South Station, 

and thence via the domestic Airport onward to the 

city of Hangzhou. Total route length will be around 

200km (or London to Derby in UK terms). 

Journey times between the metropolitan centres will 

be around 27 minutes. At present Transrapid and the 

Chinese client side are in detailed negotiation. With 

a phased roll-out likely, the Shanghai World Expo in 

2010 provides a driving deadline. 

In Germany, a connector between Munich and its 

remote FJS Airport completed the final stage of 

public planning consultation in June 2006. This system 

will replace a 45 minute rail journey with a 10 minute 

maglev trip. Service is scheduled to start in 2010. 

In the USA, Baltimore-Washington and a Pittsburgh 

regional system have been developed to the stage of 

full Business, Engineering and Environmental case, 

under the FRA’s Maglev Deployment Programme. A 

Nevada-California project has also been developed, 

as a private sector initiative. From these competing 

projects, one will be chosen to progress. It is a 

testament to the proven Transrapid technology that 

the US Federal Railroad Administration has adopted 

the German system and its safety case as the 

standard for all projects it has shortlisted. 

174 

A Public Private Partnership project is planning a 

Transrapid route in the Netherlands, relieving 

congestion in the densely populated Randstad by 

linking combining several Dutch cities into what 

would be in effect a single super-city. The system 

comprises a roughly 230 km ring link (Amsterdam 

- Schiphol Airport - The Hague - Rotterdam - Utrecht 

- Amersfoort - Almere – Amsterdam). In this dense 

urban application, the system uses Transrapid’s 

outstanding acceleration and braking performance, 

to replace road trips that can take hours on crowded 

motorways with maglev journeys of a few minutes. 

A further strategic Transrapid project is in 

development linking the Gulf states. 

In parallel with these commercial applications, the 

German Federal Government has committed to a 

three year ‘Ongoing Development Programme’, 

under which the next generation of Transrapid 

maglev vehicle will be produced and the decades- 

long process of guideway and control systems 

development continued. This phase of the 

development programme is currently in progress. The 

next-generation vehicle will be delivered in 2007/08.


An appropriate system: best value for Britain 

Applying Transrapid technology to Britain in the UK 

Ultraspeed project is designed to empower Britain’s 

economy and enhance Britain’s environment. 

Capable of phased delivery in UK PFI/PPP context 

Ultraspeed, and the PPP/PFI model underlying it, 

have been designed from the outset to be capable of 

phased delivery. Phasing is essential in order to 

ensure best value by enabling fully competitive 

procurement of construction and project finance. 

The phasing assumed for the purposes of the 

Ultraspeed Whole Life Business Case is as set out 

in the following table. For information, indicative 

scheduling foresees the six phases identified 

being completed by 2033 on a conservative design, 

construction and commissioning schedule, with 

2024 being the earliest possible date for full system 

availability. The following phasing allows for a gradual 

ramp-up from regional and super-regional service 

using 5-car maglev units to 10-car units covering 

intercity distances. 

Phase Route km 

Phase 1 Liverpool – Manchester Apt 40.40 

Phase 2 Manchester Apt – Leeds 72.95 

Phase 3 

Phase 4 

Manchester Apt – Birmingham 

International 

Birmingham Int – LHR and 

Stratford 

128.05 

200.10 

Phase 5 Leeds - Teesside - Newcastle 159.50 

Phase 6 Newcastle - Edinburgh - Glasgow 240.15 

Totals 

841.15 

175 

In reality, actual phasing is likely to be determined 

by a mixture of central and nationally/regionally 

devolved/influenced political decisions, balancing 

strategic transport and economic development 

imperatives with congestion/pollution reduction 

desiderata, nuanced by different regions competing 

to be included on the network. 

Recognising this, the Ultraspeed phasing model is 

flexible: the roll out of phases can be modelled in any 

order. It should be noted that early phases all need 

careful consideration in order to maximise ridership 

and economic development impact in their ‘stand 

alone’ early years, before connection to a larger 

network occurs. 

An advantage of phasing is that construction and 

delivery of a relatively small Stage 1 would permit any 

perceived technology risk to be removed by 

demonstrating fully reliable operation. This would 

reduce and eventually remove any risk premium that 

might be attached to the project finance for later 

stages. Phased delivery also allows for fully 

competitive procurement of the finance, construction 

and operation of the system. 

UK Ultraspeed has been planned on the basis of an 

“Availability Payment” PPP/PFI regime The 

assumption is that no up-front public sector grant 

or similar payment mechanism will be required and, 

subject to confirmation during further study, that the 

availability payment structure could be treated as a 

form of current account expenditure, not

impacting on the PSBR. There are precedents for 

such an approach on the majority of major UK PFI 

infrastructure projects, such as the contractual 

arrangements under PFI hospital concessions where 

“usage” payments have been agreed on a similar 

principal to the proposed availability payment 

structure. 

Value for money would be secured by full a 

competitive process for all generic elements of the 


Key data on phase by phase basis. Q4 2006 cost base. Capex to ±30%. 

Phase km capex 

excl land 

(£m) 

cars 

in 

fleet* 

Ops 

Staff 

Maint 

Staff 

Ops 

staff p.a. 

(£m) 

176 

project, whilst the unavoidably single-source 

elements of maglev technology and associated 

project IPR, for which all PFI bidders would submit 

‘level playing field’ bids, would be subject to the 

usual public accounting scrutiny. 

In all these regards Ultraspeed has been designed 

to deliver Best Value, for Britain. This can be further 

demonstrated, using the indicative phasing above, as 

set out in the following tables. 

Maint Staff p.a. 

(guideway & 

vehicles) £m 

Total Staff 

Costs 

(£m) 

1 40.40 £ 765 30 131 118 £4.75 £4.90 £9.64 £8.66 

2 72.95 £ 2,657 25 83 62 £2.48 £2.37 £4.85 £8.09 

3 128.05 £ 2,869 25 83 74 £2.48 £2.87 £5.35 £9.91 

4 200.10 £ 3,849 100 257 218 £8.12 £8.43 £16.55 £28.34 

5 159.50 £ 2,920 100 231 168 £6.74 £6.24 £12.98 £24.27 

6 240.15 £ 4,963 100 269 258 £8.48 £9.94 £18.41 £31.06 

Key data from above, summarised on cumulative basis 

Phase km 

cumul 

capex 

excl land 

(£m) 

fleet 

(cars) 

Ops 

Staff 

Maint 

Staff 

Total 

staff 

Total staff per 

route-km 

Total Staff 

Costs 

(£m) 

per 

route 

km (£k) 

Avg maint hard 

costs** p.a. (guideway 

& vehicles) £m 

Avg maint hard 

costs p.a. (guideway 

& vehicles) £m 

1 40.40 £ 765 30 131 118 249 6.16 £9.64 238.71 £8.66 214 

2 113.35 £ 3,422 55 214 180 394 3.48 £14.50 127.90 £16.76 148 

3 241.40 £ 6,291 80 297 254 551 2.28 £19.85 82.21 £26.66 110 

4 441.50 £ 10,140 180 554 472 1,026 2.32 £36.39 82.43 £55.00 125 

5 601.00 £ 13,060 280 785 640 1,425 2.37 £49.37 82.15 £79.27 132 

6 841.15 £ 18,024 380 1,054 898 1,952 2.32 £67.79 80.59 £110.33 131 

* Cars raked in 5-car units Phases 1-3, 10-car units from 

Phase 4 onward.Change in maintenance & staffings cost at 

Phase 4 reflects both increased km and first delivery of 

10-car units 

** Conservative extrapolation from German-originated model. 

We expect significant reductions in cost when this model 

is developed in light of UK rail and aviation sector best 

practice. 

Figures include ‘refit & refresh’ overhauls at Years 4, 13 & 

23 at a cost of £77.6K per car. 

per 

route 

km (£k)


A transformational system: speed 

and sustainability 

In UK reality, Ultraspeed’s deployment of Transrapid produces the following results. 

Journey Ultraspeed Comparator 

Glasgow-Edinburgh non-stop (dependent on terminal location). 12 mins 45 mins (today’s rail) 

Liverpool Airport – Manchester Airport 10 mins 60 mins (today’s motorway) 

Heathrow – M25 – Birmingham International – 83mins 

Manchester Airport – West Yorkshire – Leeds (v/max 500km/h) 113 mins (typical high speed train, 

optimised for this route profile) 

A hypothetical TGV-style railway shadowing the UKU route is 90 mins 

assumed to enable like-for-like comparison. (NB: any such (v/max 400km/h) 

railway would require tunnelling under Pennines, and would this 

be £bns more expensive than Ultraspeed, where Transrapid 

route parameters enable the maglev route to follow the M62 corridor. 

Mode Total Trip Time to 

446 seat 5-car 


convey 400 

passengers over the 

full distance 

Transrapid has notable environmental advantages 

when compared to high-speed rail. Two comparative 

example illustrate the point. 

MWh 

(or MWh equiv for 

diesel) 

Firstly, the 90 minute London – Leeds stopping 

journey referred to above can be achieved by a 

840 – 1,196 seat 10-car Ultraspeed unit for a total 

consumption of only 17MWh, whereas an 808-seat 

177 

Total CO 2 

emitted (tonnes) 

Velaro-E ‘Doppelzug’ (two units coupled) consumes 

22MWh for the journey, although taking 113 minutes 

to complete it. 

CO 2 per 

passenger km @ 

100% Load Factor 

CO 2 per 

passenger km @ 

typical Load Factor 

60 mins 5.1 MWh 3.06 23.5g 42.3g @ 60% LF 

415 seat ICE3 60 mins 7.0 MWh 4.20 34.7g 62.4g @ 60% LF 

558-seat NoL 

Eurostar 

200 seat Airbus 130 mins (2 x 65 

mins BA timeable) 

60 mins 12.0 MWh 

(after Kemp et al) 

VW Passat 140 TDI 35,000 mins (400 

÷ 1.7 pax typical 

loading x 150 mins) 

7.20 44.2g 79.5g @ 60% LF 

n/a 8.08 153.0g 275.0g @ 60% LF 

15.0 @ 5 pax/car 

(1,511L equiv) 

45.2 @ 1.7 pax/car 

(4,443L equiv) 

4.14 

12.18 

35.5g 

101.5g 

The second example uses the following table to 

enable the broadest like-for-like comparison over a 

300km non-stop London–Manchester journey. This 

data uses a CO 2 value of 600g per kWh generated at 

the power station. (This can be adjusted for

different generation mixes). Clearly, with carbon-free 

generation sources, Ultraspeed would be not only be 

emissions-free along the route, but genuinely 

zero-emissions in all aspects of operation. 

Further environmental advantages include: 

Elevated operation (up to 20 metres) that allows 

for continued use of land below. The ability to use 

such guideway at 200km/h with less noise than 

background street activity is also a significant 

cost-reducing factor in penetrating urban areas. 

Transrapid can enter cities elevated, whereas 

noisier, less flexibly curving LGV alignments 

typically are forced to tunnel. 

More effective use of energy due to holistic design 

of guideway to meet specific speed profiles in 

specific locations: propulsion power is supplied 

precisely where it is needed in acceleration zones 

or uphill gradients, whilst regeneration can be 

used in braking. 

Gradients up to 10% and half the curve radius of 

LGV alignments minimise land-take and intrusive 

civil engineering. 


178 

Curve radii vs TGV-style tail 

Crest radii at various speeds 

Both horizontal curve and crest radii (as well as the 

sag radii, which are twice as tight as the crests) 

are engineered to fit ‘comfort profiles’ built to keep 

g-forces to lower levels than those experienced in 

urban motoring. 

Deploying unique qualities of the Transrapid system 

allowed a 2006 Imperial College Civil Engineering 

Project under Prof Mike Bell to demonstrate that 

even the most difficult terrain for UKU - the Pennine 

crossing - could be constructed with an alignment 

which minimizes environmental impact by very closely 

following that of the M62. 

A further advantage is afforded by Transrapid’s 

smooth aerodynamic configuration and contact-free 

propulsion, both of which curtail noise pollution: no 

bogies and pantographs being present. 

Sharp horizontal and vertical radii enable corridor-following and civils cost reduction (Shanghai illustrations, actual guideway – the bend on the left is taken at 

around 200mph)


Noise emissions at various speeds vs other modes (draft) (Each additional 10 db(A) is perceived as a doubling of noise levels) 

Comparative energy requirements vs typical 

wheel on rail high speed train 

(measured in kWh/km at steady speeds) 

Speed ICE3 Transrapid 

(km/h) (8-car 415 seats) (5-car 446 seats) 

200 9.0 7.9 

250 13.1 9.8 

300 18.0 12.3 

350 (23.7)* 15.4 

400 19.1 

450 23.2 

500 27.9 

*350km/h is the practical limit for wheel on rail trains. 

This speed is not currently used on any regularly timetabled 

service on any European high speed line. 

179 

In general terms, in energy consumption as in noise 

emission, Transrapid has about a 100km/h 

performance and/or efficiency advantage over 

conventional best-practice modes of transport. 

Most tellingly this is evidenced in energy 

consumption terms (here compared to a modern 

ICE3 high speed train).

7 


Summary of speed, power consumption 

and emissions comparisons with rail 

180


Recognising the importance of energy consumption as a key issue in the design and development of a 

strategic transport network, UK Ultraspeed has been keen to benchmark our environmental performance 

against that of other systems. 

In this Chapter, we present a comparison of Transrapid maglev performance over specific ‘like for like’ journey 

and trip time profiles against that of a current European high speed train, the German ICE3. 

We note comments that it would be helpful to have another comparator in addition to ICE3. We are happy to 

benchmark against Shinkansen if data is made available. For now we cross-refer the numbers ICE3 to those 

presented by Prof Roger Kemp for the Class 373 NoL Eurostar on a hypothetical 600km London-Edinburgh Line. 

We summarise Prof Kemp’s 373 information after the ICE comparators. We do not have access to his 

source data, so we are sourcing the values from the charts Roger presented in April 2004. 

One useful broader comparator is emerging. An as yet unpublished average of 0.17kWh per passenger km 

is solidifying across ATOC (where the average speed is surely sub-100km/h). In all the scenarios we present 

below, Ultraspeed is going at least three times faster, with lower kWh per pass km results. 

Figure 1 :446-seat Transrapid, 292km, 60 minutes non-stop 

Total MWh for 

No of seats on this 

No of km on this journey 

Total ASK = 130, 232 

Wh/ASK = 39.16 

Load Factor Passengers Passenger km Wh per pKM kWh p PKM 

100% 446 130,232 39.16 0.039 

60% 268 78,139 65.27 0.065 

35% 156 45,581 111.89 0.112 

Figure 2: 446-seat Transrapid, 292km, 50 minutes non-stop 

Total MWh for 



Total ASK = 130, 232 

Wh/ASK = 53.75 


100% 446 130,232 53.75 0.054 

60% 268 78,139 89.58 0.090 

35% 156 45,581 153.57 0.154 

Figure 3: 415-seat ICE3, 292km, 60 minutes non-stop 

Total MWh for 



Total ASK = 121,180 

Wh/ASK = 57.77 


100% 415 121,180 57.77 0.058 

60% 249 72,708 96.28 0.096 

35% 145 42,413 165.04 0.165 

181 

5.1 

446 

292 

7.0 

446 

292 

7.0 

415 

292


But point-to-point journey times are only half the story. Using the acceleration, braking and high speed 

abilities of Transrapid to the full, we can offer a journey with three intermediate stops also in 60 minutes (with 

stations modelled at 0km, 15km, 190km, 280km, 292km). 

Figure 4: 446-seat Transrapid, 292km, 60 minutes with 4 stops 

Total MWh for 



Total ASK = 130,232 

Wh/ASK = 61.43 


100% 446 130,232 61.43 0.061 

60% 268 78,139 102.38 0.102 

35% 156 45,581 175.51 0.176 

Again cross-referring to the emerging ATOC average of 0.17 kWh/pkm, the maglev advantage is particularly 

starkly illustrated here. Whereas one has to assume a cross-ATOC average speed of less than 100km/h is 

producing the 0.17 figure (at whatever load factor (35%?) is being used), the table above maps a Transrapid 

averaging 292km/h over an intercity route that would be, say, London-M25-BHX–MAN Apt–Manchester in the 

real world. Cruise-phase speed peaks at over 450km/h to meet the 1 hour journey time. 

We feel that the above figures relating to a maglev exploiting its design advantages to the full, including 

phases using outright high speed, provide an extremely robust counter to the concern that has been raised 

that it could be improper: 

to say that this mode is more energy efficient at like for like speeds, (37%), and then 

talk about journey times that need the speed advantage and will give an energy use 

100% higher (292kmh to 450kmh). On their figures getting to Manchester in 45 mins 

will use significantly more energy than the current service […]. 

Let us address this factually. We understand there is a figure of 0.136 kWh per passenger km for Virgin West 

Coast emerging as a component of the cross-ATOC average. Using the maglev numbers in Figure 4, we have a 

result for Ultraspeed of 0.137 kWh p pkm at 45% Load Factor. And we’re getting from London to Manchester 

or v.v with four stops in one hour on that profile, whilst WCML is producing its comparable number getting its 

passengers to Manchester in 2h15m. (Note: extrapolating from ORR National Rail Trends Yearbook 2005-2006, 

we estimate that VWC runs at around 35% Load Factor over its 22.9 million timetabled train km.) 

It is impossible to model a high speed rail equivalent of the maglev service shown in Figure 4. There is no 

current wheel on rail train that could deliver this stopping pattern within this journey time. 

Note regarding all the above, the Wh per passenger km results for sub-100% Load Factors are calculated for 

now on a simplified basis, omitting energy savings that would accrue from the removal of the weight of 

passengers and luggage. If this were taken into account, the figures for low load factors would be better for 

both train and maglev. 

Cleary the impact would not be huge as, at high speed, the primary resistance that must be overcome is 

aerodynamic drag, not the mass of the train/maglev itself. Later studies will certainly go to this level of detail 

182 

8.0 

446 

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and will then reveal a further maglev advantage. Maglevs benefit proportionally more in mass-reduction terms 

by removing passengers, as the passengers & luggage represent a greater proportion of the total mass of the 

100% laden vehicle. Put another way, if 65% percent of the passengers get off a steel-on-steel train, they 

don’t take 65% of the weight of the bogies and pantographs with them. 

Figure 5 

Hypothetical London-Edinburgh 600km High Speed Line, with 350km/h maximum 

speed, assuming seating capacity based on 558-seat NoL Eurostar (on which the 

subtending examples in Kemp et al are worked, from which this data is summarised). 

Total MWh for 



Total ASK = 334, 800 

Wh/ASK = 95.00 

Load Factor Passengers Passenger km Wh per km kWh p PKM 

100% 558 334,800 95.00 0.095 

60% 335 200,880 158.33 0.158 

35% 195 117,180 271.43 0.271 

As a final point of information on consumption issues, we offer the following table. 

Figure 6: total resistance to motion at various speeds [kN] 

Speed Transrapid ICE3 

200km/h 29 33 

300km/h 44 65 

350km/h 56 85 

400km/h 69 n/a 

CO 2 emissions – & putting rail (X2000) data in context 

In response to the hypothesis that the Swedish X2000 is a benchmark for very-low-emissions rail transport, 

we cite the following intelligence: 

X2000: 

Installed power max.: 3260 kW 

Length: 140 m 

Cars: 1 power car , 5 trailer cars 

Seating 1./2.Class/Servicecar: 78/152/22 

Max. speed ever attained: 276 km/h 

Max permitted speed: 210 km/h 

Max speed in revenue service: 210 km/h 

SJ’s own website states: “Almost all trains in Sweden are electricity-driven. And SJ only 

buys renewable energy from hydropower for its trains. This means that the production 

of electricity for the trains only causes a minimum amount of emissions. Calculated per 

person for example the emission of carbon dioxide during a trip between Stockholm and 

Gothenburg is the equivalent of 3 millilitres of petrol.” 

(See http://www.sj.se/sj/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=260&I=en&I=en). 

So a Transrapid operated by SJ wouldn’t produce any CO2 either! 

183 

31.8 

558 

600


We are concerned that such (laudably) green metrics should be used when producing stats for UK use. It is 

one thing for the kWh per train km to roughly agree between Sweden and UK. Indeed “UK values close to the 

Swedish measured figures” have been reported. We have no problem with Swedish wheel-on-rail trains being 

roughly comparable with UK wheel-on-rail trains in terms of power consumption. Indeed we’d be surprised if 

they were much different. 

It is, however, quite another thing to assume that SJ’s 100% green kilowatts are the same as Britain’s dirty 

kilowatts, and to extend the Anglo-Swedish comparison to claim CO 2 figures for the UK that are comparable to 

Sweden. This can only be done by assuming, that Network Rail is using a fully hydro/renewable/nuclear mix. 

a) is this true? 

b) will it continue to be true as nuclear runs down before next-gen nuclear and renewables come on stream? 

The argument is a red herring anyway. If heavy rail CO 2 is assessed using a specific generation-mix, 

Transrapid must be assessed on the same mix. If one allows assessments in which one transport operator 

buys a clean mix, one must permit the competitor to buy an equally clean mix. 

We have done our CO 2 calculations on the (German) mix which produces 600g/kWh generated at power 

station. Our figures for specific energy consumption per passenger km are as set out in Figure 7. . Please 

note that these specific consumption figures do not include upstream issues such as transmission losses from 

power station to the maglev system. The results are roughly comparable for rail and maglev systems. 

Figure 7: CO2 in g per passenger km, using trip profiles above 

Maglev trip profiles as per Rail profiles as per 

Load Factor Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 4 ICE3 Fig 3 Kemp Fig 5 

100% 23.50 32.25 36.86 34.46 57.00 

60% 39.16 53.75 61.43 57.77 95.00 

35% 37.13 92.14 105.31 99.03 162.86 

We offer the following points of comparison and comment on the above table. 

Comparison with short haul flight 

The maglev Figure 1 trip profile (60 mins, non-stop) is directly comparable with the published BA schedule of 

65 mins gate-to-gate for Heathrow – Manchester by air. 

DfT figures as recorded in Hansard (8 Jul 2004 : Column 786W) cite a figure of 8.08t of CO 2 emission for a 

single flight from London to Manchester. This equates to 153g/pass km @ 100% Load Factor and 

275g/pass km @ 60% Load Factor. 

Thus under like-for-like conditions Transrapid maglev produces only 14%–15% of the CO 2 

emissions of a short haul jet. 

Needless to say the maglev advantage comes fully into play once it has outperformed the aircraft over the 

point-to-point trip. The plane then sits on the apron for 25-90 minutes before returning, whereas the maglev 

departs after a three minute station stop to link from Manchester onward to Leeds, Teesside and Newcastle in 

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45 minutes, thus providing a seamless journey, with no modal shifts, that is quite impossible by air. 

Also no form of air transport can return energy via regenerative braking; another maglev (and rail) advantage. 

Comparison with car travel 

Using a best-practice contemporary car, the VW Passat 140bhp 1.9L TDi, and its officially-stated emissions of 

159g per car-km, we get the following results. 

To produce the same transport capacity as one 446-seat Ultraspeed London-Manchester service on requires 

89 cars, assuming a (very cosy!) 5 passengers per car. Each car consumes 16.9L of diesel @ 5.8L per 100km. 

This equates to 1,511L of diesel in total. This in turn equates to around 15 MWh (3 times more than maglev). In 

total the 89 cars travel 26,046 total km and emit 4.14t CO2 @ 159g/km (around 25% more than maglev’s 3.06t). 

However, at more typical 1.7 passengers per car, 262 cars are needed, consuming 4,443L diesel, equivalent 

to 45.27MWh (9 times worse than maglev). The 262 cars travel 76.607 total km and emit 12.18t CO2 @ 

159g/km. (4 times worse). 

Many private cars have significantly worse environmental performance than the VW Passat cited. A four-fold 

improvement in automotive emissions performance is not a realistic expectation. 

Even if emissions performance did improve to that degree, driving from London to Manchester is still going to 

take around five hours. Using that number, it would be hard to advocate a strategic transport policy requiring 

262 drivers to spend a combined total of 163 8-hour working days on the inherently less safe (because 

human-controlled and essentially chaotic) road network to deliver the same transport capacity a single maglev 

creates in one hour on a fully-automated, fully-failsafe system whose timetable is defined to the second. 

Underlying energy issues 

Prof Kemp suggests an efficiency of wheel-on-rail train and upstream transmission system of 0.65 (turning 

the 57 kWh per seat his 350km/h train uses into 88 kWh at the power station). In the next stage of study, we 

would address these issues on the basis of UK-specific strategic power planning. We would expect to be 

able to deliver better energy-efficiency overall by (a) optimising power distribution as we build a completely de 

novo network and (b) maximizing maglev-specific energy efficiencies. 

As a de novo project, with a significant and predictable energy requirement, Ultraspeed will also be in a 

position to select (and catalyse the development of) its power suppliers on the basis of their emissions-efficiency. 

We are aware that the existing national power distribution grid may be inadequate to feed Ultraspeed in some 

areas. This would apply too new High Speed Rail. Clearly this issue would have to be addressed in next 

stage studies. 

A comment on economic impacts 

The macro-economic numbers – in wasted journey time alone – can be estimated by using a mid-range 

‘Value of Time’ figure from DfT’s own range (let us assume 22p per minute). 

Taking our ‘London to Manchester in an hour’ example 446 car passengers x 5 hours = 2,230 hours = 

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133,800 minutes. Subtract from this the 26,760 minutes the maglev passengers spend travelling and the 

result is 107,040 minutes. Using the 22p/min cost-of-time figure each journey made by multi-car rather than 

single-maglev would cost the UK economy roughly £23.5K. 

We estimate that over the system as a whole, Ultraspeed will deliver around £2bn in annual journey time 

savings alone (vs a mix of other possible solutions which deliver the same capacity but not, of course, the 

speed). This is perhaps the easiest to quantify of Ultraspeed’s many macro-economic benefits, all of which 

must be considered against costs. Others include a rough doubling of the locational competitiveness of the 

cities of the North, with studies indicating up to £60bn in annual net FDI inflows catalysed by the development 

of an Ultraspeed network. 

Many of the significant public-benefit numbers Ultraspeed produces are sufficient on their own to balance 

and justify Government commitment to a PFI deal on an availability payments basis. Taken in the round, 

Ultraspeed’s public-good, competitiveness and environmental outcomes will significantly outperform the 2.6:1 

benefit:cost ratio that Government deemed sufficient for CrossRail to proceed to Hybrid Bill stage. 

Peak capacity 

To give some detail on the Ultraspeed design capacity of 7,200 pax per hour in each direction. (6 x 1,200 

seats at 10 minute headway). 

Two answers. Firstly, it would be technically possible to design the system for a headway of five minutes, thus 

doubling capacity to 14,400 per hour in each direction. 

This gives 28,800 movements in a peak hour. This is very closely comparable to the (future, as yet unattained) 

performance of the Shinkansen system: 

as many as 12 trains departing from Tokyo Station can operate at peak hours, with the 

future potential for a maximum of 15 trains per hour operating one way, including those 

departing from the new Shinagawa Station. 

http://jr-central.co.jp/eng.nsf/english/bulletin/$FILE/vol44-tokai.pdf#search=%22%22JR%22%20tokyo%20 

osaka%20shinkansen%20timetable%22 

Assuming around 1,000 seats per Skinkansen, capacity order of magnitude is the same. 

Secondly, we should stress that the decision to build (or allow for later upgrade to) a system with shorter 

headways is most cost-effectively taken at design stage. Shorter headway requires, in particular, shorter 

Operational Control sections. Shorter headways do entail higher costs. As ever, these issues are a cost: 

benefit balance. We have specified Ultraspeed for 10 minute headways because, in our research, this was 

the headway required to meet demand. 

However, we do appreciate that in certain areas (particularly routes like Leeds-Manchester) link loads may 

be high enough to justify designing for reduced headway. In such areas, Ultraspeed plays both intercity and 

‘super-metro’ roles. Again these strategic issues are topics for further study. 

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