Commodore Clipper - Marine Accident Investigation Branch

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Figure 4 Localised damage to inner plastic core Ten minutes into the test flames could be seen in the socket and the white plastic core began to melt away (Figure 5). Figure 5 Initial flaming of plastic core
Approximately eleven and a half minutes into the test the flames had spread upwards to involve the red outer casing of the socket. Shortly afterwards the flame was extinguished. The damage to the outer casing is clearly visible in Figure 6. Figure 6 Damage to socket from initial flaming The voltage was increased to 50V at 10 amps. Approximately 20 minutes from the start of the test smoke could be seen emanating from the rear of the socket. The material of the socket reignited and molten plastic was dripping onto the floor. The coil was moved into direct contact with the housing using tongs leading to immediate ignition of the material causing flash flaming sufficient to ignite any combustible material in the vicinity. During the test no ignition of the webbing or the curtain material took place. Once the flaming had died down a piece of webbing was placed into contact with the coil and ignited immediately. The flame spread up the webbing strap and ignited the side curtain material though this did not lead to extensive fire spread and the flames self-extinguished after a few minutes. Finally a direct flame source (gas burner) was applied to the webbing straps. This caused fire spread to the curtain material (Figure 7).
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ACCIDENT REPORT M A R I N E A C C I
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CONTENTS GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
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2.10 Management of the emergency re
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRON
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SYNOPSIS At 0242 (BST) on 16 June 2
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SECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION 1.1
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Figure 1 Sequence of images recorde
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Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the i
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‘AO’ class deck boundary Green
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Figure 5 Cloud of steam from the up
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A few seconds later, just before 03
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By 0523 it had been reported that m
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helicopter stationed at Lee-on-the-
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needed to be considered. However, t
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the system could not be started. Wi
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Reproduced from Admiralty Chart BA
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MAIB inspectors later found a route
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combined effect of using the heelin
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1.7.3 Cargo handling When the fire
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At 1810, the CPSO relayed his concl
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From 2100 to 2130 firefighters exti
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The deck boundary between the main
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1.10.6 Ro-ro hydraulic systems A nu
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Deck drain blocked by potatoes Deck
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Heat damage to tyre Charred and del
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1.12.2 Refrigerated trailer system
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Three electrical control and power
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Damaged external power supply conne
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X-ray of the external power supply
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The three other examples of reefer
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The webbing strap, curtain-side and
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Commodore Clipper’s master held a
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During the night of 8/9 October 201
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SECTION 2 - ANALYSIS 2.1 AIM The pu
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likely that a high resistance fault
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appropriate for special category sp
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vessel’s ability to berth without
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Although the vertical position of t
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2.6.2 Role of the master The master
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2.7 ENTRY TO HARBOUR 2.7.1 Pilotage
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Another possible option might have
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2.9.2 Cargo handling It was evident
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Instead, local control centres prol
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the vessel’s arrival could be int
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2.11 wIDER RISkS 2.11.1 Vulnerabili
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SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS 3.1 SAFETY
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8. The deck boundary between the ma
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SECTION 4 - ACTION TAkEN 4.1 MAIB A
Page 97 and 98: Hampshire Fire and Rescue Services
Page 99 and 100: The Bahamas Maritime Authority is r
Page 101 and 102: Name of vessel COMMODORE CLIPPER Na
Page 105 and 106: Name of vessel COMMODORE CLIPPER Lo
Page 107 and 108: Name of vessel COMMODORE CLIPPER Fi
Page 116 and 117: Report of the examination of the el
Page 118 and 119: Cobham Technical Services ERA Techn
Page 144 and 145: 12 November 2010 Dear Commodore Cli
Page 146 and 147: Side curtain webbing Figure 2 Exper
Page 150: Figure 7 Ignition of curtain materi
Page 175 and 176: Bahamas Maritime Authority 20 Old B
Page 177 and 178: BACKGROUND At 0242 (BST) on 16 June
Page 179 and 180: MAIB flyer to ro-ro vessel operator
Page 181 and 182: With tugs standing by, Commodore Cl
Page 183 and 184: Safety Lessons Ro-ro ferry operator
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Commodore Clipper - Marine Accident Investigation Branch

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