Germany 2005 - FIFA.com

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Overall Analysis
Technical and Tactical Analysis
Tactical adaptability
Apart from the World Cup, the Confederations
Cup is the only FIFA tournament that
brings together ‘A’ national teams from every
continent.
Differing styles of play and tactical variations
were thus to be expected. General questions
raised were ‘who would lay down what marks’,
and ‘how tactically adaptable were the individual
teams’. Whilst we could not really hope to
see any new trends, as at a FIFA World Cup,
there were some interesting insights into how
the teams are developing in general.
Of the finalists, Argentina displayed an abundance
of tactical flexibility. Against Tunisia
they began with a 3-2-3-2 system with two
defensive midfielders in front of the defence.
The next line was formed by two wide men
and Riquelme (8) as a central creative playmaker.
Up front, they played with two strikers.
Argentina had no difficulty changing their
formation from game to game or even during
a game. The basic system quickly became a
4-4-2 or a 3-4-3, with the versatile Zanetti (4)
and Sorin (3), who both switched between
defence and midfield, playing key roles.
In contrast, Brazil stuck to their chosen strategy
throughout, with two central defensive
midfielders in front of a back four. Although
Kaka (8) and Ronaldinho (10) started in wide
midfield positions, they enjoyed total freedom
going forward, frequently switching inside or
moving up front and harmonising superbly
with the two strikers, Adriano (9) and Robinho
(7). Defensive work was almost entirely
the responsibility of a six-man block. Brazil’s
structure did not change when a substitution
was made.
All the other teams adjusted their style of play
to changes in situation. Germany, who started
with a 4-4-2 formation and a midfield diamond,
occasionally switched to a more cautious
set-up with two defensive midfielders.
For the play-off for third place, they reverted
to their original formation.
Mexico played an impressive, hard-running
game, quickly adapting their basic 3-3-3-1
formation to a defensive 4-5-1 or an attacking
3-4-3. A compact defensive style in which
they pressured the ball in numbers turned
into an attacking short-passing game involving
some fast interplay through the middle or
down the flanks.
Japan went with a 3-5-2 formation at the beginning
of the tournament but changed to
a 4-4-2 from the second game in order to
stabilise their defence. This adjustment also
increased their attacking options down the
flanks, leading to an enormous improvement
in performance against Greece and Brazil.
Greece were particularly adept at varying
their game according to their opponents.
They started the tournament with their triedand-tested
3-4-3 formation featuring a compact
defensive block and sweeping wing play.
In the match against Mexico, who operated
with a lone striker, they switched to a 4-4-2
system.
Tunisia started against Argentina with a back
four, a packed midfield and one forward, but
eventually switched to 4-4-2 to increase their
attacking threat with a second striker. In the
final group game, they adopted a 3-3-2-2 formation,
with the two front men playing wide
apart and the two players behind them moving
forward from midfield into the space.
Australia started with a 4-1-4-1 system but
were hit by the loss of Popovic (6) from the
centre of their defence. Although they maintained
their structure, the change in personnel
did not have a positive effect. Up front, Aloisi
(15) was often left on his own. The attempt
to introduce a second striker in the shape of
Viduka (9) produced no decisive change as
he was still not fully fit after a lengthy injury
lay-off.
Strength – speed – craft
The aforementioned factors have a major
impact on the standard of football at international
level.
Strength manifests itself in a variety of ways:
in powerful defending on the floor and in the
air (Coloccini 16, Heinze 6, Lucio 3 etc.); in
strength in the tackle; in running duels for the
ball in defence or in attack (Zanetti 4, Salcido
3); in powerful shooting (Adriano 9, Ballack
13, Nakamura 10) and in impressive heading
(Borghetti 9).
Speed involves a lot more than just sprinting.
Speed of action and reaction, anticipation
and a rapid grasp of match situations go beyond
the simple aspect of running.
Craft is total control of the ball in all aspects
of the game: in passing the ball quickly; in
keeping possession in the tightest of spaces;
in controlling the ball under pressure; in opening
up the play with a long ball or a diagonal
pass; in dribbling; and in doing the unexpected.
The tournament’s top teams (e.g. Brazil
and Argentina) possessed the aforementioned
skills and thus led the way. Other teams will
no doubt learn from the experience and put
the time until next year to good use.
Creativity and fluidity
The offensive game between midfield and attack
is increasingly being dominated by ‘free
spirits’ such as Ronaldinho (10), Kaka (8),
Riquelme (8), Ballack (13) and Nakamura (10),
who with their outstanding ability are capable
of deciding a match on their own. They are
largely relieved of defensive responsibilities,
allowing them to concentrate primarily on
their attacking game. There are different philosophies
as far as this is concerned. Whereas
the South Americans accept the freedom accorded
to these players and set up a defensive
line behind them, Ballack (13) is criticised for
it in Germany because there is a view that the
whole team has to defend. A prime example
of this attitude is Greece, who involve all their
players in their defensive work.
Speed of transition
The ability to switch quickly from defence to
attack and vice-versa is especially important
in today’s football, in which compact defensive
blocks are set up to restrict the attacking
space available to a team. On winning possession
of the ball, the focus is now on getting
forward as quickly as possible. Swift passing
moves, dribbling at pace and long balls to
the front men are effective weapons against
a team that has pushed forward. However, a
willingness to make decisions, coupled with
vision and confidence are important prerequisites
for a successful counterattack. Examples
of this are Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Japan.
Unnecessary delays only give the opposition
time to regroup.
Execution of set pieces
Set pieces are another good way of breaching
a defensive unit. Free-kicks from the flank
are particularly dangerous. Specialists such as
Riquelme (8), Ronaldinho (10) and Deisler (10)
play the ball with speed and swerve it into the
danger area, where a slight deflection will often
lead to a goal. Direct free-kicks in front of
goal are taken with a special technique that
involves striking the ball over the wall so that
it drops into the goal at the last second, leav-
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