Regulamento do Curso de Mestrado do PEQ - peq / coppe / ufrj

CLAWSCLAWS3WARFARE STUDIESLAND FOR CENTREVICTORY THROUGH VISIONthousands which the IDAS will not be able to meetfrom their meagre cadre strength.The command and control of IFAs has been changedthrough this policy and their Annual PerformanceAssessment Reports (APARs) will now be initiatedby the CFAs. This is a welcome step but is unlikelyto have any significant effect on the ground,given the accommodative cadre structure of theIDAS. Interestingly, an audit report on the ArmyCommanders’ special financial powers carried outby the DAD in 2012, attributed the IFAs’ inability toraise critical observations in procurement cases to theirAPARs being raised by the Army Commanders 2 .Similarly, the annual revenue procurement plan andlong-term equipment support plan, proposed witha computerised budgetary management system,comprise a welcome policy measure. The policyproposes a collegiate mechanism to speed up thevarious stages of all procurement cases to hasten theprocurement cycle (para 5.1), which is indeed a bettersystem from the prolonged movement of files betweenthe IFA and the CFA being currently followed.The timeline for the implementation of the above,given the past experience is, however, unrealistic.A Procurement Committee (PC) is proposed to beformed by all CFAs within their domain for carryingout procurement, with the IFA or his representativeas a part of this committee. This experiment will notbe a success at both Service HQ level as also at lowerformations namely Divisional and Brigade HQ becauseof the sheer quantum of cases and the time required todeliberate upon these cases, an aspect which the policysurprisingly discounts. In operationally committedformations, the CFA who is the Commanding Officeror an officer who is one rank lower, will have notime to devote to only procurement matters due tooperational commitments and training. Nor will theIFA be able to attend multiple PC meetings. In case,there is no Deputy Commander posted in a BrigadeHQ, the procurement will be halted or, similarly, if theIFA proceeds on leave, the procurements will again beaffected. In addition, since the trained and dedicatedIFA staff has not been put in place, the IFA functionswill be performed by Group B staff of the DAD whoare neither numerically nor attitudinally equipped tohandle the quantum of cases in the lower formations.The provision of the PC also by implication embedsthe IFA into the Technical Evaluation Committee(TEC) which hithertofore was not a part of his domain.The policy is alive to the fact that in its present form, theCFAs will be constrained by operational exigencies toresort to overruling of the IFAs’ advice. Accordingly,the provisions regarding overruling have been madeless cumbersome (para 12.4). Overruling, however,should not be treated as a matter of routine but shouldbe used with great caution or it will render the wholemechanism ineffective.ImplicationsIn effect , the DFPDS 2015, instead of “Delegation ofFinancial Powers to the Defence Services,” will resultin centralisation of delegated financial powers fromthe lower CFAs. The manner in which the DFPDS2015 has been issued lacks transparency as, unlike itsprevious version, the minutes of deliberations leadingto the issue of this policy have not been made public.In the earlier version of DFPDS, issued in 2006, beforethe actual financial schedules have been described, thefull record of deliberations that went into formulatingthe policy had been laid out, duly authenticated andsigned as correct by representatives of the variousServices as well as the concerned officers from theMoD (Finance) before being finally countersigned bythe Financial Adviser Defence Services (FADS). Nosuch record of deliberations has been promulgatedalong with the present version of the DFPDS. In casea committee 3 comprising all stakeholders has indeeddeliberated in a consultative manner, leading to theissue of such a policy, the users and stakeholders towhom the budget has been allocated have the rightto know the details of the deliberations based onwhich such a policy has been issued. What is morealarming is that this policy which has the potentialto exponentially increase the equipment hollowness