Business Removing

Doing Business
in 2005
Removing Obstacles
to Growth
A copublication of the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation and Oxford University Press

© 2005
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Contents
Doing Business in 2005 is the second in a series of
annual reports investigating the scope and manner
of regulations that enhance business activity and
those that constrain it. New quantitative indicators
on business regulations and their enforcement can
be compared across 145 countries—from Albania to
Zimbabwe—and over time. Doing Business in 2004:
Understanding Regulation presented indicators in 5
topics: starting a business, hiring and firing workers,
enforcing contracts, getting credit and closing a business.
Doing Business in 2005 updates these measures
and adds another two sets: registering property and
protecting investors. The indicators are used to analyze
economic and social outcomes, such as productivity,
investment, informality, corruption, unemployment,
and poverty, and identify what reforms have worked,
where and why.
Removing obstacles to growth: an overview 1
Measuring with impact 9
Starting a business 17
Hiring and firing workers 25
Registering property 33
Getting credit 41
Protecting investors 49
Enforcing contracts 59
Closing a business 67
References 75
Data Notes 79
Doing Business indicators 89
Country tables 98
Acknowledgments 133

1
Removing obstacles
to growth: an overview
What are the findings?
What to reform?
Which myths to dispel?
What to expect next?
The past year has been good for doing business in 58 of
the 145 Doing Business sample countries. They simplified
some aspect of business regulations, strengthened property
rights or made it easier for businesses to raise financing.
Slovakia was the leading reformer: introducing
flexible working hours, easing the hiring of first-time
workers, opening a private credit registry, cutting the
time to start a business in half and, thanks to a
new collateral law, reducing the time to recover debt by
three-quarters. Colombia was the runner-up. Among the
top 10 reformers, 2 other European Union entrants—
Lithuania and Poland—significantly lightened the burden
on businesses. India made progress in improving
credit markets. Five other European countries—Belgium,
Finland, Norway, Portugal, and Spain—reduced the cost
of doing business and entered the top 10 list (table 1.1).
The major impetus for reform in 2003 was competition
in the enlarged European Union. Seven of the top
10 reformers were incumbent or new European Union
members. Thirty-six of 89 reforms—in starting a business,
hiring and firing workers, enforcing a contract,
getting credit and closing a business (topics in Doing
Business in 2004 and 2005)—happened in EU countries.
Reforms in registering property and protecting investors
(new topics in Doing Business in 2005) are also taking
place fast in the EU. Accession countries reformed ahead
of the competitive pressures on their businesses in the
larger European market. Incumbent members reformed
to maintain their advantage in the presence of many
low-wage producers from accession countries, producers
that would now compete with them on equal terms.
Yet progress was uneven. Fewer than a third of poor
countries reformed 1 . And those reformers concentrated
on simplifying business entry and establishing or improving
credit information systems (figure 1.1). Almost
no reforms took place in making it easier to hire and fire
workers or in closing down unviable businesses. Across
regions, African countries reformed the least.
Many of the reforms in poor countries were spurred
by the desire of governments and donors to quantify
the impact of aid programs (figure 1.2). The main success
story is that business start-up is now easier in
borrowers from the International Development Association
(IDA)—encouraged by performance targets set in
the 13th IDA funding round and by the Millennium
TABLE 1.1
Top 10 reformers in 2003
Reforms affecting Doing Business indicators on:
Hiring
Starting a and Enforcing Getting Closing a
Country business firing contracts credit business
Slovakia ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Colombia ✓ ✓ ✓
Belgium ✓ ✓ ✓
Finland ✓ ✓ ✓
India ✓ ✓ ✓
Lithuania ✓ ✓ ✓
Norway ✓ ✓
Poland ✓ ✓ ✓
Portugal ✓ ✓ ✓
Spain ✓ ✓ ✓
Note: The table identifies all reforms that took place in 2003 and had a measurable effect
on the indicators constructed in this report. Countries are listed alphabetically, with the
exception of Slovakia, the leading reformer, and Colombia, the runner-up.
Source: Doing Business database.

2 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
FIGURE 1.1
More reforms in rich countries
Number of reforms by region
26 26
11
8 7
6
5
What was reformed
Shares of reforms by topic
Closing
a business
Hiring
and firing
18%
Enforcing
contracts
18%
15%
Starting
a business
24%
25%
Credit
information
Enforcing
contracts
19%
25%
Credit
information
Closing
a business
4%
52%
Starting
a business
OECD
high income
Europe &
Central
Asia
Latin
America &
the Caribbean
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Middle
East &
North Africa
East Asia &
the Pacific
South
Asia
Reforms
in rich countries
Reforms
in poor countries
Note: Reforms affecting Doing Business indicators.
Source: Doing Business database.
Challenge Account, an initiative of the United States
government. 2 Measuring the initial burdens and the
progress with reforms also spurred reforms in the European
Union, labor reform in Colombia and bankruptcy
reform in India.
Lithuania and Slovakia broke into the list of the 20
economies with the best business conditions as measured
in this year’s report. 3 New Zealand tops the list, followed
by the United States, Singapore, Hong Kong (China) and
Australia (table 1.2). Among developing countries, Botswana
and Thailand scored best. Latvia, Chile, Malaysia,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, South Africa, Tunisia and
Jamaica follow. At the other end of the spectrum, 20 poor
countries—four-fifths of them in sub-Saharan Africa—
make up the list of economies with the most difficult
business conditions. The list may change somewhat next
year because of reforms and because new topics will be
added to the rankings.
Being in the top 20 on the ease of doing business
does not mean zero regulation. Few would argue it’s
every business for itself in New Zealand, that workers are
abused in Norway or that creditors seize a debtor’s assets
without a fair process in the Netherlands. Indeed, for
protecting property rights, more regulation is needed to
make the top 20 list.
All the top countries regulate, but they do so in less
costly and burdensome ways. And they focus their efforts
more on protecting property rights than governments in
other countries. If Australia needs only 2 procedures to
start a business, why have 15 in Bolivia and 19 in Chad?
If it takes 15 procedures to enforce a contract in Denmark,
why have 53 in Lao PDR? If it takes 1 procedure to
register property in Norway, why have 16 procedures in
Algeria? And if laws require all 7 main types of disclosure
to protect equity investors in Canada, why do those in
Cambodia and Honduras provide none?
FIGURE 1.2
What gets measured gets done
Reduction in time and cost for business start-up, 2003–04
Level in
2003
–5%
–10%
–15%
2004
EU members
TIME
COST
Source: Doing Business database.
IDA borrowers
TIME
START-UP MEASURED
COST
Top EU
reformers
France
Spain
Slovakia
Belgium
Finland
All other
countries
TIME
COST
Top IDA
reformers
Ethiopia
Benin
Nicaragua
Mongolia
Moldova
TABLE 1.2
Top 20 economies on the ease of doing business
1 New Zealand 11 Switzerland
2 United States 12 Denmark
3 Singapore 13 Netherlands
4 Hong Kong, China 14 Finland
5 Australia 15 Ireland
6 Norway 16 Belgium
7 United Kingdom 17 Lithuania
8 Canada 18 Slovakia
9 Sweden 19 Botswana
10 Japan 20 Thailand
Note: The ease of doing business measure is a simple average of the country’s ranking
in each of the 7 areas of business regulation and property rights protection measured
in Doing Business in 2005.
Source: Doing Business database.

REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH: AN OVERVIEW 3
What are the findings?
The analysis leads to 3 main findings:
• Businesses in poor countries face much larger regulatory
burdens than those in rich countries. They face 3
times the administrative costs, and nearly twice as many
bureaucratic procedures and delays associated with
them. And they have fewer than half the protections of
property rights of rich countries.
• Heavy regulation and weak property rights exclude
the poor from doing business. In poor countries 40% of
the economy is informal. Women, young and low-skilled
workers are hurt the most.
• The payoffs from reform appear large. A hypothetical
improvement to the top quartile of countries on the
ease of doing business is associated with up to 2 percentage
points more annual economic growth.
Businesses in poor countries face much larger
regulatory burdens than those in rich countries
It takes 153 days to start a business in Maputo, but 2 days
in Toronto. It costs $2,042 or 126% of the debt value to
enforce a contract in Jakarta, but $1,300 or 5.4% of the
debt value to do so in Seoul. It takes 21 procedures to
register commercial property in Abuja, but 3 procedures
in Helsinki. If a debtor becomes insolvent and enters
bankruptcy, creditors would get 13 cents on the dollar in
Mumbai, but more than 90 cents in Tokyo. Borrowers
and lenders are entitled to 10 main types of legal rights
in Singapore, but only 2 in Yemen.
These differences persist across the world: the countries
that most need entrepreneurs to create jobs and
FIGURE 1.3
More regulatory obstacles in poor countries
Source: Doing Business database.
Ratio of poor to rich countries
Cost to fire a worker
Cost to enforce contracts
Minimum capital for start-up
Years to go through insolvency
Days to register property
Days to start a business
Less –1.6
protection
of property –1.4
rights
–2.0
1.6
3.0
1.9
More
1.8 delays
2.2
Legal rights of borrowers and lenders
Contract enforcement procedures
Investor protections: disclosure index
Higher
costs
4.2
boost growth—poor countries—put the most obstacles
in their way (figure 1.3). The average difference between
poor and rich countries on Doing Business cost indicators
is threefold. Rich countries score twice poor ones on indicators
relating to property rights—enforcing contracts,
protecting investors and legal rights of borrowers and
lenders. Latin American countries have very high regulatory
obstacles to doing business. But African countries
are even worse—and African countries reformed the
least in 2003.
Heavy regulation and weak property rights
exclude the poor from doing business
In The Mystery of Capital, Hernando de Soto exposed the
damaging effects of heavy business regulation and weak
property rights. With burdensome entry regulations, few
businesses bother to register. Instead, they choose to operate
in the informal economy. Facing high transaction costs
to get formal property title, many would-be entrepreneurs
own informal assets that cannot be used as collateral to
obtain loans. De Soto calls this “dead capital.” The solution:
simplify business entry and get titles to property.
But many titling programs aimed at bringing assets
into the formal sector have not had the lasting impact
that reformers hoped for. Doing Business in 2005 helps
explain why. While it is critical to encourage registration
of assets, it is as important—and harder—to stop them
from slipping back into the informal sector and to use
their formal status to gain access to credit.
Registering property—a new topic in this year’s report—explains
that when formalizing property rights
is accompanied by improvements in the land registry,
collateral registry, the courts, and employment regulation,
the benefits are much greater. If the formal cost
of selling the property is high, titles will lapse by being
traded informally. In Nigeria and Senegal that cost
amounts to about 30% of the property value. And even
when a formal title is well-established, it will not help to
increase access to credit if courts are inefficient, collateral
laws are poor and there are no credit information
systems, because no one would be willing to lend. Add to
this rigid employment regulation, and few people will be
hired. Women, young and low-skilled workers are hurt
the most: their only choice is to seek jobs in the informal
sector (figure 1.4).
Two examples. Nerma operates a small laboratory in
Istanbul. She feels strongly about providing job opportunities
for women but says employment legislation dis-

4 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
FIGURE 1.4
Complex regulations exclude the disadvantaged from doing business
Women’s share of private sector employment
Informal sector share of GDP
Greater
share
Greater
share
Lesser
share
Least rigid
Most rigid
Countries ranked by rigidity of employment index, quintiles
Note: Relationships are significant at the 5% level, controlling for income per capita.
Source: Doing Business database, World Bank (2004a), WEF (2004).
Lesser
share
Fewest
procedures
Most
procedures
Countries ranked by procedures to register property, quintiles
courages it. When women marry they are given a year to
decide whether to leave their job and if they choose to
go, the employer is required to pay a severance payment
based on years of service. And, if the business experiences
a drop in demand, it costs the employer the equivalent of
112 weeks salary to dismiss a redundant worker. With
such rigid regulation, employers choose conservatively.
Only 16% of Turkish women are formally employed.
Rafael runs a trading business in Guatemala. A large
customer refuses to pay for equipment delivered 2 months
earlier. It would take more than 4 years to resolve the commercial
dispute in the courts and even then the outcome
is uncertain. Rafael has no choice but to negotiate with the
customer and ends up getting only a third of the amount
due. With no money to pay his taxes, Rafael closes the business
and goes informal. He is not alone. More than half of
economic activity in Guatemala is in the informal sector.
Payoffs from reform appear large
A hypothetical improvement on all aspects of the Doing
Business indicators to reach the level of the top quartile of
countries is associated with an estimated 1.4 to 2.2 percentage
points in annual economic growth (figure 1.5). 4
This is after controlling for other factors, such as income,
government expenditure, investment, education, inflation,
conflict and geographic regions. In contrast, improving
to the level of the top quartile of countries on
macroeconomic and education indicators is associated
with 0.4 to 1.0 additional percentage points in growth.
How significant is the impact of regulatory reform?
Very. Only 24 of the 85 poor countries averaged at least
2% growth in the last 10 years. China, the most prominent
among the 24, scores higher on the ease of doing
business than Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia or Turkey.
FIGURE 1.5
Ease of doing business is associated with more growth
Additional annual growth from a hypothetical improvement
to the top quartile on the ease of doing business
Implied
additional
growth
+2.2%
+1.4%
+1.4%
2.6%
FIGURE 1.6
Simpler business regulation, more human development
Human development index
1.0
0.8
Actual
growth
1.0%
1.3%
1.4%
0.6
0.4
Most difficult
Least difficult
Countries ranked by ease of doing business, quartiles
Note: Analysis controls for income, government expenditure, primary and secondary enrollment,
inflation, investment, regions and civil conflict. Relationships are significant at the 5% level.
Source: Doing Business database, Djankov, McLiesh and Ramalho (2004).
0.2
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Ease of doing business
Source: Doing Business database, UNDP (2004).

REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH: AN OVERVIEW 5
Economic growth is only one benefit of better business
regulation and property protection. Human development
indicators are higher as well (figure 1.6). Governments
can use revenues to improve their health and
education systems, rather than support an overblown
bureaucracy.
The gains come from two sources. First, businesses
spend less time and money on dealing with regulations
and chasing after scarce sources of finance (figure 1.7).
Instead, they spend their energies on producing and marketing
their goods. Second, the government spends fewer
resources regulating and more providing basic social services.
Sweden, a top 10 country on the ease of doing business,
spends $7 billion a year or 8% of the government
budget, and employs an estimated 100,000 government
officials to deal with business regulations. 5 The United
Kingdom spends $56 billion a year, or nearly 10% of the
budget, to administer business regulation. 6 The Netherlands
spends $22 billion or 11% of its budget. Belgium,
$10 billion. Norway, $6 billion. 7 In both countries, this
amounts to about 9% of government spending.
What would happen if these countries were to reduce
red tape by a moderate 15%? The savings would
amount to between 1.2% and 1.8% of total government
expenditures, or approximately half of the public health
FIGURE 1.7
High costs of dealing with business regulation
Percentage of firms reporting that government regulations
occupy 10% or more of senior management time
61
56 55
51
India Ecuador Albania Tanzania Kenya Ukraine Brazil Cambodia
Source: World Bank investment climate assessments.
budget. Some governments are more ambitious. In 2002
the Dutch government set a goal of cutting expenditures
on administrative burdens by 25% by 2006. Actal, an independent
agency for cutting red tape, estimates that $2
billion has already been saved by doing impact assessments
before new regulations reach the parliament. The
Belgian government has set the same 25% reduction as a
goal. Denmark, France, Italy and Norway have also set
quantitative goals for reducing red tape.
49
44 43
37
What to reform?
The benefits of regulatory reform are likely to be even
greater in developing countries, which regulate more. Yet
few governments are eager to reform, arguing that they
have limited capacity, that it takes a long time and that it
costs a lot. In 2003 countries that scored the lowest on
the ease of doing business measure reformed at one
third the rate of countries in the top quartile.
Reform involves simplification. Governments would
have more capacity and more money if they reformed.
With so many examples of good practice to learn from,
there is no reason to wait (table 1.3).
Imagine Namibia wants to be among the best in regulating
business entry. A delegation from the company
registrar’s office could visit Australia, Canada or New
Zealand and see how the process works there. To learn
how reforms take place, it could travel to Serbia and
Montenegro, which just passed legislation to move registration
out of the courts—and to Italy, which made the
entry process much easier by establishing a single access
point. Or one could visit countries nearby—Botswana,
South Africa and Uganda all have well-functioning business
entry. The same approach could be followed for reforms
of regulations of labor, credit, property, corporate
governance, courts and bankruptcy.
To prioritize reform, governments can start by measuring
regulatory costs and identifying the biggest opportunities
for improvement. Belgium did so by introducing
an annual survey of enterprises on the main regulatory
obstacles they face. A total of 2,600 businesses participate
in the survey, and the results are reported to the parliament.
The process identified problems in company registration—a
main reason for the 2003 reform—and in
business licensing, where reform is ongoing. Actal, the independent
agency in the Dutch government, performs
cost-benefit analysis of regulatory proposals. Along with
similar agencies in Denmark and Korea, it is among the
best in measuring and reducing red tape. There are success
stories in developing countries too. In Mozambique
and Vietnam, the government regularly seeks advice from
the business community on priorities for reform.

6 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
TABLE 1.3
Simple solutions and where they have worked
Principles of good regulation
Starting
a business
Hiring and
firing
workers
Registering
property
Enforcing
contracts
Getting
credit
Protecting
investors
Closing a
business
Source: Doing Business database.
• Registration as an administrative process
CANADA, CHILE, ITALY, SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
• Use of single identification number
BELGIUM, ESTONIA, MOROCCO, TURKEY
• No minimum capital requirement
BOTSWANA, IRELAND, TANZANIA, THAILAND
• Electronic application made possible
LATVIA, MOLDOVA, SWEDEN, VIETNAM
• Long duration of fixed-term contracts
AUSTRIA, COSTA RICA, DENMARK, MALAYSIA
• Apprentice wages for young workers
CHILE, ECUADOR, FINLAND, TUNISIA
• Redundancy as grounds for dismissal
ARMENIA, BOTSWANA, LEBANON, RUSSIA
• Moderate severance pay for redundancy
FINLAND, MADAGASCAR, NAMIBIA, URUGUAY
• Consolidate procedures at the registry
LITHUANIA, NORWAY, THAILAND
• Unify or link the cadastre and property
AUSTRALIA, NETHERLANDS, SLOVAKIA
• Make the registry electronic
ITALY, NEW ZEALAND, SINGAPORE
• Complete the cadastre
AUSTRIA, CZECH REPUBLIC, DENMARK, IRELAND
• Summary proceedings for debt collection
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, FINLAND, LITHUANIA, PHILIPPINES
• Case management in courts
INDIA, MALAYSIA, SLOVAKIA, UNITED STATES
• Appeals are limited
BOTSWANA, CHILE, ESTONIA, GREECE
• Enforcement moved out of court
HUNGARY, IRELAND, NETHERLANDS, SWEDEN
• Legal protections in collateral law
ALBANIA, NEW ZEALAND, SLOVAKIA, UNITED STATES
• No restrictions on assets for collateral
AUSTRALIA, SINGAPORE, UNITED KINGDOM
• Sharing of positive credit information
GERMANY, HONG KONG (CHINA), MALAYSIA
• Data protection laws to ensure quality
ARGENTINA, BELGIUM, UNITED STATES
• Derivative suits allowed
CHILE, CZECH REPUBLIC, KOREA, NORWAY
• Institutional investors active
CHILE, KOREA, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES
• Disclosure of family and indirect ownership
DENMARK, SWEDEN, THAILAND, TUNISIA
• Public access to ownership and financial data
GERMANY, POLAND, SOUTH AFRICA
• Foreclosure focus in poor countries
ARMENIA, KENYA, NEPAL, PARAGUAY
• Specialized expertise in the courts
COLOMBIA, INDIA, LATVIA, TANZANIA
• Appeals are limited
AUSTRALIA, ESTONIA, MEXICO, ROMANIA
• Administrators are paid for maximizing value
DENMARK, JAPAN, JORDAN, MALAYSIA
Which myths to dispel?
This year’s analysis has also dispelled some commonly
held beliefs about the environment for doing business.
Myth #1 Regulatory reform is costly
The costs are modest for many of the reforms just outlined.
Setting up a private credit bureau cost less than
$2 million in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Setting up an administrative
agency for business registration cost less
than $2 million in Serbia and Montenegro. Integrating
the business start-up process into a single access point
cost $10 million in Turkey. Simple calculations from
growth analysis suggest that the benefit-to-cost ratios of
such reforms are on the order of 25:1. 8 Easing start-up
was recently listed by a panel packed with Nobel laureates
as one of the most cost-effective ways to spur development—ahead
of investing in infrastructure, developing
the financial sector and scaling up health services. 9
Myth #2 Social protection requires more business
regulation
Just look at the Nordic countries. All four Nordic economies
in Doing Business are on the list of countries with
the simplest business regulation: Norway (#5), Sweden
(#9), Denmark (#12) and Finland (#14). Few would argue
that they scrimp on social benefits relative to other
countries, or regulate too little. Instead, they have simple
regulations that allow businesses to be productive. And
they focus regulation on where it counts—protecting
property rights and providing social services. Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania, having learned much from their
richer neighbors, are also among the countries with the
best business environment. Heavier business regulation
is not associated with better social outcomes. 10
Myth #3 Entrepreneurs in developing countries
face frequent changes in laws and regulations
Entrepreneurs complain of unpredictability. And governments
complain of reform fatigue, blaming the development
aid agencies. Yet reforms in developing countries
are rare. Many have been stuck with the same laws
and regulations for decades: Mozambique’s company
law dates from 1888, Angola’s from 1901. No legal
change there. The difficulties businesses face come from
a lack of information and from discretion in enforcement.
There are simple solutions. Online services in the
company registrar can make it clear how to start a business.
Disclosure laws can reveal company ownership and
finances. And collateral and property registries can determine
who owns what.

REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH: AN OVERVIEW 7
Myth #4 Regulation is irrelevant in developing
countries because enforcement is poor
If it were, it would not be associated with so much informality
(figure 1.8). Few businesses comply with all
regulations in poor countries, since it is so prohibitively
costly that entrepreneurs choose to operate in the informal
economy. A large informal sector is bad for the
economy: it creates distortions, reduces tax revenues and
excludes many people from basic protections. If regulation
were simplified, entrepreneurs would find benefits
in moving to the formal sector, such as greater access to
credit and to courts.
FIGURE 1.8
Heavier regulation—more informality
Informal sector share of GDP
Greater
share
Lesser
share
Most difficult
Least difficult
Countries ranked by ease of doing business, quintiles
Source: Doing Business database.
What to expect next?
Three other areas of the business environment are being
researched. First, dealing with business licenses. One argument
that government officials give for why business
entry is difficult is that they don’t need to spend many
resources on regulation once the worthy entrants are selected.
Studying business licensing tests this argument—
and the argument fails. The same countries that heavily
regulate entry also have more complex and burdensome
licensing regimes (figure 1.9). The data and analysis will
be released in late 2004 on the Doing Business website.
Two new topics will be featured in Doing Business in
2006. One is trade logistics. What are the procedures, time
and cost for an exporter to bring goods from the factory
door to the ship, train or truck and across the border?
FIGURE 1.9
Bureaucratic entry, bureaucratic operations
Cost to obtain operational licenses and permits
Higher
Lower
Least expensive
Most expensive
Countries ranked by cost to start a business, quintiles
Source: Doing Business database.
What does it take to import a good and bring it to the
store shelf? How to deal with customs, pre-shipment inspections
and technical and quality certification?
The other is corporate taxation—its level, structure
and administration. Tax reform has been hotly debated,
especially in Europe, where several transition economies—Bulgaria,
Poland, Russia and Slovakia—are moving
to or have already adopted flat corporate and personal
tax at rates lower than the ones in other European countries.
Estonia has no tax on corporate earnings if they are
re-invested. Whether lowering taxation spurs enough
new business activity to make up for the loss of budget
revenues is a question that will be addressed next year.
The number of sample countries will continue to expand.
This year, Bhutan and Estonia were included in this
report. Data for Fiji, Kiribati, the Maldives, the Marshall
Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Samoa, the Solomon Islands,
Tonga and Vanuatu are available on the Doing Business
website. The governments of another dozen countries,
such as Cape Verde and Tajikistan, have requested inclusion
in next year’s sample.
Beyond adding new topics and countries is the challenge
of understanding how reform takes place. Doing
Business started by studying what entrepreneurs go
through in starting a business, hiring and firing workers,
enforcing contracts, registering property, getting credit,
protecting investors and closing a business. With time,
the project is building more information on reforms—
what motivates them, how to manage them and what
their impact is. Coming in Doing Business in 2006 are
studies of what reformers go through to improve business
conditions.

8 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Notes
1. Poor countries are defined as low and lower middle income economies
under World Bank Group income classifications.
2. As a part of the IDA13 round of funding, 39 IDA borrowers were
monitored on the days and cost to start a business between January
2002 and January 2004. The population-weighted change during this
period was –12% on days to start a business and –9% on cost to start a
business.
3. The ease of doing business measure is the simple average of country
rankings (from 1 to 135) in each of the 7 topics covered in Doing Business
in 2005. The ranking for each topic is the simple average of rankings
for each of the indicators—for example the starting a business
ranking averages the country rankings on the procedures, days, cost
and minimum capital requirement to register a business.
4. Based on a hypothetical improvement to the average of the top quartile
of countries on the ease of doing business indicator. Standard
growth regression analysis estimates the relationship between 10 year
average annual GDP growth rates and the ease of doing business indicator.
The analysis controls for income, government expenditure, primary
and secondary school enrollment, inflation, investment, civil
conflict and regions. The relationship is robust using 5, 15 and 20 year
growth rates, as well as when controlling for trade, ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
latitude, and in instrumental regressions. See Djankov,
McLiesh and Ramalho (2004).
5. NNR (2003).
6. British Chamber of Commerce (2004).
7. The data for Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway come from Danish
Commerce and Companies Agency (2003).
8. Growth estimates implied from the analysis in Klapper, Laeven and
Rajan (2004) suggest benefits of $48 million from the reforms implemented
in Serbia and Montenegro, and $413 million in Turkey, in the
first year alone.
9. Copenhagen Consensus (2004). Available at http://www.copenhagen
consensus.com/
10. Djankov and others (2002).

9
Measuring
with impact
How are the indicators constructed?
How is the methodology being improved?
What is new?
In 1908 the first Model T came off the Ford Motor Company’s
factory floor. The time to produce a single car:
12 ½ hours. The price: $825. Few people could afford
one. Realizing this, in 1911 Henry Ford asked Frederick
Taylor, the creator of time-and-motion studies, for help.
After studying the production process from beginning
to end, Taylor divided it into separate procedures and
assigned workers to each. By 1914 it took 93 minutes to
produce a Model T, and the price fell to $440. Ford produced
261,000 that year, nearly as many produced by the
other 300 car manufacturers combined.
In 1986 Hernando de Soto published The Other
Path, using a time-and-motion study to show the prohibitive
obstacles to establishing a business in Peru. De
Soto’s research team followed all necessary bureaucratic
procedures in setting up a one-employee garment factory
in the outskirts of Lima. It took 289 days and $1,231
for the business to legally start operations.
Doing Business is a time-and-motion study which
measures, across 145 countries, the obstacles faced by
an entrepreneur performing standardized tasks: starting
a business; hiring and firing workers; obtaining business
licenses; getting credit; registering property; protecting
investors; enforcing contracts; and closing down
a business. It takes 7 procedures and 8 days and costs
1% of income per capita to register a business in Singapore;
41 procedures, 455 days and 10% of the debt
to enforce a debt contract in Oman; 5 procedures, 49
days and 4% of the property value to register property
in Pakistan; and 16 procedures, 121 days and 13% of income
per capita to recover collateral in Mexico (figure 2.1).
The Doing Business research is conducted in coop-
FIGURE 2.1
Complex procedures to recover collateral in Mexico
Days
Percentage of income per capita
120
12
90
9
Cost
60
6
Time
30
3
0
1 4 8 12 16
0
Procedures
Source: Doing Business database.
1. Filing of complaint before judge.
2. Writ of the court in which the complaint is admitted.
3. Judicial request for payment of the encumbered assets.
4. Answer to the claim. The debtor may oppose defenses.
5. Court admits or dismisses the answer.
6. Notice to the creditor of the opposed defenses.
7. Hearing of admission of evidence.
8. Court renders judgement.
9. Decision to proceed to asset sale.
10. Determination of asset value.
11. Decision on method of sale.
12. Arrangement for public auction.
13. The debtor is notified of the date for the public auction.
14. Publication of legal notices for potential buyers.
15. Public sale.
16. Creditor reimburses the exceeding amount to the debtor.

10 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
eration with leading scholars. The methodology for each
of the 8 topics is developed in an academic background
paper. 1 More than 60 other researchers have used the
data, uncovering systematic patterns in business regulations
and access to credit across countries, and testing
hypotheses for the determinants of these patterns. 2
The Doing Business data come from readings of laws
and regulations, with input and verification from more
than 3,000 local government officials, lawyers, business
consultants and other professionals administering or
advising on legal and regulatory requirements. The
methodology uses factual information and allows several
interactions with local respondents, ensuring accuracy
by clarifying possible misinterpretations of questions.
A library of current laws, also specifying the
regulatory reforms under way, supports each indicator set.
The use of local knowledge distinguishes Doing Business
from several other existing indicators, such as the ones
produced by the Heritage Foundation, Freedom House,
the International Country Risk Guide and Institutional Investor,
constructed by experts living in other countries.
Transparent and easily replicable, Doing Business
can be used for comparisons and benchmarks across
countries. All the surveys and details of the methodology
are published on the website—http//rru.worldbank.org/
doingbusiness—as are the contacts for local partners
who provide information. 3 The indicators on starting a
business have been audited externally. 4
There is also a simple process for contesting the
data—a welcome way to improve the indicators. 5 In the
last year, about 60 inquiries have been received, primarily
from government officials and development experts,
and in 10 cases the interaction led to revisions of an indicator.
These include correcting the data on starting a
business in Bolivia, the Czech Republic, France, Honduras,
Madagascar and Tunisia; on enforcing a contract
in Iran and Tunisia; on closing a business in Serbia and
Montenegro; and on firing workers in South Africa. The
corrections are immediately reflected on the website, the
most up-to-date source. With 3,192 data points in last
year’s report, the corrections amount to 0.3% of the total
sample.
Most important, the Doing Business analysis can be
used to support policy reforms, and is already starting to
do so—for 2 reasons. First, understanding the relationship
between indicators and economic and social outcomes
enables policymakers to see how particular laws
and regulations are associated with poverty, corruption,
employment, access to credit, the size of the informal
economy and the entry of new firms. Putting higher administrative
burdens on entrepreneurs diminishes business
activity—but it also creates more corruption and a
larger informal economy, with fewer jobs for the poor.
Second, Doing Business provides guidance on the
design of reforms. The indicators offer a wealth of detail
on the specific regulations and institutions that enhance
or hinder business activity, the biggest bottlenecks causing
bureaucratic delay and the cost of complying with
regulation. Governments can identify, after reviewing
their country’s Doing Business indicators, where they lag
behind and what to reform (figure 2.2). They then can
understand what constitutes best practices and which
countries to learn from. For property registration, from
New Zealand, Norway and Thailand. For business registration,
from Australia and Canada. To improve contract
enforcement, from Dutch courts. To better protect small
investors, from Canada, Israel, Spain, the United Kingdom
or the United States and their regulators.
FIGURE 2.2
Reform in Ethiopia focuses on the major obstacles
Days
45
Time reduced
from 44 days to 32
2003
Percentage of income per capita
450
2003
2004
30
15
Procedures
reduced
from 8 to 7
300
150
Cost reduced
from 484% to 78%
(of income per capita)
0
1 4 8
Procedures
Source: Doing Business database.
0
1 4 8
Procedures
2004

MEASURING WITH IMPACT 11
How are the indicators constructed?
The methodology for each of the topics in Doing Business
has 6 features:
• The team, with academic advisers, collects and analyzes
the laws and regulations in force.
• This analysis yields a survey designed for local professionals
experienced in their fields—such as incorporation
lawyers and consultants for business entry, litigation
lawyers and judges for contract enforcement,
officials in land registries and real estate lawyers for registering
property.
• The survey utilizes a standardized business case to
ensure comparability across countries and over time—
with assumptions about the legal form of the business,
its size, location and nature of operations.
• The local experts have several rounds of interaction
with the Doing Business team, typically 4.
• The preliminary results are presented to both academics
and practitioners for refinements in the survey
and further rounds of data collection.
• The data are subjected to numerous tests for robustness,
which lead to subsequent revisions or expansions
of the collected information. For example, the initial
contract enforcement study collected and analyzed data
for the recovery of a debt in the amount of 50% of income
per capita, as well as for 2 other cases—the eviction
of nonpaying tenants and the recovery of a smaller
debt claim (5% of income per capita). After the release
of Doing Business in 2004, it became clear that court and
attorney fees were often too high to expect small debt
cases to reach the court. As a result, the debt amount was
increased fourfold in this year’s report.
FIGURE 2.3
Enforcing a contract in Poland—1,000 days
Days
1,000
800
600
400
200
Filing of complaint 90 days
0
1
Procedures
41
Source: Doing Business database.
Trial and judgment
730 days
Enforcement 180 days
The result is a set of indicators that is easy to verify
and replicate. And extending the dataset to obtain other
benchmarks is straightforward. For example, the Doing
Business case studies assume a certain type of business—
usually a domestic limited liability company. Analysts
can follow the methodology, adjust the assumption and
construct the same benchmarks for other standardized
cases, for example sole proprietorships and foreign companies.
The methodology for one project—enforcing a contract—illustrates
the general approach. The indicators
for contract enforcement are constructed by studying
a standardized case of a payment dispute in the amount
of 200% of income per capita in a country’s most populous
city. The data track the procedures to recover the
debt through the courts or through an administrative
process, if such a process is available and preferred by
creditors. The plaintiff has fully complied with the contract
(and is thus 100% in the right) and files a lawsuit to
recover the debt. The debtor attempts to delay and opposes
the complaint. But the judge or administrator decides
every motion for the plaintiff.
The data come from readings of the codes of civil
procedures and other court regulations, as well as from
administering surveys to local litigation attorneys, with
at least 2 lawyers participating in each country. In 30
countries the surveys are also completed by judges to see
whether their answers are similar to those of attorneys.
They are. As with all of the Doing Business in 2005 topics,
the data are for January 2004.
Based on the survey responses, 3 indicators of the
efficiency of commercial contract enforcement are developed:
• The number of procedures, mandated by law or
court regulation, that demand interaction between the
parties or between them and the judge (administrator)
or court officer.
• The time of dispute resolution in calendar days,
counted from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit
in court until the moment of settlement or, when appropriate,
payment. (This includes the days when actions
take place and the waiting periods between actions.)
• The official cost of court procedures, including
court costs and attorney fees, where the use of attorneys
is mandatory or common, or an administrative debt recovery
procedure, expressed as a percentage of the debt.

12 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Based on these data Doing Business constructs a timeand-motion
figure for each country. The figure makes
clear what the main bottlenecks are in the contract enforcement
process. In Poland, for example, it takes
1,000 days and 41 procedures to enforce a simple debt
contract (figure 2.3). Three-quarters of that time is
spent on the trial and judgment, with the 22nd procedure—hearings—taking
the longest. Cutting procedures
and reducing the time for hearings would substantially
improve efficiency. In Estonia it takes only
150 days and 25 procedures.
Such analysis is conducted on each of the 8 topics,
for every one of the 145 countries in the Doing Business
in 2005 sample.
How is the methodology being improved?
Two characteristics define good indicators. First, they
capture the real constraints to doing business. Second,
they are understood by policymakers, business leaders,
journalists and development experts and are easy to act
upon. Doing Business in 2005 introduces changes to develop
more of each.
On capturing constraints, 2 concerns have been
raised: whether the data from surveys of professionals
are representative and whether the indicators are a good
reflection of business constraints across the country. The
answer: surveys of local professionals offer several advantages
over enterprise surveys or polling of international
experts, but the indicators for a business in Rio de
Janeiro may be very different from the indicators for a
business in São Paulo. In large countries, particularly in
such federations as Brazil, Indonesia and Russia, regional
indicators need to be constructed.
The typical respondent to the survey on business
registration assisted over 100 businesses through the
entry process in 2003. The typical respondent to the survey
of closing down a business comes from the law firm
that dealt with the largest number of bankruptcy cases in
her country in 2001–03. And the typical respondent to
the survey on protecting investors has the largest advisory
practice on corporate governance issues in his
country and has worked on various bar association or
government committees in drafting new laws and regulations
on shareholder protections. It is difficult to surpass
their expertise and the accuracy of the data generated
from their answers to the Doing Business surveys.
But these experts often work in the largest cities and
may not be familiar with the practice in other parts of
the country. So, this year Doing Business developed indicators
at the regional level in several large countries.
In Brazil 9 cities other than São Paulo have been studied.
In India 8 cities other than Mumbai. In Pakistan 4 cities
other than Karachi.
From these limited exercises, and from the work of
others, it is apparent that large differences exist across regions
within a country (figure 2.4). 6 In Brazil the municipal
requirement for an alvará (operational license)
accounts for a significant proportion of the overall time
to start a business and is the main reason for differences
across cities. In São Paulo, the largest business city and
the benchmark for the Doing Business cross-country indicators,
the alvará requirement drives up the total days
FIGURE 2.4
Regional variations in Brazil—tremendous
Time and cost to start a business
Days
Percentage of income per capita
24 10 Salvador
12
37 10 Belo Horizonte
22
27 20 Fortaleza
17
30
37
37
18
13
20
Campo Grande
Manaus
Cuiabá
15
16
16
48 25 Brasília
09
47 30 Porto Velho
22
46 45 Rio de Janeiro
21
32 120
São Paulo
12
Alvara
Source: Doing Business database.
Time and cost to register property
(percentage of property value)
5
4
3
2
Brasília
Manaus
Campo Grande
Porto Velho
Fortaleza
Cuiabá
Belo
Rio de Janeiro Horizonte
São Paulo
Salvador
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Days

MEASURING WITH IMPACT 13
to start a business to double that in most other cities.
Some of the same patterns that hold across countries are
visible at the subnational level—for example in Brazil
the cities with higher official fees for registering property
are also the cities with the longest time.
Such within-country work is necessary to identify
constraints and design reforms. Here, the methodology
developed by Doing Business again offers advantages
over the alternative methods. It is significantly cheaper
than running enterprise surveys. And it is much more
accurate than asking a New York-based expert about
business constraints in Porto Velho (the 60th largest city
in Brazil).
Still, there is room for improvement. Changes have
been made to every set of indicators. For example, last
year the statutory requirement for minimum capital was
taken as part of the initial cost of starting a business. But
in a number of countries, only a part of the mandated
minimum capital needs to be paid up-front, with the
rest paid over time. For example, only 25% is paid upfront
in Germany, 30% in Italy and 50% in Armenia. The
revised indicator reflects the up-front cost only.
Indicators of credit markets were also improved.
Doing Business in 2004 reported a measure of the legal
rights of creditors in insolvency. This year, the measure
is expanded to cover collateral laws as well—which define
legal rights that help both borrowers and lenders.
And indicators on credit information were simplified
to an index of 6 variables, covering information sharing
from both public and privately owned registries.
As another example, last year’s methodology for enforcing
a contract did not allow for a creditor to seek recovery
outside the courts. This assumption was made in
the belief that such actions may always be reversed by a
FIGURE 2.5
High costs to fire in some countries
Cost to fire (weeks)
0 50 100 150
New Zealand
Algeria
South Africa
Honduras
Congo, Dem. Rep.
India
Romania
Angola
Greece
Guatemala
Notice
Source: Doing Business database.
Severance
Penalty for dismissal
later court judgment and are not preferred by creditors.
But several countries—for example, Belgium, France
and Greece—have administrative debt collection procedures
that are binding for both debtors and creditors.
This year, administrative procedures are used for countries
where the respondents indicate they are the most
common method.
A different problem arises when the respondents describe
how entrepreneurs would register a business, go
to court or enter bankruptcy—but in reality have dealt
little with such transactions. To gauge their experience,
this year’s surveys collected information on how many
such transactions the respondent completed. The new
evidence shows that the average incorporation lawyer
dealt with more than 100 cases of business entry in 2003.
And because Doing Business has about 500 respondents
on starting a business, the data reported here reflect experience
with more than 50,000 transactions for the
whole sample—for only one of the topics in Doing Business.
Beyond the arithmetic, a professional dealing with
these issues every day can differentiate between usual
costs and delays and those under extraordinary circumstances.
To inspire reform, indicators need to be simple.
Changes to the methodology have been made where
users of the indicators said they had trouble understanding
them. For example, last year’s indices on the rigidity
of employment regulation were based on a reading of
the laws and varied from 0 (less rigid regulation) to 100
(more rigid regulation). Many business people asked
whether the indices could be presented in terms of costs.
So this year, a new indicator on the cost of firing a redundant
worker has been constructed (figure 2.5), measured
in terms of weeks of wages.
For another example, last year’s indicators on the
difficulty of closing a business looked at the cost, time,
priority of claims and extent of court involvement. Policymakers
have said that they are most concerned about
how much value is being lost in inefficient bankruptcy
procedures. The result is a new indicator, which calculates
how many cents on the dollar can be recovered in
bankruptcy (figure 2.6).
Once the simple indicator triggers interest in reform,
by comparing it with those for other countries and
by showing the economic and social benefits of improvement,
more detailed information collected by the
Doing Business team can be used to assist the reformers.
One example is the indicators on registering property.
Once the government of Malawi acknowledges the need
to make registration more efficient, the depth of the

14 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
FIGURE 2.6
Low recovery rates in insolvency in most countries
Brazil
Haiti
Philippines
Kenya
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Pakistan
Poland
Belgium
Singapore
Source: Doing Business database.
Recovery rate (cents on the dollar)
0 20 40 60 80 100
FIGURE 2.7
How can Malawi reform property registration?
analysis allows further investigation of where the reform
should focus (figure 2.7). In particular, the third procedure—the
requirement to obtain consent from the minister
of lands for the property transfer—is the largest
bottleneck to registering property. Cutting this procedure
would reduce the time by 75%.
Data have also been collected on the actual use of
courts in filing for bankruptcy. This is a first attempt to
measure use of public institutions and hence the relevance
of bankruptcy laws for the average business. The
result: in 40 countries bankruptcy is hardly ever used.
The analysis of such data helps in setting priorities for
reform and in designing improvements to indicators.
Doing Business in 2005 presents new indicators on collateral
laws to address how creditors enforce their rights
outside of bankruptcy.
Doing Business in 2006 will report whether these improvements
help reformers. The use of various indicators
in allocating aid—for the United States’ grants
under the Millennium Challenge Account, for the International
Development Association and for World Bank
lending operations in Brazil, Nigeria, Peru and a dozen
other countries—is a hopeful start. So are the requests
for inclusion in the Doing Business sample by the governments
of Bhutan, Cape Verde, Estonia, Mauritius and
Tajikistan.
The early successes in supporting regulatory reform
owe much to the media. Since its publication last October,
Doing Business has been featured in more than 700
media stories around the world. And in Brazil, Colombia,
the Czech Republic, Poland and Serbia and Montenegro,
the media coverage helped policymakers to identify issues
and reform to gain momentum.
ANSWER –
Cut the governor consent requirement
Thailand
South Africa
Mozambique
Days to register property
0 30 60 90 120
Days
120
90
Malawi
Paraguay
Cambodia
Sri Lanka
Ukraine
Burkina Faso
Malawi
Source: Doing Business database.
60
30
0
Procedure 3
Obtain consent
from the minister
of lands for the
property transfer
1 6
Procedures

MEASURING WITH IMPACT 15
What is new?
Three new sets of indicators have been developed, showing
the regulations an entrepreneur faces when registering
property, protecting investors and dealing with business
licenses. The data for the first 2 sets are presented in
this report. Information on business licenses has been so
difficult to collect in some countries that the data will
become available on the Doing Business website in November.
The following indicators are constructed:
• Registering property—procedures, time and cost to
register property. The indicators are constructed
assuming a standardized case of a business that wants to
purchase land and buildings in the peri-urban area of
the most populous city. The property is already recorded
in the registry and cadastre, free of title dispute and valued
at 50 times income per capita. The indicators measure
the time and cost to comply with all necessary procedures
to register the transfer of title from the seller to
the buyer.
• Protecting investors—an index of ownership and financial
disclosure. Seven types of disclosure make up the
indicator—by reporting family, indirect and beneficial
ownership, and on voting agreements between shareholders,
by requiring audit committees and the use of
external auditors and by making such information available
to all current and potential investors. The data come
from a survey of corporate and securities lawyers. They
measure the highest available disclosure, reflecting the
choices of small investors to put their money in publicly
listed or privately held companies. In countries where
stock exchange regulations and securities laws are in
force, the disclosure index assesses these regulations. In
other countries, the disclosure requirements come from
the company law. So the indicators are relevant for private
companies as well as publicly listed ones.
• Dealing with business licenses—procedures, time
and cost to obtain business licenses and permits for ongoing
operations. Because licenses are industry-specific,
the data are built for a case in the construction industry.
In future years the data will cover other major industries.
The same standardized case used in building the starting
a business data is applied to assess the procedures, time
and cost necessary for the business to operate legally in
the construction industry, after completing all required
general registration procedures. Next, a new standardized
case is developed to measure the formalities necessary
for ongoing operations in the construction industry—assuming
that the operations are to build a
warehouse in the peri-urban area of the most populous
city. Technical characteristics of the warehouse are described
to construction and real estate lawyers and construction
associations who answered the survey. Indicators
measure the procedures, time and cost to comply
with all necessary regulations and formalities to complete
the warehouse construction—from obtaining a location
permit or building permit to obtaining utility
connections and registering the new building.
Detailed explanations on the construction of indicators,
including the new ones, are available in the Data
Notes section.
Notes
1. Several papers are already published, including Djankov and others
(2002), Djankov and others (2003a), Djankov and others (2003b), and
Botero and others (forthcoming). Two other papers—Djankov,
McLiesh and Shleifer (2004) and Djankov and others (forthcoming)—
are the basis for the Getting Credit and Closing a Business chapters, respectively.
2. These include, among others, Rajan and Zingales (2003), Klapper,
Laeven and Rajan (2004), Bolaky and Freund (2004), Lerner and
Schoar (2004), Acemoglu (2003), Mulligan and Shleifer (2003), Hoekman,
Kee and Olarreaga (2003) and Smarzynska and Spatareanu
(2004).
3. In the surveys, respondents are asked whether they wish to have their
names and contacts printed. A small percentage have requested
anonymity.
4. Booz, Allen and Hamilton (2004).
5. Questions about the methodology can be asked at http://rru.worldbank.
org/doingbusiness/askquestion and will be answered within 48
hours. Readers who wish to contest the data are referred to the detailed
methodology in the Data Notes or at
http://rru.worldbank.org/doingbusiness/ methodology and to the procedure
by procedure data on the Doing Business website. For example,
in contesting the Starting a Business data on Albania, the reader
should look at http://rru.doingbusiness.org/
doingbusiness/exploretopics/startingbusiness/economies/albania.pdf.
6. SEBRAE (2000), World Bank Investment Climate Assessments, available
at http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ic/ic_country_report.htm.

17
Starting a business
Who is reforming business start-up?
What to reform?
Why make it easy?
Ridwan always wanted to start his own business. So last
January the Indonesian quit his job as a nurse, sold his
car and took his savings out of the bank. Five months
later, he is the owner of a health spa in Jakarta. Almost.
He still hasn’t received an inspection from the municipal
authorities, mandatory for the business to operate legally.
Nor has he gotten his operational permit. This is not
unusual. It takes 151 days to start a business in Jakarta.
Starting a business is a leap of faith even in the best
of circumstances. Governments should encourage the
daring. And some do. In 2003 it became easier to start a
new business in 35 countries. But progress was uneven.
Countries in the European Union and borrowers from
the International Development Association (IDA) improved
dramatically (figure 3.1). Few others changed. In
the EU, following the 2000 Lisbon Summit, countries
signed a charter agreeing to benchmark and reform the
regulation of business start-up. 1 IDA received additional
funding for borrowers conditional on cutting the time
and cost of business start-up. 2 The lesson—what gets
measured gets done.
Much was achieved with the stroke of a pen—by
abolishing old decrees or passing new ones at the ministry
of economy, ministry of finance or company registrar.
Some countries combined several administrative
functions into a single access point for would-be entrepreneurs.
Others improved information systems. Turkey
launched one-stop registration, by combining 7 procedures
into a single visit to the company registry. The
time to start a business was cut from 38 days to 9. The
cost fell by a third. And the number of registrations shot
up by 18%. Italy opened online business registration,
almost halving the time to start a business—from 23
days to 13. Russia eliminated 3 procedures, cutting to 9
the face-to-face interactions between the entrepreneur
and government officials. Similar administrative reforms
were implemented in Argentina, Colombia, Jordan,
Madagascar, Moldova, Morocco and Nicaragua.
The world’s top reformer—France—adopted a law
on encouraging entrepreneurs. It launched online business
registration and scrapped the minimum capital requirement
for private limited liability companies. The
number of procedures to start a business was cut from 9
to 7. The time was reduced from 49 days to 8. And the
cost of start-up became negligible. Some 14,000 new
businesses registered, up 18% on the year before.
Three other reformers passed new legislation. Spain
created a new corporate form and established a process
FIGURE 3.1
What gets measured gets done
Reduction in time and cost for business start-up, 2003–04
Level in
2003
–5%
–10%
–15%
2004
EU members
TIME
COST
Source: Doing Business database.
TIME
START-UP MEASURED
IDA borrowers
COST
All other
countries
TIME
COST

18 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
to forward company applications electronically between
different government agencies. The number of procedures
to start a business fell from 11 to 7. Changes in the
Slovak Company Law introduced a time limit on business
registration, cutting the days to start a business
from 98 to 52. Bosnia and Herzegovina modified the
Law on Business Companies, reducing the minimum
capital requirement from 10,000KM to 2,000KM and
setting a statutory time limit for registration. In May
2004 Poland adopted the Economic Freedom Act, which
will create a single registration procedure and reduce the
days to register a business from 25 to 5.
A few countries slipped. Azerbaijan extended the
statutory time limit for registration and increased the
time to start a business from 106 days to 123. India
added a procedure by requiring separate steps for obtaining
different tax numbers. Benin, Domican Republic,
Kuwait and Malawi increased fees. Zimbabwe hiked
the capital duty from 1% to 20%, and increased the license
application fee fourfold. Costs in Mauritania increased
by a third, and in Rwanda by a quarter.
Who is reforming business start-up?
An entrepreneur trying to set up a business can face obstacles—costs,
delays or procedural complexities. Doing Business
in 2005 measures 4 dimensions of this difficulty: the
number of procedures, the time, the cost in official fees and
the minimum capital that the entrepreneur must deposit
in the bank before registration starts (Box 3.1). 3 In each
case a higher number indicates that opening a business
is more difficult and that fewer entrepreneurs will do so.
Doing Business in 2004 revealed that poor countries
regulate business start-up more than rich countries.
These are the countries that most need to spur entrepreneurial
activity, have the least enforcement capacity and
the fewest checks to ensure regulatory discretion is not
abused. The gap is still large. On average it takes 6 procedures,
27 days and 8% of the income per capita to start
a business in OECD countries—and 11 procedures, 59
days and 122% of the income per capita to do so in poor
countries. Some are catching up. Armenia, Mongolia
and Moldova introduced significant reforms. Others
made incremental improvements, including Georgia, Indonesia,
Sri Lanka and Vietnam.
Of all areas of regulation measured in Doing Business,
entry regulations were reformed the most. A quarter
of countries made it easier to start a business in 2003.
Some reformed dramatically. The top 10 reformers cut
procedures by 26%, time by 41%, cost by 56% and minimum
capital by 8% on average (figure 3.2).
Why the change? Performance targets were important.
IDA received additional funding allocations conditional
on improvements in the time and cost of business
start-up. And the United States government (through
the Millennium Challenge Account) began allocating
funds based on performance in business start-up indicators.
More than two-thirds of IDA borrowers improved,
by more than 10% on average (see figure 3.1).
FIGURE 3.2
The top 10 reformers
Average improvement, 2003–04
Level
in 2003
2004
Procedures
–26%
Time
–41%
Source: Doing Business database.
Cost
–56%
Minimum
capital
–8%
Top reformers
France
Morocco
Turkey
Ethiopia
Slovakia
Mongolia
Moldova
Belgium
Spain
Nicaragua
But the biggest reforms are happening in Europe,
where country performance on start-up regulations is
monitored under the European Charter for Small Enterprises.
5 Fully half the EU countries introduced improvements
in 2003. France led the way, followed by Belgium,
Finland and Spain. Among the new EU countries, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia made the
fastest progress. In the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia
further reforms are under way.
Other regions reformed less, with some exceptions.
In South Asia, Nepal and Sri Lanka reduced the time to
start a business, following Pakistan the previous year.
In the Middle East and North Africa, Jordan and Morocco
implemented sweeping reforms and made the top
20 reformers list. In Latin America, Argentina, Bolivia,
Colombia and Nicaragua made significant improvements.
Moldova and Mongolia made the top 20 reformers
list, as did Russia, which continued its rise up the
rankings for a second year, by reducing the number of
procedures from 19 to 12 in 2002 and to 9 in 2003.

STARTING A BUSINESS 19
BOX 3.1
Who has the most regulation of business start-up—and who the least?
Number of procedures
Fewest
Most
Australia 2 Argentina 15
Canada 2 Bolivia 15
New Zealand 2 Greece 15
Finland 3 Guatemala 15
Sweden 3 Ukraine 15
Belgium 4 Belarus 16
Denmark 4 Brazil 17
Ireland 4 Paraguay 17
Norway 4 Uganda 17
United States 5 Chad 19
Two procedures are enough to start a business: notification
of existence, and registration for tax and social
security. But only Australia, Canada and New Zealand
limit requirements to just those 2. Many countries—
especially poor ones—impose additional procedures.
Chad, the world’s ninth poorest country, has 19. OECD
countries require only 6 on average. More procedures
mean more delays and more opportunities for bureaucrats
to extract bribes.
Time (days)
Least
Most
Australia 2 Venezuela 116
Canada 3 Azerbaijan 123
Denmark 4 Burkina Faso 135
United States 5 Angola 146
Puerto Rico 7 Indonesia 151
France 8 Brazil 152
Singapore 8 Mozambique 153
Turkey 9 Congo, Dem. Rep. 155
Hong Kong, China 11 Lao PDR 198
Netherlands 11 Haiti 203
Business start-up takes only 2 days in Australia and 27
days on average in rich countries. France and Turkey
joined the list of countries with the shortest entry time.
In poor ones it is more than twice that—60 days. Latin
America tops the list as the region with most delays, 70
days on average, followed by sub-Saharan Africa, at 63
days. Haiti takes the longest time, at 203 days.
Cost (% of income per capita, and $US)
Least % $ Most % $
Denmark 0.0 0 Yemen, Rep. 269.3 1,404
New Zealand 0.2 39 Zimbabwe 304.7 140
United States 0.6 210 Rwanda 316.9 601
Sweden 0.7 257 Congo, Rep. 317.6 2,501
United Kingdom 0.9 314 Chad 344.2 1,086
Puerto Rico 1.0 110 Niger 396.4 1,025
Canada 1.0 271 Cambodia 480.1 1,529
France 1.1 368 Congo, Dem. Rep. 556.8 611
Singapore 1.2 262 Angola 884.6 6,621
Finland 1.2 417 Sierra Leone 1,268.4 1,663
Official fees do not buy efficiency. The time and cost to
set up a business go hand in hand. Six of the 10 countries
with the shortest time to start a business also have
the lowest official cost. Eight of the 10 most expensive
countries for start-ups are in Africa, where it costs on
average twice the income per capita to start a business.
Fees are high even in dollar terms. In France the entrepreneur
pays only $368 in official fees—in Niger
$1,025. In many countries bribes move the process
along, making the difference in total entry costs even
larger between rich and poor countries.
Minimum capital requirement (% income per capita, and $US)
None (0%) Most % $
42, including: Morocco 719 11,429
Australia Niger 745 1,925
Botswana Egypt, Arab Rep. 816 8,126
Canada Mauritania 858 3,765
France China 1,104 12,082
Nepal Jordan 1,148 21,157
Thailand Saudi Arabia 1,550 133,511
Uganda Yemen, Rep. 1,561 8,138
United States Ethiopia 1,822 1,740
Vietnam Syrian Arab Republic 5,054 267,261
In all but 42 countries entrepreneurs need to deposit
minimum capital into a (usually frozen) account to establish
a limited liability company. But not all countries
require paying the money up front. 4 High capital requirements
are the norm in the Middle East and North
Africa—more than 8 times income per capita. More
than half of the Latin American and East Asian countries
and all South Asian countries require no paid minimum
capital.
Source: Doing Business database.

20 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Procedures
Governments can reduce the number of procedures
while maintaining the same level of regulation. Turkey
did this. In June 2003, 7 procedures—obtaining a permit
from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, making a payment
to the consumers’ fund, registering at the trade
registry, registering for taxes, for social security, at the
chamber of commerce and at the ministry of labor—
were combined into one, and delegated to the chambers
of commerce (figure 3.3). Application forms were unified
and shortened, and registry officers were trained in
customer relations. None of the substantive requirements
for the procedures were changed. 6 A new business
can now be started in about a week.
A year ago Colombia was tied with Belarus and
Chad for the most procedures. Since then it established
business help centers and concentrated several procedures,
relocating representatives of each agency to the
new offices. The number of procedures dropped from 19
to 14—the time, from 60 days to 43.
Belgium launched online registration and combined
4 procedures into 1 at a company center. In so
doing it entered the list of countries with fewest procedures.
The office now handles responsibilities previously
performed at the trade registry, social security registry
and the tax registry. Time was cut from 56 days to 34.
Time
Eliminating or combining procedures gave the largest
time savings. But some countries also cut time by reforming
individual procedures. Argentina established a
fast-track process for registration, reducing the time to
obtain a company identification number from 14 days to
FIGURE 3.3
Big changes in Turkey in 2003
Time
Time reduced
from 38 days to 9
Source: Doing Business database.
2003
2004
Number of procedures
2003
Procedures reduced
from 13 to 8
5. Sri Lanka computerized the registry office, cutting a
week off of waiting time. Moldova also introduced a new
electronic system at the state registration chamber, reducing
delays by a third.
Cost
Reducing costs can be straightforward. Ethiopia did it by
eliminating the requirement to publish notices in two
newspapers. Costs plummeted from almost 500% of income
per capita to 77%, and time fell from 44 days to 32.
Albania eliminated some registration fees, almost halving
cost to 32%. Georgia cut the start-up cost from 23%
to 14%. The Democratic Republic of Congo reduced
cost by a third, albeit to a still staggering 557% of the income
per capita.
Capital
Scrapping minimum capital requirements is a difficult
reform because it requires legislative change. France was
the only economy to abolish the requirement last year,
and Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only one to reduce
it. And the new draft company law in Serbia and
Montenegro contemplates a significant reduction in
2005: from 5,000 Euro to 10.
Some justify capital requirements as protecting
creditors and society against damage from failing or untrustworthy
businesses. But in many countries minimum
capital can be paid with in-kind contributions,
such as management time—hardly of value in insolvency.
In others the capital may be withdrawn immediately
after registration. In practice recovery rates in insolvency
are no different between countries with and
without minimum capital requirements. 7 The countries
that developed the requirement in the 18th century—
England and France—have both scrapped it.
Others should follow. Cambodia shows why. It takes
almost 5 times the income per capita in official fees to
start a business in Phnom Penh. Also the entrepreneur
needs to deposit CR20 million, or about $5,100, in a
bank account during the registration process: more than
17 times the income per capita. Add other official costs,
and the entrepreneur needs $6,650, or 22 times the income
per capita (figure 3.4). In the United States this
would amount to $833,000. In reality the official fees for
starting a business in New York City are $210, and there
is no minimum capital requirement.
High capital requirements are common in the Middle
East and North Africa. Syria imposes the world’s
highest, at 50 times the income per capita. But this is a
20th century invention. 8 Before then, the Middle East

FIGURE 3.4
“More difficult” can mean a lot more difficult
1148%–
5054%
STARTING A BUSINESS 21
Most
difficult
Range of the
5 highest
16–19
Easiest
Range of the
2–3
5 lowest
Procedures
Source: Doing Business database.
152–203
2–7
Time
(days)
% of income per capita
1500
1000
500
396%–
1268%
0–1%
Cost
0
Minimum
capital
TABLE 3.1
Ease of business start-up
Easiest
Canada
Australia
New Zealand
United States
Hong Kong, China
Puerto Rico
France
United Kingdom
Singapore
Denmark
Source: Doing Business database.
Most difficult
Mauritania
Guinea
Togo
Cambodia
Haiti
Yemen, Rep.
Angola
Burkina Faso
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Chad
had some of the most flexible laws governing business establishment.
This suggests that reform is feasible. Indeed,
Lebanon revised its company legislation in 1998, cutting
capital requirements to 82% of its income per capita.
What are the results of all this reform? The ease of
business start-up is a simple average of the ranking of
the number of procedures, the associated time and cost,
and the capital required at the start of business. Canada
comes first. France just joined the list. All 4 Nordic countries
are among the 20 best practice countries, as are Ireland,
Israel, Romania, Switzerland, and Thailand. Among
the countries with the most cumbersome new business
start-up are 7 African countries (table 3.1).
What to reform?
As ways to ease business start-up, Doing Business in 2004
recommended single registration forms, a single company
identification number, a general-objects clause in
the articles of incorporation and eliminating court involvement
in the registration process.
This year’s analysis shows that these reforms work.
The update also asked local Doing Business partners to
name the 5 biggest regulatory and administrative obstacles
in starting new businesses. “Too many separate procedures
and different offices to visit” came out on top, at
24% (table 3.2). Poor service was next, at 16%. Long duration
of start-up procedures was third, at 12%.
The data suggest that reform to reduce the number
of procedures and the time to start a business would
have the highest payoff. Here are 6 ways to do it:
• Create single access points for business.
• Get out of the courts.
• Make registration electronic.
• Introduce temporary business licenses.
• Impose a “silence is consent” rule in business
registration.
• Standardize paperwork.
TABLE 3.2
The 5 largest obstacles to start-up
Identified problem
Percent of respondents
Too many procedures 24
Poor service 16
Long duration 12
Insufficient information 6
Corruption 6
Note: 27% of respondents reported no significant obstacles, 3% reported high costs, 2%
high minimum capital and 4% reported other obstacles.
Source: Doing Business database.
Create single access points for business
Successful reforms in 2003—in Belgium, Colombia,
Kenya, Nicaragua, Portugal, Russia and Turkey—involved
creating single access points for entrepreneurs
(sometimes also known as business help centers). Past reforms
tried launching a one-stop shop for entrepreneurs,
which would then deliver the application documents to
all the other regulatory agencies. Experience shows that
this often meant a one-more-stop shop that frequently
increased delays. 9 A better model is to nominate an existing
agency—such as the company registry—to be the
single access point and bring together representatives of
various other agencies.

22 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Witness the work of the Centro de Formalidades de
Empresa in Portugal. Ten such centers have opened in
Portugal since 1998, at the initiative of the Portuguese
Entrepreneurs’ Association. All company registration procedures
are performed here in only 3 visits—previously
it took 11. Thirty-seven other countries have single access
points, including Algeria, Austria, Estonia, Finland,
Israel, Jamaica, Morocco, Romania, Thailand and the
United Kingdom. These countries take less than half the
time of those without single access points.
Get out of the courts
A second group of reformers, including Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Romania, eliminated the need for mandatory
use of both notaries and judges. Romania made
optional the use of notaries in business registration.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is in the midst of implementing
reform that will make registration an administrative
process, without resorting to the courts. There remain 16
countries—mostly transition countries—where the use
of notaries is still mandatory even though the registration
process involves judges. Slovakia reformed last year
to give incorporation cases to court clerks, not judges.
Notaries perform a simple verification service—
such as certifying that minimum capital has been deposited
in the Republic of Congo or verifying the
founder’s signatures in Hungary—which could easily be
handled by the municipal official or court clerk already
involved in registration. And they typically cost a lot. No
wonder that survey respondents in Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia
and Macedonia say that notaries add no value to the incorporation
process.
The countries that have most improved the ease of
business start-up have done so by eliminating the need
for judges. Company registration is an administrative
process. Judges can be freed to focus on commercial disputes.
A recent example is Italy, which until 1998 had the
most cumbersome regulation of any European economy,
with the process taking 4 months. Registration was taken
out of the courts, saving 3 months. Further reforms last
year reduced the time to only 13 days. Several Latin
American countries, including Chile, Honduras and
Nicaragua, have taken registration out of the hands of
judges as well. 10 Serbia and Montenegro adopted legislation
to do so in May 2004. The benefits are large: entrepreneurs
in countries where registration is a judicial
process spend 14 more days to start a business.
Make registration electronic
In public administration, technology can create a unified
database of business information for sharing across municipal
offices and government agencies. And the Internet
can provide information to would-be entrepreneurs,
such as details on procedures, fee schedules and the
working hours of the relevant agencies.
With some simple legislation to allow electronic signatures,
the Internet can also be used to file business registrations,
as in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Singapore and
the United States—but also Moldova and Vietnam. Almost
half the sample countries have such laws, and a dozen others
have draft laws in parliament. Doing so cuts time—by
more than 50% on average (figure 3.5). Paper registration
remains available for those without Internet access.
FIGURE 3.5
Electronic registration and silent consent can shorten start-up time
Average change in time for business start-up
Source: Doing Business database.
Time without electronic registration
With online
services
–21 days
With electronic
database
–23 days
With electronic
database and
online services
–30 days
Time without limit
or silent consent
A “Silence is Consent” rule
imposes a deadline after which
a business is automatically
considered registered.
+19 days
With time limit
but no silent consent
Time limits alone are
associated with increased
registration time.
With time
limit and
silent consent
–28 days

STARTING A BUSINESS 23
Introduce temporary business licenses
Another reform is using temporary business licenses,
which let entrepreneurs get on with operating businesses
in standard commercial and manufacturing sectors before
the final license is approved. Algeria, France and
Honduras allow this. Introducing such licenses in Brazil,
one of the 10 countries where setting up a business takes
the longest, would have a big impact. 11 Here’s how it
could work. While registering for municipal taxes the
entrepreneur could also receive a temporary operations
license. This license would last 6 months and be replaced
by a regular one on inspection by the municipal authority.
With this simple reform, starting a business in Brazil
would take 4 weeks, not 5 months.
Impose a “silence is consent” rule
Statutory time limits on business registration are common,
and 43 countries have such statutes. The rationale
is that government officials would have an incentive
to meet the deadline. In practice, such time limits don’t
work. They are usually too generous—30 days in Albania,
Cameroon, Honduras, Lithuania, Mozambique,
Uzbekistan and Venezuela. And they are difficult to enforce.
So in most cases having only a time limit only
means more delays (figure 3.5).
There is a simple fix: impose a shorter time limit—
say, 5 days—and introduce a “silence is consent” rule.
Once the deadline has passed the business is automatically
considered registered. This approach, pioneered in
Italy, is currently enforced in Armenia, Georgia and Morocco.
All 4 are among the world’s fastest 20% of countries
to register a business.
Standardize paperwork
Sixty-four of the sample countries have standard articles
of company incorporation, including China, Costa Rica,
Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Tunisia and Vietnam.
With standard forms available, the entrepreneur does
not usually need legal or notary services. And the registry
finds it easier to process the documents. In Armenia,
for example, the statutory reply time for such applicants
is only two days.
Why make starting a business easy?
Cumbersome entry procedures push entrepreneurs into
the informal economy, where businesses pay no taxes
and many of the benefits that regulation is supposed to
provide are missing. Workers lack health insurance and
pension benefits. Products are not subject to quality
standards. Businesses cannot obtain bank credit or use
courts to resolve disputes. Women are hurt disproportionately,
since they constitute 75% of informal employees.
Corruption is rampant, as bureaucrats have many
opportunities to extract bribes. These effects were reported
in depth in Doing Business in 2004.
The experience with reform shows that new entry
of formal businesses grows when regulation is relaxed
and administrative process simplified. Consider Ethiopia,
France, Morocco, Slovakia and Turkey—the top 5 reformers
in 2003. Since their reforms, new registrations
have grown 2–4 times faster than in other countries (figure
3.6). In France 14,000 new businesses were registered
in 2003, up 18% on the year before. Registrations in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia and Russia shot up by
similar rates after start-up procedures were streamlined. 12
Enticing enterprises to the formal economy has two
economic benefits. First, because formally registered enterprises
have less need to hide from government inspectors
and the police, they grow to more efficient sizes.
FIGURE 3.6
Simpler regulation encourages entry
Increase in new registrations, 2003–04
2004
OECD
average
Level in
2003
12%
Slovakia
18% 18%
France
Turkey
Top 5 reformers
Source: Doing Business database, National Statistical Agencies.
21%
Morocco
48%
Ethiopia
On average, in a sample of 10 developing countries, informal
enterprises produce 40% less than enterprises in
the same sectors of the formal economy. 13 Second, formally
registered enterprises pay taxes, increasing the tax
base for government revenues and reducing the statutory
tax rate on companies. The effect is even bigger
if business registration reforms are accompanied by
streamlining tax, labor and related regulations, which
encourages formally registered firms to fully report sales
and officially register workers. As more companies move
to the formal economy, governments can lower the tax

24 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
burden on all firms, as recently done in Poland, Russia
and Slovakia. This gives every business more incentive
to produce. International evidence suggests that a 1%
reduction in taxes is associated with a 3.7% increase
in firms, a 0.9% increase in sales and a 1.1% increase in
employment. 14
Reforming business start-up can add between a
quarter and half a percentage point to growth rates in
the average developing economy (figure 3.7). These estimates
come from recent firm-level studies that compare
the growth of industries with naturally low entry
barriers, such as retail or food production, to such industries
as chemicals or paper-pulp, with high fixed
entry costs. 15 Growth in naturally “high entry” industries
is especially held back by cumbersome regulations—evidence
that simple regulation spurs growth, not the other
way around.
The result? Adding a quarter percentage point of annual
income growth in developing countries alone
would amount to $14 billion a year, about a quarter of
all international development aid. 16 In Brazil the added
annual growth would cover 25% of spending on primary
education.
There are indirect benefits as well. A study by the
World Bank shows that trade openness contributes
FIGURE 3.7
Lower barriers, higher growth
Additional annual income growth
due to entry reform
Poor country
average
(0.33%)
0.24%
0.25%
0.30%
0.34%
0.37%
0.48%
Mozambique Indonesia Egypt Belarus Bolivia Brazil
Note: The hypothetical reform involves moving from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile
on the ease of start-up—that is, from a Paraguay to a Sri Lanka.
Source: Calculations based on Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2004).
about 0.4 percentage points annual economic growth in
countries where labor markets are flexible and business
start-up is easy. 17 Why? Because trade enhances growth
by channeling resources to their most productive uses
in the economy. But if such resource movement is encumbered
by high entry barriers, the effects of trade
diminish and can even be reversed. This explains the
negative effects of trade liberalization in some Latin
American countries, where entry is difficult and labor
markets inflexible.
Notes
1. European Charter for Small Enterprises, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/charter/charter_en.pdf.
2. Thirty-nine countries were monitored between January 2002 and
January 2004 as a part of the IDA13 round of funding. The population-weighted
change during this period was –12% on days to start a
business and –9% on cost to start a business.
3. See Data Notes for details on the methodology.
4. The table shows only paid capital requirements. The minimum capital
requirement in Belgium is 18,550 euro, but of this amount only 20%
needs to be deposited at registration. In Germany only 25% of the
minimum capital or 12,500 euro, whichever is smaller, needs to be
paid at registration. In El Salvador and Uruguay a quarter of the minimum
capital is needed at the start; in Mexico, a fifth.
5. European Commission (2002).
6. Foreign investors now receive the same treatment as domestic ones.
7. The correlation between countries and the Doing Business indicator of
recovery rates in insolvency is –.09.
8. Mokyr (2003).
9. Sader (2002).
10. In these countries the commercial registry remains affiliated with the
courts, but the relationship is limited to administrative oversight. In
May 2004 Honduras passed a law to separate the commercial registry
from the courts and make it a public administrative agency.
11. SEBRAE (2000).
12. New registrations grew by 26% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16% in
Colombia and 14% in Russia.
13. World Bank (forthcoming).
14. Calculations based on Goolsbee’s (2002) analysis of the effect of corporate
tax on the corporate share of firms, sales and employment. Figures
refer to firms operating in the industry classification “general merchandise.”
Elasticities for other industries are of similar magnitude.
15. Klapper and others (2004) on Eastern and Western European countries,
and Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004) on rich and middle income
countries. Both studies use the entry regulation measures developed
in Djankov and others (2002) and define good regulation at the
level of the United States—the benchmark is having 4 procedures, 4
days and a cost of 0.5% of the income per capita to start a business.
16. Total income of the 81 IDA countries was $1.1 trillion in 2003, total
aid about $58 billion.
17. Bolaky and Freund (2004).

HIRING AND FIRING WORKERS 25
Hiring and
firing workers
Who is reforming employment regulation?
What to reform?
Why make hiring and firing easier?
Employers in Burkina Faso cannot write fixed-term contracts
unless the job is seasonal. The mandated minimum
wage is $54 a month—the third highest in the world relative
to value added per worker, at 82%. Night and weekend
work are prohibited, and women are not permitted
to work more than 8 hours a day. If the business needs to
downsize, the employer must notify the ministry of labor
to fire a single worker, and the law mandates that the redundant
worker is trained and placed in other jobs prior
to dismissal. If a resolute employer goes through these
procedures, a redundancy would cost 18 months’ wages
in severance pay and penalties. Small surprise that much
of business operates in the informal sector, which accounts
for 40% of economic output in the country.
Rigid regulation is common in developing countries,
so employers choose conservatively. Some workers
benefit—mostly men with several years of experience on
the job. But young, female and low-skilled workers are
often denied job opportunities (figure 4.1). This is true
even in rich countries—52% of small business owners
in Greece, 46% in Belgium, 41% in Spain and 34% in
Germany indicate that they have hired fewer employees
as a result of burdensome employment regulation. 1 If
Spain were to increase the flexibility of its employment
regulation to the level in the United States, analysis
suggests employment would increase by 6.2 percentage
points. And additional job opportunities for women
would increase 3 times as much as those for men. 2
Employment regulations are designed to protect
workers from arbitrary, unfair or discriminatory actions
by their employers. These regulations—from mandatory
minimum wage, to premia for overtime work, to
FIGURE 4.1
Women and youth lose out from rigid employment laws
Women’s share of private sector employment
Youth unemployment
Greater
share
Greater
share
Lesser
share
Least rigid
Most rigid
Countries ranked by rigidity of employment index, quintiles
Lesser
share
Least rigid
Most rigid
Countries ranked by difficulty of hiring index, quintiles
Note: The relationships shown are significant at the 1% level and remain significant at the 5% level when controlling for income per capita.
Source: Doing Business database, World Bank (2004a), WEF (2004).

26 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
grounds for dismissal, to severance pay—have been introduced
to remedy apparent market failures. The failures
range from the exploitation of workers in one-company
towns to discrimination on the basis of gender,
race or age to the suffering of the unemployed in the
Great Depression and in the transition of formerly socialist
economies.
In response, the International Labour Organization
has established a set of fundamental principles and
rights at work, including the freedom of association, the
right to collective bargaining, the elimination of forced
labor, the abolition of child labor and the elimination of
discrimination in hiring and work practices. 3
Beyond these regulations, governments struggle to
reach the right balance between labor market flexibility
and job stability. Most developing countries err on the
side of excessive rigidity, to the detriment of businesses
and workers alike. Burkina Faso vies with Angola, Niger,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Togo for the country that regulates
employment the most. And across the world, poor
countries regulate labor much more than rich countries
do (figure 4.2). This is done in the name of offering better
jobs.
But as economies stagnate—due to inflexible labor
markets, among other reasons—governments are pressed
to provide stability and they do so by imposing even
stricter regulations on businesses in an attempt to preserve
current jobs. New job creation is stifled, and the informal
sector expands. In the informal sector, women
constitute three-quarters of workers. They have no health
benefits and receive no support for their children, no
FIGURE 4.2
Poor countries regulate employment the most
Rigidity of employment index
More
Rigidity
48
38
32
Poor
Source: Doing Business database.
Middle income
Rich
Rigidity of
employment
Difficulty
of hiring
Rigidity
of hours
sick leave and no pensions. If abused by their employer,
they have no recourse to the courts since the employment
relationship is not documented. Far from protecting
the vulnerable, rigid employment regulations exclude
them from the market.
In 2003, eight rich economies—Australia, Belgium,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and
Taiwan (China)—introduced more flexible employment
regulation. Five middle income countries—Croatia,
Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia—did the same.
Only one poor country—Namibia—improved. Another
3—Albania, Egypt and Romania—passed more restrictive
regulations. Two types of reforms were common: increasing
the flexibility of working hours and introducing
new types of term contracts.
Poor
Middle
income
Rich
Poor
= + +
Middle income
Rich
Poor
Difficulty
of firing
Middle
income
Rich
Who is reforming employment regulation?
Reforms of labor regulation are often triggered by a crisis—with
varying results. The Great Depression, World
War II and the oil crises in the early 1970s brought increased
regulation. The economic downturns in Europe
in the 1980s and the financial crises in Latin America and
later in East Asia brought reforms to cut employment
regulation. The trend in the last two decades is toward
more flexibility, except in Africa and Latin America. 4
Last year continued the trend. Slovakia introduced
the most far-reaching changes (table 4.1). Latvia and
Norway increased the limit for overtime hours and ended
restrictions on weekend work. 5 Hungary, Namibia and
Taiwan (China) also increased the flexibility of working
hours. Poland and Portugal made it easier for employers
to hire on term contracts. The Netherlands privatized its
job-search agency. Germany made it easier for small
companies to hire temporary workers. And Australia introduced
individual savings accounts in place of severance
payments. 6
The reforms had a common goal: creating jobs.
Consider two examples. Italy abolished the government
monopoly on job placement services and introduced job
sharing, for 2 workers to share the same position. The
number of hours and types of part-time contracts were
expanded. The government says these changes would
create 250,000 new jobs. 7 Belgium expanded the system
of “service vouchers,” to simplify hiring for such jobs as
cleaning, house repair and gardening. This is claimed to
result in 25,000 new jobs. 8 Whether or not these exact
figures are reached, evidence shows that the increased
flexibility will boost employment.

HIRING AND FIRING WORKERS 27
TABLE 4.1
Sweeping reforms in Slovakia in 2003
Before
• No part-time contract
• Term contracts could not be
extended
• Limit of 150 hours of overtime
a year
• Approval by union for firing a
worker
• Retraining before dismissal
• Union approval for flexible
work time
• Approval by union for group
dismissals
Three countries made regulation more rigid. Egypt
reduced the flexibility of working hours, made night
work more difficult for women and doubled Hajj leave.
In Albania the flexibility of working hours was reduced,
payment for work during weekends doubled and fixedterm
contracts were allowed only for temporary jobs. In
Romania the premium for overtime work was increased
from 50% to 75% and term contracts are now possible
only for exceptional needs, making their use unlikely. But
these changes don’t always last—similar restrictive reforms,
introduced in Slovakia in 2001, were revised 2
years later. 9
Difficulty of hiring
Now
• Part-time contracts for students,
women and retirees
• Extensions of term contracts possible
• Limit of 400 hours of overtime, with
worker consent
• No requirement
• No requirement
• No approval for shifting hours in a
4-month period
• Notification for group dismissals
Source: Doing Business database, Jurajda and Mathernova (2004).
The best way to spur job creation is by making it easy to
contract regular workers. If that is politically difficult, an
intermediate step is to allow for flexible term contracts.
These permit businesses to hire more workers when the
demand for their products rises, without imposing high
costs for dismissals if demand declines. Flexibility is
greater if such contracts do not require special approvals,
can be used for any task and have longer duration.
OECD, Middle Eastern and East Asian economies make
it easy to hire fixed-term workers. But many Latin American
and African countries impose excessive limitations.
Colombia, Mexico and Panama allow employers to write
term contracts only for specific tasks and for 1 year. After
the year is over, the employer has to either fire the worker
or offer a permanent position. Chad, Mauritania, Niger
and Togo also allow such contracts only for specific
tasks, lasting for 2 years or less. The result: constant
turnover of workers, who get fired just before the statutory
time limit is met. Employers have no interest in providing
training. Productivity stays low.
Another obstacle to hiring new workers, especially
young ones, is a high minimum wage relative to the
average wage in the economy. Almost all countries have
a minimum wage as a way of trying to provide a
decent living standard. 10 In most rich countries, minimum
wages are typically a quarter to a third of value
added per worker—21% in Finland, 24% in Japan, 25%
in France and 29% in the Netherlands. 11 But in Cambodia,
Niger and Vietnam minimum wages are two-thirds
or more of value added per worker. The result is a higher
number of unemployed youths and low-skilled workers.
12 And because these countries do not have a social
safety net for the unemployed, the impact is even more
serious.
Rigid work hours
Many industries have seasonal highs and lows. Much
of agro-processing business is in the summer and fall.
Much of retail business is during holidays. Businesses
can meet these fluctuations in demand by expanding
and contracting the number of work hours—if the law
permits. In El Salvador, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden and
Uganda the working day can extend to more than 12
hours a day in peak periods. But in the Philippines and
Ukraine the maximum is 8 hours. In both countries
there are restrictions on night and weekend work, so the
employer cannot use 2 shifts. These rigidities allegedly
increase worker welfare. Yet workers prefer adjustments
to changing demand through flexible working hours
rather than through the alternatives: hiring and firing or
informal work. 13
Difficulty of firing
A barrier to firing is a barrier to hiring. Yet South Asian
countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka and most African
countries impose formidable restrictions on firing. The
average African business faces twice the administrative
hassle in firing a worker than does an OECD business
(figure 4.3). The same countries that make hiring easy, in
the OECD and East Asia, make firing easy too. Transition
economies are mixed. Eastern European countries like
Slovakia and Bulgaria are among the least restrictive.
Former Soviet countries like Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine
and Uzbekistan are among the most restrictive.
Firing is almost impossible in Uzbekistan. Redundancy—because
of deteriorating economic conditions
or falling demand—is not considered a fair ground for
dismissal. To fire a single worker, the employer must
document several incidents of drunkenness at the workplace
or show a consistent pattern of insubordination.

28 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
BOX 4.1
Who has the most rigid labor regulation—and who the least?
Difficulty of hiring
Least
Most
25, including: Romania
Israel
Mauritania
Slovakia
Central African Republic
Australia
Rwanda
Denmark
Togo
Saudi Arabia
Congo, Rep.
Botswana
Morocco
Russia
Chad
United States
Burkina Faso
Namibia
Niger
Difficulty of firing
Least
Canada
Costa Rica
Hong Kong, China
Jamaica
Japan
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Uganda
Uruguay
Most
Cameroon
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Ukraine
Congo, Rep.
India
Mexico
Nepal
Angola
Tunisia
Uzbekistan
The Difficulty of Hiring index measures whether term
contracts can be used only for temporary tasks; the maximum
duration of term contracts; and the ratio of the
mandated minimum wage (or apprentice wage, if available)
to the average value added per working population. 14
In Namibia, the 10th least regulated country, term contracts
can be used for any task and have unlimited duration;
the minimum wage to value added ratio is 21%. In
Mauritania, the 10th most regulated country, term contracts
are allowed for specific tasks and are limited to 2
years; the minimum wage to value added ratio is 68%.
The Difficulty of Firing index has 8 parts: whether redundancy
is a fair ground for dismissal; whether the employer
needs to notify the labor union or the labor ministry for firing
one redundant worker; and the same for group dismissals;
whether the employer needs approval from the
labor union or the labor ministry for firing one redundant
worker; and the same for group dismissals; whether the law
mandates training or replacement prior to dismissal; if priority
rules apply for dismissals; and if priority rules apply
for re-employment. Uruguay doesn’t regulate any of these
areas. Angola regulates all of them.
Rigidity of hours
Least
Canada
Hong Kong, China
Lebanon
Malaysia
New Zealand
Serbia and Montenegro
Singapore
Tunisia
United States
Chile
Most
Brazil
Greece
Spain
Ukraine
Venezuela
Portugal
Burkina Faso
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Côte d’Ivoire
Niger
Rigidity of employment
Least Index Most Index
Hong Kong, China 0 Angola 75
Singapore 0 Sierra Leone 76
Malaysia 3 Central African Republic 76
United States 3 Rwanda 76
Canada 4 Togo 76
Uganda 7 Congo, Dem. Rep. 77
New Zealand 7 Chad 80
Slovakia 10 Congo, Rep. 86
Jamaica 10 Burkina Faso 90
Saudi Arabia 13 Niger 90
The Rigidity of Hours index is a simple average of 5 indicators:
whether night work is allowed; whether weekend work
is allowed; whether the workweek consists of 5 1 ⁄2 days or
more; whether the workday can extend to 12 hours or more
(including overtime); and whether the annual paid vacation
days are 21 or less. In Chile, the 10th least regulated
country, the workday can extend to 12 hours, the workweek
can extend to 6 days, there are no regulations on night and
weekend work, and the minimum paid leave is 19 days a
year. In Brazil, the 10th most regulated country, the workday
is limited to 10 hours. Weekend work is not allowed,
and the minimum paid leave is 30 days.
The Rigidity of Employment index is a simple average of
the Difficulty of Hiring, Rigidity of Hours and Difficulty of
Firing indices, varying between 0 and 100, with higher values
for more rigid regulation. Differences across countries
are enormous. Saudi Arabia, with the 10th most flexible employment
regulations, has no restrictive regulations on hiring
and firing but regulates weekend work. Angola, with the
10th most rigid regulations, regulates heavily every aspect
of work hours and firing, but allows term contracts with
5-year duration.
Source: Doing Business database.

HIRING AND FIRING WORKERS 29
FIGURE 4.3
Difficult to fire workers in some countries
Difficulty of firing index
MORE
RIGIDITY
50 Sub-Saharan Africa
48 South Asia
43 Europe & Central Asia
39 Middle East & North Africa
Highest
100 Tunisia
Uzbekistan
FIGURE 4.4
Who pays what to fire?
Severance cost in weeks of salary equivalence
65
49
42
5 most expensive
countries:
Sierra Leone 188
Lao PDR 185
Guatemala 170
Brazil 165
Egypt, Arab Rep. 162
Source: Doing Business database.
34 Latin America & the Caribbean
33 East Asia & the Pacific
27 OECD high income
Lowest
0 12 including:
Canada
Japan
Uruguay
Poor
countries
Middleincome
countries
Source: Doing Business database.
Rich
countries
5 least expensive
countries:
United States 8
Belgium 8
Singapore 4
Puerto Rico 0
New Zealand 0
With this documentation in hand the employer seeks
approval from the ministry of labor. Within a month he
receives a visit from a labor inspector and is asked
whether the employee was offered placement at another
position. The alternative placement must last 3 months,
with progress evaluated. After that, another application
is sent to the ministry. Chances of success are slim. The
process for firing a group of workers is even more difficult.
The difficulty of firing is one of the reasons why
more than a third of economic activity in Uzbekistan
takes place in the informal sector.
Cost of firing
An employer in Egypt faces administrative barriers to
firing a redundant worker similar to those in Uzbekistan.
But at the end of the process, an even bigger obstacle
arises. More than 3 years of salary must be paid to see
the worker leave, comprising 3 months salary during the
compulsory notice period, a severance package equivalent
to 27.5 months of salary (for a worker with 20 years
of experience) and a dismissal penalty equivalent to 8
months of salary. Small wonder that the employer keeps
the worker around.
Poor countries impose firing costs 50% higher than
those in rich countries (figure 4.4). Some argue that this
is justified because governments in poor countries do
not have enough resources to provide unemployment
insurance, so the cost should be borne by businesses.
This is backward logic. Heavy regulation of dismissal is
associated with more unemployment, so those who want
to work in poor countries frequently get neither a job
nor unemployment insurance.
Flexible labor markets, by contrast, provide job
opportunities for more people, ensuring that the best
worker is found for each job. Productivity rises, as do
wages and output. Higher taxes are collected, and the
government can afford a social protection system.
Consider Colombia. In 2002 the government broadened
the definition of just causes for dismissal. It cut the
severance payment of a worker with 20 years of experience
from 26 months to 11—and the mandated notice
period from 8 weeks to 2. The reforms created 300,000
new jobs. 15 And with the added tax revenues, the government
established an incentive subsidy for hiring unemployed
youths in small enterprises. So far, however,
the incentive scheme has not worked as effectively as
hoped. (A proposal for revisions is awaiting congressional
approval.)
What triggered these reforms in Colombia? They
started with a study by the Inter-American Development
Bank, which identified employment regulation rigidities
as the main cause of high unemployment. 16 Comparing
the impact of regulations in Colombia with those of its
neighbors and select OECD economies, the study concluded
that the current regime benefited the few at the
expense of the many. Other analyses confirmed the findings
and proposed specific reforms. Faced with a 20%
unemployment rate, the government had little choice
but to experiment. Good measurement and some desperation
got the job done.

30 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
What to reform?
Bold reforms, as in Colombia or Slovakia, have the largest
payoffs in increasing productivity, reducing unemployment,
and providing women with better economic and
social opportunities. In the absence of such sweeping
change, four types of reform work best:
• Increase the length and scope of term contracts.
• Introduce apprentice wages.
• Allow flexible working hours.
• Remove administrative approvals for dismissals.
Increase the length and scope of term contracts
In 1991 Peru revised its labor law to allow for a 3-year
term contract for any task. The previous law allowed
1-year contracts for temporary tasks. Within a year, the
number of workers on term contracts shot up by 50%
and by 1997 more than doubled, to make up 40% of all
employment contracts. Young and informal workers
benefited the most, with youth unemployment falling by
7 percentage points and the informal sector shrinking
by 12 percentage points. 17
Five of last year’s reformers—Croatia, Italy, Poland,
Portugal and Slovakia—increased the duration of term
contracts and expanded their applicability. Germany
and Russia did the same the previous year. In those 2
countries and in Poland, there is no limit to the length
of term contracts. Portugal increased the duration to 6
years, Slovakia to 5, Italy to 3.
But term contracts are a good reform only when it is
difficult to reduce the cost of regular contracts—and
even then as a temporary measure. If they are not accompanied
by reforms of regular contracts, term contracts
could contribute to the development of a dual
labor market—as evidenced in Spain. 18
Introduce apprentice wages
Thirty countries have apprentice wages, ranging from
Chile to Madagascar, Thailand to Tunisia, Serbia and
Montenegro to Australia. Apprentice wages are a 1990s reform,
except for Denmark, France and some Latin American
countries, which have had them since the 1960s. Such
reform is cheap: the beneficiaries are easy to target, and
the apprenticeship lasts a short time, after which the employee
enters a regular contract. 19 It is also easier to introduce
apprentice wages than to lower the minimum wage,
because labor unions oppose them much less.
Allow flexible working hours
To accommodate fluctuations in demand, a business
may at times need longer workweeks—hopefully not too
often. Businesses in the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland found this the hard way. With employment regulations
that permitted only 150 hours of overtime a
year in the mid-1990s, and with limits to term contracts,
much demand remained unmet. All 3 countries reached
an innovative solution: to allow swaps of working hours
between peak periods and slow periods, as long as the
number of hours remained constant over the course of 6
months (Poland) or a year (Czech Republic, Hungary).
Poland soon found that a 6-month period was inadequate,
because seasonal demands usually require an annual
cycle.
More recently, many Central European economies
have found a complementary solution: longer overtime
hours, with the consent of employees. Latvia increased
the overtime hours to a maximum of 432 a year, Hungary
and Slovakia to 400, Poland to 260. The combination
of time swaps within the normal work hours and
expanded overtime makes it possible for businesses to
adjust to swings in demand.
About 50 countries allow flexible working hours. In
the others, temporary increases in demand mean lost revenues
or higher production costs. For example, the normal
workweek in Indonesia is 40 hours, and 3 additional
hours of overtime per day are allowed. The premium for
overtime work is 50% for the first hour, and 100% thereafter.
So to meet an increase in temporary demand of 50%
the owner of a 200-employee company would have to hire
19 new workers. 20 The labor costs on that 50% output increase
would rise by 96%. In Venezuela, where only two
hours of overtime work per week are allowed, at a 50%
premium, the business would have to hire 66 new workers
and the labor cost would increase by 90%. Countries
that move to more flexible work hours can bring those
labor costs down considerably—Slovakia from 111% to
27%, Namibia from 54% to 39% (figure 4.5).
Remove administrative approvals to dismissals
Many countries have both high administrative barriers
and large direct costs of firing. If a business owner in Sri
Lanka decides to fire a redundant worker, she needs to
obtain approval from the labor union. This takes time.
Often, the case ends up in the labor tribunal, involving
further costs and delays. Fines are frequently levied for
failing to comply with this or that procedure. And once

HIRING AND FIRING WORKERS 31
FIGURE 4.5
Boosting production can be costly…
…but reform works.
Cost to temporarily expand production by 50%
(percentage increase in labor cost)
111 Latvia, Slovakia
99 Hungary
90 Venezuela
80 Portugal
72 Norway
54 Namibia
48 Tunisia
30 Malaysia, United States
Reforms in 2003
yielded big
improvements
Namibia
Before 54
After 39 39
Norway
72
Hungary
99
90
Latvia
111
90
Slovakia
111
27
15 Morocco
6 Kenya
0 Ireland
Source: Doing Business database.
the approval is granted, the worker gets 25 months in
severance pay. 21 Hardly anyone gets fired, but few people
get hired. Both employers and employees in countries
like Sri Lanka would be better off if the administrative
approval were scrapped and severance payments are
lowered. Colombia introduced such a system last year.
Instead of (or together with) severance payments,
which hit a troubled business during the worst possible
time—economic downturns—middle income countries
can introduce unemployment insurance. This shifts the
focus of regulation from protecting jobs to protecting
workers, by helping them deal with moving to new
jobs. 22 The Korean government instituted a similar scheme
in 1996. The timing was fortuitous, mitigating the effects
on workers during the 1997–98 financial crisis. The
Chilean reform of 2002 introduced savings accounts: the
employee pays 0.6% of gross wages and the employer
pays 2.4%, with two-thirds going to an individual account
and a third to a common fund. Severance pay is
cut from 30 days to 24 for each year worked. Unemployed
Chilean workers receive benefits for 5 months, no
matter how long they have been insured. The payments
are progressively reduced each month, to encourage
searching for another job. Australia followed suit, introducing
individual savings accounts last year.
Why make hiring and firing easier?
Businesses seek other means of staying competitive if
employment regulation is rigid. They hire informal
workers, pay them under the table and avoid providing
social benefits. 23 Women are 3 times more likely to be
hired informally. And as parents fail to find decent employment,
children often turn up in the workplace.
The people employment regulation is supposed to
protect are hurt the most (figure 4.6). When there are
fewer job opportunities in the formal sector, inequality
often rises as people turn to the informal sector, which offers
lower pay and no health insurance or social benefits. 24
Foreign investment falls as well. Restrictive labor
markets are cited as the third most important reason for
foreign companies not to invest, behind high corporate
taxes and corruption. 25 One study shows that an increase
in flexibility at the rate of the Slovak reforms is associated
with 14–18% more foreign investment. 26
Rigid employment regulation also imposes indirect
costs, by restricting the ability of firms to adjust to
shocks, such as new technologies, macroeconomic
shocks and privatization. 27 For example, very rigid employment
regulation reduces the benefits of trade liberalization.
28 As an economy opens, competition from
now-cheaper imports drives jobs away from less productive
sectors and into more productive ones, expanding
the economy. This happens only if workers can move.
With high barriers to hiring and firing, labor remains in
unproductive sectors. The result is less job creation and
a loss of competitiveness, as in much of Latin America in
the last decade.

32 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
FIGURE 4.6
Who loses from rigid employment regulation?
Informal sector
Child participation in employment Income share of the poorest 20%
Greater
share
Greater
share
Greater
share
Lesser
share
Lesser
share
Lesser
share
Least
rigid
Most
rigid
Countries ranked by
rigidity of employment, quintiles
Note: Analysis controls for income per capita. Relationships are significant at the 5% level.
Source: Doing Business database, World Bank (2004a).
Least
Most
difficult
difficult
Countries ranked by
difficulty of hiring, quintiles
Least
costly
Countries ranked by
firing cost, quintiles
Most
costly
Notes
1. European Commission (2002).
2. Di Tella and McCullom (1999).
3. ILO (1998).
4. OECD (2004).
5. In the case of Latvia, for transport businesses only.
6. OECD (2004).
7. But note that previous reforms in Italy have not always achieved the
desired effects.
8. Eironline (2004).
9. Jurajda and Mathernova (2004).
10. Eleven countries do not have a mandated minimum wage either by
law or by economy or industrywide collective agreements. These are
Ethiopia, Guinea, Hong Kong (China), Kuwait, Malaysia, Namibia,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates and
Yemen. They use other means for trying to provide good living standards
for their working population.
11. Most studies express the minimum wage as a percentage of the average
wage. However, data on average wages are only available for about 30
countries outside the OECD. In the absence of such data, the use of
value added per worker is necessary.
12. See, for example, Neumark, Cunningham and Siga (2003).
13. Rutkowski (2004).
14. The methodology in last year’s report was different. This year’s changes
bring the methodology closer to the one developed in Botero and others
(forthcoming).
15. Echeverry and Santa Maria (2004).
16. Heckman and Pages (2003).
17. Saavedra and Torero (2003).
18. OECD (2004).
19. A number of countries have conducted studies on the effectiveness of
such reform in attracting young employees and providing them onthe-job
training. All have found positive results. See, for example, Neumark
and Wascher (2003).
20. Normal production is 200 workers @ 40 hours = 8,000 hours. A 50%
increase in demand requires 12,000 hours. The 200 workers can work
3 hours per day overtime, or 55 hours per week. Production with current
workers therefore expands to 200 workers @ 55 hours = 11000
hours. The remaining shortfall of 1,000 hours requires 19 additional
workers (=1,000/55).
21. Vodopivec (2004).
22. For a detailed discussion, see World Bank (2004).
23. Botero and others (forthcoming).
24. There are exceptions. Income inequality in Chile is among the highest
in Latin America—with the poorest 20% receiving only 3.3% of
income—yet informality is the lowest, at less than a fifth of business
activity.
25. ATKearney (2004).
26. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2004).
27. Betcherman (2002).
28. Bolaky and Freund (2004).

33
Registering property
Who makes registering property easy—and how?
What else secures property rights?
What to reform?
Why reform?
Every cloud has a silver lining. The Napoleonic wars
brought some of the most fierce battles Europe had seen.
But to fund his conquests, Napoleon had all French
properties accurately mapped and registered for taxation,
saying “a good cadastre [property map] of the
parcels will be the complement of my civil code.” 1 Once
annexed, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland received
the same system.
There are better reasons for registering property
than financing wars. Defining and publicizing property
rights have proven good for entrepreneurs as well. Land
and buildings account for between half and threequarters
of country wealth in most economies. 2 And
with formal property titles, entrepreneurs can obtain
mortgages on their homes or land and start businesses.
Banks prefer land and buildings as collateral since they
are difficult to move or hide. 3 In Zambia 95% of commercial
bank loans to businesses are secured by land, in
Indonesia 80%, and in Uganda 75%. 4 The benefits go
beyond credit. Property titling can also significantly increase
land values and investment (figure 5.1). 5
But a large proportion of property in developing
countries is not formally registered. Peruvian economist
Hernando de Soto estimates the value at $9.3 trillion,
calling it “dead capital.” Unregistered property limits the
financing opportunities for new businesses and expansion
opportunities for existing ones. In Ethiopia 57% of
firms report that access to land is their main obstacle, as
do 35% in Bangladesh and 25% in Kenya and Tanzania. 6
Recognizing these bottlenecks, governments have embarked
on extensive property titling programs in developing
countries.
Yet bringing assets into the formal sector is of little
value unless they stay there. Many titling programs in
Africa were futile because people bought and sold property
informally—neglecting to update the title records
in the property registry. 7 Why? In the average African
country a simple formal property transfer in the largest
business city costs 14% of the value of the property and
takes more than 100 days. Worse, the property registries
are so poorly organized that they provide little security
of ownership. For both reasons, formalized titles quickly
go informal again.
Even if titles remain formal, they don’t amount to
much if governments control property prices and restrict
the ability to trade. Property markets will not
function effectively if regulations restrict investment
from being channeled to its most productive use. And ti-
FIGURE 5.1
Defining and protecting property rights—large benefits
Indonesia
Brazil
Thailand
Brazil
Thailand
Honduras
Brazil
Thailand
Percentage increase
0 30 60 90 120
LAND VALUES
INVESTMENT
0 100 200 300 400
ACCESS TO CREDIT
Note: Based on analysis of household survey data comparing titled and untitled property.
Source: Feder (2002).

34 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
tles won’t lead to more credit if collateral laws make it
expensive to mortgage property and inefficient courts
prevent banks from seizing collateral when a debtor
defaults. Not surprisingly some studies document cases
where titling failed to bring the expected increases in investment
or income. 8
Efficient property registration reduces transaction
costs and improves the security of property rights. This
benefits all entrepreneurs, especially small ones. The rich
have few problems protecting their property rights. They
can afford the costs of investing in security systems and
other measures to defend their property. But small entrepreneurs
cannot. Reform can change this. Improving the
security of property rights in Peru was shown to increase
productive activities. 9 Across countries, firms of all sizes
report that their property rights are better protected in
countries with more efficient property registration. But
the relationship is much stronger for small firms. 10
Who makes registering property easy—
and how?
An entrepreneur wants to buy property in the peri-urban
area of Lagos. It is a simple case—the seller has agreed
and the property is officially recorded and free of dispute.
Title registration begins. The entrepreneur starts by hiring
a lawyer, mandatory in Nigeria. She obtains application
forms, tax clearances, a plan of the property, assessments
and stamps of the deeds. Next she pays stamp
duties and deposits fees, conducts a search of the land
registry and submits the application for consent to the
governor of the state. And then waits for 6 months. After
obtaining consent, she pays another 3 separate fees and
taxes and submits the receipts to 2 more agencies. The
property is inspected by state valuers and the transfer
recorded in the land registry. Twenty one procedures,
27% of the property value in official fees and 274 days
later, she owns the property. If she wants a mortgage, the
bank must go through a similar procedure to obtain consent
for registering it.
The process is so cumbersome that the standard
practice is to go through all the procedures to register a
business—no mean feat in Nigeria—and then put the
property in the name of the business. That way the property
can be traded by buying and selling the company
rather than facing all the costs of registering property
again. 11
Compare this with what a Norwegian entrepreneur
experiences when buying property in Oslo. He goes to
the land registry, submits an application form (which
can also be obtained on the Internet or in bookstores)
and pays the registration fee and 2.5% of the property
value in stamp duty. Registration is complete in a day.
Some other countries also make it simple (box 5.1).
In New Zealand the buyer checks the legal status of the
property with local authorities, then pays a conveyancer
0.17% of the property value to register the transfer online.
Registration is complete in 2 days. In Sweden, too, 2
days are all that are required—the entrepreneur need
only submit registration forms and pay 3% in taxes and
fees at a bank. The same is true in Thailand, which has a
world-class system where all contracts are prepared in
the land office as a part of registration. 12 In Singapore
the buyer conducts all due diligence and pays taxes on
the Internet. Registration is over in 9 days.
A number of transition countries speed up registration
by offering an expedited procedure: a buyer can pay
a higher fee for faster processing. In Lithuania using the
fast track costs 25% extra but cuts time from 29 days to
3. In the Kyrgyz Republic and Slovakia the expedited
procedure saves 15 days, in Russia 20 days and in Kazakhstan
12 days. 13 Outside the region Argentina also has
a fast track service saving 21 days. And Spain has an innovative
system to improve speed: the registry’s fees are
cut by 30% if the process exceeds 15 days.
No such luck in most other countries. Much of the
difficulty is caused by overly complex procedures. Ghana
is switching from a system that records deeds of transfer
to one that provides guaranteed title. The transfer must
be registered in both systems, a process that involves 6
agencies and 382 days. Only 8% of properties are registered.
Austria, Honduras and Yemen require the buyer to
go to both notaries and the courts. In Ukraine and
Uzbekistan the land is registered separately from the
building, effectively doubling the complexity of the
process. In 2004 Russia reformed, combining land and
building information into a unified cadastre. The authorities
in Shanghai, China did the same.
In a third of countries, delays in recording at the
property registry are the main obstacle, including in the
Dominican Republic and Portugal. An entrepreneur in
Guinea can complete the due diligence requirements in
3 weeks. Unless he has connections, however, he’ll then
wait 3 months for the registry to finish processing.
Threatened with delays, the entrepreneur may be
tempted to offer a bribe to move the process along. And
on top of that, he must pay 16% in taxes.

REGISTERING PROPERTY 35
BOX 5.1
Who has the most efficient property registration—and who the least?
Procedures (Number)
Fewest
Most
Norway 1 Latvia 10
Sweden 1 France 10
Belgium 2 Ecuador 11
New Zealand 2 Uzbekistan 12
Thailand 2 Tanzania 12
United Kingdom 2 Greece 12
Finland 3 Brazil 14
Lithuania 3 Ethiopia 15
Singapore 3 Algeria 16
Taiwan, China 3 Nigeria 21
Countries with the simplest registration require the entrepreneur
only to pay fees or taxes and to register the
transfer. In Norway and Sweden the 2 steps are combined.
Another 15 countries have 3 or fewer steps. Others,
especially poor countries, require a bewildering set
of procedures—getting approvals, notarizations, documentation,
inspections, clearances and making payments.
More procedures mean more delays and more
chances for officials to demand bribes, as every encounter
between the entrepreneur and official is an opportunity
for corruption.
Time (Days)
Least
Most
Norway 1 Togo 212
New Zealand 2 Belarus 231
Sweden 2 Nigeria 274
Thailand 2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 331
Lithuania 3 Angola 335
Saudi Arabia 4 Côte d’Ivoire 340
Netherlands 5 Rwanda 354
Australia 7 Ghana 382
Taiwan, China 7 Slovenia 391
Singapore 9 Croatia 956
Cost (% of property value)
Least
Most
Saudi Arabia 0.0 Sierra Leone 16.5
New Zealand 0.2 Central African Republic 17.4
Belarus 0.2 Zimbabwe 18.1
Mongolia 0.4 Burundi 18.1
Azerbaijan 0.5 Cameroon 18.8
Estonia 0.5 Mali 20.6
United States 0.5 Congo, Rep. 22.5
Denmark 0.6 Nigeria 27.2
Russian 0.8 Syrian Arab Republic 30.4
Lithuania 0.9 Senegal 34.0
Costs come largely from taxes, registration fees and notary
charges. A Saudi entrepreneur pays nothing—although
he would also get less security because the registration
is only with a notary and not linked to a cadastre.
Recent reforms will change this. Transfer taxes in Syria
are an astonishing 30% of the value. It doesn’t lead to
higher revenue collection: a common practice is to have
2 contracts, with one for the parties with the real price,
and one for the tax agency with an underreported value.
Reducing fees removes the disincentive to register transactions
formally.
Ease of registering property (average ranking )
Most
Least
New Zealand 127 Congo, Rep. 28
Lithuania 120 Sierra Leone 27
Norway 118 Tanzania 26
Saudi Arabia 117 Senegal 26
Sweden 116 Congo, Dem. Rep. 24
Singapore 115 Côte d’Ivoire 22
United Arab Emirates 112 Uzbekistan 19
United States 112 Burkina Faso 17
Armenia 109 Angola 16
Switzerland 106 Nigeria 4
Twenty-one countries allow the entrepreneur to register
property in 20 days. But in Angola, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia court backlogs can
cause delays of over a year. It is possible to get a provisional
title on application, but full certainty under
property law comes only with the final title. Inefficient
registries delay the process in many African countries,
especially when bribes are not paid.
The ease of registering property is a simple average of
country rankings by the number of procedures, time
and cost, where higher values indicate more efficient
property registration. Entrepreneurs in Nordic countries
have the easiest time transferring property. Armenia and
Lithuania also make the top 10 list following their reforms.
Nine of the 10 least efficient countries are in Sub-
Saharan Africa, largely because of combined high costs
and time. Nigeria is the least efficient.
Source: Doing Business database.

36 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
FIGURE 5.2
Registering property is complex in Uzbekistan
Days
100
75
50
25
0
1
Procedures
12
Source: Doing Business database.
Cost
Time
Percentage of property value
13
12
11
10
9
FIGURE 5.3
Harder to register in poor countries
Time and cost to register property
133
116
Days
62
51
54
56
34
Source: Doing Business database.
OECD
High income
East Asia &
the Pacific
Middle East &
North Africa
South
Asia
Latin America &
the Caribbean
Europe &
Central Asia
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Percentage of property value
3.2
4.2
4.8
5.6
6.8
6.1
14.4
Inspections of the property slow the transfer of title
in 30 countries, none rich, including Bangladesh, Bolivia,
the Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan and
Malaysia. Uzbekistan has 2, compounding an already
complex procedure (figure 5.2). Both inspections are to
verify the property’s borders. The first double-checks the
official cadastre records. The second triple-checks it.
Both times, every neighbor must sign and seal the inspection.
Such complexity increases the likelihood that
bribes may change hands.
Another large bottleneck, especially in Africa, is the
requirement for government consent before property is
transferred. It causes delays, usually requires an exorbitant
fee and can be a major source of corruption.
Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Zambia
all have consent requirements. This is not always a relic
of colonial days. Nigeria’s came with the Land Use Act
of 1978. It was adopted to reduce conflict, but added a
6-month delay and a 10% fee.
The effect of such obstacles is evident across countries.
Registering property is almost twice as efficient in
rich countries as in poor ones (figure 5.3). Across regions,
OECD and East Asian countries have the most efficient
registration, averaging about 40 days and costing
less than 5% of the property value. It is most difficult in
Sub-Saharan Africa, where it takes more than 100 days
and with costs of over 14%. Latin American countries
typically require many procedures, including more due
diligence, and take longer than average. Most countries
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have low costs—
3.2% on average, with 6 countries at less than 1%. But in
almost all, the seller will also need to pay value added
tax. And low costs in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova,
Poland and Slovenia are offset by long delays.
What else secures property rights?
Doing Business in 2005 presents measures of the efficiency
of registering property. But many other factors
help secure property rights. Among these are the organization
of the registry, the legal rights that come with
ownership and the controls on property markets. Property
lawyers and property registries provided detailed information
on each of these areas. Several examples highlight
how they matter.
Organization of the registry and cadastre
Property registries record legal ownership, and the cadastre
records physical characteristics and identifies boundaries.
In the Netherlands all properties are recorded in the
registry and cadastre, with the two unified to avoid conflicting
records. Registry information can be accessed online
without restriction. In Costa Rica about 1.2 million
properties are registered, but almost 1.7 million plots are
supposedly recorded in the cadastre. The total area of all
registered properties exceeds the area of the country by
6% (figure 5.4). Evidently, some records are duplicates or
contradictory. Although it takes only 21 days and 3.6% to
register transfers, the value of title is questionable as a result.
Burundi has the opposite problem—how to verify
who owns what, with less than 1% of properties recorded
in a cadastre that is only paper-based.

REGISTERING PROPERTY 37
FIGURE 5.4
What proportion of property is recorded?
Estimated percentage of property recorded in the cadastre
0 20 40 60 80 100
Burundi
Senegal
Pakistan
Togo
Nicaragua
Colombia
Philippines
Albania
Thailand
Poland
Turkey
Denmark
Slovakia
Costa Rica
Source: Doing Business database.
Types of property tenure
More than 100 countries permit private ownership in
perpetuity. By contrast in Mozambique, private ownership
of land is not permitted. A business can only obtain
a use right for 50 years. Similar restrictions apply in
China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lao PDR,
Lesotho and Uzbekistan. The shorter the length of the
lease, the less security for the business. And systems that
register limited tenure rights are generally more difficult
to maintain, especially ensuring that the use rights are
followed and that extensions of terms are properly recorded.
The more complexity of rules, the more opportunities
for corruption. Reforms in Macedonia in 2001
converted use rights to private ownership, enabling a
more active property market to develop.
But even with private ownership in perpetuity, in
around a fifth of countries there are restrictions on the
ability to sell, lease, bequeath, transfer by gift or mortgage
the most common form of ownership. Four-fifths
of countries limit foreign ownership of land, including
outright bans in Bhutan, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Mongolia
and Oman.
In most countries women are far less likely to own
property than men—although the number of femaleheaded
households has increased to almost a third in developing
countries, women have formal title to less than
5% of land. 14 This is not because countries apply direct
legal bans, though some come close. As late as 1996 married
women in Botswana could not register deeds in their
own names. Today married women in Zimbabwe may not
register land without their husband’s permission. But improving
women’s property rights now requires attention to
related laws, such as inheritance, family and custom law. In
Kenya, custom and personal law overrides the principle of
anti-discrimination. Formal legal disputes over land title
uphold custom law that women do not inherit land, with
the result that despite comprising 70% of the agricultural
labor force and 48% of all small entrepreneurs, women
hold less than 5% of registered Kenyan land titles. 15
Some Asian and Latin American countries have introduced
joint titling and explicit guarantees for women’s
rights, including Nicaragua and Vietnam. Uganda just
reformed to require women’s participation in sales of
family land. These reforms support social development.
When women can control property, children’s educational
attainment and other social indicators are higher. 16
Property market controls
Following extensive land reform in 1999–01, registering
transfers of property is quick in the Kyrgyz Republic. It
takes only 15 days using the expedited option, with 7
procedures and at 5% of the property value. But tight restrictions
remain. For example, agricultural land cannot
be sold to individuals residing in towns and cities
or to legal entities, making it difficult to establish agroprocessing
businesses.
Similar restrictions limit the value of property rights
in more than half of the sample countries (figure 5.5). In
Kenya parties to a transaction of agricultural land need to
be approved by the land control board. In Korea transferring
titles in certain designated areas require government
approval, with the idea of preventing speculation.
In reality it prevents owners from using their property
and drives transactions into the informal economy.
Quantitative indicators of these, and other regulatory
measures of the security of property rights will be
developed in Doing Business in 2006.
FIGURE 5.5
Controls of property markets
Percentage of countries that control prices,
ownership, and transfers
8
Controls
of property
prices
14
Ceiling
on land
ownership
Source: Doing Business database.
23
Price controls
of real estate
services
31
Restrictions
on transfer
of property
37
Policies
to deter
speculation

38 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
What to reform?
Land reforms can be highly political and take years. But
the ease of registering property can be improved with
some simple steps. Here are 4 ways to start:
• Simplify and combine procedures for registering
property.
• First link, then unify the agencies involved.
• Provide easier access to the registry.
• And a warning: don’t regard technology as a panacea.
Countries with the fastest time to register property
also have the fewest procedures, without sacrificing due
diligence. Most simply combine steps at the registry,
rather than require the entrepreneur to go to 7 different
agencies, as in Ethiopia and Tanzania, or 3 separate
agencies to pay taxes, as in the Philippines. In Chile the
registry checks for payment of taxes, rather than require
the entrepreneur to go to the tax agency to get a tax
clearance certificate—as in Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay.
In Cambodia the registry automatically forwards the notification
of registration to the municipality, rather than
add an extra step in the process—as in El Salvador and
Kyrgyz Republic. And in two-fifths of countries the entrepreneur
can pay the stamp duty at the registry when
applying, rather than make a separate trip to the tax
agency, bank or municipality.
A related reform is to link or unify the property registry
and cadastre. By doing so it is easier to detect overlapping
and duplicate titles, saving time in due diligence
and improving the security of property rights. Controlling
for income per capita, countries with unified agencies
score significantly higher on the ease of registering
property. Lithuania unified its cadastre and property
registry in 1997, as well as the separate land and building
registries. It is now unifying all this with other important
public registries—such as addresses and legal entities.
Honduras is merging its registry and cadastre.
A first step towards unification is linking the registry
and cadastre. Spain’s 2002 Cadastral Act aims to do just
that, to increase consistency between the two. The same
is happening in Costa Rica—where the registry also has
access to the civil registry’s national database, allowing it
to determine whether the person transferring property is
alive. This has stemmed a flow of transactions in recent
years, when properties of deceased owners were known
to have exchanged hands, apparently with the owner’s
consent. Countries like Croatia and Slovenia, where the
property registry is in the courts and accounts for over
half of the case backlog, may consider as a priority reform
merging the registry with the cadastre. Much like
new business registration, land registration is inherently
an administrative, not adjudicative process, and does not
require a judge’s attention.
Expanding access to information in the property registry
helps owners to be clearly identified, reducing the
transaction costs to determine who owns what and cutting
the need for time-consuming due diligence. But 28
countries restrict access to the property registry, including
Bolivia, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kuwait and Nepal. In Sri Lanka
a notary or lawyer must be used to access the information.
China, the Kyrgyz Republic and Mongolia are all implementing
reforms to improve access to what was previously
restricted information. Countries with the greatest
ease of registering property also provide more information
and make it more accessible to entrepreneurs.
Many countries are embracing new technologies in
property registration. One in 3 have made registration
electronic in the last 5 years, with rich countries leading
the way. This helps in many ways (figure 5.6). Take the
United Kingdom. Its Land Registration Act, the first
major overhaul of land registration since 1925, came
into force in October 2003. The act sets up a new system
of electronic dealing with land, so that the register accurately
reflects land ownership at any given time. The reform
allows users to investigate title to land online, with
the absolute minimum of additional searches, inspections
and inquiries, and to get instantaneous computerized
updates of title. Implementation is not complete
yet, but time to register is already reported to have declined
by 30%.
FIGURE 5.6
Use of technology is associated with more efficiency
Average reduction in time to register property
Computerized
business systems
–51 days
Source: Doing Business database.
Electronic
imaging of titles
–15 days
Electronic
registry of
property
rights
–57 days
Electronic
cadastre
–38 days

REGISTERING PROPERTY 39
Others are doing the same. Ireland recently digitized
its registry records, allowed for electronic processing by
the registry and provided online information to customers.
Electronic conveyancing has been introduced in
the Netherlands and New Zealand—2 of the most efficient
countries for registering property. In Italy time to
register has been cut in half after electronic filing and release
of data were introduced. But it is not only rich
countries. Middle income countries like Colombia,
Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia, and even Madagascar and
some states in India are making at least some aspects of
the registry and cadastre electronic. The benefits are apparent.
Countries with more use of technology often
have more efficient property registration, even after controlling
for income per capita.
But technology is not a panacea. Many of the reformers
already had fairly efficient property registration
systems, which helped them to be among the first to go
electronic. In many other countries, particularly poor
ones, electronic registration is probably not sustainable
yet. If paper records are inaccurate, putting them in a
computer won’t help. There, the focus needs to be on
improving the efficiency of current services and coverage
and accuracy of the registry. Thailand, one of the
most efficient registration systems in the world, is a good
example. The registry there is still manual. But there is a
direct link between the registry and cadastral maps, land
records storage is continually improving, decentralized
registration is possible and there is a nationwide system
for personal identification.
Why reform?
Few would disagree that property rights are needed to encourage
investment, productivity and growth. Many studies
show this. 17 The question is how to protect those rights.
Some would argue that more regulation and a formalized
property registration process ensure more due
diligence, enhancing property rights. But complexity
breeds uncertainty, increases transactions costs and offers
opportunities for fraud. And more bureaucracy produces
more mistakes about who owns what. Longer and
more expensive property registration is associated with
weaker perceived security of property rights, even controlling
for income per capita (figure 5.7). Firms report
more problems in accessing land in countries with costly
and cumbersome registration procedures. 18
No surprise then, countries that make registration
easy also have fewer property title disputes. 19 In Thailand,
where it takes 2 procedures, 2 days and costs 6% of
the value, an estimated 0.1% of registered parcels are in
dispute. In the Philippines the estimated dispute rate is
15% and in Honduras 10%.
Faced with bureaucratic property registration, many
entrepreneurs choose to keep their assets informal. Investment
in expensive titling programs is ill-advised in
such countries, without reforms of property registries
and laws. Registry officials and property lawyers report a
significantly lower proportion of formally registered titles
in countries with complex, lengthy and expensive
registration. They also report more bribes (figure 5.7). In
many countries firms also rate property registries as the
most corrupt public organizations. 20
FIGURE 5.7
Easy property registration—more secure property rights, less informality, less corruption
Perceived security of property rights
Informal sector share of GDP
Perceived corruption
More
secure
Greater
share
More
corrupt
Less
secure
Lesser
share
Less
corrupt
Least
Most
Countries ranked by
steps to register property, quintiles
Note: Analysis controls for income per capita. Relationships are significant at the 5% level.
Source: Doing Business database, Heritage Foundation (2004), Kaufmann and others (2003).
Least
Most
Countries ranked by
steps to register property, quintiles
Least
Most
Countries ranked by
steps to register property, quintiles

40 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
FIGURE 5.8
Easy property registration, more credit, more investment
Private credit as a percentage of GDP
8
Private investment as a percentage of GDP
20
6
4
15
2
0
Most difficult
Least difficult
Countries ranked by ease of property registration, quintiles
Most difficult
Least difficult
Countries ranked by ease of property registration, quintiles
Note: Relationships with private credit remain significant at the 1% level when controlling for income, contract enforcement, and GDP growth, at the 10% level for investment when controlling for income.
Source: Doing Business database, World Bank (2004).
10
With fewer assets in the formal sector, more entrepreneurs
are excluded from using property as collateral,
and less credit is allocated (figure 5.8). The possibility of
getting loans is the only reason to take on the daunting
task of registering in some countries. Banks in Rwanda
will even assign staff to assist in the registration process
so that they can take property as collateral. But when it
is too difficult, few bother. Entrepreneurs will invest less
if their property rights are less secure. Inefficient registration
is associated with lower rates of private investment
(figure 5.8). And it leads to lower productivity,
since it is harder for property to be transferred from less
to more productive uses. The result is slower growth.
One study estimates that restrictive land market regulations
cost 1.3% of annual economic growth in India. 21
Notes
1. UNRCC (2004).
2. Ibbotson, Siegal and Love (1985). This chapter focuses on registering
real property. See chapter 5 on registering movable property as
collateral.
3. More effective collateral laws would encourage greater use of
movable assets as collateral, as discussed in the next chapter.
4. World Bank Group Investment Climate Assessments (various).
Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ic/ic_
country_report.htm
5. See Deininger (2003) for a summary.
6. World Bank Group Investment Climate Assessments (various).
Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ic/ic_
country_report.htm
7. Deininger (2003).
8. Durand-Lasserve and Royston (2002).
9. Fields (2002).
10. Based on analysis of the Doing Business indicators with firm level
data on the perceived security of property rights, as reported in
Batra and others (2003).
11. World Bank (2002).
12. Land Equity International (2003).
13. In Moldova and Ukraine the expedited procedure does not cut total
time because they are performed simultaneously with procedures
that take a longer time.
14. Anderson-Saito and Dhar (2004).
15. Ellis (2004).
16. Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2002), Katz and Chamorro (2002).
17. Knack and Keefer (1995), Besley (1995), Claessens and Laeven
(2003), see Deininger (2003) for a summary and analysis of relevant
studies.
18. Based on analysis of 15,561 firms in 41 countries as reported in
World Bank Investment Climate Assessments.
19. Based on estimated dispute rates provided by property registries
and lawyers as a part of the Doing Business survey.
20. World Bank Group Investment Climate Assessments (various).
Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ic/ic_
country_report.htm
21. McKinsey and Company (2001).

41
Getting credit
Who is increasing access to credit?
What to reform?
Why reform?
Zohra wants to expand her profitable catering business
in Algiers. She has new customers lined up, but needs
additional finance. She applies for a bank loan. The loan
officer checks Zohra’s credit history with the bank—and
finds nothing. She has not borrowed before. And because
there is no credit registry in the country, he cannot
confirm that she has always paid her bills on time.
He asks about collateral. Zohra has only her accounts receivable
to offer because the family house belongs to her
husband’s family. But laws restrict the bank from taking
receivables as collateral. The application is rejected. The
business stays small.
Zohra’s tale is common. Getting finance is rated as the
biggest obstacle for businesses in Algeria. It is the same in
most other countries. 1 Smaller businesses are constrained
the most. Women, who are more likely to run small businesses,
face the biggest hurdles (figure 6.1). 2
Some governments have made access to credit easier.
In 2003–04, credit information systems were established
in Armenia, Bulgaria, India, Latvia and Slovakia
and improved in another 20 countries. Collateral law reform
has also proceeded, at a more modest pace. Slovakia
was the top reformer last year. But a half dozen other
countries—from Macedonia to Spain—have reformed
as well. And Poland increased the protection of secured
creditors in bankruptcy.
Improving credit information and the laws to create
and enforce collateral—both in and out of bankruptcy—
is not just about creditor rights. It benefits deserving
debtors just as much, by increasing their chances to access
credit. And it boosts productivity and growth, by
shifting capital to the best business ventures. The gains
are large. In Bangladesh nearly half the poor people who
received credit lifted themselves out of poverty, but only
4% of those without credit did. 3 Some of the effect is no
doubt due to differences in education and land ownership,
but a large role remains for improving access for
creditworthy borrowers. 4
Others have tried alternative solutions. Laws in
Benin, Chile and Syria cap the interest rates that lenders
can charge. Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, Italy, Mexico, Peru
and Vietnam permit a bankrupt debtor to seek safe harbor
from debt collection for the entire insolvency proceeding—by
which time the bankruptcy estate is whittled
to nothing. Real estate and essential business
equipment in Bolivia, Mali and United Arab Emirates
are exempt from collection on default.
FIGURE 6.1
Getting credit is hard, especially for some
Access to bank finance
(percentage of firms with bank finance)
More
Access
Male-owned
businesses
in Tanzania
Female-owned
businesses
in Tanzania
Source: Doing Business database.
27
8
Large
firms
Small
firms
47
28

42 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
The rationale for such arrangements is that borrowers
need protection. The irony is that they hurt the very
people they are meant to protect. Insiders can always get
loans. But high-risk borrowers—most start-ups, small
firms, poor people—will not get a loan at a capped interest
rate. Nor if they cannot offer their main business
assets as collateral. They will be refused credit.
Borrower protections often backfire. Introduce
strong ones and there will be no borrowers to protect.
Take the Maldives. After a few years of successful development
of mortgage lending, politicians thought it
would be a popular reform to prohibit creditors from
seizing the primary residence in case of default. Within
months the mortgage market dried up. (In April 2004
the law was amended to address some of its weaknesses).
Bankruptcy receives a lot of attention in reform
proposals for improving access to credit. Yet bankers
and corporate lawyers estimate that more than threequarters
of collateral enforcement takes place outside of
bankruptcy. In poor countries, more than 90%. This
may decrease if bankruptcy were more efficient. But
even in countries with the most efficient insolvency, the
majority of creditors enforce outside of bankruptcy.
Credit markets work best with an effective assessment of
the borrower’s credit history, an ability to use a wide
range of assets as collateral cheaply, and enforcement of
collateral out of court. This is where Albania, India and
Latvia have focused their reform efforts.
Who is increasing access to credit?
Sharing credit information
Twenty-five years ago, only a third of countries had either
a private bureau, a public registry or both. Today 80% do.
The growth in poor and middle income countries has
been dramatic, with 37 new public registries and 23 private
bureaus, mainly in Latin America, East Asia and
Central and Eastern Europe. But poorer countries still lag
well behind rich ones, especially in information sharing
through private bureaus (figure 6.2, table 6.1).
Credit registries are useful to lenders only if they
distribute a broad range of high quality and easily accessible
data. Fourteen countries have credit information
systems with:
• Both positive information, meaning loans outstanding,
assets, payment behavior on accounts in good
standing—as well as negative information, meaning
defaults and arrears.
• Data on both firms and individuals.
• Data from retailers, or utilities as well as financial
institutions.
• Five or more years of historical data preserved.
• Data on all loans above 1% of income per capita.
• Legal guarantees for the consumer’s right to inspect
their data.
These are Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
But in many other countries, credit information is
limited—21 have at most 2 of these features including
Ghana, Morocco, the Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro,
Sri Lanka and Yemen. And 25 countries have no
FIGURE 6.2
Scant private information sharing in poor countries
Presence and coverage of credit information registries
90
Presence
(percentage of countries)
60
60
57
33
Source: Doing Business database.
Private bureau
21 Poor 47
Middle
income
Rich
Public registry
Poor 14
Middle
income
65
Rich 68
Coverage
(borrowers per 1,000 adults)
information sharing including Albania, Ethiopia, Jamaica,
the Kyrgyz Republic, Malawi, Papua New Guinea,
Russia and Syrian.
Reforms of registries focused on 5 areas:
• Providing data online. The bureaus in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Spain—as well as the Brazilian, Belgian,
Mozambican, Pakistani and Portuguese public registries—launched
online systems. Creditors can now obtain
information instantly. In most countries it used to
take more than a week. Bangladesh and Bulgaria plan to
launch online access in late 2004.
• Sharing positive information. The public registries in
Belgium, Brazil and Turkey began sharing more positive
information. Backed by new laws, the Greek and Hong
Kong (China) private bureaus did the same. In Greece
the number of consultations to the bureau grew by more
223
499

GETTING CREDIT 43
TABLE 6.1
Coverage of credit registries: Borrowers covered per 1,000 adult population
Private bureaus
Public registries
Top 10 Bottom 10 Top 10 Bottom 10
Canada 1,000 Portugal 79 Portugal 637 Mali 1
Ireland 1,000 Costa Rica 78 Belgium 533 Rwanda 1
Korea, Rep. 1,000 Denmark 71 Spain 394 Central African Republic 1
Norway 1,000 Spain 65 Malaysia 339 Saudi Arabia 1
United Kingdom 1,000 Philippines 34 Taiwan, China 334 Congo, Rep. 1
United States 1,000 Hungary 33 Chile 290 Serbia and Montenegro 1
Sweden 980 Israel 15 Venezuela 286 Cameroon 1
New Zealand 978 Pakistan 3 Argentina 201 Chad 0.4
Australia 954 Ghana 1 El Salvador 198 Nigeria 0.2
Germany 856 Kenya 1 Peru 143 Guinea 0.2
Source: Doing Business database.
than 50%, and several new products for lenders were
launched. In Hong Kong (China) the number of borrowers
covered by the bureau more than doubled, while
in Belgium it increased fivefold.
• Including more loans. Saudi Arabia’s public registry
cut the minimum loan size for collecting data from 5
million riyals to 500,000, almost doubling the number of
borrowers recorded. The Tunisian registry scrapped its
minimum loan cutoff altogether, increasing the coverage
of borrowers by more than 15 times.
• Introducing new products for lenders. These range
from credit scoring in Austria, Peru, Singapore and
Turkey to fraud detection in Ireland and Spain. Singapore
added data on borrower credit limits, the number
of days loans are overdue and commercial information
from public registries. Brazil expanded the scope of information
from 10 types to 30, including data on the
type of loan and how borrowers use credit.
• Improving data quality. The Bangladesh public registry
raised the penalty for banks that withhold data
from 2,000 takas to 500,000 and the penalty for disclosing
credit information to unauthorized parties from
2,000 takas to 100,000. As a result, the share of banks
submitting data on time jumped from 25% to 95%. In
Panama the bureau created a customer service office for
disputes on data accuracy. In Mozambique quality shot
up after new regulations allowed the registry to fine
banks for providing incomplete information. More than
a dozen countries are improving data protection laws,
which include incentives and safeguards for quality.
Overall, public registries reformed more than private
bureaus in 2003. But private bureaus remain better
structured to serve lenders. Public registries usually perform
a dual role of serving creditors and supporting the
banking supervisor in monitoring risk in the financial
system. For example only 14% of public registries report
offering such services as credit scoring, borrower monitoring
or debt collection to clients—compared with 90%
of private bureaus.
Legal rights for borrowers and lenders
Having access to past credit history is not enough. In
most countries, only the largest and best connected
businesses can get unsecured loans. The rest have to
pledge assets as collateral. In many countries, collateral
laws make this no easy task.
Lending is easier when debtors are entitled to pledge
any type of asset. But only 40 countries enable the debtor
to offer a changing pool of assets (such as inventory or
receivables), future assets (such as crops) and the entire
business as collateral. A borrower in the United States
can charge all assets of the business, tangible and intangible,
present and future, to obtain a loan that may fluctuate
in value. Doing so is impossible for a business in
Paraguay. By law the agreement must identify and describe
each asset and the debt specifically—and how to
know the future?
In Angola, Brazil, China and Mali inventory can be
used as collateral, but the list has to be updated with
every change. How would a grocery store get credit if it
has to make adjustments to the collateral list every time
a new stock arrives? And imagine a bank taking security
from an accounting firm in Algeria or Peru. Pledging its

44 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
FIGURE 6.3
High costs to create collateral in Africa
Cost to create and register a collateral agreement
Percentage of income per capita
39 Sub-Saharan Africa
22 Middle East & North Africa
20 Latin America & the Caribbean
7 Europe & Central Asia
6 South Asia
5 OECD high income
3 East Asia & the Pacific
Source: Doing Business database.
22 Poor
10 Middle income
5 Rich
main asset, accounts receivable, requires the notification
and consent of all the debtors.
After the type of security and debt is agreed, a lender
wants to check for existing rights to the collateral and
alert others of its priority. The best way is with a collateral
registry. Most countries have some type of registry—for
security over land, vessels, aircraft and intellectual
property. And in most an agreement is binding
over third parties only if it is registered. But only 30 have
registries that allow registration of charges of all types of
movable property, as well as link the registry across regions,
to make it easy to retrieve information.
Creating and registering movable collateral is easy
in many countries. In Botswana, Canada, Kuwait, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the
United States, fees, taxes and stamp duties are negligible,
and registration is complete in 1 or 2 days. But in others,
costs in a standardized case of creating security add up to
50% of income per capita or more (figure 6.3, table 6.2). 5
Most countries register charges within 2 weeks. But
it takes more than a month in Azerbaijan, Ghana, Honduras,
India, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and South
Africa. In Poland registration takes place in the court,
where a judge must certify the legality of the agreement.
The process can take 6 months. In the meantime, a
fraudulent borrower could pledge the asset to another
creditor. And the main business of courts—resolving
disputes—is held up.
Costs to create collateral are highest in poor countries
and lowest in Asian and OECD countries. Countries
with no registries are cheaper. But the creditors lose
out elsewhere because they have no way of notifying
others of their right to the collateral.
Collateral registration is only part of the story. Laws
on who has priority to the collateral introduce another
set of risks. In India the creditor can lose out to unpaid
taxes, to someone who bought the collateral in good
faith or to judgment creditors. 6 India is not alone. Sixty
countries give priority to a claimant other than the secured
creditor. The uncertainty means higher interest
rates and less credit for borrowers.
In Brazil credit can be secured by movable collateral,
but only at high cost and with a painstakingly specific
description in the loan agreement. If the debtor defaults,
an even bigger obstacle arises. Creditors must file a claim
with the court. Long proceedings ensue before the judge
decides to enforce and orders bailiffs to seize the assets.
After appraisal, a public auction is scheduled and advertised.
The court determines a minimum price. If met,
sale proceeds are deposited in a public agency and distributed
through settlement procedures. Debtors have
unlimited opportunities to drag the process by appeal.
Enforcement takes more than 7 years.
In another 40 countries enforcing collateral requires
the same long court trial as for unsecured debt. Prospects
for recovery are dim. Lenders respond with huge collateral
requirements and high interest rates. In Zambia average
collateral requirements are more than 3 times the
value of the loan and interest rates top 28%. 7 Few can afford
such terms. Compare this with Australia. The creditor
would appoint a receiver and serve notice on the borrower.
The receiver would seize and sell the asset. No
courts are involved, as long as the debtor cooperates. Enforcement
is over in 10 days. In Latvia, even if the debtor
does not cooperate with out-of-court measures, enforce-
TABLE 6.2
The least expensive to create collateral—and the
most
Cost to create and register security, % income per capita
Top 10 Bottom 10
New Zealand 0.02 Egypt, Arab Rep. 52.7
Netherlands 0.03 Jordan 56.3
Canada 0.05 Mali 58.5
Kuwait 0.06 Morocco 62.2
United Kingdom 0.07 Niger 74.6
Puerto Rico 0.09 Benin 80.7
United States 0.14 Togo 83.4
Hong Kong, China 0.18 Cameroon 87.6
Taiwan, China 0.20 Congo, Dem. Rep. 130.0
Albania 0.25 Côte d’Ivoire 155.9
Note: Austria, Cambodia, Germany, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland have no cost but
also no collateral registry.
Source: Doing Business database.

GETTING CREDIT 45
ment only takes two months through a simple summary
procedure with limits on frivolous appeals.
Collateral laws are of less use when debtors with
multiple creditors default—or when the best way to recover
debt is to reorganize an insolvent business. Bankruptcy
laws come in. They define who controls the
process, who has rights to the debtor’s assets, and the efficiency
of realizing these rights. It is natural to anticipate
more lending if creditors expect to be treated fairly
in a bankruptcy case, and the rights of secured lenders in
bankruptcy law have been shown to expand credit. 8
Three of these rights are most important:
• A secured creditor may enforce on its collateral
when a debtor enters reorganization—so the assets
are not “stayed.”
• The secured creditor is the first to be paid out of the
proceeds from liquidation.
• The creditors or an administrator manage the business
during reorganization, rather than the bankrupt
debtor himself.
Increasing these rights means changing bankruptcy
laws—a difficult reform. In 2003 only two countries improved
on these indicators. 9 In Poland employees and
taxes previously were paid before the secured creditors
upon liquidation. Now, secured creditors have priority
to the proceeds from the sale of their collateral (if there
is a shortfall, employee claims rank ahead). In Armenia,
since March 2004, the debtor automatically loses control
of its property to an administrator on bankruptcy, increasing
creditor rights. Some others, such as Spain, introduced
reforms that affected creditor rights but did
not change the net score.
To measure the ease of getting credit, a new index on
how well collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending
includes the 3 measures of legal rights in bankruptcy and
7 measures of collateral law: general rather than specific
descriptions of assets are permitted (expanding the scope
of assets covered); general rather than specific descriptions
of debt are permitted (expanding the scope of debt
covered); any legal or natural person may grant or take
security over business credits; a unified registry including
charges over movable property operates; security provides
priority outside bankruptcy; parties may agree on
TABLE 6.3
The most legal rights for borrowers and lenders—
and the least
Top 10 Bottom 10
United Kingdom 10 Brazil 2
Hong Kong, China 10 China 2
Singapore 10 Morocco 2
Albania 9 Peru 2
Australia 9 Haiti 2
Botswana 9 Lao PDR 2
Netherlands 9 Yemen, Rep. 2
New Zealand 9 Turkey 1
Slovakia 9 Greece 1
Latvia 8 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0
Source: Doing Business database.
enforcement procedures by contract; and creditors may
both seize and sell collateral out of court. Nine countries
have more than 9 of these features. A dozen have 2 or
fewer (table 6.3).
OECD countries score the highest (figure 6.4).
Transition countries follow, reflecting the sweeping collateral
law reforms in almost every country in the last
decade, supported among others by the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development. 10 Poor and middle
income countries score much lower than rich countries.
Some, such as the Dominican Republic, have laws
on collateral from the 19th century—hardly relevant to
today’s financing needs. Others score poorly even after
reforms—such as the OHADA countries in West Africa.
Their 1998 improvements did not go far enough. The
Middle East and North Africa and Latin America vie for
the region with the weakest legal rights.
FIGURE 6.4
OECD countries—most rights for borrowers and lenders
Legal rights index
GREATER
SECURITY
6.3 OECD high income
5.4 Europe & Central Asia
5.2 East Asia & the Pacific
5.0 Sub-Saharan Africa
4.0 South Asia
3.8 Middle East & North Africa
3.9 Latin America & the Caribbean
6.3 Rich
4.9 Middle income
4.5 Poor
Source: Doing Business database.

46 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
What to reform?
In an attempt to improve credit markets in the 1990s,
many developing countries introduced procedures for
reorganizing bankrupt companies, along the lines of
Chapter 11 in the United States. The procedures are almost
never used. A better approach is to improve credit
information systems and legal rights. Doing Business in
2004 recommended regulations or codes of conduct to
encourage lenders to participate in private bureaus. It
also discussed how public registries can complement or,
in some cases, help compensate for a lack of private information
sharing. And it explored ways to improve debt
recovery in bankruptcy, including giving clear and predictable
priority to secured creditors.
Six other reforms expand access to credit:
• Distributing both positive and negative information.
• Expanding providers of data to the credit registry.
• Making credit registries electronic.
• Introducing universal security for debtors and creditors.
• Establishing registries for all security interests in
movables.
• Permitting out of court collateral enforcement.
Distribute positive and negative credit information
The more information a registry provides to help predict
defaults, the more useful it is to lenders, and the more
credit available (figure 6.5). 11 Seventeen countries distribute
only a limited range of positive data, all through
public registries. Australia, Denmark, Estonia, Ghana,
New Zealand and the Philippines distribute only negative
data. 12 Why not permit both? The excuse is usually
FIGURE 6.5
Broader information and electronic access—more credit
Increase in private credit to GDP associated with:
Percentage points
12.6
Both positive
and negative
information are shared
12.0
Retailers,
trade creditors
and/or utilities
also submit data
10.8
Access
is electronic
Note: Analysis controls for income, GDP growth, enforcement, and legal rights.
Relationships are significant at the 10% level.
Source: Doing Business database.
privacy. But consumer protection laws can allow sharing
of both while safeguarding privacy. In 2003 Greece permitted
sharing positive data but with stricter requirements
for consumer consent before it can be accessed,
enabling the borrower to opt out of the system if desired.
Brazil, Hong Kong (China) and Turkey did the same.
Borrowers have the right to access their own credit reports
and a clear mechanism to challenge errors.
Expand providers
Expanding the sources of data also works. Trade creditors,
retailers and utilities have a wealth of information
on payment histories. Sharing it increases the power to
predict default and expands credit (figure 6.5). 13 Some
85% of private bureaus use data from retailers and utilities,
but only 35% of bank-owned bureaus do. And with
the exception of Belgium, all public registries gather data
only from supervised financial institutions. Banking
laws are sometimes a restriction to sharing data from
non-bank creditors, as in Poland. The Czech bureau is
awaiting a revision to the Personal Data Protection Act
to include information from nonbanking sources. The
Turkish bureau will do so by the end of 2004.
Make the registry electronic
An easy way to improve credit registries, without changing
laws or negotiating with lenders to submit more
data: provide online access. The new online system in
Pakistan cost $500,000 to set up. It delivers reports to
lenders instantly. Compare that with a bank in Cameroon,
which must wait up to 3 months before getting a
written report in the mail. Creditors in 24 other countries
cannot access data electronically. With technology
so cheap, there is no reason to wait. Providing online access
is associated with more credit (figure 6.5). And it
may help spur commercial banks to adopt credit scoring
technology, which both speeds the lending process and
reduces opportunity for gender bias. 14
Introduce universal security for debtors and creditors
As a part of its collateral law reform in 2002, Slovakia
permitted debtors to use all movable assets as collateral—present
and future, tangible and intangible— abolishing
the requirement for specific descriptions of assets
and debt. Since then more than 70% of all new business
credit is secured by movables and receivables. Credit to
the private sector increased by 10%.
Borrowers in all countries can pledge land or land
use rights. All can pledge tangible movable assets without

GETTING CREDIT 47
losing possession. 15 And then the restrictions come. Specific
descriptions of assets and debt preclude debtors
from using changing pools of assets and future assets as
collateral, preventing inventory and receivables financing.
Some countries have tried to correct the problem. In
1997 Panama introduced a floating charge over an entire
business. But only for assets located outside the country.
Paraguay allows borrowers to pledge inventory. But only
if it consists of mining or industrial products. And each
item must be listed individually. Angola, Egypt, Morocco
and Vietnam permit nonpossessory pledges. But only to
licensed banks.
Such solutions always fall short. Potential borrowers
with the wrong collateral miss out on loans. The answer
is to create a universal security instrument, covering all
assets and all debt, and letting all debtors and all creditors
benefit.
Establish registries for all collateral
Collateral registries work best when they are unified by
region and cover all types of assets. Even rich countries
need reform. Austria, Germany and Switzerland have no
collateral registries. 16 France operates local registries. And
there are separate registries for pledges over shares, bank
accounts, receivables and equipment. Separate registration
with tax authorities is also required. Another 32 countries
require multiple registration, including Cameroon,
Colombia, Ecuador, Japan and Morocco. In Syria charges
over movable property are possible only where there is a
pre-existing registry—namely vehicles, vessels and intellectual
property. Turkey has a similar system. The solution:
create universal charges and a unified registry of movable
property charges indexed by the name of the debtor.
Indonesia established a registry in 2001. And Spain
unified its registries in 1998. But Eastern European
countries have led the way in establishing unified registries
of charges over movable collateral. Bulgaria, Hungary,
Romania and Moldova all successfully introduced
such registries recently. Bosnia and Herzegovina is about
to launch its unified registry. Since it was established in
1998 the Macedonian registry has been used by banks as
a standard part of lending. The most effective registries
permit a simple administrative filing of a notice of the
charge—and do not stall the registration process with
legal review or authentication.
The Romanian registry permits notice filing and is
online, allowing creditors to check for existing liens instantly.
Another 23 countries make the registry accessible
electronically. Those that do often have significantly faster
registration and more credit, controlling for other factors.
Permit out of court collateral enforcement
In 2000 Spain introduced out of court enforcement
through notarial execution, allowing debtors and creditors
to agree on enforcement methods. Time to enforce
was cut from more than 1 year to 3 months. The gains
from reforms in Slovakia were even larger. It took 560
days to enforce a mortgage through the old system. Now
it is possible to enforce in 45 days (figure 6.6).
Ten years ago it was almost impossible to enforce
collateral in India. The process could easily take 25 years.
In 1998 the government established Debt Recovery Tribunals,
with expedited enforcement proceedings. Expected
time to enforce was cut to around 10 years. More
reforms were introduced in May 2004. State-owned
banks, which account for 90% of lending, were permitted
to enforce out of court. On default the bank must
notify the debtor. After a 60 day grace period the bank
can seize the assets directly and sell by public auction.
Introducing the reform was difficult—it had to survive a
Supreme Court challenge. But the new procedure is widely
used. Creditors can expect to enforce within 9 months.
Designing out of court enforcement that doesn’t
collapse at the first objection of the debtor cuts enforcement
time by three-quarters on average. The less
courts are involved, the shorter the time, and the more
willing creditors are to lend. The point of collateral
agreements is to avoid a regular trial. And if the case goes
to court, efficiency can be improved by introducing
summary proceedings—as in Estonia—without judicial
analysis of the cause of the dispute, and with limitations
on debtor’s ability to appeal.
FIGURE 6.6
Reform works—Slovakia before and after
Days to enforce a mortgage
Source: Doing Business database.
Time reduced
from 560 days to 45
2003
Procedures reduced from 14 to 6
2004
Number of procedures

48 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Why reform?
Broader sharing of credit information, stronger legal
rights in and out of bankruptcy and more efficient
enforcement mean more credit (figure 6.7). Analysis of
credit markets over the last 25 years shows that introducing
information sharing and strengthening rights in
bankruptcy expand credit, even controlling for other determinants
of lending. 17 In poor countries, information
sharing works better than legal rights.
The most credit constrained—small firms, women
and poor people—gain the most. 18 All firms are more
likely to have loans from financial institutions in countries
with stronger legal rights. But the relationship is
larger and more significant for small firms. 19 One study
shows that small firms are 40% more likely to have a
bank loan in countries with credit registries. 20 Why? Because
registries help sort good borrowers from bad.
There are more benefits. Countries with stronger
legal rights have fewer nonperforming loans, even controlling
for income per capita. Businesses report fewer
credit constraints. They also get cheaper loans—lending
rates and spreads between lending and deposit rates are
significantly lower. And ratings of financial system stability
are higher. 21
The result: higher productivity and more growth.
Adding one of the features in the information-sharing
index is associated with 6 percentage points more credit
to the private sector (as a share of GDP). This implies
that moving from a score of 0 to 5 on the credit information
index is associated with 0.9 percentage points
more GDP growth and 0.7 percentage points more productivity
growth. Reforming legal rights in Egypt or
Turkey to the level of Botswana or Jordan suggests 1.1
percentage points in more economic growth and 0.9 percentage
points higher productivity growth (figure 6.7). 22
FIGURE 6.7
Better legal protections and more credit information lead to higher growth
Stronger legal rights, more credit
(Credit as a percentage of GDP)
More
credit
More information sharing, more credit
(Credit as a percentage of GDP)
More
credit
More credit, higher growth
(percentage points)
1.1 Egypt,
Arab Rep.
0.9 Brazil
0.9 Turkey
Less
credit
Less
credit
0.7 Yemen, Rep.
0.5 Cambodia
0.7 China
0.6 Côte d’Ivoire
0.4 Pakistan
Least rights
Most rights
Countries ranked by legal rights index
quintiles
Least sharing
Most sharing
Countries ranked by information sharing index
quintiles
Note: The relationships are significant at the 1% level and remain so at the 5% level when controlling for income per capita.
Sources: Doing Business database and King and Levine (1993).
Added
GDP
Added
productivity growth
Note: Based on implied growth from increasing the legal rights
score to the 75th percentile.
Notes
1. Batra and others (2003).
2. Even for larger firms, gender differences remain. See Center for
Women’s Business Research (2004) and Weeks and Seiler (2001).
3. Grameen Bank (2004).
4. See also Littlefield and others (2003), World Bank (2001).
5. The standardized case assumes a value of debt and security of 10 times
income per capita.
6. Judgment creditors are given the right to an asset by court verdict.
7. World Bank (2004b).
8. This 4-point measure of creditor rights was developed by La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and covered 49 countries.
9. The lack of reform in 2003 is not an aberration. Only 30 countries
changed their creditor rights in bankruptcy score in the last 25 years.
10. Dahan and Simpson (2004).
11. See also Barron and Staten (2003) for micro evidence of this effect.
12. In another 7—Chile, Costa Rica, Hungary, Pakistan, Paraguay, Spain
and Uruguay—the private bureau distributes only negative data but
positive data is available from the public registry.
13. See also Barron and Staten (2003) for micro evidence of this effect.
14. Royal Bank of Canada (2004).
15. Either through title finance or a traditional security instrument.
16. These countries require lenders to take title to the collateral.
17. Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2004).
18. See Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (forthcoming) and Gropp
and others (1997) for evidence on small firms.
19. Based on analysis of the Doing Business legal rights of borrowers and
lenders indicator with firm level data on access to bank finance, as reported
in Batra and others (2003).
20. Love and Mylenko (2003).
21. Based on analysis of the Doing Business legal rights of borrowers and
lenders indicator with: The IMF Global Stability Report measure of
nonperforming loans; International Financial Statistics lending and deposit
rates; Global Competitiveness Report 2003–04 ratings of the ease
of getting loans and financial system soundness, and Moody’s strength
of financial system rating. Relationships are significant at the 5% level.
All analysis controls for income per capita.
22. Calculations based on King and Levine (1993).

49
Protecting investors
Who uses equity finance?
What encourages equity investment?
What to reform?
Why reform?
In July 1991 the Bank of Credit and Commerce International,
otherwise known as BCCI, collapsed. Its 400
branches in 70 countries closed. Investors faced losses totaling
more than $10 billion. In November the same year
the body of Robert Maxwell, one of Britain’s wealthiest
men, was found in the sea off the coast of Tenerife. A few
days later the auditors of the Mirror Group found that
$900 million had been diverted as unauthorized loans
from the pension fund to Maxwell’s private companies.
Interest in corporate governance took off. Sir Adrian
Cadbury, chair of the first committee on corporate governance
in the United Kingdom, writes: “When our Committee
was formed [in 1991], neither our title nor our
work program seemed framed to catch the headlines. It
is, however, the continuing concern about standards of
financial reporting and accountability, heightened by
BCCI, Maxwell, and the controversy over directors’ pay,
which has kept corporate governance in the public eye.” 1
Since the Cadbury report, more than 160 corporate governance
guidelines and codes of best practice have been
produced in 90 countries. 2
Meanwhile, Kwadwo, a Ghanaian who recently returned
from working abroad, is looking for additional
private financing. Having saved $40,000, he wants to
start a bus company to service the link between Accra
and Kumasi. He is looking to buy 6 buses and needs another
$30,000. So he goes to the bank but is told that he
needs to put up $90,000 as collateral for the $30,000 he
would borrow. This won’t do. Kwadwo approaches several
people who have that kind of money and offers
them a partnership. But everyone declines, afraid that
Kwadwo would abscond with their money.
In countries like Ghana, good corporate governance
is about creating incentives for investors to provide finance
without the need to exercise daily control of business
operations. The typical case looks more like
Kwadwo’s search for a business partner than it resembles
BCCI or initial public offerings in rich countries. And
potential investors worry about expropriation by the entrepreneur
or managing partner. 3 But the same principles
of good corporate governance apply in both rich
and poor countries.
Preventing expropriation from taking place, and
exposing it when it does, requires legal protections of
small shareholders and enforcement capabilities. And—
the focus of Doing Business in 2005—it requires that the
business disclose information on ownership and financial
performance and on the precise nature of business
transactions. Whether small investors decide to go to the
court, file a complaint with the regulator or feed the information
to the media and embarrass the insider, better
information disclosure helps.
Four types of ownership disclosure reduce expropriation:
information on family, indirect, and beneficial
ownership, and on voting agreements between shareholders.
Two types of financial disclosure help investors:
the business can have an audit committee that reviews
and certifies financial data and the law may require that
an external auditor be appointed. Finally, disclosure is
most effective when both ownership and financial information
is available to all current and potential investors.
Summing these seven features into a Disclosure Index,
ranging from 0 to 7, reveals that British investors enjoy
among the strongest protections in the world, with a score

50 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
of 7. Ghanaian investors are among the least protected,
with a score of 2 (the law requires disclosure of indirect
ownership and the appointment of external auditors).
Investors benefit greatly from such legal protection.
So do entrepreneurs. If expropriation remains unpunished,
few would dare investing in business partnerships
or publicly listed companies. Banks would be the only
source of finance. But poor collateral laws or weak property
registration systems would be an insurmountable
obstacle to many businesses in obtaining credit. The result:
businesses do not reach efficient size for lack of financing,
and economic growth is held back. 4
Who uses equity finance?
In rich countries new business start-ups and the state
raise money on financial markets. In developing countries,
the established large companies and the state do.
Stock exchanges in the United Kingdom and the United
States have larger market capitalization and higher trading
volume than all other stock markets combined (table
7.1). The Toronto Stock Exchange has larger market capitalization
than the stock exchanges in Brazil, India, and
Russia put together.
While stock markets exist in more than 100 countries,
in only 40 do they contribute in any meaningful
way to raising capital. 5 Some countries have attracted
public equity investors. Chile has developed an active
stock market, bolstered by the privatization of pension
funds, the largest investors. Poland has followed a similar
path. Markets in Mexico, Russia and Turkey attract
foreign institutional investors. China, Korea and Malaysia
have seen the largest foreign inflows, thanks to the
growth of the corporate sector (figure 7.1).
Others have failed. In the 1990s many Latin American
and transition economies established stock exchanges
to list privatized companies. But because ownership
of these companies is concentrated in the hands
of a limited group of shareholders, and there are few
shareholder protections to encourage minority investment,
voluntary de-listings are common—more than
150 companies moved into private hands in Brazil over
the last 5 years, nearly 500 in Bulgaria, and more than
1,000 in the Czech Republic and Romania. Stock markets
in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Kyrgyz Republic,
and Moldova are moribund.
In all but a handful of countries, such as Japan and
the United States, publicly listed companies are controlled
by a few wealthy families (figure 7.2). The state frequently
has large holdings too. In 1999 the state controlled 30% of
large listed companies in Malaysia, 25% in Germany and
Portugal and 20% in Indonesia and Thailand. 6 In many
Asian and Latin American countries business and politics
mix. In 1998, here is how Imelda Marcos described the extent
of her family’s holdings: “We practically own every-
TABLE 7.1
Top 40 stock markets, 2003
Total market
Listed capitalization
Rank Market companies (US$m)
1 United States 5,295 14,266,266
2 Japan 3,116 3,040,665
3 United Kingdom 2,311 2,412,434
4 France 723 1,355,643
5 Germany 684 1,079,026
6 Canada 3,578 893,950
7 Spain 3,191 726,243
8 Switzerland 289 725,659
9 Hong Kong, China 1,029 714,597
10 China 1,296 681,204
11 Italy 271 614,842
12 Australia 1,405 585,475
13 Netherlands 183 488,647
14 Taiwan, China 669 379,023
15 Korea 1,563 329,616
16 Sweden 264 287,500
17 India 5,644 279,093
18 South Africa 426 267,745
19 Brazil 367 234,560
20 Russia 214 230,786
21 Belgium 152 173,612
22 Finland 142 170,283
23 Malaysia 897 168,376
24 Saudi Arabia 70 157,302
25 Singapore 475 145,117
26 Denmark 187 127,997
27 Mexico 159 122,532
28 Thailand 405 118,705
29 Greece 339 106,845
30 Norway 156 94,679
31 Chile 240 86,291
32 Ireland 55 85,070
33 Israel 576 75,719
34 Turkey 284 68,379
35 Portugal 59 58,285
36 Indonesia 333 54,659
37 Austria 86 54,528
38 Argentina 107 38,927
39 Luxembourg 44 37,333
40 Poland 203 37,165
Source: Standard & Poor’s (2004).

PROTECTING INVESTORS 51
FIGURE 7.1
Few initial public offerings outside OECD and East Asia
Number of initial public offerings, 2003
Top 5
144 United States
125 Japan
105 Canada
97 China
88 Australia
81 Korea
56 Malaysia
Source: Bloomberg and National Stock Exchange websites.
Indonesia 6
India 6
Philippines 4
South Africa 3
Poland 2
Mexico 1
Turkey 1
FIGURE 7.2
Ownership is concentrated in developing countries
Percentage ownership of the 3 largest investors
in the 10 largest publicly listed companies
68
Russia
64
Mexico
Source: World Bank (2004d).
62
Egypt
Arab Rep.
58
57
Indonesia Brazil United
States
19 18
Japan
thing in the Philippines from electricity, telecommunications,
banking, beer and tobacco, newspaper publishing,
television stations, shipping, oil and mining, hotels and
beach resorts, down to coconut milling, small farms, real
estate and insurance.” 7 With such powerful controlling
shareholders and few protections, small investors do not
risk their money buying public equity.
Firms in poor countries need private equity finance,
as seen in Kwadwo’s search for partners. But investors are
scarce. In Indonesia, for example, equity accounts for
only 2% of financing in small businesses. In Romania,
5%. In Venezuela, 7%. In contrast, it is nearly a quarter
of financing in Malaysia. 8 This is not because equity is
unnecessary. Firms in poor countries are twice as likely
to report that a lack of equity finance is an obstacle to
growth—42%, compared with 20% in rich countries. 9
But no investor will put money where it is not safe.
What encourages equity investment?
What investors fear the most is having their money expropriated.
Whether the company is private or public,
expropriation of minority shareholders may be achieved
by selling products or assets at below-market prices,
buying products or assets at above-market prices, taking
business opportunities away from the company and issuing
loans at preferential rates. In many countries with
poor legal protections, clever entrepreneurs can devise
ways to deny fair returns to investors while remaining
within the law. 10
Doing Business distinguishes 3 dimensions of investor
protection: disclosure of ownership and financial
information; legal protections of small investors; and enforcement
capabilities in the courts or securities regulator.
This year the focus is primarily on disclosure of
ownership and financial information and on shareholder
protections, with some discussion on enforcement.
Analysis of enforcement will be developed further in next
year’s report.
Disclosure
Consider 5 examples of popular expropriation methods:
• In 1996 controlling shareholders of Aeroflot, Russia’s
largest airline, set up a company to handle Aeroflot’s
overseas revenues—but with a 6-month payment delay.
Aeroflot covered the gap by borrowing from another
company—owned by the same controlling shareholders—at
above-market interest rates. More than $600
million was siphoned. 11
• In 1998 Peronnet, a French company, rented a warehouse
from SCI at above-market rates. Unbeknownst to
small investors, Peronnet’s controlling shareholder had
established SCI, which bought land and built the warehouse
to lease back to Peronnet. 12
• In 2001 LeisureNet, a fitness company in South
Africa, collapsed. The failure was triggered by a $7 million
investment in a chain of gyms in Germany. Subsequent
investigation revealed that the intermediary company,
Dalmore, was jointly owned by the managers of
LeisureNet. Each pocketed over $1 million. 13

52 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
• In 2003 Unefon, the cellphone unit of the Mexican
broadcaster TV Azteca, was at risk of defaulting
on a $325 million loan from its biggest creditor, Nortel.
Nortel sold the debt to a private company, Codisco Investments,
at a steep discount, for $107 million. Four
months later, Unefon paid back the full $325 million
debt. Codisco netted $218 million. But TV Azteca neglected
to tell investors that half of Codisco was owned
by its controlling shareholder. 14
• In 2003 Italian dairy-foods giant Parmalat defaulted
on a $185 million loan, prompting auditors to inspect financial
statements. It turned out accounts were falsified
to hide $10 billion in losses and $620 million misappropriated
to other family owned companies. More than $9
billion of Parmlat’s reported assets could not be traced. 15
FIGURE 7.3
Rich countries disclose the most
Disclosure index
GREATER
DISCLOSURE
Source: Doing Business database.
5.5 OECD high income
3.9 East Asia & the Pacific
3.6 Europe & Central Asia
3.2 South Asia
2.6 Middle East & North Africa
2.4 Sub-Saharan Africa
2.3 Latin America & the Caribbean
5.3 Rich
3.7 Middle income
2.6 Poor
The common element in these cases: a lack of disclosure.
None of the controlling shareholders informed
minority investors of their ownership in related companies.
This is legal in many countries. In Mexico, Russia
and 70 other countries neither the corporate law nor the
securities law required such disclosure. An external audit
finally caught the Parmalat scandal, but managers were
able to simply invent assets for 15 years without close
scrutiny from audit committees. In Turkey and 67 other
countries, the combination of both internal audit committees
and external audits to catch and disclose such
behavior is not required.
Canada, Israel, Spain, the United Kingdom and the
United States have the most disclosure requirements of
any country (table 7.2). Rich countries mandate much
higher disclosure than do developing countries. East
Asia has the most disclosure of any developing region.
Latin America has the least (figure 7.3).
TABLE 7.2
Rich countries disclose the most
Most Disclosure Index Index
Canada 7 Japan 6
Israel 7 Korea, Rep. 6
Spain 7 Lithuania 6
United Kingdom 7 Nigeria 6
United States 7 Philippines 6
Australia 6 Slovakia 6
Austria 6 South Africa 6
Chile 6 Sweden 6
Czech Republic 6 Taiwan, China 6
France 6 Thailand 6
Hong Kong, China 6 Tunisia 6
Ireland 6 Zimbabwe 6
Source: Doing Business database.
These indicators come from a new survey of corporate
and securities lawyers. 16 The data measure the most
stringent level of required disclosure, reflecting the
choices of small investors to put their money in publicly
listed or privately held companies. In countries where
stock exchange regulations and securities laws are in
force, the disclosure index assesses these regulations. In
other countries, the disclosure requirements come from
the company law. So the indicators are relevant for private
companies as well as publicly listed ones.
Disclosure of ownership shows who has enough
power to appoint managers and determine business
strategy. If an investor illicitly gains control of the business,
he may expropriate the investments of small shareholders
and do so legally by voting for transactions that
benefit him at the expense of others. Four types of ownership
disclosure reduce this possibility: information on
family, indirect or beneficial ownership, and on voting
agreements between shareholders.
Family ownership. First, investors would like to know
whether a large shareholder expands his control of the
business when another member of his family buys shares.
Some countries—such as Canada, Japan, and Norway—
mandate disclosure of ownership by immediate family
members. Others go further. The Czech Republic requires
disclosure for “any related person.” Still others impose
no requirements whatsoever, including such rich
countries as Germany and Italy, as well as middle income
ones as Egypt.
Indirect ownership. A second disclosure that benefits
small investors is that of indirect ownership. Yoshisuke
Aikawa, the founder of Nissan, describes a classic example.
Consider a wealthy Japanese family that establishes
a business, Choten Corp, with ¥1 billion. 17 The family

PROTECTING INVESTORS 53
FIGURE 7.4
Pyramid structures can mask related-party transactions
Controlling
family
1b
51%
51%
Choten
2b
Public
investors
Ichi
Ni
1b
1b
51% 51% 51%
51%
Futatsu-Ichi Futatsu-Ni Futatsu-San Futatsu-Yon
1b 1b 1b 1b
Source: Aikawa (1934).
51%
Total public
investment
4b
takes Choten public and raises almost an additional ¥1
billion. It then organizes 2 other businesses, Ichi and Ni,
each financed with ¥500 million from Choten and almost
¥500 million in public equity. Another 4 firms are
organized under Ichi and Ni with the same strategy (figure
7.4). Now the family fully controls 7 firms, with ¥5
billion in consolidated assets, by leveraging ¥4 billion
from small investors. To raise the same equity through
Choten alone, their ownership would have been diluted
to a minority 20%. Good for the family. But minority investors
are more vulnerable to expropriation if they are
unaware of how business between Choten and its subsidiaries
could benefit the controlling family.
Beneficial ownership. A third way to gain control is
through nominee accounts, trust funds, or brokerage
firms, where the identity of the buyer is not disclosed. 18
This practice is so popular in Indonesia, that by 1996
the Suharto family managed to amass control of 417
companies, 21 of them publicly-listed, using nominee
accounts and trusts. The practice is still permitted. In
contrast, Malaysia revised its regulation in 2001 to limit
nominee ownership.
Voting agreements. Fourth, shareholders may have
agreements that stipulate collective voting on strategic
issues or managerial appointments. If these agreements
are not disclosed, as in Jordan, the Philippines or Turkey,
small investors may lose out.
In addition to ownership disclosure, 2 types of financial
disclosure help investors.
Audit committees. The quality of financial information
is increased if the company law or securities law
requires internal audits before financial statements are
released to investors. The business can have an audit
committee that reviews and certifies financial data. Better
yet, the committee may include some outside members.
Korea has made the most progress, by mandating
audit committees and also requiring that two-thirds of
the committee members in large companies be outsiders.
External audits. Laws can also require that an external
auditor be appointed. Countries like Argentina and
Spain have both an internal audit committee and an external
auditor, while Hungary, like many other countries,
has a requirement only for an external auditor. One
caveat: in many countries external auditors are not so independent.
In Peru, for example, an estimated 6,000 auditors
vie for the business of 200 listed companies, which
pay the highest fees for auditing services. Sometimes, the
most malleable auditors get the job.
Public access to information. Finally, disclosure is
most effective when both ownership and financial information
are available to all current and potential investors,
either in stock exchange bulletins if the company
is public, or in annual reports, newspapers, or company
registries for privately held companies. One example. In
2000 the Australian Stock Exchange introduced a realtime
disclosure system that utilizes the Internet for reporting
information that may affect investors’ choices. It
also monitors the media for company announcements
that may have not been reported but fall under the disclosure
regulation. About 300 such announcements were
detected last year. Yet in countries like Saudi Arabia or
Venezuela, only the regulators have access to ownership
information.
The 7 ways of enhancing disclosure—by reporting
family, indirect, and beneficial ownership, and on voting
agreements between shareholders, by requiring audit
committees of the board of directors and the use of
external auditors, and by making such information
available to all current and potential investors—make up
the Doing Business indicator of disclosure (table 7.3).
Twenty four countries have 6 or more of these features.
Thirty others—almost all poor countries—have fewer
than two.
Legal protections
Disclosure of ownership and financial information is
just the beginning. Legal protections of the rights of
small investors are needed. In the Peronnet case, for example,
failure to disclose was not sufficient to void the
lease agreement with SCI. The court ruled that the decision
to lease was not taken with the sole intention of
benefiting the majority shareholder and served a legitimate
business purpose. It took no interest in the question
of whether the creation of SCI and the price it

54 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
TABLE 7.3
Building the disclosure index
Disclosure Measure Canada Korea, Rep. Mexico
Macedonia,
FYR Bangladesh Ghana Lebanon
1. Family ownership is disclosed Yes Yes No No No No No
2. Indirect ownership is disclosed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
3. Beneficial ownership is disclosed Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No
4. Voting agreements between shareholders must be disclosed Yes Yes No No No No No
5. Audit committees must be established Yes No Yes No No No No
6. External auditors must be used Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
7. Both ownership and financial information is available publicly Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Disclosure Index (number of yes responses) 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Source: Doing Business database.
charged for the building were fair to minority shareholders.
The law did not provide for such interpretation.
A large literature documents the benefits of shareholder
protection. 19 It concludes that four legal protections
of small investors are both effective and relatively
easy to enforce: 20
• Cumulative voting for directors, which permits shareholders
to multiply their number of votes by the number
of directorships being voted on and to cast the total votes
for one director. Cumulative voting allows small investors
to gain representation at the board of directors,
improving their access to information and giving them
voice in decisions on large transactions.
• Allowing derivative suits, where shareholders can
sue on behalf of the company for damages caused
to the company. Derivative suits lower the cost of challenging
management decisions in the courts, because a
shareholder only has to prove damages to the company
instead of damages to herself.
• Low threshold of capital, say 5%, to call shareholders’
meetings. Lower capital thresholds make it easier
for shareholders to organize a meeting to challenge
management and to put additional items on the meeting’s
agenda.
• Pre-emptive rights to buy new shares, where current
shareholders have the first opportunity to buy newly issued
shares in order to avoid diluting their ownership.
Pre-emptive rights limit the risk of expropriation, where
shares are issued to the controlling shareholder or related
parties at below-market prices.
Together, these protections help explain a large proportion
of the variation in access to external financing
(figure 7.5) and the number of public listings across the
world. Among middle income countries, Chile, with
strong protections for small investors, has a market capitalization
of 74% of GDP in 2003. Egypt, where equity
investors have fewer protections, has one of 29%. Among
developed countries, Spain protects small investors and
has a market capitalization nearly twice Italy’s, 71% of
FIGURE 7.5
More legal protections, more equity
Market capitalization to GDP
FIGURE 7.6
Efficient courts help protect minority shareholders
Perceived protection of minority shareholders
Higher
High
Lower
Least protections
Most protections
Countries ranked by minority shareholder protection index, quintiles
Note: Analysis controls for income per capita. Relationships are significant at the 5% level.
Source: Doing Business database, World Bank (2004a).
Low
Least time
Most time
Countries ranked by days to enforce a contract, quintiles
Note: Analysis controls for income per capita. Relationships are significant at the 1% level.
Source: Doing Business database, WEF (2004).

PROTECTING INVESTORS 55
national income, compared with 40%. South Africa has
among the strongest protections for equity investors and
a market capitalization rivaling Switzerland’s.
Small investors in Yukos, the second largest Russian
oil company, have been hurt by a lack of pre-emptive
rights. Here is what happened. In 1999 Yukos, the majority
shareholder of Tomskneft, voted to increase the number
of Tomskneft shares by 300%. The new shares were
sold to off-shore companies, allegedly owned by the controlling
shareholder of Yukos, without informing existing
Tomskneft shareholders. The ownership of existing small
shareholders dropped from 49% to 9%, reducing the
payoff to investors by four-fifths. This would have been
impossible in the presence of pre-emptive rights in Russian
company law. At least the investors were allowed to
file a derivative suit, and actually did—in another 20% of
countries even that would have been impossible, including
in Bangladesh, Ecuador, Kuwait and Vietnam.
Enforcement
Good investor protections are the ones a country can enforce.
Even the best rules are useless if enforcement is
weak. Some economies—such as the Kyrgyz Republic,
Moldova and Nigeria—adopted strong company or securities
laws, but no cases of small investors’ abuse have
ever been resolved in the courts.
As in any other commercial dispute, the speed, cost,
and fairness of the judgment determine whether small
investors would use the courts and succeed in getting
compensation. Potential expropriators know this as well
and calculate the risk of being caught and punished.
New Zealand and Norway, where courts perform well,
see less abuse of investors (figure 7.6). Colombia improved
enforcement in 2002 by giving arbitration tribunals
the power to issue binding judgments. A decision
of the tribunal typically takes 6 months.
What to reform?
Start with what’s simple. Increase disclosure. Then, make
it easier for small investors to challenge attempts at expropriation
in the courts. Enforce harsher penalties for
managers or large investors who misbehave. And encourage
investors to be active in identifying bad practices.
It used to be that disclosing ownership and financial
information cost a lot of money. Publishing a newspaper
announcement every time shares change hands, and
printing quarterly financial statements cost money.
Printing annual reports and reaching every small investor
cost even more. The internet has changed that.
Now it is almost costless to disseminate information,
once it has been assembled. 21
Many companies and stock exchanges are taking advantage
of this. In Thailand the stock exchange publishes
all ownership changes and quarterly statements on its
website. Egypt increased the disclosure requirements last
year and penalized about 100 companies that did not
meet the higher standard. Chile required listed companies
to publish quarterly financial reports and make them
available electronically. Hungary passed a new Capital
Markets Act, which introduces US-style disclosure of
ownership and financial information. Brazil took a different
path by establishing the Novo Mercado, with more
stringent disclosure requirements. About 40 companies
have already listed. 22 And in July 2004 the Indian government
announced intentions to create a separate market
for trading equity in smaller companies, with simpler
disclosure requirements. This would allow the introduction
of stricter disclosure for companies listed on the
main market.
Specialized commercial courts have been shown to
improve the enforcement of debt contracts and speed up
bankruptcy proceedings. They are equally beneficial for
small investors who want to challenge decisions by managers
or boards of directors. Some countries, such as
India, channel shareholder suits into special tribunals,
avoiding the delays in regular courts. Much like bankruptcy,
corporate governance issues require more expertise
so it pays for judges to be specialized in commercial
cases. And even without specialization, cutting the procedures,
time and cost to go through the regular courts
will help.
Disclosure requirements work only if they are
backed by sufficient penalties and enforcement. Often,
penalties are negligible. Two examples. In Indonesia the
penalty for missing the deadline for submitting an annual
report to the securities market regulator is $120.
This is nothing for most companies. Not surprisingly,
more than a third usually miss the deadline. 23 In Bulgaria
penalties were increased in a 2003 reform, but their
enforcement is woeful. An estimated 6% of the value of
fines is paid. The remainder is challenged in the courts,
taking years to resolve. 24
Reforms in other countries show that disclosure
improves with stronger penalties. Mexico has increased
compliance. In 1999, 30 of its 180 companies did not
meet disclosure requirements. A dozen were penalized.

56 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
In 2003 only 3 companies delayed their disclosure. South
Africa recently implemented similar regulation that enables
the stock exchange to suspend trading in companies
that neglect disclosure. Again, the number of delinquents
has dropped.
No matter how good the disclosure, the legal protections,
and the enforcement channels that government
provides, they will amount to nothing unless someone
uses them. Enter the institutional investors. The California’s
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS),
with $162 billion in assets, is the most active. Every year
CalPERS publishes its assessment of investor protections
in emerging markets. This year its analysis shows that
India, Israel, Korea and Poland have the strongest investor
protections. Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Venezuela
have the weakest. Using such rankings, CalPERS only invests
in countries with good protection. 25
TIAA-CREF, the second largest pension fund in the
United States, and Franklin Templeton, a large mutual
fund, are also active in promoting disclosure and better
corporate governance. Others should follow. These large
players, because of their financial clout, influence not
only individual companies but also regulators, putting
them in the best position to lobby for change.
Why reform?
The more corporate governance scandals are reported,
the better. It means expropriators are getting caught.
And that small investors can take comfort in being protected
by disclosure laws and shareholder rights.
If the rights of investors are not protected, having
majority ownership in a business is the only way to eliminate
expropriation. A majority investor has access to all
the company documents and prevails in business decisions.
But few entrepreneurs would agree to have their
business controlled by someone else. Those who do have
less incentive to work hard, as the payoffs from success
accumulate to someone else. The result: entrepreneurship
is suppressed and fewer profitable investment projects
are undertaken.
A recent study of private equity transactions finds
this exact pattern: Both the entrepreneur and investors
lose out. In countries with higher risk of expropriation,
the size of investments is half that in countries with good
investor protections. Two deals take place for every 3
deals in countries that protect investors. And in the risky
countries investors acquire majority stakes, limiting their
opportunity for diversification. 26
This pattern also holds down the size of stock markets.
When small investors see high expropriation risk,
they do not invest. The market stays underdeveloped,
with low trading volume (figure 7.7). 27 Instead, they may
put their money in the banking sector, invest in real estate,
or transfer it abroad. Either way, it does not reach
profitable businesses in need of long-term financing.
Better disclosure can change this. The United States securities
legislation of 1933–34 increased financial disclosure
and made auditors liable for mistakes—resulting in
a significantly larger number of listings. 28 Today, if Russia
were to adopt the more stringent disclosure regulations
of Thailand, analysis suggests that its stock market
capitalization would increase by up to 60%, and the volume
of trades by 40%. 29
FIGURE 7.7
More disclosure, more access to equity markets and more turnover
Perceived access to equity
Turnover of stocks traded
High
High
Low
Low
Least disclosure
Most disclosure
Countries ranked by disclosure index, quintiles
Note: Analysis controls for income per capita. Relationships are significant at the 1% level.
Source: Doing Business database, WEF (2004), World Bank (2004a).
Least disclosure
Most disclosure
Countries ranked by disclosure index, quintiles

PROTECTING INVESTORS 57
With languid equity markets, economic growth is
held back. If Jordan’s equities traded as much as those
in the average OECD market—implying a quadrupling
of their turnover—analysis suggests annual growth
would have been higher by up to 1.1 percentage points
a year. 30 If equities in Mexico traded as much as those
in the OECD on average, the analysis implies annual
growth would be higher by up to 0.6 percentage points
(figure 7.8).
Better disclosure and investor protections also result
in higher valuations. A recent study estimates that threequarters
of differences in corporate values across countries
are due to differences in investor protection. 31 In
a study of companies in the United States, an investment
strategy that sells the decile of companies with weakest
disclosure and legal protections and buys into the decile
of companies with the most disclosure and protections
generated a 50% premium during 1995–99. 32 Evidence
from Korea and Russia suggests even higher returns: a
160% premium for Korean companies and nearly 800%
premium for Russian ones. 33
The benefits accrue mainly to small businesses and
entrepreneurs like Kwadwo, the Ghanaian looking for
FIGURE 7.8
Large potential growth from more active equity markets
Percentage point increase in annual GDP growth from
equity turnover
1.3
Iran
1.1
Jordan
0.7
Greece
Source: Calculations based on Beck and Levine (2004).
business partners. The reason is that they don’t have
long–standing relations with banks, as established businesses
do. If Kwadwo were to find a partner and start the
bus service to Accra, other entrepreneurs benefit as well,
by having cheaper access to the capital city. But the effects
reach farther. Travel to school and hospitals is easier. The
distance between equity markets and the poor shrinks.
0.7
Czech
Republic
0.6
Mexico
0.3
Hungary
Notes
1. Cadbury report (1992).
2. Gregory (1999, 2001, 2002) and OECD (2003).
3. La Porta and others (2000).
4. See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (forthcoming).
5. Some examples are available in the corporate governance assessments carried
out under the World Bank’s Reports on the Observance of Standards
and Codes program. Thirty-eight assessments have been completed.
Reports are available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg. html.
6. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (1999).
7. New York Times, Dec. 8, 1998, p. A16.
8. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2002).
9. Batra and others (2003).
10. Johnson and others (2000).
11. Business Week, July 24, 2000, p. 17.
12. Schmidt (1999).
13. Sunday Times, Jan. 20, 2002, p. 4.
14. New York Times, Dec. 24, 2003, C1.
15. Business Week, Jan. 12, 2004, p. 32.
16. Djankov and others (forthcoming).
17. Cited in Morck and Nakamura (2003).
18. Examples of how nominee ownership can be misused to expropriate
small investors are provided in OECD (2001).
19. The work by Andrei Shleifer and his colleagues has led to a large literature
on the benefits of investor protections. See La Porta and others
(1998), Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) and Rajan and Zingales (2003).
20. These measure were developed by La Porta and others (1998) and
updated to January 2004 for 115 countries in Doing Business in 2005.
Class actions suits are another protection for small investors but are
typically more difficult to enforce.
21. But note that implementing good internal controls and hiring external
auditors costs as much as it did before the Internet.
22. See Capaul (2004) for details. Thirty-one companies are listed on Nivel
I, 5 companies on Nivel II, and 3 companies on the highest level.
23. On October 1st 2004 the penalty for missing the deadline in submitting
the annual report will be raised to 500 million Rupiah (about
US$55,000).
24. Naneva (2003).
25. CalPERS (2004).
26. Lerner and Schoar (2004).
27. Liquidity is the preferred measure for stock market development as it
reflects the opportunity for risk diversification and entry of small investors.
Market capitalization is frequently driven by prices and may
reflect expectations about future growth rather than an active market.
28. Landis (1938).
29. Calculation based on La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer
(forthcoming).
30. Beck and Levine (2004). Also see Levine and Zervos (1998).
31. Nenova (2003).
32. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003).
33. Black (2001) and Black, Jang and Kim (2003).

59
Enforcing contracts
Who is reforming courts?
What to reform?
Why reform?
“I have had a company for 10 years. I’ve brought 15 cases
against customers for nonpayment, but I’ve never been
able to win a judgment. The courts are full of cases. The
rats eat the paper. The courts lose volumes of cases. Our
cases are not big enough to pay the bribes judges would
accept. So we don’t bother, we just can’t collect our
debts.” 1 These are the words of Facundo, a businessman
in Buenos Aires. They may as well be the words of an entrepreneur
in Bolivia, Indonesia, Lebanon, Poland or
Serbia and Montenegro, countries where debt collection
through the courts takes years.
Why do courts in so many developing countries perform
so poorly? The problem is not the quality of judges
or the lack of resources. More training and more resources
would help. But the main reasons lie elsewhere. A
striking difference between courts in most developing
countries and those in OECD countries is the overly bureaucratic
judicial procedures that judges and litigants
face when resolving a dispute (figure 8.1). It takes 58 procedures
for a creditor to collect her debt in Sierra Leone
but only 11 in Australia, and 55 procedures in Egypt but
only 14 in Norway. Each additional procedure costs more
time and money. Frequently, bribes change hands to
move the process along. In Cambodia, for example,
judges top the list as the most corrupt public servants. 2
In many countries only the rich can afford resolving
disputes through the courts. For the rest, justice is out of
reach. In Venezuela recovering an overdue debt of
$8,000 (twice the annual income per capita) would often
cost $2,500 in court and attorney fees. In the Philippines
the creditor might pay as much as $1,000 to recover a
debt worth $2,000. In Indonesia the fees for collecting a
debt of $2,000 can be higher than the amount claimed.
Businesses have little incentive to use the courts.
In the absence of efficient courts, fewer investments
and business transactions take place (figure 8.2). Those
that do involve a small group of people linked through
kinship, ethnic origin or previous dealings. This substantially
reduces the economic benefits that come from trade.
Some would argue that more formality in dispute
resolution ensures that due process is followed and justice
is done. The evidence suggests otherwise. The more
complex the procedures for resolving disputes, the less
likely firms are to report that judges are impartial and
court decisions fair. 3 In the words of the former Assistant
Attorney General of Mexico: “It is often stated that
delay in the administration of justice is equivalent to a
denial of justice. If this is so, Mexico is plagued by de-
FIGURE 8.1
Courts in poor countries are inefficient
Cost and time to enforce a contract
35 Poor
countries
Cost
(court and legal fees
as a percentage of debt value)
Source: Doing Business database.
18 Middle income
421 Poor countries
countries
417 Middle income
countries
12 Rich
280 Rich
countries
countries
Time
(days from filing
to enforcement)

60 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
FIGURE 8.2
Inefficient courts—less investment, less trade
Investment as a percent of GDP
23
Trade as a percent of GDP
90
22
80
21
70
20
60
Shortest Longest Least Most
Countries ranked by days to enforce a contract, quintiles
Countries ranked by cost to enforce a contract, quintiles
Note: Relationships are significant at the 5% level.
Source: Doing Business database, World Bank (2004a).
nials of justice. An excessive formalism of the proceedings
is the main cause of this situation.” 4
Courts serve businesses best when they are efficient
and fair. This requires simplifying debt collection—say,
by establishing summary proceedings—and reducing
cost and delays. Successful reforms have introduced case
management in the courts, as in Armenia and Slovakia,
put enforcement into the hands of specialized public
agencies or private bailiffs, as in Latvia, and reformed
procedures to discourage frivolous appeals, as in Estonia.
Colombia implemented the most far-reaching reform
of any country in 2003. The time to resolve a dispute
was cut by 30% (figure 8.3). Eighteen other countries reformed
one or more aspects of contract enforcement:
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Honduras, Israel, Lao PDR,
Lithuania, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, the Philippines,
Serbia and Montenegro and Slovakia. Many reforms
were initiated by governments at the pressure of
business groups, with judges initially opposing them and
then begrudgingly accepting the change. In some instances,
particularly in Latin America, enforcement functions
were taken out of the courts altogether, rather than
dealing with the politics of court reform.
FIGURE 8.3
Colombia: the top reformer in 2003
Days to resolve a commercial dispute
527
146
165
Before
reforms
Source: Doing Business database.
216
363
After
reforms
79 Enforcement
216 Judgment
68 Notification
Who is reforming courts?
European countries made up more than half the reformers
in 2003–04. Nordic and Baltic courts—in Estonia,
Finland, Lithuania and Norway—saw the most changes.
No reform took place in the Middle East, Africa or South
Asia. Yet debt recovery is slow in the Middle East, at 438
days. Lebanon and Syria take about 2 years each (box
8.1). The United Arab Emirates is only slightly faster.
Middle Eastern countries also have the highest number
of procedures to enforce a contract. And enforcing contracts
is expensive in Africa, where court and attorney
fees account for 40% of the overdue debt, if collected. Recovering
debt in South Asian courts also comes at a high
price—42% of the claimed amount will go toward such
fees. By comparison, legal fees account for only 6% of the
debt in OECD countries (table 8.1).
The 3 most ambitious reformers—Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Colombia and Lithuania—improved in different
ways. Bosnia and Herzegovina allowed summary
judgments for smaller commercial disputes and moved
such cases to lower courts. The time to resolve a dispute
was cut from 665 days to 330—a huge improvement, although
still high. But lower courts need not always oper-

ENFORCING CONTRACTS 61
BOX 8.1
Who has the most efficient contract enforcement—and who the least?
Number of procedures to enforce a contract
Fewest
Most
Australia 11 Algeria 49
Greece 14 Burundi 51
Norway 14 Congo, Dem. Rep. 51
Tunisia 14 Chad 52
United Kingdom 14 Kuwait 52
Denmark 15 Lao PDR 53
Uganda 15 United Arab Emirates 53
Hong Kong, China 16 Egypt, Arab Rep. 55
Ireland 16 Cameroon 58
Japan 16 Sierra Leone 58
Days to enforce a contract
Fastest
Slowest
Tunisia 27 Syrian Arab Republic 672
Netherlands 48 Lebanon 721
New Zealand 50 Nigeria 730
Japan 60 Congo, Dem. Rep. 909
Singapore 69 Poland 1,000
France 75 Slovenia 1,003
Korea, Rep. 75 Angola 1,011
Denmark 83 Serbia and Montenegro 1,028
Norway 87 Italy 1,390
Belgium 112 Guatemala 1,459
Cost to enforce a contract (% of debt amount)
Least
Most
Norway 4.2 Philippines 50.7
New Zealand 4.8 Chad 54.9
Switzerland 5.2 Central African Republic 72.2
Korea, Rep. 5.4 Burkina Faso 92.5
Sweden 5.9 Papua New Guinea 110.3
Belgium 6.2 Bhutan 113.8
Denmark 6.6 Cambodia 121.3
Finland 7.2 Indonesia 126.5
United States 7.5 Malawi 136.5
Taiwan, China 7.7 Congo, Dem. Rep. 256.8
Source: Doing Business database.
Australia heads the list as the country with the fewest procedures
to enforce a contract. Another 23 countries make
it simple, requiring 20 procedures or less. Most are rich
countries, although the list also includes
Georgia, Jamaica, Lithuania, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Tunisia,
Uganda and Zambia. Five African and 4 Middle Eastern
countries are on the list of countries with most procedures.
Some Latin American economies—Bolivia,
Panama and Paraguay—come close. Poor countries have
more complex contract enforcement. On average it takes
50% more procedures in poor countries than in rich.
Simple debt collection in the 10 countries with the fastest
contract enforcement lasts 3 months or less. In the slowest
10 countries, 2 years or more. Tunisia has the shortest
time to enforce contracts. A simple summary proceeding
is complete in a month. France is also among the fastest,
having an out-of-court procedure to collect debt. Estonia
nearly breaks into the top 10 list, improving its ranking to
11th. Botswana and Lithuania follow, with less than 5
months to enforce contracts. Three European Union
countries feature in the bottom 10. Italy’s courts are
among the world’s slowest. So are Poland’s and Slovenia’s.
Access to justice is cheapest in the European Union. Four
member countries are among the 10 countries with the
lowest fees relative to the claim amount. New EU members
such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are
only just outside the list. Five African and 5 Asian countries
make up the list of countries with the most expensive
contract enforcement, with court and attorney fees accounting
for more than half the amount of the debt. In
another 28 countries contract enforcement through the
courts is a luxury few can afford, with costs amounting to
more than a third of the debt amount.
ate more efficiently. A similar reform in Romania in
2001 increased delays, illustrating that reformers would
benefit from information on where the largest bottlenecks
are before designing the change.
In Colombia a courier company now notifies the
debtor of the court filing. Previously, a court clerk was
responsible for delivering the notice. If the courier fails
to reach the debtor, the notice is published in a newspaper.
If the debtor does not show up in court, the case
continues without him. In a second reform, notaries
and the chamber of commerce—not just the judge—
can organize auctions for the sale of assets.
TABLE 8.1
Cumbersome, costly enforcement in some regions
Cost Cost
Region Procedures Days (US$) (% debt)
East Asia & Pacific 29 325 1,604 43
Europe & Central Asia 30 413 930 16
Latin America & Caribbean 35 469 1,343 24
Middle East & North Africa 39 438 2,118 16
OECD: High income 20 230 5,319 6
South Asia 30 375 497 42
Sub-Saharan Africa 36 433 340 40
All countries 31 389 1,734 26
Source: Doing Business database.

62 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
In Lithuania the parties are encouraged to go into a
summary proceeding, which takes a third of the regular
procedure’s time. The full evidence is presented at the
beginning of the trial. The old practice was to keep some
evidence to the end, and use it if things went wrong. Fees
for appealing the court’s judgment were increased substantially,
to discourage abuse.
Summary proceedings
The most popular reform in 2003 was introducing summary
proceedings, especially for the collection of small
debt. 5 For example, in Israel the new civil procedure
code incorporates a swift proceeding. Debt cases under
NIS50,000 (about $12,000) are filed at the magistrate’s
court. Within 45 days the debtor has to enter his defense.
The court then schedules a hearing within the next 135
days. The hearing cannot be postponed by anyone but
the presiding judge of the court. This is rare. After the
hearing the court has 14 days to issue judgment. In total
the process takes less than 200 days.
In Norway a similar summary procedure, previously
available only for returned checks and promissory notes,
is now available for debt under NOK100,000 ($15,000).
In Portugal the new code allows summary proceedings:
the creditor need only present the judge with evidence of
the transaction and nonpayment. In the Philippines the
rules for summary proceedings cover cases like a bounced
check or nonpayment of a promissory note. So, debt
cases no longer go through preliminary investigation before
the city prosecutor, as was the case before. This cuts
nearly 4 months off the debt recovery time.
Two other countries sped up debt enforcement by
moving it to a lower jurisdiction or out of court. In Lao
PDR debt collection cases below $2,500 are now handled
in the district courts. In Bangladesh the new law encourages
settlement before a case enters the regular proceedings.
The judge helps mediate such settlements.
Enforcing judgments
FIGURE 8.4
Lengthy delays in enforcement
Days between judgment and enforcement
162
Poor
countries
75
Rich
countries
Source: Doing Business database.
The second most popular reform in 2003 focused on enforcing
judgments. In rich countries the average duration
from the time the judge hands down a decision
to the time the creditor gets her money back is 75 days.
In middle income countries it takes 134 days. In poor
countries, 162 days. In India, Jordan and Mexico enforcement
accounts for more than half the debt recovery
process (figure 8.4). Reforms in Austria, Colombia, Estonia
and Portugal introduced stricter time limits on enforcement
procedures, or allowed professionals other
than court officials to do it.
Setting deadlines
Enforcement as a percentage
of the entire debt recovery process
Jordan
Mexico
India
55%
57%
72%
Enforcement
Filing and
judgement
The third main type of reform—seen in Finland, Lithuania,
Norway and Slovakia—puts emphasis on imposing
and adhering to deadlines for filing documents and presenting
arguments through case management. The
Finnish experience illustrates the benefits. 6 An electronic
case management system keeps track of deadlines for contesting
claims or appealing judgments. If the deadline has
passed, the system automatically notifies the court clerk
and the plaintiff, and the case moves to the next stage. It
also sets dates for court hearings. Case management in
Finland has yielded other benefits as well. For cases that
have remained dormant over a prescribed limit—typically
9 months—the case management system sends a reminder
to the presiding judge. Frequently the case has
been settled out of court or the plaintiff has decided not
to pursue it further. Either way, the judge can close it.
In Slovakia the main reduction in delays due to case
management has come from the random assignment of
cases as they enter the courts. Cases are sent to whichever
judge has the lightest load, ensuring faster service. Case
management has reduced corruption: it makes it more
difficult to know which judge to bribe for a favorable ruling.
In 2002 a poll indicated that 79% of Slovaks saw judicial
corruption as a major problem. In early 2004 only
42% did—huge progress, even if there is a lot of room
for further improvement. 7

ENFORCING CONTRACTS 63
What to reform?
Doing Business in 2004 identified 4 types of reform that
have improved dispute resolution:
• Establishing information systems in the courts.
• Taking transactions that are not disputes, such as
business registration, out of the judges’ hands.
• Reducing procedural complexity.
• Establishing small-claims courts and specialized
commercial courts.
TABLE 8.2
Popular reforms in 2003
Establish judicial statistics
systems
Remove nondisputes from
judges’ hands
Introduce summary proceedings
Establish small claims courts
Source: Doing Business database.
Argentina, Bulgaria, Finland,
Germany, Mexico, Slovakia
Germany, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland,
Lithuania, Portugal, Philippines
Israel, Lao PDR, Norway
Some of these reforms have a long history. In England
the first comprehensive report on caseloads and
judicial statistics came out in 1851. Sixty reports have
followed since. 8 More countries have taken up reforms
recently (table 8.2). Germany developed a case tracking
system for staff planning in the judiciary. 9 Bulgaria also
introduced such a system in all of its district courts. Serbia
and Montenegro recently took business registration
out of the courts. In Germany and Slovakia registration
is still in the courts, but court clerks rather than judges
are now responsible for it. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland
and Lithuania simplified proceedings by making
the rules on presenting evidence more flexible. Streamlined
procedures for small claims were established in Israel,
Lao PDR and Norway.
Russia illustrates the benefits of reform. Within a year
after the introduction of the summary procedure in late
2002, 60% of debt collection cases in Moscow used the
new procedure, and about a third of cases in Novosibirsk
and Saratov. A summary procedure typically takes 2
months from start to finish, 9 months less than the general
procedure. 10 The head of the commercial court in
Moscow notes that “the procedure is shorter and simpler,
and can take place without holding a judicial hearing,
only on the basis of written documents. This procedure is
permitted when the parties have no objections to it. For
example, an energy supplier isn’t paid. The business says it
has no money. Where is the dispute? Everything is clear.
But before [the reform] we handled such cases according
to the general procedure which is complicated. Now the
time of judge is freed up to resolve more difficult cases.” 11
The federal district court of Mexico City analyzed
judicial statistics before introducing reform. The judiciary
had complained of a shortage of judges to handle
the ever-increasing number of cases and asked for additional
resources. In 2002 the Secretaria de Hacienda
Credito y Publico commissioned a study on the profile
of users of commercial dispute resolution, the typical
duration and cost of debt recovery cases and the likely
outcome. 12 The results surprised everyone: 60% of cases
never moved beyond the initial filing: of those that did
half were abandoned before reaching judgment. So while
Mexican judges claimed overload, in reality they dealt
with only 1 in 5 cases. 13 Once this adjustment is made,
the data show that the average Mexican judge handles
fewer cases than judges in Colombia and Ecuador. Instead
of hiring more judges, the government can spare
money for other uses.
Three other reforms have proven successful in the
past year:
• Introducing case management.
• Reducing abuse of appeals.
• Providing better incentives for enforcement.
Introducing case management
Case management—when the judge follows the case
from start to end—received international attention after
Lord Woolf’s Access to Justice in England and Wales report
came out in 1995, though reforms to introduce it in Australia,
Canada and Hong Kong (China) were already ongoing.
14 The report was concerned with the rapidly rising
expenditures on legal aid. At the same time, surveys of
users consistently indicated a high level of dissatisfaction
with the courts. After reviewing several thousand cases,
Lord Woolf recommended judicial case management as
the main way to increase access to justice. British courts
reformed accordingly. The idea has also sparked reforms
in India, Malaysia, New Zealand and Uganda. 15
By now there is ample evidence to show that case
management in the courts reduces delays and increases
user satisfaction in rich, middle income and poor countries
alike. The average duration of debt collection is 5
months in rich countries where judges actively manage

64 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
FIGURE 8.5
Active case management cuts time
Days between filing and enforcement
Judges do not
actively
manage
Judges
actively
manage
469
278
Poor
countries
Source: Doing Business database.
Middle income
countries
529 521
Rich
countries
the case—and nearly 18 months in rich countries where
judges don’t. The same pattern is seen elsewhere (figure
8.5). The reduction in time does not come at higher cost.
Quite the opposite: fees in countries with case management
tend to be lower because attorney costs are lower. 16
Case management involves 2 changes. First, judges
take the responsibility to follow cases from start to finish.
In most countries a debt collection case typically comes
to the judge a dozen times. Without case management
the judge is not aware of how the case is progressing,
depending on other court officials to move the case
along. The second is introducing an electronic system of
recording and following cases from the time they are
filed to the time judgment is issued or the case is withdrawn,
as in Finland. With greater incentives to reach
resolution and better technology, the judge can follow
each case at any moment.
It doesn’t take much time or money to develop a case
management system. Slovakia’s reform started in 1999 as
a pilot in the Banska Bystrica court. 17 Within 6 months
the average time between filing and the first hearing was
cut from 73 days to 27 and the average number of procedures
from 23 to 5, as judges were randomly assigned and
could schedule the hearings without the need for consultation
with court clerks and other judges. The pilot was
scaled up to all district courts in 2002–03. 18 The cost was
minimal: $2 million. Similar case management systems
are now being introduced in Albania and Armenia, with
World Bank support. Progress is benchmarked in the Judicial
Reform Index developed by the American Bar Association
for its work in Central and Eastern Europe. 19
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Romania
and Ukraine are assessed as the least advanced in
developing case management.
330
151
Reducing abuse of appeals
When the Portuguese set up courts in Brazil in the
1700s, they brought their civil procedure code, with one
change—appeals were allowed at any point during the
proceedings and an additional level of appeal was introduced.
The ultimate decision lay with the King. The reason
was simple: should a Portuguese be accused of robbing,
killing, defrauding or otherwise damaging the
property of a local, the possibility for “home-bias” of the
judge was greatly reduced if his judgment could be easily
overturned.
Three centuries later, much has changed in Brazil.
But the rules on appeals remain the same. Debtors frequently
abuse their rights of appeal, using it for stalling
enforcement: 88% of judgments in commercial cases are
appealed. 20 And where the judge awards the full request
of compensation to the creditor, appeal is universal
(100%). If this number doesn’t look high, consider this:
in Argentina 13% of judgments are appealed, in Peru
17%, in Mexico 30%.
Appeals on legal issues, a necessary feature of a fair
justice system, are allowed in every country. But they
needn’t suspend the judicial process. It is better to allow
an appeal on all alleged errors but to allow the trial and
enforcement to continue while the appeal is resolved.
This is what Botswana, Chile, France, Greece and 30
other countries do. In countries where appeals suspend
the enforcement of judgment, it takes twice the time to
collect on overdue debt—160 days instead of 80. Yet
users do not consider the procedure fairer, as reported in
Doing Business in 2004.
Several countries have reformed their appeals
process. Benin barred appeals during small-claims cases.
Estonia and Finland do not allow appeal during the
summary proceedings. If the debtor wants to dispute
the judgment in these three countries, he would have to
open a new case. Lithuania tripled the fee for appeals,
obliging the debtor to pay all legal costs of the creditor
when the appeal fails. This has reduced appeals considerably.
Other countries, such as Japan, Mexico, Slovakia
and Thailand, allow appeal of the final judgment but do
not allow interlocutory appeal (appeals during the proceedings).
This is associated with a 20% reduction in the
average court delay.
Improving enforcement
In many countries, courts not only deliver judgments,
they try to enforce them. This generally doesn’t work.
Specialized public collection agencies or private enforcers
are usually in a better position to collect debt (figure 8.6).

ENFORCING CONTRACTS 65
Two types of reform have worked. First, in Finland,
Ireland and Sweden, a state enforcement authority collects
all debt, including what is due in taxes. Armenia, Estonia
and Latvia recently adopted a similar system. The
second option is to privatize the enforcement process.
In France, a private enforcement specialist, huissier de
justice, collects on all private claims. 21 Belgium and the
Netherlands also have private enforcement, as do many
former French colonies, such as Algeria and Benin. Inspired
by the French example, Hungary, Poland, Scotland
and Slovakia have all introduced private enforcement.
And in many common law countries—Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, Uganda—the creditor’s attorney is responsible
for enforcement, with the help of the police.
Better incentives for remuneration—as when the enforcer
is paid a percentage of the recovered claim, or
a nominal fee plus a pro-rated bonus—speed up collection.
22 These schemes are superior to a flat fee or wages
(figure 8.7). Russia is a recent example of reform. In 2002,
the remuneration rules for bailiffs were changed so that a
bailiff would receive a bonus of 2% of the debt claim if he
successfully collected the money. This change improved
small debt recovery and had a lesser, but still positive, effect
on collecting larger debts. The reason is that the
bonus was capped at 800 rubles ($27), so the bailiff gets
the same reward for all cases of 40,000 rubles or more. As
larger amounts are more difficult to collect, enforcement
focused on the easier cases. 23
Finally, a reform that usually fails: increasing the
number of judges to reduce court congestion. Such reform
has obtained strong support in the development
FIGURE 8.6
Courts take longer to enforce a judgment
Days between judgment and enforcement
Court
enforcement
time
Private or
specialized
public
enforcement
time
Poor
countries
–15%
Source: Doing Business database.
Middle income
countries
–25%
Rich
countries
–39%
aid community. 24 This is understandable: by simple
arithmetic, the more the judges, the fewer cases per
judge. And it works for a brief period, after which delays
increase again as more people bring cases to court, while
the efficiency of dealing with each case remains the same.
Sri Lanka is an example. To take the burden off the
regular civil courts, specialized tribunals have been created
to hear tax disputes, consumer complaints, and
labor cases. But the civil courts remain as backlogged as
ever. This is because the solution—more judges—treats
the manifestation of the problem, not the problem itself.
A simple rule for reformers: when the judiciary
argues for more judges, it is time to also simplify procedures.
It costs less and has longer term effects.
Why reform?
The fewer procedures, the lower the cost, the shorter the
time to resolve disputes—the better that businesses rate
the efficiency and integrity of the courts (figure 8.8) and
the more likely that businesses are to go to the judge the
next time a dispute arises. As confidence in dispute resolution
rises, entrepreneurs become more willing to
enter contracts beyond their narrow circle of known
business partners. Trade increases and business expands,
bring-ing more prosperity. A survey of Russian
entrepreneurs shows that twice as many entrepreneurs
start business in cities like Taganrog, where the courts
are perceived as efficient, as in cities like Rostov-on-
Don, where courts are perceived as corrupt and slow. 25
A study comparing the corporate sectors in Mexico
and the United States finds that weaknesses in contract
FIGURE 8.7
Payment incentives for enforcers cut time
Days between judgment and enforcement
Enforcer
paid fixed fee
Enforcer paid
pro-rated fee
178
104
Poor
countries
Source: Doing Business database.
151
82
Middle income
countries
89
29
Rich
countries

66 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
enforcement are associated with a smaller size of businesses
in Mexico. There, 96% of businesses employ less
than 10 workers. In the United States, only about 63%
of businesses do. And the efficiency of debt collection
varies across Mexican states, with the top one, Aguascalientes,
being nearly three times as efficient as the bottom
one, Guerrero. Improvements in debt recovery from
the bottom to the top quartile of states imply a large
jump in employment—a 17% increase in the number of
workers in the average business. 26
Reforms of debt collection reduce costs to the government
as well. This was the original motivation behind the
Woolf Report in the United Kingdom. The simpler the
procedures, the less the need for more court clerks and
judges. The more summary judgments, the less the taxpayer
money used to fund drawn out trials. The government can
instead direct more resources to legal aid for the poor.
FIGURE 8.8
More procedures—more corruption…
Perception of judicial integrity
…less efficiency
Perception of judicial efficiency
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Least
Most Least Most
Countries ranked by procedures to enforce a contract, quintiles
Countries ranked by procedures to enforce a contract, quintiles
Note: The relationships shown are significant at the 1% level and remain significant at the 5% level when controlling for income per capita.
Source: Doing Business database, WEF (2004).
Notes
1. An interview reported in Kahn (2003), p. 27.
2. World Bank (2004c).
3. Based on analysis of the Doing Business indicators with indicators of
impartiality of the judiciary from Economic Freedom of the World and
Batra and others (2003). Results are significant at the 5% level, controlling
for income per capita.
4. Samano (2002), p. 9.
5. A recent report on case management in the Canadian judiciary suggests
as a main indicator of success the ratio of cases judged in summary proceedings
to cases judged in regular proceedings. The rationale is that
summary proceedings reflect the willingness of judges to provide quick
resolution. See Quebec Ministere de la Justice (2001).
6. Laukkanen (2004).
7. Surveys published in Pravda newspaper, various issues.
8. Zuckerman (1999).
9. Deloitte Consulting (2003).
10. Hendley (2004).
11. Proskuryakova (2002).
12. World Bank (2003b).
13. Creditors complained of a pro-debtor bias in judgments. The evidence
suggests otherwise. Nearly 90% of judgments in Mexico and 80% of
judgments in Argentina were in favor of the creditor. These percentages
rose after appeal.
14. Lord Woolf (1995).
15. See Australian Law Reform Commission (2003) for a summary of
reforms.
16. On average, the cost of dispute resolution is 15% with case management,
and 25% without. This difference exists at all income levels.
17. Korb (2002).
18. World Bank (2003c).
19. CEELI (2004).
20. World Bank (2003d).
21. Kennett (2002).
22. Data on remuneration of enforcement agents was collected for the first
time in this year’s survey. The questionnaire is available at the Doing
Business website.
23. Hendley (forthcoming).
24. See, for example, Buscaglia and Dakolias (1999).
25. Djankov and others (2004).
26. Laeven and Woodruff (2004).

67
Closing a business
Where is exit easy?
Who is reforming exit?
What to reform?
Why reform?
Each year, more businesses—about 13,200—go through
bankruptcy in Canada than in all non-OECD countries.
More go through bankruptcy in Belgium—one in every
55—than in Latin America. More go through bankruptcy
in Norway—one in every 40—than in South Asia
and Africa. 1 The difference is large even as a share of all
firms (figure 9.1).
This is not because businesses don’t fail in developing
countries. They just don’t use bankruptcy. And even
in rich countries, use of bankruptcy is rare. Creditors
and debtors in OECD countries would typically renegotiate
the terms of the loan, extend the payment period or
write-off some part of the debt. Bankruptcy is only used
when it lowers the cost of exit. Everyone recognizes the
names Enron, Kmart and WorldCom, the three largest
among 57,324 US bankruptcies in 2003. But these constitute
only a fraction of the 600,000 business closures
that year. 2 The remaining 90 percent took place outside
of bankruptcy, by creditors foreclosing on their loans
and businesses shutting down voluntarily.
Bankruptcy—through liquidation or reorganization—is
a backup for simple foreclosure procedures. 3 It
is needed when a company like Daewoo, with dozens of
creditors, thousands of employees and billions of dollars
in assets, becomes insolvent. Or when the failure of a
business, such as Swissair, affects the normal functioning
of many other businesses. Or when corporate fraud
needs to be investigated—as for Parmalat. Liquidation—
when a business is judged unviable and sold to new
owners—and especially reorganization—when an attempt
is made to keep the business in operation with
current owners and (often) managers—involve a complex
process of sorting through assets or revising the
business plan.
But developing countries have few industrial giants
like Daewoo or Parmalat. Their businesses typically have
few sources of financing and face simpler problems in
coordinating among creditors when becoming insolvent.
And simpler problems need simpler solutions. But new
bankruptcy laws—and over 60 developing countries
have adopted them in the last 10 years—seldom meet the
needs of investors. The effort has often been misdirected
into establishing complex procedures for reorganizing
businesses in distress: in Albania, Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia,
Niger, Togo, Vietnam and Yemen, to name a few. Turkey
and Uzbekistan both introduced reorganization in 2003,
preventing creditors from using the less complex liquida-
FIGURE 9.1
No bankruptcy in developing economies
Annual bankruptcy filings
(average number 1999–2003)
9,744
Rich
countries
314
Middle
income
Poor
countries
Source: Doing Business database, Claessens and Klapper (forthcoming).
53
Bankruptcies as a percentage
of all limited liability firms
Finland 4.14
New Zealand 3.67
United States 3.65
Norway 2.59
France 2.62
Russia 0.31
Colombia 0.16
Argentina 0.12
Thailand 0.12
Peru 0.05

68 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
tion and the even simpler foreclosure procedure. They
don’t use the fancy reorganization procedure either.
In developing countries, business exit works best in
direct negotiations between the creditor and debtor. In
Ethiopia, Jamaica, Namibia and Thailand, secured creditors
can seize the assets of defaulted companies without
the complex court procedures associated with bankruptcy.
As a result, they can recover 50 cents for every
dollar loaned. 4 Contrast this with 15 cents on the dollar
for liquidation and reorganization bankruptcy proceedings
in other poor countries.
Several countries got reforms right. In 2003, Bulgaria,
Estonia, India, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Spain,
Tunisia, and the United Kingdom streamlined their
bankruptcy procedures—and some achieved immediate
results. In Bulgaria, the creditors now typically collect 34
cents on a dollar. In Estonia, 40 cents. In Tunisia, 50
cents. In India, where the reform has just started, creditors
now collect 13 cents on the dollar, a third more than
they did a year ago. The reforms share similar features.
They reduce appeals that suspend the bankruptcy
process. They introduce or tighten time limits of procedures.
They establish specialization in dealing with bankruptcy
cases. And they set incentives for the administrator
to get the most from the estate.
Where is exit easy?
When a business closes, creditors and other claimants in
Finland, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan (China) typically
recover 90 cents on the dollar. In Belgium, Canada, Ireland,
the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom,
more than 85 cents on the dollar. These are the 10 economies
with most efficient foreclosure or bankruptcy procedures.
Surveys of business executives agree (figure 9.2).
How do these economies do it? Through a combination
of speed, low cost, and continuity of business operations
(box 9.1). It takes less than a year to resolve
foreclosure or bankruptcy. 5 The cost of closing a business
is just a small percentage of the value of the troubled
business: 1% in Finland, the Netherlands, Norway,
and Singapore; and about 4% in Belgium, Canada, Japan,
and Latvia. And in all of the most efficient ten, the
business is sold or reorganized as a going concern and
management is replaced. 6 No value is lost by stopping
operations. 7
Getting that efficient takes time. Consider Finland, a
leader. It adopted the first bankruptcy law in 1734, when
it was still part of Sweden. More than a century passed
before the law was amended in 1868, now in independent
Finland, to clarify the priority of claims in liquidation.
Another century passed without reforms. In 1970,
the law was reformed to give the bankruptcy administrator
the right to terminate labor contracts on a short
notice. Then in 1978, a new regulation was adopted on
group dismissals in large companies undergoing bankruptcy.
A 1986 amendment enhanced the priority of
floating charge holders. In 1991, the rules for recovery
were elaborated in a separate legislative act. Several other
reforms followed, prompted by the economic stagnation
after the collapse of the Soviet Union—Finland’s most
FIGURE 9.2
Higher recovery rate leads to more usage
Perceived usefulness of bankruptcy law
MORE
USAGE
AVERAGE
RECOVERY
RATE
8 21 32 50 82
Countries ranked by recovery rate, quintiles
Note: Relationships are significant at the 1% level.
Source: Doing Business database, WEF (2004).
important trading partner. In 1992, unsecured creditors
were given priority over tax and labor claims. In 1993
a reorganization procedure was introduced. In 1995, a
bankruptcy ombudsman was established to supervise the
administration of bankruptcy estates. Finally in 2004,
an amendment was adopted to prevent frivolous bankruptcy
filings.
Several other countries provide claimants with a
high return when a business closes. In Australia, Austria,
Hong Kong (China), Korea, Latvia, New Zealand, Spain
and Sweden, recovery rates are more than 70 cents. Rich
countries can afford to have a spectrum of exit options—
from foreclosure, which is still the prevalent exit mechanism
in Australia and the United Kingdom, to liquidation,
most often used in Austria, Denmark, Germany, the
Netherlands and Sweden, to reorganization, much used
in Canada, France and the United States. Recent reform
has focused on providing different bankruptcy tracks for
different types of businesses. For example, Finland and

CLOSING A BUSINESS 69
BOX 9.1
Where is closing a business the most efficient—and where the least?
Recovery rate
(Cents on the dollar)
Most
Least
Japan 92 Haiti 2
Singapore 91 Angola 1
Finland 90 Brazil 0
Taiwan, China 90 Central African Republic 0
Canada 89 Lao PDR 0
Ireland 89 Chad 0
Norway 88 Cambodia 0
Netherlands 86 Bhutan 0
Belgium 86 Rwanda 0
United Kingdom 86 Madagascar 0
Time to go through insolvency
(Years)
Fastest
Slowest
Ireland 0.41 Philippines 5.64
Japan 0.54 Haiti 5.70
Canada 0.75 Belarus 5.75
Singapore 0.78 Indonesia 6.00
Taiwan, China 0.79 Oman 7.00
Norway 0.89 Mauritania 8.00
Belgium 0.90 Czech Republic 9.17
Finland 0.94 Brazil 10.00
United Kingdom 1.00 Chad 10.00
Spain 1.00 India 10.00
Cost to go through insolvency
(% of estate)
Least
Most
Finland 1 Congo, Rep. 38
Kuwait 1 Macedonia, FYR 38
Netherlands 1 Panama 38
Norway 1 Philippines 38
Belgium 4 Sierra Leone 38
Canada 4 United Arab Emirates 38
Georgia 4 Venezuela 38
Japan 4 Central African Republic 76
Latvia 4 Chad 76
New Zealand 4 Lao PDR 76
Source: Doing Business database.
Claimants—creditors, tax authorities, and employees—recover
92 cents on the dollar from an insolvent firm in Japan,
but only 7 cents in Romania. This is the result of three differences:
the time spent closing down, the cost, and whether the
firm survives as a going concern. In Japan the business is reorganized
as a going concern under new management, without
loss of value. 9 Official costs of the proceeding are 4%—reducing
the available money to 96 cents. The reorganization
takes 6 months, while the assets depreciate and claims are tied
up at lending rates of 1.8% a year. The recovery rate is the
present value of the proceeds—92 cents on the dollar. 10 The
secured creditor has first priority and receives the full amount.
In Romania the business starts rehabilitation proceedings but
is eventually liquidated in parts—cutting the estate value from
100 to 70. 11 This is reduced to 62 cents after paying 8% of the
initial value in official costs. Assets depreciate and the claims
are tied up for 4.6 years while the procedure is completed, at
rates of 45% a year. The result—claimants collect 7 cents on
the dollar. 12 The secured creditor is paid after taxes and labor
claims.
What drags the inefficient countries down? Delays. They account
for half of the difference in the average rich and poor
country’s recovery rates. Top performers resolve foreclosure
or bankruptcy within a year. In 2004 Spain joined this list
by introducing statutory time limits on procedures. Closing
down takes the longest in South Asia, at 4.8 years. Latin America
is second, at 3.6 years. Delays are 4 years in poor countries,
twice as long as in rich countries. But there are notable exceptions
in developing economies. Insolvency takes just over a
year in Jamaica, Latvia and Tunisia.
Whether the business keeps operating explains a third of the
difference between rich and poor countries. Thirty-four countries
typically keep the insolvent firm running. This includes
Australia, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as Thailand
and Uganda. Over three quarters of OECD countries do. None
in South Asia manage to. And only 4% of poor countries do.
High administrative fees account for another 15% of the difference
between rich and poor country’s recovery rates. Sub-
Saharan African and East Asian countries have the highest
costs, at over 20% of the bankruptcy estate. Except Israel, no
rich economy has such high costs.
The recovery rate is calculated at the time of entry into bankruptcy
or foreclosure proceedings. In some countries—such
as the Nordics—management must announce insolvency.
Creditors can trigger insolvency proceedings immediately before
more value is lost. But in many others, the debtor can
hide insolvency, and creditors cannot initiate proceedings. In
such cases the value of the firm will shrink even before the
proceedings start.

70 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Japan have instituted simplified reorganization procedures
for small businesses. Italy has introduced a new rescue
procedure for large businesses—with more than
1,000 employees and debts exceeding US$1 billion. Australia,
Estonia, Finland and Sweden have instituted
streamlined procedures for the liquidation of companies
which lack sufficient assets to complete a regular procedure.
A few other countries do well. Recovery rates in Jamaica,
Mexico and Poland are over 60 cents on the dollar.
In contrast, secured creditors in Brazil, Costa Rica,
the Philippines, and Romania get close to nothing if
their debtor enters bankruptcy. In all of these countries
debtors can enter complex reorganization procedures,
where they are protected from creditors. Reorganization
lasts nearly 6 years in the Philippines and about 4 years
in Costa Rica and Romania. Brazil takes the longest:
creditors can start foreclosure but there are many opportunities
for appeal, each time suspending the process.
It typically takes 10 years. 8
Building an efficient reorganization procedure in
bankruptcy is a luxury. Rich countries can afford it. Few
others can. The differences in recovery rates in a reorganization
procedure between rich and poor countries are
large (figure 9.3). This explains why bankruptcy filings
FIGURE 9.3
Poor countries have low recovery rates
Recovery rate in reorganization
Cents on the dollar
67
Rich
countries
34
Middle
income
Source: Doing Business database.
21
Poor
countries
Difference
between rich
and poor
25 TIME
7 COST
14 BUSINESS
KEEPS RUNNING
More time, higher costs
and keeping the business
running account for the
difference.
are so rare outside the OECD, notwithstanding the reforms
of bankruptcy law.
Not all claimants get the full recovery rate. Fiftyeight
countries give the secured creditor priority to the
proceeds. But in Belarus, Burkina Faso, Ecuador and
Oman, taxes and workers all have higher priority than secured
creditors. Recovery rates for these claimants are 15
cents on average. For the secured creditor, only 7 cents.
Who is reforming exit?
In 2003–04 exit became easier in 9 countries: Bulgaria,
Estonia, India, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Spain,
Tunisia and the United Kingdom. Two countries—
Turkey and Uzbekistan—implemented reform that reduced
efficiency.
Those that succeeded in increasing recovery rates did
so by simplifying existing law. Take Spain. The 2003 reforms
featured three improvements. First, the court can
now order debtors to pay, without entry into bankruptcy.
This reform is estimated to have reduced the number of
frivolous bankruptcy filings by 40%. Second, statutory
deadlines on the duration of procedures are cut in half.
Third, appeals do not suspend the recovery of debt. These
improvements raise the efficiency of Spanish bankruptcy
to that of Hong Kong (China), at 83 cents on the dollar.
Bulgaria also amended its bankruptcy law by reducing
statutory deadlines and cutting opportunities for appeal.
Before, claimants were given 6 months to file claims
once a business declared bankruptcy. Now the limit is 3
months. Before the reform, if the reorganization plan
was rejected by the creditors’ committee, the debtor could
appeal before a general court and then before a superior
court. Now only one appeal is possible. Time to go
through bankruptcy fell by 5 months, with further reduction
expected. Cost was cut in half. Estonia, Lithuania
and the United Kingdom implemented similar reforms
with success.
Poland reformed differently. A court-appointed administrator
takes over the management of the business
once bankruptcy is filed. At a preliminary meeting, the
creditors’ committee decides whether the business should
be reorganized or liquidated. This allows for bankruptcy
to be avoided altogether in cases where the creditors can
agree on foreclosure. It is now also easier to switch between
the two proceedings if the prospects for recovery
change. Time to go through bankruptcy was cut by a
quarter. The recovery rate of bankruptcy in Poland is
now on a par with Portugal’s, at 68 cents on the dollar.
India started ambitious reforms. It repealed the Sick
Industrial Companies Act, which prevented bankrupt
companies from being liquidated. At the same time, it
established specialized bankruptcy tribunals. Twelve are
already in operation, with several dozen to commence

CLOSING A BUSINESS 71
operations in the next year. Time to go through bankruptcy
was cut by 15%.
Some reforms made matters worse, increasing delays
and reducing recovery rates. Exit became harder
in Turkey and Uzbekistan in 2003. Turkey adopted a
postponement procedure, which gives the creditor two
years to implement a plan before creditors can start liquidation.
This was done to alleviate the burden on businesses
during the latest financial crisis. Time for
insolvency jumped by a year, and recovery rates fell by
15 cents. Uzbekistan created a reorganization procedure
with a 3 month stay on creditors and an additional
level of appeals, increasing delays by 9 months and cutting
recovery rates from 17 to 12 cents on the dollar.
What to reform?
Doing Business in 2004 recommended three ways to improve
the closure of businesses. First, use simple exit
proceedings in poor countries and resist copying the
complex bankruptcy systems of OECD countries. Second,
involve creditors in decisions throughout the bankruptcy
process. Third, provide continuous training for
judges and bankruptcy administrators. This year five
more reforms have been identified:
• Improve foreclosure in poor countries.
• Speed up liquidation in middle income countries.
• Provide specialized expertise.
• Limit appeals.
• Pay administrators for maximizing the estate value.
Improve foreclosure in poor countries
Countries like Armenia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria,
and Paraguay have focused on improving the efficiency
of their foreclosure procedures. Anything more complicated
would increase delays, reduce recovery rates, and
create opportunities for corruption.
Foreclosure can be improved by reforming secured
transactions law to allow summary proceedings, out of
court enforcement, and limited appeals. Poor countries
should also ensure that liquidation or reorganization
does not stop foreclosure. This can be achieved by having
creditor consent before the business enters bankruptcy,
as in China, Hungary and Kuwait. In the past,
many countries’ laws stopped businesses from entering
reorganization by mandating a large payment, say 30%
of the outstanding debt, as a condition for entry into reorganization.
This achieves the same outcome as creditors’
consent but is more cumbersome to enforce.
Some poor countries have introduced reorganization
in bankruptcy before there is the demand or capacity
to enforce it. If Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland
didn’t need modern reorganization until the late 1990s
(figure 9.4), why would Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Uzbekistan need it now? 13 Benin surely doesn’t.
Its reorganization procedure has not been used once
since it was introduced in 1998. Nor is bankruptcy used
in many other OHADA countries—for example Central
African Republic, Chad, Mali and Niger—which adopted
a reorganization procedure at the same time.
Reorganization is a complex procedure, and it will
work well only with an effective judiciary, competent
bankruptcy administrators and a liquid market for the
assets of bankrupt firms. 14 Only rich countries have all
these features. In developing countries, complex solutions
make simple problems worse.
Speed up liquidation in middle income countries
Middle income countries, where businesses often have
more than one creditor, will find a high payoff from
making their liquidation procedures faster. If Botswana
can close down a business in 2 years, so can Brazil,
Egypt, Jordan, Slovakia, Slovenia, Syria and Venezuela.
Estonia allows no appeals for entry into liquidation and
has introduced a fast-track for liquidation proceedings.
In 2000 Slovakia made liquidation more efficient by allowing
the firm to operate as a going concern throughout
the process.
FIGURE 9.4
Rich countries waited to introduce reorganization
Income per capita in year of reform
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
Source: Doing Business database.
Canada 1992
Norway 1984
Ireland 1990
France 1985
Costa Rica 1989
Bulgaria 2000
Albania 1996
Georgia 2001
Cameroon 1998
Senegal 1998
India 1986
Uzbekistan 2003
Vietnam 1990

72 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Provide specialized expertise
Whether in Burundi, Bulgaria or Belgium, the judiciary
can be organized to provide specialization for the judges
who deal with foreclosure or bankruptcy cases. This has
large benefits in increasing recovery rates (figure 9.5). In
poor countries, specialization can be achieved by establishing
a specialized commercial section in the general
court. Its clerks and judges deal only with bankruptcy
and debt recovery issues and not with divorce or criminal
cases. Ghana has done this, as has Bosnia and Herzegovina
more recently.
Where the flow of contract enforcement and bankruptcy
cases is larger, specialized commercial courts
or bankruptcy authorities can be considered. Colombia,
Ecuador, India, Latvia, Moldova, Peru and Tanzania have
implemented such reforms in the last few years. Countries
with a high volume of cases can establish specialized
bankruptcy courts, as in Japan and the United States. The
volume of cases and the complexity of the legal matters
ensures that only experienced judges, at advanced stages
in their careers, are selected for these courts.
Countries can also build specialized expertise by
mandating that judges have business experience. Bankruptcy
judges in most rich countries have such experience,
acquired by running their own firms as in France,
by being legal counsel in corporations or private law
firms, as in the United States, or by going through a business
training program, as in Germany. With few exceptions,
like Peru, judges in developing countries have no
business experience and typically no training in business
and accounting matters either. This needs change because
countries that value business experience of judges
have 10% higher recovery rates.
Beyond training and requirements for business experience,
scarce expertise can be pooled by allowing legal
entities and not only physical persons to administer the
bankruptcy estate. The Czech Republic did this in 2000
with great success. But many countries don’t permit it.
Limit appeals
Appeals are needed to resolve legitimate disputes. But
too often they are abused—invoked for frivolous reasons
and delaying an efficient outcome. Limiting appeals,
both at the outset and during the procedure, increases
recovery rates (figure 9.6). In foreclosure proceedings,
the creditor in Australia, New Zealand or the United
Kingdom need only prove that a payment is overdue.
Appeal is not possible. In contrast, in El Salvador the
debtor can appeal foreclosure and delay its start by up to
16 months. In Angola, Haiti, and Honduras the appeals
last so long—often years—that employees or the tax authority
can initiate bankruptcy and stop the foreclosure
process altogether. Secured creditors get next to nothing.
As a result, banks are only willing to lend to businesses
whose owners put up personal assets as collateral. Few
can afford such terms.
Appeals delay liquidation or reorganization proceedings
even more. In Bolivia, appeals take a year. In Chile
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, appeals last several years.
What to do? Cut the period of appeals. Romania just
did so, reducing each appeal from 30 to 10 days. Or limit
appeals only to those on legal grounds, not on the case
facts, which are already established and accepted by the
judge at the start of the case. Or allow the case to continue
during appeal, as in Estonia. This avoids disruption
while providing for disputes to be resolved. Allowing the
FIGURE 9.5
Specialization pays off on all dimensions
Time, cost, recovery
and survival rate in insolvency
50
FIGURE 9.6
Limiting appeals increases recovery rates
Percentage increase in recovery rate
32%
48
Case
continues
25%
General
Court 3.4
Specialized
court
2.6
16
10
29
20
17%
Time
(years)
Cost
(percentage
of estate)
Recovery
rate
(cents per dollar)
Probability
of survival
(percent)
Case is
delayed
Order initiating
insolvency
appealed
Liquidation
appealed
Claim amount
disputed
Source: Doing Business database.
Source: Doing Business database.

CLOSING A BUSINESS 73
foreclosure or bankruptcy case to continue on appeal is
associated with 20% less time in closing a business. And
it almost doubles the chance of keeping it operating.
Pay administrators for maximizing the estate value
Administrators can be paid on the outcome of bankruptcy,
setting incentives to maximize proceeds. Doing so
increases recovery rates—by 20% on average. Fifty countries
pay on market proceeds. The list includes Denmark,
Japan and the United States, as well as many developing
countries—including Jordan, Malaysia and Slovakia. But
many countries set perverse incentives, paying administrators
a monthly salary. In this case, more delays mean
higher income—hardly an incentive for the administrator
to speed the process.
Why reform?
FIGURE 9.7
Higher recovery, more credit…
Private credit as a percentage of GDP
Greater
share
Efficient insolvency helps new entrepreneurs start and
grow their businesses. With higher recovery rates, banks
are more willing to lend (figure 9.7). And more money
goes to new business ventures. The freedom to fail in
business, and do so through an efficient process, ensures
that a country’s people and capital are put to their most
productive uses. Entrepreneurs benefit the most, as seen
by the strong association between the closing of failed
businesses and new start-ups (figure 9.8). Closing inefficient
firms increases overall productivity. Exit of unviable
businesses contributed 19% to productivity growth
in Taiwan (China), 23% in Korea and 39% in Indonesia
in the 1990s. 15
The link between entrepreneurship and the closing
of unviable businesses is not as novel as it may sound. It
is nothing more than Schumpeter’s notion of creative
destruction, where new people—or sometimes the same
people—try to develop new ideas into profitable businesses.
Schumpeter surely would have frowned at the expansion
of sophisticated rescue techniques for failed
businesses in developing countries.
FIGURE 9.8
…more exit, more entry
Exiting and entering firms as a percentage of total firms
(manufacturing firms, 1995–2002, weighted by employment)
Entering firms
7
6
5
INDONESIA
FINLAND
Lesser
share
Lowest rate
Highest rate
Countries ranked by recovery rate in insolvency, quintiles
Note: Analysis controls for income, GDP growth, contract enforcement, legal rights
and credit information.
Source: Doing Business database, World Bank (2004a).
4
ROMANIA NETHERLANDS TAIWAN
ESTONIA
U.K. CHINA
CHILE
3
HUNGARY
ITALY
MEXICO
U.S.
PORTUGAL
2
BRAZIL
COLOMBIA
ARGENTINA
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Exiting firms
Source: Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004).
KOREA
Notes
1. This is the result of having less efficient procedures, but also of the
larger proportion of businesses that operate in the informal economy.
2. US Census Bureau (2003), table 748, p. 506.
3. Easterbrook (1990).
4. Dollars and cents are used as generic terms for local currency units
throughout the chapter.
5. But in the Netherlands where the process lasts 19 months.
6. In all ten, secured creditors have priority in the distribution of bankruptcy
proceeds, before taxes, employees and suppliers.
7. The data are built assuming that the business is viable, so that the value
of the firm is higher as a going concern and the efficient outcome is either
reorganization or sale as a going concern.
8. A new bankruptcy law was amended and approved by the Senate on
July 6th 2004.
9. The insolvent firm is viable by assumption of the case study.
10. The calculation is (100 – (4% x 100) – (25 x .2 x .5))/(1+.018) ^0.5 = 92
11. Research shows that the average loss in efficiency from exit of viable
firms is 30%. See Data Notes Section for details.
12. The calculation is (100 – (8% x 100) – (25 x .2 x 4.6))/(1+.45)^4.6 = 7
13. Witness the draft Insolvency Bill in Nepal. It envisages a courtappointed
reorganization manager. See details in Pradhan (2004).
14. Baird (1986).
15. Annual average labor productivity growth in Taiwan (China) from
1981–96 was 7.6%; in Korea from 1983–93 was 11.6% and in Indonesia
from 1992–95 was 12%. Source: Aw, Batra and Roberts (2004).

75
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79
Data notes
Economy characteristics
Starting a business
Hiring and firing workers
Registering property
Getting credit
Protecting investors
Enforcing contracts
Closing a business
Ease of doing business
The indicators presented and analyzed in Doing Business
measure government regulation and the protection of property
rights—and their effect on businesses, especially on
small and medium-size domestic firms. First, they document
the degree of regulation, such as the number of procedures to
start a business or register commercial property. Second, they
gauge regulatory outcomes, such as the time and cost to enforce
a contract or go through bankruptcy. Third, the indicators
measure the extent of legal protections of property, for
example in the disclosure of company information to investors
or the scope of assets that can be used as collateral according
to secured transactions laws. The data for all sets of
indicators in Doing Business in 2005 are for January 2004.
Based on research of laws and regulations, with input and
verification from more than 3,000 local government officials,
lawyers, business consultants and other professionals routinely
administering or advising on legal and regulatory requirements,
this methodology offers several advantages. It
uses factual information and allows for multiple interactions
with local respondents, clarifying potential misinterpretations
of questions. It is inexpensive, so data can be collected
in a large sample of economies—135 published in Doing
Business in 2005, with another 10 available on the website.
Because the same standard assumptions are applied in the
data collection, which is transparent and easily replicable,
comparisons and benchmarks are valid across countries. And
the data highlight not only the extent of obstacles, but also
help identify their source, supporting policymakers in designing
reform.
The Doing Business methodology has 3 limitations that
should be considered when interpreting the data. First, in
many cases, the collected data refer to businesses in the country’s
most populous city and may not be representative of
regulatory practices in other parts of the country. Second, the
data often focus on a specific business form—limited liability
company of specified size—and may not be representative
of the regulation on other businesses, for example, sole proprietorships.
Finally, some indicators—such as time—involve
an element of judgment by the expert respondents.
Therefore, if sources indicate different estimates, the time indicators
reported in Doing Business represent the median values
of several responses given under the assumptions of the
case study.
Questions on the methodology may be asked through the
“Ask a Question” function available on the Doing Business
website at http://rru.worldbank.org/doingbusiness and will
be answered within 48 hours. For urgent queries, please call
Marie Delion at 1 202 473 0183. Updated indicators, as well
as any revisions of or corrections to the printed data, are
available on the website.

80 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Economy characteristics
Region and income group
Doing Business uses the World Bank regional and income
groupings available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/
countryclass/countryclass.html. Throughout the report, the
term rich economies refers to the high income group, middle
income refers to the upper middle income group and poor
economies refers to the lower middle and low income groups.
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita
Doing Business reports 2003 income per capita, calculated
using the Atlas method (current US$), as published in the
World Development Indicators. For cost indicators expressed
as a percentage of income per capita, 2003 local currency unit
GNI, as reported in the World Development Indicators, is
used as the denominator.
Population
Doing Business reports mid-year 2003 population statistics as
published in the World Development Indicators.
Starting a business
Doing Business records all generic procedures that are officially
required for an entrepreneur to start up an industrial or
commercial business. These include obtaining all necessary
licenses and permits and completing any required notifications,
verifications or inscriptions with relevant authorities.
After a study of laws, regulations, and publicly available information
on business entry, a detailed list of procedures,
time, cost and minimum paid-in capital requirements is developed.
Subsequently, local incorporation lawyers and government
officials complete and verify the data on applicable
procedures, the time and cost of fulfilling each procedure
under normal circumstances and the minimum paid in capital.
On average at least four different law firms participate per
country. Information is also collected on the sequence in
which procedures are to be completed and whether procedures
may be carried out simultaneously. It is assumed that
any required information is readily available and that all government
and nongovernment agencies involved in the startup
process function efficiently and without corruption. If answers
by local experts differ, enquiries continue until the data
are reconciled.
Assumptions about the business
To make the business comparable across countries, 10 assumptions
are employed. The business:
• Is a limited liability company. If there is more than one
type of limited liability company in the country, the most
popular limited liability form among domestic firms is
chosen. Information on the most popular form is obtained
from incorporation lawyers or the statistical office.
• Operates in the country’s most populous city.
• Is 100% domestically owned and has 5 owners, none of
whom is a legal entity.
• Has start-up capital of 10 times income per capita at the
end of 2003, paid in cash.
• Performs general industrial or commercial activities, such
as the production or sale of products or services to the
public. It does not perform activities of foreign trade and
does not handle products subject to a special tax regime,
for example, liquor or tobacco. The business is not using
heavily polluting production processes.
• Leases the commercial plant and offices and is not a proprietor
of real estate.
• Does not qualify for investment incentives or any special
benefits.
• Has up to 50 employees 1 month after the commencement
of operations, all of them nationals.
• Has a turnover at least 100 times income per capita.
• Has a company deed 10 pages long.
Assumptions about procedures
To make the procedures comparable across countries, 6 assumptions
are employed:
• A procedure is defined as any interaction of the company
founder with external parties (government agencies,
lawyers, auditors, notaries). Interactions between company
founders or company officers and employees are not
considered separate procedures.
• The founders complete all procedures themselves, without
middlemen, facilitators, accountants or lawyers, unless the
use of such third party is mandated by law.
• Procedures that are not required by law for starting
a business are ignored. For example, obtaining
exclusive rights over the company name is not counted
in a country where businesses may use a number as identification.
• Shortcuts are counted only if they fulfill 3 criteria: they are
legal; they are available to the general public; and avoiding
them causes substantial delays.
• Only procedures required of all businesses are covered. Industry-specific
procedures are excluded. For example,
procedures to comply with environmental regulations are
included only when they apply to all businesses.
• Procedures that the company undergoes to connect to
electricity, water, gas and waste-disposal services are not
included, unless they entail inspections required prior to
starting operations.

DATA NOTES 81
Cost measure
The text of the Company Law, the Commercial Code and
specific regulations and fee schedules are used as sources for
calculating the costs. If there are conflicting sources and the
laws are not clear, the most authoritative source is used. The
constitution supersedes the company law, and the law prevails
over regulations and decrees. If conflicting sources are of
the same rank, the source indicating the most costly procedure
is used, since an entrepreneur never second-guesses a
government official. In the absence of fee schedules, a governmental
officer’s estimate is taken as an official source. In
the absence of government officer’s estimates, estimates of incorporation
lawyers are used. If several incorporation lawyers
provide different estimates, the median reported value is applied.
In all cases, the cost excludes bribes.
Time measure
Time is recorded in calendar days. It is assumed that the minimum
time required per procedure is 1 day. Time captures
the median duration that incorporation lawyers indicate is
necessary to complete a procedure. If a procedure can be accelerated
for an additional cost, the fastest procedure is chosen.
It is assumed that the entrepreneur does not waste time
and commits to completing each remaining procedure without
delay. The time that the entrepreneur spends on gathering
information is ignored. It is assumed that the entrepreneur
is aware of all entry regulations and their sequence from
the beginning.
Paid-in minimum capital requirement
The paid-in minimum capital requirement reflects the
amount that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank before
registration starts. This amount is typically specified in
the Commercial Code or the Company Law. Many countries
mandate a capital requirement but allow businesses to pay
only a portion of it during registration, with the remainder
paid after the first year of operation. For example in January
2004 the minimum capital requirement for limited liability
companies in Armenia was 50,000 dram, of which half was
payable before registration. In Honduras in January 2004 the
minimum capital requirement was 25,000 lempiras, but only
a quarter of this amount needed to be paid in before registration.
This methodology is originally developed in Djankov and others
(2002) and adopted with minor changes here.
Hiring and firing workers
Every economy has established a complex system of laws and
institutions intended to protect the interests of workers and
to guarantee a minimum standard of living for its population.
The OECD Job Study and the International Encyclopedia
for Labour Law and Industrial Relations identify 4 areas
subject to statutory regulation in all countries: employment,
industrial relations, occupational health and safety, and social
security. Doing Business focuses on the regulation of employment,
specifically the hiring and firing of workers and the
rigidity of working hours.
The data on hiring and firing workers are based on a detailed
study of employment laws and regulations. The employment
laws of most countries are available online in the NATLEX
database, published by the International Labour Organization.
In all cases, both actual laws and secondary sources are
used to ensure accuracy. Conflicting answers are further
checked in 2 additional sources, including a local legal treatise
on employment regulation. Secondary sources include
the International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial
Relations. Finally, all data are verified and completed by
local law firms through a detailed survey on employment regulations.
To make the data comparable across countries, several assumptions
about the worker and the company are employed.
The worker:
• Is a nonexecutive full-time male employee who has
worked in the same company for 20 years.
• Earns a salary plus benefits equal to the country’s average
wage during the entire period of his employment.
• Has a nonworking wife and two children. The family resides
in the country’s most populous city.
• Is a lawful citizen who belongs to the same race and religion
as the majority of the country’s population.
• Is not a member of the labor union, unless membership is
mandatory.
The business:
• Is a limited liability company.
• Operates in the country’s most populous city.
• Is 100% domestically owned.
• Operates in the manufacturing sector.
• Has 201 employees.
• Abides by every law and regulation, but does not grant
workers more benefits than what is legally mandated.
Indicators
Two indicators are constructed: a Rigidity of Employment
Index and a Cost of Firing measure.
The Rigidity of Employment Index is the average of three
sub-indices: a Difficulty of Hiring index, a Rigidity of Hours
index and a Difficulty of Firing index. All sub-indices have
several components. And all take values between 0 and 100,
with higher values indicating more rigid regulation.
The Difficulty of Hiring index measures (i) whether term
contracts can only be used for temporary tasks; (ii) the max-

82 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
imum duration of term contracts; and (iii) the ratio of the
mandated minimum wage (or apprentice wage, if available)
to the average value-added per working population. A country
is assigned a score of 1 if term contracts can only be used
for temporary tasks, and a score of 0 if term contracts can be
used for any task. A score of 1 is assigned if the duration of
term contracts is 3 years or less; 0.5 if the duration is between
3 and 5 years; and 0 if term contracts can last more than 5
years. Finally, a score of 1 is assigned if the ratio of minimum
wage to average value added per worker ratio is higher than
0.75; 0.67 for ratios between 0.50 and 0.75; 0.33 for ratios between
0.25 and 0.50; and a score of 0 if the ratio is below 0.25.
For example, term contracts are only allowed for temporary
tasks in Uruguay (a score of 1), but they can be longer than 5
years (a score of 0), and the ratio of the mandated minimum
wage to the value-added per worker in 0.10 (also a score of 0).
Averaging the three subindices and scaling the index to 100
gives Uruguay a score of 33.
The Rigidity of Hours index has 5 components: (i) whether
night work is restricted; (ii) whether weekend work is allowed;
(iii) whether the workweek consists of 51⁄2 days or
more; (iv) whether the workday can extend to 12 hours or
more (including overtime); and (v) whether the annual paid
vacation days are 21 days or less. If the answer to any of these
questions is no, the country is assigned a score of 1, otherwise
a score of 0 is assigned. For example, night work is not allowed
in Vietnam (a score of 1), weekend work is restricted (a
score of 1), the workday—with overtime—can extend to 12
hours (a score of 0), 6-day work weeks are allowed (a score of
0), and paid vacation is 16 days (a score of 0). The scores are
then summed and scaled to 100 to get to the final index of 40
for Vietnam.
The Difficulty of Firing index has 8 components:
(i) whether redundancy is not grounds for dismissal;
(ii) whether the employer needs to notify the labor union or
the labor ministry for firing 1 redundant worker; (iii)
whether the employer needs to notify the labor union or the
labor ministry for group dismissals; (iv) whether the employer
needs approval from the labor union or the labor ministry
for firing 1 redundant worker; (v) whether the employer
needs approval from the labor union or the labor ministry for
group dismissals; (vi) whether the law mandates training or
replacement prior to dismissal; (vii) whether priority rules
apply for dismissals; and (viii) whether priority rules apply
for reemployment. If the answer to any question is yes, a score
of 1 is assigned, otherwise a score of 0 is given. Questions (i)
and (iv), as the most restrictive regulations, have doubleweight
in the construction of the index. For example, an employer
in Brazil has to both notify (a score of 1) and seek approval
(a score of 2) from third parties when dismissing a
redundant worker, she has to both notify (a score of 1) and
seek approval (a score of 1) when dismissing a group of
workers, and redundancy is not considered a fair grounds for
dismissal (a score of 2). The law does not mandate priority
rules for dismissal (a score of 0) or reemployment (a score of
0), and there is no requirement for retraining or alternative
placement prior to dismissal (a score of 0). Adding up and
scaling to 100 gives the final index of 70 for Brazil.
The Cost of Firing indicator measures the cost of advance notice
requirements, severance payments and penalties due
when firing a worker, expressed in terms of weekly wages. For
example, in Cameroon an employer is required to give 16
weeks advance notice prior to a redundancy dismissal, the
severance pay for workers with 20 years of experience equals
7 months of wages, and redundancy is grounds for dismissal
so no penalty is levied. Altogether, the employer pays the
equivalent of 46 weeks of salary to dismiss the worker.
This methodology is originally developed in Botero and others
(forthcoming) and adopted with minor changes here.
Registering property
A business purchases land and a building in a peri-urban area
of the most populous city. Doing Business covers the full sequence
of procedures necessary to transfer the property title
from the seller to the buyer. Every required procedure is included,
whether it is the responsibility of the seller, the buyer,
or where it is required to be completed by a third party on
their behalf.
Local property lawyers and property registries provide information
on required procedures, as well as the time and the
cost to fulfill each of them. In most countries, the data are
based on responses by both lawyers and officials in the property
registries.
Assumptions about the business
To make the business comparable across countries, five assumptions
are employed. The business:
• Is a limited liability company.
• Is located in a peri-urban area of the country’s most populous
city.
• Is 100% domestically and privately owned (no foreign or
state ownership).
• Employs 50 employees, all of whom are nationals.
• Operates in general commercial activities.

DATA NOTES 83
Assumptions about the property
To make the property comparable across countries, ten assumptions
are employed. The property:
• Has a value of 50 times income per capita.
• Is currently fully-owned by another domestic limited liability
company.
• Has no mortgages attached and has been under the same
ownership for the past 10 years.
• Is adequately measured and filed in the cadastre, registered
in the land register and free of title disputes.
• Is located in a peri-urban commercial zone and no rezoning
is required.
• Consists of land and a building. The land area is 6,000
square feet (557.4 square meters). A warehouse of 10,000
square feet (929 square meters) is located on the land. The
warehouse is 10 years old, in good condition and was constructed
following all safety standards, building codes and
other legal requirements.
• Will not be subject to renovations or additional building
following the purchase;
• Has no trees, natural water sources, natural reserves or
historical monuments of any kind;
• Will not be used for special purposes and no special permits
for residential use, industrial plants, waste storage,
certain types of agricultural activities, etc. are required;
• Has no occupants (legal or illegal) and no other party
holds a legal interest in it. The purchasing company will
take vacant possession of the property.
Procedures measure
A procedure is defined as any interaction of the buying or
selling company, their agents (if the agent is required by law)
or the property itself with external parties, including government
agencies, inspectors, notaries, lawyers, etc. Interactions
between company officers and employees are not considered.
All procedures that are legally required for registering property
are recorded, even if they may be avoided in exceptional
cases. It is assumed that the purchasing company follows the
fastest legal option available. Although the business may use
lawyers or other professionals where necessary in the registration
process, it is assumed that it does not employ an outside
facilitator in the registration unless required to by law.
Cost measure
Only official costs are recorded. These include fees, transfer
taxes, stamp duties, and any other payment to the property
registry, notaries, public agencies or lawyers, if required by
law. Other taxes, such as capital gains tax or value added tax
(VAT) are excluded from the cost measure. If cost estimates
differ among sources, the median reported value is used.
Total costs are expressed as a percentage of the property
value, calculated assuming a property value of 50 times income
per capita.
Time measure
Time is recorded in calendar days. It is assumed that the minimum
time required for each procedure is one day. Time captures
the median duration that property lawyers or registry
officials indicate as necessary to complete a procedure. It is
assumed that the entrepreneur does not waste time and commits
to completing each remaining procedure without delay.
If a procedure can be accelerated for an additional cost, the
fastest procedure is chosen. If procedures may be undertaken
simultaneously, it is assumed that they are. It is assumed that
the parties involved are aware of all regulations and their sequence
from the beginning. Time spent on gathering information
is not considered.
The methodology is developed in “Property,” an ongoing research
project by Simeon Djankov, Facundo Martin and
Caralee McLiesh.
Getting credit
Doing Business constructs measures on credit information
sharing and the legal rights of borrowers and lenders. One set
of indicators measures the coverage, scope, quality and accessibility
of credit information available through public or private
credit registries. A second set describes how well collateral
and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending.
Data on credit information sharing are built in two stages:
first, the respective banking supervision authorities as well as
public information sources are surveyed to confirm the presence
or absence of public credit registries and private credit
information bureaus. Second, when applicable, a detailed
survey on the public or private credit registry’s structure, law,
and associated rules collects data in 5 areas:
• Coverage of the market
• Scope of information collected and distributed
• Access to the data
• Quality of data
• Legal framework for information sharing and quality of
data.
The surveys were adapted from previous versions designed in
cooperation with the “Credit Reporting Systems Project” in
the World Bank Group and with input from Professor Marco
Pagano of the University of Naples. Survey responses are verified
through several rounds of follow-up communication
with respondents as well as by contacting third parties and
consulting public sources. In more than a third of cases, the
survey data are complemented by teleconference calls.

84 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Public credit registry coverage
A public credit registry is defined as a database managed by
the public sector, usually by the Central Bank or Superintendent
of Banks, that collects information on the standing of
borrowers (persons or businesses) in the financial system and
makes it available to financial institutions. The coverage indicator
reports the number of individuals and firms listed in
the public credit registry with current information on repayment
history, unpaid debts or credit outstanding. The number
is scaled to country’s adult population (per 1,000 adult
population). If a public registry does not operate, the coverage
value is 0.
Private credit bureau coverage
A private credit bureau is defined as a private firm or a nonprofit
organization that maintains a database on the standing
of borrowers (persons or businesses) in the financial system
and facilitates exchange of credit information among banks
and financial institutions. Credit investigative bureaus and
credit reporting firms that do not directly facilitate information
exchange between financial institutions are not considered.
The coverage indicator reports the number of individuals
or firms listed in the private credit bureau with current
information on repayment history, unpaid debts or credit
outstanding. The number is scaled to the country’s adult
population (per 1,000 adult population). If a private bureau
does not operate, the coverage value is 0.
Credit information availability
This index measures rules affecting the scope, access and
quality of credit information available through either public
or private bureaus. A score of 1 is assigned for each of the following
6 features of the credit information system:
• Both positive and negative credit information (for example
on payment history, number and kind of accounts,
number and frequency of late payments and any collections
or bankruptcies) is distributed;
• Data on both firms and individuals is distributed;
• Data from retailers, trade creditors and/or utilities as well
as financial institutions is distributed;
• More than 5 years of historical data is preserved;
• Data on loans of above 1% income per capita is
distributed;
• By law, the consumer has the right to access their data.
The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating
that more credit information is available from either a public
registry or a private bureau to facilitate lending decisions. For
example, in Uruguay, both a public and private registry operate.
The private bureau distributes only negative information,
but the public registry distributes both negative and positive
information (a score of 1). Both the public and private registries
distribute data on firms as well as individuals (a score
of 1). Although the public registry shares data only among
supervised financial institutions, lenders can access information
from retailers and utilities from the private bureau (a
score of 1). The public registry preserves more than 5 years of
historical data (score of 1). It collects data on loans only if
they are more than $11,000—3.6 times income per capita—
but the private bureau collects information on loans above
100 pesos, less than 1% of income per capita (a score of 1).
Consumers do not have the right to access their data (score of
0). Summing across the variables gives the total score of 5 for
Uruguay.
Cost to create and register collateral
The indicator assesses the ease of creating and registering collateral.
The data are based on research of collateral and insolvency
laws and responses to a survey on secured transactions
laws, developed with input and comments from a range of
experts including those from the Center for Economic Analysis
of Law, the International Bar Association Committee E8
on Financial Law, and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development.
Participating lawyers estimate the costs, based on the following
standardized case: An entrepreneur with a medium size
(100 employees) textile business located in the most populous
city seeks a loan from a local bank. The loan would finance
the purchase of industrial sewing machines worth 10
times income per capita. The entrepreneur secures the loan
by pledging the industrial sewing machines as collateral while
keeping both possession and ownership title (nonpossessory
security right). If a non possessory security right is unavailable
in the country, the closest functional substitute is used.
Costs include taxes, notary fees and duties associated with
creating the security right and registering it in the collateral
registry, where such a registry operates. Countries without a
registry usually have lower costs, although the secured creditor
is disadvantaged elsewhere because they are unable to notify
other creditors of their right to the collateral through a
registry. The cost measure is presented as a percentage of income
per capita.
Legal rights of borrowers and lenders
The index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy
laws facilitate lending. It is based on data collected
through research of collateral and insolvency laws supported
by the responses to the survey on secured transactions laws.
It includes 3 aspects related to legal rights in bankruptcy, and
7 aspects found in collateral law. The indicators related to
creditor rights in bankruptcy are based on the methodology
of La Porta and others (1998). A score of 1 is assigned for
each of the following features of the laws:
• Secured creditors are able to seize their collateral when a
debtor enters reorganization—that is there is no “automatic
stay” or “asset freeze” imposed by the court.
• Secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds from
liquidating a bankrupt firm, as opposed to other parties

DATA NOTES 85
such as government or workers.
• Management does not stay in reorganization. An administrator
is responsible for managing the business during
reorganization, rather than the management of the bankrupt
debtor.
• General—rather than specific—description of assets is
permitted in collateral agreements.
• General—rather than specific—description of debt is permitted
in collateral agreements.
• Any legal or natural person may grant or take security.
• A unified registry including charges over movable property
operates.
• Security provides priority outside of bankruptcy.
• Parties may agree on enforcement procedures by contract.
• Creditors may both seize and sell collateral out of court.
The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating
that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand
access to credit.
This methodology is developed in Simeon Djankov, Caralee
McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer, “Private Credit Around the
World,” working paper, Department of Economics, Harvard
University, July 2004; and adapted from La Porta and others
(1998).
Protecting investors
Doing Business distinguishes 3 dimensions of investor protection:
disclosure of ownership and financial information; legal
protections of small investors; and enforcement capabilities
in the courts or securities regulator. Doing Business in 2005
focuses on disclosure of ownership and financial information.
The data come from a survey of corporate and securities
lawyers and are based on relevant corporate governance laws
and regulations applicable to a standard company. Only general
rules—as opposed to those applicable to companies
within a particular industry—are considered. In building the
data, the highest available level of disclosure is taken into account,
reflecting the notion that small investors can put their
money in public or private equity. In countries where stock
exchange regulations and securities laws are in force, the disclosure
index assesses these regulations. In other countries,
the disclosure requirements come from the company law. So
the indicators are relevant for private companies as well as
publicly listed ones.
Assumptions about the business
To make the data comparable across countries, the following
assumptions are made about the business. The business:
• Is a publicly-traded corporation, listed on the country’s
most important stock exchange. If there are no publiclytraded
companies in the country, it is assumed that the
company is a big private company with a large number of
shareholders and employees.
• Has a Board of Directors and a Chief Executive Officer
(CEO), who has the legal capacity to act on behalf of the
Company where permitted, even if this is not specifically
required by law.
• Has only national shareholders.
• Has only invested in the country and has no subsidiaries
or operations abroad.
• Is not involved in the banking, power, telecommunications
or insurance industries or any other industry where
there are special regulations applicable to the particular
industry.
Disclosure measure
The index captures seven ways of enhancing disclosure:
whether laws and regulations require reporting (i) family, (ii)
indirect and (iii) beneficial ownership; (iv) disclosing information
on voting agreements between shareholders; (v) audit
committees to the board of directors; (vi) use of external auditors;
and (vii) ownership and financial information is publicly
available to all current and potential investors. The index
varies between 0 and 7, with higher values indicating more
disclosure. For example, in Bangladesh the company is not
required to disclose family ownership (a score of 0), but is required
to disclose indirect ownership (a score of 1) and beneficial
ownership (a score of 1). Voting agreements are not required
to be disclosed (a score of 0). There are no
requirements for audit committees (a score of 0), but external
auditors must be used (a score of 1). Ownership and financial
information are not required to be disclosed publicly
(a score of 0). Summing across all variables yields the total
index of 3 for Bangladesh.
The methodology is developed in “Corporate Theft,” an
ongoing research project by Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer.

86 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Enforcing contracts
Indicators on enforcing contracts measure the efficiency of
the judicial (or administrative) system in the collection of
overdue debt. The data are built following the step-by-step
evolution of a payment dispute either before local courts or
through an administrative process, if such a process is available
and preferred by creditors. The data are collected
through research of the codes of civil procedures and other
court regulations, as well as surveys to local litigation lawyers.
At least 2 lawyers participate in each country and in a quarter
of the countries, judges complete the survey as well. To ensure
comparability, survey respondents are provided with significant
detail, including the amount of the claim, the location
and main characteristics of the litigants, the presence of city
regulations, the nature of the remedy requested by the plaintiff,
the merit of the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s claims and
the social implications of the judicial outcomes.
Assumptions about the case
To make the case comparable across countries, 10 assumptions
are employed:
• The debt value equals 200% of the country’s income per
capita.
• The plaintiff has fully complied with the contract (the
plaintiff is 100% right).
• The case presents a lawful transaction between businesses
residing in the country’s most populous city.
• The bank refuses payment for lack of funds in the borrower’s
account.
• The plaintiff attempts to recover the debt by filing
a law suit or going through an administrative process, if
such a process is available and preferred by creditors.
• The debtor attempts to delay service of process but it is finally
accomplished.
• The debtor opposes the complaint (default judgment is
not an option).
• The judge decides every motion for the plaintiff.
• The plaintiff attempts to introduce documentary evidence
and to call one witness. The debtor attempts to call one
witness. Neither party presents objections.
• The judgment is in favor of the plaintiff.
Procedures measure
The indicator measures the number of procedures mandated
by law or court regulation that demand interaction between
the parties or between them and the judge (or administrator)
or court officer.
Cost measure
The indicator measures the official cost of going through
court procedures, including court costs and attorney fees
where the use of attorneys is mandatory or common, or the
costs of an administrative debt recovery procedure, expressed
as a percentage of the debt value.
Time measure
The indicator measures the time of dispute resolution—in
calendar days—counted from the moment the plaintiff files
the lawsuit in court until settlement or payment. This includes
both the days where actions take place and waiting periods
between actions. The respondents make separate estimates
of the average duration of different stages of the
dispute resolution: for the completion of service of process
(time to notify the defendant), the issuance of judgment
(time for the trial or administrative process) and the moment
of payment or repossession (time for enforcement).
The methodology is originally developed in Djankov and others
(2003) and adopted with minor changes here.
Closing a business
Doing Business studies the time and cost of insolvency proceedings
involving domestic entities. The data are derived
from survey responses by local law firms, all members of the
International Bar Association. Answers were provided by a
senior partner at each firm, in cooperation with one or two
junior associates.
Assumptions about the business
To make the business comparable across countries, 10 assumptions
are employed. The business:
• Is a limited liability company.
• Operates in the country’s most populous city.
• Is 100% domestically owned, of which 51% is owned by
its founder, who is also the chairman of the supervisory
board (aside from the founder, there is no other shareholder
who has above 1% of shares).
• Has downtown real estate as its major asset, on which it
runs a hotel.
• Has a professional general manager.
• Has average annual revenue of 1,000 times income per
capita over the last 3 years.
• Has 201 employees and 50 suppliers, each of whom is
owed money for the last delivery.
• Borrowed from a domestic bank 5 years ago (the loan has
10 years to full repayment) and bought real estate (the
hotel building), using it as a security for the bank loan.
• Has observed the payment schedule and all other conditions
of the loan up to now.
• Has a mortgage with the value of the mortgage principal
being exactly equal to the market value of the hotel.

DATA NOTES 87
Assumptions about the case
To make the case comparable across countries, 3 assumptions
are employed:
• In January 2004 the business is experiencing liquidity
problems. The company’s loss in 2003 brought its net
worth to a negative figure. There is no cash to pay the bank
either interest or principal in full, due on January 2, 2004.
Therefore, the business defaults on its loan. Management
believes that losses will be incurred in 2004 and 2005 as
well.
• The bank holds a floating charge against the hotel in
countries where floating charges are possible. If the law
does not permit a floating charge, but contracts commonly
use some other provision to that effect, this provision
is specified in the lending contract.
• The business has too many creditors to renegotiate out of
court. Its options are: a procedure aimed at rehabilitation
or any procedure that will reorganize the business to permit
further operation; a procedure aimed at liquidation;
or a procedure aimed at selling the hotel, either as a going
concern or piecemeal, either enforced through court (or a
government authority like a debt collection agency) or out
of court (receivership).
Cost measure
The cost of the bankruptcy proceedings are calculated based
on answers by practicing insolvency lawyers. If several respondents
report different estimates, the median reported
value is used. Costs include court costs, as well as fees of insolvency
practitioners, independent assessors, lawyers, accountants,
etc. Bribes are excluded. The cost figures are averages
of the estimates in a multiple-choice question, where the
respondents choose among the following options: 0–2%,
3–5%, 6–10%, 11–16%, 16–20%, 21–25%, 26–50%, and
more than 50% of the estate value of the bankrupt business.
Time measure
Time is recorded in calendar years. It captures the average duration
to complete a procedure as estimated by insolvency
lawyers. Information is collected on the sequence of the
bankruptcy procedures and on whether any procedures can
be carried out simultaneously. Delays due to legal derailment
tactics that parties to the insolvency may use, in particular extension
of response periods or appeals, are considered.
Recovery rate
The recovery rate measures the efficiency of foreclosure or
bankruptcy procedures. It estimates how many cents on the
dollar claimants—creditors, tax authorities, and employees—
recover from an insolvent firm. The calculation takes into account
whether the business is kept as a going concern during
the proceedings, as well as court, attorney and other related
costs and the discounted value due to the time spent closing
down. If the business keeps operating, no value is lost on the
initial claim, set at 100 cents on the dollar. If not, the initial
100 cents on the dollar are reduced to 70 cents on the dollar.
Then, the official costs of the insolvency procedure are deducted
(1 cent for each percentage cost of the initial value).
Finally, the value lost due to the time that the money remains
tied up in insolvency procedures is taken into account, including
the loss of value due to depreciation of the hotel furniture.
Consistent with the international accounting practice,
the depreciation rate of office furniture is taken to be 20%. In
turn, the value of the furniture is assumed to be a quarter of
the total value of assets. The recovery rate is the present value
of the remaining proceeds, using end-2003 lending rates
from IMF’s International Financial Statistics and supplemented
with data from central banks.
This methodology is developed in “Efficiency in Bankruptcy,” an
ongoing research project by Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, Tatiana
Nenova, and Andrei Shleifer.
Ease of doing business
The ease of doing business index is the simple average of
country rankings (from 1 to 135) in each of the 7 topics covered
in Doing Business in 2005. The ranking for each topic is
the simple average of rankings for each of the indicators. The
starting a business ranking averages the country rankings on
the procedures, days, cost and minimum capital requirement
to register a business. The hiring and firing ranking averages
the country rankings on the rigidity of employment index
and firing costs. The property ranking averages the country
rankings on the procedures, time and cost to register property.
The credit ranking is based on the sum of the credit information
availability and legal rights scores. The protecting
investors and closing a business rankings is based on the disclosure
index and recovery rates, respectively. And the enforcing
contracts ranking averages the country rankings on
the procedures, time and cost to enforce contracts. The ease
of doing business measure ranges from 1 to 135, with higher
values indicating more efficient regulation and stronger protections
of property rights.
This methodology is developed by Simeon Djankov, Caralee
McLiesh, and Rita Ramalho in “Growth and the Ease of Doing
Business,” working paper, World Bank, Aug. 2004.

DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS 89
Starting a Business
Hiring and Firing Workers
January 2004
January 2004
Minimum Difficulty Rigidity Difficulty Rigidity of
Cost capital of hiring of hours of firing employment Firing
Number of Time (% of income (% of income index index index index costs
Economy procedures (days) per capita) per capita) (0–100) (0–100) (0–100) (0–100) (weeks)
Albania 11 47 32.2 41.3 11 60 20 30 55
Algeria 14 26 27.3 65.5 56 60 50 55 17
Angola 14 146 884.6 64.4 44 80 100 75 116
Argentina 15 32 15.7 8.1 44 80 30 51 94
Armenia 10 25 7.0 4.5 17 40 50 36 17
Australia 2 2 2.1 0.0 0 40 10 17 17
Austria 9 29 6.0 64.1 0 80 40 40 55
Azerbaijan 14 123 14.7 0.0 33 40 40 38 42
Bangladesh 8 35 91.0 0.0 11 40 20 24 47
Belarus 16 79 25.3 44.3 33 60 70 54 21
Belgium 4 34 11.3 14.1 11 40 10 20 8
Benin 8 32 196.9 333.4 72 60 50 61 54
Bhutan 11 62 11.0 0.0 78 60 10 49 94
Bolivia 15 59 173.9 4.6 61 60 0 40 98
Bosnia and Herzegovina 12 54 46.2 65.0 78 40 30 49 33
Botswana 11 108 11.3 0.0 0 20 40 20 19
Brazil 17 152 11.7 0.0 67 80 70 72 165
Bulgaria 11 32 10.3 116.6 33 40 10 28 30
Burkina Faso 13 135 152.8 498.6 100 100 70 90 80
Burundi 11 43 191.5 0.0 50 40 60 50 41
Cambodia 11 94 480.1 394.0 33 80 30 48 39
Cameroon 12 37 182.5 232.0 61 80 80 74 46
Canada 2 3 1.0 0.0 11 0 0 4 28
Central African Republic 10 14 204.5 559.2 89 80 60 76 37
Chad 19 75 344.2 610.4 100 80 60 80 47
Chile 10 28 10.0 0.0 17 20 20 19 51
China 12 41 14.5 1104.2 11 40 40 30 90
Colombia 14 43 27.4 0.0 72 60 20 51 49
Congo, Dem. Rep. 13 155 556.8 246.8 72 100 60 77 62
Congo, Rep. 8 67 317.6 244.6 89 80 90 86 42
Costa Rica 11 77 25.7 0.0 44 60 0 35 38
Côte d’Ivoire 11 58 133.6 222.3 78 100 30 69 92
Croatia 12 49 14.4 24.4 61 60 50 57 55
Czech Republic 10 40 10.8 44.5 44 20 20 28 22
Denmark 4 4 0.0 48.8 0 40 10 17 39
Dominican Republic 10 78 25.4 1.9 11 80 30 40 70
Ecuador 14 92 47.4 10.4 44 40 70 51 131
Egypt, Arab Rep. 13 43 63.0 815.6 0 80 80 53 162
El Salvador 12 115 128.0 132.5 67 40 50 52 110
Estonia 6 72 7.5 49.7 11 80 40 44 33
Ethiopia 7 32 77.4 1821.9 50 60 20 43 48
Finland 3 14 1.2 29.3 33 60 40 44 24
France 7 8 1.1 0.0 78 80 40 66 32
Georgia 9 25 13.7 54.5 17 60 70 49 21
Germany 9 45 5.9 48.8 44 80 40 55 80
Ghana 12 85 87.5 31.4 11 40 50 34 25

90 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Starting a Business
Hiring and Firing Workers
January 2004
January 2004
Minimum Difficulty Rigidity Difficulty Rigidity of
Cost capital of hiring of hours of firing employment Firing
Number of Time (% of income (% of income index index index index costs
Economy procedures (days) per capita) per capita) (0–100) (0–100) (0–100) (0–100) (weeks)
Greece 15 38 35.2 125.7 78 80 40 66 133
Guatemala 15 39 62.8 31.8 61 40 20 40 170
Guinea 13 49 208.2 475.4 67 80 30 59 133
Haiti 12 203 176.1 182.4 11 40 20 24 26
Honduras 13 62 72.9 37.0 22 40 30 31 46
Hong Kong, China 5 11 3.4 0.0 0 0 0 0 13
Hungary 6 52 22.9 86.4 11 80 30 40 34
India 11 89 49.5 0.0 33 20 90 48 79
Indonesia 12 151 130.7 125.6 61 40 70 57 157
Iran, Islamic Rep. 9 48 7.3 2.1 0 60 60 40 122
Ireland 4 24 10.3 0.0 28 40 20 29 52
Israel 5 34 5.5 0.0 0 80 20 33 90
Italy 9 13 16.2 11.2 61 60 30 50 47
Jamaica 7 31 15.4 0.0 11 20 0 10 12
Japan 11 31 10.6 74.9 33 40 0 24 21
Jordan 11 36 52.0 1147.7 11 40 50 34 90
Kazakhstan 9 25 10.5 32.7 0 60 20 27 17
Kenya 12 47 53.4 0.0 22 20 30 24 47
Korea, Rep. 12 22 17.7 332.0 11 60 30 34 90
Kuwait 13 35 2.4 148.5 0 60 0 20 42
Kyrgyz Republic 8 21 11.6 0.6 33 40 40 38 21
Lao PDR 9 198 18.5 28.5 11 60 80 50 185
Latvia 7 18 17.6 41.4 78 20 50 49 42
Lebanon 6 46 131.5 82.3 44 0 40 28 103
Lesotho 9 92 58.4 17.7 0 60 20 27 47
Lithuania 8 26 3.7 62.8 33 60 30 41 34
Macedonia, FYR 13 48 11.6 89.5 33 40 40 38 38
Madagascar 13 44 65.3 50.7 28 60 60 49 41
Malawi 10 35 140.8 0.0 22 20 20 21 90
Malaysia 9 30 25.1 0.0 0 0 10 3 74
Mali 13 42 187.4 482.3 78 60 60 66 81
Mauritania 11 82 140.8 858.1 89 60 60 70 31
Mexico 8 58 16.7 15.5 67 60 90 72 83
Moldova 10 30 18.6 24.6 33 60 70 54 21
Mongolia 8 20 8.1 182.1 11 80 20 37 17
Morocco 5 11 12.3 718.6 100 40 70 70 101
Mozambique 14 153 95.8 14.5 72 80 40 64 141
Namibia 10 85 19.3 0.0 0 60 40 33 26
Nepal 7 21 74.1 0.0 22 20 90 44 90
Netherlands 7 11 13.2 66.2 28 60 40 43 16
New Zealand 2 12 0.2 0.0 11 0 10 7 0
Nicaragua 9 45 170.1 0.0 22 80 50 51 24
Niger 11 27 396.4 744.7 100 100 70 90 76
Nigeria 10 44 95.2 59.4 22 80 30 44 13
Norway 4 23 2.9 28.9 11 40 40 30 12
Oman 9 34 4.9 100.1 44 60 0 35 13

DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS 91
Starting a Business
Hiring and Firing Workers
January 2004
January 2004
Minimum Difficulty Rigidity Difficulty Rigidity of
Cost capital of hiring of hours of firing employment Firing
Number of Time (% of income (% of income index index index index costs
Economy procedures (days) per capita) per capita) (0–100) (0–100) (0–100) (0–100) (weeks)
Pakistan 11 24 36.0 0.0 78 40 30 49 90
Panama 7 19 25.1 0.0 78 40 70 63 47
Papua New Guinea 8 56 30.7 0.0 11 20 20 17 38
Paraguay 17 74 157.6 0.0 56 60 60 59 99
Peru 10 98 36.4 0.0 44 60 60 55 56
Philippines 11 50 19.5 2.2 22 60 40 41 90
Poland 10 31 20.6 237.9 11 60 30 34 25
Portugal 11 78 13.5 39.5 33 80 60 58 98
Puerto Rico 7 7 1.0 0.0 22 20 20 21 0
Romania 5 28 7.4 0.0 78 60 50 63 98
Russia 9 36 6.7 5.6 0 60 20 27 17
Rwanda 9 21 316.9 0.0 89 80 60 76 54
Saudi Arabia 12 64 69.7 1549.5 0 40 0 13 79
Senegal 9 57 112.9 270.4 61 60 70 64 38
Serbia and Montenegro 11 51 9.5 120.3 28 0 40 23 21
Sierra Leone 9 26 1268.4 0.0 78 80 70 76 188
Singapore 7 8 1.2 0.0 0 0 0 0 4
Slovak Republic 9 52 5.7 46.1 0 20 10 10 17
Slovenia 10 61 12.3 19.0 28 80 50 53 47
South Africa 9 38 9.1 0.0 56 40 60 52 38
Spain 7 108 16.5 16.9 67 80 60 69 68
Sri Lanka 8 50 10.7 0.0 0 40 80 40 108
Sweden 3 16 0.7 36.9 28 60 40 43 24
Switzerland 6 20 8.6 33.2 0 40 10 17 12
Syrian Arab Republic 12 47 34.2 5053.9 0 60 50 37 79
Taiwan, China 8 48 6.3 224.7 61 60 30 50 90
Tanzania 13 35 186.9 6.8 56 80 60 65 38
Thailand 8 33 6.7 0.0 67 40 20 42 47
Togo 13 53 229.4 485.7 89 80 60 76 84
Tunisia 9 14 11.0 327.3 61 0 100 54 29
Turkey 8 9 26.4 0.0 44 80 40 55 112
Uganda 17 36 131.3 0.0 0 20 0 7 12
Ukraine 15 34 17.6 113.9 33 80 80 64 94
United Arab Emirates 12 54 26.5 416.9 0 80 20 33 96
United Kingdom 6 18 0.9 0.0 11 40 10 20 25
United States 5 5 0.6 0.0 0 0 10 3 8
Uruguay 11 45 48.2 181.6 33 60 0 31 34
Uzbekistan 9 35 17.0 21.9 33 40 100 58 28
Venezuela, RB 13 116 15.0 0.0 78 80 10 56 83
Vietnam 11 56 28.6 0.0 56 40 70 55 98
Yemen, Rep. 12 63 269.3 1561.1 0 80 30 37 17
Zambia 6 35 22.8 2.7 0 40 40 27 47
Zimbabwe 10 96 304.7 53.0 11 40 20 24 29

92 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Registering Property
Getting Credit
January 2004
January 2004
Cost to Legal Credit Private
Cost create collateral rights information Public registry bureau
Number of Time (% of property (% of income index index coverage coverage
Economy procedures (days) value) per capita) (0–10) (0–6) (per 1,000 adults) (per 1,000 adults)
Albania 7 47 3.8 0.3 9 0 0 0
Algeria 16 52 9.0 0.4 3 0 0 0
Angola 8 335 11.0 6.9 3 4 7 0
Argentina 5 44 8.8 21.3 3 6 201 733
Armenia 4 18 0.9 0.9 4 . . . . 0
Australia 5 7 4.5 5.5 9 5 0 954
Austria 3 32 4.5 0.0 5 5 11 393
Azerbaijan 7 61 0.5 9.2 6 0 0 0
Bangladesh . . . . . . 21.3 . . 3 7 0
Belarus 7 231 0.2 3.6 5 3 . . 0
Belgium 2 132 12.8 6.4 7 6 533 0
Benin 3 50 15.1 80.7 4 2 2 0
Bhutan 4 44 1.0 0.6 . . 0 0 0
Bolivia 7 92 5.1 51.0 3 4 96 0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 7 331 6.1 15.2 5 4 0 156
Botswana 4 69 5.0 2.0 9 5 0 309
Brazil 14 42 2.0 21.4 2 6 78 425
Bulgaria 9 19 2.4 1.0 6 4 13 0
Burkina Faso 8 107 16.2 22.2 4 2 2 0
Burundi 5 94 18.1 38.3 . . 2 2 0
Cambodia 7 56 4.1 0.0 4 0 0 0
Cameroon 5 93 18.8 87.6 4 2 1 0
Canada 6 20 2.0 0.0 7 5 0 1000
Central African Republic 3 69 17.4 15.0 3 3 1 0
Chad 6 44 13.3 48.9 3 3 0 0
Chile 6 31 1.4 5.3 4 6 290 220
China 3 32 3.1 0.0 2 3 4 0
Colombia 7 23 3.6 38.9 4 4 0 300
Congo, Dem. Rep. 8 106 10.1 130.0 3 0 0 0
Congo, Rep. 6 103 22.5 151.1 3 3 1 0
Costa Rica 6 21 3.6 16.2 4 5 10 1000
Côte d’Ivoire 7 340 10.2 155.9 2 2 2 0
Croatia 5 956 2.5 6.1 4 0 0 0
Czech Republic 4 122 3.0 0.6 6 5 21 249
Denmark 6 42 0.6 16.4 7 3 0 71
Dominican Republic 7 107 6.3 38.4 4 5 . . 294
Ecuador 12 21 16.0 10.8 3 5 124 0
Egypt, Arab Rep. 7 193 7.0 52.7 0 3 102 0
El Salvador 5 52 3.5 5.0 5 5 198 823
Estonia 4 65 0.5 43.0 . . 5 0 95
Ethiopia 15 56 11.0 10.6 5 0 0 0
Finland 3 14 4.0 0.8 6 4 0 148
France 10 193 5.8 0.5 3 3 17 0
Georgia 8 39 2.5 30.0 7 0 0 0
Germany 4 41 4.2 0.0 8 6 6 856
Ghana 7 382 4.1 37.9 5 2 0 1

DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS 93
Registering Property
Getting Credit
January 2004
January 2004
Cost to Legal Credit Private
Cost create collateral rights information Public registry bureau
Number of Time (% of property (% of income index index coverage coverage
Economy procedures (days) value) per capita) (0–10) (0–6) (per 1,000 adults) (per 1,000 adults)
Greece 12 23 13.7 29.5 1 4 0 111
Guatemala 5 55 2.4 15.0 4 4 0 124
Guinea 6 104 15.7 31.7 2 2 0 0
Haiti 5 195 8.1 30.2 2 3 3 0
Honduras 7 36 8.8 36.6 5 3 61 0
Hong Kong, China 3 56 2.0 0.2 10 4 0 615
Hungary 4 79 6.8 13.5 5 3 0 33
India 6 67 13.9 11.3 4 0 0 0
Indonesia 6 33 11.0 2.5 5 3 4 0
Iran, Islamic Rep. 9 36 5.0 . . 5 2 . . 0
Ireland 5 38 10.3 3.2 8 5 0 1000
Israel 7 144 7.5 4.0 8 4 0 11
Italy 8 27 1.3 3.7 3 6 79 571
Jamaica 5 54 13.5 . . 6 0 0 0
Japan 6 14 4.1 2.7 6 6 0 615
Jordan 8 22 10.0 56.3 6 3 5 0
Kazakhstan 8 52 1.8 4.1 5 0 0 0
Kenya 7 39 4.0 3.3 8 4 0 1
Korea, Rep. 7 11 6.3 8.1 6 5 0 1000
Kuwait 8 75 1.0 0.1 5 4 0 166
Kyrgyz Republic 7 15 5.3 12.4 8 0 0 0
Lao PDR 9 135 1.1 3.8 2 0 . . 0
Latvia 10 62 2.1 1.5 8 4 6 0
Lebanon 8 25 5.9 2.2 4 4 31 0
Lesotho 6 101 9.1 44.5 . . 0 0 0
Lithuania 3 3 0.9 4.1 4 3 44 0
Macedonia, FYR 6 74 3.7 15.9 6 2 6 0
Madagascar . . . . . . 39.0 4 3 3 0
Malawi 6 118 3.5 . . . . 0 0 0
Malaysia 4 143 2.2 3.2 8 6 339 . .
Mali 5 44 20.6 58.5 3 2 1 0
Mauritania 4 49 8.5 5.6 7 1 2 0
Mexico 5 74 5.3 25.7 2 6 0 382
Moldova 5 81 1.3 1.5 6 0 0 0
Mongolia 4 10 0.4 2.0 5 3 23 0
Morocco 3 82 6.1 62.2 2 2 6 0
Mozambique 7 33 11.9 5.0 4 4 5 0
Namibia 9 28 9.7 28.3 . . 5 0 353
Nepal . . . . . . 2.4 4 3 1 0
Netherlands 4 5 6.4 0.0 9 5 0 645
New Zealand 2 2 0.2 0.0 9 5 0 978
Nicaragua 7 65 6.5 2.0 4 5 62 0
Niger 5 49 12.5 74.6 4 3 1 0
Nigeria 21 274 27.2 20.7 8 3 0 0
Norway 1 1 2.5 0.5 6 5 0 1000
Oman 4 16 3.0 20.9 3 0 0 0

94 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Registering Property
Getting Credit
January 2004
January 2004
Cost to Legal Credit Private
Cost create collateral rights information Public registry bureau
Number of Time (% of property (% of income index index coverage coverage
Economy procedures (days) value) per capita) (0–10) (0–6) (per 1,000 adults) (per 1,000 adults)
Pakistan 5 49 4.2 11.5 4 4 2 3
Panama 7 44 2.4 1.9 6 5 0 530
Papua New Guinea 4 72 5.2 2.9 . . 0 0 0
Paraguay 7 48 2.1 26.0 3 6 90 . .
Peru 5 31 3.2 16.0 2 6 143 271
Philippines 8 33 5.7 8.3 5 2 0 34
Poland 7 204 1.6 1.2 2 5 0 380
Portugal 5 83 7.3 10.2 5 5 637 79
Puerto Rico . . . . . . 0.1 6 5 0 643
Romania 8 170 1.9 1.1 4 3 4 0
Russia 6 37 0.8 11.6 3 0 0 0
Rwanda 5 354 9.5 . . 5 3 1 0
Saudi Arabia 4 4 0.0 0.0 . . 2 1 0
Senegal 6 114 34.0 16.5 3 2 3 0
Serbia and Montenegro 6 186 5.5 87.4 5 1 1 0
Sierra Leone 8 58 16.5 175.3 5 0 0 0
Singapore 3 9 1.5 0.3 10 4 0 335
Slovak Republic 5 22 3.1 20.1 9 3 6 0
Slovenia 6 391 2.0 3.2 6 3 25 0
South Africa 6 20 11.3 2.3 6 5 0 636
Spain 4 20 7.1 11.4 5 6 394 65
Sri Lanka 8 63 5.1 0.7 3 2 0 19
Sweden 1 2 3.0 15.0 6 4 0 980
Switzerland 4 16 1.4 0.0 6 5 0 233
Syrian Arab Republic 4 23 30.4 6.4 5 0 0 0
Taiwan, China 3 7 7.0 0.2 4 5 334 . .
Tanzania 12 61 12.6 21.3 5 0 0 0
Thailand 2 2 6.3 1.1 5 5 0 150
Togo 6 212 7.8 83.4 2 2 3 0
Tunisia 5 57 6.1 22.4 4 2 93 0
Turkey 8 9 3.3 19.9 1 4 32 300
Uganda 8 48 5.5 11.9 5 0 0 0
Ukraine 9 93 4.3 3.5 6 0 0 0
United Arab Emirates 3 9 2.1 9.4 4 2 18 0
United Kingdom 2 21 4.1 0.1 10 6 0 1000
United States 4 12 0.5 0.1 7 6 0 1000
Uruguay 8 66 7.1 28.6 4 5 72 756
Uzbekistan 12 97 11.8 1.0 5 0 0 0
Venezuela, RB 8 34 1.8 7.7 4 4 286 0
Vietnam 5 78 5.5 2.0 4 3 8 0
Yemen, Rep. 6 21 3.9 4.7 2 1 12 0
Zambia 6 70 9.2 19.2 6 0 0 0
Zimbabwe 4 30 18.1 2.4 7 0 0 0

DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS 95
Protecting Investors
Enforcing Contracts
Closing a Business
January 2004
January 2004
January 2004
Recovery rate
Disclosure index Number of Time Cost Time Cost (cents on
Economy (0–7) procedures (days) (% of debt) (years) (% of estate) the dollar)
Albania 3 39 390 28.6 4.0 38 24.6
Algeria 2 49 407 28.7 3.5 4 37.0
Angola 2 47 1011 9.2 4.7 18 1.2
Argentina 5 33 520 15.0 2.8 18 23.5
Armenia 3 24 195 17.8 1.9 4 39.6
Australia 6 11 157 14.4 1.0 8 80.0
Austria 6 20 374 9.8 1.0 18 72.5
Azerbaijan 2 25 267 19.8 2.7 8 33.2
Bangladesh 3 29 365 21.3 4.0 8 23.2
Belarus 1 28 250 20.7 5.8 4 11.9
Belgium 4 27 112 6.2 0.9 4 86.2
Benin 1 49 570 29.6 3.1 18 8.8
Bhutan 1 20 275 113.8
NO
NO
PRACTICE PRACTICE 0.0
Bolivia 2 47 591 10.6 1.8 18 32.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 36 330 19.6 3.3 8 32.1
Botswana 5 26 154 24.8 2.2 18 50.9
Brazil 5 25 566 15.5 10.0 8 0.2
Bulgaria 2 34 440 14.0 3.3 8 34.2
Burkina Faso 1 41 458 92.5 4.0 8 6.4
Burundi 1 51 512 35.0 4.0 18 16.4
Cambodia 0 31 401 121.3
NO
NO
PRACTICE PRACTICE 0.0
Cameroon 1 58 585 36.4 3.2 18 21.4
Canada 7 17 346 12.0 0.8 4 89.1
Central African Republic 1 45 660 72.2 4.8 76 0.0
Chad 1 52 526 54.9 10.0 76 0.0
Chile 6 28 305 10.4 5.6 18 19.3
China 4 25 241 25.5 2.4 18 35.2
Colombia 2 37 363 18.6 3.0 1 54.6
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 51 909 256.8 5.2 18 1.9
Congo, Rep. 3 47 560 43.0 3.0 38 10.3
Costa Rica 1 34 550 41.2 3.5 18 15.5
Côte d’Ivoire 2 25 525 47.6 2.2 18 14.8
Croatia 4 22 415 10.0 3.1 18 26.1
Czech Republic 6 22 300 9.6 9.2 18 16.8
Denmark 5 15 83 6.6 3.4 8 59.8
Dominican Republic 1 29 580 35.0 3.5 8 17.1
Ecuador 1 41 388 15.3 4.3 18 18.1
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2 55 410 18.4 4.2 18 18.4
El Salvador 1 41 275 12.5 4.0 8 24.9
Estonia 4 25 150 10.6 3.0 8 40.0
Ethiopia 2 30 420 14.8 2.4 8 40.0
Finland 5 27 240 7.2 0.9 1 90.2
France 6 21 75 11.7 1.9 8 46.6
Georgia 5 18 375 31.7 3.2 4 20.3
Germany 5 26 184 10.5 1.2 8 50.3

96 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Protecting Investors
Enforcing Contracts
Closing a Business
January 2004
January 2004
January 2004
Recovery rate
Disclosure index Number of Time Cost Time Cost (cents on
Economy (0–7) procedures (days) (% of debt) (years) (% of estate) the dollar)
Ghana 2 23 200 14.4 1.9 18 28.2
Greece 5 14 151 12.7 2.0 8 45.6
Guatemala 1 37 1459 14.5 4.0 18 18.3
Guinea 4 44 306 27.6 3.8 8 22.2
Haiti 1 35 368 25.0 5.7 38 1.5
Honduras 0 36 545 33.1 3.7 8 21.5
Hong Kong, China 6 16 211 12.9 1.1 8 82.3
Hungary 5 21 365 8.1 2.0 23 30.8
India 4 40 425 43.1 10.0 8 12.5
Indonesia 4 34 570 126.5 6.0 18 10.6
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2 23 545 12.0 4.5 8 19.1
Ireland 6 16 217 21.1 0.4 8 88.9
Israel 7 27 585 22.1 4.0 23 38.0
Italy 5 18 1390 17.6 1.2 18 43.5
Jamaica 2 18 202 27.8 1.1 18 63.5
Japan 6 16 60 8.6 0.5 4 92.4
Jordan 3 43 342 8.8 4.3 8 26.7
Kazakhstan 5 41 400 8.5 3.3 18 13.4
Kenya 2 25 360 41.3 4.5 18 14.7
Korea, Rep. 6 29 75 5.4 1.5 4 81.1
Kuwait 1 52 390 13.3 4.2 1 38.7
Kyrgyz Republic 3 46 492 47.9 3.5 4 24.4
Lao PDR 1 53 443 30.3 5.0 76 0.0
Latvia 5 23 189 11.0 1.1 4 85.0
Lebanon 1 39 721 26.7 4.0 18 19.3
Lesotho 4 49 285 23.9 2.6 8 33.0
Lithuania 6 17 154 14.1 1.2 8 52.4
Macedonia, FYR 4 27 509 32.8 3.7 38 7.9
no no
Madagascar 1 29 280 22.8 practice practice 0.0
Malawi 2 16 277 136.5 2.6 8 17.6
Malaysia 5 31 300 20.2 2.3 18 35.4
Mali 1 28 340 34.6 3.6 18 6.3
Mauritania 1 28 410 29.3 8.0 8 6.1
Mexico 5 37 421 20.0 1.8 18 64.5
Moldova 3 37 280 16.2 2.8 8 29.3
Mongolia 3 26 314 22.6 4.0 8 16.5
Morocco 4 17 240 17.7 1.8 18 34.8
Mozambique 2 38 580 16.0 5.0 8 12.3
Namibia 1 31 270 28.3 1.0 4 53.7
Nepal 3 28 350 25.8 5.0 8 25.8
Netherlands 5 22 48 17.0 1.7 1 86.2
New Zealand 5 19 50 4.8 2.0 4 71.4
Nicaragua 1 18 155 16.3 2.2 8 38.1
Niger 1 33 330 42.0 5.0 18 2.6
Nigeria 6 23 730 37.2 1.5 18 33.2
Norway 5 14 87 4.2 0.9 1 87.9

DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS 97
Protecting Investors
Enforcing Contracts
Closing a Business
January 2004
January 2004
January 2004
Recovery rate
Disclosure index Number of Time Cost Time Cost (cents on
Economy (0–7) procedures (days) (% of debt) (years) (% of estate) the dollar)
Oman 1 41 455 10.0 7.0 4 23.6
Pakistan 4 46 395 35.2 2.8 4 38.1
Panama 1 45 355 37.0 2.0 38 18.2
Papua New Guinea 4 22 295 110.3 2.8 38 34.2
Paraguay 4 46 285 30.4 3.9 8 8.7
Peru 4 35 441 34.7 3.1 8 31.1
Philippines 6 25 380 50.7 5.6 38 3.8
Poland 4 41 1000 8.7 1.4 18 68.2
Portugal 5 24 320 17.5 2.5 8 69.9
Puerto Rico .. 43 270 21.0 3.8 8 61.4
Romania 2 43 335 12.4 4.6 8 6.9
Russia 3 29 330 20.3 1.5 4 48.4
Rwanda 1 29 395 49.5
NO
NO
PRACTICE PRACTICE 0.0
Saudi Arabia 2 44 360 20.0 2.8 18 31.7
Senegal 1 36 485 23.8 3.0 8 18.8
Serbia and Montenegro 3 36 1028 23.0 2.6 23 20.8
Sierra Leone 1 58 305 31.0 2.5 38 12.1
Singapore 5 23 69 9.0 0.8 1 91.3
Slovak Republic 6 27 565 15.0 4.7 18 39.6
Slovenia 4 25 1003 16.3 3.6 18 23.6
South Africa 6 26 277 11.5 2.0 18 31.8
Spain 7 23 169 14.1 1.0 8 83.4
Sri Lanka 4 17 440 21.3 2.2 18 33.1
Sweden 6 23 208 5.9 2.0 8 73.2
Switzerland 5 22 170 5.2 4.6 4 37.0
Syrian Arab Republic 1 48 672 34.3 4.1 8 29.2
Taiwan, China 6 22 210 7.7 0.8 4 89.6
Tanzania 1 21 242 35.3 3.0 23 21.3
Thailand 6 26 390 13.4 2.6 38 42.0
Togo 2 37 535 24.3 3.0 18 14.5
Tunisia 6 14 27 12.0 1.3 8 50.1
Turkey 2 22 330 12.5 2.9 8 25.7
Uganda 2 15 209 22.3 2.1 38 35.5
Ukraine 3 28 269 11.0 2.6 18 25.5
United Arab Emirates 2 53 614 16.0 5.1 38 4.7
United Kingdom 7 14 288 15.7 1.0 6 85.8
United States 7 17 250 7.5 3.0 8 68.2
Uruguay 1 39 620 25.8 2.1 8 21.9
Uzbekistan 4 35 368 18.1 4.0 4 12.5
Venezuela, RB 1 41 445 28.7 4.0 38 4.9
Vietnam 1 37 404 30.1 5.5 18 16.4
Yemen, Rep. .. 37 360 10.5 3.0 8 28.6
Zambia 1 16 274 28.7 2.7 8 19.4
Zimbabwe 6 33 350 19.1 2.2 18 9.2

98 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
ALBANIA GNI per capita (US$) 1,740 Population (m) 3.2
Europe and Central Asia
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 3
Time (days) 47 Time (days) 47
Cost (% of income per capita) 32.2 Cost (% of property value) 3.8 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 41.3 Number of procedures 39
Getting Credit Time (days) 390
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.3 Cost (% of debt) 28.6
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 9
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0
Rigidity of employment index 30 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0
Firing costs (weeks) 55 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 24.6
ALGERIA GNI per capita (US$) 1,890 Population (m) 31.8
Middle East & North Africa
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 14 Number of procedures 16 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 26 Time (days) 52
Cost (% of income per capita) 27.3 Cost (% of property value) 9.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 65.5 Number of procedures 49
Getting Credit Time (days) 407
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.4 Cost (% of debt) 28.7
Difficulty of hiring index 56 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.5
Rigidity of employment index 55 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 37.0
ANGOLA GNI per capita (US$) 740 Population (m) 13.5
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 14 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 146 Time (days) 335
Cost (% of income per capita) 884.6 Cost (% of property value) 11.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 64.4 Number of procedures 47
Getting Credit Time (days) 1011
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 6.9 Cost (% of debt) 9.2
Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 100 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 7 Time of insolvency (years) 4.7
Rigidity of employment index 75 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 116 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 1.2
ARGENTINA GNI per capita (US$) 3,650 Population (m) 38.4
Latin America & Caribbean
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 15 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 32 Time (days) 44
Cost (% of income per capita) 15.7 Cost (% of property value) 8.8 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 8.1 Number of procedures 33
Getting Credit Time (days) 44
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 21.3 Cost (% of debt) 15.0
Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 201 Time of insolvency (years) 2.8
Rigidity of employment index 51 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 733 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 94 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 23.5

COUNTRY TABLES 99
ARMENIA GNI per capita (US$) 950 Population (m) 3.1
Europe & Central Asia
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 3
Time (days) 25 Time (days) 18
Cost (% of income per capita) 7.0 Cost (% of property value) 0.9 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 4.5 Number of procedures 24
Getting Credit Time (days) 195
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.9 Cost (% of debt) 17.8
Difficulty of hiring index 17 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index . . Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) . . Time of insolvency (years) 1.9
Rigidity of employment index 36 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 39.6
AUSTRALIA GNI per capita (US$) 21,650 Population (m) 19.9
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 2 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 2 Time (days) 7
Cost (% of income per capita) 2.1 Cost (% of property value) 4.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 11
Getting Credit Time (days) 157
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 5.5 Cost (% of debt) 14.4
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 9
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.0
Rigidity of employment index 17 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 954 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 80.0
AUSTRIA GNI per capita (US$) 26,720 Population (m) 8.1
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 29 Time (days) 32
Cost (% of income per capita) 6.0 Cost (% of property value) 4.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 64.1 Number of procedures 20
Getting Credit Time (days) 374
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 9.8
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 11 Time of insolvency (years) 1.0
Rigidity of employment index 40 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 393 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 55 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 72.5
AZERBAIJAN GNI per capita (US$) 810 Population (m) 8.2
Europe & Central Asia
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 14 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 123 Time (days) 61
Cost (% of income per capita) 14.7 Cost (% of property value) 0.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 25
Getting Credit Time (days) 267
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 9.2 Cost (% of debt) 19.8
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.7
Rigidity of employment index 38 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 42 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 33.2

100 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
BANGLADESH GNI per capita (US$) 400 Population (m) 138.1
South Asia
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures . . Disclosure Index 3
Time (days) 35 Time (days) . .
Cost (% of income per capita) 91.0 Cost (% of property value) . . Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 29
Getting Credit Time (days) 365
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 21.3 Cost (% of debt) 21.3
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . .
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 7 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0
Rigidity of employment index 24 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 23.2
BELARUS GNI per capita (US$) 1,590 Population (m) 9.9
Europe & Central Asia
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 16 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 79 Time (days) 231
Cost (% of income per capita) 25.3 Cost (% of property value) 0.2 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 44.3 Number of procedures 28
Getting Credit Time (days) 250
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.6 Cost (% of debt) 20.7
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) .. Time of insolvency (years) 5.8
Rigidity of employment index 54 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 21 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 11.9
BELGIUM GNI per capita (US$) 25,820 Population (m) 10.3
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 4 Number of procedures 2 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 34 Time (days) 132
Cost (% of income per capita) 11.3 Cost (% of property value) 12.8 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 14.1 Number of procedures 27
Getting Credit Time (days) 112
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 6.4 Cost (% of debt) 6.2
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 7
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 533 Time of insolvency (years) 0.9
Rigidity of employment index 20 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 8 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 86.2
BENIN GNI per capita (US$) 440 Population (m) 6.7
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 32 Time (days) 50
Cost (% of income per capita) 196.9 Cost (% of property value) 15.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 333.4 Number of procedures 49
Getting Credit Time (days) 570
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 80.7 Cost (% of debt) 29.6
Difficulty of hiring index 72 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 2 Time of insolvency (years) 3.1
Rigidity of employment index 61 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 54 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 8.8

COUNTRY TABLES 101
BHUTAN GNI per capita (US$) 660 Population (m) 0.9
South Asia
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 62 Time (days) 44
Cost (% of income per capita) 11.0 Cost (% of property value) 1.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 20
Getting Credit Time (days) 275
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.6 Cost (% of debt) 113.8
Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . .
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) no practice
Rigidity of employment index 49 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) no practice
Firing costs (weeks) 94 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.0
BOLIVIA GNI per capita (US$) 890 Population (m) 9.0
Latin America & Caribbean
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 15 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 59 Time (days) 92
Cost (% of income per capita) 173.9 Cost (% of property value) 5.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 4.6 Number of procedures 47
Getting Credit Time (days) 591
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 51.0 Cost (% of debt) 10.6
Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 96 Time of insolvency (years) 1.8
Rigidity of employment index 40 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 98 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 32.5
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA GNI per capita (US$) 1,540 Population (m) 4.1
Europe & Central Asia
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 54 Time (days) 331
Cost (% of income per capita) 46.2 Cost (% of property value) 6.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 65.0 Number of procedures 36
Getting Credit Time (days) 330
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 15.2 Cost (% of debt) 19.6
Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.3
Rigidity of employment index 49 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 156 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 33 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 32.1
BOTSWANA GNI per capita (US$) 3,430 Population (m) 1.7
Sub-Saharan Africa
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 108 Time (days) 69
Cost (% of income per capita) 11.3 Cost (% of property value) 5.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 26
Getting Credit Time (days) 154
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.0 Cost (% of debt) 24.8
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 9
Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.2
Rigidity of employment index 20 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 309 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 19 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 50.9

102 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
BRAZIL GNI per capita (US$) 2,710 Population (m) 176.6
Latin America & Caribbean
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 17 Number of procedures 14 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 152 Time (days) 42
Cost (% of income per capita) 11.7 Cost (% of property value) 2.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 25
Getting Credit Time (days) 566
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 21.4 Cost (% of debt) 15.5
Difficulty of hiring index 67 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 78 Time of insolvency (years) 10.0
Rigidity of employment index 72 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 425 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 165 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.2
BULGARIA GNI per capita (US$) 2,130 Population (m) 7.8
Europe & Central Asia
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 9 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 32 Time (days) 19
Cost (% of income per capita) 10.3 Cost (% of property value) 2.4 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 116.6 Number of procedures 34
Getting Credit Time (days) 440
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.0 Cost (% of debt) 14.0
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 13 Time of insolvency (years) 3.3
Rigidity of employment index 28 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 30 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 34.2
BURKINA FASO GNI per capita (US$) 300 Population (m) 12.1
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 135 Time (days) 107
Cost (% of income per capita) 152.8 Cost (% of property value) 16.2 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 498.6 Number of procedures 41
Getting Credit Time (days) 458
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 22.2 Cost (% of debt) 92.5
Difficulty of hiring index 100 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 100 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 2 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0
Rigidity of employment index 90 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 80 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 6.4
BURUNDI GNI per capita (US$) 100 Population (m) 7.2
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 43 Time (days) 94
Cost (% of income per capita) 191.5 Cost (% of property value) 18.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 51
Getting Credit Time (days) 512
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 38.3 Cost (% of debt) 35.0
Difficulty of hiring index 50 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . .
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 2 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0
Rigidity of employment index 50 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 41 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 16.4

COUNTRY TABLES 103
CAMBODIA GNI per capita (US$) 310 Population (m) 13.4
East Asia & Pacific
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 0
Time (days) 94 Time (days) 56
Cost (% of income per capita) 480.1 Cost (% of property value) 4.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 394.0 Number of procedures 31
Getting Credit Time (days) 401
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 121.3
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) no practice
Rigidity of employment index 48 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) no practice
Firing costs (weeks) 39 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.0
CAMEROON GNI per capita (US$) 640 Population (m) 16.1
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 37 Time (days) 93
Cost (% of income per capita) 182.5 Cost (% of property value) 18.8 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 232.0 Number of procedures 58
Getting Credit Time (days) 585
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 87.6 Cost (% of debt) 36.4
Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 80 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 3.2
Rigidity of employment index 74 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 46 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 21.4
CANADA GNI per capita (US$) 23,930 Population (m) 31.6
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 2 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 7
Time (days) 3 Time (days) 20
Cost (% of income per capita) 1.0 Cost (% of property value) 2.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 17
Getting Credit Time (days) 346
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 12.0
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 7
Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 0.8
Rigidity of employment index 4 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1000 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 28 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 89.1
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC GNI per capita (US$) 260 Population (m) 3.9
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 14 Time (days) 69
Cost (% of income per capita) 204.5 Cost (% of property value) 17.4 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 559.2 Number of procedures 45
Getting Credit Time (days) 660
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 15.0 Cost (% of debt) 72.2
Difficulty of hiring index 89 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 4.8
Rigidity of employment index 76 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 76.0
Firing costs (weeks) 37 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.0

104 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
CHAD GNI per capita (US$) 250 Population (m) 8.6
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 19 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 75 Time (days) 44
Cost (% of income per capita) 344.2 Cost (% of property value) 13.3 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 610.4 Number of procedures 52
Getting Credit Time (days) 526
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 48.9 Cost (% of debt) 54.9
Difficulty of hiring index 100 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 10.0
Rigidity of employment index 80 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 76.0
Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.0
CHILE GNI per capita (US$) 4,390 Population (m) 15.8
Latin America & Caribbean
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 28 Time (days) 31
Cost (% of income per capita) 10.0 Cost (% of property value) 1.4 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 28
Getting Credit Time (days) 305
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 5.3 Cost (% of debt) 10.4
Difficulty of hiring index 17 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 290 Time of insolvency (years) 5.6
Rigidity of employment index 19 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 220 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 51 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 19.3
CHINA GNI per capita (US$) 1,100 Population (m) 1288.4
East Asia & Pacific
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 41 Time (days) 32
Cost (% of income per capita) 14.5 Cost (% of property value) 3.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 1104.2 Number of procedures 25
Getting Credit Time (days) 241
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 25.5
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 4 Time of insolvency (years) 2.4
Rigidity of employment index 30 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 35.2
COLUMBIA GNI per capita (US$) 1,810 Population (m) 44.6
Latin America & Caribbean
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 14 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 43 Time (days) 23
Cost (% of income per capita) 27.4 Cost (% of property value) 3.6 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 37
Getting Credit Time (days) 363
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 38.9 Cost (% of debt) 18.6
Difficulty of hiring index 72 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0
Rigidity of employment index 51 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 300 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 1.0
Firing costs (weeks) 49 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 54.6

COUNTRY TABLES 105
CONGO, DEM. REP GNI per capita (US$) 100 Population (m) 53.2
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 155 Time (days) 106
Cost (% of income per capita) 556.8 Cost (% of property value) 10.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 246.8 Number of procedures 51
Getting Credit Time (days) 909
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 130.0 Cost (% of debt) 256.8
Difficulty of hiring index 72 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 100 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 5.2
Rigidity of employment index 77 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 62 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 1.9
CONGO, REP. GNI per capita (US$) 640 Population (m) 3.8
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 3
Time (days) 67 Time (days) 103
Cost (% of income per capita) 317.6 Cost (% of property value) 22.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 244.6 Number of procedures 47
Getting Credit Time (days) 560
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 151.1 Cost (% of debt) 43.0
Difficulty of hiring index 89 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 90 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0
Rigidity of employment index 86 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0
Firing costs (weeks) 42 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 10.3
COSTA RICA GNI per capita (US$) 4,280 Population (m) 4.0
Latin America & Caribbean
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 77 Time (days) 21
Cost (% of income per capita) 25.7 Cost (% of property value) 3.6 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 34
Getting Credit Time (days) 550
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 16.2 Cost (% of debt) 41.2
Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 10 Time of insolvency (years) 3.5
Rigidity of employment index 35 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1000 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 38 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 15.5
COTE D’IVOIRE GNI per capita (US$) 660 Population (m) 16.8
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index . .
Time (days) 58 Time (days) 340
Cost (% of income per capita) 133.6 Cost (% of property value) 10.2 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 222.3 Number of procedures 34
Getting Credit Time (days) 525
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 155.9 Cost (% of debt) 47.6
Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2
Rigidity of hours index 100 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 2 Time of insolvency (years) 2.2
Rigidity of employment index 69 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 92 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 14.8

106 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
CROATIA GNI per capita (US$) 5,350 Population (m) 4.5
Europe & Central Asia
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 49 Time (days) 956
Cost (% of income per capita) 14.4 Cost (% of property value) 2.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 24.4 Number of procedures 22
Getting Credit Time (days) 415
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 6.1 Cost (% of debt) 10.0
Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.1
Rigidity of employment index 57 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 55 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 26.1
CZECH REPUBLIC GNI per capita (US$) 6,740 Population (m) 10.2
Europe & Central Asia
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 40 Time (days) 122
Cost (% of income per capita) 10.8 Cost (% of property value) 3.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 44.5 Number of procedures 22
Getting Credit Time (days) 300
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.6 Cost (% of debt) 9.6
Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 21 Time of insolvency (years) 9.2
Rigidity of employment index 28 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 249 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 22 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 16.8
DENMARK GNI per capita (US$) 33,750 Population (m) 5.4
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 4 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 4 Time (days) 42
Cost (% of income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of property value) 0.6 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 48.8 Number of procedures 15
Getting Credit Time (days) 83
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 16.4 Cost (% of debt) 6.6
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 7
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.4
Rigidity of employment index 17 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 71 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 39 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 59.8
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC GNI per capita (US$) 2,070 Population (m) 8.7
Latin America & Caribbean
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 78 Time (days) 107
Cost (% of income per capita) 25.4 Cost (% of property value) 6.3 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 1.9 Number of procedures 29
Getting Credit Time (days) 580
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 38.4 Cost (% of debt) 35.0
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) . . Time of insolvency (years) 3.5
Rigidity of employment index 40 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 294 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 70 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 17.1

COUNTRY TABLES 107
ECUADOR GNI per capita (US$) 1,790 Population (m) 13.0
Latin America & Caribbean
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 14 Number of procedures 12 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 92 Time (days) 21
Cost (% of income per capita) 47.4 Cost (% of property value) 16.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 10.4 Number of procedures 41
Getting Credit Time (days) 388
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 10.8 Cost (% of debt) 15.3
Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 124 Time of insolvency (years) 4.3
Rigidity of employment index 51 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 131 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 18.1
EGYPT, ARAB REP GNI per capita (US$) 1,390 Population (m) 67.6
Middle East & North Africa
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 43 Time (days) 193
Cost (% of income per capita) 63.0 Cost (% of property value) 7.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 815.6 Number of procedures 55
Getting Credit Time (days) 410
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 52.7 Cost (% of debt) 18.4
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 0
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 80 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 102 Time of insolvency (years) 4.2
Rigidity of employment index 53 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 162 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 18.4
EL SALVADOR GNI per capita (US$) 2,200 Population (m) 6.5
Latin America & Caribbean
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 115 Time (days) 52
Cost (% of income per capita) 128.0 Cost (% of property value) 3.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 132.5 Number of procedures 41
Getting Credit Time (days) 275
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 5.0 Cost (% of debt) 12
Difficulty of hiring index 67 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 198 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0
Rigidity of employment index 52 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 823 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 110 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 24.9
ESTONIA GNI per capita (US$) 4,960 Population (m) 1.4
Europe & Central Asia
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 6 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 72 Time (days) 65
Cost (% of income per capita) 7.5 Cost (% of property value) 0.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 49.7 Number of procedures 25
Getting Credit Time (days) 150
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 43.0 Cost (% of debt) 10.6
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . .
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0
Rigidity of employment index 44 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 95 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 33 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 40.0

108 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
ETHIOPIA GNI per capita (US$) 90 Population (m) 68.6
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 15 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 32 Time (days) 56
Cost (% of income per capita) 77.4 Cost (% of property value) 11.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 1821.9 Number of procedures 30
Getting Credit Time (days) 420
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 10.6 Cost (% of debt) 14.8
Difficulty of hiring index 50 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.4
Rigidity of employment index 43 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 48 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 40.0
FINLAND GNI per capita (US$) 27,020 Population (m) 5.2
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 3 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 14 Time (days) 14
Cost (% of income per capita) 1.2 Cost (% of property value) 4.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 29.3 Number of procedures 27
Getting Credit Time (days) 240
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.8 Cost (% of debt) 7.2
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 0.9
Rigidity of employment index 44 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 148 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 1.0
Firing costs (weeks) 24 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 90.2
FRANCE GNI per capita (US$) 24,770 Population (m) 59.7
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 10 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 8 Time (days) 193
Cost (% of income per capita) 1.1 Cost (% of property value) 5.8 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 21
Getting Credit Time (days) 75
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.5 Cost (% of debt) 11.7
Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 17 Time of insolvency (years) 1.9
Rigidity of employment index 66 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 32 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 46.6
GEORGIA GNI per capita (US$) 830 Population (m) 4.6
Europe & Central Asia
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 25 Time (days) 39
Cost (% of income per capita) 13.7 Cost (% of property value) 2.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 54.5 Number of procedures 18
Getting Credit Time (days) 375
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 30.0 Cost (% of debt) 31.7
Difficulty of hiring index 17 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 7
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.2
Rigidity of employment index 49 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 21 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 20.3

COUNTRY TABLES 109
GERMANY GNI per capita (US$) 25,250 Population (m) 82.6
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 45 Time (days) 41
Cost (% of income per capita) 5.9 Cost (% of property value) 4.2 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 48.8 Number of procedures 26
Getting Credit Time (days) 184
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 10.5
Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 6 Time of insolvency (years) 1.2
Rigidity of employment index 55 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 856 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 80 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 50.3
GHANA GNI per capita (US$) 320 Population (m) 20.4
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 85 Time (days) 382
Cost (% of income per capita) 87.5 Cost (% of property value) 4.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 31.4 Number of procedures 23
Getting Credit Time (days) 200
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 37.9 Cost (% of debt) 14.4
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.9
Rigidity of employment index 34 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 25 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 28.2
GREECE GNI per capita (US$) 13,720 Population (m) 10.7
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 15 Number of procedures 12 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 38 Time (days) 23
Cost (% of income per capita) 35.2 Cost (% of property value) 13.7 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 125.7 Number of procedures 14
Getting Credit Time (days) 151
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 29.5 Cost (% of debt) 12.7
Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 1
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.0
Rigidity of employment index 66 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 111 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 133 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 45.6
GUATEMALA GNI per capita (US$) 1,910 Population (m) 12.3
Latin America & Caribbean
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 15 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 39 Time (days) 55
Cost (% of income per capita) 62.8 Cost (% of property value) 2.4 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 31.8 Number of procedures 37
Getting Credit Time (days) 1459
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 15.0 Cost (% of debt) 14.5
Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0
Rigidity of employment index 40 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 124 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 170 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 18.3

110 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
GUINEA GNI per capita (US$) 430 Population (m) 7.9
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 49 Time (days) 104
Cost (% of income per capita) 208.2 Cost (% of property value) 15.7 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 475.4 Number of procedures 44
Getting Credit Time (days) 306
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 31.7 Cost (% of debt) 27.6
Difficulty of hiring index 67 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.8
Rigidity of employment index 59 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 133 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 22.2
HAITI GNI per capita (US$) 380 Population (m) 8.4
Latin America & Caribbean
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 203 Time (days) 195
Cost (% of income per capita) 176.1 Cost (% of property value) 8.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 182.4 Number of procedures 35
Getting Credit Time (days) 368
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 30.2 Cost (% of debt) 25.0
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 3 Time of insolvency (years) 5.7
Rigidity of employment index 24 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0
Firing costs (weeks) 26 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 1.5
HONDURAS GNI per capita (US$) 970 Population (m) 7.0
Latin America & Caribbean
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 0
Time (days) 62 Time (days) 36
Cost (% of income per capita) 72.9 Cost (% of property value) 8.8 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 37.0 Number of procedures 36
Getting Credit Time (days) 545
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 36.6 Cost (% of debt) 33.1
Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 61 Time of insolvency (years) 3.7
Rigidity of employment index 31 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 46 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 21.5
HONG KONG, CHINA GNI per capita (US$) 25,430 Population (m) 6.8
East Asia & Pacific
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 5 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 11 Time (days) 56
Cost (% of income per capita) 3.4 Cost (% of property value) 2.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 16
Getting Credit Time (days) 211
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.2 Cost (% of debt) 12.9
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 10
Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.0
Rigidity of employment index 0 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 615 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 13 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 82.3

COUNTRY TABLES 111
HUNGARY GNI per capita (US$) 6,330 Population (m) 10.1
Europe & Central Asia
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 6 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 52 Time (days) 79
Cost (% of income per capita) 22.9 Cost (% of property value) 6.8 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 86.4 Number of procedures 21
Getting Credit Time (days) 365
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 13.5 Cost (% of debt) 8.1
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.0
Rigidity of employment index 40 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 33 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 23.0
Firing costs (weeks) 34 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 30.8
INDIA GNI per capita (US$) 530 Population (m) 1063.7
South Asia
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 89 Time (days) 67
Cost (% of income per capita) 49.5 Cost (% of property value) 13.9 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 40
Getting Credit Time (days) 425
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 11.3 Cost (% of debt) 43.1
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 90 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 10.0
Rigidity of employment index 48 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 79 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 12.5
INDONESIA GNI per capita (US$) 810 Population (m) 214.5
East Asia & Pacific
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 151 Time (days) 33
Cost (% of income per capita) 130.7 Cost (% of property value) 11.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 125.6 Number of procedures 34
Getting Credit Time (days) 570
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.5 Cost (% of debt) 126.5
Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 4 Time of insolvency (years) 6.0
Rigidity of employment index 57 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 157 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 10.6
IRAN, ISLAMIC REP. GNI per capita (US$) 2,000 Population (m) 66.5
Middle East & North Africa
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 9 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 48 Time (days) 36
Cost (% of income per capita) 7.3 Cost (% of property value) 5.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 2.1 Number of procedures 23
Getting Credit Time (days) 545
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) . . Cost (% of debt) 12.0
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) . . Time of insolvency (years) 4.5
Rigidity of employment index 40 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 122 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 19.1

112 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
IRELAND GNI per capita (US$) 26,960 Population (m) 3.9
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 4 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 24 Time (days) 38
Cost (% of income per capita) 10.3 Cost (% of property value) 10.3 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 16
Getting Credit Time (days) 217
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.2 Cost (% of debt) 21.1
Difficulty of hiring index 28 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 0.4
Rigidity of employment index 29 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1000 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 0.1
Firing costs (weeks) 52 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 88.9
ISRAEL GNI per capita (US$) 16,020 Population (m) 6.7
Middle East & North Africa
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 5 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 7
Time (days) 34 Time (days) 144
Cost (% of income per capita) 5.5 Cost (% of property value) 7.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 27
Getting Credit Time (days) 585
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 4.0 Cost (% of debt) 22.1
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0
Rigidity of employment index 33 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 11 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 23.0
Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 38.0
ITALY GNI per capita (US$) 21,560 Population (m) 57.6
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 13 Time (days) 27
Cost (% of income per capita) 16.2 Cost (% of property value) 1.3 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 11.2 Number of procedures 18
Getting Credit Time (days) 1390
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.7 Cost (% of debt) 17.6
Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 79 Time of insolvency (years) 1.2
Rigidity of employment index 50 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 571 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 43.5
JAMAICA GNI per capita (US$) 2,760 Population (m) 2.6
Latin America & Caribbean
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 31 Time (days) 54
Cost (% of income per capita) 15.4 Cost (% of property value) 13.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 18
Getting Credit Time (days) 202
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) . . Cost (% of debt) 27.8
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.1
Rigidity of employment index 10 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 12 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 63.5

COUNTRY TABLES 113
JAPAN GNI per capita (US$) 34,510 Population (m) 127.2
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 31 Time (days) 14
Cost (% of income per capita) 10.6 Cost (% of property value) 4.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 74.9 Number of procedures 16
Getting Credit Time (days) 60
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.7 Cost (% of debt) 8.6
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 0.5
Rigidity of employment index 24 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 615 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 21 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 92.4
JORDAN GNI per capita (US$) 1,850 Population (m) 5.3
Middle East & North Africa
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 3
Time (days) 36 Time (days) 22
Cost (% of income per capita) 52.0 Cost (% of property value) 10.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 1147.7 Number of procedures 43
Getting Credit Time (days) 342
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 56.3 Cost (% of debt) 8.8
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 5 Time of insolvency (years) 4.3
Rigidity of employment index 34 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 26.7
KAZAKHSTAN GNI per capita (US$) 1,780 Population (m) 14.9
Europe & Central Asia
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 25 Time (days) 52
Cost (% of income per capita) 10.5 Cost (% of property value) 1.8 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 32.7 Number of procedures 41
Getting Credit Time (days) 400
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 4.1 Cost (% of debt) 8.5
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.3
Rigidity of employment index 27 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 13.4
KENYA GNI per capita (US$) 390 Population (m) 31.9
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 47 Time (days) 39
Cost (% of income per capita) 53.4 Cost (% of property value) 4.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 25
Getting Credit Time (days) 360
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.3 Cost (% of debt) 41.3
Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8
Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.5
Rigidity of employment index 24 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 14.7

114 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
KOREA, REP. GNI per capita (US$) 12,020 Population (m) 48.0
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 22 Time (days) 11
Cost (% of income per capita) 17.7 Cost (% of property value) 6.3 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 332.0 Number of procedures 29
Getting Credit Time (days) 75
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 8.1 Cost (% of debt) 5.4
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.5
Rigidity of employment index 34 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1000 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 81.1
KUWAIT GNI per capita (US$) 16,340 Population (m) 2.4
Middle East & North Africa
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 35 Time (days) 75
Cost (% of income per capita) 2.4 Cost (% of property value) 1.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 148.5 Number of procedures 52
Getting Credit Time (days) 390
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.1 Cost (% of debt) 13.3
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.2
Rigidity of employment index 20 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 166 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 1.0
Firing costs (weeks) 42 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 38.7
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC GNI per capita (US$) 330 Population (m) 5.1
Europe & Central Asia
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 3
Time (days) 21 Time (days) 15
Cost (% of income per capita) 11.6 Cost (% of property value) 5.3 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.6 Number of procedures 46
Getting Credit Time (days) 492
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 12.4 Cost (% of debt) 47.9
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.5
Rigidity of employment index 38 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 21 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 24.4
LAO PDR GNI per capita (US$) 320 Population (m) 5.7
East Asia & Pacific
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 9 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 198 Time (days) 13.5
Cost (% of income per capita) 18.5 Cost (% of property value) 1.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 28.5 Number of procedures 53
Getting Credit Time (days) 443
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.8 Cost (% of debt) 30.3
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 80 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) . . Time of insolvency (years) 5.0
Rigidity of employment index 50 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 76.0
Firing costs (weeks) 185 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.0

COUNTRY TABLES 115
LATVIA GNI per capita (US$) 4,070 Population (m) 2.3
Europe & Central Asia
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 10 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 18 Time (days) 62
Cost (% of income per capita) 17.6 Cost (% of property value) 2.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 41.4 Number of procedures 23
Getting Credit Time (days) 189
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.5 Cost (% of debt) 11.0
Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8
Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 6 Time of insolvency (years) 1.1
Rigidity of employment index 49 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 42 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 85.0
LEBANON GNI per capita (US$) 4,040 Population (m) 4.5
Middle East & North Africa
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 6 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 46 Time (days) 25
Cost (% of income per capita) 131.5 Cost (% of property value) 5.9 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 82.3 Number of procedures 39
Getting Credit Time (days) 721
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.2 Cost (% of debt) 26.7
Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 31 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0
Rigidity of employment index 28 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 103 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 19.3
LESOTHO GNI per capita (US$) 590 Population (m) 1.8
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 92 Time (days) 101
Cost (% of income per capita) 58.4 Cost (% of property value) 9.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 17.7 Number of procedures 49
Getting Credit Time (days) 285
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) . . Cost (% of debt) 23.9
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . .
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.6
Rigidity of employment index 27 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 33.0
LITHUANIA GNI per capita (US$) 4,490 Population (m) 3.5
Europe & Central Asia
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 26 Time (days) 3
Cost (% of income per capita) 3.7 Cost (% of property value) 0.9 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 62.8 Number of procedures 17
Getting Credit Time (days) 154
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 4.1 Cost (% of debt) 14.1
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 44 Time of insolvency (years) 1.2
Rigidity of employment index 41 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 34 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 52.4

116 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
MACEDONIA, FYR GNI per capita (US$) 1,980 Population (m) 2.0
Europe & Central Asia
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 48 Time (days) 74
Cost (% of income per capita) 11.6 Cost (% of property value) 3.7 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 89.5 Number of procedures 27
Getting Credit Time (days) 509
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 15.9 Cost (% of debt) 32.8
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 6 Time of insolvency (years) 3.7
Rigidity of employment index 38 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0
Firing costs (weeks) 38 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 7.9
MADAGASCAR GNI per capita (US$) 290 Population (m) 16.9
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures . . Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 44 Time (days) . .
Cost (% of income per capita) 65.3 Cost (% of property value) . . Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 50.7 Number of procedures 29
Getting Credit Time (days) 280
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 39.0 Cost (% of debt) 22.8
Difficulty of hiring index 28 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 3 Time of insolvency (years) no practice
Rigidity of employment index 49 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) no practice
Firing costs (weeks) 41 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.0
MALAWI GNI per capita (US$) 170 Population (m) 11.0
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 35 Time (days) 118
Cost (% of income per capita) 140.8 Cost (% of property value) 3.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 16
Getting Credit Time (days) 277
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 44.5 Cost (% of debt) 136.5
Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . .
Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.6
Rigidity of employment index 21 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 17.6
MALAYSIA GNI per capita (US$) 3,780 Population (m) 24.8
East Asia & Pacific
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 30 Time (days) 143
Cost (% of income per capita) 25.1 Cost (% of property value) 2.2 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 31
Getting Credit Time (days) 300
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.2 Cost (% of debt) 20.2
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8
Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 339 Time of insolvency (years) 2.3
Rigidity of employment index 3 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) . . Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 74 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 35.4

COUNTRY TABLES 117
MALI GNI per capita (US$) 290 Population (m) 11.7
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 42 Time (days) 44
Cost (% of income per capita) 187.4 Cost (% of property value) 20.6 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 482.3 Number of procedures 28
Getting Credit Time (days) 340
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 58.5 Cost (% of debt) 34.6
Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 3.6
Rigidity of employment index 66 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 81 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 6.3
MAURITANIA GNI per capita (US$) 430 Population (m) 2.7
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 82 Time (days) 49
Cost (% of income per capita) 140.8 Cost (% of property value) 8.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 858.1 Number of procedures 28
Getting Credit Time (days) 410
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 5.6 Cost (% of debt) 29.3
Difficulty of hiring index 89 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 7
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 1 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 2 Time of insolvency (years) 8.0
Rigidity of employment index 70 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 31 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 6.1
MEXICO GNI per capita (US$) 1,380 6,230 Population (m) 102.3
Latin America & Caribbean
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 58 Time (days) 74
Cost (% of income per capita) 16.7 Cost (% of property value) 5.3 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 15.5 Number of procedures 37
Getting Credit Time (days) 421
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 25.7 Cost (% of debt) 20.0
Difficulty of hiring index 67 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 90 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.8
Rigidity of employment index 72 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 382 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 83 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 64.5
MOLDOVA GNI per capita (US$) 590 Population (m) 3.6
Europe & Central Asia
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 3
Time (days) 30 Time (days) 81
Cost (% of income per capita) 18.6 Cost (% of property value) 1.3 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 24.6 Number of procedures 37
Getting Credit Time (days) 280
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.5 Cost (% of debt) 16.2
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.8
Rigidity of employment index 54 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 21 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 29.3

118 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
MONGOLIA GNI per capita (US$) 480 Population (m) 2.5
East Asia & Pacific
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 3
Time (days) 20 Time (days) 10
Cost (% of income per capita) 8.1 Cost (% of property value) 0.4 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 182.1 Number of procedures 26
Getting Credit Time (days) 314
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.0 Cost (% of debt) 22.6
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 23 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0
Rigidity of employment index 37 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 16.5
MOROCCO GNI per capita (US$) 1,320 Population (m) 30.1
Middle East & North Africa
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 5 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 11 Time (days) 82
Cost (% of income per capita) 12.3 Cost (% of property value) 6.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 718.6 Number of procedures 17
Getting Credit Time (days) 240
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 62.2 Cost (% of debt) 17.7
Difficulty of hiring index 100 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 6 Time of insolvency (years) 1.8
Rigidity of employment index 70 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 101 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 34.8
MOZAMBIQUE GNI per capita (US$) 210 Population (m) 18.8
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 14 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 153 Time (days) 33
Cost (% of income per capita) 95.8 Cost (% of property value) 11.9 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 14.5 Number of procedures 38
Getting Credit Time (days) 580
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 5.0 Cost (% of debt) 16.0
Difficulty of hiring index 72 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 5 Time of insolvency (years) 5.0
Rigidity of employment index 64 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 141 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 12.3
NAMIBIA GNI per capita (US$) 1,870 Population (m) 2.0
Sub-Saharan Africa
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 9 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 85 Time (days) 28
Cost (% of income per capita) 19.3 Cost (% of property value) 9.7 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 31
Getting Credit Time (days) 270
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 28.3 Cost (% of debt) 28.3
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . .
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.0
Rigidity of employment index 33 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 353 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 26 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 53.7

COUNTRY TABLES 119
NEPAL GNI per capita (US$) 240 Population (m) 24.7
South Asia
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures . . Disclosure Index 3
Time (days) 21 Time (days) . .
Cost (% of income per capita) 74.1 Cost (% of property value) . . Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 28
Getting Credit Time (days) 350
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.4 Cost (% of debt) 25.8
Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 90 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 5.0
Rigidity of employment index 44 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 25.8
NETHERLANDS GNI per capita (US$) 26,310 Population (m) 16.2
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 11 Time (days) 5
Cost (% of income per capita) 13.2 Cost (% of property value) 6.4 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 66.2 Number of procedures 22
Getting Credit Time (days) 48
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 17.0
Difficulty of hiring index 28 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 9
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.7
Rigidity of employment index 43 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 645 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 1.0
Firing costs (weeks) 16 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 86.2
NEW ZEALAND GNI per capita (US$) 15,870 Population (m) 4.0
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 2 Number of procedures 2 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 12 Time (days) 2
Cost (% of income per capita) 0.2 Cost (% of property value) 0.2 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 19
Getting Credit Time (days) 50
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 4.8
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 9
Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.0
Rigidity of employment index 7 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 978 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 0 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 71.4
NICARAGUA GNI per capita (US$) 730 Population (m) 5.5
Latin America & Caribbean
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 45 Time (days) 65
Cost (% of income per capita) 170.1 Cost (% of property value) 6.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 18
Getting Credit Time (days) 155
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.0 Cost (% of debt) 16.3
Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 62 Time of insolvency (years) 2.2
Rigidity of employment index 51 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 24 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 38.1

120 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
NIGER GNI per capita (US$) 200 Population (m) 11.8
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 27 Time (days) 49
Cost (% of income per capita) 396.4 Cost (% of property value) 12.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 744.7 Number of procedures 33
Getting Credit Time (days) 330
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 74.6 Cost (% of debt) 42.0
Difficulty of hiring index 100 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 100 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 5.0
Rigidity of employment index 90 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 76 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 2.6
NIGERIA GNI per capita (US$) 320 Population (m) 135.7
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 21 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 44 Time (days) 274
Cost (% of income per capita) 95.2 Cost (% of property value) 27.2 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 59.4 Number of procedures 23
Getting Credit Time (days) 730
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 20.7 Cost (% of debt) 37.2
Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 8
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.5
Rigidity of employment index 44 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 13 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 33.2
NORWAY GNI per capita (US$) 43,350 Population (m) 4.6
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 4 Number of procedures 1 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 23 Time (days) 1
Cost (% of income per capita) 2.9 Cost (% of property value) 2.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 28.9 Number of procedures 14
Getting Credit Time (days) 87
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.5 Cost (% of debt) 4.2
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 0.9
Rigidity of employment index 30.3 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1000 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 1.0
Firing costs (weeks) 12 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 87.9
OMAN GNI per capita (US$) 7,830 Population (m) 2.6
Middle East & North Africa
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 34 Time (days) 16
Cost (% of income per capita) 4.9 Cost (% of property value) 3.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 100.1 Number of procedures 41
Getting Credit Time (days) 455
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 20.9 Cost (% of debt) 10.0
Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 7.0
Rigidity of employment index 34.8 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 13 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 23.6

COUNTRY TABLES 121
PAKISTAN GNI per capita (US$) 470 Population (m) 148.4
South Asia
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 24 Time (days) 49
Cost (% of income per capita) 36.0 Cost (% of property value) 4.2 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 46
Getting Credit Time (days) 395
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 11.5 Cost (% of debt) 35.2
Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 2 Time of insolvency (years) 2.8
Rigidity of employment index 49 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 3 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 38.1
PANAMA GNI per capita (US$) 4,250 Population (m) 3.0
Latin America & Caribbean
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 19 Time (days) 44
Cost (% of income per capita) 25.1 Cost (% of property value) 2.4 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 45
Getting Credit Time (days) 355
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.9 Cost (% of debt) 37.0
Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.0
Rigidity of employment index 63 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 530 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0
Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 18.2
PAPUA NEW GUINEA GNI per capita (US$) 510 Population (m) 5.5
East Asia & Pacific
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 56 Time (days) 72
Cost (% of income per capita) 30.7 Cost (% of property value) 5.2 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 22
Getting Credit Time (days) 295
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.9 Cost (% of debt) 110.3
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . .
Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.8
Rigidity of employment index 17 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0
Firing costs (weeks) 38 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 34.2
PARAGUAY GNI per capita (US$) 1,100 Population (m) 5.6
Latin America & Caribbean
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 17 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 74 Time (days) 48
Cost (% of income per capita) 157.6 Cost (% of property value) 2.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 46
Getting Credit Time (days) 285
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 26.0 Cost (% of debt) 30.4
Difficulty of hiring index 56 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 90 Time of insolvency (years) 3.9
Rigidity of employment index 59 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) . . Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 99 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 8.7

122 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
PERU GNI per capita (US$) 2,150 Population (m) 27.1
Latin America & Caribbean
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 98 Time (days) 31
Cost (% of income per capita) 36.4 Cost (% of property value) 3.2 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 35
Getting Credit Time (days) 441
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 16.0 Cost (% of debt) 34.7
Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 143 Time of insolvency (years) 3.1
Rigidity of employment index 55 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 271 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 56 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 31.1
PHILIPPINES GNI per capita (US$) 1,080 Population (m) 81.5
East Asia & Pacific
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 50 Time (days) 33
Cost (% of income per capita) 19.5 Cost (% of property value) 5.7 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 2.2 Number of procedures 25
Getting Credit Time (days) 380
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 8.3 Cost (% of debt) 50.7
Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 5.6
Rigidity of employment index 41 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 34 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0
Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 3.8
POLAND GNI per capita (US$) 5,270 Population (m) 38.2
Europe & Central Asia
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 7 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 31 Time (days) 204
Cost (% of income per capita) 20.6 Cost (% of property value) 1.6 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 237.9 Number of procedures 41
Getting Credit Time (days) 1000
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.2 Cost (% of debt) 8.7
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.4
Rigidity of employment index 34 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 380 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 25 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 68.2
PORTUGAL GNI per capita (US$) 12,130 Population (m) 10.2
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 78 Time (days) 83
Cost (% of income per capita) 13.5 Cost (% of property value) 7.3 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 39.5 Number of procedures 24
Getting Credit Time (days) 320
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 10.2 Cost (% of debt) 17.5
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 637 Time of insolvency (years) 2.5
Rigidity of employment index 58 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 79 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 98 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 69.9

COUNTRY TABLES 123
PUERTO RICO GNI per capita (US$) 10,950 Population (m) 3.9
Latin America & Caribbean
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures . . Disclosure Index . .
Time (days) 7 Time (days) . .
Cost (% of income per capita) 1.0 Cost (% of property value) . . Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 43
Getting Credit Time (days) 270
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.1 Cost (% of debt) 21.0
Difficulty of hiring index 22 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.8
Rigidity of employment index 21 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 643 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 0 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 61.4
ROMANIA GNI per capita (US$) 2,310 Population (m) 22.2
Europe & Central Asia
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 5 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 28 Time (days) 170
Cost (% of income per capita) 7.4 Cost (% of property value) 1.9 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 43
Getting Credit Time (days) 335
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.1 Cost (% of debt) 12.4
Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 4 Time of insolvency (years) 4.6
Rigidity of employment index 63 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 98 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 6.9
RUSSIA GNI per capita (US$) 2,610 Population (m) 143.4
Europe & Central Asia
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 3
Time (days) 36 Time (days) 37
Cost (% of income per capita) 6.7 Cost (% of property value) 0.8 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 5.6 Number of procedures 29
Getting Credit Time (days) 330
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 11.6 Cost (% of debt) 20.3
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.5
Rigidity of employment index 27 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 48.4
RWANDA GNI per capita (US$) 220 Population (m) 8.3
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 21 Time (days) 354
Cost (% of income per capita) 316.9 Cost (% of property value) 9.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 29
Getting Credit Time (days) 395
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) . . Cost (% of debt) 49.5
Difficulty of hiring index 89 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) no practice
Rigidity of employment index 76 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) no practice
Firing costs (weeks) 54 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 0.0

124 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
SAUDI ARABIA GNI per capita (US$) 8,530 Population (m) 22.5
Middle East & North Africa
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 64 Time (days) 4
Cost (% of income per capita) 69.7 Cost (% of property value) 0.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 1549.5 Number of procedures 44
Getting Credit Time (days) 360
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 20.0
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders . .
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 2.8
Rigidity of employment index 13 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 79 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 31.7
SENEGAL GNI per capita (US$) 550 Population (m) 10.0
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 57 Time (days) 114
Cost (% of income per capita) 112.9 Cost (% of property value) 34.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 270.4 Number of procedures 36
Getting Credit Time (days) 485
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 16.5 Cost (% of debt) 23.8
Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 3 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0
Rigidity of employment index 64 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 38 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 18.8
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO GNI per capita (US$) 1,910 Population (m) 8.1
Europe & Central Asia
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 3
Time (days) 51 Time (days) 186
Cost (% of income per capita) 9.5 Cost (% of property value) 5.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 120.3 Number of procedures 36
Getting Credit Time (days) 1028
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 87.4 Cost (% of debt) 23.0
Difficulty of hiring index 28 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 1 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1 Time of insolvency (years) 2.6
Rigidity of employment index 23 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 23.0
Firing costs (weeks) 21 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 20.8
SIERRA LEONE GNI per capita (US$) 150 Population (m) 5.3
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 26 Time (days) 58
Cost (% of income per capita) 1268.4 Cost (% of property value) 16.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 58
Getting Credit Time (days) 305
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 175.3 Cost (% of debt) 31.0
Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.5
Rigidity of employment index 76 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0
Firing costs (weeks) 188 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 12.1

COUNTRY TABLES 125
SINGAPORE GNI per capita (US$) 21,230 Population (m) 4.3
East Asia & Pacific
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 8 Time (days) 9
Cost (% of income per capita) 1.2 Cost (% of property value) 1.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 23
Getting Credit Time (days) 69
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.3 Cost (% of debt) 9.0
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 10
Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 0.8
Rigidity of employment index 0 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 335 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 1.0
Firing costs (weeks) 4 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 91.3
SLOVAKIA GNI per capita (US$) 4,920 Population (m) 5.4
Europe & Central Asia
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 52 Time (days) 22
Cost (% of income per capita) 5.7 Cost (% of property value) 3.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 46.1 Number of procedures 27
Getting Credit Time (days) 565
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 20.1 Cost (% of debt) 15.0
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 9
Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 6 Time of insolvency (years) 4.7
Rigidity of employment index 10 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 39.6
SLOVENIA GNI per capita (US$) 11,830 Population (m) 2.0
Europe & Central Asia
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 61 Time (days) 391
Cost (% of income per capita) 12.3 Cost (% of property value) 2.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 19.0 Number of procedures 25
Getting Credit Time (days) 1003
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.2 Cost (% of debt) 16.3
Difficulty of hiring index 28 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 25 Time of insolvency (years) 3.6
Rigidity of employment index 53 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 23.6
SOUTH AFRICA GNI per capita (US$) 2,780 Population (m) 45.3
Sub-Saharan Africa
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 38 Time (days) 20
Cost (% of income per capita) 9.1 Cost (% of property value) 11.3 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 26
Getting Credit Time (days) 277
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.3 Cost (% of debt) 11.5
Difficulty of hiring index 56 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.0
Rigidity of employment index 52 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 636 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 38 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 31.8

126 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
SPAIN GNI per capita (US$) 16,990 Population (m) 41.1
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 7 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 7
Time (days) 108 Time (days) 20
Cost (% of income per capita) 16.5 Cost (% of property value) 7.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 16.9 Number of procedures 23
Getting Credit Time (days) 169
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 11.4 Cost (% of debt) 14.1
Difficulty of hiring index 67 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 394 Time of insolvency (years) 1.0
Rigidity of employment index 69 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 65 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 68 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 83.4
SRI LANKA GNI per capita (US$) 930 Population (m) 19.2
South Asia
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 50 Time (days) 63
Cost (% of income per capita) 10.7 Cost (% of property value) 5.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 17
Getting Credit Time (days) 440
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.7 Cost (% of debt) 21.3
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 80 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.2
Rigidity of employment index 40 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 19 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 108 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 33.1
SWEDEN GNI per capita (US$) 28,840 Population (m) 9.0
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 3 Number of procedures 1 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 16 Time (days) 2
Cost (% of income per capita) 0.7 Cost (% of property value) 3.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 36.9 Number of procedures 23
Getting Credit Time (days) 208
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 15.0 Cost (% of debt) 5.9
Difficulty of hiring index 28 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.0
Rigidity of employment index 43 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 980 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 24 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 73.2
SWITZERLAND GNI per capita (US$) 39,880 Population (m) 7.3
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 6 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 20 Time (days) 16
Cost (% of income per capita) 8.6 Cost (% of property value) 1.4 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 33.2 Number of procedures 22
Getting Credit Time (days) 170
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.0 Cost (% of debt) 5.2
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.6
Rigidity of employment index 17 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 233 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 12 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 37.0

COUNTRY TABLES 127
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC GNI per capita (US$) 1,160 Population (m) 17.4
Middle East & North Africa
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 47 Time (days) 23
Cost (% of income per capita) 34.2 Cost (% of property value) 30.4 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 5053.9 Number of procedures 48
Getting Credit Time (days) 672
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 6.4 Cost (% of debt) 34.3
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 50 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.1
Rigidity of employment index 37 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 79 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 29.2
TAIWAN, CHINA GNI per capita (US$) 13,320 Population (m) 22.6
East Asia & Pacific
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 48 Time (days) 7
Cost (% of income per capita) 6.3 Cost (% of property value) 7.0 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 224.7 Number of procedures 22
Getting Credit Time (days) 210
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.2 Cost (% of debt) 7.7
Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 334 Time of insolvency (years) 0.8
Rigidity of employment index 50 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) . . Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 90 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 89.6
TANZANIA GNI per capita (US$) 290 Population (m) 34.9
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 12 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 35 Time (days) 61
Cost (% of income per capita) 186.9 Cost (% of property value) 12.6 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 6.8 Number of procedures 21
Getting Credit Time (days) 242
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 21.3 Cost (% of debt) 35.3
Difficulty of hiring index 56 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0
Rigidity of employment index 65 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 23.0
Firing costs (weeks) 38 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 21.3
THAILAND GNI per capita (US$) 2,190 Population (m) 62.0
East Asia & Pacific
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 2 Disclosure Index 5
Time (days) 33 Time (days) 2
Cost (% of income per capita) 6.7 Cost (% of property value) 6.3 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 26
Getting Credit Time (days) 390
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.1 Cost (% of debt) 13.4
Difficulty of hiring index 67 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.6
Rigidity of employment index 42 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 150 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0
Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 42.0

128 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
TOGO GNI per capita (US$) 310 Population (m) 4.9
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 53 Time (days) 212
Cost (% of income per capita) 229.4 Cost (% of property value) 7.8 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 485.7 Number of procedures 37
Getting Credit Time (days) 535
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 83.4 Cost (% of debt) 24.3
Difficulty of hiring index 89 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 60 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 3 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0
Rigidity of employment index 76 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 84 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 14.5
TUNISIA GNI per capita (US$) 2,240 Population (m) 9.9
Middle East & North Africa
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 14 Time (days) 57
Cost (% of income per capita) 11.0 Cost (% of property value) 6.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 327.3 Number of procedures 14
Getting Credit Time (days) 27
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 22.4 Cost (% of debt) 12.0
Difficulty of hiring index 61 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 100 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 93 Time of insolvency (years) 1.3
Rigidity of employment index 54 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 29 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 50.1
TURKEY GNI per capita (US$) 2,790 Population (m) 70.7
Europe & Central Asia
Lower middle incom
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 8 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 9 Time (days) 9
Cost (% of income per capita) 26.4 Cost (% of property value) 3.3 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 22
Getting Credit Time (days) 330
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 19.9 Cost (% of debt) 12.5
Difficulty of hiring index 44 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 1
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 32 Time of insolvency (years) 2.9
Rigidity of employment index 55 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 300 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 112 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 25.7
UGANDA GNI per capita (US$) 240 Population (m) 25.3
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 17 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 36 Time (days) 48
Cost (% of income per capita) 131.3 Cost (% of property value) 5.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 15
Getting Credit Time (days) 209
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 11.9 Cost (% of debt) 22.3
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 20 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.1
Rigidity of employment index 7 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0
Firing costs (weeks) 12 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 35.5

COUNTRY TABLES 129
UKRAINE GNI per capita (US$) 970 Population (m) 48.4
Europe & Central Asia
Lower middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 15 Number of procedures 9 Disclosure Index 3
Time (days) 34 Time (days) 93
Cost (% of income per capita) 17.6 Cost (% of property value) 4.3 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 113.9 Number of procedures 28
Getting Credit Time (days) 269
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 3.5 Cost (% of debt) 11.0
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 80 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.6
Rigidity of employment index 64 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 94 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 25.5
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES GNI per capita (US$) 20,217 Population (m) 4.0
Middle East & North Africa
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 3 Disclosure Index 2
Time (days) 54 Time (days) 9
Cost (% of income per capita) 26.5 Cost (% of property value) 2.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 416.9 Number of procedures 53
Getting Credit Time (days) 614
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 9.4 Cost (% of debt) 16.0
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 2 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 18 Time of insolvency (years) 5.1
Rigidity of employment index 33 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0
Firing costs (weeks) 96 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 4.7
UNITED KINGDOM GNI per capita (US$) 28,350 Population (m) 59.3
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 6 Number of procedures 2 Disclosure Index 7
Time (days) 18 Time (days) 21
Cost (% of income per capita) 0.9 Cost (% of property value) 4.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 14
Getting Credit Time (days) 288
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.1 Cost (% of debt) 15.7
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 10
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 1.0
Rigidity of employment index 20 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1000 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 6.0
Firing costs (weeks) 25 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 85.8
UNITED STATES GNI per capita (US$) 37,610 Population (m) 291.0
OECD: High income
High income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 5 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 7
Time (days) 5 Time (days) 12
Cost (% of income per capita) 0.6 Cost (% of property value) 0.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 17
Getting Credit Time (days) 250
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 0.1 Cost (% of debt) 7.5
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 7
Rigidity of hours index 0 Credit information index 6 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0
Rigidity of employment index 3 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 1000 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 8 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 68.2

130 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
URUGUAY GNI per capita (US$) 3,790 Population (m) 3.4
Latin America & Caribbean
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 45 Time (days) 66
Cost (% of income per capita) 48.2 Cost (% of property value) 7.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 181.6 Number of procedures 39
Getting Credit Time (days) 620
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 28.6 Cost (% of debt) 25.8
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 60 Credit information index 5 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 0 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 72 Time of insolvency (years) 2.1
Rigidity of employment index 31 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 756 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 34 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 21.9
UZBEKISTAN GNI per capita (US$) 420 Population (m) 25.6
Europe & Central Asia
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 9 Number of procedures 12 Disclosure Index 4
Time (days) 35 Time (days) 97
Cost (% of income per capita) 17.0 Cost (% of property value) 11.8 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 21.9 Number of procedures 35
Getting Credit Time (days) 368
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 1.0 Cost (% of debt) 18.1
Difficulty of hiring index 33 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 5
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 100 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0
Rigidity of employment index 58 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 4.0
Firing costs (weeks) 28 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 12.5
VENEZUELA GNI per capita (US$) 3,490 Population (m) 25.5
Latin America & Caribbean
Upper middle income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 13 Number of procedures 8 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 116 Time (days) 34
Cost (% of income per capita) 15.0 Cost (% of property value) 1.8 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 41
Getting Credit Time (days) 445
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 7.7 Cost (% of debt) 28.7
Difficulty of hiring index 78 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 4 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 10 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 286 Time of insolvency (years) 4.0
Rigidity of employment index 56 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 38.0
Firing costs (weeks) 83 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 4.9
VIETNAM GNI per capita (US$) 480 Population (m) 81.3
East Asia & Pacific
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 11 Number of procedures 5 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 56 Time (days) 78
Cost (% of income per capita) 28.6 Cost (% of property value) 5.5 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 0.0 Number of procedures 37
Getting Credit Time (days) 404
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.0 Cost (% of debt) 30.1
Difficulty of hiring index 56 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 4
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 3 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 70 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 8 Time of insolvency (years) 5.5
Rigidity of employment index 55 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 98 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 16.4

COUNTRY TABLES 131
YEMEN, REP GNI per capita (US$) 520 Population (m) 19.2
Middle East & North Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 12 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index . .
Time (days) 63 Time (days) 21
Cost (% of income per capita) 269.3 Cost (% of property value) 3.9 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 1561.1 Number of procedures 37
Getting Credit Time (days) 360
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 4.7 Cost (% of debt) 10.5
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 2
Rigidity of hours index 80 Credit information index 1 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 30 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 12 Time of insolvency (years) 3.0
Rigidity of employment index 37 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 17 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 28.6
ZAMBIA GNI per capita (US$) 380 Population (m) 10.4
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 6 Number of procedures 6 Disclosure Index 1
Time (days) 35 Time (days) 70
Cost (% of income per capita) 22.8 Cost (% of property value) 9.2 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 2.7 Number of procedures 16
Getting Credit Time (days) 274
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 19.2 Cost (% of debt) 28.7
Difficulty of hiring index 0 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 6
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 40 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.7
Rigidity of employment index 27 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 8.0
Firing costs (weeks) 47 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 19.4
ZIMBABWE GNI per capita (US$) 480 Population (m) 13.1
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income
Starting a business Registering property Protecting investors
Number of procedures 10 Number of procedures 4 Disclosure Index 6
Time (days) 96 Time (days) 30
Cost (% of income per capita) 304.7 Cost (% of property value) 18.1 Enforcing contracts
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 53.0 Number of procedures 33
Getting Credit Time (days) 350
Hiring and Firing Workers Cost to create collateral (% income per capita) 2.4 Cost (% of debt) 19.1
Difficulty of hiring index 11 Legal rights of borrowers and lenders 7
Rigidity of hours index 40 Credit information index 0 Closing a business
Difficulty of firing index 20 Public registry coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Time of insolvency (years) 2.2
Rigidity of employment index 24 Private bureau coverage (borrowers/1000 adults) 0 Cost of insolvency (% of estate) 18.0
Firing costs (weeks) 29 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 9.2

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 133
Acknowledgments
Contact details of local partners are available
on the Doing Business website at
http://rru.worldbank.org/doingbusiness
Doing Business in 2005 was prepared by a team led by
Simeon Djankov and Caralee McLiesh under the general
direction of Michael Klein. The team also comprised
Ziad Azar, Ghanem-Redouane Benamadi, Marie Delion,
Osborne Jackson, Joanna Kata-Blackman, Marcelo Lu,
Facundo Martin, Tatiana Nenova, Rita Ramalho, Lisa
Smith, Sylvia Solf and Lihong Wang.
Andrei Shleifer, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopezde-Silanes
and Oliver Hart co-authored several of the
background studies and provided academic advice
throughout the project. Several organizations and individual
experts provided comments on survey design, as
detailed in the Data Notes section. Amanda Ellis advised
on gender issues. Bruce Ross-Larson edited the manuscript.
Timothy Harford and Suzanne Smith provided
editorial advice throughout the development of the report.
Gerry Quinn designed the interior of the report
and Peter Grundy designed the cover.
Individual chapters were refereed by a panel of
experts comprising Nagavalli Anamalai, Lubomira
Beardsley, Thorsten Beck, David Bernstein, Gordon
Betcherman, John Bruce, Tony Burns, Mierta Capaul,
Jacqueline Coolidge, Frederique Dahan, Klaus Deininger,
Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Marie-Laurence Guy, Luke
Haggarty, Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Eric Haythorne,
Scott Jacobs, Leora Klapper, Luc Laeven, Isabel Lavadenz
Paccieri, Katarina Mathernova, Richard Messick,
Margaret Miller, Nataliya Mylenko, Vincent Palmade,
Friedrich Peloschek, Ismail Radwan, Jan Rutkowski,
Jaime Saavedra, Jolyne Sanjak, Stefano Scarpetta, Stefka
Slavova, Peer Stein, Richard Symonds, Stoyan Tenev,
Milan Vodopivec, David Wofford, and Wael Zakout. The
full draft report was reviewed by Shanta Devarajan,
Cheryl Gray, Daniel Kaufmann, Natalie Lichtenstein,
Joseph O’Keefe, Zia Qureshi, Neil Roger, and Alan
Winters.
The online service of the Doing Business database
is sponsored by the Rapid Response Unit of the World
Bank Group under the management of Suzanne Smith.
The team is comprised of Vadim Gorbach, Graeme
Littler, Vandana Mathur, Victor Robinson, Leila Search-
Zalmai and Fatima Shah.
The report was made possible by the generous contribution
of more than 3,000 lawyers, judges, businesspeople
and public officials in 145 countries. Many of the
contributors are members of the Lex Mundi association
of law firms or the International Bar Association. The
names of those wishing to be acknowledged individually
are listed below and contact details are posted on the
Doing Business website, http://rru.worldbank.org/doing
business.

134 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
GLOBAL
CONTRIBUTORS
BAKER & MCKENZIE
INTERNATIONAL BAR
ASSOCIATION
LEX MUNDI ASSOCIATION OF
LAW FIRMS
TRANSUNION INTERNATIONAL
ALBANIA
Artur Asllani
STUDIO LEGALE TONUCCI
Yair Baranes
USAID
Genc Boga
BOGA & ASSOCIATES
Evis Bozo
EVIS BOZO
Alban Caushi
KALO & ASSOCIATES
Victor Chimienti
BOGA & ASSOCIATES
Vilsa Dado
KALO & ASSOCIATES
Sokol ElMajaz
BOGA & ASSOCIATES
Vilma Gjyshi
KALO & ASSOCIATES
Majlinda Hakani
KPMG
Shpati Hoxha
BOGA & ASSOCIATES
Sonila Ibrahimi
BOGA & ASSOCIATES
Perparim Kalo
KALO & ASSOCIATES
Genci Krasniqi
KALO & ASSOCIATES
Renata Leka
BOGA & ASSOCIATES
Krenar Loloci
LOLOCI & ASSOCIATES
Andi Memi
HOXHA, MEMI & HOXHA
Merilda Petri
KALO & ASSOCIATES
Miranda Ramaj
BANK OF ALBANIA
Spyridon Tsakalis
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
ALGERIA
Branka Achari-Djokic
BANK OF ALGERIA
Mamoun Aidoud
AIDOUD LAW FIRM
Adnane Bouchaib
BOUCHAIB LAW FIRM
Samir Boukider
GHELLAL & MEKERBA
Mourad Dubert
DUBERT
Amine Ghellal, Esq.
GHELLAL & MEKERBA
Mohamed El Amine Haddad
GHELLAL & MEKERBA
Mustapha Hamdane
MUSTAPHA HAMDANE
Samir Hamouda
SAMIR HAMOUDA
Yamina Kebir
YAMINA KEBIR
Said Maherzi
BANK OF ALGERIA
Mohamed Sator
CABINET SATOR
Nassima Talbi
GHELLAL & MEKERBA
Spyridon Tsallas
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
ANGOLA
Fatima Freitas
FATIMA FREITAS ADVOGADOS
Teresinha Lopes
F. FARIA DE BASTOS, P.LOPES,
T. LOPES E L. SEBASTIÃO &
ASSOCIADOS
Katila Machado
FÁTIMA FREITAS ADVOGADOS
Jorge Leao Peres
NATIONAL BANK OF ANGOLA
Alexandre Do Rêgo Pinto
Pegado
ALEXANDRE PEGADO
ARGENTINA
Lisandro A. Allende
BRONS & SALAS
Juan Arocena
ALLENDE & BREA
Federico Augusto Brandt
ALFARO
Vanesa Balda
VITALE, MANOFF & FEILBOGEN
Oscar del Rio
CENTRAL BANK OF ARGENTINA
Bernardo Horacio Fernandez
CENTRAL BANK OF ARGENTINA
Celia Fernández Ramallo
FORNIELES & DEL CARRIL
Alejandro D. Fiuza
MARVAL, O’FARRELL & MAIRAL
Francisco Jose Fornieles
FORNIELES & DEL CARRIL
María Fraguas
NICHOLSON Y CANO
Nicolas Garcia Pinto
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Santiago Laclau
MARVAL, O’FARRELL & MAIRAL
Martin Lanfranco
MARVAL, O’FARRELL & MAIRAL
Roberto Laterza
ORGANIZACION VERAZ
Patricia Lopez Aufranc
MARVAL, O’FARRELL & MAIRAL
Maria Lujan Bianchi
BRONS & SALAS
Eugenio J. Maurette
ABELEDO GOTTHEIL
Sean McCormick
LLERENA & ASOCIADOS
Olga Muino
CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS
BONAERENSES
Miguel P. Murray
MURRAY, D´ANDRÉ, ISASMENDI
& SIRITO DE ZAVALÍA
Santiago M J A Nicholson
NICHOLSON Y CANO
Alfredo Miguel O’Farrell
MARVAL, O’FARRELL & MAIRAL
Jorge Raul Postiglione
BRONS & SALAS
Juan Manuel Alvarez Prado
ALVAREZ PRADO & ASOCIADOS
Liliana Segade
QUATTRINI, LAPRIDA &
ASOCIADOS
Matias Sicardi
FORNIELES & DEL CARRIL
Angelica Sola
MARVAL, O’FARRELL & MAIRAL
Ignacio L. Triolo
MARVAL, O’FARRELL & MAIRAL
Alfredo Vicens
ORGANIZACION VERAZ
Octavio Miguel Zenarruza
ALVAREZ PRADO & ASOCIADOS
ARMENIA
Tigran Atanesyan
LAWYER
Karen Hambardzoumyan
CENTRAL BANK OF ARMENIA
Hayk Hovhannisyan
LAWYER
Adnan Hrenovica
LCR
Artashes F. Kakoyan
LAWYER
Alan Kuchukyan
KPMG ARMENIA
Ara Markosyan
KPMG ARMENIA
Suren Melikyan
KPMG ARMENIA
Eduard Mesropyan
JINJ CO.
Ashot Petrosyan
MINISTRY OF TRADE AND
ECONOMICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF RA
Ashot Poghosyan
ARAX CONSULTING GROUP
Hayk Sahakyan
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
AND CADASTRAL PROJECTS’
IMPLEMENTATION, STATE
COMMITTEE OF REAL PROPERTY
CADASTRE
Tom Samuelian
DR.TOM SAMUELIAN
Tigran Serobyan
KPMG ARMENIA
Armen Ter-Tachatyan
TER-TACHATYAN LEGAL &
BUSINESS CONSULTING
Mikayel Tovmassian
TER-TACHATYAN LEGAL &
BUSINESS CONSULTING
Artur Tunyan
TUNYAN & ASSOCIATES
Andranik Vahanyan
TER-TACHATYAN LEGAL &
BUSINESS CONSULTING CJSC
AUSTRALIA
David Buda
COWLEY HEARNE LAWYERS
Greg Channell
DEPARTMENT OF LANDS
Brett Cook
ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON
David Cross
ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON
Christopher Davie
CLAYTON UTZ
Petrea Draper
COWLEY HEARNE
Peter Gemell
EVANS & PECK
Lucinda Girdlestone
COWLEY HEARNE
Penny Grau
CLAYTON UTZ
Boris Hristovski
GADENS LAWYERS
Paul James
CLAYTON UTZ
Eric Janssens
BAYCORP ADVANTAGE
Doug Jones AM
CLAYTON UTZ
Sonya Karo
ASIC
Judy Lau
AUSTRALIAN PRUDENTIAL
REGULATION AUTHORITY
Timothy L’Estrange
ANZ
Joanne Little
ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON
John Lobban
BLAKE DAWSON WALDRON
Helen Mac Kay
ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON
Des Mooney
DEPARTMENT OF LANDS
Luke Nicholls
CLAYTON UTZ
Tim O’Doherty
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Michael O’Donnell
THOMSON PLAYFORD
Mark Pistilli
ATANASKOVIC HARTNELL
Michael Popkin
ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON
Michael Quinlan
ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON
Robert Riddell
GADENS LAWYERS
Ron Schaffer
CLAYTON UTZ
Andrew Smith
MALLESONS STEPHEN JAQUES
Lyn Thomson
DEPARTMENT OF LANDS
Jane Wilson
BAYCORP ADVANTAGE
David Zwi
COWLEY HEARNE
AUSTRIA
Helmut Auer
LAND ADMINISTRATION
Johannes Barbist
BINDER GRÖSSWANG
RECHTSANWÄLTE
Walter Bornett
AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE FOR SME
RESEARCH
Doris Buxbaum
BINDER GRÖSSWANG
RECHTSANWÄLTE
Martin Eckel
EISELSBERG NATLACEN
WALDERDORFF CANCOLA
Tibor Fabian
BINDER GRÖSSWANG
RECHTSANWÄLTE
Julian Feichtinger
CERHA HEMPEL SPIEGELFELD
HLAWATI
Ferdinand Graf
GRAF, MAXL & PITKOWITZ
Bernhard Gumpoldsberger
SAXINGER, CHALUPSKY,
WEBER & PARTNERS
Andreas Hable
BINDER GRÖSSWANG
RECHTSANWÄLTE
Harald Heschl
KREDITSCHUTAVERBAND VON
1870
Sylvia Hofinger
CITY GOVERNMENT
Wilhelm Holler
GRISS & PARTNER
Alexander Klauser
BRAUNEIS, KLAUSER & PRANDL
Robert Kovacs
COFACE INTERCREDIT
Edgar Langeder
FRIEDERS TASSUL & PARTNER
Christian Lettmayr
AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE FOR SME
RESEARCH
Gregor Maderbacher
BRAUNEIS, KLAUSER & PRANDL
Peter Madl
SCHONHERR RECHTSANWALTE
Irene Mandl
AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE FOR SME
RESEARCH
Leopold Mayer
DUN AND BRADSTREET
INFORMATION SERVICES
Wolfgang Messeritsch
NATIONAL BANK OF AUSTRIA
Gerhard Muggenhuber
BEV – FEDERAL OFFICE OF
METROLOGY AND SURVEYING
Ninel Jasmine Sadjadi
CENTER OF LEGAL COMPETENCE
Christine schögler
GRISS & PARTNER
Benedikt Spiegelfeld
CERHA HEMPEL SPIEGELFELD
Christine Stark
BINDER GRÖSSWANG
RECHTSANWÄLTE
Dagmar Straka
NATIONAL BANK OF AUSTRIA
Reinhard Toegl
REINHARD TOEGL LAW OFFICE
Georg Tuppa
GRAF, MAXL & PITKOWITZ
Lothar Wachter
WOLF THEISS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 135
Angela Zaffalon
CERHA HEMPEL SPIEGELFELD
HLAWATI
AZERBAIJAN
Ofelia Abdulaeva
SALANS HERTZFELD &
HEILBRONN
Nazli Ahmadova
BAKU LAW CENTRE
Elgar Alekperov
BAKU LAW CENTRE
Aykhan Asadov
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Ismail Askerov
LEDINGHAM CHALMERS
Rufat Aslanov
NATIONAL BANK OF AZERBAIJAN
Alum Bati
SALANS HERTZFELD &
HEILBRONN
Christine Ferguson
BAKER BOTTS
Farrukh Gassimov
BAKER BOTTS
Elchin Hagverdiyev
LEDINGHAM CHALMERS
Farhad Hajizade
SALANS HERTZFELD &
HEILBRONN
Nadir Huseynbayov
LAND REGISTRATION AND
CADASTRE AGENCY FOR SUPPORT
TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AGRICULTURAL PRIVATE SECTOR
Yusif H. Jabbarov
NATIONAL BANK OF AZERBAIJAN
REPUBLIC
Gunduz Karimov
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Natik Mamedov
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Bakhtiyar Mammadov
BAKER BOTTS
Daniel Matthews
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Farhad Mirzayev
BM LAW FIRM
Benjamin Paine
LEDINGHAM CHALMERS
Mark Rowley
BAKER BOTTS
Abdullayev Sabit
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Kanan Safarov
LEDINGHAM CHALMERS
Safkhan Shahmammadli
BAKER BOTTS
Vadim Shneyer
BM LAW FIRM
Valery Sidnev
BAKER BOTTS
Michael Walsh
LEDINGHAM CHALMERS
BANGLADESH
Nahid Afreen
THE LAW ASSOCIATES
A.B.M. Badrud Doulah
DOULAH & DOULAH
ADVOCATES,ATTORNEYS &
NOTARIES
Halim Bepari
SUPREME COURT OF
BANGLADESH
Shirin Chaudhury
THE LAW ASSOCIATES
Nasirud Doulah
DOULAH & DOULAH ADVOCATES
Shamsud Doulah
DOULAH & DOULAH ADVOCATES
Aneek R. Haque
HUQ AND COMPANY
Raquibul Haque Miah
ADVOCATES & ATTORNEYS LAW
FIRM
Shamsul Hasan
THE LAW ASSOCIATES
Kamal Hossain
DR. KAMAL HOSSAIN &
ASSOCIATES
Amir-Ul Islam
THE LAW ASSOCIATES
Karishma Jahan
DR. KAMAL HOSSAIN &
ASSOCIATES
Ahsanul Kabir
KABIR & ASSOCIATES
Khondker Shamsuddin
Mahmood
ADVISERS’ LEGAL ALLIANCE
Kazi Abdul Mannan
KAZI & RAHMAN ASSOCIATES
Mirza Quamrul Hasan
ADVISERS’ LEGAL ALLIANCE
Mohammed Abdur Razzak
THE LAW ASSOCIATES
Abdur Razzaq
THE LAW COUNSEL
Jasim Uddin Ahmad
BANK OF BANGLADESH
BELARUS
Ivan Alievich
VIPCONSULT
Galina Belarus
DICSA INTERNATIONAL GROUP
OF LAWYERS
Vladimir G. Biruk
STOLITSA GROUP
Alexander Botian
BOROVTSOV & SALEI
Svetlana Dashuk
VLASOVA & PARTNERS
Alexandr Dovgenko
INCORPORATION LAWYER
Ivan Gerasimovich
VIPCONSULT LEGAL SERVICES
Gennadiy Glinskiy
DICSA
Yuri Krasnov
NATIONAL BANK OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BELARUS
Eugene Lazarenkov
LAW COMPANY TRUST
Kanstantsin Mikhel
VIPCONSULT
Vassili I. Salei
BOROVTSOV & SALEI
Vitaliy Sevrukevich
DICSA INTERNATIONAL GROUP
OF LAWYERS
Sergey Alexeevich Shavrov
NATIONAL CADASTRAL AGENCY
Yulia Sitnikova
LAW COMPANY TRUST
Galina Syromiatnikova
DICSA INTERNATIONAL GROUP
OF LAWYERS
Alexander Vasilevsky
VALEX CONSULT
Igor Verkhovodko
BUSINESSCONSULT
Vasily Volozinets
BUSINESSCONSULT
BELGIUM
Hubert Andre-Dumont
MCGUIREWOODS
Judith Buddingh
LOYENS
Hugo Callens
ELEGIS
Simon Cookson
ASHURST
Ludo Cornelis
EUBELIUS ATTORNEYS
Dirk de Backer
ALLEN & OVERY
Pieter de Koster
ALLEN & OVERY
Steven de Schrijver
VAN BAEL & BELLIS
Marc Dechevre
UNION PROFESSIONNELLE DU
CREDIT
Luc Demeyere
ALLEN & OVERY
Joan Dubaere
PEETERS ADVOCATEN-AVOCATS
Alain Francois
EUBELIUS ATTORNEYS
Pamela Cordova
LOYENS
Sandrine Hirsch
SIMONT BRAUN
Dieter Honore
ALLEN & OVERY
Jean Philippe Lebeau
COMMERCIAL COURT OF
BELGIUM
Ignace Maes
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Carl Meyntjens
ASHURST
Andre Moreau
NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM
Didier Muraille
NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM
Leo Peeters
PEETERS ADVOCATEN
Carine Van Regenmortel
ALTIUS
Sophie Rutten
ALLEN & OVERY
Hans Seeldrayers
EUBELIUS ATTORNEYS
Rudy Trogh
NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM
Jan Van Celst
ALLEN & OVERY
Tom Vantroyen
ALTIUS
Louis-H. Verbeke
ALLEN & OVERY
BENIN
Ganiou Adechy
ETUDE DE MAITRE GANIOU
ADECHY
Jean Sourou Agossou
ORDRE NATIONAL DES
ARCHITECTES ET URBANISTES
Rafikou Alabi
CABINET MAITRE ALABI
Agnes A. Campbell
CABINET D’AVOCATS CAMPELL &
ASSOCIES
Veronique Akankoussi
Deguenon
AVOCAT
Vilevo Biova Devo
CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE
L’UNION MONETAIRE OUEST
AFRICAINE
Jacques Migan
JACQUES MIGAN LAW FIRM
Edgar-Yves Monnou
CABINET EDGAR-YVES MONNOU
Edgar-Yves Mpoy
CABINET EDGAR-YVES MONNOU
Francois Nare
CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE
L’UNION MONETAIRE OUEST
AFRICAINE
Afolabi Raphael
AFOLABI RAPHAEL CHAMBERS
BHUTAN
Tshering Dorji
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CHAMBER
EEIG FOR THE KINGDOM OF
BHUTAN
Prakash Rasaily
CITY LEGAL UNIT
Ugyen Rinzin
YANGPHEL
Karma Tshering
REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES,
MINISTRY OF TRADE &
INDUSTRY
Sonam P Wangdi
MINISTRY OF TRADE &
INDUSTRY
BOLIVIA
Maria Cecilia Agreda Gómez
MORENO-BALDIVIESO
Fernando Aguirre
BUFETE AGUIRRE
Carolina Aguirre Urioste
BUFETE AGUIRRE
Miguel Angel Jemio
MORENO-BALDIVIESO
Johnny Arteaga Chavez
DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE TIERRAS
DE SANTA CRUZ
Francisco Bollini Roca
GUEVARA & GUTIÉRREZ.
María Eugenia Antezana V.
CRIALES, URCULLO & ANTEZANA
José A.Criales
CRIALES, URCULLO & ANTEZANA
Carlos Ferreira
C.R & F. ROJAS
Rodrigo Garrón
MORENO-BALDIVIESO
Primitivo Gutiérrez
GUEVARA & GUTIÉRREZ
Enrique Hurtado
SUPERINTENDENCY OF BANKS
AND FINANCIAL ENTITIES
Ricardo Indacochea
SAN MARTIN INDACOCHEA &
ASOCIADOS
Manfredo Kempff
C.R. & F. ROJAS
Ana Maria Luna Yañez
LUNA YAÑEZ ARCHITECT
Alejandra Bernal Mercado
C.R. & F. ROJAS
Milenka Saavedra Muñoz
BUFETE AGUIRRE
Mariana Pereira Nava
INDACOCHEA & ASOCIADOS
Fernando Rojas
C.R. & F. ROJAS
Pablo Rojas
C.R. & F. ROJAS
Milenka Saavedra Muñoz
BUFETE AGUIRRE
Sergio Salazar-Machicado
SALAZAR & ASOCIADOS
A. Mauricio Torrico Galindo
QUINTANILLA & SORIA
Javier Urcullo
CRIALES, URCULLO & ANTEZANA
Paula Bauer Velasco
C.R. & F. ROJAS
BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
Emina Adembegovic
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
Aida Alibalic
LANSKY, GANZGER & PARTNER
Yair Baranes
USAID
Jovana D. Batalo
LANSKY, GANZGER & PARTNER
Senada Havic
LRC CREDIT BUREAU
Adnan Hrenovica
LRC CREDIT BUREAU
Nikola Jankovic
LANSKY, GANZGER & PARTNER
Kemal Jogic
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF LABOUR
AND SOCIAL POLICY
Kerim Karabdic
ADVOKATI SALIH & KERIM
KARABDIC
Tom Kyriakopoulos
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
Castimir Mandaric
LAWYER
Branko Maric
BRANKO & VLADIMIR MARIC
Sead Milkovic
LAWYERS’ OFFICE TKALCIC-
DULIC & PREBANIC
Vesna Mrkovic
LANSKY, GANZGER & PARTNER

136 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Ibrahim Polimac
AGENCY FOR BANKING OF
FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
Nedzida Salihovic-Whalen
DLA WEISS-TESSBACH
Peter Solt
DLA WEISS-TESSBACH
Bojana Tkalcic-Dulic
LAWYERS’ OFFICE TKALCIC-
DULIC & PREBANIC
Spyridon Tsallas
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
BOTSWANA
Neill Armstrong
ARMSTRONGS ATTORNEYS
T.M Bakwena
SAFETY AND HEALTH OFFICE,
MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND
HOME AFFAIRS
Outule Bale
KNIGHT FRANK
John Carr-Hartley
ARMSTRONGS ATTORNEYS
Val Cooke
TRANSUNION ITC
Edward W. Fashole-Luke II
LUKE & ASSOCIATES
Vincent Galeromeloe
INFORMATION TRUST
CORPORATION
Akheel Jinabhai
MAGANG & COMPANY
Elizabeth Macharia
CHIBANDA, MAKGALEMELE &
COMPANY
Magang
MAGANG & COMPANY
Mercia Makgalemele
CHIBANDA, MAKGALEMELE &
COMPANY
Colin McVey
LANDFLOW SOLUTIONS
Abel Walter Modimo
MODIMO & ASSOCIATE
Claude Mojafi
MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND
HOME AFFAIRS
Otsweletse Moupo
MOUPO, MOTSWAGOLE &
DINGAKE
Alfred Ngowi
UNIVERSITY OF BOTSWANA
Kwadwo Osei-Ofei
ARMSTRONGS ATTORNEYS
Moses Pelaelo
BANK OF BOTSWANA
Randolph Samuel
TRANSUNION ITC
Doreen Seromola
ATTORNEY GENERALS CHAMBERS
Virgil Vergeer
COLLINS NEWMAN & CO.
Angelica Waibale-Muganga
ARMSTRONGS ATTORNEYS
Greg Ward
TRANSUNION ITC
Dave Williams
MINCHIN & KELLY
S. A. Ziga
ARMSTRONGS ATTORNEYS
BRAZIL
Plinio Cesar Romanini
BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL
Andrea Acerbi
FELSBERG E ASSOCIADOS
Maximiano Aguiar Camara
AGUIAR CAMARA ADVOGADOS
ASSOCIADOS
Flavia Bailone Marcilio
VEIRANO ADVOGADOS
ASSOCIADOS
Nadine Baleeiro Teixeira
DEMAREST E ALMEIDA
Adriana Baroni Santi
ULHÔA CANTO, REZENDE E
GUERRA
Altamiro Boscoli
DEMAREST E ALMEIDA
Ulhôa Canto
ULHÔA CANTO, REZENDE E
GUERRA
Samuel Carvalho
ESPINOLA E GUSMAO
ADVOGADOS E ASSOCIADOS
Gustavo Castro
VISEU, CASTRO, CUNHA E
ORICCHIO
Paulo Sergio Cavalheiro
CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL
Tania Mara Coelho de
Almeida Costa
SECRETARIA DE INSPECAO DO
TRABALHO
Guilherme G. Cronemberger
Parente
BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL
Helson de Castro
IPPOLITO, RIVITTI, DUARTE,
CASTRO, PARADEDA & MARTINS
Silvio de Salvo Venosa
DEMAREST E ALMEIDA
Heloisa Bonciani Nader di
Cunto
DUARTE GARCIA, CASELLI
GUIMARÃES E TERRA
Julia Dinamarco
DEMAREST E ALMEIDA
Thomas Benes Felsberg
FELSBERG E ASSOCIADOS
Leandro Figueiredo
FIGUEIREDO, RAUSCH MAINENTI
E TARCIA
Renato Giovanni Filho
ULHÔA CANTO, REZENDE E
GUERRA
Isabel Franco
DEMAREST E ALMEIDA
Duarte Garcia
DUARTE GARCIA, CASELLI
GUIMARÃES E TERRA
Esther Jerussalmy
ARAÚJO E POLICASTRO
Caio Julius
BOLINA LAZZARESCHI
Luciana Laquimi
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Vinicius Lemos
LEMOS ADVOCACIA EMPRESARIAL
E TRIBUTÁRIA
Daniela Lessa
DEMAREST E ALMEIDA
Maria Fernanda Lopes Ferraz
Tella
FELSBERG E ASSOCIADOS
Ricardo Loureiro
SERASA
Felipe Loureiro Salgueiro
FELSBERG E ASSOCIADOS
Joao Luiz Coelho da Rocha
BASTOS – TIGRE, COELHO DA
ROCHA E LOPES
Jose Augusto Martins
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Henrique de Faria Martins
GOULART PENTEADO, IERVOLINO
E LEFOSSE
Maria Lucia Silva Mauricio
Costa
DEMAREST E ALMEIDA
André Megale
GOULART PENTEADO, IERVOLINO
E LEFOSSE – ADVOGADOS
Aloysio Meirelles de Miranda
ULHÔA CANTO, REZENDE E
GUERRA
Fabiano Milani
GOULART PENTEADO, IERVOLINO
E LEFOSSE
Joao Montandon Borges
MONTANDON BORGES
Laecio Nascimento
NASCIMENTO IMOVEIS
João Otávio Pinheiro Olivério
GOULART PENTEADO, IERVOLINO
E LEFOSSE – ADVOGADOS
Andrea Oricchio Kirsh
KIRSH VISEU CASTRO CUNHA E
ORICCHIO
Maria Fernanda Pecora
VEIRANO ADVOGADOS
ASSOCIADOS
Cacilda Pedrosa Vieira
NASCIMENTO IMOVEIS
Silvia Poggi de Carvalho
DUARTE GARCIA, CASELLI
GUIMARÃES E TERRA
Eliane Ribeiro Gago
DUARTE GARCIA, CASELLI
GUIMARÃES E TERRA
Valeria Salomao
CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL
Domingos Sávio Ramos
de Lima
DOMINGOS SAVIO RAMOS DE
LIMA E ASSOCIADOS
Alexandre Schutze
ADVOGACIA E ACESSORIA
JURIDICA
Leonardo Soares de Oliveira
SECRETARIA DE INSPECAO DO
TRABALHO
Marcos Tiraboschi
VEIRANO ADVOGADOS
ASSOCIADOS
David Troy Giles
IPPOLITO, RIVITTI, DUARTE,
CASTRO, PARADEDA & MARTINS
Andre Villoria
BONELLI E VILLÓRIA ADVOGADOS
ASSOCIADOS
Pedro Vitor Araujo da Costa
ESCRITORIO DE ADVOCACIA
GOUVÊA VIEIRA
Beatriz Ryoko Yamashita
FISCHER & FORSTER
BULGARIA
Svetlin Adrianov
LEGAL INTERCONSULT – PENKOV,
MARKOV AND PARTNERS
Lilia Banakieva
LEGAL INTERCONSULT – PENKOV,
MARKOV AND PARTNERS
Borislav T. Boyanov
BORISLAV BOYANOV & CO.
Dimitar Danailov
GEORGIEV,TODOROV & CO.
George Dimitrov
O.R.A.C. DIMITROV, PETROV &
CO.
Alexander Georgiev
DOBREV, KINKIN, LYUTSKANOV
& PARTNERS
Veselin Iliev
I CONSULT
Georgi Kitanov
TOTEV PARTNERS
Stephan Kyutchukov
DJINGOV GOUGINSKI
KYUTCHUKOV & VELICHKOV
Dessislava Lukarova
ARSIV NATCHEV GANEVA
Jordan Rumenov Manahilov
BULGARIAN NATIONAL BANK
Stoyan Manolov
BULGARIAN NATIONAL BANK
Marina Marinova
GEORGIEV,TODOROV & CO.
Ioannis Mittikas
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
Totyu Mladenov
GENERAL LABOUR INSPECTORATE
EXECUTIVE AGENCY, MINISTRY
OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL POLICY
Vladimir Natchev
ARSIV NATCHEV GANEVA
Yordan Naydenov
BORISLAV BOYANOV & CO.
Stefaniya Nikolova
DJINGOV, GOUGINSKI,
KYUTCHUKOV & VELICHKOV
Alexander Pachamanov
GEORGIEV,TODOROV & CO
Vladimir Penkov
LEGAL INTERCONSULT – PENKOV,
MARKOV AND PARTNERS
Kamelia Popova
COFACEINTERCREDIT BULGARIA
Svilen Todorov
LEGACOM ANTOV & PARTNERS
Spyridon Tsallas
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
Irina Tsvetkova
LANDWELL BULGARIA
Stefan Tzakov
KAMBOUROV & PARTNERS
Marius A. Velichkov
DJINGOV, GOUGINSKI,
KYUTCHUKOV & VELICHKOV
BURKINA FASO
Jean-Pierre Bassole
CABINET D’AVOCATS TITINGA
FREDERIC PACERE
Vilevo Biova Devo
CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE
L’UNION MONETAIRE OUEST
AFRICAINE
Dieudonne Bonkoungou
OHADA LEGIS
Thierry Compaore
ORDRE DES ARCHITECTES DU
BURKINA
Bernardin Dabire
DABIRE SORGHO & TOE
Barthélémy Kere
CABINET D’AVOCATS
BARTHÉLÉMY KERE
Evelyne Mandessi Bell
OHADA LEGIS
Oumarou Ouedraogo
OHADA LEGIS
Titinga Frédéric Pacere
CABINET D’AVOCATS TITINGA
FREDERIC PACERE
Mahamadi Sawadogo
CABINET SAWADOGO MAHAMADI
Ignace Sawadogo
CICAD
Barterlé Mathieu Some
LAWYER
Marie-Antoinette Sorgho-Sery
DABIRE SORGHO & TOE
Frank Didier Toe
DABIRE SORGHO & TOE
BURUNDI
Sylvestre Banzubaze
S&P BANZUBAZE – CABINET
D’AVOCATS
Severin Kagabo
BANQUE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU
BURUNDI
Anatole Miburo
CABINET ANATOLE MIBURO
Tharcisse Ntakiyica
CABINET THARCISSE NTAKIYICA
Yves Ntivumbura
BANQUE DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU
BURUNDI
François Nyamoya
AVOCAT
Deogratias Nzemba
CABINET DE MAÎTRE DÉEGRATIAS
NZEMBA
Laurent Nzeyimana
BARREAU DU BURUNDI
Fabien Segatwa
ETUDE MAITRE SEGATWA
Rubeya Willy
BARREAU DU BURUNDI
CAMBODIA
Naryth H. Hem
BNG – ADVOCATES &
SOLICITORS
Phyroath Heng
INDOCHINA RESEARCH LIMITED
Tayseng Ly
DFDL/MEKONG LAW GROUP
Céline Mollard
INDOCHINA RESEARCH LIMITED
Edward Nicholas
DFDL/ MEKONG LAW GROUP
Timothy Jason Smyth
IMC CONSULTING

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 137
Nolan Stringfield
STRINGFIELD & CHENG
Samon Uy
DFDL MEKONG LAW GROUP
CAMEROON
Roland Abeng
ABENG LAW FIRM
D. Etah Akoh
ETAH-NAN & C SOCIÉTÉ
D’AVOCATS, BARRISTERS &
SOLICITORS
Feh H. Baaboh
HENRY SAMUELSON & CO
David Boyo
JING & PARTNERS
Tognia Djanko
ORDRE NATIONAL DES
ARCHITECTES DU CAMEROUN
Emmanuel Ekobo
CABINET EKOBO
Isabelle Fomukong
CABINET FOMUKONG
Tahir Souleyman Haggar
LA COMMISSION BANCAIRE DE
L’AFRIQUE CENTRALE
Paul Jing
JING & PARTNERS
Henri Pierre Job
HENRI JOB LAW FIRM
Gaston Kenfack Douajni
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Jean-Jacques Kotto
GROUPEMENT D’ARCHITECTES
AFRICAINS
Jean Aimet Kounga
ABENG LAW FIRM
Kumfa Jude Kwenyui
JURIS CONSUL LAW FIRM
Mwambo Litombe Ndeley, esq
JURIS CONSUL LAW FIRM
Daniel Mwambo Ndeley
JURIS CONSUL LAW FIRM
Ernestine Mbong Samba
ETA BESONG LAW CHAMBERS
Pierre Talom
BEAC – HEADQUARTERS
Rafael Tung Nsue
LA COMMISSION BANCAIRE DE
L’AFRIQUE CENTRALE
CANADA
Arthur Adams
SOUTHERN ONTARIO CREDIT
BUREAU
Paul Avis
MCMILLAN BINCH
David Bannon
OGILVY RENAULT
Eldon Bennett
AIRD & BERLIS
Christopher William Besant
CASSELS BROCK & BLACKWELL
David Bish
GOODMANS
John Campbell
WEIRFOULDS
Jay A. Carfagnini
GOODMANS
Susan Clifford
OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT
Thomas S. Cumming
GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON
Michael Davies
OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT
David Epstein
GARDINER ROBERTS
James Farley
LAWYER
Gian Fortuna
KENAIDAN CONTRACTING
Yoine Goldstein
GOLDSTEIN FLANZ & FISHMAN
Leonid Gorelik
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Karen Grant
TRANSUNION
Adrian Hartog
OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT
Pamela S. Hughes
BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON
Charles Johnston
SUPERINTENDENCY OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
Jason Koskela
BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON
Susan Leslie
FIRST CANADIAN TITLE
Desmond Mackey
FIRST CANADIAN TITLE
Charles Magerman
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Patrick McCarthy
BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS
Shelley Munro
OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT
Jeff Rosekat
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Harris M. Rosen
SHIBLEY RIGHTON
Paul Schabas
BLAKE CASSELS & GRAYDON
Leneo Sdao
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Norman Siebrasse
FACULTY OF LAW,UNIVERSITY OF
NEW BRUNSWICK
John Solursh
BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON
Jonathan Wigley
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Erica Young
BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
Emile Bizon
NICOLAS TIANGAYE LAW FIRM
Maurice Dibert- Dollet
MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE
Tahir Souleyman Haggar
LA COMMISSION BANCAIRE DE
L’AFRIQUE CENTRALE
Pierre Talom
BEAC – HEADQUARTERS
Nicolas Tiangaye
NICOLAS TIANGAYE LAW FIRM
CHAD
Nathé Amady
AVOCAT
Thomas Dingamgoto
CABINET DINGAMGOTO ET
ASSOCIÉS
Allaïssem K. Djaibe
CABINET D’AVOCATS
MADANI/DJAÏBE
Tahir Souleyman Haggar
LA COMMISSION BANCAIRE DE
L’AFRIQUE CENTRALE
Gerard Leclaire
INGÉNIERIE & ARCHITECTURE
Pierre Talom
BEAC – HEADQUARTERS
CHILE
Cristian Araya
ALCAINO RODRIGUEZ & SAHLI
Jorge Benitez
URRUTIA & CIA
Enrique Benitez Urrutia
URRUTIA & CIA
Manuel Blanco
BLANCO & CIA ABOGADOS
Jimena Bronfman
GUERRERO, OLIVOS NOVOA Y
ERRAZURIZ
Miguel Capo Valdez
BESALCO
Jeronimo Carcelen
CARIOLA DIEZ PEREZ-COTAPOS
& CIA.
Hector Carrasco Reyes
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS E
INSTITUCIONES FINANCIERAS
Jaime Cordova
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS Y
INSTITUTCIONES FINANCIERAS
CHILE
Rodrigo Cuchacovich
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Martín del Río
VIAL Y PALMA ABOGADOS
Cristian Delpiano
BLANCO & CIA ABOGADOS
Fernando Echeverria
CAMARA CHILENA DE LA
CONSTRUCCION
Ricardo Escobar
CAREY Y CIA
Cristian Eyzaguirre
CLARO & CIA.
María Ester Feres Nazarala
DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO,
MINISTERIO DEL TRABAJO Y DE
PREVISIÓN SOCIAL
Silvio Figari Napoli
DATABUSINESS
Luis S. Gutierrez
PUGA & ORTIZ
Cesar Jimenez Ortiz
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS Y
INSTITUCIONES FINANCIERAS
CHILE
Leon Larrain
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Andrés Jana Linetzky
ALVAREZ, HINZPETER, JANA &
VALLE
Sebastian Obach
CARIOLA DIEZ PEREZ-COPATOS
& CIA
Claudio Oritz Tello
BOLETIN COMERCIAL
Felipe Ossa
CLARO & CIA.
Juan Eduardo Palma Jr.
VIAL Y PALMA ABOGADOS
Carmen Paz Cruz Lozano
CAMARA CHILENA DE LA
CONSTRUCCION
Daniela Peña Fergadiott
BARROS COURT CORREA Y CIA.
ABOGADOS
Alfonso Reymond Larrain
ALDUNATE Y CIA.
ABOGADOS
Ricardo Riesco
CLARO & CÍA.
Edmundo Rojas García
CORPORACIÓN CHILENA DE
ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO
REGISTRAL
Gerardo Varela
CARIOLA DIEZ PEREZ-COTAPOS
& CIA.
Sebastián Yunge
GUERRERO, OLIVOS NOVOA Y
ERRAZURIZ
CHINA
Brian Barron
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Rico Chan
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Yanjua Rebecca Chao
JUN HE
Barry Cheng
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Harry Duprey
KING AND WOOD PRC LAWYERS
Kejun Guo
DEHENG
Zhang Hongsheng
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA
Dong Jing
CHEN & CO
Bob Kwauk
BLAKE CASSELS & GRAYDON
Joseph Lam
DEACONS
Edward E. Lehman
LEHMAN, LEE & XU
Wei Lei
CHEN & CO
Yang Ling
HUAXIA INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS CREDIT CONSULTING
Jerry Liu
HUAXIA INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS CREDIT CONSULTING
Linfei Liu
JUN HE
Hongli Ma
JUN HE
Chen Min
BLAKE CASSELS & GRAYDON
Rocky Qian
LEHMAN LEE & XU
Jie Tang
COUDERT BROTHERS – BEIJING
Li Wang
DEHENG
Yingdong Wang
JUN HE
Tianpeng Wang
KING AND WOOD
James Wong
DEACONS
Haibo Yang
DEHENG
Hong Ye
COUDERT BROTHERS – BEIJING
Xiaojuan Zhao
DEHENG LAW OFFICES
Jin Zhong
JUN HE
Zhang Zihong
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA
Xiaochun Zou
SINOSOURCE LAW FIRM
COLOMBIA
Patricia Arrázola Bustillo
GOMEZ-PINZON LINARES
SAMPER SUAREZ VILLAMIL
Pablo Barraquer-Uprimny
BRIGARD & URRUTIA
Leonardo Calderón
COLEGIO DE REGISTRADORES DE
INSTRUMENTOS PÚBLICOS DE
COLOMBIA
Dario Cardenas Navas
CARDENAS & CARDENAS
Camilo Cortés Guarín
LEWIN & WILLS ABOGADOS
Felipe Cuberos
PRIETO & CARRIZOSA
Ignacio Durán
COMPUTEC – DATACRÉDITO
Carlos Fradique-Méndez
BRIGARD & URRUTIA
Juanita Olaya Garcia
NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF
PLANNING
Alvaro Jose Rodriguez Gomez
POSSE HERRERA & RUIZ
Mónica Espinosa Gutiérrez
MUNOZ TAMAYO & ASOCIADOS
Santiago Gutiérrez
JOSÉ LLOREDA CAMACHO & CO
Jorge Lara
BAKER & MCKENZIE (RAISBECK,
LARA, RODRIGUEZ & RUEDA)
José Antonio Lloreda
JOSE LLOREDA CAMACHO & CO
Margarita Llorente
BRIGARD & URRUTIA
Gabriela Mancero
CAVELIER ABOGADOS
Juan Pablo Moreno-Piñeros
BRIGARD & URRUTIA
Luis E. Nieto
NIETO & CHALELA ABOGADOS
Ricardo Leon Otero
SUPERINTENDENCIA BANCARIA
DE COLOMBIA
Carlos Felipe Pinilla Acevedo
PINILLA, GONZÁLEZ & PRIETO
Daniel Posse
POSSE HERRERA & RUIZ
Rodrigo Prieto Martinez
PINILLA, GONZÁLEZ & PRIETO
Jaime Robledo-Vasquez
ZULETA SUAREZ ARAQUE &
JARAMILLO ABOGADOS

138 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Juan Carlos Rocha
PRIETO & CARRIZOSA
Mónica Rolong
JOSÉ LLOREDA CAMACHO & CO.
Paula Samper Salazar
GOMEZ-PINZON
Bernardo Salazar
BRIGARD & URRUTIA
Felipe Sandoval Villamil
GOMEZ-PINZON LINARES
SAMPER SUAREZ VILLAMIL
Ignacio Santamaria Escobar
JOSÉ LLOREDA CAMACHO & CO
Eduardo Mantilla Serrano
MUNOZ TAMAYO & ASOCIADOS
Gustavo Suárez Camacho
ZULETA SUAREZ ARAQUE &
JARAMILLO ABOGADOS
Diego Munoz Tamayo
MUNOZ TAMAYO & ASOCIADOS
Andrés Téllez Núñez
JOSÉ LLOREDA CAMACHO & CO
Carlos Umaña
BRIGARD & URRUTIA
Carlos Urrutia Holguin
BRIGARD & URRUTIA
Juan Manuel Villaveces
Hollmann
COMPUTEC
Felipe Trias Visbal
MUNOZ TAMAYO & ASOCIADOS
Eduardo Zuleta
ZULETA SUAREZ ARAQUE &
JARAMILLO ABOGADOS
CONGO, DEM. REP.
Bernard Claude
CABINET DE MAITRE MBU NE
LETANG
Lambert S. Djunga
DJUNGA & RISASI AVOCATS
Ambroise Kamukuny
CABINET TSHIBANGU ET
ASSOCIES
Jean Claude Mbaki Siluzaku
CABINET MBAKI ET ASSOCIES
Bernard Claude Mbu-Letang
CABINET MBU NE LETANG
Polycarpe Kabasele Mfumu
Tshishimbi
CABINET KABASELE MFUMU &
ASSOCIES
Louman Mpoy
CABINET ML & A
Marius Muzembe Mpungu
CABINET KABASELE MFUMU
CONGO, REP.
Claude Coelho
CABINET D’ADVOCATS CLAUDE
COELHO
Tahir Souleyman Haggar
LA COMMISSION BANCAIRE DE
L’AFRIQUE CENTRALE
Jerome Loutete
TRIBUNAL D’INSTANCE DE
MAKELEKELE ET DE BACONGO
Rafael Tung Nsue
LA COMMISSION BANCAIRE DE
L’AFRIQUE CENTRALE
Jean Petro
CABINET D’AVOCATS JEAN PETRO
Pierre Talom
BEAC – HEADQUARTERS
COSTA RICA
Gabriela Araya
OLLER ABOGADOS
Kathya Araya
FACIO & CAÑAS
Bernardo Alfaro Araya
SUPERINTENDENCIA GENERAL DE
ENTIDADES BANCARIAS DE COSTA
RICA
Carlos Ayon Lacayo
ALFREDO FOURNIER Y
ASOCIADOS
Alejandro Bettoni Traube
DONINELLI & QUINTANA
Michael Bruce
ACZALAW
Eduardo Calderón
BUFETE FACIO & CAÑAS
Luis Manuel Castro
BLP ABOGADOS
Silvia Chacon Bolanos
ALFREDO FOURNIER Y
ASOCIADOS
Daniel de LaGarza
GONZALEZ • URIBE ILP
Roberto Esquivel
OLLER ABOGADOS
Freddy Fachler
PACHECO COTO
Alfredo Fournier Beeche
BEECHE FOURNIER ASOCIADOS
Octavio Fournier M.
ALFREDO FOURNIER Y
ASOCIADOS
Tomás F. Guardia
BUFETE FACIO & CAÑAS
David Gutierrez
BLP ABOGADOS
Ronald Lachner
BLP ABOGADOS
Ivannia Mendez
OLLER ABOGADOS
Juan Muñoz-Giró
SUPERINTENDENCIA GENERAL DE
ENTIDADES FINANCIERAS
Pedro Oller
OLLER ABOGADOS
Rodrigo Oreamuno
FACIO & CAÑAS
Humberto Pacheco
PACHECO COTO
Frederico Peralta
FACIO & CAÑAS
Roger Petersen
ALLIANCE LAW GROUP, SRL
Mario Quintana
DONINELLI & QUINTANA
Luis Monge Sancho
TELETEC
Manuel Gonzalez Sanz
FACIO & CAÑAS
Dagoberto Sibaja Morales
REGISTRO NACIONAL DE COSTA
RICA
Carlos Manuel Valverde
Retana
FACIO & CAÑAS
COTE D’IVOIRE
Vilevo Biova Devo
CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE
L’UNION MONETAIRE OUEST
AFRICAINE
Alice Anthony-Diomande
FADIKA-DELAFOSSE, K.FADIKA
ET C. KACOUTIÉ
Geneviève Brou
CABINET N’GOAN,ASMAN &
ASSOCIÉS
Jean-François Chawuveau
CABINET JEAN-FRANÇOIS
CHAUVEAU
Jean-Charles Daguin
FIDAFRICA, MEMBER OF
PRICEWATERHOUSE
Simon Silue Dognima
FADIKA-DELAFOSSE, K.FADIKA
ET C. KACOUTIÉ
Karim Fadika
FADIKA-DELAFOSSE, K.FADIKA
ET C. KACOUTIÉ
Seyanne Groga
CABINET JEAN-FRANÇOIS
CHAUVEAU
Colette Kacoutie
FADIKA-DELAFOSSE, K.FADIKA
ET C. KACOUTIÉ
Noel Koffi
CABINET NOËL Y. KOFFI
Gerard Kone Dogbenin
SCPA NAMBEYA-DOGBEMIN ET
ASSOCIES
Jacques Raphaël Kouassi
CABINET N’GOAN,ASMAN &
ASSOCIÉS
Serge Messou
FIDAFRICA, MEMBER OF
PRICEWATERHOUSE
Ghislaine Moise-Bazie
SCPA KONATE, MOISE-BAZIE &
KOYO
Vanie Nadia
CABINET N’GOAN,ASMAN &
ASSOCIÉS
Francois Nare
CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE
L’UNION MONETAIRE OUEST
AFRICAINE
Georges N’Goan
CABINET N’GOAN,ASMAN &
ASSOCIÉS
Dominique Taty
FIDAFRICA, MEMBER OF
PRICEWATERHOUSE
Léon Désiré Zalo
MINISTÈRE D’ETAT,MINISTÈRE
DE L’AGRICULTURE
CROATIA
Tatjana Arapinac
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
Mladen Duliba
CROATIAN NATIONAL BANK
Bojan Fras
URIC I PARTNERI
Beata Glinska Kovac
URIC I PARTNERI
Marijan Hanzekovic
HANZEKOVIC & RADAKOVIC
Zdenko Haramija
KORPER & HARAMIJA
Marija Haramija
KORPER & HARAMIJA
Dunja Hitrec
ERNST & YOUNG
Irina Jelcic
HANZEKOVIC & RADAKOVIC
Sanja Juric
JURIC LAW OFFICES
Davor Juros
COFACE INTERCREDIT CROATIA
Margita Kis
POROBIJA & POROBIJA
Tarja Krehic-Duranovic
WOLF THEISS
Snjezana Levar
CROATIAN NATIONAL BANK
Jerina Malesevic
KOPRER & HARAMIJA
Fran Marovic
MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, LABOUR
AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Ana Mataga
CROATIAN NATIONAL BANK
Tin Matic
MATIC LAW OFFICES
Iain McGuire
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
Zvonko Nogolica
LAW OFFICES NOGOLICA
Zeljko Pazur
SME UNIT, MINISTRY OF
FINANCE
Sanja Porobija
POROBIJA & POROBIJA LAW FIRM
Vlado Sevsek Varazdin
VLADO SEVSEK & ZELJKA
BRLECIC
Ana Sihtar
SIHTAR ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Stefan Stockinger
WOLF THEISS
M. Lidija Stopfer
VUKMIR
Jane Tait
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
Iva Torik
POROBIJA & POROBIJA LAW FIRM
Hrvoje Vidan
WOLF THEISS
Jasminka Vrbanovic
JASMINKA VRBANOVIC
Ivan Vukas
URIC I PARTNERI
Hrvoje Vukic
VUKIC, JELUšIC, SULINA,
STANKOVIC, JURCAN & JABUKA
Eugen Zadravec
EUGEN ZADRAVEC LAW FIRM
CZECH REPUBLIC
Vladimir Ambruz
AMBRUZ & DARK ADVOKATI
V.O.S.
Libor Basl
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Jarmila Bilkova
PROCHÁZKA RANDL KUBR
Juri Bobek
SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY
Jiri Cerny
PETERKA & PARTNERS
Tomas Denmark
CZECH BANKING CREDIT
BUREAU
Martin Divis
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
Libor Drabek
SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY
Gabriela Hájková
PETERKA & PARTNERS
Vít Horácek
GLATZOVÁ & CO
Sarka Jandova
PROCHÁZKA RANDL KUBR
Michal Koranda
VEJMELKA & WÜNSCH
Andrea Korpasova
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Miroslava Kybalova
AMBRUZ & DARK ADVOKATI
Karol Marsovszky
WOLF THEISS
Jan Molik
JUDR JAN MOLIK ADVOKAT
Jarmila Musilova
CZECH NATIONAL BANK
Ivo Nesrovnal
GLEISS LUTZ ADVOKATI
Dagmar Novakova
PROCHÁZKA RANDL KUBR
Pavla Prikrylova
PETERKA & PARTNERS
Radek Hladky
GLEISS LUTZ
Nataša Randlová
PROCHÁZKA RANDL KUBR
Petr Riha
PROCHÁZKA RANDL KUBR
Zdenek Rosicky
SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY
Daniel Rosicky
PROCHÁZKA RANDL KUBR
Erik Steger
WOLF THEISS
Roman Studnicny
COFACE INTERCREDIT CZECHIA
Ruena Trojánková
LINKLATERS & ALLIANCE
Katerina Trojanova
CZECH BANKING CREDIT
BUREAU
Ludek Vrána
LINKLATERS & ALLIANCE
Vladimir Wagner
CZECH NATIONAL BANK,
BANKING ANALYSES SECTION
Katerina Wlodarczykova
GLATZOVÁ & CO
DENMARK
Elsebeth Aaes-Jørgensen
NORRBOM & VINDING
Christian Andersen
JONAS BRUUN
Jorgen Als Andersen
MARITIME &COMMERCIAL
COURT OF COPENHAGEN
Jens Arnesen
EVERSHEDS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 139
Thomas Bang
LVP LAWYERS LETT,VILSTRUP &
PARTNERE
Claus Bennetsen
ACCURA
Ole Borch
BECH-BRUUN DRAGSTED LAW
FIRM
Lars Buhl
KORT & MATRIKELSTYRELSEN
Jeppe Buskov
KROMANN REUMERT
Mogens Ebeling
JONAS BRUUN
Eivind Einersen
PHILIP & PARTNERE
N.V. Falling Olsen
POUL SCHMITH
KAMMERADVOKATEN
Ulrik Frirs
COMMERCE AND COMPANIES
AGENCY
Henrik Groos
ACCURA
Christian Guldmann
KROMANN REUMERT
Steen Halmind
BECH-BRUUN DRAGSTED LAW
FIRM
Mette Hedelund Thomasen
KROMANN REUMERT
Mikkel Hesselgren
GORRISSEN FEDERSPIEL
KIERKEGAARD, LAW FIRM
Jens Steen Jensen
KROMANN REUMERT
Jørgen B. Jepsen
KROMANN REUMERT
Jørgen Kjærgaard Madsen
KROMANN REUMERT
Jakob Hüttel Larsen
PHILIP & PARTNERE
Pia Moller
DANISH FINANCIAL AUTHORITY
Soren Lehmann Nielsen
HJEJLE, GERSTED & MOGENSEN
Claus Kaare Pedersen
PHILIP & PARTNERE
Christina Prince
MAGNUSSON WAHLIN QVIST
STANBROOK
Louise Krarup Simonsen
KROMANN REUMERT
Kurt Skovlund
KROMANN REUMERT
Jorn Skovslund Hansen
RKI KREDIT INFORMATION
Henrik Stenbjerre
KROMANN REUMERT
Knud Villemoes Hansen
NATIONAL SURVEY AND
CADASTRE – DENMARK /
KORT-OG MATRIKELSTYRELSEN
DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
Adelaida Adames
HEADRICK RIZIK ALVAREZ &
FERNANDEZ
Flavia Baez de George
PELLERANO & HERRERA
Joanna M. Bonnelly Ginebra
STEEL HECTOR DAVIS PEÑA
PRIETO & GAMUNDI
Ana Isabel Caceres
TRONCOSO Y CACERES
Praxedes J. Castillo Baez
CASTILLO Y CASTILLO
Robinson Cuello Shanlate
SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA
Sarah de León
HEADRICK RIZIK ALVAREZ &
FERNANDEZ
Wendy Diaz
WENDY DIAZ & ASSOCIATES
Mary Fernández Rodríguez
HEADRICK RIZIK ALVAREZ &
FERNANDEZ
Wilson Gomez Ramirez
SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA
Franklin M F Guilamo
FIGUEROA GUILAMO
Fabio Guzman
GUZMAN ARIZA
Armando P. Henriquez
STEEL HECTOR DAVIS PEÑA
PRIETO & GAMUNDI
Luis Heredia Bonetti
RUSSIN,VECCHI & HEREDIA
BONETTI
Hipolito Herrera V.
PELLERANO & HERRERA
José Antonio Logroño
Morales
ADAMS GUZMAN & ASOCIADOS
Porfirio Lopez
DATA-CREDITO
Paola Mañón Taveras
HEADRICK RIZIK ALVAREZ &
FERNANDEZ
Xavier Marra
DHIMES & MARRA
Roberto Payano
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS
DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA
Luis Pellerano
PELLERANO & HERRERA
Maria Portes
CASTILLO Y CASTILLO
Claudia Roca
HEADRICK RIZIK ALVAREZ &
FERNANDEZ
Celeste Rodríguez González
RUSSIN,VECCHI & HEREDIA
BONETTI
Jesus R. Almanzar Rojas
DE MARCHENA KALUCHE &
ASOCIADOS
Marcelino San Miguel
CICLA
Wilfredo Senior
HEADRICK RIZIK ALVAREZ &
FERNANDEZ
Juan Suero
AARON SUERO & PEDERSINI
Manuel Tapia
DR. RAMON TAPIA ESPINAL &
ASOC.
Eduardo Trueba
PELLERANO & HERRERA
ECUADOR
Fabián Andrade Narváez
PAZ & HOROWITZ
Ines Baldeon
CONSULTORES ESTRATEGICOS
ASOCIADOS
Lucía Cordero-Ledergerber
FALCONI PUIG ABOGADOS
Fernando del Poso
GALLEGOS & VALAREZO
Antonio Donoso Naranjo
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS E
SEGUROS
José Duran
MOELLER, GÓMEZ-LINCE & CÍA
Luis C. Fernandez
PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE
Juan Carlos Gallegos
GALLEGOS & VALAREZO
Luis Eduardo Garcia
LEGALSA & HEINERT
Ana Maria Gomez
LEGALSA & HEINERT
Silvia Hidalgo-Pallares
PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE
Jacob R. Hidrowoh
PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE
Rodrigo Jijon
PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE
Miguel Macias Carmigniani
MACIAS HURTADO & MACIAS
Heinz Moeller Freile
MOELLER, GÓMEZ-LINCE & CÍA
Paulina Montesdeoca De
Bustamante
MACIAS HURTADO & MACIAS
Jorge Paz Durini
PAZ & HOROWITZ
José M. Pérez
PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE
Sebastian Pérez-Arteta
PEREZ BUSTAMANTE & PONCE
Bruno Pineda-Cordero
PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE
Xavier Amador Pino
ESTIDIO JURIDICO AMADOR
Falconi Puig
FALCONI PUIG ABOGADOS
Sandra Reed
PEREZ BUSTAMENTE & PONCE
ABOGADOS
Maria de los Angeles Roman
FABARA & COMPAÑIA
ABOGADOS
Jose Rumazo Arcos
PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE
Hernan Santacruz
PÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE Y PONCE
Santiago Terán Muñoz
MOELLER, GÓMEZ-LINCE & CÍA
Guillermo Torres
INFAES
EGYPT, ARAB REP
Alaa Amer
CENTRAL AUTHORITY FOR
PROTECTING MANPOWER AND
WORKING ENVIRONMENT,
MINISTRY OF MANPOWER AND
MIGRATION
Nabila Mohamed Habashy Ali
CENTRAL BANK OF EGYPT
Mohamed Ajsa
CENTRAL BANK OF EGYPT
Attef Mohmed Alfeky
ALFEKY SOLIMAN & PARTNERS
ADVOCATES
Sami Barakat
ELGHATIT LAW FIRM
Rania Bata
SARWAT A. SHAHID LAW FIRM
Amal Afifi Dawood
DENTON WILDE SAPTE
Ashraf Elibrachy
IBRACHY & DERMARKAR
Tarek El-Marsafawy
ADEL KAMEL
Sarwat Abd El-Shahid
SARWAT A. SHAHID LAW FIRM, IN
AFFILIATION WITH WEIL,
GOTSHAL & MANGES
Samir El Tagy
CENTRAL AUTHORITY FOR
PROTECTING MANPOWER AND
WORKING ENVIRONMENT,
MINISTRY OF MANPOWER AND
MIGRATION
Ahmed Farid Mohamed
El-Sherbiny
AHMED EL-SHERBINY LAW FIRM
Samiha Fawzy
THE EGYPTIAN CENTER FOR
ECONOMIC STUDIES
Taher Helmy
HELMY, HAMZA & PARTNERS,
MEMBERS OF BAKER &
MCKENZIE
Sara Hinton
TROWERS & HAMLINS
Sadeyaa Ibrahim
CENTRAL AUTHORITY FOR
PROTECTING MANPOWER AND
WORKING ENVIRONMENT,
MINISTRY OF MANPOWER AND
MIGRATION
Karim Adel Kamel
ADEL KAMEL & ASSOCIATES
Mohamed Kamel
AL KAMEL LAW BUILDING,
Reinhard Klarmann
MENA ASSOCIATES
Daniel MacSweeney
TROWERS & HAMLINS
Katerina Miltiadou
MECOS
Ashraf Nadoury
NADOURY & NAHAS
Diaa El-Din Abd Rabou
CENTRAL BANK OF EGYPT
Ingy Rasekh
MENA ASSOCIATES
Ahmed Abdel Reheem
NADOURY & NAHAS S
Hala F. Riad
KOSHERI, RASHED & RIAD
Mohamed Serry
SHALAKANY
Mahmoud Shedid
SHALAKANY
Ragy Soliman
IBRACHY & DERMARKAR
Mohamad Talaat
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Mona Zulficar
SHALAKANY
EL SALVADOR
Francisco Armando Arias
Rivera
F.A. ARIAS & MUNOZ
Ruth Jeannette Cuestas
Ramirez
DIRECCIÓN DE LOS REGISTROS DE
EL SALVADOR
Luis Miguel Espino
ESPINO, NIETO, UMAÑA &
ASSOCIADOS
Roberta Gallardo
F.A. ARIAS & MUNOZ
Juan Carlos Herrera
F.A. ARIAS & MUÑOZ
Thelma Dinora Lizama de
Osorio
SUPERINTENDENCIA DEL SISTEMA
FINANCIERO
Marcela Mancia
F.A. ARIAS & MUNOZ
Diego Martin-Menjivar
ACZALAW
Astrud María Meléndez
TRANSUNION
Mauricio Melhado
GOLD SERVICE S.A. DE C.V
Antonio R Mendez Llort
ROMERO PINEDA & ASOCIADOS
Miriam Eleana Mixco Reyna
GOLD SERVICE S.A. DE C.V
Hilda Morena Segovia
SUPERINTENDENCIA DEL SISTEMA
FINANCIERO, EL SALVADOR
Maria Eugenia Olmedo de
Castaneda
ACZALAW
Celina Padilla
F.A. ARIAS & MUNOZ
Monica Guadalupe Pineda
Machuca
ACZALAW
Ana Patricia Portillo Reyes
GUANDIQUE SEGOVIA
QUINTANILLA
Danilo Rodríguez Villamil
ESPINO, NIETO, UMAÑA &
ASSOCIADOS
Jose Romero
ROMERO PINEDA & ASOCIADOS
Roxana Romero
ROMERO PINEDA & ASOCIADOS
Manuel Telles Suvillaga
LEXINCORP
ESTONIA
Aet Bergmann
TARK & CO.
Heili Haabu
RAIDLA & PARTNERS
Silja Holsmer
LAW FIRM MODY & HÄÄL
GLIMSTEDT
Imanta Hütt
HOUGH, HÜBNER, HÜTT &
PARTNERS

140 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Andres Juss
ESTONIAN LAND BOARD
Igr Kostjuk
HOUGH, HÜBNER, HÜTT &
PARTNERS
Kristi Kullerkup
TARK & CO
Peeter Lepik
LEPIK & LUHAÄÄR
Lea Liigus
SORAINEN
Jaan Lindmäe
TARK & CO
Indrek Link
HOUGH, HÜBNER, HÜTT &
PARTNERS
Marko Mehilane
LEPIK & LUHAÄÄR
Sven Papp
RAIDLA & PARTNERS
Raino Paron
RAIDLA & PARTNERS
Anton Sigal
LEPIK & LUHAÄÄR
Tarmo Sild
LEXTAL LAW FIRM
Tambet Tonisson
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Marit Toom
RAIDLA & PARTNERS
Karolina Ullman
MAGNUSSON WAHLIN QVIST
STANBROOK ADVOKATBYRÅ EESTI
FILIAAL
Urmas Ustav
LEXTAL
Toomas Vaher
RAIDLA & PARTNERS
Vesse Võhma
LEPIK & LUHAÄÄR
ETHIOPIA
Tameru Wondm Agegnehu
TAMERU WONDM AGEGNEHU
Bekure Assefa
BEKURE ASSEFA AND ASSOCIATES
Teshome Gabre-Mariam
Bokan
TESHOME GABRE-MARIAM LAW
FIRM
Berhane Ghebray
BERHANE GHEBRAY AND
ASSOCIATES
Aberra Ketsela
TAMERU WONDM AGEGNEHU
Debebe Legesse
DEBEBE LEGESSE LAW FIRM
Lakew Lemma
NATIONAL BANK OF ETHIOPIA
Mekuria Tafassa
FITANRARI TAFASSA LEGAL FIRM
FIJI
Nehla Basawaiya
MUNRO LEYS
Delores Elliott
DATA BUREAU
Richard Krishnan Naidu
MUNRO LEYS
Mohini Prasad
CROMPTONS
John Ridgway
PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK
LAWYERS
FINLAND
Markku Aaltonen
CONFERERATION OF FINNISH
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES
Ahti Auikolinen
MINISTRY OF LABOR
Claudio Busi
CASTREN & SNELLMAN
Mikko Eerola
WASELIUS & WIST
Timo Esko
ESKO,TIMO & UOTI, SAMI
Pekka Halme
NATIONAL LAND SURVEY OF
FINLAND
Berndt Heikel
HANNES SNELLMAN
Jenni Hupli
CASTREN & SNELLMAN
Raimo Husu
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION
AUTHORITY
Pekka Jaatinen
CASTREN & SNELLMAN
Juuso Jokela
SUOMEN ASIAKASTIETO OY –
FINSKA
Bernt Juthstrom
ROSCHIER-HOLMBERG &
WASELIUS
Kaija Kilappa
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION
AUTHORITY
Gisela Knuts
ROSCHIER-HOLMBERG &
WASELIUS
Pauline Koskelo
THE SUPREME COURT OF
FINLAND
Patrik Lindfors
HANNES SNELLMAN ATTORNEYS
AT LAW
Tomas Lindholm
ROSCHIER-HOLMBERG &
WASELIUS
Jyri Makela
CONFEDERATION OF FINNISH
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES
Mikko Mali
KROGERUS & CO.
Johan Nybergh
HANNES SNELLMAN
Samu Palkonen
ROSCHIER-HOLMBERG &
WASELIUS
Mikko Parjanne
SUOMEN ASIAKASTIETO OY
FINSKA
Kari Parkkinen
HEDMAN OSBORNE CLARKE
ALLIANCE
Sami Pauni
ROSCHIER HOLMBERG,
ATTORNEYS
Johanna Pulli
CASTREN & SNELLMAN
Marja Ramm-Schmidt
KROGERUS & CO.
Bekka Rasane
EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT CENTER
Mikko Reinikainen
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
Sakari E. Sorri
BUTZOW NORDIA
Kenneth Svartström
HANNES SNELLMAN
Sarah Tahkala
HANNES SNELLMAN
Micaela Thorström
ROSCHIER HOLMBERG,
ATTORNEYS
Irmeli Timonen
HANNES SNELLMAN
Sami Tuominen
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
Eeva Vahtera
MINISTRY OF LABOR
Helena Viita
ROSCHIER-HOLMBERG &
WASELIUS
Carita Wallgren
ROSCHIER HOLMBERG,
ATTORNEYS
Gunnar Westerlund
ROSCHIER-HOLMBERG &
WASELIUS
FRANCE
Vincent Asselineau
ASSELINEAU &ASSOCIÉS
Antoine Azam-Darley
AZAM-DARLEY & ASSOCIES
Laurent Barbara
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Nicolas Barberis
ASHURST MORRIS CRISP
Bertrand Barrier
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Safouen Ben Abdallah
CABINET D’AVOCATS SERRES AND
ASSOCIATES
Dorothée Bontoux
ASHURST
Louis Bernard Buchman
CAUBET CHOUCHANA MEYER
Paul Henri de Cabissole
DE PARDIEU BROCAS MAFFEI &
LEYGONIE
Stéphanie Chatelon
DELOITTE & TOUCHE JURIDIQUE
ET FISCAL
Simon Cookson
ASHURST
John D. Crothers
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Bertrand Debosque
BIGNON, LEBRAY, DELSOL &
ASSOCIES
Bertrand Delaunay
ASHURST MORRIS CRISP
Anne Delerable
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Stanislas Dwernicki
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL POLSKA
Xavier-Philippe Gruwez
XP LEGAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
FIRM
Joanna Gumpelson
DE PARDIEU BROCAS MAFFEI &
LEYGONIE
Olivier Jaudoin
SECRETARIAT GÉNÉRALE DE LA
COMMISSION BANCAIRE, BANQUE
DE FRANCE
Marc Jobert
JOBERT & ASSOCIÉS
Odile Lautard
MICAPCOR-DAGEMO, MINISTÈRE
DES AFFAIRES SOCIALES, DU
TRAVAIL ET DE LA SOLIDARIÉ
Patrick Le Moal
MICAPCOR-DAGEMO, MINISTÈRE
DES AFFAIRES SOCIALES, DU
TRAVAIL ET DE LA SOLIDARIÉ
Philippe Lefevre
LEFEVRE PELLETIER & ASSOCIES
Delphine Legras
DUBARRY LE DOUARIN VEIL
Antoine Maffei
DE PARDIEU BROCAS MAFFEI &
LEYGONIE
Geraldine Malinge
KLEIN-GODDARD ASSOCIÉS
Olivia Michaud
LEFÈVRE PELLETIER & ASSOCIÉS,
AVOCATS
Andre Pedron
DELOITTE & TOUCHE JURIDIQUE
ET FISCAL
Bernard Piot
COMPETITION TRIBUNAL &
COMMERCIAL COURT OF PARIS
Philippe Prevost
BANQUE DE FRANCE
Alexia Simon
AZAM-DARLEY & ASSOCIES
Laurent Valadoux
BANQUE DE FRANCE
Jean Luc Vallens
JUDGE
Philippe Xavier-Bender
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
GEORGIA
Irakli Adeishuvili
GEORGIAN LEGAL PARTNERSHIP
Eka Aleksidze
EY LAW
Marekh Amirashvili
AMIRASHVILI, GOGISHVILI &
SHENGELIA
Giorgi Begiashvili
BEGIASHVILI & CO.
Zaza Bibilashvili
EY LAW
Lado Chanturia
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
Irina Gordeladze
GEORGIAN LEGAL PARTNERSHIP
Khatuna Khutsurauli
BUSINESS LEGAL BUREAU
Murtaz Kikoria
NATIONAL BANK OF GEORGIA
Victor Kipiani
MGALOBLISHVILI, KIPIANI,
DZIDZIGURI
Dimitri Kitoshvili
GEORGIAN LEGAL PARTNERSHIP
Archil Melikadze
CENTER FOR ENTERPRISES
RESTRUCTURING AND
MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS
Roin Migriauli
MIGRIAULI & PARTNERS
Avto Namicheishvili
BEGIASHVILI & CO
Joseph Salukvadze
KFW FINANCED CADASTRE AND
LAND REGISTER PROJECT
Kakha O. Sharabidze
BUSINESS LEGAL BUREAU
(IN ASSOCIATION WITH TULLOCH
& CO)
Vakhtang Shepardnadze
MGALOBLISHVILI KIPIANI
DZIDZIGURI
GERMANY
Wulf Bach
SCHUFA
Klaus Berner
NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW
FIRM
Jennifer Bierly-Seipp
GASSNER STOCKMANN &
KOLLEGEN
Simon Cookson
ASHURST
Hans-Joachim Dohr
FEDERAL FINANCIAL
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY
Marc Eumann
JUSTIZMINISTERIUM DES LANDES
NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN
Ute Foshag
HOGAN & HARTSON RAUE
Klaus Günther
OPPENHOFF & RÄDLER-
LINKLATERS & ALLIANCE
Roland Hagemeister
HÖLTERS & ELSING
Manfred Heinrich
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK
Stefan Heyder
NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW
FIRM
Peter Hoegen
ALLEN & OVERY
Hök
LAW FIRM DR. HÖK,
STIEGLMEIER & KOLLEGEN
Andrea Hosenfeld
ASHURST
Markus Jakoby
VELTEN FRANZ JAKOBY
Christof Kautzsch
HAARMANN HEMMELRATH
Bernard Khun
LOVELLS
Rainer Magold
BAKER MCKENZIE
Michael Molitoris
NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW
FIRM
Bernd Oberbossel
BUNDESAMT FÜR FINANZEN
Heike Pospiech
NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW
FIRM
Joerg Rossen
CREDITREFORM

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 141
Günter Schneiders
BUNDESAMT FÜR FINANZEN
Thomas Schulz
NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW
FIRM
Ingrid Seitz
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK
Raphael Söhlke
P + P PÖLLATH + PARTNERS
Markus Stadler
NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW
FIRM
Virginia Strelen
OPPENHOFF & RÄDLER-
LINKLATERS & ALLIANCE
Holger Thomas
SJ BERWIN KNOPF TULLOCH
STEININGER
Michael Unkelbach
KANZLEI UNKELBACH
Frank Vogel
SJ BERWIN KNOPF ULLOCH
STEININGER
Oliver Waldburg
ALLEN & OVERY
Wilhelm Zeddies
WORKING COMMITTEE OF THE
SURVEYING AUTHORITIES OF THE
STATES OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
GHANA
Stella Ackwerth
LAWYER
Larry Adjetey
LAW TRUST COMPANY
Stephen Allen Brobbey
SUPREME COURT OF GHANA
Nene Amegatcher
SAM OKUDZETO & ASSOCIATES
Wilfred Anim-Odame
LAND VALUATION BOARD
Seth Asiama
INSTITUTE OF LAND
MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT
T. Dela Avle
LARYEA, LARYEA & CO.
Reginald Bannerman
BRUCE-LYLE BANNERMAN &
THOMPSON
Kojo Bentsi-Enchill
BENTSI-ENCHILL & LETSA
Stella Bentsi-Enchill
LEXCONSULT AND COMPANY
V.J. Dela Selormey
BANK OF GHANA
Lawrence Fubara Anga
ANGA &EMUWA
William E. Fugar
FUGAR & COMPANY
LEGAL PRACTITIONERS AND
NOTARIES PUBLIC
David A. Hesse
HESSE & LARSEY LAW FIRM
Rosa Kudoadzi
BENTSI-ENCHILL & LETSA
Kenneth D. Laryea
LARYEA, LARYEA & CO.
Samuel L’Quartey
SAMLON CONSTRUCTION
D.A.K. Mensah
CENTRAL DATABANK
Sam Okudzeto
SAM OKUDZETO & ASSOCIATES
Lawrence Otto
FUGAR AND COMPANY
Fred Quarshie
MINISTRY OF FINANCE &
ECONOMIC PLANNING
Issac Quarshie
UNATRAC C/O TRACTOR &
EQUIPMENT GHANA
Jacob Saah
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
GREECE
Themis Antoniou
BANK OF GREECE
Georgios B. Bazinas
ANAGNOSTOPOULOS BAZINAS
FIFIS COUNSELLOR & ATTORNEYS
AT LAW
Ioanna Bokorou
KYRIAKIDES – GEORGOPOULOS
LAW FIRM
Alkistis Christofilou
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
Poulakou Chryssiis
KYRIAKIDES – GEOGROPOULOS
LAW FIRM
Angeliki Delicostopoulou
A & A DELICOSTOPOULOU
Stefanoyannis Economou
ECONOMOU AND ASSOCIATES
Maira Galani
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
Athanassios Kanellopoulos
KALLIMOPOULOS LOUKOPOULOS
CHIOTELLIS
Petros Kapasouris
LAWYER
Catherine M. Karatzas
KARATZAS & PARTNERS
Constantinos Klissouras
ANAGNOSTOPOULOS BAZINAS
FIFIS COUNSELLOR & ATTORNEYS
AT LAW
Ilias Koimtzoglou
ZEPOS & YANNOPOULOS
Nicholas Kontizas
ZEPOS & YANNOPOULOS
Irene C. Kyriakides
KYRIAKIDES – GEORGOPOULOS
LAW FIRM
John C. Kyriakides
KYRIAKIDES – GEOGROPOULOS
LAW FIRM
Vassiliki Lazarakou
ZEPOS & YANNOPOULOS
Konstantinos Mellios
SARANTITIS & PARTNERS
Effie G. Mitsopoulou
KYRIAKIDES – GEOGROPOULOS
LAW FIRM
Dimitris E. Paraskevas
ELIAS SP. PARASKEVAS
Katia J. Protopapa
TRYFON J. KOUTALIDIS
Kleanthis Roussos
ROUSSOS LAW FIRM
Athina Skolarikou
ZEPOS & YANNOPOULOS
Anna Th. Kazantzidou
PANAGOPOULOS,VAINANIDIS,
SCHINA, ECONOMOU
Emmanuela Truli
ZEPOS & YANNOPOULOS
Spyridon Tsallas
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
Tsoumelea Vasiliki
KARATZAS & PARTNERS LAW
FIRM
Victoria Zachopoulou
TIRESIAS
GUATEMALA
Juan Luis Aguilar Salguero
AGUILAR & ZARCEÑO
Silvia Alejos
ARENALES & SKINNER-KLÉE
Ruby Asturias
ACZALAW
Ana Lucia Barrera
ARENALES & SKINNER-KLÉE
Mario Adolfo Búcaro F.
DÍAZ-DURAN & ASOCIADOS
Juan Pablo Cárdenas Villamar
DHV CONSULTANTS
Juan Pablo Carrasco de
Groote
DÍAZ-DURÁN & ASOCIADOS
Alfonso Carrillo
CARRILLO & ASOCIADOS
Rodimiro Castaneda
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS
GUATEMALA
Carlos González Castellanos
RODRÍGUEZ,ARCHILA,
CASTELLANOS, SOLARES &
AGUILAR
Anabella Chaclan
ARENALES & SKINNER-KLÉE
Guillermo Contreras
BANCARED ORBE
Eduardo Dawe
MAYORA & MAYORA
Juan Manuel Díaz-Durán
DIAZ-DURAN ASOCIADOS
Julio Eduardo Camey Silva
REGISTRO GENERAL DE LA
PROPRIEDAD DE GUATEMALA
Juan Pedro Falla
RUIZ SKINNER-KLEE & RUIZ
Gabriela Maria Franco
TRANSUNION
Rodolfo Fuentes
PROTECTORA DE CREDITO
COMERCIAL
Juan Diaz Lopez
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS
GUATEMALA
Eduardo Mayora Dawe
MAYORA & MAYORA
Victor Orantes
PRESA, POLANCO, QUEVEDO,
ORANTES & SISNIEGA
Luis Pellecer
CARRILLO & ASOCIADOS
Claudia Pereira
MAYORA & MAYORA
Diego Polanco
PRESA, POLANCO, QUEVEDO,
ORANTES & SISNIEGA
Lissa Polanco
AGUILAR & ZARCEÑO
Alfredo Rodriguez-Mahuad
RODRÍGUEZ,ARCHILA,
CASTELLANOS, SOLARES &
AGUILAR
Jorge Rolando Barrios
BONILLA, MONTANO &
TORIELLO
Sylvia Ruiz
RUIZ SKINNER-KLEE & RUIZ
Isabel Samayoa
CARRILLO & ASOCIADOS
Luis Turk Mejia
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS
GUATEMALA
Ana Lucía Umaña
MAYORA & MAYORA
Ernesto Viteri Echeverria
VITERI & VITERI
GUINEA
Boubacar Barry
BOUBACAR BARRY LAW FIRM
Ibrahima Diakite
LANDNET
Cheick Mohamed Tidjane
Sylla
BANQUE CENTRALE
HAITI
Steve Christian Brown
BROWN LAW FIRM
Jean Baptiste Brown
BROWN LAW FIRM
Yves Joseph
BANQUE DE LA REPUBLIQUE
D’HAITI
Robert Laforest
CABINET LAFOREST
Louis Gary Lissade
CABINET LISSADE
Salim Succar
CABINET LISSADE
HONDURAS
Gustavo Martin Arguello
ACZALAW
Jorge Omar Casco
BUFETE CASCO & ASOCIADOS
Tania Casco
BUFETE CASCO & ASOCIADOS
Estela Chavez
TRANSUNION
Carment Chavez
COMISION NACIONAL DE BANCOS
Y SEGUROS
Ana Cristina de Pereira
COMISION NACIONAL DE BANCOS
Y SEGUROS
José Dolores Tijerino
BUFETE TIJERINO Y ASOCIADOS
Francisco Guillermo Durón
Lopez
BUFETE DURÓN
León Gómez
B & B ABOGADOS
Laureano Gutierrez Falla
BUFETE GUTIERREZ FALLA
Lynet Kawas
BUFETE GUTIERREZ FALLA
Evangelina Lardizábal
F.A. ARIAS & MUÑOZ
Ulises Mejía León-Gómez
B&B ABOGADOS
F. Dario Lobo
BUFETE GUTIERREZ FALLA
Rene Lopez Rodezno
LOPEZ RODEZNO & ASOCIADOS
Armida Maria Lopez de
Arguello
ACZALAW
Dennis Matamoros Batson
F.A. ARIAS & MUNOZ
Maria Elena Matute Cruz
SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA
Juan Carlos Mejia Cotto
OFICINA DE MODERNIZACIÓN DE
REGISTROS DE LA PROPIEDAD
Enrique Ortez Sequeira
ORTEZ SEQUEIRA & ASSOCIATES
Jose Ramon Paz
J. R. PAZ & ASOCIADOS
José Rafael Rivera Ferrari
J.R. PAZ & ASOCIADOS
Enrique Rodriguez Burchard
ABOGADOS Y ASESORES
Roberto Zacarias Jr.
ZACARIAS AGUILAR &
ASOCIADOS
Violeta Zuniga de Godoy
COMISION NACIONAL DE BANCOS
Y SEGUROS
HONG KONG,
CHINA
Fk Au
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Andrew Baggio
BAKER & MCKENZIE
David Bateson
MALLESONS STEPHEN JAQUES
Charles D. Booth
UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG
Stephen Briscoe
RSM NELSON WHEELER
CORPORATE ADVISORY SERVICES
Nicholas Chan
SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY, IN
ASSOCIATION WITH BOUGHTON
PETERSON YANG ANDERSON
Albert PC Chan
THE HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC
UNIVERSITY
Wendy Chiu
UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG
Paul Fox
THE HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC
UNIVERSITY
Glenda Fung
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Tammy Goh
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Ramona Ho
SIT, FUNG, KWONG & SHUM
Cindy Lam
THE LAND REGISTRY
David Lawrence
DEACONS
Teresa Ma
LINKLATERS

142 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Richard Mazzochi
MALLESONS STEPHEN JAQUES
Rupert Nicholl
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Steven M. W. Shum
SIT, FUNG, KWONG & SHUM
Philip Smart
UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG
Thomas So
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Nina Sze
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Richard Tollan
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Sara Tong
TEMPLE CHAMBERS
Thomas P.J. Vaizey
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Stephen Vine
ANGELA WANG & CO
Raymond Wong
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Patrick Wong
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Sandy H.Y. Wong
DIBB LUPTON ALSOP
James Wong
THE HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC
UNIVERSITY
Shirley Yuen
TRANSUNION
Alex Yuen
TRANSUNION
HUNGARY
Csendes Agnes
DESSEWFFY, BELLÁK & PARTNERS
Geza Apagyi
DIVISION OF LAND
REGISTRATION, DEPT. OF LANDS
AND MAPPING, MINISTRY OF
AGRICULTURE AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT
András Békés
HUNGARIAN LABOUR
INSPECTORATE
Péter Berethalmi
NAGY ÉS TRÓCSÁNYI
Barbara Bognar
HUNGARIAN FINANCIAL
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY
Zsuzsanna Cseri
BARD CSERI AND PARTNERS
Tunde Ezsias
COFACE INTERCREDIT HUNGARY
Gabor Fejes
OPPENHEIM & PARTNERS
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS
DERINGER
Gábor Felsen
KÖVES CLIFFORD CHANCE
PÜNDER
Gyula Gábriel
BOGSCH & PARTNERS
Anna Gaspar
BUILD & ECON HUNGARY
Gábor Horvàth
OPPENHEIM ÈS TÀRSAI
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS
DERINGER
Andrea Jádi Németh
HAARMANN HEMMELRATH
Zoltan Krausz
BUILD & ECON HUNGARY
Olga Latkoczy
DEPT. OF LANDS AND MAPPING,
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND
RURAL DEVELOPMENT
Zoltan Marosi
OPPENHEIM & PARTNERS
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS
DERINGER
Ferenc Mátrai
HAYHURST ROBINSON
Túri Melinda
NAGY ÉS TRÓCSÁNYI
Istvan Nagy
CREDITREFORM INTERINFO
Péter Nógrádi
NÓGRÁDÍ
Klara Oppenheim
OPPENHEIM & PARTNERS
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS
DERINGER
Adam Petho
BISZ
Csaba Pigler
NAGY ÉS TRÓCSÁNYI
Tamas Saad
BUILD & ECON HUNGARY
Konrad Siegler
MARTONYI ÉS KAJTÁR BAKER &
MCKENZIE
Benedek Sipöcz
DEWEY BALLANTINE
Gábor Spitz
HAARMANN HEMMELRATH
Csaba Szabó
DESSEWFFY, BELLÁK & PARTNERS
Ágnes Szent-Ivány
SÁNDOR, SZEGEDI, SZENT-IVÁNY
Csaba Szoke
BOGSCH & PARTNERS
Judit Torok
SUPREME COURT OF HUNGARY
Melinda Turi
NAGY ÉS TRÓCSÁNYI
Zoltan Varszegi
DEZSORETI & ANTALL
LANDWELL
Erica Voros
HUNGARIAN FINANCIAL
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY
Hermann Zsofia
HAYHURST ROBINSON
INDIA
Raj Pal Arora
BUILDERS’ ASSOCIATION OF
INDIA
V C Augustine
DEPARTMENT OF BANKING
SUPERVISION
Harminder Chawla
CHAWLA & CO.
Sumeeta Choudhari
FOX MANDAL
Freyan Desai
KACHWAHA & PARTNERS
Rajkumar Dubey
SINGHANIA & CO.
R.J. Gagrat
GAGRAT & CO-ADVOCATES &
SOLICITORS
Trupti Garach
BRAND FARRAR BUXBAUM
Nirmala Gill
LITTLE & CO
Vijay Goel
SINGHANIA & CO.
Akil Hirani
MAJMUDAR & CO.
Toral Jhaveri
FOX MANDAL
Ravi Kulkarni
LITTLE & CO
Prachi Puri Malhotra
KACHWAHA & PARTNERS
Som Mandal
FOX MANDAL
Vipender Mann
CHAWLA & CO.
Stephen Mathias
KOCHHAR & CO BANGALORE
Ganpat Raj Mehta
THE BANK OF RAJASTHAN
Dara Mehta
LITTLE & CO
S.K. Mitra
INDIAN INVESTMENT CENTER
Ajit Mittal
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA
Vijay Nair
CHAWLA & CO.
Ravi Nath
RAJINDER NARAIN & CO.
Shreyas Patel
FOX MANDAL
M Prabhakaran
CONSULTA JURIS
Madhu Radhakrishnan
RADHAKRISHNAN & CO
K.K. Ramani
LAWS4INDIA
K. V. Ramesh
KOCHHAR & CO.
Dipak Rao
SINGHANIA & PARTNERS
Sameer Rastogi
SINGHANIA & CO.
Abhishek Saket
SINGHANIA & CO.
Radhika Sankaran
FOX MANDAL
Shekar Saraf
MR SHEKAR SARAF,ADVOCATE
Shardul S. Shroff
AMARCHAND MANGALDAS
Vikram Shroff
NISHITH DESAI ASSOCIATES
D.C. Singhania
SINGHANIA & CO.
Ravi Singhania
SINGHANIA & PARTNERS
A. Sivananthiram
SUBREGIONAL ILO OFFICE
Suhas Srinivasiah
KOCHHAR & CO BANGALORE
K. Suresh
STARTUPBAZAAR
S.N. Variava
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.R. Viswanathan
CREDIT INFORMATION BUREAU
INDIA
INDONESIA
John Andre Panggabean
ALI BUDIARDJO, NUGROHO,
REKSODIPUTRO
Theodoor Bakker
ALI BUDIARDJO, NUGROHO,
REKSODIPUTRO
Hamud M. Balfas
ALI BUDIARDJO, NUGROHO,
REKSODIPUTRO
Fabian Buddy Pascoal
HANAFIAH PONGGAWA BANGUN
Jenny Budiman
MAKARIM & TAIRA S.
Ayik Candrawulan Gunadi
ALI BUDIARDJO, NUGROHO,
REKSODIPUTRO
Emilia L.C. van Egmond-de
Wilde de Ligny
EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF
TECHNOLOGY
H.M.U. Fachri Asaari, S.H.
WARENS & ACHYAR
Aprilda Fiona
FIONA, RAHMAN & PARTNERS
Yulian Hadromi
HADROMI & PARTNERS
Riza Haryadi
BANK INDONESIA
Erwandi Hendarta
HADIPUTRANTO, HADINOTO &
PARTNERS, AN INDONESIAN
CORRESPONDENT FIRM OF BAKER
& MCKENZIE
Rahayu N. Hoed
MAKARIM & TAIRA S
Darrell R. Johnson
SSEK INDONESIAN LEGAL
CONSULTANTS
Stephanus Jonathan
HADROMI & PARTNERS
Galinar Kartakusuma
MAKARIM & TAIRA S.
Vyati Kartika Sari, SH
LUBIS GANIE SUROWIDJOJO
Keat Lee
LAWYER
Timbul Thomas Lubis
LUBIS GANIE SUROWIDJOJO
Bill MacDonald
PRICEWATERHOUSECOPPERS
Ferry Madian
NUGROHO REKSODIPUTRO
Yoga Mulya
HADIPUTRANTO, HADINOTO &
PARTNERS
Ali Imron Murim
CENTRAL BANK OF INDONESIA
Luhut Pangaribuan
LUHUT M.P. PANGARIBUAN &
PARTNERS
Arwin Rasyid
BANK NEGARA INDONESIA
Inge Resdiano
MAKARIM & TAIRA S.
Julinorita Simatupang
LUBIS GANIE SUROWIDJOJO,
LAW FIRM
Eman Achmad Sulaeman
LUBIS, SANTOSA & MAULANA
Helen Sunarjo
MAKARIM & TAIRA S.
Mahdi Syahbuddin
BANK PERMATA
Ernst G. Tehuteru
ALI BUDIARDJO, NUGROHO,
REKSODIPUTRO
Irene Vloerberg
EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF
TECHNOLOGY
Pudji Wahjuni Purbo
MAKARIM & TAIRA S.
Brian J. Wesol
ALI BUDIARDJO, NUGROHO,
REKSODIPUTRO
IRAN, ISLAMIC REP.
Mohammad Adib
ADIB LAW FIRM
Alexander Aghayan
ALEXANDER AGHAYAN &
ASSOCIATES
Behrooz Akhlaghi
DR. BEHROOZ AKHLAGHI &
ASSOCIATES
Reza Askari
FOREIGN LEGAL AFFAIRS GROUP
Albert Bernardi
ALBERT BERNARDI & ASSOCIATES
Ali Hatami
DR. BEHROOZ AKHLAGHI &
ASSOCIATES
Katerina Miltiadou
MECOS
Shahla Pournazeri
SHAHLA POURNAZERI &
ASSOCIATES
Yahya Rayegani
LAWYER
Seyed Mehdi Salyani
BANKING INFORMATION
DEPARTMENT
Parviz Savrai
DR. PARVIZ SAVRAI AND
ASSOCIATES
M. Shahabi
TAVAKOLI & SHAHABI,
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS
AT LAW
B.F. Zarin-Ghalam
CENTRAL BANK OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN
IRELAND
Andrew Bates
DILLON EUSTACE
Declan Black
MASON HAYES & CURRAN
Daniel Boland
ARTHUR COX
Alan Browning
L. K. SHIELDS
Tanya Colbert
MASON HAYES & CURRAN
Gerard Coll
EUGENE F. COLLINS
Anthony E. Collins
EUGENE F. COLLINS
Kathryn Copeland
CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 143
Gavin Doherty
EUGENE F. COLLINS
John Doyle
DILLON EUSTACE
Patricia Heffernan
O’DONNELL SWEENEY
Steven Hegarty
ARTHUR COX
Melissa Jennings
ARTHUR COX
William Johnston
ARTHUR COX
Andrew Mawdsley
LAWYER
Robin McDonnell
EUGENE F. COLLINS
Patricia McGovern
L. K. SHIELDS
Michael Meghen
ARTHUR COX
David O’Donohoe
ARTHUR COX
Barry O’Neill
EUGENE F. COLLINS
Maurice Phelan
MASON HAYES & CURRAN
Sinead Power
IRISH CREDIT BUREAU
Jonathan Sheehan
ARTHUR COX
Gavin Simons
EUGENE F. COLLINS
Seamus Tighearnaigh
IRISH CREDIT BUREAU
Michael Treacy
LAND REGISTRY
Ted Williams
ARTHUR COX
Gillian Woods
ARTHUR COX
ISRAEL
Eli Arbel
BANK OF ISRAEL
Avie Arenson
A. ARENSON
Paul Baris
YIGAL ARNON & CO
Ofer Bar-On
SAVIT BAR-ON INBAR
Sabina Blank
SMALL BUSINESS AUTHORITY OF
ISRAEL
Dina Brown
ELCHANAN LANDAU
Clifford Davis
S. HOROWITZ & CO.
Amihud Doron
AMIHUD DORON & CO.
David Drutman
AMIHUD DORON & CO.
Alex Hertman
S. HOROWITZ & CO.
Pinchas Katz
BANK OF ISRAEL
Gideon Koren
BEN ZVI KOREN
Michelle Liberman
S. HOROWITZ & CO.
Jackob Melcer
E.S. SHIMRON, I.MOLHO,
PERSKY & CO.
Zvi Howard Nixon
ELCHANAN LANDAU
Galit Rozovsky
YUVAL LEVY & CO
Eliot Sacks
HERZOG, FOX & NEEMAN
Yaacov Salomon
LIPSCHUTZ & CO
Asaf Samuel
LIPSCHUTZ & CO
Ron Storch
GLOBAL CREDIT SERVICES
Dror Vigdor
YIGAL ARNON & CO
Tomer Wisblech
YIGAL ARNON & CO
ITALY
Giuseppe Alemani
CURTIS, MALLET-PREVOST, COLT
& MOSLE
Gilioli Alemani
BOCCHIOLA TAMBURINI E
PARTNERS
Maria Pia Ascenzo
BANK OF ITALY
Gilles Blanchi
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
LAW ORGANIZATION
Gian Bruno Bruni
BRUNI GRAMELLINI E ASSOCIATI
Enrico Bugielli
VERUSIO E COSMELLI STUDIO
LEGALE
Sergio Calderara
NUNZIANTE MAGRONE
Filippo Cecchetti
CHIOMENTI STUDIO LEGALE
Domenico Colella
PORTOLANO COLELLA CAVALLO
PROSPERETTI STUDIO LEGALE
Simon Cookson
ASHURST
Barbara Corsetti
PORTOLANO COLELLA CAVALLO
PROSPERETTI STUDIO LEGALE
Luisa Cucchi
JONES DAY
Lisa Curran
ALLEN & OVERY
Antonio de Martinis
SPASARO MISURACA &
ASSOCIATES
Federico Dettori
GIANNI, ORIGONI, GRIPPO &
PARTNERS
Roberto Donnini
ALLEN & OVERY
Alberto Maria Fornari
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Giuseppe Godano
BANK OF ITALY
Giovanni Izzo
ABBATESCIANNI E ASSOCIATI
Enrico Lodi
CRIF
Giuseppe Lombardi
PEDERSOLI LOMBARDI E
ASSOCIATI
Stefano Macchi di Cellere
JONES DAY
Fabrizio Mariotti
STUDIO LEGALE BELTRAMO
Ida Marotta
ALLEN & OVERY
Daniela Marrani
PORTOLANO COLELLA CAVALLO
PROSPERETTI STUDIO LEGALE
Eva Maschietto
ASHURST
Pier Andrea Fré Torelli
Massini
CARNELUTTI
Maria Grazia Medici
VERUSIO E COSMELLI STUDIO
LEGALE
Francesco Misuraca
SPASARO MISURACA &
ASSOCIATES LAW FIRM
Luciano Panzani
SUPREME COURT OF ITALY
Francesco Pensato
FRANZOSI DAL NEGRO
Catherine Perrigaud
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
LAW ORGANIZATION
Barbara Picchi
BANCA D’ITALIA
Andrea Rescigno
WHITE & CASE,VARRENTI E
ASSOCIATI – MILAN
Beatrice Rubini
CRIF
Nerio Saguatti
CONSORZIO PER LA TUTELA DEL
CREDITO
Marco Sella
STUDIO LEGALE MACCHI DI
CELLERE E GANGEMI
Pensato Setti
STUDIO LEGALE MACCHI DI
CELLERE E GANGEMI
Daniela Sgro
SPASARO MISURACA &
ASSOCIATES LAW FIRM
Piervincenzo Spasaro
SPASARO MISURACA &
ASSOCIATES LAW FIRM
Vittorio Tadei
CHIOMENTI STUDIO LEGALE
Antonella Tanico
LAWYER
Fabio Tortora
EXPERIAN CREDIT BUREAU
Luca Tufarelli
RISTUCCIA & TUFARELLI
Vito Vittore
NUNZIANTE MAGRONE
Giulio Cesare Zanetti
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
LAW ORGANIZATION
JAMAICA
Christopher D. R. Bovell
DUNNCOX
Russlyn Combie Sykes
NUNES, SCHOLEFIELD DELEON &
CO.
Elise Douet
BANK OF JAMAICA
Dave L. Garcia
MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON
Peter Goldson
MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON
Tamara Green
MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON
Gayon Hosin
BANK OF JAMAICA
Anthony Jenkinson
NUNES, SCHOLEFIELD DELEON &
CO.
Derek Jones
MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON
Derek N. Jones
MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON
Norman Minott
MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON
Janet Morgan
DUNNCOX
Suzette Moss
MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON
Rosie Plant
INCORPORATED MASTERBUILDERS
ASSOCIATION OF JAMAICA
Alfred A. O.J. Rattray
RATTRAY,PATTERSON, RATTRAY
Alfred A. Rattray
MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON
Stuart Stimpson
MYERS, FLETCHER & GORDON
Humprey Taylor
TAYLOR CONSTRUCTION
Karen Wilson
RATTRAY,PATTERSON, RATTRAY
JAPAN
Shinichiro Abe
BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN
Naoki Eguchi
TOKYO AOYAMA AOKI/BAKER &
MCKENZIE
Tamotsu Hatasawa
HATASAWA & WAKAI LAW FIRM
Kaoru Hattori
ASAHI KOMA
Shigetoshi Hirano
OH-EBASHI LPC & PARTNERS
Yosuke Kanegae
OH-EBASHI LPC & PARTNERS
Osamu Kawakami
JAPAN INFORMATION CENTER
CORP
Takaya Konishi
ASAHI KOMA
Nobuaki Matsuoka
YAMAGUCHI INTERNATIONAL
Toshio Miyatake
LAW FIRM ADACHI HENDERSON
MIYATAKE & FUJITA
Satoshi Ogishi
NISHIMURA & PARTNERS
Yuji Onuki
ASAHI KOMA
Satoshi Otana
JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE
ORGANIZATION
Jeremy Pitts
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Tetsuro Sato
ASAHI KOMA
Tomoe Sato
CREDIT INFORMATION CENTER
CORP
Setsuko Sato
CCB
Hiromasa Shiozaki
ASAHI KOMA
Gaku Suzuki
ASAHI KOMA
Yuko Takagi
FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY
Shinjiro Takagi
INDUSTRIAL REVITALIZATION
CORPORATION OF JAPAN
Takanobu Takehara
NISHIMURA & PARTNERS
Kenji Utsumi
NAGASHIMA OHNO &
TSUNEMATSU
Tadeshi Yokoyama
FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY
Setsuko Yufu
ATSUMI & PARTNERS
JORDAN
Ala’a Abdel-Hadi
RAHHAL AND ASSOCIATES
Salah el Dine Al Bashir
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LEGAL
ASSOCIATES
Ola Al Kadi
ALI SHARIF ZU’BI & SHARIF ALI
ZU’BI
Eman M. Al-Dabbas
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LEGAL
ASSOCIATES
Sami E. Al-Louzi
ALI SHARIF ZU’BI & SHARIF ALI
ZU’BI
Ali Al-Masri
KHALAF MASA’DEH & PARTNERS
Sahar Anani
ALI SHARIF ZU’BI & SHARIF ALI
ZU’BI
Arar Batarseh
KHALAF MASA’DEH & PARTNERS
Nelly Batchoun
CENTRAL BANK OF JORDAN
Francis Bawab
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
Micheal T. Dabit
MICHEAL DABIT & ASSOCIATES
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Saleh Abd El-Ati
ALI SHARIF ZU’BI & SHARIF ALI
ZU’BI
Masoud Sakfal Hait
ALI SHARIF ZU’BI & SHARIF ALI
ZU’BI
Nissreen Haram
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LEGAL
ASSOCIATES
Sa’ed Karajah
KARAJAH & ASSOCIATES
Fadi Kawar
ALI SHARIF ZU’BI & SHARIF ALI
ZU’BI
Alá Khalifeh
KHALIFEH & PARTNERS

144 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Youssef Khalilieh
RAJAI DAJANI & ASSOCIATES
Firas Malhas
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LEGAL
ASSOCIATES
Ahmad Masa’deh
KHALAF MASA’DEH & PARTNERS
Khaldoun Nazer
KHALIFEH & PARTNERS
Shireen Okkeh
ALI SHARIF ZU’BI & SHARIF ALI
ZU’BI
Naif Salem
JORDANIAN CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION
Faris Sharaf
CENTRAL BANK OF JORDAN
Iyad Zawaideh
ALI SHARIF ZU’BI & SHARIF ALI
ZU’BI
Shadi Zghoul
DAJANI & ASSOCIATES
Ali Sharif Zu’bi
ALI SHARIF ZU’BI & SHARIF ALI
ZU’BI
KAZAKHSTAN
Ahmetzhan Abdulaev
GRATA
Madiar Balken
GRADUATE LAW ADADEMY
ADILET
John W. Barnum
MCGUIREWOODS
Alexander Baruskov
MCGUIREWOODS
Yuri Bassin
AEQUITAS
Yuri A. Bolotov
MICHAEL WILSON & PARTNERS
Olga Chentsova
AEQUITAS
Mariya Gekko
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Kulyash Muratovna Ilyasova
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE
FOR PRIVATE LAW,HUMANITIES
AND LAW UNIVERSITY
Eric Imashev
MCGUIREWOODS KAZAKHSTAN
Dina Khakimzhanova
SALANS
Yelena Manayenko
AEQUITAS
Marat Kh. Muzdubaev
LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE &
MACRAE
Kamilya T. Nurpeissova
LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE &
MACRAE
Snezhana V. Popova
MCGUIREWOODS KAZAKHSTAN
Jazykbaeva Raushan
AEQUITAS LAW FIRM
Richard Remias
MCGUIREWOODS KAZAKHSTAN
Sanzhar Shaimardanov
MCGUIREWOODS KAZAKHSTAN
Tatyana Suleyeva
AEQUITAS LAW FIRM
Maxim Telemtayev
MCLEOD DIXON
Assel Tokusheva
MCGUIREWOODS KAZAKHSTAN
Marla Valdez
DENTON WILDE SAPTE
Aidar Yegeubayev
BRACEWELL & PATTERSON
Natalie Yelizarova
ZHAKENOV AND PARTNERS, IN
AFFILIATION WITH WHITE
SAVELIEVA
Aiman Yerenova
AEQUITAS LAW FIRM
Carter Younger
MCGUIREWOODS
Valerie Zhakenov
ZHAKENOV AND PARTNERS, IN
AFFILIATION WITH WHITE
SAVELIEVA
Rima Zhakupova
SALANS
Ivan A. Zaitsev
MCGUIREWOODS
KENYA
Amoyo Andibo
METROPOL EAST AFRICA
K.S. Anjarwalla
KAPILA ANJARWALLA & KHANNA
ADVOCATES
Philip Coulson
KAPLAN & STRATTON
W.S. Deverell
KAPLAN & STRATTON
Oliver Fowler
KAPLAN & STRATTON
Fiona Fox
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
Peter Gachuhi
KAPLAN & STRATTON
James Kamau
ISEME, KAMAU & MAEMA
ADVOCATES
Sheetal Kapila
KAPILA ANJARWALLA & KHANNA
ADVOCATES
Kamau Karori
ISEME, KAMAU & MAEMA
ADVOCATES
Hamish Keith
DALY & FIGGIS ADVOCATES
Anthony Kiruma
MUTHOGA, GATURU &
COMPANY ADVOCATES
Henry M Kissinger
METROPOL EAST AFRICA
Alexandra Kontos
WALKER KONTOS ADVOCATES
William Maema
ISEME, KAMAU & MAEMA
ADVOCATES
Andrew Muchigi
ISEME, KAMAU & MAEMA
ADVOCATES
John Murugu
CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA
Benjamin Musau
B M MUSAU & CO.ADVOCATES
Lee Muthoga
MUTHOGA, GATURU &
COMPANY ADVOCATES
Wanjiru Nduati
KAPLAN & STRATTON
Conrad Nyakuri
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
Virginia Nzioka
B M MUSAU & CO.ADVOCATES
Fred Ochieng
KAPLAN & STRATTON
Richard Omwela
HAMILTON HARRISON &
MATHEWS LAW FIRM
Tom Onyango
OCHIENG, ONYANGO, KIBET &
OHAGA,ADVOCATES
Sonal Sejpal
KAPILA ANJARWALLA & KHANNA
ADVOCATES
Rina Thakar
WALKER KONTOS ADVOCATES
Fred Waithaka
KAPLAN & STRATTON
Cilla White
KAPLAN & STRATTON
KIRIBATI ISLANDS
John Ridgway
PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK
LAWYERS
KOREA, REP
Won-Mo Ahn
AHN & CHANG
Jae Won Bae
HWANG MOK PARK
Yong S. Bae
SOJONG PARTNERS
Duck-Soon Chang
FIRST LAW OFFICES OF KOREA
Dean Fealk
KIM & CHANG
Shin Hi-Taek
KIM & CHANG
Ju Myung Hwang
HWANG MOK PARK, P.C.
C W Hyun
KIM & CHANG
Park Jaewan
SEOUL DISTRICT COURT
James (Ik-Soo) Jeon
SOJONG PARTNERS
Young-Cheol Jeong
WOO YUN KANG JEONG & HAN
Eui Jong Chung
BAE, KIM & LEE
Gee Hong Kim
HORIZON LAW GROUP
Daniel Y. Kim
SOJONG PARTNERS
Sung Jin Kim
WOO YUN KANG JEONG & HAN
K.C. Lee
KISC, KOREA TRADE-
INVESTMENT PROMOTION
AGENCY
Dong Myung Lee
ICHON DISTRICT COURT
Gahng Hee Lee
MINISTRY OF LABOR
Sung Whan Lee
AHNSE
Dong Chin Lim
CHUNG & SUH ATTORNEYS AT
LAW
Joshua Margolis
HWANG MOK PARK
Sung-Ho Moon
HORIZON LAW GROUP
Sang Il Park
HWANG MOK PARK
Paul Stephan Penczner
KIM AND CHO
Ae-Ryun Rho
KIM & CHANG
James Rim
JUNGMIN
Kyung-Han Sohn
ARAM INTERNATIONAL
Sung-il Yang
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE
KUWAIT
Walid Abd Elrahim Ahmed
ABDULLAH KH.AL-AYOUB &
ASSOCIATES
Abdullah Al-Ayoub
ABDULLAH KH.AL-AYOUB &
ASSOCIATES
Mishare M. Al-Ghazali
MISHARE M. AL-GHAZALI &
PARTNERS
Reema Ali
ALI & PARTNERS
Ruba El- Habel
ABDULLAH KH.AL-AYOUB &
ASSOCIATES
Sam Habbas
AL SARRAF & AL RUWAYEH, IN
ASSOCIATION WITH STEPHENSON
HARWOOD
Nazih Abdul Hameed
AL-SALEH & PARTNERS
Rafiq Jaffer
ABDULLAH KH.AL-AYOUB &
ASSOCIATES
Jasmin P. Kohina
ABDULLAH KH.AL-AYOUB &
ASSOCIATES
Mohammad H. Omar
ABDULLAH KH.AL-AYOUB &
ASSOCIATES
Adel Sami
MISHARI AL-GHAZALI &
PARTNERS
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
Elmurat Abdraimov
IN AFFILIATION WITH DIGNITAS
Rosa Abirova
MCLEOD DIXON
Julia Bulatova
LAW FIRM “PARTNER”
Tania Chogai
DIGNITAS
John Corrigan
LEBOEUF LAMB GREENE &
MACRAE
Anna Fomina
IN AFFILIATION WITH DIGNITAS
Natalia Sidorovna Galiamova
THIRD ARBITRAGE COURT
David Greer
ARD/CHECCHI
Gulnara Kalikova
DIGNITAS
Temir Kazy
IN AFFILIATION WITH DIGNITAS
Alexander Korchagin
BAKER & MCKENZIE, CENTRAL
ASIA
Curtis Masters
BAKER & MCKENZIE, CENTRAL
ASIA
Emil Oskonbale
SPHYNX CONSULT
Bakytbek Saparaliev
DIGNITAS
Mirgul Smanalieva
LAW FIRM “PARTNER”
Aisuluu Subanbekova
IN AFFILIATION WITH DIGNITAS
Nurlanbek Tynaev
NATIONAL BANK OF THE KYRGYZ
REPUBLIC
Larisa Tashtemirovna
Zhanibekova
LAWYER
LAO PDR
Lasonexay Chanthavong
MEKONG LAW GROUP
Louis-Martin Desautels
MEKONG LAW GROUP
Edward Nicholas
MEKONG LAW GROUP
Isabelle Robineau
MEKONG LAW GROUP
Audray Souche
MEKONG LAW GROUP
LATVIA
Ilze Abika
SKUDRA & UDRIS
Ilze Baltmane
BALTMANE & BITANS
Sandis Bertaitis
MARKVARTE & PARTNERI
Mikus Buls
KLAVINS & SLAIDINS
Andis Conka
BANK OF LATVIA
Ivars Grunte
LAW FIRM GRUNTE&CERS
Liga Hartmane
KLAVINS & SLAIDINS
Irina Ivanova
FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL
MARKETS COMMISSION
Dace Jenava
JENAVA BIROJS
Edvins Kapostins
STATE LAND SERVICE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF LATVIA
Filip Klavins
KLAVINS & SLAIDINS
Ludmila Kornijenko
BLUEGER & PLAUDE
Valters Kronbergs
KRONBERGS
Monika Kuprijanova
COUNCIL OF SWORN NOTARIES
OF LATVIA

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 145
Indrikis Liepa
LIEPA, SKOPINA/BORENIUS,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Baiba Plaude
BLUEGER & PLAUDE
Ivars Pommers
ADVOKATFIRMAN GLIMSTEDT
Juris Puce
CREDIT REFORM LATVIA
Inese Rendeniece
LAW FIRM GRUNTE&CERS
Zane Stalberga – Markvarte
MARKVARTE & PARTNERI
Kristine Stege
BALTMANE & BITANS
Anita Tamberga-Salmane
KLAVINS, SLAIDINS & LOZE
Ugis Treilons
KLAVINS & SLAIDINS
Ziedonis Udris
SKUDRA & UDRIS
Asnata Venckava
IGK SYSTEM
Laura Viksna
BANK OF LATVIA
Romualds Vonsovics
LEJINS,TORGANS & VONSOVICS
Daiga Zivtina
KLAVINS & SLAIDINS
LEBANON
Antoine Abbound
ABBOUD & ASSOCIATES
Reem Abou Fadel
MOGHAIZEL
Nada Abu Samra
BADRI AND SALIM EL MEOUCHI
LAW FIRM
Walid Alamuddin
BANKING CONTROL COMMISSION
OF LEBANON
Ramy Aoun
BADRI AND SALIM EL MEOUCHI
LAW FIRM
Raymond Azar
RAYMOND AZAR LAW OFFICES
Jean Baroudi
BAROUDI & ASSOCIATES
Samir Baroudi
BAROUDI & ASSOCIATES
Katia Bou Assi
MOGHAIZEL
Raymonde Eid
BADRI AND SALIM EL MEOUCHI
Salim El Meouchi
BADRI AND SALIM EL MEOUCHI
Ramzi George
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
George Jabre
GEORGE JABRE & ASSOCIATES
Fady Jamaleddine
JAMALEDDINE LAW FIRM
Georges Kadige
KADIGE &KADIGE LAW FIRM
Albert Lahan
LAW OFFICES OF ALBERT LAHAM
Georges Mallat
HYAM MALLAT
Nabil Mallat
HYAM MALLAT
Yara Maroun
TYAN & ZGHEIB
Katerina Miltiadou
MECOS
Fadi Moghaizel
MOGHAIZEL
Mario Mohanna
GEORGE JABRE & ASSOCIATES
Choucair Najib
BANQUE DU LIBAN
Walid Nasser
WALID NASSER & ASSOCIATES
Toufic Nehme
ALBERT LAHAM
Nady Tyan
TYAN & ZGHEIB
LESOTHO
Stefan Carl Buys
DU PREEZ LIEBETRAU & CO.
Arshad Farouk
DU PREEZ LIEBETRAU & CO.
Graig Grant
WEBBER NEWDIGATE
Margarete Higgs
DU PREEZ LIEBETRAU & CO.
Vuyelwa Kotelo
VVM KOTELO AND CO
Tseliso Daniel Makhaphela
MINISTRY OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
Deborah Mofolo
MOFOLO,TAU – THABANE AND
COMPANY
Lebohang Molete
WEBBER NEWDIGATE
Qhobela Cyprian Selebalo
LAND MANAGEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION
LITHUANIA
Kestutis Adamonis
SORAINEN
Egidijus Bernotas
LAW FIRM “BERNOTAS &
DOMINAS GLIMSTEDT
Renata Beranskiene
SORAINEN
Dovile Burgiene
LIDEIKA, PETRAUSKAS,VALIÛNAS
IR PARTNERIAI
Tomas Davidonis
SORAINEN
Dalia Foigt
LAW FIRM D. FOIGT AND
PARTNERS / REGIJA
Kornelija Francuzeviciute
BANK OF LITHUANIA
Rolandas Galvenas
LIDEIKA, PETRAUSKAS,VALIUNAS
IR PARTNERIAI
Marius Jakulis Jason
AAA LAW FIRM
Mindaugas Kikis
LIDEIKA, PETRAUSKAS,VALIUNAS
IR PARTNERIAI
Jurate Kugyte
LIDEIKA, PETRAUSKAS,VALIUNAS
IR PARTNERIAI
Linas Margevicius
AAA LAW FIRM
Bronislovas Mikuta
STATE ENTERPRISE CENTRE OF
REGISTERS
Marius Navickas
FORESTA BUSINESS LAW GROUP
Ramunas Petravicius
LIDEIKA, PETRAUSKAS,VALIUNAS
IR PARTNERIAI
Kazimieras Ramonas
BANK OF LITHUANIA
Laimonas Skibarka
LIDEIKA, PETRAUSKAS,VALIUNAS
IR PARTNERIAI
Dainius Stasiulis
LAW FIRM “BERNOTAS &
DOMINAS GLIMSTEDT
Marius Urbelis
SORAINEN
Mindaugas Vaiciunas
D. FOIGT AND PARTNERS /
REGIJA
Victor Vaitkevicius
KREDOLINE
Rolandas Valiunas
LIDEIKA, PETRAUSKAS,VALIUNAS
IR PARTNERIAI
Darius Zabiela
LAW FIRM ZABIELA, ZABIELAITE
& PARTNERS
Audrius Vybas
LAW FIRM BERNOTAS &
DOMINAS GLIMSTEDT
MACEDONIA, FYR
Zlatko Antevski
LAWYERS ANTEVSKI
Benita Beleskova
IKRP ROKAS AND PARTNERS
Biljana Cakmakova
MENS LEGIS
Zoran Cvetanoski
STATE AUTHORITY FOR GEODETIC
WORKS
Violeta Angelova Gerovska
IKRP ROKAS AND PARTNERS
SKOPJE
Theodoros Giannitsakis
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
Ilija Graorkovski
NATIONAL BANK OF THE
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
Biljana Joanidis
LAW & PATENT OFFICE JOANIDIS
Dejan Knezovic
KNEZOVIC & ASSOCIATES
Irena Petkovska
LAWYERS ANTEVSKI
Marija Petroska
ECONOMIC CHAMBER OF
MACEDONIA
Kristijan Poolenak
POLENAK
Boris Popovski
IKRP ROKAS AND PARTNERS
SKOPJE
Tatjana Popovski
POLENAK
Ljubica Ruben
MENS LEGIS
Spyridon Tsallas
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
Dragana Vukobrat
NATIONAL BANK OF THE
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
MADAGASCAR
Raphaël Jakoba
MADAGASCAR CONSEIL
INTERNATIONAL
Manantosoa
MADAGASCAR CONSEIL
INTERNATIONAL
Michel Pain
AVOCAT
Justin Radilofe
CABINET RADILOFE
Hanta Radilofe
CABINET RADILOFE
Danielle Rakotomanana
RAKOTOMANANA ADVOCAT AU
BARREAU DE MADAGASCAR
Gerard Ramangaharivony
ETUDE RAMANGAHARIVONY &
RAFANOMEZANA
Theodore Ramangalahy
COMMISSION DE SUPERVISION
BANCAIRE ET FINANCIERE
Edilbert P. Razafindralambo
EDILBERT P. RAZAFINDRALAMBO
Henri Bernard Razakariasa
BANQUE CENTRALE DE
MADAGASCAR
Njiva Razanatsoa
BANQUE CENTRALE DE
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
Robert Atherstone
STUMBLES SACRANIE, GOW &
CO
Marshal Chilenga
TF& PARTNERS
Alan Chinula
WILLIAM FAULKNER,ATTORNEYS
AT LAW
Roseline Gramani
SAVJANI & ASSOCIATES LAW FIRM
S.E. Jussab
SACRANIE, GOW & CO.
Bansri Lakhani
SCRANIE, GOW & CO.
Shabir Latif
SCRANIE, GOW & CO.
W.R. Milonde
RESERVE BANK OF MALAWI
Shepher Mumba
SAVJANI & CO
Ben Ndau
SAVJANI & ASSOCIATES
Temwa Nyirenda
NYIRENDA & MSISHA
D. A. Ravel
WILSON & MORGAN
Krishna Savjani
SAVJANI & ASSOCIATES
Singano
SAVJANI & ASSOCIATES
Samuel Tembenu
TEMBENU MASUMBU & CO
Don Whayo
KNIGHT FRANK
MALAYSIA
Hendun Abd Rahman
AZMI & ASSOCIATES
Wilfred Abraham
MESSRS ZUL RAFIQUE &
PARTNERS
Kunal Chahl
ZAIN & CO
Yun Chang
TAY & PARTNERS
Jean Chitty
AZMI & ASSOCIATES
H.Y. Chong
AZMAN, DAVIDSON & CO
Wong Chong Wah
SKRINE
J. Wilfred Durai
ZAIN & CO
Mohammad Haszri
ABU HASSAN AZMI &
ASSOCIATES
Lim Koon Huan
SKRINE
Khoo Guan Huat
SKRINE
Ng Swee Kee
SHEARN DELAMORE & CO.
Chew Siew Kheam
CENTRAL BANK OF MALAYSIA
Christopher Lee
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Caesar Loong
RASLAN LOONG
Azmi Mohd Ali
AZMI & ASSOCIATES
Rajendra Navaratnam
AZMAN DAVIDSON & CO
Shameer Bin Othman
NIK SAGHIR & ISMAIL
Sbdul Rahim Ali
REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES
Loganath B Sabapathy
LOGAN SABAPATHY & CO
Veerasimir Saraswathi Chitty
AZMI & ASSOCIATES
Chua See Hua
RASLAN LOONG
Tharminder Singh
LOGAN SABAPATHY & CO
Chin Sok Ee
BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA
Francis Tan
AZMAN DAVIDSON & CO
Tuan Zubaidah Tuan Muda
NIK SAGHIR & ISMAIL
Jong Yon Tzan
SHEARN DELAMORE & CO.
Chung Tze Keog
CTOS SDN BHD
Leonard Yeoh
TAY & PARTNERS
Melina Yong
RASLAN LOONG
Datuk Heliliah Yusof
HIGH COURT OF KUALA LUMPUR
Azlan Zain
ZAIN & CO

146 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
MALDIVES
Shuaib M. Shah
SHAH, HUSSAIN & CO.
MALI
Mamadou Dante
CABINET DANTE
Djibril Guindo
P/LA SCPA JURIFIS CONSULT
Seydou Ibrahim Maiga
CABINET D’AVOCATS SEYDOU
IBRAHIM MAIGA
Francois Nare
CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE
L’UNION MONETAIRE OUEST
AFRICAINE
Malick Badara Sow
ATELIER D’ARCHITECTURE ET
D’URBANISME
Ahmadou Toure
ETUDE DE MAÎTRE AHMADOU
TOURE
MARSHALL
ISLANDS
Kenneth E. Barden
LAWYER
MAURITANIA
A.S. Bouhoubeyni
CABINET BOUHOUBEYNI
Brahim Ould Chadli
BANQUE CENTRALE DE
MAURITANIE
Adama Demba Diop
AVOCAT
Oumar Mohamed Moctar
CABINET MAITRE OUMAR
MOHAMED MOCTAR
Yarba Ould Ahmed Saleh
CABINET ME SIDIYA
Aliou Sall
ASSURIM
MEXICO
Miguel Alessio Robles
NOTARIO PUBLICO
David H. Brill
GOODRICH, RIQUELME Y
ASOCIADOS
Gerardo Carreto-Chávez
BARRERA, SIQUEIROS Y TORRES
LANDA
María Casas
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Oscar de la Vega
P. BASHAM RINGE Y CORREA
Luis Duarte Coppel
CERVANTES,AGUILAR ALVAREZ,
SAINZ Y VERDUZCO
David Enríquez
GOODRICH, RIQUELME Y
ASOCIADOS
Eugenia Gonzalez
GOODRICH, RIQUELME Y
ASOCIADOS
Carlos Grimm
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Ali B. Haddou-Ruiz
FEDERAL REGULATORY
IMPROVEMENT COMMISSION
Eduardo Heftye
LOPEZ VELARDE, HEFTYE Y SORIA
Roberto Hernandez Garcia
COMAD
Bill Kryzda
GOODRICH, RIQUELME Y
ASOCIADOS
Jorge León
GOODRICH, RIQUELME Y
ASOCIADOS
Jorge Leon-Orantes
GOODRICH, RIQUELME Y
ASOCIADOS
Rafael Licea Alvarez
CAMARA MEXICANA DE LA
INDUSTRIA DE LA
CONSTRUCCION
Eduardo Llamosa
PROFANCRESA
María Casas Lopez
BAKER MCKENZIE
Enrique Nort
NACIONAL BANCARIA E DE
VALORES
Tatiana Ortega
GOODRICH, RIQUELME Y
ASOCIADOS
Humberto Padilla
RITCH, HEATHER Y MUELLER
Pablo Perezalonso
RITCH, HEATHER Y MUELLER
José Luis Quiroz
MATEOS WINSTEAD Y RIVERA
Rafael Ramirez Arroyo
MARTÍNEZ,ALGABA, ESTRELLA,
DE HARO Y GALVAN-DUQUE
Juan Manuel Rincon
FRANCK, GALICIA Y ROBLES
Irela Robles Victory
SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO
ECONOMICO
Martinez Arrieta Rodríguez
VEGA RUBIO Y ASOCIADOS
Arturo Saavedra Rodríguez
MARTINEZ ARRIETA, RODRÍGUEZ,
VEGA, RUBIO Y ASOCIADOS
Adrián Salgado Morante
COMAD
Carlos Sanchez-Mejorada
SANCHEZ-MEJORADA Y PASQUEL
Cristina Sanchez-Urtiz
MIRANDA, ESTAVILLO, STAINES Y
PIZARRO-SUAREZ
Juan Francisco Torres-Landa
BARRERA, SIQUEIROS Y TORRES
LANDA
Ivonne Uriarte Acosta
BAKER & MCKENZIE.
Jorge Videgaray Verdad
CAMARA MEXICANA DE LA
INDUSTRIA DE LA
CONSTRUCCION
MICRONESIA
Kenneth E. Barden
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, PALAU
Michael Sipos
SIPOS & BERMAN
MOLDOVA
Veronica Bradautanu
TURCAN & TURCAN
David A. Brodsky
BRODSKY USKOV LOOPER REED
& PARTNERS
Mihail Buruiana
BURUIANA & PARTNERS
Procop Buruiana
BURUIANA & PARTNERS
Stela Cibotari
NATIONAL BANK OF MOLDOVA
Victoria Ciofu
NATIONAL BANK OF MOLDOVA
Alexi Ghertescu
BRODSKY USKOV LOOPER REED
& PARTNERS
Nicolae Gorea
GOREA & ASSOCIATES
Victor A. Levintsa
LEVINTSA & ASSOCIATES
ADVOCATE
Lurie Lungu
ADVOCATE
Irina Moghiliova
BRODSKY USKOV LOOPER REED
& PARTNERS
Carolina Muravetchi
TURCAN & TURCAN
Elema Sdimu
BURUIANA & PARTNERS
Maximenco Serghei
BSMB LEGAL COUNSELLORS
Carina Turcan
TURCAN & TURCAN
Alexander Turcan
TURCAN & TURCAN
Irina Verhovetchi
BSMB LEGAL COUNSELLORS
Sirghi Viorel
BSMB LEGAL COUSELLORS
MONGOLIA
Batbold Amarsanaa
ANDERSON & ANDERSON
Bayarmaa Badarch
LYNCH & MAHONEY
N. Bahdal
TSETS
Batzaya Bodikhuu
MONGOL – ADOVATE
David Buxbaum
ANDERSON & ANDERSON
Batbayar Byambaa
LYNCH & MAHONEY
L. Chimgee
BANK OF MONGOLIA
Battsereg Erdenebadrakh
ANDERSON & ANDERSON
Mary Frances Edwards
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS
Ts. Gerelchuluun
ANDERSON & ANDERSON
Batmunkh Javkhlant
ANDERSON & ANDERSON
Maurice M. Lynch
LYNCH & MAHONEY
Daniel Mahoney
LYNCH & MAHONEY
Davaadorj Nomingerel
ANDERSON & ANDERSON
M. Odonhuu
TSETS
Ulziideleg Taivan
CREDIT INFORMATION BUREAU
MOROCCO
Mohamed Mehdi Ibn
Abdeljalil
MOHAMED MEHDI IBN
ABDELJALIL
Richard Cantin
CABINET NACIRI & ASSOCIÉS
Hassan Echawnic
AVOCAT
Frédéric Elbar
CMS BUREAU FRANCIS LEFEBVRE
Myriam Bennani Hajji
AMIN HAJJI & ASSOCIÉS
ASSOCIATION D’AVOCATS
Amin Hajji
AMIN HAJJI & ASSOCIÉS
ASSOCIATION D’AVOCATS
Mohamed Ibn Abdeljalil
MOHAMED IBN ABDELJALIL
Azeddine Kabbaj
KAPPAJ
Azzedine Kettani
KETTANI
Nadia Kettani
KETTANI
Abdelmajid Khachai
Ahmed Lahrache
BANK AL-MAGHRIB
Patrick Larrivé
SCP D’AVOCATS UGGC &
ASSOCIÉS
Anis Mahfoud
CMS BUREAU FRANCIS LEFEBVRE
Hicham Naciri
CABINET NACIRI & ASSOCIÉS
Réda Oulamine
NACIRI & ASSOCIES/ GIDE
LOYRETTE NOUEL
Mehdi Salmouni-Zerhouni
SALMOUNI-ZERHOUNI
Myriam Slaoui
SCP D’AVOCATS UGGC &
ASSOCIÉS
MOZAMBIQUE
Louise Alston
JOSE CALDEIRA & ASSOCIATES
Samuel Alberto Banze
BANK OF MOZAMBIQUE
Ali Eduardo Barrote
BARROTE CONSTRUCOES
Jose Caldeira
JOSE CALDEIRA & ASSOCIATES
Alexandra Carvalho
SOLE PRACTITIONER
André Couto
H. GAMITO, COUTO,
GONCALVES PEREIRA, CASTELO
BRANCO & ASSOCIADO
Pedro Couto
H. GAMITO, COUTO, GONÇALVES
PEREIRA E CASTELO BRANCO &
ASSOCIADOS
Victor Osório de Castro
MIRANDA, CORREIA,
AMENDOEIRA & ASSOCIADOS
Carlos de Sousa e Brito
CARLOS DE SOUSA E BRITO &
ASSOCIADOS
Aquiles Dimene
VASCONCELOS PORTO &
ASSOCIADOS
Maria João Dionísio
MIRANDA, CORREIA,
AMENDOEIRA & ASSOCIADOS
Rodrigo Ferreira Rocha
MIRANDA, CORREIA,
AMENDOEIRA & ASSOCIADOS
Adrian Frey
JOSE CALDEIRA & ASSOCIATES
Rita Furtado
H. GAMITO, CUITO, GONCALVES
PEREIRA, CASTELO BRANCO &
ASSOCIADO
Jane Grob
BANCO AUSTRAL
Manuel Eduardo Guta
MANI ARTE CONSTRUCOES LDA
Cristina Hunguana
H. GAMITO, COUTO, GONÇALVES
PEREIRA E CASTELO BRANCO &
ASSOCIADOS
Rufino Lucas
CONSRUFIL
Gabriel Machado
CONFEDERACAO DAS
ASSOCIACOES ECONOMICAS DE
MOCAMBIQUE
Joao Martins
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
Orquídea Palmíra Massarongo
JOSE CALDEIRA & ASSOCIATES
Jennifer McDonald
NOVOBANCO
Lara Narcy
H. GAMITO, COUTO, GONÇALVES
PEREIRA E CASTELO BRANCO &
ASSOCIADOS
António de Vasconcelos Porto
VASCONCELOS PORTO &
ASSOCIADOS
Rodrigo Ferreira Rocha
MIRANDA, CORREIA,
AMENDOEIRA & ASSOCIADOS
Bonifácia Mario Suege
BANK OF MOZAMBIQUE
Christopher Tanner
FAO REPRESENTATION IN
MOZAMBIQUE
Agostinho Zacarias Vuma
VUMA CONSTRUCOES
NAMIBIA
Hanno D. Bossau
LORENTZ & BONE
Natasha Cochrane
P.F. KOEP & CO
Val Cooke
TRANSUNION ITC
Herman Charl Kinghorn
KINGHORN ASSOCIATES
Peter Koep
P.F. KOEP & CO
Lorinda Koorts
P.F. KOEP & CO
Willem Carel Kotze
P.F. KOEP & CO
Richard Mueller
P.F. KOEP & CO

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 147
Phillip Mwangala
BANK OF NAMIBIA
Deon Obbes
LORENTZ & BONE
Renate Rossler
P.F. KOEP & CO
Randolph Samuel
TRANSUNION ITC
Attie Slabber
WEDER KRUGER &HARTMAN
Marius van Breda
INFORMATION TRUST
CORPORATION
Greg Ward
TRANSUNION ITC
NEPAL
Janak Bhandari
GLOBAL LAW ASSOCIATES
Shrawan Khanal
M.K. NIRMAN SEWA
Indra Lohani
DHRUBA BAR SINGH THAPA &
ASSOCIATES
Surendra Man Pradhan
NEPAL RASTRA BANK
Kailash Prasad Neupane
NEPAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AUTHORITY
Megh Raj Pokhrel
DHRUBA BAR SINGH THAPA &
ASSOCIATES
Devendra Pradhan, Esq.
PRADHAN & ASSOCIATES
Bharat Raj Upreti
PIONEER LAW ASSOCIATE
Saroj Shrestha
LOTUS LAW ASSOCIATES
Kusum Shrestha
KUSUM LAW FIRM
Sudheer Shrestha
KUSUM LAW FIRM
Anil Kumar Sinha
SINHA VERMA LAW CONCERN
Sajjan Thapa
DHRUBA BAR SINGH THAPA &
ASSOCIATES
NETHERLANDS
Rob Abendroth
ALLEN & OVERY
Henri Bentfort van
Valkenburg
HOUTHOFF BURUMA
W.R. Bremer
MINISTRY OF HOUSING, SPATIAL
PLANNING AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
Joost Cuijpers
LABOUR INSPECTORATE OF THE
NETHERLANDS
Margriet H. de Boer
DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE
WESTBROEK
M. de Kogel
DE NETHERLANDESCHE BANK
Taco de Lange
LEXENCE
Michiel Gorsira
SIMMONS & SIMMONS
Glenn C. Haulussy
HAULUSSY ADVOKATEN
Paul Huijzendveld
LABOUR INSPECTORATE OF THE
NETHERLANDS
Rolf S.Jelsma
BRADDA KUTNER
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Jaap Koster
HOUTHOFF BURUMA
R. Koster
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
AMSTERDAM
Joop Lobstein
STICHTING BUREAU KREDIET
REGISTRATIE
Natalia Lorenzo van Rooij
HOUTHOFF BURUMA
Dunja Madunic
BRADA KUTTNER
Frits Meijer
OTB RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR
HOUSING, URBAN AND MOBILITY
STUDIES
Hugo Reumkens
VAN DOORNE
Stefan Sagel
DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE
WESTBROEK
Karin Schreuder
STICHTING BUREAU KREDIET
REGISTRATIE
Piet L. A. M. Schroeder
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Jamila Tib
HOUTHOFF BURUMA LAWYERS,
CIVIL NOTARIES,TAX ADVISERS
Jaap-Jan Trommel
NAUTA DUTILH ATTORNEYS
Paul van der Molen
CADASTRE AND LAND REGISTRY
AGENCY
Els van der Riet
HOUTHOFF BURUMA
Jackline van Haersolte van
Hof
DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE
WESTBROEK
Peter van Schilfgaarde
DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE
WESTBROEK
Enno Wiersma
DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE
WESTBROEK
Marcel Willems
KENNEDY VAN DER LAAN
Eugene Witjes
MINISTRY OF HOUSING, SPATIAL
PLANNING AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
NEW ZEALAND
Douglas Seymour Alderslade
CHAPMAN TRIPP
Geoff Bevan
CHAPMAN TRIPP
Tony Bevin
LAND INFORMATION NEW
ZEALAND
Tim Buckley
CHAPMAN TRIPP
Niels Campbell
BELL GULLY
Shelley Cave
SIMPSON GRIERSON
Michael Cole
SIMPSON GRIERSON
Chris Gordon
BELL GULLY
Margaret Griffin
RESERVE BANK OF NEW
ZEALAND
Paul Heath
HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
Alastair Charles Hercus
BUDDLE FINDLAY
Hershla Ifwersen
SIMPSON GRIERSON
Hana Kafedzic
CHAPMAN TRIPP
Hershla Lfwersen
SIMPSON GRIERSON
Kirri Lynn
COMPANIES OFFICE
Laurie Mayne
RUSSELL MCVEAGH
Lee-Ann McArthur
COMPANIES OFFICE
Rachel Menhennet
SIMPSON GRIERSON
Robbie Muir
LAND INFORMATION NEW
ZEALAND
Richard Peach
BAYCORP ADVANTAGE
Nicola Penman-Chambers
SIMPSON GRIERSON
Charlotte Rose
SIMPSON GRIERSON
Lester Roy Dempster
CONVEYANCERS
Scott Russell
SIMPSON GRIERSON
Peter Sheerin
BAYCORP ADVANTAGE
Murray Tingey
BELL GULLY
Michael McLean Toepfer
HESKETH HENRY
Gregory Towers
SIMPSON GRIERSON
Sarah Walsh
SIMPSON GRIERSON
Jane Wilson
BAYCORP ADVANTAGE
Richard Wilson
JACKSON RUSSELL
Arthur William Young
CHAPMAN TRIPP
NICARAGUA
Roberto Arguello
Villavicencio
F. A. ARIAS & MUÑOZ
Bertha Argüello
F.A. ARIAS & MUÑOZ
Minerva Bellorin
ACZALAW
Luis Alberto Bendaña
REGISTRO PÚBLICO DE LA
PROPIEDAD INMUEBLE Y
MERCANTIL DEL DEPARTAMENTO
DE MANAGUA
Maria Jose Bendaña
BENDAÑA & BENDAÑA
Carlos Bonilla
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS Y
DE OTRAS INSTITUCIONES
FINANCIERAS
Humberto Carrión
CARRIÓN, SOMARRIBA &
ASOCIADOS
Gloria Maria de Alvarado
ALVARADO Y ASOCIADOS
María José Guerrero
F. A. ARIAS & MUÑOZ
Luis Byron Mejia Rueda
MEJIA & ASSOCIATES
Jacinto Obregon Sanchez
OBREGON Y ASOCIADOS
José Olivas
ALVARADO Y ASOCIADOS
Roy Rivera Pastora
MEJIA & ASSOCIATES
Ana Rizo
F. A. ARIAS & MUÑOZ
César Carlos Porras Rosses
ALVARADO Y ASOCIADOS
Oscar A. Silva Peter
DELANEY & ASSOCIATES
José Evenor Taboada
TABOADA & ASOCIADOS
Rodrigo Taboada
TABOADA Y ASOCIADOS
Gustavo-Adolfo Vargas
F.A. ARIAS & MUÑOZ
NIGER
Mounkaila Adama
CABINET D’AVOCATS
Vilevo Biova Devo
CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE
L’UNION MONETAIRE OUEST
AFRICAINE
Aïssatou Djibo
ETUDE DE MAÎTRE DJIBO
AÏSSATOU
Bernar-Oliver Kouaovi
CABINET KOUAOVI
Marc Lebihan
CABINET LEBIHAN
Marie-Virginie Mamoudou
AVOCAT
Evelyne Mandessi Bell
OHADA LEGIS
Francois Nare
CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE
L’UNION MONETAIRE OUEST
AFRICAINE
Daouda Samna
OHADA LEGIS
NIGERIA
Oluseyi Abiodun Akinwunmi
AKINWUNMI & BUSARI
Olaleye Adebiyi
ALUKO & OYEBODE
Funke Adekoya San
AELEX PARTNERS
Lara Ademola
LARA ADEMOLA & CO.
John Adetiba
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
Francisca Agbasi
CHIEF LAW AGU EZETAH & CO.
Daniel Agbor
UDO UDOMA & BELO-OSAGIE
F. Akrinrele
F.O. AKINRELE & CO
Lawrence Fubara Anga
ANGA & EMUWA
Ndubisi Chuks Nwasike
FIRSTCOUNSEL FIRM
O J Ebohon
SCHOOL OF ARCHITECTURE,
DE MONTFORT UNIVERSITY
Samuel Etuk
ETUK & URUA
Lawrence Ezetah
CHIEF LAW AGU EZETAH & CO.
O.I. Imala
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA
Chike Obianwu
UDO UDOMA & BELO-OSAGIE
Uzoma Ogbonna
CHIEF LAW AGU EZETAH & CO.
Joy O. Okeaya-Inneh
CHIEF ROTIMI WILLIAMS’
CHAMBERS
Nonyelum Okeke
AJUMOGOBIA & OKEKE
Patrick Okonjo
OKONJO, ODIAWA & EBIE
Jobalo Oshikanlu
ALUKO & OYEBODE
Gbenga Oyebode
ALUKO & OYEBODE
Olufemi Sunmonu
FEMI SUNMONU & ASSOCIATES
Ladi Taiwo
ABDULAI,TAIWO & CO.
Adamu M. Usman
F.O. AKINRELE & CO
NORWAY
Frederik Astrup Borch
ADVOKATFIRMAET SELMER DA
Jan L. Backer
WIKBORG, REIN & CO.
Morten Beck
ADVOKATFIRMAET
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
Stig Berge
THOMMESSEN KREFTING GREVE
LUND
Frode Bernstsen
ADVOKATFIRMAET
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
Petter Bjerke
THOMMESSEN KREFTING GREVE
LUND
Lillann Bugge
SCHJODT LAW FIRM
Lars Carlsson
CREDITINFORM
Carl Christiansen
RAEDER ADVOKATFIRMA
Finn Erik Engzelius
THOMMESSEN GREVE LUND
Stein Fagerhaug
THOMMESSEN GREVE LUND
Stein Fagerhaug
THOMMESSEN GREVE LUND
Thomas S. Farhang
KVALE & CO.

148 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Linda Fjellheim
WIKBORG, REIN & CO.
Claus R. Flinder
SIMONSEN FØYEN
ADVOKATFIRMA
Hans Haugstad
THOMMESSEN GREVE LUND
Bjørn H. Kise
VOGT &WIIG
Jorgen Lund
THOMMESSEN KREFTING GREVE
LUND
Aase Aa. Lundgaard
DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU
Glenn McKenzie
BRØNNØYSUND REGISTER
CENTRE, SPØR
OPPLYSNINGSTELEFONEN
Ernst Arvid Moe
BANKRUPTCY COURT
Nina Moss
THE BANKING, INSURANCE AND
SECURITIES COMMISSION OF
NORWAY
Christian Mueller
THOMMESSEN GREVE LUND
Thomas Nordgård
VOGT &WIIG
Helge Onsrud
STATENS KARTVERK (NORWEGIAN
MAPPING AND CADASTRE
AUTHORITY)
Johan Ratvik
RIME & CO.ADVOKATFIRMA
Finn Rime
RIME & CO.ADVOKATFIRMA
Robert Romansky
KVALE & CO. ANS
Vegard Sivertsen
DELOITTE & TOUCHE
TOHMATSU
Bernt Olav Steinland
ADVOKATFIRMAET SELMER
Sverre Tyrhaug
THOMMESSEN GREVE LAND
Eirik Vikanes
THOMMESSEN KREFTING GREVE
LUND
Nils-Petter Wedege
DIRECTORATE OF LABOUR
INSPECTION
Preben Willoch
ADVOKATFIRMAET
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
OMAN
Said Al Shahry
SAID AL SHAHRY
Majid Al Toky
TROWERS & HAMLINS
Adrian Jones
TROWERS & HAMLINS
P.E. Lalachen
HASSAN AL ANSARI LEGAL
CONSULTANCY
Mansoor Jamal Malik
AL ALAWI MANSOOR JAMAL &
CO.
Malik Mansoor Jamal
AL ALAWI, MANSOOR JAMAL &
CO.
Ala’a Eldin Mohammed
ABU-GHAZALEH INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
PAKISTAN
Masood Khan Afridi
RIZVI, ISA,AFRIDI & ANGELL
Bilal Aftab
NEWS-VIS CREDIT
INFORMATION SERVICES
Nadeem Ahmad
ORR DIGNAM & CO
Omar Aziz Khan
IRFAN & IRFAN
Salman Aslam Butt
CORNELIUS LANE & MUFTI
Mohammad Azam Chaudhry
AZAM CHAUDHRY LAW
ASSOCIATES
Khalid Daudpota
KHALID DAUDPOTA & CO.
Faisal K. Daudpota
KHALID DAUDPOTA & CO.
Ikram Fayaz
QAMAR ABBAS & COMPANY
Faisal Fazli
RIZVI, ISA,AFRIDI & ANGELL
Syed Ahmad Hassan Shah
SHAH,AFRIDI & ANGELL &
KHAN
Ishrat Husain
STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN
Ali Adnan Ibrahim
RIZVI, ISA,AFRIDI & ANGELL
Mahomed Jaffer
ORR DIGNAM & CO
Kairas Kabraji
KABRAJI & TALIBUDDIN
ADVOCATES & LEGAL
COUNSELLORS
Muhammad Khalid Javed
BOARD OF INVESTMENT
Sikandar Hassan Khan
CORNELIUS LANE & MUFTI
Mamoon Khan
ORR DIGNAM & CO
Anwar Mansoor Khan
MANSOOR AHMAD KHAN & CO.
Aftab Ahmed Khan
SURRIDGE & BEECHENO
Babar Mufti
INTERNATIONAL CREDIT
INFORMATION
Rafiq.A. Nazir
AZAM CHAUDHRY LAW
ASSOCIATES
Amna Piracha
INTERNATIONAL CREDIT
INFORMATION
Javed Iqbal Qureshi
RIZVI, ISA,AFRIDI & ANGELL
Abdul Rahman
QAMAR ABBAS & COMPANY
Khurran Rashid
SURRIDGE & BEECHENO
Muhammad Saleem
CREDIT INFORMATION BUREAU
Jawad A. Sarwana
ABRAHAM & SARWANA
Huma Shah
SURRIDGE & BEECHENO
Syed Ahmad Hassan Shah
RIZVI, ISA,AFRIDI & ANGELL
Aziz Shaikh
AZIZ A SHAIKH & CO
Haider Shamsi
HAIDER SHAMSI AND CO
Salman Talibuddin
KABRAJI & TALIBUDDIN
ADVOCATES & LEGAL
COUNSELLORS
Saleem uz Zaman
KABRAJI & TALIBUDDIN
ADVOCATES & LEGAL
COUNSELLORS
PALAU
Kenneth E. Barden
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, PALAU
PANAMA
Leonor Alvarado
ALVARADO, LEDEZMA & DE
SANCTIS
Ernesto B. Arias
SUCRE,ARIAS & REYES
Francisco Arias G.
ARIAS FABREGA & FABREGA
Ebrahim Asvat
PATTON MORENO & ASVAT
Raúl Zuñiga Brid
ALEMAN, CORDERO, GALINDO &
LEE
Eric Britton
INFANTE GARRIDO & GARRIDO
ABOGADOS
Delia Cardenas
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS
DE PANAMA
Pedro Chaluja
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS
DE PANAMA
Shanina Jean Contreras J.
AROSEMENA, NORIEGA &
CONTRERAS
Julio Cesar Contreras, III, Esq.
AROSEMENA, NORIEGA &
CONTRERAS
Alma de Latorraca
ARIAS,ALEMAN & MORA
Carlos Alberto de Obaldia
DE OBALDIA Y GARCIA DE
PAREDES
Alexandra Duque
SUCRE & ASOCIADOS
Maria Alejandra Eisenmann
EISENMANN ABOGADOS Y
CONSULTORES
Ricardo Eskildsen Morales
ESKILDSEN & ESKILDSEN
Jorge Garrido
INFANTE GARRIDO & GARRIDO
ABOGADOS
José Juan Márquez C.
SUCRE,ARIAS & REYES
Juan Tejada Mora
ICAZA, GONZALEZ-RUIZ &
ALEMAN
José Miguel Navarrete
AROSEMENA, NORIEGA &
CONTRERAS
Francisco Pérez
PATTON MORENO & ASVAT
Alfredo Ramirez Jr
ALFARO, FERRER AND RAMIREZ
Lizbeth Ramsey
ASOCIACION PANAMEÑA DE
CRÉDITO
Luz María Salamina
ASOCIACIÓN PANAMEÑA DE
CRÉDITO
Juan A. Tejada Mora
ICAZA, GONZALEZ-RUIZ &
ALEMAN
Ramon Varela
MORGAN & MORGAN
PAPUA NEW
GUINEA
Vincent Bull
ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON
Rio Fiocco
POSMAN KUA AISI LAWYERS
Richard Flynn
BLAKE DAWSON WALDRON
Winifred T Kamit
GADENS LAWYERS
Kirsten Kobus
ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON
Mayambo Ipu Peipul
ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON
John Ridgway
PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK
LAWYERS
PARAGUAY
Hugo Berkemeyer
BERKEMEYER ATTORNEYS AND
COUNSELORS
Luis Breuer
BERKEMEYER ATTORNEYS AND
COUNSELORS
Esteban Burt
PERONI, SOSA,TELLECHEA, BURT
& NARVAJA
Olga Dios
VOUGA & OLMEDO-ABOGADOS
Juan Bautista Fiorio Gimenez
FIORIO, CARDOZO & ALVARADO
Pablo Livieres Guggiari
ESTUDIO JURIDICO
CANIZA-LIVIERES
Roberto Moreno Rodriguez
Alcala
MORENO RUFFINELLI &
ASOCIADOS
Armindo Riquelme
FIORIO, CARDOZO & ALVARADO
Maria Gloria Triguis
BERKEMEYER ATTORNEYS AND
COUNSELORS
PERU
Marco Antonio Alarcón Piana
ESTUDIO ECHECOPAR
Guilhermo Alceu Auler
MUNIZ FORSYTH RAMIREZ
PEREZ-TAIMAN & LUNA
VICTORIA
Luis Felipe Arizmendi
Echecopar
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS Y
SEGUROS DEL PEUR
Juan Luis Avendaño C.
MIRANDA & AMADO ABOGADOS
Francisco Berninzon Ponce
BERNINZON, LORET DE MOLA &
BENAVIDEZ ABOGADOS
José A. Delmar
BENITES, DE LAS CASAS, FORNO
& UGAZ
Guillermo Ferrero
ESTUDIO FERRERO
ABOGADOS
Luís Fuentes Villarán
BARRIOS FUENTES URQUIAGA
Carlos Gamarra
SUNARP – SUPERINTENDENCIA
NACIONAL DE LOS RESGISTROS
PUBLICOS DE PERÚ
Juan Luis Hernández
HERNÁNDEZ & ROSSELLÓ
ABOGADOS
Jesús Matos
ESTUDIO OLAECHEA
José Antonio Olaechea
ESTUDIO OLAECHEA
Manuel P. Olaechea Du Bois
ESTUDIO OLAECHEA
Alonso Rey Bustamante
PAYET, REY, CAUVI ABOGADOS
Ricardo P. Silva
ESTUDIO MUÑIZ, FORSYTH,
RAMIREZ, PEREZ-TAIMAN &
LUNA VICTORIA
Manuel Ugarte
BENITES, DE LAS CASAS, FORNO
& UGAZ
Sergio Valencoso
CERTICOM
Carlos Vegas
CAMARA PERUANA DE LA
CONSTRUCCION
Manuel Villa-García
ESTUDIO OLAECHEA
Monica Yoland Arteaga
Chaparro
REGISTRO PREDIAL URBANO
Gino Zolezzi
CERTRICOM
PHILIPPINES
Ofelia Abueg-Sta.Maria
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Marissa Acain
PHILBIZINFO
Theresa Ballelos
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Manuel Batallones
BAP CREDIT BUREAU
Cecile M.E. Caro
SYCIP SALAZAR HERNANDEZ &
GATMAITAN
Angelica Cayas
BOARD OF INVESTMENT
Connie Chu
ROMULO, MABANTA,
BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE
LOS ANGELES
Kenneth L. Chua
CASTILLO LAMAN TAN
PANTALEON & SAN JOSE
Emerico de Guzman
ANGARA ABELLO CONCEPCION
REGALA & CRUZ
Benjamin de la Cruz
BOARD OF INVESTMENT

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 149
Nestor Espenilla
CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Melva M. Evangelista-Valdez
JIMENEZ GONZALES LIWANAG
BELLO VALDEZ CALUYA &
FERNANDEZ
Gilberto Gallos
ABELLO CONCEPCION REGALA &
CRUZ LAW FIRM
Andres Gatmaitan
SYCIP SALAZAR HERNANDEZ &
GATMAITAN
Tadeo F. Hilado
ABELLO CONCEPCION REGALA &
CRUZ LAW FIRM
Natividad Kwan
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Francisco Ed. Lim
ABELLO CONCEPCION REGALA &
CRUZ LAW FIRM
Romeo M. Mendoza
ROMULO MABANTA
BUENAVENTURA SAYOC & DE
LOS ANGELES
Yolanda Mendoza-Eleazar
CASTILLO LAMAN TAN
PANTALEON & SAN JOSE
Jesuito Morallos
FOLLOSCO MORALLOS & HERCE
Olivia T. Olalia
ROMULO, MABANTA,
BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE
LOS ANGELES
Nicanor N. Padilla
SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO &
ONGSIAKO
Polo S. Pantaleon
CASTILLO LAMAN TAN
PANTALEON & SAN JOSE
Emmanuel C. Paras
SYCIP SALAZAR HERNANDEZ &
GATMAITAN
Teodore Regala
ANGARA ABELLO CONCEPCION
REGALA & CRUZ
Ricardo J. Romulo
ROMULO, MABANTA,
BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE
LOS ANGELES
Tess Sianghio-Baac
ABELLO CONCEPCION REGALA &
CRUZ LAW FIRM
Cirilo T Tolosa
SYCIP SALAZAR HERNANDEZ &
GATMAITAN
Rolando Mario G. Villonco
SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO &
ONGSIAKO
Romarie Villonco
SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO &
ONGSIAKO
POLAND
John Bakowski
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL POLSKA
Patrick Bell
LINKLATERS
Malgorzata Bielinska
BIURO INFORMACJI KREDYTOWEJ
Tomasz Brudkowski
KOCHANSKI BRUDKOWSKI &
PARTNERS
Malgorzata Burzynska
NATIONAL BANK OF POLAND
Renata Cichocka
HAARMANN HEMMELRATH
Sergiusz Ciolkowski
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Bozena Ciosek
WIERZBOWSKI I WSPÓLNICY
Slawomir Domzal
BIURO INFORMACJI KREDYTOWEJ
Maciej Duszczyk
BIURO INFORMACJI KREDYTOWEJ
Stanislas Dwernicki
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Tomasz Dys
DYST LEGAL
Anna Dzieciatkowska
TGC POLSKA LAW FIRM
Rafal Dziedzic
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Patryk Figiel
NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW
FIRM
Banasiuk Grzegorz
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL POLSKA
Pawel Ignatjew
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Iwona Janeczek
COMMERCIAL DEBTOR
REGISTER/KSV INFORMATION
SERVICES
Edyta Jusiel
LINKLATERS
Tamasz Kanski
SOLTYSIÑSKI KAWECKI &
SZLEZAK
Tadeusz Komosa
LINKLATERS
Katarzyna Kompowska
COFACE INTERCREDIT POLAND
Pawoak Krzysztof
SOLTYSIÑSKI KAWECKI &
SZLEZAK
Wojciech Kwasniak
NATIONAL BANK OF POLAND
Kamil Paduch
HAARMANN HEMMELRATH
Przemyslaw Pietrzak
NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW
FIRM
Bartlomiej Raczkowski
SOLTYSIÑSKI KAWECKI &
SZLEZAK
Anna Ratajczyk
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL POLSKA
Jean Rossi
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL POLSKA
Andrzej Siemiatkowski
ALLEN & OVERY
Robert Siuchmo
BIURO INFORMACJI KREDYTOWEJ
Marta Soltysik
NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW
FIRM
Tomasz Stawecki
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Anna Talar-Jeschke
HAARMANN HEMMELRATH
Dariusz Tokarczuk
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Tomasz Turek
NIKIEL I ZACHARZEWSKI
Peter Urbanek
NÖRR STIEFENHOFER LUTZ LAW
FIRM
Tomasz Wardynski
WARDYNSKI & PARTNERS
Krzysztof Wierzbowski
WIERZBOWSKI I WSPÓLNICY
Robert Windmill
HAARMANN HEMMELRATH &
PARTNER
Magdalena Wolowska
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Steven Wood
TGC POLSKA LAW FIRM
Jaroslaw Wysocki
GEODESY AND CARTOGRAPHY
Janusz Zaleski
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
BUILDING EMPLOYERS
Lukasz Zelechowski
ALLEN & OVERY
Maciej Zielinski
HAARMANN HEMMELRATH &
PARTNER
PORTUGAL
Rui Amendoeira
PEREIRA DE MIRANDA, CORREIA
& AMENDOEIRA
Catarina Araújo
AICCOPN
Manuel P. Barrocas
BARROCAS & ALVES PEREIRA
Segismundo Pinto Basto
MORAIS LEITAO, J.GALVAO
TELES & ASSOCIADOS
Ines Batalha Mendes
ABREU, CARDIGOS &
ASSOCIADOS
Susana Braz
BARROS, SOBRAL, G.GOMES &
ASSOCIADOS
João Cadete de Matos
BANCO DE PORTUGAL
Miguel de Avillez Pereira
ABREU, CARDIGOS &
ASSOCIADOS
João Cadete de Matos
BANCO DE PORTUGAL
Rosemary de Rougemont
NEVILLE DE ROUGEMONT &
ASSOCIADOS
Carlos de Sousa e Brito
CARLOS DE SOUSA E BRITO &
ASSOCIADOS
MOZAMBIQUE
Cristina Dein
JALLES ADVOGADOS
Francisco Lino Dias
BARROS, SOBRAL, G.GOMES &
ASSOCIADOS
João de Morais e Almeida
António Luís Figueiredo
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF
REGISTRY AND NOTARY CIVIL
SERVICE
Mafalda Rodrigues Fonseca
CARLOS DE SOUSA E BRITO &
ASSOCIADOS
Rita Granado Antunes
VIEIRA DE ALMEIDA &
ASSOCIADOS
Marta Leitão
ABREU & MARQUES,VINHAS E
ASSOCIADOS
Jorge Lopes
POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE OF
BRAGANÇA
Francisco Jose Maia Coelho
AICCOPN
Paulo Lowndes Marques
ABREU & MARQUES,VINHAS E
ASSOCIADOS
Fernando Marta
CREDINFORMACOES
Jorge Neves
BARROCAS & ALVES PEREIRA
Filipa Nevoa
ABREU, CARDIGOS &
ASSOCIADOS
Filipa Pedroso
MORAIS LEITAO, J.GALVAO
TELES & ASSOCIADOS
Pedro Porto Dordio
ANTÓNIO FRUTUOSO DE MELO E
ASSOCIADOS
Margarida Ramalho
ASSOCIAÇÃO DE EMPRESAS DE
CONSTRUÇÃO E OBRAS PÚBLICAS
Margarida Lima Rego
MORAIS LEITAO, J.GALVAO
TELES & ASSOCIADOS
Fernando Resina da Silva
VIEIRA DE ALMEIDA &
ASSOCIADOS
Cristina Cabral Ribeiro
BARROCAS & ALVES PEREIRA
Vicky Rodriguez
NEVILLE DE ROUGEMONT &
ASSOCIADOS
Francisco Salgueiro
NEVILLE DE ROUGEMONT &
ASSOCIADOS
José J. Tomaz Gomes
ASSOCIAÇÃO DE EMPRESAS DE
CONSTRUÇÃO E OBRAS PÚBLICAS
AnaIsavel Vieira
BANCO DE PORTUGAL
Patrícia Vinagre e Silva
VIEIRA DE ALMEIDA &
ASSOCIADOS
PUERTO RICO
Tomás Acevedo
MCCONNELL VALDES
Vicente Antonetti
GOLDMAN ANTONETTI &
CORDOVA
James A. Arroyo
TRANSUNION DE PUERTO RICO
Mildred Caban
GOLDMAN ANTONETTI &
CORDOVA
Delia Castillo de Colorado
REGISTRO DE LA PROPIEDAD DE
PUERTO RICO
Samuel Céspedes, Jr
MCCONNELL VALDES
Harry Cook
MCCONNELL VALDES
Marcelo Lopez
GOLDMAN ANTONETTI &
CORDOVA
Myrna Lozada
GOLDMAN ANTONETTI &
CORDOVA
Rubén M. Medina-Lugo
CANCIO, NADAL, RIVERA & DÍAZ
Luis Mongil-Casasnovas
MARTINEZ ODELL & CALABRIA
Pedro A. Morell
GOLDMAN ANTONETTI &
CÓRDOVA
Jorge Ruiz Montilla
MCCONNELL VALDES
Jorge Souss
GOLDMAN ANTONETTI &
CORDOVA
Jorge Souss
GOLDMAN ANTONETTI &
CORDOVA
ROMANIA
Philip Ankel
MOORE,VARTIRES & ASSOCIATES
Laura Ardeleanu
NESTOR NESTOR & KINGSTON
PETERSEN
Daniel Bruma
BOSTINA & ASSOCIATES
Anamaria Corbescu
SALANS – MOORE,VARTIRES &
ASSOCIATES
Tiberiu Csaki
SALANS – MOORE,VARTIRES &
ASSOCIATES
Teodor Gigea
COFACE INTERCREDIT ROMANIA
Ciprian Glodeanu
BOSTINA & ASSOCIATES
Veronica Grunzsnicki
BABIUC SULICA & ASSOCIATES
Corina Gabriela Ionescu
NESTOR NESTOR & KINGSTON
PETERSEN
Andrea Ionescu
ALTHEIMER & GRAY MOORE
Nicoleta Kalman
NICOLETA KALMAN
Edita Lovin
ROMANIAN SUPREME COURT
Daniel Lungu
RACOTI, PREDOIU & PARTNERS,
ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS
Mihaela Marin
SALANS – MOORE,VARTIRES &
ASSOCIATES
Elena Mirea
DELOS CREDITINFO
Obie L. Moore
SALANS – MOORE,VARTIRES &
ASSOCIATES
Ion I. Nestor
NESTOR NESTOR & KINGSTON
PETERSEN
Manuela M. Nestor
NESTOR NESTOR & KINGSTON
PETERSEN
Theodor Nicolescu
THEODOR NICOLESCU
Anca Sandru
RACOTI, PREDOIU & PARTNERS,
ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS
Christina Spyridon
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS

150 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
David Stabb
STEPHENSON HARWOOD –
POPESCU & ASSOCIATES
Arin Octav Stanescu
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
PRACTITIONERS IN
REORGANIZATION AND WINDING
UP
Cristiana Stoica
STOICA & ASOCIATII ATTORNESY
AT LAW
Paraschiva Suica-Neagu
NESTOR NESTOR & KINGSTON
PETERSEN
Valeria Tomesou
CREDIT REFORM ROMANIA
Catalin Tripon
BABIUC SULICA & ASSOCIATES
Spyridon Tsallas
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
Florentin Tuca
MUSAT & ASOCIATII
Petre Tulin
NATIONAL BANK OF ROMANIA
Cristina Virtopeanu
NESTOR NESTOR & KINGSTON
PETERSEN
Perry V. Zizzi
SALANS – MOORE,VARTIRES &
ASSOCIATES
RUSSIA
Anatoly E. Andriash
MACLEOD DIXON
Darya Angelo
LAW FIRM ALRUD
Peter Barenboim
MOSCOW INTERBANK CURRENCY
EXCHANGE
Christian Becker
HAARMANN HEMMELRATH
Alexander Belov
LAW FIRM ALRUD
Dmitry Besedin
BESEDIN VODOLAGIN SOKOLOVA
Alexey Binetsky
BINETSKY & PARTNERS
Maria Blagowolina
HAARMANN HEMMELRATH
Vladimir Dragunov
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Igor Gorchakov
BAKER & MCKENZIE
David Griston
CMS CAMERON MCKENNA
John Hammond
CMS CAMERON MCKENNA
Dimitry Ilyin
LAW FIRM ALRUD
Julia Koroleva
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
David Lasfargue
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Sergei Lazarev
RUSSIN & VECCHI
Stepan Lubavsky
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Michael J. Malloy
GOWLINGS INTERNATIONAL
Lyudmila Malykhina
CMS CAMERON MCKENNA
Janna Mansourova
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Alexey Overchuk
FEDERAL AGENCY FOR CADASTRE
OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
Olga Revzina
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Jason Sande
MACLEOD DIXON
Alexey Simanovskiy
BANK OF RUSSIA
Vladislav A. Talantsev
RUSSIN & VECCHI
Victor Topadze
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Luc Trillaud
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Dimitry Yeremin
LAW FIRM ALRUD
Larissa Zabotina
GOWLINGS INTERNATIONAL INC.
Andrey Zhdanov
BAKER & MCKENZIE
RWANDA
Claudine Gasarabwe
GASARABWE CLAUDINE &
ASSOCIES
Jean Haguma
HAGUMA & ASSOCIÉS
Annie Kairaba
RISD/LANDNET
Angelique Kantangwa
NATIONAL BANK OF RWANDA
Leopold Munderere
MEMBRE DU CONSEIL DE
L’ORDRE
Eugene Rurangwa
MINISTÈRE DES TERRES,
ENVIRONNEMENT, FORÊTS, EAU
ET RESSOURCES NATURELLES
André Verbruggen
AVA
Jean Marie Vianney
Mugemana
CABINET D’AVOCATS MUGEMANA
& ASSOCIES
SAMOA
Fiona Ey
PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK
Semi Leung-Wai
LEUNG WAI LAW FIRM
John Ridgway
PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK
LAWYERS
SAUDI ARABIA
Ali Abedi
THE ALLIANCE OF ABBAS F.
GHAZZAWI & CO. AND HAMMAD
& AL-MEHDAR
Belal Talal Al Ghazzawi
AL-GHAZZAWI PROFESSIONAL
ASSOCIATION
Talal Amin Al Ghazzawi
AL-GHAZZAWI PROFESSIONAL
ASSOCIATION
Mohammed Al-Jaddan
THE LAW FIRM OF YOUSEF AND
MOHAMMED AL-JADDAN
Mohammad S. Aba Al-Khail
SAUDI ARABIAN MONETARY
AGENCY
Fahd Al-Mufarrij
SAUDI ARABIAN MONETARY
AGENCY
Basel B. Barakat
LAW OFFICES OF HASSAN
MAHASSNI
Majed Mohammed Garoub
THE LAW FIRM OF MAJED M.
GAROUB
Taj Eldin M. Hassan
AL-GHAZZAWI PROFESSIONAL
ASSOCIATION
Jochen Hundt
AL-SOAIB LAW FIRM
Mohammed Jaber
NADERLAW & TRANSLATION
OFFICE
Abdul Kareem
THE ALLIANCE OF ABBAS F.
GHAZZAWI & CO. AND HAMMAD
& AL-MEHDAR
Hassan Mahassni
LAW OFFICES OF HASSAN
MAHASSNI
Francois Majdy
KASSEEM AL-FALLAJ LAW FIRM
Stephen Matthews
LAW OFFICE OF MOHAMMED S.
AL-RASHEED
Katerina Miltiadou
MECOS
Akram Mohamed Nader
BAHRA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
Mohammed M.J. Nader
NADER LAW & TRANSLATION
OFFICE
Ceyda Okur
THE ALLIANCE OF ABBAS F.
GHAZZAWI & CO. AND HAMMAD
& AL-MEHDAR
Sameh M Toban
TOBAN LAW FIRM
Ebaish Zebar
LAW FIRM OF SALAH AL-
HEJAILANY
SENEGAL
Ameth Ba
ETUDE DE MAÎTRES BA &
TANDIAN
Ramatoulaye Diagne
ORDRE DES ARCHITECTES
Andrée Diop-Depret
GA 2D
Vilevo Biova Devo
CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE
L’UNION MONETAIRE OUEST
AFRICAINE
Rita Fall
AGENCE CHARGÉE DE LA
PROMOTION DE
L’INVESTISSEMENT ET DES
GRANDS TRAVAUX
Aboubacar Fall
FALL ASSOCIATES
Mame Adama Gueye
SCP MAME ADAMA GUEYE &
ASSOCIES
Khaled Houda
CABINET KANJO KOITA
Sidy Abdallah Kanoute
Mamadou Mbaye
SCP MAME ADAMA GUEYE &
ASSOCIES
Ibrahima Mbodj
ETUDE MAITRE IBRAHIMA
MBODJ
Ndjaye Mbodj
ETUDE MAITRE IBRAHIMA
MBODJ
Moustapha N’Doye
Francois Nare
CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE
L’UNION MONETAIRE OUEST
AFRICAINE
Amadou C. Sall
AGENCE CHARGÉE DE LA
PROMOTION DE
L’INVESTISSEMENT ET DES
GRANDS TRAVAUX
Francois Sarr
FRANCOIS SARR & ASSOCIÉS
Mamadou Seck
SCP SOW, SECK & DIAGNE
SERBIA AND
MONTENEGRO
Miroslav Basic
STUDIO LEGALE SUTTI
Bojana Bregovic
WOLF THEISS
Yorgos Chairetis
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
Natasa Cveticanin
JANKOVIC, POPOVIC & MITIC
Zivka Djuric
MINISTRY OF LABOUR,
EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL
AFFAIRS
Ilija Drazic
DRAZIC, LAZAREVIC / BEATOVIC,
BEOGRAD
Horst Ebhardt
WOLF THEISS
Patricia Gannon
KARANOVIC & NIKOLIC
ADVOKATI
Nikola Jankovic
JANKOVIC, POPOVIC & MITIC
Julijana Jevtic
JANKOVIC, POPOVIC & MITIC
Dragan Karanovic
KARANOVIC & NIKOLIC
ADVOKATI
Nikola Kosic
AGENCY SPORTNET DIN
Dubravka Kosic
STUDIO LEGALE SUTTI
Vidak Kovacevic
WOLF THEISS
Manolis Ktistakis
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
Emmanouel Ktistakis
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
Natasa Lalovic
WOLF THEISS
Mirko Lovric
NATIONAL BANK OF SERBIA AND
MONTENEGRO
Miodrag Markovic
HAYHURST ROBINSON
Neli Markovic
CREDIT INFORMATION SYSTEM
Katarina Nedeljkovic
LAW OFFICE KATARINA
NEDELJKOVIC
Srdja M. Popovic
POPOVIC, POPOVIC, SAMARDZIJA
& POPOVIC
Todd Robinson
HAYHURST ROBINSON
Petar Stojanovic
JOKSOVIC, STOJANOVIC &
PARTNERS
Lidija Tomasovic
POPOVIC, POPOVIC, SAMARDZIJA
& POPOVIC
Spyridon Tsallas
IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS
Milos Zivkovic
ZIVKOVIC & SAMARDZIC LAW
OFFICE
SIERRA LEONE
Sonkita Conteh
A. TEJAN-COLE AND ASSOCIATES
Berthan Macaulay Jr
BASMA & MACAULAY
Emmanuel Roberts
ROBERTS AND PARTNER
Abdul Tejan-Cole
A. TEJAN-COLE AND ASSOCIATES
Mustapha S. Turay
ROBERTS AND PARTNER
Ibrahim S Yillah
ROBERTS & PARTNER CHAMBERS
SINGAPORE
Kala Anandarajah
RAJAH & TANN
Deborah Evaline Barker
KHATTAR WONG & PARTNERS
Sam Bonifant
CLIFFORD CHANCE
Ai-Chuin Serene Chee
DONALDSON & BURKINSHAW
Leslie Chew
KHATTAR WONG & PARTNERS
Daniel Chia
YEO-LEONG & PEH
Gooi Chi Duan
DONALDSON & BURKINSHAW
Ong Hway Cheng
RAJAH & TANN
Latiff Ibrahim
HARRY ELIAS PARTNERSHIP
ThamYew Kong
MONETARY AUTHORITY OF
SINGAPORE
Lee Kuan Wei
VENTURE LAW (IN ASSOCIATION
WITH WHITE & CASE)
Lee Lay See
RAJAH & TANN
Eugene Lim
DONALDSON & BURKINSHAW
Angela Lim
BAKER & MCKENZIE.WONG &
LEOW
Alvin Lingam
HARRY ELIAS PARTNERSHIP
Chit Fai Kelry Loi
DONALDSON & BURKINSHAW

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 151
Beng Hong Ong
WONG TAN & MOLLY LIM
Tan Peng Chin
TAN PENG CHIN
Nandakumar Ponniya
CLIFFORD CHANCE
Mark Rowley
CREDIT BUREAU SINGAPORE
Teng Siu Ing
SINGAPORE LAND AUTHORITY
Cheah SweeGim
KELVIN CHIA PARTNERSHIP
Bok Hoay Tan
DONALDSON & BURKINSHAW
Sharon Tay
DONALDSON & BURKINSHAW
David Teo
DONALDSON & BURKINSHAW
Lincoln Teo
CREDIT BUREAU SINGAPORE
Daphne Teo
MONETARY AUTHORITY OF
SINGAPORE
Tjong Yai Tjan
TAN PENG CHIN
Ng Wai King
VENTURE LAW
Lim Wee Teck
RAJAH & TANN
Lee Kuan Wei
VENTURE LAW
Benjamin Yap
KELVIN CHIA PARTNERSHIP
Jennifer Yeo
YEO-LEONG & PEH
Samuel Yuen
DAVID LIM & PARTNERS
SLOVAKIA
Miloš Kachanák
DETVAI LUDIK MALÝ UDVAROS
Martin Bednár
HMG & PARTNERS
Monika Berecova
MINISTRY OF LABOUR, SOCIAL
AFFAIRS AND FAMILY
Roman Bircak
CECHOVÁ RAKOVSKÝ
Jana Brezinova
DEDÁK & PARTNERS
Katarina Cechova
CECHOVA RAKOVSKÝ
Ondrej Dusek
PETERKA & PARTNERS
Juraj Elias
CMS CARNOGURSKÝ
Pavol Erben
BLAHA, ERBEN & PARTNERI
Lubos Frolkovic
WOLF THEISS
Milan Horvath
NATIONAL BANK OF SLOVAKIA
Martin Javorcek
CMS CARNOGURSKÝ
Michaela Jurková
CECHOVÁ RAKOVSKÝ
Milos Kachanak
DETVAI LUDIK MALÝ UDVAROS
Tomáš Kamenec
DEDÁK & PARTNERS
Renatus Kollar
ALLEN&OVERY
Petr Kucera
ASPEKT KILCULLEN
Michal Luknar
SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY
Vladimir Malik
COFACE INTERCREDIT SLOVAKIA
Jozef Malý
DETVAI LUDIK MALÝ UDVAROS
Tomáš Maretta
CECHOVÁ RAKOVSKÝ
Jana Moravcikova
CECHOVÁ RAKOVSKÝ
Peter Netepn
DETVAI LUDIK MALÝ UDVAROS
Zuzana Petrasova
CECHOVÁ RAKOVSK ADVOCATES
Tomáš Rybár
CECHOVÁ RAKOVSK ADVOCATES
Radoslav Saly
CECHOVÁ RAKOVSK ADVOCATES
Milan Semelak
NATIONAL LABOUR INSPECTORATE
Erik Steger
WOLF THEISS
Jana Štelbacká
CECHOVÁ RAKOVSKÝ
Lenka Subenikova
WOLF THEISS
Roman Turok-Hetes
NATIONAL BANK OF SLOVAKIA
Zuzana Valerova
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
SLOVAK OFFICE
Tomáš ZareckÝ
CECHOVÁ RAKOVSKÝ
SLOVENIA
Stane Berlec
SLOVENIAN TRADE &
INVESTMENT PROMOTION
AGENCY
Crtomir Borec
DELOITTE&TOUCHE
Simon Bracun
LAW FIRM COLJA, ROJS &
PARTNERJI
Borut Brezovar
LABOUR INSPECTORATE OF
SLOVENIA, MINISTRA OF LABOUR,
FAMILY AND SOCIAL AFFAIR
Markus Bruckmueller
WOLF THEISS
Miodrag Dordevic
SUPREME COURT OF SLOVENIA
Petra Drobne
SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
CENTER
Marina Ferfolja
GORSE & PARTNER
Joze Golobic
SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
CENTER
Vilma Hanzel
BANK OF SLOVANIA
Sreco Jadek
JADEK & PENSA
Andrej Jarkovic
ŠELIH, ŠELIH, JANEZIC &
JARKOVIC
Aleksandra Jemc
JADEK & PENSA
Florian Kirchhof
SCHÖHNERR RECHTSANWÄLTE
Denis Kostrevc
DELOITTE & TOUCHE
Katja Kumar Bavec
COLJA, ROJS & PARTNERJI
Gerald Lambert
DELOITTE & TOUCHE
Mitja Novak
MITJA JELENIC NOVAK
Pavle Pensa
JADEK & PENSA
Tomaz Perse
TRADE AND INVESTMENT
PROMOTION OFFICE
Natasa Pipan Nahtigal
ŠELIH, ŠELIH, JANEZIC &
JARKOVIC
Boris Ruzic
LABOUR INSPECTORAT OF
SLOVENIA, MINISTRY OF LABOUR,
FAMILY AND SOCIAL AFFAIR
Rudi Šelih
ŠELIH, ŠELIH, JANEZIC &
JARKOVIC
Klemen Sesok
DELOITTE & TOUCHE
Damjana Sitar
BANK OF SLOVENIA
Irina Skocir
COFACE INTERCREDIT SLOVENIJA
Barbara Smolnikar
SKB BANKA DD
SOLOMON ISLANDS
John Ridgway
PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK
LAWYERS
SOUTH AFRICA
Michael Adcock
BOWMAN GILFILLAN
Heidi Bell
BOWMAN GILFILLAN
Andrea Bezuidenhout
FINMARK TRUST
Fatima Bhyat
CONSULTANT
Ann Boulton
TRANSUNION ITC
Marianne Brown
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC FINANCE
AND AUDITING
Vicky Bunyan
WERKSMANNS
Mary Chege-Mwangi
LEBOEUF LAMB GREENE &
MACRAE
Paul Coetser
BRINK COHEN LE ROUX INC.
Val Cooke
TRANSUNION ITC
Gretchen De Smit
EDWARD, NATHAN & FRIEDLAND
O J Ebohon
SCHOOL OF ARCHITECTURE, DE
MONTFORT UNIVERSITY
Miranda Feinstein
EDWARD, NATHAN & FRIEDLAND
Lauren Flemming
TRANSUNION ITC
Mike Forsyth
AUSTEN SMITH ATTORNEYS
David Garegae
GREATER PRETORIA
METROPOLITAN COUNCIL
Hennie Geldenhuys
DEPARTMENT OF LAND AFFAIRS
Tim Gordon-Grant
BOWMAN GILFILLAN INC.
Kim Goss
BOWMAN GILFILLAN
Sam Gumede
WERKSMANNS
Osafo Gyimah
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
DEVELOPMENT BOARD
Desere Jordaan
WEBBER WENTZEL BOWENS
Jude Kearney
LEBOEUF LAMB GREENE &
MACRAE
Fritz Keller
LINDSAY, KELLER & PARTNERS
Alison Koen
LINDSAY, KELLER & PARTNERS
Renee Kruger
WEBBER WENTZEL BOWENS
Fatima Laher
BOWMAN GILFILLAN
Sam Lefafa
DEPARTMENT OF LAND AFFAIRS
Francis Manickum
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND
INDUSTRY
Andrew Muir
AUSTEN SMITH ATTORNEYS
Johan Neser
CLIFFE DEKKER
Laurence F Pereira
VORSTER PEREIRA
Randolph Samuel
TRANSUNION ITC
Hugo Stark
SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK
Claire Tucker
BOWMAN GILFILLAN
Llevellyn Van Wyk
CSIR
Jacques VanWyk
CLIFFE DEKKER
Michael Vorster
BOWMAN GILFILLAN
Greg Ward
TRANSUNION ITC
David Watkins
BOWMAN GILFILLAN INC.
Phillip Webster
LEBOEUF LAMB GREENE &
MACRAE
Allen West
DEPARTMENT OF LAND AFFAIRS
(JUSTICE COLLEGE)
Peter Eugene Whelan
BOWMAN GILFILLAN FINDLAY &
TAIT
Ralph Zulman
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF
SOUTH AFRICA
SPAIN
Agustin Bou Maqueda
JAUSA, NADAL & VIDAL
Cristina Calvo
ASHURST
Ariadna Cambronero
URÍA & MENÉNDEZ
Simon Cookson
ASHURST
Fermin Córdoba Gavín
ECHECOPAR ABOGADOS
Charles Coward
URÍA & MENÉNDEZ
Soledad Crucesde Abia
BANK OF SPAIN
Sergio del Bosque
URÍA & MENÉNDEZ
Iván Delgado
PÉREZ-LLORCA
Anselmo Diaz Fernández
BANK OF SPAIN
Alejandro Ferreres
URÍA & MENÉNDEZ
Guillermo Frühbeck
DR FRÜHBECK ABOGADOS Y
ECONOMISTAS
Pablo González-Espejo
URÍA & MENÉNDEZ
Calvin A. Hamilton
MONEREO, MEYER &
MARINEL-LO ABOGADOS
Ana Just
LURIS VALLS ABOGADOS
André Monereo Velasco
MONEREO, MEYER &
MARINEL-LO ABOGADOS
Fernando Mendez
COLEGIO DE RESGITRADORES DE
LA PROPIEDAD Y MERCANTILES
DE ESPAÑA
Nicolas Nogueroles
COLEGIO DE RESGITRADORES DE
LA PROPIEDAD Y MERCANTILES
DE ESPAÑA
Candido Paz-Ares
URÍA & MENÉNDEZ
Alfonso Pedrajas
MULLERAT
Pedro Pérez-Llorca Zamora
PÉREZ-LLORCA
Roser Ràfols
ROCA JUNYENT ADVOCATS
Arturo Rainer Pan
ECHECOPAR ABOGADOS LAW
FIRM
Enrique Rajoy
COLEGIO DE RESGITRADORES DE
LA PROPIEDAD Y MERCANTILES
DE ESPAÑA
Ricardo Rebate Labrandero
SÁNCHEZ PINTADO, NÚÑEZ &
ASOCIADOS
Eduardo Rodríguez-Rovira
URÍA & MENÉNDEZ
María Rubio de Casas
BAKER & MCKENZIE, MADRID

152 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Pilar Salinas
SÁNCHEZ PINTADO, NÚÑEZ &
ASOCIADOS
Rafael Sebastián
URÍA & MENÉNDEZ
Arancha Seva García
URÍA & MENÉNDEZ
Miguel Torres
MULLERAT
Carlos Vall
LURIS VALLS ABOGADOS
Javier Valle Zayas
URÍA & MENÉNDEZ
Eva M. Vazquez
MONEREO, MEYER &
MARINEL-LO ABOGADOS
Carlos Viladás
URÍA & MENÉNDEZ
Marco Zambrini
URÍA & MENÉNDEZ
SRI LANKA
Asanka Abeysekera
TICHURELVAM ASSOCIATES
Subashini Abraham
SUDATH PERERA ASSOCIATES
Ayomi Aluwihare-
Gunawardene
F.J.& G. DE SARAM
N.P.H. Amarasena
CREDIT INFORMATION BUREAU
OF SRI LANKA
Bertie Buddhisena
MINISTRY OF LANDS
Sharmela de Silva
TIRUCHELVAM ASSOCIATES
Savantha DeSaram
D. L. & F. DE SARAM
Amila Fernando
JULIUS & CREASY
Desmond Fernando
FERNANDO & CO.
T.G. Gooneratne
JULIUS & CREASY
Mahinda Haradasa
VARNERS LANKA OFFICE
U.L. Kadurugamuwa
F.J.&G. DE SARAM
Roshani Kobbekaduwa
F.J.&G. DE SARAM
Ramani Muttetuwegama
TICHURELVAM ASSOCIATES
Kandiah Neelakandan
MURUGESU & NEELAKANDAN
Sudath Perera
SUDATH PERERA ASSOCIATES
R. Senathi Rajah
JULIUS & CREASY
Rujaratnam Senathi Rajah
JULIUS & CREASY
Paul Ratnayeke
PAUL RATNAYEKE ASSOCIATES
Avindra Rodrigo
F.J. & G DE SARAM
P. Samarasiri
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA
Niranjan Sinnethamby
TIRUCHELVAM ASSOCIATES
Neelan Tiruchelvam
TIRUCHELVAM ASSOCIATES
John Wilson, Jr.
JOHN WILSON PARTNERS
SWEDEN
Hans Andersson
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY,
EMPLOYMENT AND
COMMUNICATIONS
Mats Berter
MAGNUSSON WAHLIN QVIST
STANBROOK ADVOKATBYRA
Henrik Bielenstein
LINKLATERS ADVOKATBYRA
Tommy Bisander
UC AB
Vibekke Eliasson
FINANSINSPEKTIONEN
Jörgen Estving
MAGNUSSON WAHLIN QVIST
STANBROOK ADVOKATBYRA
Magnus Graner
ADVOKATFIRMAN LINDAHL
Leif Gustasson
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Olof Hallberg
ADVOKATFIRMAN LINDAHL
Eric Halvarsson
HAMMARSKIÖLD & CO.
Peder Hammarskiöld
HAMMARSKIÖLD & CO
Paula Hammarstrom
Andersson
ANDERSSON MAGNUSSON
WAHLIN QVIST STANBROOK
ADVOKATBYRA
John Henwood
ROBINSON HERTRAM
Stefan Holmberg
GÄRDE WESSLAU
Margret Inger
FINANSINSPEKTAIONEN
Bengt Kjellson
LANTMÄTERIET
Mattias Larsson
ADVOKATFIRMAN CEDERQUIST
Camilla levinsson
MAGNUSSON WAHLIN QVIST
STANBROOK ADVOKAT
Tomas Lööv
BOARD OF SWEDISH INDUSTRY
AND COMMERCE FOR BETTER
REGULATION
Lars Mikael Mellguist
SVEA COURT OF APPEAL
Lars Nylund
ADVOKATFIRMAN FYLGIA
Susanne Öhbom
HÖKERBERG & SÖDERQVIST
ADVOKATBYRÅ
Malin Ohlin-Akermark
ADVOKATFIRMAN VINGE
Mattias Örnulf
HÖKERBERG & SÖDERQVIST
ADVOKATBYRÅ
Carl Östring
ADVOKATFIRMAN FYLGIA
Martin Pagrotsky
ADVOKATFIRMAN VINGE
Lennart Palm
BOARD OF SWEDISH INDUSTRY
AND COMMERCE FOR BETTER
REGULATION
Åke Rådberg
SWEDISH CONSTRUCTION
FEDERATION
Cecilia Rembert
INVEST IN SWEDEN AGENCY
Jonna Svefors
GÄRDE WESSLAU
Martin Wallin
LINKLATERS LAGERLÖF
Robert Wikholm
ADVOKATFIRMAN VINGE
SWITZERLAND
Peter R. Altenburger
ALTENBURGER & PARTNERS
Karl Arnold
PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY
Beat M. Barthold
FRORIEP RENGGLI
Frederic Betrisey
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Philippe de Salis
BOREL & BARBEY
Suzanne Eckert
WENGER PLATTNER
Robert Furter
PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY
Rotf Gertsch
SWISS FEDERAL BANKING
COMMISSION
Erwin Griesshammer
VISCHER
Hans R. Hintermeister
ZEK SWITZERLAND
Yvonne Hintermeister
HANDELSREGISTERAMT DES
KANTONS ZURICH
Urs Klöti
PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY
Michael Kramer
PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY
Eva Leuthold
PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY
Andrea Molino
SPIESS BRUNONI PEDRAZZINI
MOLINO
Guy-Philippe Rubeli
PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY
Bertrand Schott
PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY
Kurt Spinnler
SWISS FEDERAL BANKING
COMMISSION
Daniel Steudler
SWISS FEDERAL DIRECTORATE OF
CADASTRAL SURVEYING
Jacques Tissot
OFFICE CHARGÉ DU DROIT DU
REGISTRE FONCIER ET DU DROIT
FONCIER
Marc-André Tudisco
INTERNATIONALER VERBAND FUER
ARBEITSNEHMERSCHUTZ
Marc Tütsch
WENGER PLATTNER
Thomas Zogg
PESTALOZZI LACHENAL PATRY
SYRIAN ARAB
REPUBLIC
Alissar Al-Ahmar
AL-AHMAR & PARTNERS,
ATTORNEYS AND LEGAL
ADVISORS
Kanaan Al-Ahmar
AL-AHMAR & PARTNERS,
ATTORNEYS AND LEGAL
ADVISORS
Hani Bitar
SYRIAN ARAB CONSULTANTS LAW
OFFICE
Riad Daoudi
SYRIAN ARAB CONSULTANTS LAW
OFFICE
Antoun Joubran
SYRIAN ARAB CONSULTANTS LAW
OFFICE
Muhammad Jumma
BANK OF SYRIA
Ousama Karawani
KARAWANI LAW OFFICE
Fady Kardous
KARDOUS LAW OFFICE
Katerina Miltiadou
MECOS
Moussa Mitry
FACULTY OF LAW – DAMASCUS
UNIVERSITY / LOUKA & MITRY
LAW OFFICE
Moussa Mittry
LOUKA & MITRY LAW OFFICE
Samer Nofal
SAMER NOFAL LAW FIRM
Gabriel Oussi
SYRIAN ARAB CONSULTANTS LAW
OFFICE
Housam Safadi
SAFADI BUREAU
Abdulhay Sayed
DR. MOUSTAFA AL-SAYED
TAIWAN, CHINA
Hui-ling Chen
WINKLER PARTNERS
Edgar Y. Chen
TSAR & TSAI LAW FIRM
John Chen
FORMOSA TRANSNATIONAL
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Chun-Yih Cheng
FORMOSA TRANSNATIONAL
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Helen Chou
RUSSIN & VECCHI
Cindy Chou
CHEN, SHYUU& PUN ATTORNEYS
AT LAW
Julie Chu
JONES DAY
Serina Chung
JONES DAY
Joyce Fan
LEE AND LI
Stephen Franck
YANGMING PARTNERS
James Hong
CHEN, SHYUU& PUN ATTORNEYS
AT LAW
Yuling Hsu
FORMOSA TRANSNATIONAL
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Jack J.T. Huang
JONES DAY
Roxy Huang
YANGMING PARTNERS
Margaret Huang
LCS & PARTNERS
C.Y. Huang
TSAR & TSAI LAW FIRM
Zue Min Hwang
CHINESE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF GENERAL CONTRACTORS.
Charles Hwang
YANGMING PARTNERS
James J.M. Hwang
TSAR & TSAI LAW FIRM
Victor I-Hsiu Chang
LCS & PARTNERS, COUNSEL
Jen Kong Loh
ALLIANCE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OFFICES
Fang-Ting Kuo
JOINT CREDIT INFORMATION
CENTER
Fang-Ting Kuo
JOINT CREDIT INFORMATION
CENTER
Edward Lai
CENTRAL BANK OF CHINA
Bee Leay Teo
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Justin Liang
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Jeffrey Lin
JOINT CREDIT INFORMATION
CENTER
Rich Lin
LCS & PARTNERS
Jennifer C. Lin
TSAR & TSAI LAW FIRM
Jocelyn Liu
LCS & PARTNERS
Thomas H. McGowan
RUSSIN & VECCHI
Mark Ohlson
YANGMING PARTNERS
Patrick Pai-ChiangChu
LEE AND LI
Angela Wu
YANGMING PARTNERS
Shiau-Pan Yang
LEE AND LI
TANZANIA
Charles Acworth
KNIGHT FRANK TANZANIA
S.J. Bwana
HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA
Augustino Chatulika
BANK OF TANZANIA
Naimi Dyer
KALUNGA & CO.ADVOCATES
Ademba Gomba
GOMBA & CO.ADVOCATES
Johnson Jasson
JOHNSON JASSON & CO
ASSOCIATES

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 153
Leopold Thomas Kalunga
KALUNGA & COMPANY,
ADVOCATES
A.K. Kameja
KAMEJA & NGULUMA
ADVOCATES
Wilbert Kapinga
MKONO & CO. LAW FIRM
Sam Mapande
LAW ASSOCIATES
Ishengoma Masha
MUJULIZI & MAGAI ADVOCATES
Henry Sato Massaba
KAMEJA & NGULUMA
ADVOCATES
L.H. Mkila
BANK OF TANZANIA
Nimrod Mkono
MKONO & CO. LAW FIRM
Fidelis Mutakyamilwa
MINISTRY OF LANDS AND
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
DEVELOPMENT
Aisha Naiga
MKONO & CO. LAW FIRM
Alex Nguluma
MAAJAR, RWECHUNGURA,
NGULUMA & MAKANI
Charles RB Rwechungura
MAAJAR, RWECHUNGURA,
NGULUMA & MAKANI
Constantine Rweyemamu
MUTALEMWA ,ISHENGOMA,
MASHA, MUJULIZI & MAGAI
Grace Shao
MAAJAR, RWECHUNGURA,
NGULUMA & MAKANI
Ringo Tenga
LAW ASSOCIATES
Leopold Thomas Kalunga
KALUNGA & CO.ADVOCATES
THAILAND
Tratit Anudhira
CHANDLER AND THONG-EK
Natsuda Bhukkanasut
BANK OF THAILAND
Rujira Bunnag
MARUT BUNNAG INTERNATIONAL
LAW OFFICE
Albert T. Chandler
CHANDLER AND THONG-EK
Chinnavat Chinsangaram
WHITE & CASE
Thawat Damsa-ard
TILLEKE & GIBBINS
INTERNATIONAL
John Fotiadis
TILLEKE & GIBBINS
INTERNATIONAL
Paul Gregory
CLIFFORD CHANCE
Vira Kammee
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
COUNSELLORS
Suwat Kerdphon
BANGKOK METROPOLITAN LAND
OFFICE DEPARTMENT OF LANDS
Komkrit Kietduriyakul
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Samma Kitsin
THAI CREDIT BUREAU
Dej-Udom Krairit
DEJ-UDOM & ASSOCIATES
Kobnang Kunjura
THAI CREDIT BUREAU
Narong Leungbootnak
ASIAN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
Tongurai Limpiti
BANK OF THAILAND
Sakchai Limsiripothong
WHITE & CASE
David Lyman
TILLEKE & GIBBINS
INTERNATIONAL
Steven Miller
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Piched Niamnud
CHANDLER AND THONG-EK
Stephen Ogunlana
ASIAN TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE
Peradach Patanachan
CLIFFORD CHANCE
Cynthia Pornavalai
TILLEKE & GIBBINS
INTERNATIONAL
Noppramart Prasitmonthon
TILLEKE & GIBBINS
INTERNATIONAL
Pascale Prud’homme
TILLEKE & GIBBINS
INTERNATIONAL
Jane Puranananda
DEJ-UDOM & ASSOCIATES
Wanna Rakyao
DEPARTMENT OF LANDS
Piyanuj Ratprasatporn
TILLEKE & GIBBINS
INTERNATIONAL
Nuttida Samalapa
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Jessada Sawatdipong
CHANDLER & THONG-EK
Alexander James Seeley
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
COUNSELLORS
Hunt Talmage
CHANDLER AND THONG-EK
Anongporn Thanachaiary
TILLEKE & GIBBINS
INTERNATIONAL
Boonchai Thaveekittikul
BOONCHAI ARTHUR ANDERSEN
Rawee Wan Thongsrimadum
CLIFFORD CHANCE
Harold K. Vickery Jr.
VICKERY & WORACHAI
Pimvimol Vipamaneerut
TILLEKE & GIBBINS
INTERNATIONAL
Prapakorn Wannakano
BANK OF THAILAND
Nipa Wongyeekul
DEJ-UDOM & ASSOCIATES
TOGO
Ayessou Adade
CADASTRAL INSPECTION
Folly Adama
CABINET AQUEREBURU AND
PARTNERS
Jean-Marie Adenka
CABINET ADENKA
Richard Akpoto –
Kougbleneou
L’ECOLE AFRICAINE DES MÉTIERS
DE L’ARCHITECTURE ET DE
L’URBANISME, STUDIO ALPHA
A.I.C.
Koffi Alinon
CRCD/LANDNET
Philippe Ametsiagbe
MINISTRY OF URBANISM AND
HOUSING
Alexis Aquereburu
CABINET ME A.C. AQUEREBURU
Vilevo Biova Devo
CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE
L’UNION MONETAIRE OUEST
AFRICAINE
Kofi Kumodzi
DRH – GLOBAL EXCEL
INTERNATIONAL
Francois Nare
CENTRALE DES RISQUES DE
L’UNION MONETAIRE OUEST
AFRICAINE
Adjémida Douato Soededjede
SAFECO
TONGA
John Ridgway
PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK
LAWYERS
TUNISIA
Badreddine Barkia
CENTRAL BANK OF TUNISIA
Bouaziz Belaiba
SORENCO
Lamine Bellagha
ADLY BELLAGHA AND ASSOCIATES
Adly Bellagha
ADLY BELLAGHA AND ASSOCIATES
Héla Ben Miled
FERCHIOU & ASSOCIATES
MEZIOU KNANI
Kamel Ben Salah
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Abdelfatah Benahji
FERCHIOU & ASSOCIES MEZIOU
KNANI
Elyès BenMansour
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Celine Dupont
FERCHIOU & ASSOCIATES
MEZIOU KNANI
Salaheddine Caid Essebsi
SALAHEDDINE CAID ESSEBSI &
ASSOCIATES
Amina Larbi Ezzine
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Faiza Feki
CENTRAL BANK OF TUNISIA
Noureddine Ferchiou
FERCHIOU & ASSOCIATES
MEZIOU KNANI
Sami Kallel
KALLEL & ASSOCIATES
Radhi Meddeb
COMETE ENGINEERING
Faouzi Mili
MILI AND ASSOCIATES
Ilhem Ouanes
FERCHIOU & ASSOCIATES
MEZIOU KNANI
Lina bou Richa
FERCHIOU & ASSOCIATES
MEZIOU KNANI
Imed Tanazefti
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
TURKEY
Burcu Acarturk
PEKIN & PEKIN
Ugur Aktekin
MEHMET GÜN & CO
I. Hakki Arslan
CENTRAL BANK OF THE
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
Mehmet Artemel
SERAP ZUVIN
Elvan Aziz
PAKSOY & CO.
Kadriye Baysal
TURKISH CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION
Erol Bircanoglu Jr.
BIRCANOGLU LAW FIRM
Melis Biskin
OFFICES OF M. FADLULLAH
CERRAHOGLU
Mesut Cakmak
CAKMAK ORTAK AVUKAT
BUROSU
Zeynep Cakmak
CAKMAK ORTAK AVUKAT
BUROSU
Ibrahim Canakci
BANKING REGULATION AND
SUPERVISION AGENCY
Fadlullah Cerrahoglu
M. FADLULLAH CERRAHOGLU
Devrim Çukur
ÇUKUR & YILMAZ
Dilara Duman
SARIBRAHMOLU LAW OFFICE
Lale Giray
PEKIN & PEKIN
Semiha Gorgulu
YAMANER & YAMANER
Ali Gozutok
PEKIN & PEKIN
Mehmet Gün
MEHMET GÜN & CO.
Sezin Guner
PEKIN & PEKIN
Selen Gures
M. FADLULLAH CERRAHOGLU
Senem Gursoy
BIRCANOGLU LAW FIRM
Hande Hamevi
PEKIN & PEKIN
Baris Kalayci
MEHMET GÜN & CO
Kazim Kerman
KKB KREDIT KAYIT BUREAU
Burcu Mutulu
M. FADLULLAH CERRAHOGLU
Sezin Okkan
PEKIN & PEKIN
Fahri Okumus
CENTRAL BANK OF THE
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
Sebnem Onder
CAKMAK ORTAK AVUKAT
BUROSU
Nihat Ozdemir
TURKISH CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION
Eser Ozer
ANORBIS ULUSLARARASI BILGI
MERKZI
Emin özkurt
MEHMET GÜN & CO.
Serdar Paksoy
PAKSOY & CO.
Ahmed Pekin
PEKIN & PEKIN
Sefika Pekin
M.FETHI PEKIN & SEFIKA PEKIN
M. Selçuk Polat
TURKISH CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION
Nihat Sahin
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF LAND
REGISTRY AND CADASTRE
Y. Selim Sariibrahimoglu
SARIBRAHMOLU LAW OFFICE
Yesim Sezgingil
DTB DIS TICARET BILGI
MERKEZI
Paul Sheridan
DENTON WILDE SAPTE & GUNER
Pinar Tanilkan
PEKIN & PEKIN
Nese Tasdemir
MEHMET GÜN & CO.
Selcuk TayfunOk
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
ISTANBUL
Elif Tezcan
M.FETHI PEKIN & SEFIKA PEKIN
Selma Toplü Ünlü
MEHMET GÜN & CO
Fuat Tuac
PEKIN & PEKIN
Feyza Tukel
BIRCANOGLU LAW FORM
Aysegül Yalçinmani
M. FADLULLAH CERRAHOGLU
Selim Yavuz
PEKIN & PEKIN
Mehtap Yildirim-Ozturk
CAKMAK ORTAK AVUKAT
BUROSU
Serap Zuvin
SERAP ZUVIN
UGANDA
Russell Eastaugh
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
Moses Jurua Adriko
ADRIKO & KARUGABA
ADVOCATES
Oscar Kambona
KAMPALA ASSOCIATED
ADVOCATES
Masembe Kanyerezi
MUGERWA & MASEMBE
ADVOCATES
Philip Karugaba
ADRIKO & KARUGABA
ADVOCATES

154 DOING BUSINESS IN 2005
Sim K. Katende
KATENDE, SEMPEBWA AND
COMPANY ADVOCATES
Bart Katureebe
KAMPALA ASSOCIATED
ADVOCATES
Lilian Keene-Mugerwa
LAND TENURE REFORM
PROJECTS, MINISTRY OF WATER,
LANDS, AND ENVIRONMENT
Assumpta Kemigisha
NANGWALA, REZIDA & CO
ADVOCATES,
Robert Kiggundu
ARCH FORUM
Mohmed Mbabazi
NYANZI, KIBONEKA AND
MBABAZI ADVOCATES
David F.K. Mpanga
A.F. MPANGA,ADVOCATES
Gabriel Mpubani
GABRIEL MPUBANI
Charles Muganwa Ssemakula
LAWYER
Peters K. Musoke
SHONUBI, MUSOKE & CO.
Rachel Mwanje Musoke
MUGERWA & MASEMBE
ADVOCATES
Rose Namarome
LEX UGANDA ADVOCATES &
SOLICITORS
Charles Odere
LEX UGANDA ADVOCATES &
SOLICITORS
Alex Rezida
NANGWALA, REZIDA & CO
ADVOCATES,
Justin Semuyaba
SEMUYABA, IGA, & CO.
ADVOCATES
Alan Shonubi
SHONUBI, MUSOKE & CO
Ssekatawa
MUGERWA & MASEMBE,
ADVOCATES
Ezekiel Tuma
SHONUBI, MUSOKE & CO.
UKRAINE
Oleg Alyoshin
VASIL KISIL & PARTNERS
Viktor Andriyaka
GRISCHENKO & PARTNERS
Natalia Artemova
GRISCHENKO & PARTNERS
Daniel A. Bilak
JURVNESHSERVICE ATTORNEYS &
COUNSELS
Yuriy Brykaylo
KONNOV & SOZANOVSKY
Serhiy Chorny
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Olexandr Fedoriv
CREDIT RATING AGENCY
SLAVRATING
Anna V. Globina
CHABOURNE AND BARKE
Yaroslav Gregirchak
MAGISTER & PARTNERS
James Hitch
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Ruslan Israpilov
GRISCHENKO & PARTNERS
Valeria Kazadorova
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Anastasiya Khutko
SHEVCHENKO DIDKOVSKIY &
PARTNERS
Alexandr Kireyev
NATIONAL BANK OF UKRAINE
Sergei Konnov
KONNOV & SOZANOVSKY
Svetlana Kustova
KONNOV & SOZANOVSKY
Olexander Martinenko
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Ilona Melnichuk
KONNOV & SOZANOVSKY
Sergiy Onishchenko
CHABOURNE AND BARKE
Andrii Palianytsia
LCPS
Olexiy Pokotylo
KONNOV & SOZANOVSKY
Vira Potyekhina
GRISCHENKO & PARTNERS
Olyana Rudyakova
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Igor A. Shevchenko
SHEVCHENKO DIDKOVSKIY &
PARTNERS
Oleg Shevchuk
PROXEN
Markian Silecky
THE SILECKY FIRM
Mykola Stetsenko
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Sergei Voitovich
GRISCHENKO & PARTNERS
Alexander N Yefimov
ALEXANDER YEFOMIV
Oleg Zagnitko
MAGISTER & PARTNERS
Galina P. Zagorodnyuk
KONNOV & SOZANOVSKY
Svitlana Zakhtey
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Oleg Zinkevych
KRAVETS & LEVENETS
UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES
Saeed Abdulla Al Hamiz
CENTRAL BANK OF THE UAE
Murad Abida
HADEF AL DHAHIRI &
ASSOCIATES
Bashir Ahmed
AFRIDI & ANGELL
Salah El Dien Al Nahas
HADEL AL DHAHIRI &
ASSOCIATES
Habib M. AlMulla
HABIB AL MULLA& CO
Ammar Al-Saleh
AL TAMIMI & COMPANY
Lisa Dale
AL TAMIMI & COMPANY
Abdul latif Eissa
HILAL ASSOCIATES
Hassen A. Ferris
AFRIDI & ANGELL
Ayman Hamdy
SHALAKANY LAW OFFICE
Hussan M.K. Hourani
AL TAMIMI & COMPANY
Nabil A. Issa
AFRIDI & ANGELL
Walid Karam
HABIB AL MULLA& CO
Suneer Kumar
AL-SUWAIDI & COMPANY
Katerina Miltiadou
MECOS
Stephen Rodd
BRYAN CAVE
Vandana Rupani
AFRIDI & ANGELL
Jonathan Silver
CLYDE & CO
Mahamed Suwaidi
AL-SUWAIDI & COMPANY
Neil Taylor
DAVIS LANGDON
UNITED KINGDOM
Kenneth Baird
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS
DERINGER
Richard Boulton
FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY
Greg Boyd
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Michael Brown
EVERSHEDS LAW FIRM
Richard Clark
SLAUGHTER AND MAY
Simon Cookson
ASHURST
Laura Cram
ASHURST
David Crosthwaite
DAVIS LANGDON CONSULTANCY
Paul Samuel Gilbert
FINERS STEPHENS INNOCENT
Andrew Glaze
WRAGGE & CO
Simon Graham
WRAGGE & CO
John Hadlow
EXPERIAN
Andrew D. Haywood
DARLINGTONS SOLICITORS
Gillian Key-Vice
EXPERIAN
Gillian Key-Vice
EXPERIAN
Sarah Lawson
DENTON WILDE SAPPE
Steve Mallen
KNIGHT FRANK
Christopher Mallon
WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES
Willie Manners
MACFARLANES
John Meadows
HM LAND REGISTRY
Jim Meikle
DAVIS LANGDON CONSULTANCY
Michael Prior
SHAWN COULSON
INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS
Milton Psyllides
EVERSHEDS LAW FIRM
Dave Sharp
REGISTERS OF SCOTLAND
Paul Sillis
COLLYER-BRISTOW
Kathy Smith
SLAUGHTER AND MAY
Michael Steiner
DENTON WILDE SAPPE
Katherine Stones
WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES
Sally Willcock
WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES
Philip Wood
ALLEN & OVERY
Julia Yates
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS
DERINGER
John Young
EVERSHEDS LAW FIRM
UNITED STATES
David Adkins
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
Carl Anduri
LEX MUNDI
Richard F. Broude
RICHARD F. BROUDE
Mike Calder
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW
YORK
Peter R Chaffetz
CLIFFORD CHANCE
Tammy Fudem
THELEN REID & PRIEST (NEW
YORK)
Veronica Glanville
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY
COURT
Lawrence Haas
BAKER & MCKENZIE, CHICAGO
Melissa M Johns
CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN &
HAMILTON
Jonel Jordan
TRANSUNION
Charles L. Kerr
MORRISON AND FOERSTER
Pierre le Roux
INTERGRAPH MAPPING AND
GEOSPATIAL SOLUTIONS
Erik Lindauer
SULLIVAN AND CROMWELL
David Malamed
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Raymond McGuire
CONTRACTORS’ ASSOCIATION OF
GREATER NEW YORK
Matthew Meade
MORRISON AND FOERSTER
David Newberg
COLLIER, HALPERN, NEWBERG,
NOLLETTI, & BOCK
Samuel Nolen
RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER
Howard Oken
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW
YORK
John Ralls
THELEN REID & PRIEST
Stephen Raslavich
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY
COURT
Lillian E. Rice
CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN &
HAMILTON
Phillip Salomon
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW
YORK
David Snyder
SNYDER & SNYDER
Richard Spillenkothen
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
Frederick Turner
SNYDER & SNYDER
Jason Vonderhaar
TRANSUNION
URUGUAY
Maria Elena Abo
MUXI & ASOCIADOS
Laura Arocena
HUGHES & HUGHES
César I. Aroztegui
AROZTEGUI & ASOCIADOS/
BRONS & SALAS
Luis Baccino
AROZTEGUI & ASOCIADOS/
BRONS & SALAS
Maria Isabel Bonaffon
DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE
REGISTROS
Corina Bove
GUYER & REGULES
Carlos Brandes
GUYER & REGULES
Mercedes Jimenez de
Arrechaga
GUYER & REGULES
Conrado Hughes Delgado
HUGHES & HUGHES
María Durán
HUGHES & HUGHES
Noelia Eiras
HUGHES & HUGHES
Gabriel Ejgenberg
ESTUDIO BERGSTEIN
Agustín Etcheverry Reyes
ESTUDIO DR. MEZZERA
Marcelo Femenías
BADO, KUSTER, ZERBINO &
RACHETTI
Daniel Ferrere
FERRERE LAMAISON
Diego Galante
GALANTE & MARTINS
Rosario Garat
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE
INSTITUCIONES DE
INTERMEDIACIÓN
Flavia Gatti
FERRERE LAMAISON
Manuel Gonzalez Rocco
BANCO CENRAL DEL URUGUAY

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 155
Marcela Hughes
HUGHES & HUGHES
Ariel Imken
BANCO CENTRAL DEL URUGUAY
Alfredo Inciarte Blanco
PEREZ DEL CASTILLO – NAVARRO
– INCIARTE – GARI
Estudio Jurídico
MUXI & ASOCIADOS
Nelly Kleckin
ESTUDIO BERGSTEIN
Elbio L. Kuster
BADO, KUSTER, ZERBINO &
RACHETTI
Jose Lorieto
CLEARING DE INFORMES
Matilde Milicevic
CLEARING DE INFORMES
Alejandro Miller Artola
ARTOLA GUYER & REGULES
Ricardo Olivera-García
OLIVERA & DELPIAZZO
Veronica Raffo
FERRERE LAMAISON
Bruno Santin
ESTUDIO JURÍDICO MUXÍ &
ASOCIADOS
Alvaro Tarabal
GUYER & REGULES
UZBEKISTAN
Sanjar Abdukhalilov
DENTON WILDE SAPPE
Jamol Askarov
CHADBOURNE AND PARKE
Ilkhom Azizov
AZIZOV & PARTNERS
Irina Gosteva
DENTON WILDE SAPTE
Thomas Johnson
DENTON WILDE SAPTE
Moubarak Kambarova
DENTON WILDE SAPTE
Natalia V. Lopaeva
SUPREME ECONOMIC COURT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN
Ibrahim Mukhamedjanov
AZIZOV & PARTNERS
Ravshan Rakhmanov
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Taminech Roshanian
ROSHIANIAN, PAYMAN, IRWIN
Alexander Samborsky
MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
GEODESY, CARTOGRAPHY AND
STATE CADASTRE
Vakhid Saparov
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Sofiya Shaikhrazieva
DENTON WILDE SAPTE
Sergey Shirov
DENTON WILDE SAPTE
Umarov Abdurakhim
Vakhidovich
UZBEK ASSOCIATION OF BANKS
VANUATU
Christopher Dawson
DAWSON BUILDERS
Juris Ozols
JURIS OZOLS AND ASSOCIATES
John Ridgway
PACIFIC LEGAL NETWORK
LAWYERS
VENEZUELA
Jorge Acedo-Prato
HOET PELAEZ CASTILLO &
DUQUE
Carolina Armada
ITP CONSULTING
Alfredo Basalo-Rodríguez
HOET PELAEZ CASTILLO &
DUQUE
Gertrudiz Bonilla
ROMERO-MUCI & ASOCIADOS
Mercedes Briceño
CONAPRI
Alvaro Briceño
ITP CONSULTING
Camilo Daza
CONAPRI
Arturo de Sola Lander
DE SOLA PATE & BROWN
Trino Alcides Díaz
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS
Carlos Dominguez
HOET PELAEZ CASTILLO &
DUQUE
Carlos G. Domínguez
HOET PELAEZ CASTILLO &
DUQUE
Rossanna D’Onza
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Iris Guijarro
ITP CONSULTORES
Victor Sanchez Leal
BENTATA ABOGADOS
Antonio López Castillo
DE SOLA PATE & BROWN
Luiz Ignacio Mendoza
RODRIGUEZ & MENDOZA
Gustavo Muci
ROMERO-MUCI & ASOCIADOS
Irving Ochoa
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS Y
OTRAS INSTITUCIONES
Fernando Peláez-Pier
HOET PELAEZ CASTILLO &
DUQUE
Miguel Angel Pérez Lavaud
AVELEDO KLEMPRER RIVÀS
PEREZ TRUJILLO SANZ &
ASOCIADOS
Gustavo Enrique Planchart
Pocaterra
TINOCO,TRAVIESO, PLANCHART
& NUÑEZ
Carlos Plaza Anselmi
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Victor Sanchez Leal
LEAL BENTATA ABOGADOS
Oscar Ignacio Torres
TRAVIESO EVANS ARRIA RENGEL
& PAZ
Carlos Velandia Sanchez
ASOCIACIÓN VENEZOLANA DE
DERECHO REGISTRAL
Patricia Wallis
ITP CONSULTING
VIETNAM
Pierre Anglès d’Auriac
FLÉCHEUX, NGO & ASSOCIÉS
Brett Ashton
CHESTERTON PETTY
Nicholas Audier
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Frederick Burke
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Frederick Burke
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Doan Chien
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Uan Pham Cong
STATE BANK OF VIETNAM
Giles Thomas Cooper
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Florent Fassier
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
John Hickin
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Phong-anh Hoang
GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL
Nguyen Hoang Kim Oanh
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Ian K. Lewis
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Han Mahn Tien
CONCETTI CONSULTING
Tran Manh Hung
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Nguyen Tuan Minh
TILLEKE & GIBBINS
CONSULTANTS
Lai Minh Thuy
FREEHILL HOLLINGDALE & PAGE
Dao Nguyen
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Anna On
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Viet D. Phan
TRAN H. N. & ASSOCIATES
Tran YenTrang Phan
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Timothy Reinold
FREEHILL HOLLINGDALE & PAGE
Yee Chung Seck
BAKER & MCKENZIE
ThanhHa Tran
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Thomas J. Treutler
JOHNSON STOKES & MASTER
Nguyen Viet Ha
RUSSIN & VECHI
Pham Nghiem XuanBac
VISION & ASSOCIATES
INVESTMENT & MANAGEMENT
CONSULTANTS
YEMEN, REP.
Sheikh Tariq Abdullah
Anwar Adham
ADHAM & ASSOCIATES
Jamal Adimi
JAMAL ADIMI LAW OFFICE
Khaled Al Buraihi
KHALED AL BURAIHI FOR
ADVOCACY & LEGAL SERVICES
Abdalla Al Meqbeli
ABDALLA AL MEQBELI &
ASSOCIATES
Hassan Al-Dailami
HASSAN AL-DAILAMI & CO.
Mohamed Taha Hamood Al-
Hashimi
MOHAMED TAHA HAMOOD &
CO.
Nageeb Alkadi
NAGEEB ALKADI & ASSOCIATE
OFFICES
Abdalla Al-Meqbeli
ABDALLA AL-MEQBELI &
ASSOCIATES
Abdulla Al-Olofi
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
Mohamed Jaffer Kassim
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Zuhair Abdul Rasheed
SHEIKH TARIQ ABDULLAH
Khaled Saeed
AL BURAIHI KHALED
Saeed Sohbi
SAEED HASSAN SOHBI
ZAMBIA
Adam Aziz
AD ADAMS & CO
Moses Chatulika
BANK OF ZAMBIA
Mwelwa Chibesakunda
CORPUS GLOBE ADVOCATES
Elias Chipimo
CORPUS GLOBE
Abdulla Dudhia
MUSA DUDHIA & CO
Robin Durairajah
CORPUS GLOBE ADVOCATES
Harriet Kapekele
CORPUS GLOBE ADVOCATES
Pixie Linda Mwila Kasonde-
Yangailo
P.H. YANGAILO & COMPANY
Frank M. Lwambano
ELLIS & CO
N.K. Mubonda
D.H. KEMP & CO. LAW FIRM
Morris Mulomba
BANK OF ZAMBIA
Henry Musonda
KIRAN & MUSONDA ASSOCIATES
Marjorie Grace Mwenda
MG JOHNSON-MWENDA & CO
Kanti Patel
CHRISTOPHER, RUSSELL COOK &
CO
Solly Patel
CHRISTOPHER, RUSSELL COOK &
CO
Noah Siasimuna
MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND
SOCIAL SECURITY
John Sichinsambwe
MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL
SECURITY
Albert M. Wood
ALBERT M WOOD & CO
A.R. Zikonda
HIGH COURT OF ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE
Richard H. S. Beattie
THE STONE BEATTIE STUDIO
Roger H. Chadwick
SCANLEN & HOLDERNESS
Innocent Chagonda
ATHERSTONE & COOK
Lindsay Cook
ATHERSTONE &COOK
C.L. Dhliwayo
RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE
Obert Chaurura Gutu
GUTU & CHIKOWERO
Stephen Gwasira
RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE
Kantor
KANTOR & IMMERMAN
Brenda Wood Khahari
B.W. KAHARI
Peter Lloyd
GILL GODLONTON & GERRANS
T S Manjengwah
WINTERTONS LAW FIRM
Tendayi Manyumwa
DEPARTMENT OF
GEOINFORMATICS AND
SURVEYING AT THE UNIVERSITY
OF ZIMBABWE
Thembiwe Mazingi
COGHLAN,WELSH & GUEST
John Meyburgh
STUMBLES AND ROWE
Honour P. Mkushi
SAWYER AND MKUSHI
Piniel Mkushi
SAWYER & MKUSHI
Stenford Moyo
SCANLEN & HOLDERNESS
Alwyn Pichanick
WINTERTONS LAW FIRM