Blick aus Asien

Schwerpunktthema
Will Euro problems hurt Asian
monetary integration?
Whereas the Euro was on the brink of faltering, Asia is contemplating increased financial
integration: Financial markets are becoming more open, the Chiang Mai Initiative has been
multilateralised and China has once again unpegged the Yuan from the US-Dollar. Andrew
Sheng takes a look at lessons Asia can learn from Europe’s difficulties and further steps to
be taken for regional financial cooperation.
Blick aus Asien
At the 10th Anniversary of the Euro’s
launch in 2009, there were some sugges -
tions that one-day the Euro might even
take over the role of the US dollar as the
dominant reserve currency. After all, the
US dollar had been depreciating due to
the subprime crisis against the Euro. Less
than a year later, the Euro is sliding as a
result of the Greek debt crisis.
Doubters are now pointing to a political
and structural crisis of the Euro,
and focusing on the need for stronger
fiscal discipline. The Maastricht Treaty,
that led to the creation of the euro area,
was unable to bind the euro area members
to fiscal discipline. If even the
uber-fiscally conservative Germany
could not meet the limits of 3% of GDP
fiscal deficit due to the high costs of
funding the re-unification of Germany,
why should the smaller states adhere
to the Treaty?
The structural flaw of the Euro zone is
that even though there may be a unified
European Central Bank and a converging
European financial supervisory system,
there is no unified fiscal system. Thus,
once a member country runs a large fiscal
deficit, there is no central body to
effectively coordinate fiscal policy.
Proponents of Asian monetary integration
point to growth in trade integration
as a pre-condition for future
financial integration. Those who think
that Asian integration is a pipe dream
say that there is currently no political
consensus, not even the makings of a
unified monetary or currency policy, and
little convergence on supervisory policy.
Further, there are hardly any discussions
within Asia on common fiscal policies.
The Euro problems are more warning
signals to Asian reforms on what not to
do and what to avoid, rather than positive
indicators of the road to integration.
But not all the lessons are negative. I can
think of several ‘green shoots’ coming
out of the Euro problems for Asia.
The first is that you can’t hurry the
process. It takes time to get consensus on
what is right for a large community of
different interests and different cultures.
If you ask ten Asian economists on what
they think the future of Asian integration
is, I am sure you will get more than
ten opinions. Common thinking is nonexistent,
let alone common institutions.
At least, European bureaucracies have
been talking and bargaining with each
other for more than 50 years through the
centers’ of power in Brussels, Basel and
Frankfurt.
Secondly, talk about Asian monetary
integration has always been defensive
rather than offensive, in the sense that
some pooling of resources (such as an
Asian Monetary Fund) could hopefully
defend weaker Asian currencies from
excessive speculation and instability.
The reason why multilateralisation of
the Chiang Mai initiatives took quite a
long time to arrange is that immediately
follow ing the Asian financial crisis
threats of instability receded, and thus
there was little urgency to getting any
agreement done. The problems of the
Euro have given the Asian integration
process more urgency.
Thirdly, in the last decade, differences
in country income and wealth levels
have become less unequal. With Japan in
the doldrums and the rise of China,
India, Gulf states and East Asia-ex
Japan; Asian countries are now more
evenly matched. Ten years ago, Japan
was the sole advanced country, but
today, China, India, Korea and Indonesia
are members of the G20. Seven of the
Asia Pacific’s financial centres are
amongst the top 15 in the world according
to the City of London Global Financial
Centre Index.
Fourthly, the return of the RMB to a
more flexible currency arrangement and
the upward revaluation of the Asian currencies
in recent months indicate that
the financial markets are reflecting the
shifting economic weight towards the
East. Asia will be receiving more hot
money flows and will have to cope with
the same pressures that plagued East
Asia in the early 1990s, just before the
Asian financial crisis.
Fifth, the official attitude towards
more controls over the speculative barbar
ians at the gate has changed, even as
Germany unilaterally banned naked short
selling and the IMF has acknow ledged
that capital controls are part of the
macro-economic toolkits. The balance of
power between markets and the central
banks in managing currency stability has
tilted back towards central banks.
None of the above positive signs add
up to greater impetus for Asian monetary
integration. Indeed, there is no sign
that there is greater sense of regional
cooperation, since Korea was also willing
to put currency issues on the agenda of
G20 in Toronto.
Much will depend on how China plays
her cards in the near future. Shanghai
has already been designated as the international
financial centre for China and
the RMB is becoming an important trade
currency, particularly with neighbouring
countries. The sheer weight of excess
savings in the surplus countries will
clearly give Asian financial centers’ more
clout in the recycling of global funds.
What is not obvious is how Asian
policy-makers are institutionalising the
process.
The process of Asian financial integration
must depend first and foremost
on the degree of deepening in Asian
financial institutions. The process of
creating diverse financial institutions has
happened too slowly relative to the
needs of the rising middle class and
aging demographics. Asia has always
prided itself on growth with relatively
little financial repression, in the sense
that depositors received only slightly
negative real interest rates, with the
benefits of repression given to the export
and manufacturing sectors. In recent
years, however, the rise of inflation has
hurt the savers, but the benefits to the
borrowers have been unevenly spread.
Perhaps the next phase of Asian
financial integration will be less officially
driven, and more market led
through the removal of the barriers to
Asian financial institutions integrating
Asiatisches Währungsnetzwerk
Land
Brunei
China (+ Hongkong)
Indonesien
Japan
Kambodscha
Korea, Republik
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippinen
Singapur
Thailand
Vietnam
Beitrag in Mio. USD
30
38.400
4.552
38.400
120
19.200
30
4.552
60
4.552
4.552
4.552
1.000
within the region. Allowing more Asian
financial institutions into each others’
domestic markets is more of a concrete
step towards regional integration than
visionary statements.
Witness how Malaysia has allowed
Chinese, Indian, Indonesia, Japanese and
Middle East financial institutions into its
home market. If this process accelerates
and spreads, Asian financial integration
will happen through the ramen bowl of
inter-connected institutions. Note that I
am not talking about spaghetti.
The article has been published at
www.eastasiaforum.org on July 5th, 2010
Die Chiang Mai-Initiative geht auf einen
Gipfel der ASEAN+3 Staaten (ASEAN sowie
China, Japan und Südkorea) im Jahr 2000 in
der thailändischen Stadt Chiang Mai
zu rück. Ziel war – als Reaktion auf die Asienkrise
– die Bildung eines asiatischen Netzwerks
bilateraler Währungs-Swap-Abkommen,
um die Liquidität der Mitgliedsstaaten
bei künftigen Krisen zu sichern. Im Zuge der
weltweiten Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise
wurde 2009 beschlossen, die Initiative multilateral
auszurichten. Im März 2010 wurde
entsprechend ein asiatischer Fonds in Höhe
von 120 Milliarden US-Dollar eingerichtet,
in den die beteiligten Länder mit unterschiedlichen
Anteilen einzahlen. Schwergewichte
sind China mit Hongkong, Japan und Korea.
Diese großen Beitragszahler dürfen nicht
mehr Geld aus dem Fonds entnehmen als
sie eingezahlt haben. Die anderen Staaten
dürfen ein Vielfaches ihrer Einlagen ausleihen
– je nach zugeteiltem Multiplikator.
Beitrag in Prozent
0,025 %
32,0 %
3,8 %
32,0 %
0,1 %
16,0 %
0,025 %
3,8 %
0,05 %
3,8 %
3,8 %
3,8 %
0,8 %
Multiplikator
5,0
1,0
2,5
1,0
5,0
2,5
5,0
2,5
5,0
2,5
2,5
2,5
5,0
Andrew Sheng is Adjunct Professor
at the University of Malaya and
Tsinghua University, Beijing.
www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/07/05/willeuro-problems-hurt-asian-monetaryintegration/
06
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