Schriften des Historischen Kollegs - Kolloquien 6 - Historisches Kolleg

In the Shadow of Stabilization: German Liberalism 33
In many respects, the fateof the DDP was not unlike that ofthe DVP.For although
the leaders of the DVP had always been much less inhibited in their solicitation of
middle-dass economic interests than the Democrats, the inflation and subsequent
stabilization of the mark had done much to intensify the general level of interest antagonism
within their party as we1l 49 • The situation within the DVP was further complicated
by the fact that representatives of the German industrial establishment had
become firmly entrenched on the party's right wing, thereby leaving it exposed to
charges from the WP and VRP that it was nothing more than the instrument of German
big business 50 . Using his visibility as Germany's Foreign Minister to maximum
advantage, Stresemann tried to counter the disintegrative effect which the inflation
and stabilization of the mark had had upon his party's predominantly middle-dass social
base by reaffirming the primacy of foreign policy and the national traditions upon
which the party had been founded 51 . Like the Democrats, Stresemann was not adverse
to using nationalism as a means of holding his party together and of compensating the
German middle dass for the materiallosses which it had suffered during the first half
of the 1920's. Moreover, in the DVP's case this was supplemented by a renewed emphasis
upon liberalism and the ideological traditions with which the DVP, as the successor
of the prewar National Libenil Party (Nationalliberale Partei), had always
identified itself 52 • All of this represented a conscious attempt on the part of Stresemann
and his associates to undercut the increasingly prominent role which organized
economic interests had come to play in their party's internal affairs. But this ploy was
only partially effective in terms of arresting the forces of social and political disintegration
which first the inflation and then the stabilization of the mark had unleashed
within the DVP, and the party's dedine, as the outcome of the Saxon state elections in
the fall of 1926 dearly confirmed, was to continue unabated throughout the remainder
of the decade 53 .
With the resounding defeat of the German liberal parties in the May 1928 Reichstag
elections the legitimacy crisis of the Weimar party system entered its final and decisive
phase. For although the elections had taken place in a dimate of relative eco-
49 In this respect, see the speeches by Hoff, Keinath, Morath, and Thiel in: Die finanziellen und
sozialpolitischen Probleme bei der Reichstagswahl 1930. Reden gehalten bei einer volksparteilichen
Tagung am 25. Juli 1930 im Reichstage, ed. Reichsgeschäftsstelle der Deutschen Volkspartei
(Berlin, n. d. [1930]) 13-44.
50 On the role of German industry within the DVP, see Lothar Döhn, Politik und Interesse. Die
Interessenstruktur der Deutschen Volkspartei, (Meisenheim 1972) 91-131, 164-234.
51 For example, see Gustav Stresemann, Nationale Realpolitik. Rede auf dem 6. Parteitag der
Deutschen Volkspartei am 14. November 1924, (Flugschriften der Deutschen Volkspartei No.
56, Berlin 1924).
52 In this respect, see Deutscher Liberalismus. Reden in der Sitzung des Zentralvorstandes der
Deutschen Volkspartei am 23. Mai 1925 in Berlin, ed. Reichsgeschäftsstelle der Deutschen
Volkspartei (Berlin 1925), and 60 Jahr-Feier der Nationalliberalen Partei am 19. und 20. März
1927 in Hannover, ed. Reichsgeschäftsstelle der Deutschen Volkspartei (Berlin 1927).
53 On the DVP's general decline throughout the 1920's, see Otto Thiel, Wie kommen wir zu einer
großen Deutschen Volkspartei? Vortrag, geh. auf der Tagung der Reichsgemeinschaft junger
Volksparteiler in Berlin am 26. Oktober 1930 (n. p., n.d. [1930D 5-7.