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ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY AND NEUROSCIENCE<br />
VENICE, 17-21 APRIL 2011<br />
1
Contents<br />
Program schedule……………………………………3<br />
Abstracts………………………………………………..6<br />
List <strong>of</strong> participants………………………….….…19<br />
Accommodation…………………………………….21<br />
3
PANEL 1: CONSCIOUSNESS I<br />
Program<br />
Monday, April 18 th<br />
Chairs: Pr<strong>of</strong>. Michael Pauen <strong>and</strong> Georgina Torbet<br />
9:00 - 9:25<br />
9:25 - 9:50<br />
9:50 - 10:15<br />
On the Influence <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Brain</strong> on the <strong>Brain</strong>: Be “Aware”!<br />
(Sebastian Philipp)<br />
Meditation…? Questions for Neuroscientists<br />
(Arun Singh)<br />
10:15 - 10:30 BREAK<br />
PANEL 2: CONSCIOUSNESS II<br />
The Role <strong>of</strong> Neuroscientific Findings in Ascribing<br />
Intentional States (Joachim Lipski)<br />
Chairs: Pr<strong>of</strong>. Arno Villringer <strong>and</strong> Bianca van Kemenade<br />
10:30 - 10:55<br />
The Mystery <strong>of</strong> the Internal Clock, or What do we Know<br />
about Time Perception? (Sophie Herbst)<br />
10:55 - 11:20 Hypnosis as <strong>and</strong> Neuroscience (Vera Ludwig)<br />
11:20 - 11:45<br />
11:45 - 13:30 LUNCH<br />
13:30<br />
afternoon<br />
Cognitive Neuroscience Approaches to Freudian Repression<br />
(Georgina Torbet)<br />
Boat to Venice<br />
Sightseeing with an organized tour; details tba<br />
4
PANEL 3: ETHICS<br />
Tuesday, April 19 th<br />
Chairs: Pr<strong>of</strong>. Benedikt Grothe <strong>and</strong> Emiliano Zaccarella<br />
9:00 - 9:25<br />
9:25 - 9:50<br />
Ethical Issues in Human-Robot Interaction<br />
(Aleks<strong>and</strong>ra Kupferberg)<br />
Neuroscientific Research on Moral Judgement<br />
(David Kaufmann)<br />
9:50 - 10:15 Neuroscience <strong>and</strong> Morality (Judy Ng)<br />
10:15 - 10:30 BREAK<br />
PANEL 4: SENSE PERCEPTION I<br />
Chairs: Pr<strong>of</strong>. Wilhelm Vossenkuhl <strong>and</strong> Alex<strong>and</strong>er Soutschek<br />
10:30 - 10:55<br />
10:55 - 11:20<br />
Color Vision: From the Outside World via the Cortex to<br />
Consciousness (Christian Kellner)<br />
Recurrent Neural Processing in Somatosensory Awareness<br />
(Ryszard Auksztulewicz)<br />
11:20 - 11:45 Multisensory Integration (Bianca van Kemenade)<br />
11:45 - 13:30 LUNCH<br />
PANEL 5: SENSE PERCEPTION II<br />
Chair: PD Dr. Stephan Sellmaier <strong>and</strong> Ellen Fridl<strong>and</strong><br />
13:30 - 13:55<br />
Orientation Encoding in the FFA is Selective to Faces:<br />
Evidence from Multivoxal Pattern Analysis (Fern<strong>and</strong>o<br />
Ramirez)<br />
13:55 - 14:20 Naturalized Epistemology (Alex<strong>and</strong>er Soutschek)<br />
5
Wedesday, April 19 th<br />
PANEL 6: WILL AND DECISION MAKING<br />
Chairs: Pr<strong>of</strong>. Michael Pauen <strong>and</strong> Ryszard Auksztulewicz<br />
9:00 - 9:25<br />
9:25 - 9:50<br />
The Role <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Brain</strong> in Impulsivity <strong>and</strong> Self-Control<br />
(Saskia Köhler)<br />
Building Blocks in Human Decision Making <strong>and</strong> Cognitive<br />
Control (Rol<strong>and</strong> Nigbur)<br />
9:50 - 10:15 Drosophila <strong>and</strong> Cognitive Functions (Armin Bahl)<br />
10:15 - 10:30 BREAK<br />
PANEL 7: CLINICAL APPLICATIONS<br />
Chairs: Pr<strong>of</strong>. Benedikt Grothe <strong>and</strong> Judy Ng<br />
10:30 - 10:55 Optogenetics (Barbara Trattner)<br />
10:55 - 11:20<br />
11:20 - 11:45<br />
11:45 - 13:30 LUNCH<br />
PANEL 8: LANGUAGE<br />
Reduction <strong>of</strong> Inter-hemispheric Connectivity in Disorders<br />
<strong>of</strong> Consciousness (Smadar Ovadia-Caro)<br />
The Neural Effects <strong>of</strong> Alcohol Bias Modification Training<br />
(Corinde Wiers)<br />
Chairs: Pr<strong>of</strong>. Arno Villringer <strong>and</strong> Aleks<strong>and</strong>ra Kupferberg<br />
13:30 - 13:55<br />
CLOSING SESSION<br />
On the Nature <strong>of</strong> Merge: Neuroanatomical Correlates <strong>of</strong><br />
Local Syntactic Structures in Natural Language Processing<br />
(Emiliano Zaccarella)<br />
6
Aleks<strong>and</strong>ra Kupferberg<br />
Abstracts<br />
Ethical Issues in Human-Robot Interaction<br />
Despite tremendous usefulness <strong>and</strong> great social benefits gained by integrating robots as<br />
helpers <strong>and</strong> interaction partners into human environments, there are a number <strong>of</strong><br />
important ethical problems involved in such developments. These problems require<br />
careful consideration <strong>and</strong> analyses from a perspective <strong>of</strong> applied ethics, since ethical<br />
problems will be noticeable in cases where robots are used in everyday <strong>and</strong> intimate<br />
settings such as the education sector, personal assistance duties <strong>and</strong> the elderly care. In<br />
such settings, the tendency <strong>of</strong> humans to see their interactions with machines in<br />
anthropomorphic terms will be increased <strong>and</strong> people might develop affection towards<br />
machines e.g. because <strong>of</strong> similarities in personality <strong>and</strong> knowledge <strong>and</strong> also affection<br />
shown by the robot towards the human. Another problem might arise in case that a robot<br />
is given two conflicting orders by two different humans. Whom should it obey? Who<br />
should carry the responsibility for a failure in a joint human-robot task? A different issue<br />
deals with the question whether it is ethically <strong>and</strong> morally responsible to manufacture<br />
robot workers <strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong>roids, since the argument is that robot workers take jobs from<br />
human workers. In which way will humanity be transformed if the dangerous,<br />
monotonous <strong>and</strong> hazardous work will be performed by robots <strong>and</strong> the expectations <strong>of</strong><br />
humans will increase towards other humans? The consequences <strong>of</strong> introduction <strong>of</strong> robots<br />
in human environments will also increase the percentages <strong>of</strong> his/her life interfacing with<br />
machines instead <strong>of</strong> real humans. Therefore, ethics must do empirical research to<br />
examine what counts as a good life in the environment that encompasses both humans<br />
<strong>and</strong> robotic companions.<br />
Alex<strong>and</strong>er Soutschek<br />
Naturalized Epistemology: Can empirical science help to answer traditional<br />
epistemological questions?<br />
In traditional philosophy, epistemological questions are investigated by conceptual<br />
analyses <strong>and</strong> a priori arguments. For example, the sceptical question <strong>of</strong> whether<br />
knowledge <strong>of</strong> the external world is possible shall be answered by analysing our intuitive<br />
concepts <strong>of</strong> knowledge <strong>and</strong> reality. In contrast to that program, naturalized epistemology<br />
assumes that the modern empirical sciences like psychology or the neurosciences can<br />
explain better than philosophy how the human mind works <strong>and</strong> how it gains knowledge<br />
about its environment. In consequence, epistemology should give up its traditional project<br />
<strong>of</strong> a conceptual analysis <strong>of</strong> knowledge <strong>and</strong> stick to the results <strong>of</strong> empirical sciences<br />
instead. In my talk, I will deal with the question whether naturalized epistemology really<br />
can find an answer to traditional epistemological problems like scepticism.<br />
7
Armin Bahl<br />
Smarter than One Might Think: Drosophila as a model for higher cognitive<br />
functions<br />
In the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster, electrophysiological <strong>and</strong> imaging techniques as<br />
well as neuronal genetic modifications can be combined at the same time in the behaving<br />
animal. It is that recent fusion <strong>of</strong> well-established toolsets that makes the fly one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
most popular model organisms for the study <strong>of</strong> developmental biology, brain physiology,<br />
neuronal computation <strong>and</strong> behavior today (Olsen & Wilson, 2010, Seelig et al., 2010). The<br />
Drosophila brain has less than a cubic square millimeter in size <strong>and</strong> approximately<br />
300.000 nerve cells. <strong>Brain</strong>s <strong>of</strong> higher organisms like humans have more than 300.000<br />
times more nerve cells <strong>and</strong> are more than 2 million times larger. These numbers could<br />
lead to the belief that the fly’s behavioral repertoire should be small <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> only minor<br />
interest for human neurobiology. But despite their small brains flies do have amazing<br />
abilities, they possess, for example, an elaborated memory <strong>and</strong> can be trained to associate<br />
colors with objects or odors (Brembs & Heisenberg, 2001). Using visual cues they also<br />
build up spatial memories allowing them to quickly navigate towards a target spot whose<br />
location had be learned before (Foucaud et al., 2010). A well-studied topic in<br />
psychophysics is attention <strong>and</strong> saliency, which is normally attributed only to higher<br />
organisms but it was shown that the ability to attend to a salient object is also present in<br />
flies (Wolf & Heisenberg, 1980). There is an ongoing debate on whether the freedom <strong>of</strong><br />
will might be an illusion <strong>and</strong> that behaviour instead <strong>of</strong> being self-initiated is always<br />
deterministic with variability coming from internal or external noise (Heisenberg 2009).<br />
However there are evidences from research in Drosophila that the manoeuvres during<br />
flight might be self-initiated by internal noise-independent mechanisms (Maye et al.,<br />
2007). These examples demonstrate that Drosophila has a long list <strong>of</strong> exciting <strong>and</strong><br />
elaborated abilities <strong>and</strong> therefore makes it an interesting model organism also for<br />
research in human cognition, physiology <strong>and</strong> psychology. In combination with the<br />
experimental possibilities in flies it is now possible to tackle the neural basis <strong>of</strong> these<br />
behaviors which might shed light on the neural representation <strong>of</strong> learning, attention <strong>and</strong><br />
will - might it be free or not.<br />
Arun Singh<br />
Meditation…? Questions for Neuroscientists<br />
Generally, the aim <strong>of</strong> meditation is modulation <strong>of</strong> awareness. Any effort free from<br />
distraction <strong>of</strong> the mind may work as effective meditation. There are two different<br />
meditation categories: concentrative, <strong>and</strong> non-concentrative. It may be integrated into a<br />
specific spiritual context, but is by itself not specific to religion in general. It includes an<br />
approach to manage stress, anxiety, headache, <strong>and</strong> daily physical pain complaints. Since<br />
1960, more than 1000 research articles have been published trying to explain the benefits<br />
<strong>of</strong> meditation. Richard Davidson <strong>and</strong> Dalai Lama have investigated the effects <strong>of</strong><br />
meditation on the brain. For example, one <strong>of</strong> Davidson’s studies found that long-term<br />
meditators showed high amplitude gamma synchrony during mental practice. All <strong>of</strong> his<br />
studies imply that intensive meditation results in both functional as well as structural<br />
changes in the brain regions. Investigations performed by Lazar et al have demonstrated<br />
that mediation can increase the density <strong>of</strong> grey matter <strong>and</strong> cortical thickness. Meditation<br />
has also been related to alterations <strong>of</strong> sensory perception, as well as metabolic changes,<br />
e.g. <strong>of</strong> heart rate, blood pressure, respiration. Given scientific evidence has proved to be<br />
beneficial for mental <strong>and</strong> physical health, but there is much more left to be yet understood<br />
by neuroscientists.<br />
8
Barbara Trattner<br />
Optogenetics<br />
Optogenetics is an elegant emerging method in neuroscience, which exploits optical <strong>and</strong><br />
genetic tools to precisely control neuronal brain circuits in living animals at a high<br />
temporal <strong>and</strong> spatial resolution. Generally neuronal properties are investigated with the<br />
help <strong>of</strong> selective pharmacological agents targeting certain neuronal structures. These<br />
agents are however disadvantageous in that they have a systemic action, are temporally<br />
imprecise <strong>and</strong> may cause unspecific side-effects. In addition to replacing pharmacology,<br />
optogenetic approaches can also substitute electrical stimulation <strong>of</strong> a neuronal population<br />
for defined light-gated activation. Photosensitive proteins can be artificially expressed in<br />
neurones to alter their firing properties <strong>and</strong> thereby information processing. By exposing<br />
only a certain brain area to light, only the activity <strong>of</strong> those neurones will be modulated by<br />
the photosensitive proteins. Due to the immense possibilities that optogenetics <strong>of</strong>fer in<br />
elucidating neuronal brain circuits, it was selected the method <strong>of</strong> the year 2010 by the<br />
prestigious scientific journal Nature Methods. The principle <strong>of</strong> using optogenetics was<br />
first found around 2000, when photosensitive proteins were expressed in neurones, which<br />
could thereby be sensitised to light. Further research in the field <strong>of</strong> optogenetics led to the<br />
implementation <strong>of</strong> genetically-encoded bacterial <strong>and</strong> algeal photosensitive ion channels<br />
<strong>and</strong> pumps in neurones. Depending on the properties <strong>of</strong> these ion transporters, they can<br />
either hyperpolarise or depolarise neurones. An advantage <strong>of</strong> using photosensitive ion<br />
transporters to targeting endogenous channels with drugs is the fast time constant: Upon<br />
illumination with the correct wavelength, photosensitive channels open <strong>and</strong> close in the<br />
range <strong>of</strong> milliseconds. A lot <strong>of</strong> research is currently going on to develop new artificial<br />
light-gated ion channels or receptors. With the help <strong>of</strong> tissue-specific promoters, these<br />
proteins can be expressed only in a certain neuronal subgroup or at a confined<br />
developmental stage.<br />
Precisely choosing the brain area, which is exposed to light, allows the further refinement<br />
<strong>of</strong> the subgroup <strong>of</strong> modulated neurones. By expressing photosensitive proteins in a<br />
subclass <strong>of</strong> neurones responsible for a defined behaviour, researchers can nowadays<br />
control behaviour by exciting or inhibiting only those neurones with light. Flies for<br />
instance can learn that a certain odour is aversive when the odour is paired with the lightgated<br />
activation <strong>of</strong> a certain receptor class. Mice can be woken up when a certain neuronal<br />
population <strong>of</strong> the hypothalamus, artificially expressing photosensitive proteins, are<br />
stimulated with light.<br />
The therapeutic aim <strong>of</strong> optogenetics for humans is to restore vision after a degeneration <strong>of</strong><br />
photoreceptor cells in the retina. In mice it was shown that equipping retinal neurones<br />
with photosensitive proteins from microbes using a viral delivery can restore visual<br />
responses. In humans this approach is currently investigated in inherited retinal<br />
dysfunctions: In Leber’s congenital amaurosis patient lack a certain pigment protein <strong>of</strong><br />
the retina. Subretinal administration <strong>of</strong> viral vectors encoding the absent pigment, lead to<br />
a long-lasting improvement in vision perception. However optogenetic treatments are not<br />
yet st<strong>and</strong>ard in the therapy <strong>of</strong> blindness, mainly due to the fact that viral gene transfer<br />
bears many risks.<br />
9
Bianca van Kemenade<br />
Multisensory Integration<br />
Our senses are constantly bombarded with information from the different modalities. In<br />
order to interact with our environment in an appropriate manner, we have to select which<br />
information is most important. In the process <strong>of</strong> integrating this information to give rise<br />
to a conscious percept, the different modalities can influence each other: our conscious<br />
perception <strong>of</strong> a stimulus in one modality can be influenced by a stimulus in another<br />
modality. This process is <strong>of</strong>ten referred to as multisensory integration, or cross-modal<br />
processing. Multisensory integration is a broad topic that covers a wide range <strong>of</strong> research;<br />
therefore I will select some <strong>of</strong> the most important findings. I will introduce some<br />
interesting illusions, discuss some studies on the neural mechanisms underlying<br />
multisensory integration, <strong>and</strong> cover some patient studies. With this overview I would like<br />
to introduce this fascinating topic to other scientists working in different fields.<br />
Christian Kellner<br />
Color Vision: From the outside world via the cortex to consciousness<br />
Color <strong>and</strong> color vision has always been a topic that fascinated scholars, ranging from<br />
Dalton's research <strong>of</strong> color blindness over Goethe's "Theory <strong>of</strong> Color" to the "dispute"<br />
between the trichromatic theory <strong>of</strong> Young–Helmholtz theory <strong>and</strong> the opponent process<br />
theory <strong>of</strong> Hering. Color (vision) also became a highly debated topic in the Philosophy <strong>of</strong><br />
mind with the problem <strong>of</strong> "qualia" (<strong>and</strong> its suggested consequence <strong>of</strong> the "explanatory<br />
gap").<br />
At the core <strong>of</strong> a lot <strong>of</strong> those problems lies the fundamental question <strong>of</strong> the relationship<br />
between the outside (physical) world <strong>and</strong> the subjective personal experience. Of course,<br />
nowadays neuroscientists believe that the link is made via the brain. Though (color) vision<br />
is a field that has undergone intensive research by neuroscientists, there are <strong>of</strong> course<br />
some yet fundamental but unsolved problems; two famous ones are the problem <strong>of</strong><br />
dichromats ("what do 'color blind' people see") <strong>and</strong> the problem <strong>of</strong> unique hues (the<br />
elementary chromatic hues: red, green, yellow & blue) <strong>and</strong> their (still missing) neuronal<br />
correlates.<br />
I will mainly focus on the current state <strong>of</strong> the latter problem <strong>and</strong> if there is time/space left<br />
I will also try to present some new insights about the problem <strong>of</strong> color blindness.<br />
10
Corinde Wiers<br />
The Neural Effects <strong>of</strong> Alcohol Bias Modification Training<br />
The pathology <strong>of</strong> alcoholism is associated with maladaptive attention- <strong>and</strong> approach<br />
biases towards substance-related stimuli, i.e. the tendency <strong>of</strong> alcoholic patients to<br />
approach rather than avoid these stimuli, even though they are not rationally inclined to.<br />
From animal studies it is known that limbic areas are structurally <strong>and</strong> functionally altered<br />
after long-term drinking, but the neural mechanisms <strong>of</strong> alcohol biases in humans remain<br />
largely unknown. In this talk I present my currently ongoing research, in which I use fMRI<br />
<strong>and</strong> EEG to study brain regions involved in these biases in alcoholic patients. My<br />
hypothesis is that limbic brain activity predicts performance on a computerised alcohol<br />
bias task. My next step is to underst<strong>and</strong> how bias modification training, a promising<br />
intervention in which patients selectively learn to avoid rather than approach stimuli,<br />
modulates the brain <strong>and</strong> may prevent relapse. Finally I talk about how neuroimaging can<br />
be <strong>of</strong> use for the treatment <strong>of</strong> alcohol addiction directly.<br />
11
David Kaufmann<br />
Neuroscientific Research on Moral Judgement<br />
In my research project at GSN I intend to investigate the overt <strong>and</strong> covert philosophical<br />
conceptual premises <strong>of</strong> the neuroscientific approach to investigating moral judgement <strong>and</strong><br />
the importance <strong>of</strong> these premises for interpreting neuroscientific results in philosophical<br />
terms as well as in ordinary language. The first step in order to do this would be to<br />
investigate the links between philosophical, psychological <strong>and</strong> neuroscientific concepts<br />
employed in the explanation <strong>of</strong> moral judgement <strong>and</strong> their characteristic role in their<br />
theories <strong>of</strong> origin. For the seminar “Current Issues in philosophy <strong>and</strong> neurosciences” I’d<br />
like to propose to give a short introduction on one issue about the neuroscientific research<br />
on moral judgement that this first step could shed some light on <strong>and</strong> which I consider<br />
especially interesting: It has been a striking feature <strong>of</strong> neuroscientific experiments on<br />
moral judgements that they’re most <strong>of</strong>ten „nothing but“ psychological experiments<br />
performed in an fMRI scanner – <strong>and</strong> their results are most <strong>of</strong>ten „only“ used to back up<br />
already quite well confirmed psychological theories on moral judgement. When it comes<br />
to a philosophical or common language interpretation <strong>of</strong> these neuroscientific findings we<br />
must find that from a philosophical point <strong>of</strong> view they seem quite boring. They just<br />
confirm stuff that is already “known” from psychological research. The question that<br />
arises in regard <strong>of</strong> this matter is whether the situation that neuroscientific research on<br />
morality doesn’t seem to give great philosophical insights is owed to „structural“ reasons<br />
(for example due to conceptual constraints) or whether the reasons for that frustrating<br />
situation are just „coincidental“ (due to the fact that just occasionally nobody happened to<br />
do research otherwise).<br />
What does “conceptual constraints” mean here? I’d like to speak <strong>of</strong> “conceptual<br />
constraints” when we can’t talk in philosophical terms or ordinary language about what<br />
the neurosciences tell us about morality in their own scientific jargon. This could mean<br />
concretely that neuroscientific statements cannot be „translated“ in common ways <strong>of</strong><br />
speaking but by „going the long way“ <strong>and</strong> being first translated into psychological terms –<br />
as a mere confirmation <strong>of</strong> already existing psychological hypotheses. According to this line<br />
<strong>of</strong> thought, anything that neuroscience can <strong>of</strong>fer apart from the assertion <strong>of</strong> psychological<br />
hypothesises would be „lost in translation“.<br />
This would not only be a pity for the interested lay person, but also for the neuroscientist<br />
engaged in the investigation <strong>of</strong> moral judgement: It would be quite a blow if she would not<br />
be able to explain her findings to laymen apart from what can be proven by her efforts in<br />
psychological research.<br />
As a philosopher I see it as a thrilling task to investigate whether such constraints exist by<br />
examining the links between philosophical, psychological <strong>and</strong> neuroscientific concepts<br />
that play a role in the philosophical interpretation <strong>of</strong> neuroscientific results on moral<br />
judgement. The resulting findings could in the best case tell us whether <strong>and</strong> to what extent<br />
a direct philosophical or ordinary language interpretation <strong>of</strong> neuroscientific results is<br />
possible – <strong>and</strong> in how far taking “the long way” would really leave everything that doesn’t<br />
derive from psychological hypothesises in limbo. If such a translation (direct or indirect)<br />
should be possible, it will be an even more fascinating next step to check where there is<br />
room for misunderst<strong>and</strong>ings <strong>and</strong> misinterpretations <strong>of</strong> which I daresay that there will be<br />
plenty <strong>of</strong>. But this will be a different story. My short talk or my poster would give an<br />
account <strong>of</strong> how such constraints could look like in theory, my reasons for thinking that<br />
they are at least limited, an outlook what I expect to find <strong>and</strong> possible next steps. I would<br />
set these matters in context <strong>of</strong> an overall presentation <strong>of</strong> my dissertation project.<br />
12
Emiliano Zaccarella<br />
On the Nature <strong>of</strong> Merge: Neuroanatomical Correlates <strong>of</strong> Local Syntactic<br />
Structures in Natural Language Processing<br />
Probabilistic fiber tracking approaches to language-relevant areas have recently identified<br />
a dorsal stream going from pars opercularis (BA 44) to the posterior temporal cortex via<br />
the superior longitudinal fasciculus, <strong>and</strong> a more ventral stream going from the frontal<br />
operculum (FOC) to the anterior temporal cortex via the uncinate fasciculum. According<br />
to the ‘two-pathways’ model, it has been suggested that the former stream supports the<br />
processing <strong>of</strong> non-adjacent elements in hierarchically more complex sentences <strong>and</strong><br />
possibly the identification <strong>of</strong> the constituency structure, while the latter stream supports<br />
the combinations <strong>of</strong> adjacent elements in a sequence. Even though many studies contrast<br />
this view a direct comparison with the stimulus material so far employed will show that<br />
the model above is still adequate <strong>and</strong> preferable over alternative suggestions. A corrected<br />
set <strong>of</strong> stimuli for a following fMRI analysis will be finally discussed.<br />
Fern<strong>and</strong>o Ramirez<br />
Orientation Encoding in the FFA is Selective to Faces: Evidence from<br />
Multivoxal Pattern Analysis<br />
The fusiform face area (FFA) is a region <strong>of</strong> the human ventral visual pathway that exhibits<br />
a stronger response to faces than objects. The role <strong>of</strong> this region within the face perception<br />
network is not well understood, <strong>and</strong> its selectivity has been debated. Furthermore, it is<br />
unclear which properties <strong>of</strong> visual stimuli are reflected in the patterns <strong>of</strong> activation <strong>of</strong> this<br />
region. Here we directly explored the encoding <strong>of</strong> orientation using a combination <strong>of</strong> fMRI<br />
<strong>and</strong> multivoxel pattern analysis. We presented subjects with synthetic images <strong>of</strong> faces <strong>and</strong><br />
cars that were rotated in depth <strong>and</strong> presented either above or below fixation. We explored<br />
orientation related information available in fine-grained activity patterns in FFA <strong>and</strong> early<br />
visual cortex. Distributed signals from the FFA allowed above-chance classification <strong>of</strong><br />
within-category orientation only for faces. This result generalized to faces presented in<br />
different retinotopic positions. In contrast, classification in early visual cortex resulted in<br />
equal, above-chance classification <strong>of</strong> face <strong>and</strong> car orientation, but only when trained <strong>and</strong><br />
tested on corresponding retinotopic positions. Classification across position was<br />
substantially decreased for both categories in early visual cortex. We conclude that<br />
category-selective effects <strong>of</strong> stimulus orientation are reflected in the fine grained patterns<br />
<strong>of</strong> activation in FFA, <strong>and</strong> that the structure <strong>of</strong> these patterns is partially translation<br />
invariant.<br />
13
Georgina Torbet<br />
Cognitive Neuroscience Approaches to Freudian Repression<br />
This presentation will discuss the methods through which the empirical sciences may<br />
investigate psychoanalytic constructs, focusing particularly on repression. While<br />
repression is a well-known clinical phenomenon, it lacks a robust evidence base <strong>and</strong> is<br />
difficult to reconcile with current knowledge <strong>of</strong> experimental psychology. We have<br />
attempted to frame repression in terms <strong>of</strong> mechanisms which are well understood in<br />
cognitive neuroscience, in order to investigate this subject experimentally <strong>and</strong> to gather<br />
empirical data on it.<br />
We have built upon experiments in directed forgetting, in which people intentionally<br />
forget material which they had previously learned when instructed to do so. We have<br />
replicated this well-known effect, <strong>and</strong> exp<strong>and</strong>ed the paradigm to include cues given in a<br />
non-conscious way. Through innovative use <strong>of</strong> subliminal stimuli, we have attempted to<br />
demonstrate that unconscious cues can effect memory <strong>and</strong> induce forgetting. Some<br />
preliminary results will be presented, <strong>and</strong> implications for the empirical study <strong>of</strong><br />
psychoanalytic phenomena will be discussed.<br />
Joachim Lipski<br />
The Role <strong>of</strong> Neuroscientific Findings in Ascribing Intentional States<br />
The role <strong>of</strong> intentional terminology in neuroscientific contexts, one <strong>of</strong> the most crucial<br />
links between philosophy <strong>and</strong> the neurosciences, is still lacking a proper theoretical<br />
foundation. Available proposals range from a simple identification <strong>of</strong> intentional<br />
statements with corresponding neurological statements, to a more-or-less strictly causally<br />
moderated relationship, to denying the neurosciences the use <strong>of</strong> such terminology at all.<br />
Subscribing to any <strong>of</strong> these views will have a significant bearing on the role that<br />
neuroscientific findings play in the potential ascription <strong>of</strong> intentional properties, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
fact that these views are competing has led to many a controversial debate. Personally, I<br />
suggest that many <strong>of</strong> these proposals, while being mutually exclusive in their elaborated<br />
forms, have put forward valuable points which can be constructively integrated into a<br />
theory <strong>of</strong> translation between neuroscientific terms, ins<strong>of</strong>ar as they pertain to intentional<br />
phenomena, <strong>and</strong> intentional terms, such as they are being used in analytic philosophy.<br />
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Judy Ng<br />
Neuroscience <strong>and</strong> Morality<br />
Where does morality originate? Is it only a social construct or is it hardwired into the<br />
functionings <strong>of</strong> the human brain? Through observation <strong>of</strong> many patients with different<br />
brain damage over the decades <strong>and</strong> their resulting abnormal moral judgments,<br />
neuroscientists have deduced possible links between neuroanatomy <strong>and</strong> moral judgment.<br />
In addition, fMRI studies have shown an association between brain areas that are<br />
involved in emotional processing <strong>and</strong> aspects <strong>of</strong> moral cognition, while other patient<br />
studies have suggested that deficits in moral behavior <strong>and</strong> cognition are associated with<br />
emotional dysfunction. Many <strong>of</strong> these studies utilize test stimuli that range from morally<br />
relevant statements <strong>and</strong> pictures to complex moral scenarios <strong>and</strong> dilemmas. Taken<br />
together, recent studies suggest that morally relevant stimuli may provoke an emotional<br />
response that may influence moral judgment, but the driving force <strong>of</strong> the judgment itself<br />
remains to be investigated.<br />
Rol<strong>and</strong> Nigbur<br />
Building Blocks in Human Decision Making <strong>and</strong> Cognitive Control<br />
Human decision making is based on manifold neuro-cognitive processes that allow goaldirected<br />
predictions <strong>of</strong> the environmental context but also enable flexible adjustments to<br />
monitor perceptual selection or behavioral adaptation. In so-called conflict paradigms<br />
participants have to react to ambiguous information that sometimes induces competing<br />
activations in the brain. Here, cognitive control is needed to amplify the brain activity to<br />
perform the task at h<strong>and</strong> correctly.<br />
In my studies I investigated how these control functions can be tracked via<br />
electrophysiological brain activity (EEG). Several approaches have tried to identify the<br />
neural building blocks <strong>of</strong> executive control functions. The medial frontal cortex (MFC) is<br />
thought to detect conflicts <strong>and</strong> recruit additional resources from other brain areas<br />
including the lateral prefrontal cortices (LPFC). Together with additional task relevant<br />
areas in the brain such as motor or perceptual systems a network for implementing<br />
control functions is assumed.<br />
I will present data from experiments using different conflict paradigms that will<br />
demonstrate how event-related potentials (ERPs) can help to shed light on the cognitive<br />
architecture <strong>of</strong> our brain. Furthermore I will show how spectral decomposition <strong>of</strong> the EEG<br />
signal delivers information about the interaction <strong>of</strong> different brain areas. In a last step I<br />
will refer to current research investigating the role <strong>of</strong> emotion <strong>and</strong> motivation in decision<br />
making <strong>and</strong> cognitive control functions.<br />
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Ryszard Auksztulewicz<br />
Recurrent Neural Processing in Somatosensory Awareness<br />
The characteristics <strong>of</strong> neural processing underlying conscious stimulus detection, despite<br />
extensive research, remain elusive. As a prominent theoretical account <strong>of</strong> visual<br />
awareness, the recurrent processing hypothesis states that while stimuli generally evoke<br />
feedforward activity propagating through the visual cortex, stimuli which become<br />
consciously detected are further processed in feedforward-feedback loops established<br />
between various stages <strong>of</strong> visual processing.<br />
Although this hypothesis has not been tested directly in modalities other than vision,<br />
monkey studies have provided indirect evidence for feedback processing in somatosensory<br />
detection. Here we applied dynamic causal modelling (DCM) to EEG data acquired from<br />
humans in a somatosensory detection task to test this theory. In the analysis, we focused<br />
on model-based evidence for feedforward, feedback <strong>and</strong> recurrent processing between<br />
primary <strong>and</strong> secondary somatosensory cortices. Our results suggest that increased<br />
recurrent processing within the somatosensory system, dominated by an enhanced cSIcSII<br />
connection, underlies somatosensory awareness.<br />
Saskia Köhler<br />
The Role <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Brain</strong> in Impulsivity <strong>and</strong> Self-Control<br />
Impulsivity is a personality trait that is present in healthy individuals. However, high<br />
impulsivity may also cause problems in social life, such as troubles in partnership, fights,<br />
<strong>and</strong> traffic violations. This is because impulsive actions are <strong>of</strong>ten rapid, unplanned, hasty<br />
<strong>and</strong> without regard to negative consequences. The opposite <strong>of</strong> impulsivity can be<br />
described as self-control, given that people showing high impulsivity have problems<br />
controlling their actions, thoughts <strong>and</strong> emotions. Since an association between impulsivity<br />
<strong>and</strong> mental illness is apparent, neuroscientific research in this field is important. In my<br />
PhD project, I investigate the role <strong>of</strong> the brain in impulsivity <strong>and</strong> self-control with<br />
different approaches: (1) administering different functional magnetic resonance imaging<br />
(fMRI) paradigms, which provoke impulsive or self-controlled behavior, (2) examining<br />
fMRI resting state measurements, (3) examining MRI structural measurements, <strong>and</strong> (4)<br />
determining the influence <strong>of</strong> virtual lesions with transcranial direct current stimulation<br />
(tDCS). I examine psychiatric patients, which are characterized by high impulsivity <strong>and</strong><br />
low self-control competencies (alcohol dependent patients <strong>and</strong> pathological gamblers),<br />
<strong>and</strong> healthy subjects. I will present results from at least one <strong>of</strong> these approaches.<br />
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Sebastian Philipp<br />
On the Influence <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Brain</strong> on the <strong>Brain</strong>: Be “Aware”!<br />
Altered statistics in external sensory stimuli lead to a change in the neural representation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the respective sensory entity. This is the well investigated phenomenon that the<br />
external world shapes representations in the brain. However, besides some recent studies<br />
it is not yet investigated how internal, mental conditions – such as attention, imagery or<br />
meditation – effect neural sensory representations – which is the question <strong>of</strong> whether <strong>and</strong><br />
how the brain itself shapes representations in the brain. The effects <strong>of</strong> altered external<br />
stimulation <strong>of</strong> the body on somatosensory representations are well investigated by<br />
psychophysically measuring the tactile acuity <strong>of</strong> human subjects. Recent studies report<br />
effects <strong>of</strong> long-term Tai Chi practice on tactile acuity [2]. Tai Chi is a sensory attentional<br />
training where practitioners focus attention on the body's extremities. Study results<br />
showed that Tai Chi practitioners' tactile acuity in the finger tips is superior to that <strong>of</strong> the<br />
matched controls. However, it is questionable if these effects are only due to the subjects'<br />
having focused their attention on their extremities during the long-term practice over<br />
several years or if it is also due to the bodily aspects <strong>of</strong> the long-term Tai Chi practice. In<br />
our study, we investigate the effect <strong>of</strong> a short meditative training – a purely mental<br />
training – on tactile acuity in the finger tips. Tactile acuity <strong>of</strong> subjects with ample<br />
experience in Zazen is measured psychophysically before the training period. During the<br />
training period <strong>of</strong> two hours, subjects are asked to be completely aware <strong>of</strong> the arising<br />
sensory percepts in their fingertips while preventing external stimulation by not moving<br />
their h<strong>and</strong>s. After training, subjects' tactile acuity is measured again. We compare tactile<br />
acuity before <strong>and</strong> after the meditative intervention. In my presentation I will give an<br />
introduction to the topics <strong>of</strong> meditation <strong>and</strong> alterations <strong>of</strong> sensory representations by<br />
external stimulation. Furthermore, I will show preliminary results from our current study<br />
on the effects <strong>of</strong> meditation on tactile acuity <strong>and</strong> I will mention possible philosophical<br />
aspects <strong>of</strong> this study in order to yield an open discussion with the audience.<br />
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Smadar Ovadia-Caro<br />
Reduction <strong>of</strong> Inter-hemispheric Connectivity in Disorders <strong>of</strong> Consciousness<br />
Disorders <strong>of</strong> consciousness (DOC) pose diagnostic challenges because patients can be<br />
behaviorally unresponsive. A promising new approach towards DOC diagnosis may be<br />
<strong>of</strong>fered by the analysis <strong>of</strong> functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data acquired in<br />
the absence <strong>of</strong> any task dem<strong>and</strong>s (“resting-state”). Previous work has shown reduced<br />
functional connectivity within the "default network", a subset <strong>of</strong> regions known to be<br />
deactivated during engaging tasks, which correlated with the degree <strong>of</strong> consciousness<br />
impairment. However, it remains unclear whether the breakdown <strong>of</strong> connectivity is<br />
restricted to the "default network", <strong>and</strong> to what degree changes in functional connectivity<br />
can be observed at the single-subject level. Here, we analyzed resting-state interhemispheric<br />
connectivity in three homotopic regions <strong>of</strong> interest, which could reliably be<br />
identified based on distinct anatomical l<strong>and</strong>marks, <strong>and</strong> were part <strong>of</strong> an "externally<br />
oriented network". Resting-state fMRI data were acquired for a group <strong>of</strong> 11 healthy<br />
subjects <strong>and</strong> 8 DOC patients. At the group level, our results indicate decreased interhemispheric<br />
functional connectivity in patients with impaired awareness as compared to<br />
subjects with intact awareness. The single-case statistic by Crawford & Howell (1998)<br />
indicated a significant deviation from the healthy sample in 5/8 patients. Importantly, <strong>of</strong><br />
the three patients whose connectivity indices were comparable to the healthy sample, one<br />
was diagnosed as locked-in. Our results highlight the clinical potential <strong>of</strong> resting-state<br />
fMRI data, <strong>and</strong> suggest further investigation <strong>of</strong> inter-hemispheric connectivity as a<br />
complementary diagnostic measure for DOC patients.<br />
Sophie Herbst<br />
The Mystery <strong>of</strong> the Internal Clock, or What do we Know about Time<br />
Perception?<br />
Time perception is becoming a popular research field again, based on its long-st<strong>and</strong>ing<br />
history that dates back to antique philosophers. In my talk I’ll give a short insight on the<br />
topic from a psychological viewpoint, illustrated by recent discussions in the scientific<br />
community <strong>and</strong> discuss how state-<strong>of</strong>-the-art neuroscience methods can help to uncover<br />
the mysteries <strong>of</strong> which there are still plenty in this field.<br />
Subsequently I will focus on my thesis’ question: how perceptual processes can influence<br />
our internal time keeping mechanisms. Different views exist about whether subjective<br />
duration is based on early perceptual processes or relates to higher-level stimulus<br />
processing requiring attention. In order to distinguish between the influences <strong>of</strong> early <strong>and</strong><br />
late processes perceptual processing on perceived duration, we applied a well-established<br />
paradigm from attention research: the Attentional Blink. Our preliminary findings argue<br />
for a specific influence <strong>of</strong> higher-level cognitive processes on perceived duration, or – in<br />
other words – suggest that simple changes in visual input do not fully explain the<br />
emergence <strong>of</strong> subjective duration.<br />
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Vera Ludwig<br />
Hypnosis <strong>and</strong> Neuroscience<br />
Hypnosis can influence perception, behaviour, <strong>and</strong> cognition in healthy people. For<br />
example, susceptible individuals may temporarily experience their own movements as<br />
produced by an external source, they may have hallucinations, or they may report a<br />
complete absence <strong>of</strong> pain. Such effects make hypnosis a potentially powerful tool for<br />
cognitive neuroscience; <strong>and</strong> indeed, this method is increasingly being used in<br />
neuroimaging studies. I will explain what hypnosis can do for mind-<strong>and</strong>-brain research by<br />
showing how it has helped to elucidate the neural basis <strong>of</strong> certain subjective phenomena<br />
(e.g., pain, feeling <strong>of</strong> agency). However, I will also consider the limitations <strong>and</strong> challenges<br />
<strong>of</strong> research using hypnosis – in particular, the possibility that hypnotized participants are<br />
merely role-playing. After the presentation, we will discuss to what extent <strong>and</strong> in which<br />
cases hypnosis can be a useful research tool.<br />
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<strong>Berlin</strong> Faculty<br />
List <strong>of</strong> participants<br />
Ellen Fridl<strong>and</strong>, PhD ellenfridl<strong>and</strong>@gmail.com<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>. Michael Pauen m@pauen.com<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>. Arno Villringer villringer@cbs.mpg.de<br />
<strong>Berlin</strong> Participants<br />
Ryszard Auksztulewicz rikismo@gmail.com<br />
Sophie Herbst ksherbst@gmail.com<br />
Bianca van Kemenade biancavankemenade@gmail.com<br />
Saskia Koehler saskia.koehler@psychologie.hu-berlin.de<br />
Vera Ludwig vera.Ludwig@gmx.net<br />
Rol<strong>and</strong> Nigbur rol<strong>and</strong>nigbur@googlemail.com<br />
Smadar Ovadia smadar.ovadia@gmail.com<br />
Milena Rabovsky milena.rabovsky@hu-berlin.de<br />
Fern<strong>and</strong>o Ramirez toporam@yahoo.com<br />
Georgina Torbet gtorbe01@students.bbk.ac.uk<br />
Corinde Wiers corinde@gmail.com<br />
Emiliano Zaccarella zaccarella@cbs.mpg.de<br />
Munich Faculty<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>. Benedikt Grothe grothe@lmu.de<br />
PD Dr. Stephan Sellmaier stephan.sellmaier@lrz.uni-muenchen.de<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>. Wilhelm Vossenkuhl vossenkuhl@lmu.de<br />
Munich Participants<br />
Armin Bahl arbahl@gmail.com<br />
Aleks<strong>and</strong>ra Kupferberg aleks<strong>and</strong>ra.kupferberg@gmx.de<br />
David Kaufmann david_kaufmann@gmx.net<br />
Joachim Lipski abt-nihil@gmx.de<br />
Arun Singh arun.singh@med.uni-muenchen.de<br />
Judy Ng judyng@neuro.mpg.de<br />
Barbara Trattner barbaratrattner@hotmail.com<br />
Sebastian Philipp seb.t.p@gmx.de<br />
Christian Kellner kellner@biologie.uni-muenchen.de<br />
Alex<strong>and</strong>ra Soutschek alex.soutschek@web.de<br />
Annette Winkelmann, Manager <strong>Berlin</strong> <strong>School</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Mind</strong> <strong>and</strong> Barin<br />
Dr. Alex<strong>and</strong>ra Stein, Coordinator Graduate <strong>School</strong> <strong>of</strong> Systemic Neurosciences<br />
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Accomodation <strong>and</strong> transportation<br />
Our accommodation: Don Orione Artigianelli<br />
Website: www.donorione-venezia.it<br />
Zattere Dorsoduro 909/A - 30123 Venezia –<br />
tel +39 0415224077 - fax +39 0415286214<br />
Transportation to San Servolo<br />
From the guesthouse, you need to go to the station "Zaterre" <strong>and</strong> take boat number 51 or<br />
2, leaving at 8:21 / 8:20 to San Zaccaria <strong>and</strong> there change to line 20 to San Servolo.<br />
(http://www.actv.it/; http://www.univiu.org/viu-quick/how-to-get-viu)<br />
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