hydropolitics of the tigris - euphrates river basin with - ceris.be

asic goods. In other words, Syria’s goal of self-sufficiency is moving farther and farther out of reach. This
is complicated by the poor quality of oil that Syria produces, requiring it to also import a certain amount of
processed oil from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Recent natural gas finds may supplement this export balance in
the future but the situation for feeding its own population has been so tenuous that Syria has had to accept
Food Aid in 1990 and 1997. Presently Syria must import between one-third and one-half of its cereal needs.
It is not surprising that the Euphrates Rivers is their primary focus for development, irregardless of its more
powerful neighbours who command its sources (Turkey) or insist on its continuing supply (Iraq). 29
Syria has launched a number of water and hydro-electric power development schemes to regain its goal of
self-sufficiency. In 1974, with the aid of Soviet engineering and finance, Syria constructed the Tabqa Dam
on the Euphrates, forming the giant reservoir later named Lake Assad. As expected there were conflicting
complaints and relations from downstream Iraq. With expectations of up to 60% of the nation’s hydro-power
production and irrigation of almost 400,000 hectares from the Tabqa, the results were disappointing. Some
of the generators were faulty and affected by seasonal variations of discharge, producing as little as 150 MW
as opposed to the expected 840 MW. The land to be irrigated turned out to contain a large component of
gypsum in its soil structure, a mineral composed of calcium sulphate that became soluble in water and
dissolved. The region to be irrigated had been levelled at much expense to promote irrigation flow but it
soon dissolved into a vast field of holes and hummocks, breaking canal structures, causing leakage and
making regulated flow impossible. The dissolved gypsum also adversely affected crops in the their root
zone. 30 The Syrian Government began revising downwards its estimates of irrigable land to 370,00 ha
(hectares) and later to 240,000ha. Estimates of the real situation are vague, ranging from 60,000 ha to almost
400,000, although the latter figure is unlikely as it is higher than the Syrian government’s estimate. 31
Other dams have been constructed by Syria in the Euphrates Valley, including the Al-Baath regulatory dam
and the Tishreen hydro-electric power dam. Syria has future plans for irrigation water to be drawn from the
Tigris (from which it has access to only one bank) and on the Orontes River. The latter is a cause of irritation
with Turkey who is in this case a downstream user from Syria. Additional plans for future irrigation arrive at
a global target of 1.4 million hectares, which will require considerably more abstraction from the Euphrates
and the Tigris Rivers than is being developed at the moment. Considering the abstraction planned for
Turkey’s GAP, this may not be realistic, but again this is difficult to say because accurate data on Syria’s
water resources are extremely elusive. The absence of hard data, according to many observers, reflects a lack
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