hydropolitics of the tigris - euphrates river basin with - ceris.be

28 Daoudy, M., Water, Institutions and Development in Syria: A Downstream Perspective from the Euphrates and
Tigris, (World Commission on Dams Report, Serial No: env 108), p.11. Daoudy also remarks on the phenomena that
the value attributed to agriculture, in and of itself, far exceeds its economic value due to its strongly instilled cultural,
symbolic, political and military significance.
29 McQuarrie, p.42-44.
30 Hillel, p. 108.
31 McQuarrie, p. 46.
32 Hillel, p.109, remarks on the lack of professional and administrative expertise, especially in the instance where much
of the land prepared for irrigation from the Tabqa Dam was found to be unsuitable.
33 McQuarrie, p.80.
34 Daoudy, In 1982 all water-related acts were unified into one law and the Ministry of Irrigation were formed in 1983,
supervising industrial, agricultural and human water consumption. p.5.
35 Ibid. p. 99, Lake Abu-Dibbis has a storage capacity of 45 BCM and Lake Tharthar BCM.
36 Shapland, G., Rivers of Discord, (Hurst and Company, London, 1997), p.109.
37 Hillel, The Third River is a canal augmented by feeder canals and drainage pipes to draw away saline agricultural
return flow.p.100.
38 Partow, H., The Mesopotamian Marshlands: Demise of an Ecosystem, (Early Warning and Assessment Technical
Report, UNEP/DEWA/TR.01-3 Rev.1, 2001), pp.22-23. Partow emphasises that the original design would not have
resulted in marshland drainage as such, and was technically sound because irrigation without drainage is ultimately
unsustainable. The design did, however, provide the broader framework from which the marshland drainage plan was
derived.
39 McQuarrie, Initially production did rise until the mid-1990’s. Farmers were required to crop all lands every year (no
rotation) and many gate valves for flood irrigation were left open for days which increased withdrawals from the rivers.
At the end of the day, these unstable agricultural methods coupled with untimely droughts began to reduce the
agricultural production. p.70.
40 Partow, p.24.
41 McQuarrie, states that in the year following the Gulf War agricultural production dropped by 50%. This included the
failure of the national date crop, due to raw sewage being dumped directly into the Tigris River.
42 McQuarrie, Iraq claimed rights to 16.1bcm/year from the Euphrates based on a 1965 World Bank study. Syria’s
withdrawal for the Tabqa reduced the flow to 9.4bcm/year. Iraq subsequently claimed that this reduction had resulted
in a loss of 70% of agricultural potential and threatened three million farmers dependent on river irrigation. p.73.
43 Shapland, comments that there was a strong antagonism between the two Ba’athist regimes in Baghdad and
Damascus who were both continually vying for pan-Arab influence and would use any excuse to accuse each other of
hostile acts. p.117.
44 Hillel, p.109, McQuarrie, pp.73-74, & Shapland, who mentions that the Arab League tried first to mediate the
situation, unsuccessfully, and later was replaced by Saudi Arabia and the Soviets who secured the additional release
of water. pp. 117-118.
45 McQuarrie, p.75 & Shapland, who writes that in any case the Arab partners laid a claim to 700m 3 /s from the
Euphrates to be shared between them both. p.119.
46 Adams, p. 27.
47 McQuarrie, pp. 75-76.
48 Adams, comments that “Water and the PKK were political and strategic levers on either side.”, p;28.
49 Hillel, p.189, and McQuarrie, p.54.
50 Shapland, Syria and Lebanon signed and agreement in 1994 (after some twenty years of discussions) in which the
allocation of Orontes water was agreed upon. As part of this agreement Lebanon could continue to draw water from
existing wells in the Orontes Basin but would not be permitted to drill new wells. p.144.
51 ibid., This distribution also reflects the degree of influence that Syria holds over Lebanon.p.145.
52 McQuarrie, p.79.
53 Shapland, Syria is almost obliged to link this rhetoric to her territorial claims to Hatay Province because she has yet
to take a strategic decision between her claims to Hatay versus her claims to the Euphrates. This is a weakness,
exploited by Turkey again in 1995 when the same complaint was raised by Turkey to counter Syrian objections to
continuing projects on the Euphrates (in this case the construction of the Birecik Dam), p.146
54 Carkoglu, A., and Eder, M., Water Conflict: The Euphrates-Tigris Basin, in Turkey in World Politics: An emerging
Multi-regional Power, Rubin B. & Kirisci K. eds. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), The trade between Turkey and Iraq
40