hydropolitics of the tigris - euphrates river basin with - ceris.be

Research Papers N° 1
Centre Européen de Recherche Internationale et Stratégique
HYDROPOLITICS OF THE
TIGRIS - EUPHRATES RIVER BASIN
WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Murray Biedler
2004
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Biography
Murray Biedler
Wynyard (Canada), 1957
Consultant
Hydrology, Rhode University (South Africa), 1992
Ceris 2002-2003
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to acknowledge and thank my supervisor Professor Robert Anciaux of the Faculté de
Philosophie et Lettres at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, for his orientation and generous
support of this work.
Acknowledgements and thanks are due also to the Centre Européen de Recherches
Internationales et Stratégiques – Ceris, to the
Université de Paris XI - Faculté Jean Monnet Programme Master of Arts in International
Politics – 2003-2004, and to the Institute Director Professor André Mirroir for inviting me to
participate.
Murray Biedler
June 2004
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Table of Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4
Hydropolitics and the Water Security Complex……………………………………. 4
The Twin Rivers of the Tigris and Euphrates ........................................................... 5
The Euphrates............................................................................................................. 6
The Tigris .................................................................................................................... 6
Water Development, History and Security in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin………. 10
Water Development, History and Security in Turkey……………………………….12
Financing of GAP: Turkey versus The World………………………………………15
The Politics of GAP………………………………………………………………….. 15
Water Development, History and Security in Syria.................................................. 15
Water Development, History and Security in Iraq....................................................17
Iraq, War and Water………………………………………………………………….. 24
Hydropolitics and Hydrological Impacts on Regional Security ............................. 20
Turkey’s Keban Dam and Syria’s Lake Assad………………………………………. 26
Turkey and the Attaturk Reservoir…………………………………………………. 26
Syria, the Orontes River and Hatay Province………………………………………. 28
Iraq and GAP…………………………………………………………………………. 30
Hydropolitical Conflict Resolution: Attempts to Achieve Regional
Hydrological Harmony and Security………………………………………………30
The Joint Technical Committee (JTC) and Regional Tripartite Meetings……….. 31
International Water Rules and Water Rights………………………………………. 33
Exporting from the Water-Rich to the Water-Poor: Inter-Basin Transfers………35
Hydropolitical Conflict Resolution: Alternatives………………………………… 36
Ecological Approach to Management………………………………………………. 36
External Mediation…………………………………………………………………….37
The Role of the EU: Regional Power and External Mediator?............................ 38
EU Development Policy on Water………………………………………………….. 38
The EU - Turkey Relationship……………………………………………………….. 40
Turkey and Accession………………………………………………………………… 41
Conclusions............................................................................................................... 34
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Introduction
This paper evaluates water management in the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin from a point of view of
Hydropolitics. The three riparian countries to be focused on are Turkey, Syria and Iraq. They will each be
described in their individual hydropolitical context. The history and nature of regional disputes over water
will be presented, followed by a discussion of models and attempts to resolve these disputes and to promote
realistic and sustainable water management of the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin. Finally the role of the
European Union as an external influence on the process, the special relationship that exists between Turkey
and the EU, and the implications this may have on negotiating towards a settlement of this complex dispute
will be examined.
Hydropolitics and the Water Security Complex
Hydropolitics, a term developed in the 1990’s, deals with the politics of international water resources. It
tends to be multidisciplinary and includes a political, technical, economic, social and legal approach to
analysing international water issues. This multi-disciplinary approach not only reflects the growing interest
and concern over international water issues, but also the complexity of these same issues. One such is the
water security complex or the hydropolitical security complex, defined as “a group of states whose primary
hydropolitical concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national hydropolitics cannot be
realistically considered separate from one another”. 1
The development of the idea of a hydropolitical security complex is derived from the work of Barry Buzan
who explains the security complex as being a “set of units whose major processes of securitisation,
desecuritisation, or both are so inter-linked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or
resolved apart from one another”. 2 It recognizes the fact that “in terms of foreign policy-making most states
define their security relations in regional rather than global terms and that when they confront global issues
there is a tendency to see these as determined by the regional context. In effect the region dominates the
perception of security.” 3 This is seen as a major departure from the traditional military-state approach to
security studies and is an important tool that allows us to put water at the centre of a security (and therefore
foreign policy) analysis between Turkey, Syria and Iraq.
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The Twin Rivers of the Tigris and Euphrates
The Tigris and the Euphrates rivers are the two greatest rivers of western Asia and can rightfully lay claim to
the appellation ‘exotic’ as they traverse different climatic and topographic zones in their journey from source
to the mouth. Their origins are “…scarcely 30 kilometres from each other, in a relatively cool and humid
zone with a rugged landscape of high mountains and deep gorges, raked by autumn and spring rains and
visited by winter snows. From there, incongruously, the two rivers run separately onto a wide, flat, hot, and
poorly drained plain. In their middle courses, they diverge hundreds of kilometres apart, only to meet again
near the end of their journey and discharge together into the Persian Gulf.” 4
Geographically and historically, the upper sections of the rivers have carved their way through, and into, the
Tertiary Rock and mountain gorges of Anatolia and the high plateaux of Syria and Iraq. There has been little
change in their physical position, always separate and always parallel, until the twin rivers fall off the final
limestone plateau and onto the great plain of Mesopotamia. It is here that the rivers, heavily loaded with silt
from the highlands, lose much of their energy and begin to meander and sometimes separate in series of
braided channels.
Over millennia the rivers in Mesopotamia have changed their positions numerous times due to flooding.
There have been many industrious attempts by man to construct diversions and canals in order to use the silt-
rich rivers for irrigation purposes over increasingly wider zones of agricultural cultivation. It has been
estimated that over 3million tons of eroded soils and earth materials are deposited into the Tigris-Euphrates
basin in a single day. This will vary with higher discharges during spring flows from snow melt (March to
May) and the lower discharges of the hotter and drier summer months (July to October). A smaller surge of
water discharge occurs during the winter months due to the winter rains. The difference between the low
summer discharges and those of the spring run-off from the snows can indeed be great; as much as 10 times.
In terms of agriculture the timing of these peaks and lows is unfavourable for the practice of direct flooding
irrigation: the peaks are too late for winter crops and spring runoff arrives too early to be used for many
summer crops (except for rice). For much of the arable land of the Mesopotamian plain where rainfall is low,
it is necessary to divert water from the rivers during periods of high crop demand and, in some cases,
provide storage as well. This required good engineering skills and water management practices. For those
responsible to manage the flows of the rivers it was also apparent that diversion and storage were an
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effective tool for reducing the heavy impacts and destruction of flooding. These silt-rich river systems
slowly deposited their bedload as they moved across the plain, eventually building up layer by layer a river
bed (or levee) that rests at times above the surrounding plain. It is no surprise that such a structure often
became unstable during floods, at which time the rivers jumped their banks and changed their course. 5
The Euphrates
The majority of the headwaters for the Euphrates (about two-thirds) are located in the Turkish region of
Anatolia. The River begins with 2 tributaries, the Murat-Su and the Kara-Sue (or Frat-Sue) which meet
north of the city of Elazia. Here the river is almost entirely snow-fed from mountain streams. Flowing
southward, the Euphrates comes within 160km of the Mediterranean before it turns left into Syria to
continue in a south-westerly direction, almost straight towards the Persian Gulf. While traversing the barren
Northeast corner of Syria known as the ‘duck’s-bill’ (due to the triangular shape of this small piece of
territory) the Euphrates is joined by 2 tributaries; the Balikh and the Khabur rivers. There is not a large
volume contribution from these 2 rivers. As the Euphrates enters into Syria it carries an estimated 30 billion
cubic metres per year (BCM/Y), rising to 32 BCM/Y as it leaves Syria to enter Iraq. For the remaining
1000km of its journey in Iraq, no more water flows into the Euphrates.
The Tigris
The headwaters of the Tigris River begin in the small mountain lake of Jazar Golu in Turkey, 30 km from
the upper catchment of the Euphrates. The flow of the Tigris is augmented by the Batman-Su as it leaves
Turkish territory. Unlike the Euphrates, the Tigris flows directly towards Iraq and the Mesopotamian Plain
with only a brief parallel alongside the Syrian border. Only 20% of the length of the Tigris lies in Turkey.
The remainder lies in Iraq where it is fed by the Iranian-based tributaries of the Khabur, the Greater Zab
(partly beginning in Turkey), the lesser Zab, the Uzaym and the Diyala rivers which flow down from the
Kurdistan and the Zagros Mountains. 6
The mean annual flow of the Tigris before it enters into Iraq from Turkey is 20 to 23 BCM/Y, but during its
passage in Iraq it receives from all of the above tributaries an additional 25 to 29 BCM/Y. Calculation of
flows for both the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers is difficult due to annual as well as seasonal variations. A
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mean annual flow consists of only a best estimate taken from data reflecting huge variability from month to
month and year to year. 7
The Tigris and the Euphrates join together about 160km above the head of the Persian Gulf, forming the
Shatt al-Arab. Just before entering into the Persian Gulf, the Shatt al-Arab is joined by the Karun River as it
drops southward from Iran.
A summary of each countries contributions 8
Riparian Contribution of Countries to Euphrates River Basin
Euphrates River
Turkey Iraq Syria Iran Total
Discharge (%) 98.6 0.0 1.4 —
Billion m 3 /year 32.2 0.0 0.5 — 32.7
Drainage Area (%) 28.0 40.0 17.0 —
Drainage Area km 2 125,000 177,000 76,000 — 444,000
River Length (%) 41.0 35.0 24.0 —
River Length (km) 1,230 1,060 710 — 3,000
Riparian Contribution of Countries to Tigris River Basin
Tigris River
Turkey Iraq Syria Iran Total
Discharge (%) 65.0 13.2 0.0 21.7
Billion m 3 /year 33.5 6.8 0.0 11.2 51.5
Drainage Area (%) 12.0 54.0 0.2 34.0
Drainage Area km 2 45,000 292,000 1,000 37,000 375,000
River Length (%) 21.0 77.0 2.0 —
River Length (km) 400 1418 44 — 1862
Summary of Each Countries’ Contributions to the Euphrates-Tigris Basin
Tigris & Euphrates Rivers Turkey Iraq Syria Iran Total
Discharge (%) 78.1 8.1 0.5 13.3
Billion m 3 /year 65.7 6.8 0.5 11.2 84.2
Drainage Area (%) 20.5 46.0 9.0 19.0
Drainage Area km 2 170,000 469,000 77,000 37,000 819,000
River Length (%) 33.5 51.0 15.5 —
River Length (km) 1630 2478 754 — 4862
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It is interesting to note that the Tigris River transports the largest amount of water into and through Iraq and
that a large portion of this flow originates in Iran. Iran contributes almost double the flow to the Tigris
compared to Iraq, illustrating the vulnerability of Iraq’s downstream status. It is worth noting that Iran is the
next biggest location of water resources in the region outside of Turkey. However, the most vulnerable
country in this twin river complex is Syria, who controls very little flow into the Euphrates, has almost no
exposure to the Tigris and fewer alternative water resources of its own.
Water Rich?
The common perception, even in recent studies, designates Turkey as a water-rich country and its
neighbours, especially Syria, as being water poor. This designation is underscored by Turkey’s large size,
snowy mountains and abundant precipitation. It is true that available data indicates that Turkey does indeed
have more water per capita than its neighbours but other studies sound a cautionary note. In a 2000 study
produced by the IDRC (International Development Research Centre, Canada) Mehmet Tomanbay suggests
that Turkey should not be classified as water-rich, explaining that “to be rich in water resources, a country
must have more than 10,000m 3 /person per year. Water supplies of between 1,000 and 2,000 m 3 /person per
year make a country water stressed… This country of 65 million people has an average annual renewable
potential of 205 Gm 3 , or about 3150 m 3 /person per year, which is far below the 10,000 m3 parameter needed
to classify a country as water rich.” 9 This observation is also echoed by Turan (2003) who states that Turkey
is not a water-rich country but, because its water resources are more varied, it has “higher capabilities than
some of its neighbours of using its resources efficiently.” 10
Water Development, History and Security in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin
Regional Summary
The water resources in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin have a long history, almost 7500 years, of human attempts
to manage them. The rivers were used locally for transport and to demarcate territorial boundaries, but it is
evident that there were many constructions implemented specifically for irrigation purposes. The traces of
ancient canals criss-crossing Mesopotamia are as evident from the ground as they are from the sky. Some of
the endeavours have been monumental. One ancient canal, the Nahrawan, was constructed in the 6 th century
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and measured a width of 30 metres over a distance of 300 kilometres. It carried water from the Tigris River
to extend the potential irrigation area right up to the Persian frontier. These canal systems were complex and
run by efficient administrations. One impetus for this development was likely the water-logging between the
rivers and the salinisation of the soil that almost always accompanies heavy irrigation in arid lands.
Salinisation occurs when heavy irrigation flows in arid and hot lands evaporate at a high rate, leaving traces
of minerals and salts behind in the soils. This will be further exacerbated when over-irrigation waterlogs the
soils, effectively blocking the return of water to the groundwater regime. The exceedingly high temperatures
in the Mesopotamian Plain tend to draw water up from the soil to the surface where it also evaporates with
the surface water, leaving behind additional deposits of minerals and salts (evaporites). The evaporation
process becomes even more concentrated when salts or other minerals are present in the water. 11 .
Normally irrigation water should be able to penetrate the soils and enter into the groundwater regime as
irrigation return flow. However, especially in lower Mesopotamia where the Tigris and Euphrates have a low
gradient and even tend to build up their water bed above the local land surface, it becomes physically
impossible for the rivers to act as a drainage feature. 12 Thus the construction of the Nahrawan Canal in
ancient times allowed irrigated lands to be drained naturally and regularly, preventing a decline in soil
quality.
Even while succeeding civilisations continued to develop within this hydraulic culture they were also
subjected to waves of insecurity and conflict, the most marked of which was the invasion of the Mongols in
the 13 th century. Some historians have marked this as the most destructive episode in the history of
civilisation. The Mongols destroyed many of the canal systems and adjacent structures, leaving behind such
an impact that the Mesopotamian hydraulic culture collapsed, drifting toward a smaller-scale agricultural and
rural society until the 19 th century. There are signs, however, that 200 years before the Mongol invasion the
region was beginning to suffer extensively from salinisation of its over-irrigated soils. M. Murakami
suggests that this was caused by decreasing effectiveness of central government which resulted in a
corresponding lapse in maintenance of the irrigation (and the drainage) canal networks. 13
By the 19 th century there were notable signs of an effective return to large-scale irrigation systems managed
by a central government. This was occurred under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire, in which the Tigris
and Euphrates were basically co-ordinated by one management. Only after World War I and the collapse of
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the Ottoman Empire did the Tigris and the Euphrates become international rivers. This paralleled the new
independence of ex-colonies such as Syria, Iraq and the resulting establishment of Turkey as a nation-state.
To manage such a large river basin complex would soon become difficult enough with additional players,
the new boundaries and a larger management. However these issues would become further complicated by
the different needs and the very different identities of each of these 3 stakeholders.
Water Development, History and Security in Turkey
“Long-term observers of Turkish foreign policy and its major concerns did not identify water as a major
policy concern until the last two decades. In contrast to Syria and Iraq, its neighbours to the south, Turkey
had not used its water resources extensively.” 14 It can be said that in recent years water itself has not become
a foreign policy issue for Turkey but certain issues have become linked to Turkey’s utilisation of
transboundary waters. As the Turkish economy grew, became more industrial and integrated into the world
economy, its use and degree of water consumption changed markedly.
Unlike Syria and Iraq, who both have a long history of irrigation, Turkey’s agriculture tended to be dry
(relying largely on natural precipitation) rather than irrigated. Physically, whatever irrigable land that was
available existed near rivers whose flow was completely inside the country’s boundaries. Consequently the
majority of water consumption in Turkey had little or no transboundary impact with its neighbours. Also in
“pre-industrial” Turkey the use of water resources for hydro-electricity was limited mainly to servicing the
needs of urban centres. The remainder of required power supply was provided by imported fossil fuels.
The biggest change in Turkey’s economic history came in the 1950’s, just after World War II, when Turkey
joined the Western Bloc. This was encouraged and rewarded by financial assistance from the United States
and International agencies, who launched a process for economic development. The decision by Turkey to
build itself into an economic player on an international scale was not just due to opportunism but had its
roots earlier in the 20 th Century. During the 1930’s Turkey had established an independent agency known as
the Electrical Resources and Survey and Development Agency who would begin surveying rivers to
establish their suitability for hydro-electric production. The agency began with a survey station on the
Euphrates and by the early 1960’s had established a nation-wide network. The administrative and
infrastructural follow-up of this network was the creation of the General Directorate of State Hydraulic
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Works, who had the responsibility to carry out the construction of the first of many hydro-electric dams.
Construction under the umbrella of this DG began modestly enough with six dams in the 1950’s but
increased exponentially to one hundred and sixty-nine dams by the late 1990’s. 15
This veritable explosion of dam construction was a result of Turkey being forced to develop a national water
policy. While the first dams were being constructed (with outside assistance) during the 1950’s, Turkey had
not yet developed a clear water policy. 16 By the mid-1970’s it became alarmingly clear that Turkey’s energy
consumption was very quickly outstripping its capacity to supply. Petroleum had to be imported in
increasing quantities, attempts to negotiate oil from the Mosul fields of Iraq were unsuccessful and what few
resources of coal existed had become too dangerous for extraction. Except for its rivers, Turkey was fast
reaching the limits of its natural resource capacity. 17 Still, in the opening stages of this development, much
of the water resources were being managed internally or at such a level as not to noticeably impact on
neighbouring countries. This situation was about to change in 1965 with the construction of the Keban Dam,
the first major step in the Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi (the Southeast Anatolia Development Project),
otherwise known as GAP.
GAP is a major hydro-electric and irrigation scheme that was first conceived of and began to take shape in
the 1930’s as part of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s vision of a modern Turkey. By the 1960’s this vision began
to take shape in the form of Southern Anatolia being seen as the hydro-electric capital of the Middle East,
with an accompanying renewal of Turkey’s national and regional image. Structurally GAP would include 22
dams, 25 irrigation projects and 19 hydro-electric power plants requiring the launch of 13 sub-projects.
Seven projects would be located on the Euphrates River and six projects on the Tigris. With an aim to
harness up to 30 percent of Turkey’s water resource potential the overall project objectives were:
� Raise the level of income in the GAP region by improving the economic structure of the region
and thus reduce regional development disparities.
� Enhance productivity and employment opportunities in rural areas.
� Enhance the population absorption capacities of big centres in the region.
� Contribute to economic growth, social stability and export promotion as national objectives by
the efficient utilization of resources in the region.
Initial estimated costs ran in excess of $20 billion (USD). 18 While in earlier years Turkey had profited by
funding support from the United States and international organisations for construction of dams (e.g. the
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Seyhan dam), the politics of funding had changed in the post Cold-War environment. In the 1960’s when
Turkey announced its plans to construct the Keban dam, their largest dam to date, they automatically turned
to the World Bank and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). These institutions had an
established history of funding infrastructure projects but this had begun to change.
“Starting as early as 1950, the bank had developed a set of policy guidelines about the construction of dams
that it was being asked to finance. If a dam were to be situated on a river involving more than one state, the
bank would work to establish a balance between the water rights of all riparians and the benefits to be
derived from the realisation of the new project.” 19
Financing of GAP: Turkey versus The World
The World Bank statement, in this case, referred specifically to Syria and Iraq. Eventually the World Bank
agreed to contribute to funding the Keban Dam and later the Karakaya Dam projects but only on the
condition that a specified minimum flow was maintained for downstream users. 20 However Turkey persisted
in its unilateral approach to water projects without consulting downstream users, effectively closing this
source of funds. Turkey did manage to secure limited financial assistance from some Western governments
and Israel but it became apparent that Turkey would have to provide a large share of funding for GAP. There
were financial pressures and economic consequences as Turkey channelled billions of dollars into the
project. By 2002 almost $14 billion (USD) had been spent on GAP and most of this had come from Turkey.
This resulted in high inflation (70% in the early 1990’s), and up to 80% of the GDP being spent on public
debt. The Turkish Lira was also drastically devalued, almost 100% since the early 1990’s. 21
The Politics of GAP
The provinces being developed by GAP border on Syria and Iraq and are home to the ethnic population of
Kurds who also inhabit neighbouring territories in Syria and Iraq. The Kurds account for about half of the
population in the Anatolia region, with the remainder being Turkish and a small percent of Arabs. 22 As an
ethnic minority the Kurdish population has a natural suspicion of the Government. Within its ranks can be
found political components agitating for an independent Kurdish territory or Kurdistan. One of the best
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known political components is the PKK, or Kurdistan Workers Party, which had hardened into a violent
confrontational organisation responsible for numerous terrorist attacks in the Anatolia region. The Turkish
government responded with a strong military presence and counter-insurgency activities.
One of the consequences of these dam constructions is the flooding of large tracts of land that are normally
inhabited by subsistence-level farmers living near the rivers. These populations were subsequently displaced
from the land to the cities, provoking a fear among the Kurds that the Government was trying to forcably
assimilate them into Turkish society. By 1990 as many as 210,000 people had been displaced by land
flooded by the Keban, Karkaya and Ataturk dams. Essentially a tribal society with strong kinship links, the
displaced Kurds were also being forced to leave behind their clan structure in order to integrate into the
Turkish state structure. The Kurds also believed that there would not be a fair land redistribution for them
under GAP, and that only collaborators of State Authorities and multinationals involved in the construction
of the dams (and subsequent development) would be permitted to benefit. Finally, there was a complaint that
numerous historical sites of Kurdish heritage were being inundated by the project.
The most controversial of these sites was linked to the construction of the Ilisu Dam, which would displace
an estimated 78,000 people and destroy the ancient archaeological town of Hasankeyf (first settled 10,000
years ago). 23 There had been numerous complaints that the Turkish government was not providing adequate
alternatives, facilities or assistance to displaced populations. There was some sensitivity to these complaints
among the Turkish Government and European actors due to the Akduvar incident of 1996 where a number
of individuals (Akduvar and others from the village of Kelekci) brought a case against the Turkish State,
lodging it at the European Commission of Human Rights. The case was assisted by the exiled Kurdish
organisation known as the Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP). 24
The KHRP, aided by the international environmental NGO Friends of the Earth, focussed on the issues of
displacement and environmental impacts of GAP. They publicised an external report, labelling the Ilisu Dam
project to be potentially instrumental cause of social and environmental impacts. This included “abrogating
five World Bank policy guidelines on 18 counts, in addition to OECD’s Development Assistance
Committee’s guidelines on projects involving involuntary resettlement.” 25 The report also announced that no
governments should extend export credits to firms involved in the construction. Swiss, British, Swedish and
Italian companies were involved in the construction consortium and although the Swiss leaders tried to
13

downplay the situation, they were soon overtaken by the public outcry. Also, because of a reluctance to
provoke or justify another Akduvar case, pressure on the construction consortium also came from European
Council of Ministers (and therefore national governments) to disengage from the project. Construction firms
such as the British and the Italians (among others) were forced to eventually pull out.
The Turkish response to this outside pressure was mixed. They claimed sovereignty as the core issue and
that the management of national water resources by a ruling government is a sovereign right of that
government. Turkey refused to debate this issue at an interstate level but was not able to convince other
players such as the EU or major investors of this point of view. Turkey adopted a position that western states
were ‘meddling’ in Turkey’s internal politics were being ‘unreasonable’. Water Policy and the GAP project,
even though the early issues surrounding it were still geographically national (i.e. within Turkish
‘boundaries), had now become international and firmly linked to foreign policy. Turkey, as a matter of pride
as well as necessity, took the decision to contribute funding to the GAP itself. One of the consequences of
this was delay. The original deadline for completion was set for 2001 but this was extended in 1999 to a later
date in 2010.
Another response by Turkey was, in a sense, to acknowledge the criticisms levelled at it and to initiate a
series of environmental and sociological evaluations of the GAP project itself. These studies were supposed
to be non-partisan but were performed by internal agencies such as the Sociology Association of Ankara,
and tended to highlight the positive economic aspects of GAP for sustainable development of the Anatolia
Region. Journalists were invited to view the potential development planned for the population around
Hasankeyf (but there were rumours of pressure on local authorities). 26 It cannot be underestimated that the
Turkish government felt a strong sense of pride in GAP. They saw it as the means to pull the Anatolian
region out of an economic wasteland and consequently to boost the faltering Turkish economy, all done with
Turkish expertise and planning. However the attacks on their Human Rights record and the impact of
international public opinion on investment in Turkey began to take its toll and the Turkish Government
slowly began to lose their moral high ground.
Still, in the face of heavy costs and criticisms, the project has moved forward with numerous smaller projects
but notably with the construction of the Karakaya Dam in 1980 followed by the key to the entire GAP
complex, the Ataturk Dam, in 1990. It was the diversion of water into the Ataturk reservoir in 1990 that
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crystallised the disagreements between the riparian states and justified the earlier reservations expressed by
the World Bank. To begin filling the Ataturk reservoir Turkey diverted the flow of the Euphrates for one
month, enraging the immediate downstream user, Syria, and provoking a strong reaction from Iraq.
Water Development, History and Security in Syria
Of the three major countries sharing the waters of the Tigris-Euphrates basin, Syria’s dependency on the
Euphrates is crucial for developing its agricultural economy. The Tigris river also flows along Syria’
common border with Iraq for about forty kilometres but Syria is reluctant to withdraw too much water from
this river at risk of antagonising Iraq. Other resources include the smaller rivers of the Orontes (originating
in Lebanon and terminating in Turkey) and the Yarmouk which delineates the border between Syria and
Jordan. There are groundwater resources available in the Orontes river basin but over-abstraction has led to a
drop in the water table and salinisation of the soils is occurring 27 .
Almost 95% of water withdrawn in Syria goes to agriculture with the remaining 3.3% for domestic use and
1.8% for industry. Agriculture has always been a significant component of the Syrian economy
(supplemented by small oil reserves) and she has pursued a self-sufficient strategy for food security. In the
1950’s agriculture accounted for half of Syria’s GDP and employed much of the population. In the 1970’s a
weakened economy and low oil prices drove much of the rural population to the cities. By the end of that
decade Syria was importing large quantities of food and other goods, while paying with cash from their
dwindling oil reserves. This was the result of a food security policy which had become one of the most
important aspects of Syria’s economic development and was viewed as crucial for national security. There
is, however, a dangerous logic at work here in terms of economic efficiency. Almost 90% of Syria’s total
water consumption is allocated to agriculture while in reality agriculture presently contributes less to the
country’s GDP than industry. 28
This situation is worrying for Syria whose small oil reserves are calculated to last only until 2025. It
produces twice what it uses domestically, exporting oil to pay for the massive import of foodstuffs and other
15

asic goods. In other words, Syria’s goal of self-sufficiency is moving farther and farther out of reach. This
is complicated by the poor quality of oil that Syria produces, requiring it to also import a certain amount of
processed oil from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Recent natural gas finds may supplement this export balance in
the future but the situation for feeding its own population has been so tenuous that Syria has had to accept
Food Aid in 1990 and 1997. Presently Syria must import between one-third and one-half of its cereal needs.
It is not surprising that the Euphrates Rivers is their primary focus for development, irregardless of its more
powerful neighbours who command its sources (Turkey) or insist on its continuing supply (Iraq). 29
Syria has launched a number of water and hydro-electric power development schemes to regain its goal of
self-sufficiency. In 1974, with the aid of Soviet engineering and finance, Syria constructed the Tabqa Dam
on the Euphrates, forming the giant reservoir later named Lake Assad. As expected there were conflicting
complaints and relations from downstream Iraq. With expectations of up to 60% of the nation’s hydro-power
production and irrigation of almost 400,000 hectares from the Tabqa, the results were disappointing. Some
of the generators were faulty and affected by seasonal variations of discharge, producing as little as 150 MW
as opposed to the expected 840 MW. The land to be irrigated turned out to contain a large component of
gypsum in its soil structure, a mineral composed of calcium sulphate that became soluble in water and
dissolved. The region to be irrigated had been levelled at much expense to promote irrigation flow but it
soon dissolved into a vast field of holes and hummocks, breaking canal structures, causing leakage and
making regulated flow impossible. The dissolved gypsum also adversely affected crops in the their root
zone. 30 The Syrian Government began revising downwards its estimates of irrigable land to 370,00 ha
(hectares) and later to 240,000ha. Estimates of the real situation are vague, ranging from 60,000 ha to almost
400,000, although the latter figure is unlikely as it is higher than the Syrian government’s estimate. 31
Other dams have been constructed by Syria in the Euphrates Valley, including the Al-Baath regulatory dam
and the Tishreen hydro-electric power dam. Syria has future plans for irrigation water to be drawn from the
Tigris (from which it has access to only one bank) and on the Orontes River. The latter is a cause of irritation
with Turkey who is in this case a downstream user from Syria. Additional plans for future irrigation arrive at
a global target of 1.4 million hectares, which will require considerably more abstraction from the Euphrates
and the Tigris Rivers than is being developed at the moment. Considering the abstraction planned for
Turkey’s GAP, this may not be realistic, but again this is difficult to say because accurate data on Syria’s
water resources are extremely elusive. The absence of hard data, according to many observers, reflects a lack
16

of planning capacity as well as the need for a simple network to monitor their own water resources (as has
been installed throughout Turkey). 32 The lack of planning has been compounded by the poor designs
implemented, by heavy losses due to inefficiency and ultimately the poor returns on investment. 33 Although
M. Daoudy acknowledges a lack of data, she notes that one cannot automatically assume there is a lack of
institutional capacity. Daoudy states that Syria has, in fact, quite a highly structured and bureaucratic system
of water management, with centralised water authority in the form of a Ministry of Irrigation, who is
responsible for all Ministerial activities involving water consumption. 34
Water Development, History and Security in Iraq
Historically the Region of Iraq has probably the oldest hydraulic culture in the region. However centuries of
flood irrigation under hot desert sun have resulted in large areas of irrigable land becoming saline and, in
some cases, completely waterlogged.
After the Mongol invasion rehabilitation of this ancient land re-started in the Twentieth Century, just before
World War I, with the construction of the Hindiyah Dam. It was the discovery of petroleum and the
introduction of large motorised pumps that enabled the enlargement of irrigation areas. As with its
neighbours upstream, Iraq had to deal with irregular seasonal flows as well as variations from year to year,
making it difficult to be efficient with flood irrigation and large-scale agriculture. Subsequently, numerous
dams were installed to provide storage for shortfalls, act as buffers in flooding and generally to regulate the
flows of the Tigris and Euphrates. The largest reservoirs include Lake Habbaniyah, Lake Abu-Dibbis and
Lake Tharthar (1970). 35 Tharthar is in the site of an old saline depression that is supplied with water via a
canal that links it to the Tigris River. Initially subject to high levels of salinity resulting from high
evaporation, an additional canal connecting to the Tigris further downstream brought more fresh water and
improved the quality of the lake. Subsequent construction of more canals linked the Tharthar to the
Euphrates Rriver, allowing the Iraqi’s to transfer water in large quantities from the Tigris to the Euphrates
basin for irrigation purposes.
There was a tendency for Iraq to spend heavily on hydrological infrastructures such as dams and barrages.
This policy was based on a fear of losing water from the upstream riparians of Syria and Turkey (and to
some extent Iran). This fear focussed more on the Euphrates than the Tigris, thus the added value of Lake
17

Tharthar and the linking system of canals from which water could be shifted from the Tigris to the Euphrates
River basin. Due to poor land management and a weak delivery structure (many canals were leaking
heavily), irrigated lands were becoming more quickly saline and water-logged. Rather than improving
irrigation management the authorities, by habit, expanded the irrigation zones with the corresponding dams
and barrages. In the long-term this policy had limited success, with the total of effective irrigated land area
not really increasing. Consequently production did not kept pace with the country’s needs, with some areas
going out of production almost as fast as new areas are initiated. 36
The last major attempt to solve the problem of salination with hydrological structures was the construction
of the Third River which is in fact a canal running from Baghdad to Basra. The Canal was designed to
provide drainage for the lands between the two major rivers and freeing up previously unusable agricultural
land. Started in the 1950’s and finished in 1992, the canal was originally planned by Western engineers
(British engineer Fred Haigh), supported by Western aid and built by Western contractors. The perception of
this construction changed after the Gulf War of 1992. With the onset of sanctions, many contractors and all
Western funding were pulled out of Iraq, who then finished the project themselves at a cost of $ 2 billion
(USD). 37 There were, however, some changes to the original design.
The Third River has also been credited with being the means of draining the waters of the famous reed
marshes of southern Iraq, which were also home to many Shi’ite dissidents who rebelled against Saddam
Hussein after the Gulf War. During the 1970’s and the 1980’s the focus of the construction of the Third
River began to shift from being merely a drainage system to also include a system of marshland drainage
and reclamation. The main changes introduced by the Iraqi Government included the installation of dams
and diversions along the Tigris and Euphrates that served to divert flow around the Marshes either straight
into the Gulf or into the Shatt Al-Arab. Following the civil unrest in the south, the government worked
intensively for 9 months to construct the diversions. The original drainage system works effectively in
evacuating saline return flow and could conceivably improve water quality in the Marshlands. However by
effectively blocking any inflow to the Marshes, their destruction was inevitable. 38
This has had serious consequences for Iraq because, like Syria, it was originally an agricultural economy
capable of sustaining itself in terms of food security. As with Syria this situation changed rapidly and
agriculture dropped from 70% of Iraq’s GDP in the 1920’s to as low as 6% in 2001. A part of this GDP
18

portion had been taken up by petroleum exports but there were definite economic impacts being seen from
the loss of usable agricultural land. Where once Iraq was self-sufficient in cereal production, in the latter half
of the Twentieth Century it had became a net importer of agricultural goods.
With the shift to an oil economy, the situation for Iraq was less drastic than in Syria due to Iraq’s superior oil
reserves. Iraq could afford to overlook economic inflation, persistent droughts, loss of productive soils,
increased industrialisation, migration of farm workers to urban centres and reduced spending on agriculture.
There was still enough water for industry and domestic consumption, although quality was beginning to
become a problem. This comfortable barrier was soon to be shaken. The need for agricultural production,
irrigable lands and the increased concern for water security would resurface with the advent of the regime of
Saddam Hussein.
Iraq, War and Water
For almost twenty years Saddam Hussein focussed on exploiting the petroleum resources of Iraq and
persecuting long and/or costly wars against neighbouring Iran and later Kuwait. During his years in power
there was a corresponding shift towards military spending and away from water transportation (canals and
irrigation networks) and agricultural extension works. The construction of dams still continued but only
because this was seen as necessary from a military point of view. The 10 years of war with Iran proved
costly both economically and socially, but it was the Gulf War that started to break down Iraq’s social
economy; not with the War itself, but with the sanctions that followed.
International sanctions played a multiple role in water management. First, due to an immediate reduction in
Iraq’s ability to import food (along with other goods and material) there was an additional pressure on local
production of food. This required access to more agricultural land and, while attempting to rehabilitate saline
zones with the Third River, the government also opted for increased irrigation flow, putting more stress on
the country’s water resources. 39 The Government also maintained that the drainage canals served to open up
access to areas of petroleum reserves, a necessary action to counter sanctions. 40
In spite of all of the Iraqi governments efforts, the water supply and agricultural production experienced a
downward spiral. During the Gulf War as well as the recent conflict in Iraq, the regular strategy of aerial
19

ombings of water storage dams and HEP (hydro-electric power) dams have resulted in extensive damage of
water infrastructures such as purification plants and power stations. 41 Presently in Iraq the issue of food
shortages are being dealt with by importation and assistance from the International community (though not
effectively) and many areas are still severely plagued by the lack of drinking water and electricity as a
consequence of the war.
Hydropolitics and Hydrological Impacts on Regional Security
As infrastructural developments on the Tigris and Euphrates began to gather pace, especially in Turkey, they
triggered a series of incidents that did not erupt into the much-prophesied ‘water wars’ but certainly
exacerbated the security situation between all of the riparian states. They will be reviewed here in the order
reflecting countries whose trans-boundary water management practices first spilled into the security arena.
We begin, not surprisingly, upstream.
Turkey’s Keban Dam and Syria’s Lake Assad
The construction of the Keban Dam in the 1960’s provided the first sign of regional security stress linked to
water. After discussions with Syria, Turkey had agreed to release 350m 3 /s of Euphrates water to Syria but
there were complaints from Iraq that this was insufficient. When Turkey and Syria began to impound water
for eventually filling both the Keban and the Tabqa Dams in 1974-5, Iraq put up strong enough protest that it
resulted in Turkey’s application for funding to the World Bank being conditional to a release a minimum of
450m 3 /s. 42 It did not stop there. Iraq focussed their hostilities on Syria; not only because of the sharp
reduction of flow from the Euphrates from the Tabqa Dam that Iraq believed was theirs by right, but also
because of the growing enmity between the two Ba’athist regimes. 43
The dispute reached crisis proportions and in March and April of 1975 both Iraq and Syria mobilised troops
along their common borders and closed each other’s airspaces. It required Soviet and Saudi intervention to
mediate the situation and Syria finally agreed to release more water. 44
Turkey and the Attaturk Reservoir
20

In 1980 a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) met to share technical details between Turkey, Syria and Iraq
and to try to build a sense of trust between all implicated players (hydrologists, engineers and Government
ministers). The JTC first began working in 1982-83 but the Committee soon collapsed under suspicion and
mistrust over the data that was being shared. One of the main sources of problems was the differences in the
agendas of all of the members. Syria wanted to discuss the sharing of the Euphrates, Turkey preferred to
focus on exchanges of information while both its riparian Arab neighbours insisted on viewing the Tigris
and Euphrates as two separate river basins. Turkey disputed this declaration by observing that not only did
the two rivers come together at the Shatt al-Arab , but that with Lake Tharthar Iraq had anyway succeeded in
connecting the two rivers intentionally and was already moving water between them. This dispute may seem
academic in the broader negotiations, but if the two rivers in Iraq were to be considered as one (because of
the possibility to augment Euphrates’ flow by diversion from the Tigris via the Tharthar) then Iraq’s claim to
a larger share of the Euphrates River could be weakened. With such diversions from the main objective, the
JTC met as many as 16 times up to 1993 with little effect. It required another type of framework to initiate
one of the first water protocols between Turkey and Syria and it was to originate with the PKK. 45
The role of the Kurdish population within the regional security framework has already been mentioned
earlier, but it was Syria’s support of the PKK that caused more consternation in Turkey’s eyes. Assad of
Syria had reasoned that the PKK could act as a potential lever for negotiating with its potentially more
powerful Turkish neighbour. During the mid-1980’s the PKK stepped up attacks on Turkish soil. The
political lever seemed to be taking shape and eventually became effective when in 1987 Turgut Ozal (then
the Prime Minister of Turkey) visited Syria in 1987 to negotiate an agreement in which Turkey would
guarantee 500m 3 /s of water flow to be released to Syria in exchange for Syria’s co-operation in security
issues, specifically the PKK. This agreement, known as the 1987 Protocol, was never clearly defined and
thus became a point of contention after its inception. 46
In January of 1990 when Turkey began to impound water from the Euphrates for the Ataturk Dam, Syria and
Iraq insisted that two weeks was sufficient to begin filling the reservoir, while Turkey continued to impound
for four weeks. Then it was argued that Turkey was not providing the guaranteed 500m 3 /s of water flow to
Syria and Iraq. Turkey maintained that it had provided an excess of 750m 3 /s as adequate compensation
during a period running up to the impoundment. In an averaged calculation over a period of preceding
21

months (end November to early February) Turkey does provide an average equalling the agreed upon
minimum but on a monthly basis they clearly breached the agreement. 47
Mutual suspicions and the need for Turkey and Syria to maintain their respective levers of control gave very
little room for the JTC or the 1987 Protocol to function. Syria continued to maintain support for the PKK as
Turkey continued its development of GAP, albeit with a much reduced international support. Events finally
became critical in 1998 when Turkey publicly charged Syria with harbouring PKK training camps and
supporting the leader Abdullah Ocalan. They threatened military action unless Syria renounced PKK
support. Assad of Syria, perhaps realising that he had pushed his political lever against Turkey as far as he
could, closed the PKK training camps that were located in the Bekaa Valley and expelled Ocalan (who was
later arrested in Kenya by Turkish security). Even after Ocalan’s capture it seems that Assad never
completely renounced his negotiating card against Turkey and the GAP project, because he still permitted a
PKK presence in Syria’s territory. 48
Syria, the Orontes River and Hatay Province
After World War I the Ottoman Empire was carved up by the League of Nations. The province of Hatay,
known at the time as the Sanjuk of Alexandretta (now Iskendrum), was placed under the French influenced
territories of Syria-Lebanon. While Syria was preparing for independence from French control in 1936,
Turkey approached France to request that this territory be given to the new Turkish Republic as its
population was majority Turkish. In order to purchase goodwill and to prevent Turkey from falling again
under German influence, the region was given to Turkey and later named as Hatay Province. Syria does not
accept this agreement, referring to the lost territory as ‘the stolen province of Hatay’, insisting on its return
to Syrian Sovereignty. Some Syrian maps still portray Hatay Province as being part of Syrian territory. 49
The Orontes River flows into Syria from Lebanon and onwards into Hatay Province in Turkey. Distribution-
wise, 33 km of the river lies in Lebanon, 471 in Syria and 67 in Turkey, reflecting also the relative
abstraction of water taken by each country. Lebanon takes 20% of the flow from the Orontes, Syria 70% and
Turkey rests with the remaining 10%. 50 This distribution, although agreed upon, is a bit uneven as it
prohibits Lebanon to construct any dams on the Orontes while Syria has already installed two dams.
22

Lebanon has complained about this but Syria’s superior position in the region leaves little room for
negotiation. 51
The significance of the Orontes is in how its use is portrayed by Syria and Turkey. Turkey claims that, as a
downstream riparian, it should have a proportional access to waters of the Orontes. Syria, who abstracts very
much the lion’s share of the Orontes water, justifies this action by claiming that it has sovereign rights to the
river because the majority of its flow lies in Syrian territory. This is, quite evidently, the opposite of Syria’s
downstream riparian claim to equitable shares of flow from the Euphrates River. This contradiction is
frequently pointed out by Turkey, who criticises Damascus’ claims that the Euphrates be recognized as an
international river, and uses Syria’s same sovereignty logic to justify their own unilateral management of the
Euphrates. 52 In fact, as early as the 1950’s when Syria was seeking World Bank funding to support an
irrigation abstraction from the Orontes for the Ghab agricultural region, Turkey voiced strong enough
objections (as a downstream user) that, in a reversal of roles, Syria had to withdraw her application
following World Bank evaluations. 53
Iraq and GAP
Although Iraq is farther downstream from Turkey on the Euphrates than Syria it is immediately downstream
from Turkey on the Tigris River. Iraq’s initial response to GAP was less strident than Syria because GAP
began initially on the Euphrates whereas Iraq’s interests were more focussed on the Tigris for irrigation. Iraq
initially had a good capacity to supplement their electricity needs with thermal generation (due to large oil
reserves) and were therefore less dependent on hydro-electricity. There were also historical economic links
between the two countries with Turkey acting as a corridor for Iraqi oil. 54 Iraq was also too pre-occupied
with the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, the following sanctions and finally the recent Iraq War to enter into
any water disputes with Turkey. Turkey and Iraq also had an agreement which allowed Turkish troops to
pursue PKK insurgents into Iraqi-Kurdish territory. This agreement lapsed when Turkey sided with the U.S.
in the Gulf war and later when Turkey maintained a strong military presence on the Iraqi border. During the
post Gulf War sanctions, Saddam Hussein made some complaints about the quality of water on the
Euphrates being partially responsible for Iraqi mortality (especially among children) but he preferred to
guard this rhetoric for the U.S. and other Allies who had imposed sanctions. 55
23

Hydropolitical Conflict Resolution: Attempts to Achieve Regional Hydrological Harmony and
Security
Up to the present the three countries along the Tigris-Euphrates complex have classified themselves (and
been viewed outside) as simply upstream users and downstream users. Negotiations during the first half of
the Twentieth Century were more often the result of European influence from outside of the region and were
relatively smooth. 56 One of the first treaties signed from within the region was the Treaty of Friendship and
Good Neighbourliness (signed in 1946). This offered one of the first legal instruments for co-operation for
the present-day entities of the signatories. 57
The fact that Syria exists as a sometime ‘middle-stream’ entity with regards to Iraq only serves to add to the
complexity of an already complicated issue. The most likely disputes can be characterised as; Syria and
Turkey, Syria and Iraq, both Syria and Iraq against Turkey and possibly, in the future as GAP progresses
into the Tigris, between Iraq and Turkey. The water policies of each country (and conflicting claims for
access to water), almost all of them unilateral, can be summed up as:
“…pitting the prerogatives of an upstream country against those of a midstream and a downstream country;
the territorial sovereignty of one country against the historical rights of another; the aspiration of ethnic
minorities against centralised authoritarian states; the need for economic development against the
requirement to protect the environment; short-term sectoral interests against those of the regional community
of nations.” 58
The Joint Technical Committee (JTC) and Regional Tripartite Meetings
The JTC had its origins in the Turkish-Iraqi Treaty of 1946 (first regional agreement) but its first meeting
was in 1965. Discussions focussed on the Euphrates with Turkey’s Keban, Syria’s Tabqua and Iraq’s
Haditha Dam. Disputes arose immediately over consumption figures and irrigation needs. During the early
1980’s much of the discussions centred on the GAP project (again with no resolution) and, after 16 meetings
the JTC held its last session in 1993. Interestingly enough the subject of the meeting was to try to agree upon
the joint management of the Euphrates but a disagreement on terminology and definitions ultimately blocked
any progress. Syria and Iraq presented a model of co-riparians equally sharing an international river while
Turkey maintained the Euphrates was not international but transboundary, and not subject to this form of
24

equal-sharing distribution. This example of elocutionary debate appears to be an effort by Turkey to evade
acknowledgement (and thus responsibility) of international law governing international water courses. 59
Mehmet Tomanbay, in attempting to elucidate Turkey’s position, states that Turkey rejected the co-
sovereignty of the Tigris, Euphrates and the Orontes because “no essential navigation concerns exist on
these rivers” (therefore not falling under earlier International treaties on Navigable Waters) and that since
1980 the JTC meetings “have accepted that the Tigris and Euphrates are ‘regional waters.’ 60 Comments from
all riparians are seen as highly nationalistic rather than objective by Kolars who observes that Syrian and
Iraqi authors would also present “equally persuasive yet nationally focussed accounts of the situation.” 61
Because of the present war (or post-war in Iraq) it is unlikely we will see any tripartite agreements in the
foreseeable future. Since the Iran-Iraq War, the subsequent Gulf War and the ruling term of the Saddam
Hussein Regime, security and militarily enforced sanctions have been much more of a distraction to the Iraqi
Authority than water negotiations with its neighbours. This has reduced regional talks on water to de facto
Turkey and Syria, whose historically antagonistic positions have been well known. There are indications that
this has changed since the death of President Hafez al-Assad in June 2000 and the installation of his son
Bashar in his place. On his accession to the office of President there was speculation that his Western
education may signal a different and more co-operative approach to regional negotiations. 62 This has been
demonstrated by a recent Memorandum of Understanding signed between Turkey and Syria on 19 June
2002, called GAP-GOLD, which includes water-related issues. In the agreement, joint irrigated agricultural
research projects, exchange programs, field trips, operation of irrigation projects and other joint projects are
promoted. 63
International Water Rules and Water Rights
Three of the main theories of international water rights that govern water distribution practices around the
world are as follows: 64
� Territorial sovereignty theory
� The natural water flow or absolute integrity theory
� The equitable apportionment theory
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The territorial sovereignty theory is also known as the Harmon Doctrine, 65 which maintains that riparian
states have exclusive (sovereign) rights over waters flowing through their territory. This justifies any type of
water use by the state, irregardless of the downstream impacts. Originating in the US, this law has been
rescinded in favour of more neighbour-friendly laws but Turkey has chosen to invoke it as part of their
cause.
The natural water flow theory refers to territorial integrity of watercourses, stating that a river is a natural
part of the territory of a riparian state and that the state is entitled to the natural flow of the river,
unhampered by upstream riparians. This theory is closely linked to the notion of historic rights or established
user rights. 66 Syria and Iraq invoke these principles, claiming Turkey must respect them also.
The concept of equitable apportionment is more recent and has its roots in the arena of international law
relating to international watercourses. The term “international watercourse” was adopted by the UN
International Law Commission and is part of the formulation of the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses (the UN/ILC Law) that apply to waters which are situated in different states.
Although first presented in 1959 it was not presented for ratification until 1997. In the interim, the most
widely used law for use of International Rivers was drawn up in Helsinki in 1966. The Helsinki Law gave
rights to existing uses of water on shared water resources and is based largely on the principle of equitable
utilisation. It promoted the equitable distribution of uses and does not give any particular use a priority over
the other.
A relative ranking system has been applied to help quantify equitable use for the Tigris-Euphrates Basin
with the result that the calculated allocable share of water between Turkey, Syria and Iraq is almost equal. In
his evaluations McQuarrie suggests that this methodology is unrealistic because it ranks each particular use,
such as food security, as having equal weighting or importance for all countries. For example Syria would
place a higher priority over food security than Turkey, while Turkey would emphasise hydro-electric energy
(and subsequent economic development) over irrigation to provide the same security. The model also
requires a certain data reliability, which is not yet available in the region and does not include political or
security concerns for each country; aspects which frequently dominate economic and social agendas. Finally,
McQuarrie pragmatically points out that with such a model Turkey would ultimately lose from a sovereignty
point of view and that, for the moment, there are no sanctions for not accepting the UN/ILC Law. 67
26

The UN/ILC Law was presented for ratification in 1997 and was accepted by Syria and Iraq but not by
Turkey. This agreement is the most widespread and accepted internationally but because it challenges the
state sovereignty principle of water management, Turkey will not accept it. However some observers note
that, contrary to claims and fears regularly expressed by Syria, Iraq, and even the Arab League, Turkey has
in fact not chosen to completely control or extensively limit (except for the case of the Attaturk Dam) flow
from the Tigris or the Euphrates rivers. 68
Exporting from the Water-Rich to the Water-Poor: Inter-Basin Transfers
Turkey has proposed transporting water outside of her territory to other water-needy countries of the region
in an attempt to use water as a positive policy instrument. In 1987 Turkey proposed the ‘Peace Pipeline’
which would draw water from the Ceyhan and Seyhan rivers which are wholly Turkish (i.e. not trans-
boundary or ‘international’) but also including a portion from the Attaturk Dam. The pipeline was destined
to supply Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the GCC states. 69 A second pipeline would supply water to Syria,
Jordan, the West Bank & Gaza Strip and Israel from the Attaturk Dam reservoir and rivers flowing into the
Black Sea. 70 Although vigorously promoted by Turkey, a number of criticisms blocked the proposal from
moving ahead, namely:
� The price of water, based on the cost of construction, was found to be too high. 71
� Arab states did not like the idea of having dependency on a non-Arab country for water. They also did
not accept that Israel would benefit from the plan.
� Syria was not happy with abstraction from the Attaturk Reservoir (i.e. the Euphrates), which they
regarded as partially a Syrian resource in terms of principles of equitable sharing and territorial integrity
of water courses (see above: International Water Rules). Also, Syria did not appreciate the proposal that
they pay for water drawn from the Euphrates, water which they believe they are entitled to at no cost. 72
Although Israel was also reluctant to participate in a scheme that would create a dependency on a distant
water source in a hostile neighbourhood they did express interest in purchasing shipped water from the
Manavgat River water facility. This was a bi-lateral agreement rather than a regional one involving shipping
water to Israel in balloons or giant bladders, as has been initiated for Cyprus. 73 The quantities would not be
27

large enough to provide an alternative water supply but rather to mitigate Israel’s dependency on regional
sources. 74 Earlier this year (2004) Israel has decided to do just that and has agreed to purchase up to 50
million cubic metres a year for 20 years from Turkey’s freshwater facility on the Manavgat River. Initial
announcements of the agreement link the sale of water to a purchase of armaments from Israel by Turkey. 75
Negotiations started in 2002 with the Manavgat Water Agreement signed on 04 of March, 2004. Some
Israeli critics of the deal complained that the cost of transferred water was more expensive than desalinated
water, but Israeli policy seems to be that “overall relations with Turkey are more important than 50 million
cubic meters” of water. 76
Hydropolitical Conflict Resolution: Alternatives
Ecological Approach to Management
McQuarrie suggests the UN/ILC Law is a modest beginning but ultimately “fails as a practical tool for water
allocation.” What is required (and what has been missing from the Tigris-Euphrates riparian debate) is more
emphasis on environmentally sustainable solutions. 77 This is echoed by Shiva, who believes that these
monolithic international agreements do not provide justice due to the individual nature of river basins, in
which the principle of equitable utilization becomes vague. 78 Kolars states that in order to present a way out
of the present impasse, three main elements are required: facts, interpretations of such facts and the
subsequent acts, emphasising the need for reliable data acquisition. Furthermore, a threshold needs to be
established beyond which politics cannot be permitted to destroy the water resources. For example, Kolars
notes that the claims of sovereignty, right of prior usage and the right of equity are all recognized by the
international community (politically) but if “taken into combination, the water demanded by the three
riparians would exceed the actual flow of the Euphrates in the year 2040 by at least 2.0bcm/yr.” 79 He also
points out that, due to simple geographical differences between Turkey’s mountainous terrain and Syria’s
flatter topography and the obvious difference in numbers of storage reservoir sites, it is simply not realistic
physically to justify insisting on, for example, equal storage rights. Shiva adds that it is a management
mistake to assume that water conserved (or not used) is water wasted (Turkey’s view is that waters flowing
into the Mediterranean are ‘lost’). These ‘unused’ waters are essential to sustaining habitats not only along
the length of the river to the mouth. They also maintain recharge to the groundwater reserves of the region
and the global water quality. 80 Furthermore, the river needs to be managed as a whole entity, requiring
28

perhaps a River Ethic and a River Advocacy or an external, independent technical entity to advocate for
good water management.
External Mediation
Some water policy analysts suggest that external mediation by an international institution may be too
visionary, especially in cases where there is very little trust. They council a step-by-step approach to co-
operation in which “parallel but not united institutions on either side of the border would probably be more
successful than attempts to move quickly to regional institutions.” 81 Kibaroglu agrees partly with the above
view and, while advocating an international regime to be suitable, points out that each riparian case must be
dealt with in a specific manner according to its profile and needs. For example, Turkey should continuously
assess the needs of downstream riparians while at the same time Syria needs to reassess their policy on food
self-sufficiency. 82 Postel acknowledges the role of international institutions but advocates more the need for
strong local institutions for water negotiations to be promoted by the countries involved. She states that the
role of these institutions can make a difference in dispute situations and that treaties have been known to
provide ongoing monitoring and enforcement even when signatories were engaged in hostilities. 83 Others,
however, believe that introducing an external party into the negotiation process is one of the best
possibilities to promote joint negotiations between the three countries. Kolars (above) suggest an advocacy
role, not to mediate the negotiations but to represent the river itself for the benefit of all. 84 McQuarrie adds
that such an authority should also be technical, determine technical needs of riparians and legitimize the
needs of the riparians. 85 This is echoed by Kaya, who envisions a ‘joint watercourse institution’ that must
include an inventory study of all water and land resources of all of the parties. Kaya, however, still strongly
advocates the value of international law; agreeing that it cannot decide the allocation of the water in the
Tigris-Euphrates but that it can provide a good basis for negotiation. 86 Shapland suggests the USA (or even a
regional power) could act as a calming influence in riparian disputes. 87
29

The Role of the EU: Regional Power and External Mediator?
EU Development Policy on Water
One of the biggest powers in the region in terms of size, political and potential economic influence
(especially since the new accessions of 1 May, 2004) is the European Union (EU). While the EU may not
have a specific policy dealing with the Tigris-Euphrates region, the EU’s development policy provides
guidelines for development that can be applied to most river basins. It situates the management of water
resources within the overall priority of the social sector and links water to many other sectors such as health,
food security, transport and trade. Guidelines have been produced based on the Dublin Principles (from the
International Conference on Water and the Environment, Dublin 1992) and Agenda 21 from the first Earth
Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. These guidelines promote the river basin as the geographical setting
for practicing Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). Also included are some economic and
financial principles such as:
� Water has an economic value and should be recognized as an economic good
� Charging tariffs for water services is an important component of any strategy for sustainability. 88
These guidelines, although comprehensive, tend to focus on development tools at the national level and
don’t provide clear guidelines for the International scale. However in a recent EU policy note for water
sectoral development, the document places at the top of its list ‘trans-boundary water management for
conflict prevention’ as the first key global challenge for the future. 89
The broader EU Water and Development Policy, while strongly linked to poverty reduction, pursues the
issues of trans-boundary co-operation and conflict prevention between states by emphasising sustainable
river basin management. In the Communication on Conflict Prevention (11 April 2001), EC support is
recommended where a clear commitment to regional collaboration exists “within and, in the case of trans-
boundary water resources, between states concerned, through sustainable river basin management…” 90
30

The EC is a major donor in grant financing whose actions follow three principles; political dialogue,
development co-operation and trade. Many of these grants for the region fall under a series of programs
known as Euro-Med. 91 Environment and sustainable development are clearly stated components of EC
development policy for the Euro-Med programs. The EC’s external relations are linked to conflict
prevention and resolution for water and land use under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Actions on
this include promoting sound environmental practices in foreign direct investment and in export credits. The
EC, in its policy, acknowledges the need to provide support for states to achieve water security and to
promote dialogue on “basin-wide cooperation in such areas as information-sharing, capacity building and
technology transfers as well as help focusing on achievable goals – out of a ‘basket of benefits’ – instead of
focusing on rights and allocation issues. 92 ” It is evident in this statement that an EU development approach
to the Tigris-Euphrates dispute would promote dialogue but would give little support to the standard claims
(sovereignty, historical rights, territorial integrity) propounded the Tigris-Euphrates countries. Rather the EU
focus would be on a river basin approach, something that all three countries have yet to accept as strategy.
The EU - Turkey Relationship
Since the break-up of the Ottoman Empire Turkey has had strong ties with European States; first with
Germany, later with France and finally with the European Union. Since World War II Turkey has been
involved with westernisation as a means of ensuring “the irreversibility of the modernisation process”.
Although there has been post-war support from the US, Turkey has by preference sought and gained
membership to a number of European ‘Clubs’ such as the Council of Europe in 1949 and soon after NATO
and the European Economic Community in 1959. As a culmination to this goal, Turkey has applied for
membership of the EU. 93 Turkey was by-passed during the three enlargements of the Mediterranean (1981
& 86), Scandinavia and Austria (1995) and the Eastern Enlargement (2004). 94 There was American support
for Turkey’s candidacy with Turkey presented as a ‘good ally’. The US criticised the EU for excluding
Turkey, meanwhile guarding Turkey as a possible future vehicle for American foreign policy in the region. 95
31

Turkey and Accession
In 1999 the EU Summit in Helsinki accepted Turkey as a candidate country and the Turkish Government
announced its own National Program for the Adoption of the EU acquis communautaire on 19 March 2001.
The Copenhagen European Council in December of 2002 stated that Turkey would be given until end - 2004
to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria. If the European Council of 2004 finds that these criteria have been
met, then accession negotiations can begin. 96 In order to conform to EU accession requirements, laws and
directives Turkey has begun with amendments of their constitution on issues such as human rights,
strengthening the rule of law and restructuring democratic institutions. 97 Although Turkey was overlooked in
2003 during the Eastern expansion, their progress in this process will be reviewed in 2004. To facilitate this
process the EU has promised an increase in accession aid.
The part of the acquis communautaire of interest to this paper is the Environmental Acquis. The process of
alignment is known as the Approximation Process and needs to be taken up before membership of a country
to the Union. Turkey will be required to invest in environmental protection and provision of environmental
services that fit to EU standards. This program starts normally three to four years before membership and
can continue up to fifteen years afterwards. Depending on how much financial support Turkey can gain from
the EU, this can be an expensive undertaking requiring also commitment from Turkey’s private sector which
is at the moment weak and in need of restructuring. However, by commercialising some state services to the
private sector, such as environmental services and other public services, Turkey can generate funding and
participation from the private sector. 98
In December of 2004 a Progress Report of the Commission will be presented to see how far Turkey has
advanced along the road of pre-accession. An interim report was presented at the end of 2003 99 , which was
in general more positive than the earlier reports. It indicates progress in the fields of democracy and human
rights and includes an abolition of the state of emergency in the South East of the country. There are other
shortcomings in the political area but progress in the economic dimension has been positive. The least
progress has been in the third pillar of the Copenhagen criteria, which is that of acquis, and that is the area
which concerns water and the environment. The 2003 report states that “As regards the integration of
environmental protection into other policies, no progress can be reported” 100 , including no progress with
regard to water quality. In terms of trying to move ahead on the Tigris – Euphrates discussions by riparians
32

this does not bode well for the immediate future if we take as a precept that Turkey would have to adhere to
EU water management regulations (the European Water Framework Directive) 101 . Turkey would have to
implement some sweeping changes to its policy to adapt to environmentally sound river basin management
as is required by the Directive.
Turkey’s frustration at the time of this report is that the EU has formally linked (and in Turkey’s opinion
unfairly added on) a settlement over Cyprus to the Copenhagen criteria for pre-accession negotiations.
Turkey has been unwilling to push for a clear settlement on Cyprus without a clear or firm commitment from
the EU regarding the opening of accession negotiations. The EU, on the other hand, is hesitant to give such a
clear signal, further complicating the issue. 102
One other factor that cannot be underestimated is the role of Turkey in regional security. Turkey is a long-
standing member of NATO alongside European members and as such has a voice in regional defense issues
linked to NATO. Also recent security incidents such as the bombings in Istanbul in the end of 2003 have
heightened awareness in Europe of the dangers of radical Islam and Turkey’s unique position to participate
in the European security field. In this light Turkey has a role to play in the European Strategic Defense
Initiative (ESDI), and its presentation of candidacy at the Helsinki Summit was very timely because
important decisions were being taken on ESDI at that same summit. 103
33

Conclusions
Historically there were few disputes about the management of the Tigris-Euphrates river basin until after
WWII. This coincided with the autonomy of the 3 main countries in the river basin (Turkey, Syria and Iraq)
and an extraordinary leap forward in development of agricultural expansion, irrigation projects,
industrialization and use of hydro for electrical power. The majority of these initiatives required the
construction of dams and canals for transporting water from rivers and ‘lakes’ to arid zones or, as is the case
in southern Iraq, away from inundated or water-logged zones.
Each country has a different focus on development strategy and therefore have different requirements from
the domain of water resources.
Turkey, who has opted for industrialization in South East Anatolia, primarily uses water to provide electrical
power to support its drive to industrialize itself and to reduce costly dependency on importing energy in the
form of petroleum. A good portion of the stored water from the GAP project will certainly be used to expand
irrigation areas to immediately raise agricultural economic activity at the local level. In addition Turkey has
installed water facilities along the Mediterranean coast (such as on the Manavgat River) to begin processing
water for export. Preliminary activities have begun with North Cyprus and a deal has been recently signed
with Israel. Turkey has announced its interest to increase this service to all countries in the region. The dams,
especially the GAP project, reduce the flow downstream but Turkey argues that she has sovereign rights to
the water that flows in her territory. Although Turkey does not suffer from downstream management of her
waters, she has been affected by downstream complaints have strongly impacted on International funding for
GAP.
Syria, in pursuit of a strategy of independent food security linked to agriculture, has set about organizing her
water resources accordingly with dams along the Euphrates and extensive abstraction along the Orontes
River. Poor design and planning have resulted in inefficiency of the Syrian hydrological program, with the
result that she is now a net importer of food and sometime receiver of food aid. There is a need to adjust
economic plans and strategies and develop their industrial capacity to try to escape this dependency. Syria
will have some difficulty, being a state with underdeveloped industrial capacity and limited energy reserves
(petroleum and hydroelectricity). This change will require an adjustment in human resources (skills, training
34

and capacity building), an abandonment of internal food security strategy (and therefore dependence on
outside sources), and a change of political will. Being a downstream riparian, Syria has come into dispute
with Turkey over the GAP project, proclaiming their territorial and historical rights to the Euphrates over
the sovereign rights of Turkey.
Iraq is also heavily invested in dams and canals for irrigation and hydro-electricity, but is less dependent on
agriculture than Syria due to their petroleum reserves. Normally Iraq has had cordial water and economic
relations with Turkey but this changed with the Gulf War and sanctions, in which Turkey sided against Iraq.
Due to isolation and harsh limits on oil exports, Iraq was faced with a new dependency on agriculture (and
hence irrigation/water transfers) that had not existed for many years since the petroleum boom. With
negligent maintenance of the system during the Saddam Hussein regime, the Iraqi’s were forced to scramble
in pushing up agricultural supply, not only for maintaining food supply but to ensure internal economic
activity (at least to a degree) and therefore stability and security. Desalinization canals and systems were put
into action to try to reclaim unusable lands but were also put into use to drain southern marshes where
insurgents were hiding. Contrary to the other two riparian neighbours Iraq has been restricted to limited
water resource management on a local scale only and has had very little time or opportunity to consider the
implications of what is going on upstream. This is still the case at the moment during the post-Saddam
Hussein era of Coalition Authorities also being unable to think beyond the short term needs of domestic
water supply and trying to repair water transport facilities. It will be some time before issues of water
transport, canals, dams, flood management and drought storage, and finally upstream water quality and
quantity are recognized as priorities for Iraq.
Almost all management models agree that a river basin management model is the best solution for dealing
with future needs and scenarios of use. Due to the differences between each riparian it is generally accepted
that an outside entity or organization acting as a mediator is the best method to initiate this type of
discussion. The European Union is the largest local institution in the region that not only has an organization
with vast experience and skills but also has financial resources for development and a political interest to
promote open and fruitful discussions on management of the river basin. This is a much more effective
proposition than the United States, who is only viewed favourably by Turkey and not by Syria and Iraq who
see the U.S. as biased. The accession candidacy of Turkey has perhaps slightly skewed her independent
status. It could also provide an impetus to steer the negotiation agenda away from old historic and rights-
35

ased approach and more towards an integrated river-basin approach to management. If Turkey is serious
about joining the EU it has to conform to the environmental acquis and therefore will be required to conform
to the rules and regulations of the European Water Framework Directive. When this happens the
negotiations will then be de-facto between the EU, Syria and Iraq which could break down one of the biggest
stumbling blocks of the negotiating process; that of distrust.
Turkey’s progress on pre-accession is up for review at the end of 2004. Even if negotiations begin it is likely
that Turkey will not see water as an immediate priority. However there exists a window of opportunity in
negotiating the once difficult tripartite negotiations on the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin; namely that there
will not likely be an Iraqi representation to participate in them for the foreseeable future. Bi-lateral talks
between Turkey and Syria will be easier for an external institution to try to mediate and could allow them to
progress farther, although care must be taken not to do so at the expense of a sovereign Iraq.
36

Centre Européen de Recherche Internationale et Stratégique
Ceris was established in 1985 on the initiative of a group of university professors, diplomats and
senior civil servants. The objective was to promote post graduate education and research in the field of
international relations.
In 1988 Ceris introduced a Master of Arts in International Politics. Over the years, Ceris has
created intensive courses, entitled Post Graduate Certificates and devoted to EU external relations, conflict
prevention & conflict management, security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Finally, Ceris will
shortly be introducing a new Master of Arts in Development Policy Implementation and Governance.
The courses offered are all part-time and organised on Friday evenings and Saturday mornings.
They are given in English, though certain courses on the MA in International Politics are delivered in
French. Currently, it is also possible to follow the
MA in International Politics as part of a ‘distance learning’ programme, with this format being set to
develop in the years to come.
The education that Ceris provides is distinctive in two respects. First of all, it offers a very high level
of university education organized in partnership with leading european universities, in particular the
Collège d’Etudes Interdisciplinaires de l’Université Paris Sud that sponsors the Master of arts in
International politics. The quality of the education owes much to the team of invited lecturers. Over the
years, Ceris has developed a network of EU or Nato key experts and professors drawn from universities
renowned for their excellence. For this reason, it boasts a first rate academic team that few universities
would be in a position to offer. Each year the MA in International Politics course is run by thirty or so
experts, notably from the London School of Economics and Political Science, the Universities of Oxford,
Cambridge, Warwick, Kings College in London, l’Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Paris, l’Institut
Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva and American universities, such as Johns Hopkins.
The second special feature lies in Ceris' international audience. Those following the courses come
from around forty different countries. Two thirds are from European Union Member States or countries
applying for membership, with the third coming from North and South America, Sub-Sahara Africa, South
and East Asia. More than 85% of them have a professional occupation. The largest group is made up of
civil servants from European institutions (the European Commission, Parliament, Council, the European
Social and Economic Committee, Committee of the Regions). Then there are diplomats posted in Brussels
and working either in bilateral embassies or in missions or permanent representations. Senior managers from
the private sector working in lobbying or for interest groups, most frequently in conjunction with the
European Commission or Parliament, make up the third significant group. Finally, there are members of
staff from NGO’s and foreign journalists accredited by the European Union or Nato. Sixty percent of
attendees are aged between 25 and 34, though students aged 35 and over account for twenty-five to thirty
percent. We should add that Ceris each year reserves several places for graduates fresh from university, who
are destined for international careers.
37

Ceris Research Papers
All Ceris Papers can be accessed via the website : www.ceris.be
n° 1 Hydropolitics of the Tigris-Euphrates River Bassin with
implications for the European Union
Murray Biedler, 2004
n° 2 Le Processus de Kimberley et les diamants de la guerre
Philippe Renaudière, 2004
n° 3 Natural Gas on the Balkan
Eberhard Röhm-Malcotti, 2005
n° 4 The United States of American’s Global War on Terror in
Iraq : International Humanitarian Law Approaches
Vanhullebusch Matthias, 2006
n° 5 Fueling the Future: alternative energies, econ omic
concequences and geopolitical changes
Ana Ochôa, 2006
n° 6 New Foreign Policy of Lithuania After Membersh ip
in E U and Nato
Jurgis Gurstis, 2006
n° 7 Existential Anxiety or Age of Sacred Terror?
Peter J. Scammell, 2006
n° 8 The European Union as a CFSP Actor in Georgia :
can the EU still do more?
Tea Akhvlediani, 2007
38

& 1 McQuarrie, Patrick, Water Security in the Middle East: Growing Conflict Over Development in the Euphrates –Tigris
Basin, (Trinity College, Dublin, 2003), p.11.
2 Buzan, B., People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era,(Hemel
Hempstead and New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
3 Evans, G., and Newnham, J., Dictionary of International Relations, (Penguin, 1998), p.492.
4 Hillel, Daniel, Chapter 5, The Twin Rivers from Rivers of Eden: The Struggle for Water and the Quest for Peace in
the Middle East, (Oxford University Press, 1994), p.92.
5 Ibid., pp.93, 97
6 MacQuarrie, pp.6-7.
7 Ibid., p.7
8 Calculations and synthesis from MacQuarrie, pp.8-9 and data from Hillel, p.96 as well as from Kibaro lu, Building a
Regime for the Waters of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin, (International and National Water Law and Policy Series,
2002)
9 Tomanbay, M, Chapter 6. Turkey’s Water Potential and the Southeast Anatolia Project, in Water Balances In The
Eastern Mediterranean, Brooks, D.B. and Mehmet, O., Eds.(IDRC Publication, 2000)
10 Turan, I., Water and Turkish Foreign Policy, (Chapter 10 in The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, Martin, L.G. &
Keridis, D. eds., MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004), p.208.
11 Domenico, P.A. & Schwartz, F.W., Physical and Chemical Hydrogeology, (John Wiley & Sons, 1990), p.554.
12 Adams, Mark, Water and Security Policy: The Case of Turkey, (NESA Center, Occasional Paper, 2002),2, Hillel, 98,
and McQuarrie, p.59.
13 Murakami, M., Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East: Alternative strategies, (UN University Press, Tokyo,
1995) remarks that the lack of repairs and cleaning resulted in gradual siltation of the canals, reducing their efficiency.
He suggests that by the time of the Mongol invasions the agricultural abandonment of lands in the region was almost
complete.
14 Turan, p.190.
15 ibid. The first major dam to be constructed was the Seyhan dam, completed in 1956 and built with external support
from the US. A multi-purpose dam, it supplied power for the Adana Industrial region and irrigation water for the Cilician
Plains which was a well known cotton producing area and supplier to the British textile industry. Irrigation encouraged
agricultural development and power encouraged investment in industry. Twenty-six dams were constructed from 1960-
69, thirty-one from 1970-79, sixty-nine during 1980-89 and thirty-seven between 1990-97. pp.192-3.
16 This was likely due to a general assumption that there were abundant (and unused) water resources available. It
was, in any case, difficult to formulate a policy due to the lack of knowledge and data to effectively quantify the water
resource base.
17 McQuarrie notes that energy production during this period was growing at a rate of 33 percent but energy
consumption had increased by a staggering 172 percent, pp. 13-14.
18 Hillel, in 1994, quotes a sum in excess of $20 billion while Adams, in 2002, presents a total cost of $32 billion, giving
a good idea of the increasing costs of GAP, p.105.
19 Turan, I., World Bank staff was being instructed to consider the international aspects of projects that they were
evaluating.
20 McQuarrie, p.73 & Turan, p.198.
21 Adams, 4 and McQuarrie, pp.35-36.
22 Hillel, p.104.
23 Adams, McQuarrie, 34, and Shiva, V., Water Wars, Privatization, Pollution, and Profit, (Pluto, London, 2002), p.72.
The number of villages to be destroyed by flooding was estimated at 183.
24 Adams, pp. 40-41, The European Court of Human Rights delivered a judgement on the first case involving the
destruction of villages in southwestern Turkey by security forces during their anti-terrorist program, pronouncing
against Turkey. It was found that the burning of the applicant’s house violated the right of the applicant to private and
family life and the right to peaceful enjoyment of their property. Further, the Court found that the undue pressure the
Turkish Authorities put on the applicants to withdraw their petition violated their right to individual petition.
25 McQuarrie, p.35, excerpts from the KHRP report, 2000, “The Ilisu Dam, the World Commission on Dams and Export
Credits”.
26 Adams, p.42.
27 Hillel, p.107.
39

28 Daoudy, M., Water, Institutions and Development in Syria: A Downstream Perspective from the Euphrates and
Tigris, (World Commission on Dams Report, Serial No: env 108), p.11. Daoudy also remarks on the phenomena that
the value attributed to agriculture, in and of itself, far exceeds its economic value due to its strongly instilled cultural,
symbolic, political and military significance.
29 McQuarrie, p.42-44.
30 Hillel, p. 108.
31 McQuarrie, p. 46.
32 Hillel, p.109, remarks on the lack of professional and administrative expertise, especially in the instance where much
of the land prepared for irrigation from the Tabqa Dam was found to be unsuitable.
33 McQuarrie, p.80.
34 Daoudy, In 1982 all water-related acts were unified into one law and the Ministry of Irrigation were formed in 1983,
supervising industrial, agricultural and human water consumption. p.5.
35 Ibid. p. 99, Lake Abu-Dibbis has a storage capacity of 45 BCM and Lake Tharthar BCM.
36 Shapland, G., Rivers of Discord, (Hurst and Company, London, 1997), p.109.
37 Hillel, The Third River is a canal augmented by feeder canals and drainage pipes to draw away saline agricultural
return flow.p.100.
38 Partow, H., The Mesopotamian Marshlands: Demise of an Ecosystem, (Early Warning and Assessment Technical
Report, UNEP/DEWA/TR.01-3 Rev.1, 2001), pp.22-23. Partow emphasises that the original design would not have
resulted in marshland drainage as such, and was technically sound because irrigation without drainage is ultimately
unsustainable. The design did, however, provide the broader framework from which the marshland drainage plan was
derived.
39 McQuarrie, Initially production did rise until the mid-1990’s. Farmers were required to crop all lands every year (no
rotation) and many gate valves for flood irrigation were left open for days which increased withdrawals from the rivers.
At the end of the day, these unstable agricultural methods coupled with untimely droughts began to reduce the
agricultural production. p.70.
40 Partow, p.24.
41 McQuarrie, states that in the year following the Gulf War agricultural production dropped by 50%. This included the
failure of the national date crop, due to raw sewage being dumped directly into the Tigris River.
42 McQuarrie, Iraq claimed rights to 16.1bcm/year from the Euphrates based on a 1965 World Bank study. Syria’s
withdrawal for the Tabqa reduced the flow to 9.4bcm/year. Iraq subsequently claimed that this reduction had resulted
in a loss of 70% of agricultural potential and threatened three million farmers dependent on river irrigation. p.73.
43 Shapland, comments that there was a strong antagonism between the two Ba’athist regimes in Baghdad and
Damascus who were both continually vying for pan-Arab influence and would use any excuse to accuse each other of
hostile acts. p.117.
44 Hillel, p.109, McQuarrie, pp.73-74, & Shapland, who mentions that the Arab League tried first to mediate the
situation, unsuccessfully, and later was replaced by Saudi Arabia and the Soviets who secured the additional release
of water. pp. 117-118.
45 McQuarrie, p.75 & Shapland, who writes that in any case the Arab partners laid a claim to 700m 3 /s from the
Euphrates to be shared between them both. p.119.
46 Adams, p. 27.
47 McQuarrie, pp. 75-76.
48 Adams, comments that “Water and the PKK were political and strategic levers on either side.”, p;28.
49 Hillel, p.189, and McQuarrie, p.54.
50 Shapland, Syria and Lebanon signed and agreement in 1994 (after some twenty years of discussions) in which the
allocation of Orontes water was agreed upon. As part of this agreement Lebanon could continue to draw water from
existing wells in the Orontes Basin but would not be permitted to drill new wells. p.144.
51 ibid., This distribution also reflects the degree of influence that Syria holds over Lebanon.p.145.
52 McQuarrie, p.79.
53 Shapland, Syria is almost obliged to link this rhetoric to her territorial claims to Hatay Province because she has yet
to take a strategic decision between her claims to Hatay versus her claims to the Euphrates. This is a weakness,
exploited by Turkey again in 1995 when the same complaint was raised by Turkey to counter Syrian objections to
continuing projects on the Euphrates (in this case the construction of the Birecik Dam), p.146
54 Carkoglu, A., and Eder, M., Water Conflict: The Euphrates-Tigris Basin, in Turkey in World Politics: An emerging
Multi-regional Power, Rubin B. & Kirisci K. eds. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), The trade between Turkey and Iraq
40

had played a strong role in the development of Southeast Anatolia, with trade volume of up to $2 billion by 1989. This
dropped sharply, leaving a fleet of 40,000 trucks idle and raising unemployment. p.239.
55 Adams, p.33.
56 McQuarrie, A Commission formed between Britain and France (following the Convention of 23 December, 1920)
regulated Syrian irrigation works that could affect Iraq; a Franco-Turkish agreement (October 20, 1921) ensuring water
supply to the Syrian city of Aleppo; the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) stating that Turkey should confer with Iraq before
commencing activities that could alter the flow of the Euphrates and others.p.92.
57 ibid., McQuarrie notes that the flaw in this agreement is that it completely ignores Syria., p.92.
58 Hillel, p.110.
59 McQuarrie, Turkey argues that both rivers are transboundary rivers in that they cross international boundaries but
do not constitute them.p.95.
60 Tomanbay, M., Turkey’s Approach to Utilization of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, (Arab Studies Quarterly, Spring
2000, Vol. 22 Issue 2, p.79). Tomanbay goes on to clarify that, in Turkey’s point of view, the Tigris and the Euphrates
are to be regarded as one river because they join together at the Shatt al-Arab before entering the Gulf and they are
also linked by the Tharthar Canal.
61 Kolars, J., Defining the Political/Ecological Threshold for the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, (Arab Studies Quarterly,
Spring 2000, Vol. 22 Issue 2, p.101)
62 Adams, p.64.
63 McQuarrie, p.96.
64 Shiva, pp.76-82.
65 ibid., The theory is named after J. Harmon, US Attorney General who used it in 1895 to settle a dispute with Mexico
other water disputes with Canada, p.100.
66 Shapman, p.160.
67 McQuarrie, presents a table from the UNEP GEO Data Portal (httm://geodata.grid.unep.ch) illustrating the relative
ranking between uses and includes such factors as geography, climate, environmental policy, historical factors, social
indicators, population and a variety of needs, p.102. McQuarrie further states that political and security motivations
have defined Turkey’s policy of security over water, often taking priority over economic and social needs.p.105.
68 Turan, Turkey has rejected any claims contrary to that of water sovereignty and is quite careful about involving itself
in any agreements that could undermine these claims, p.208.
69 GCC refers to Gulf Co-operation Council: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and
Oman.
70 Shapland, p.46.
71 Murakami,M., Chapter 2, Review studies on arid-zone hydrology and water-resources development and
management, Section 2.1, The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, from Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East:
Alternative Strategies, (UN University Press, Tokyo-New York-London, 319pp., 1995). Murakami notes that the total
project cost of the Peace Pipeline, estimated at the time (1990) to be US$21 x 10 9 , would make it the most expensive
transboundary project in the world; more expensive than the Euro Tunnel which cost US$15 x 10 9 (1995 estimates).
72 Hillel, p.246, Shapland, pp.46-47 & Turan,p.206, The cost of water was estimated to be less expensive than that of
desalination, but subsequent economic evaluations confirmed that it would be, indeed, more expensive.
73 Bicak, A.H., & Jenkins, G., Chapter 7., Transporting Water by Tanker from Turkey to North Cyprus: Costs and
Pricing Policies, in Water Balances In The Eastern Mediterranean, Brooks, D.B. and Mehmet, O., Eds.(IDRC
Publication, 2000), in their attempts to estimate the costs in $/m 3 for the transfer come up with initial cost of $0.79/m 3 ,
suggesting that it would be 50% cheaper than desalination costs (not counting costs of Cyprus off-loading
infrastructure or Cyprus payment for raw water). They do qualify this estimate by saying that potentially the most costly
factor would be uncontrolled leakage due to bad management. Turan comments that this has indeed become one of
the problems, p.207 and Vidal (see below) quotes a 2004 cost for a Turkey to Israel transfer of just above $1.00/m 3 .
74 Shapland, p.47 & Turan, p.206-207.
75 Vidal, J., Israeli ‘water for arms’ deal with Turkey, The Guardian, (January 6, 2004)
76 Quote from Major General Uri Saguy, retired head of Mekorot Water Company (and ex-chief of military intelligence)
in UPI article Politics spur Israeli Turkish water deal. The article goes on to mention that Israel upgraded Turkey’s Air
Force and is upgrading their tanks, with Turkish military orders totalling $3 billion. The water sale could act as a
balance of trade (United Press International, 05, March, 2004).
77 McQuarrie, p.107.
41

78 Shiva goes on to say that “equitable use theory treats rivers as static resources to apportioned at will.” and this is an
error because the “distribution of benefits and losses to upstream and downstream regions or to riparian and nonriparian
states, changes over time, as does the implication for equitable sharing.”, p.80-81.
79 Kolars, p.1.
80 Shiva, m.81.
81 Brooks, D., Between the Great Rivers: Water in the Heart of the Middle East, in Water Management in Africa and
the Middle East, (IDRC, 1996),p.89.
82 Kibaroglu, A., Prospects for Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin in Water Policy: Allocation and management
in practice, Howsam & Carter, eds. (E & FN SPON, London, 1996), p.37.
83 Postel, S. & Wolf, A., Dehydrating Conflict, (Foreign Policy, September/October), pp.2-9)
84 Kolars, p.4.
85 McQuarrie, p.107.
86 Kaya, I., The Euphrates-Tigris basin: An overview and opportunities for cooperation under international law, in
Aridlands Newsletter, Conflict Resolution and Trans-boundary Water Resources, No. 44, Fall/Winter 1998, p.7.
87 Shapland, p.164.
88 European Commission Directorate-General for Development, Towards sustainable water resources management:
Guidelines for water resources development co-operation, (European Commission, 1998).
89 European Union, Sectoral Development Policies, Water: water management in developing countries,
(http://europa.eu.int:scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12514.htm, last updated 2002).
90 Bjorklund, G., Water Management in Developing Countries – Policy and Priorities for EU Development Cooperation,
(a Background Document for an EC Communication on Water and Development, Stockholm International Water
Institute, Stockholm, 2001), pp.14-15.
91 Ibid., p.21.
92 Ibid;, p.33.
93 Ugur, M., The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemna, (Ashgate Publishing Ltd., Aldershot,
1999) p.2.
94 Ibid. Ugur states that Turkish policy-makers ignore that their lack of commitment on policy reform have contributed
to this result, rather they prefer to see this as an EU preference to keep Turkey (Muslim) out of the European Club.
The other side of this argument is the failure of the EU to recognise their failure to provide an adequate enough anchor
to encourage Turkish policy-makers to go farther. p.18.
95 Hall, D., & Danta, D., eds., Chapter 17, Turkey, in Europe Goes East: EU enlargement, diversity and uncertainty,
(The Stationary Office, London, 2000), p.263.
96 Eralp, A., Chapter 5, Turkey and the European Union, in The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, Martin, L.G. &
Keridis, D., eds.(MIT Press, Cambridge & London, 2004), p.81.
97 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey – EU Relations: Post-Helsinki Phase, (2003).
98 Markandya, A., Turkey: Towards EU Accession, The Environmental Acquis, (paper for Ankara Conference, 10-11
May, 2003)
99 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, available on
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/rr_tk_final.pdf
100 ibid. p.106.
101 The European Commission Directorate-General for Environment, The Water Framework Directive focuses on
Integrated River Basin Development, available on http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/water/waterframework/index_en.html
102 Aydin, S., Progress Report on Turkey - Problems and Prospects, (Commentary, Centre for European Policy
Studies, January 2004)
103 Eralp, A., p.79.
42

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