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7, 1Ak<br />

I I II ~I~ ~ ~ ~~~lo<br />

I" 4* 4 CON A$: l<br />

F"<br />

Deve1met agstance-~Africa 'I<br />

Anassmeto h refugee situation insuhrc ral i~'ndeatern Aica~<br />

A~ It a<br />

~,t1977 AC<br />

. ABSRAC<br />

Assesses~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ne nIeue.polmouhr.cvladEsenAr<br />

n<br />

j~tme.2.17,<br />

f A'hep~ reuge and 'hs 0e)m o ut tsf ie I<br />

vey from A~<br />

/'guI, 8.hato I 1Vst tBt nd Aee~ad -- sthSta~iad<br />

erve osib' the fuee cams'uhr~Ct~~ cocetatos and Tis docentA4<br />

~~ I~~lA aneew Amrfilan pre i~u suro rvpyI ordr to suvpp th,recd ani5tnde<br />

forrefu~~pi,~ ees ad hos ctis J1 tete s'~d s pt-i r r<br />

,wh~r' A petoinet. "Great divers77 nii~wrtowBostin Lotf refule~gou o<br />

~ - ~ lozmiquef h troublZaiee: ptsa, $eAfria. jEqual ~~ herilA rfound mon hottI<br />

~~A~lA% ~ tearies ith eeeoe toalofi :Ahlwy 3Utrpsf~ ;nwih thys ta r oil ria.adI<br />

l~alA~lpee. gnce; j~o~tcof-erI a!Ides U.S ~ To~y , general z .<br />

it'ol b~qee~ posaid1 t i re eeregee vinpsconenrions asi lifesppote<br />

compar~ned tote bare, Of subisenioe rUevel of d'iteOAe iori,6nce by large psectorsof<br />

71Yf~~ A therO~uac prinnty Af~icancoutis.found lptopositonof<br />

st refuge geuroups s<br />

obii~ou tf-t4 trouble, scotsnaof A1augmnaino & divrs supford apoast<br />

A ~A,., caunne with eeencI tot~ waeIei,oypoidingtrat nues.T eipie<br />

admitbtie t.~~~~~~~p&~~os supprt-tomost ubeae ofrr.Fi govueernmeivn~a1 e~~ efgele iupport,pa'n~rg~uan~yWt~eno iesupr ns.m<br />

A'aied tot-ibaesubsisde oneache cfountee sceexpi bI1atesctr<br />

th1pp0.c um iOOOanfiaVut~s4T&frtp~r~ 0.PREfuDO1.114<br />

1 euleml<br />

RefgeeWIAEGreuesDypoiln aa AlI oi--18<br />

ILTYP OFd'oWraNlzTo<br />

AIDgnc~<br />

I<br />

I.<br />

I


'a.. -<br />

X<br />

C....<br />

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'"'-le•rn. "<br />

alas, wo<br />

~ * Un,,<br />

!2eri9<br />

~A I 1•riG 1<br />

Niger<br />

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/,;<br />

"O ke<br />

k.<br />

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I-)Cwa<br />

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0,-,0" ,,,o.<br />

,"<br />

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a"Z<br />

Coffee I,<br />

"<br />

"" ....- ms- _-./amN<br />

owmot<br />

ir -mWeNo<br />

-11% , I~ z ~..<br />

,~*Angola -7~<br />

-Zaima, a­<br />

&%u~ EL'*..<br />

It asdeno<br />

Is.<br />

9"M.<br />

a--<br />

",ell<br />

Iryaaa<br />

ltAtptl<br />

. -­<br />

- (<br />

,,-, hems o,<br />

: ,o<br />

Z.<br />

-_,... b -.


CONTENTS<br />

I. INTODUCTZON 1<br />

II. OVERVIEW (SUIARY) 5<br />

III. SITUATIONS BY COUNTRY 10<br />

A. Botswa~a 10<br />

S. Lesotho<br />

17<br />

Z. Swaz .land 23<br />

D. Mo za<strong>mb</strong>ique 29<br />

E. Za<strong>mb</strong>i a 35<br />

F Zaire 42<br />

G. Kenya 51<br />

H. Sudan so<br />

I. D:.bouti 65<br />

IV. CONT"-E.TAL AND REGIONAL POLICIES<br />

AND PROGRA.MS 71.<br />

A. Life Support<br />

B. Education<br />

C. Voluntary Agency Assistance<br />

D. Junicr Professional Officers - UN<br />

71<br />

72<br />

"1<br />

79<br />

E. Peace Corps<br />

F. Self-Help Funds<br />

G. A<strong>mb</strong>assador's Refugee Contingency<br />

Fund<br />

H. Refuge* Categories<br />

I. Liberaticr. movements<br />

j. Refugee Policy and Strategy<br />

K. Country Support<br />

. Coordination<br />

80<br />

81<br />

81<br />

82<br />

83<br />

84<br />

85<br />

85<br />

M. Self-Sufficiency 86<br />

V. CONCLUSION so<br />

APPMMIX A. Glossary of Abbreviations 90<br />

APPEN X B. Contact List 93<br />

APPENDIX C. Statistical Summary, Refugee<br />

Population 109<br />

iii


Africa<br />

Botsawana<br />

Lesotho<br />

Swaziland<br />

Ioxa<strong>mb</strong>ique<br />

Za<strong>mb</strong>ia<br />

Zaire<br />

Kenya<br />

Sudan<br />

Republic of Djibouti<br />

LIST OF MAPS<br />

LIST OF CHARTS<br />

Chart A. Refugee Assistance Cocrdination<br />

Bo tswana<br />

Cha't B. Refugee Assistance Coordination<br />

Lesoth..o<br />

Chart C. Refugee Assistance ZCordinaticn -­<br />

Swaziland<br />

Chart D. Refugee Assistance Coordina.ion -­<br />

Mo:a<strong>mb</strong>ique<br />

Chart E. Refugee Assistance Coordinat on -­<br />

Za<strong>mb</strong>ia<br />

Chart F. Refugee Assistance Coordination -­<br />

Zaire<br />

Chart G. Refugne* Assistance Coordination -­<br />

Kenya<br />

Chart N. Retu.ee Assistance Coordination -­<br />

Sudan<br />

Chart I. Refugee AssLstance Coordination<br />

Dj ibouti<br />

iv<br />

ii<br />

15<br />

21<br />

27<br />

33<br />

40<br />

49<br />

56<br />

63<br />

69<br />

16<br />

22<br />

28<br />

34<br />

41<br />

50<br />

57<br />

64<br />

70


I. INTRODUCTION<br />

New, as well as chronic refugee problems in Southern,<br />

Central and Eastern Africa have resulted in increasingly<br />

urgent appeals to the United States for bilateral and multilatera<br />

assistancc and relief efforts. While A=eri-a has<br />

regular:y contrbuted to UN and other rclief agenci.as, the<br />

grow-.n nu<strong>mb</strong>er-s of dislocated persons and h.e ."creasing<br />

:omplex--y cf their problems have placed increased demands<br />

on our resources. :n order to meet current appeals and to<br />

ar::c-pa.e future requirements, the White House asked the<br />

Departzent of State and AD to assess -.he situation, review<br />

Amer:can relief programs and develop a broad assistance<br />

strategy for helping needy refugees and host countries 3 s<br />

The Office of Refugee and Miaration Affairs in State<br />

(HA/OM) .has conducted a field assessment of relief<br />

activiies ecarr:ed out by '.tN and interna.ional orani:a.ions<br />

t- which t.he "nited States makes regular ccntributns. AD<br />

'as :-ust completed ".ts field survey, rev:ew-ng present and<br />

future refuqee requirements within the range of AZD capabil.t.les.<br />

At the same time A:D has explored ways to strengthen<br />

the institutional and physical infrastructure of the affected<br />

countries in order to pe it them to carry a shaire of the<br />

refugee burden. : ot only have the two field assessments<br />

been complementary, but hopefully, resulting recomendations,<br />

protects and programs will blend in forming a uniform,<br />

integrated refugee assistance strategy.<br />

1. See Deparment messages at conclusion of this chapter.<br />

1.


'he A= assessment te& consisting of G. Edward Clark<br />

(A<strong>mb</strong>assador, Retired), Jesse L. Snyder (AZ"General Develop­<br />

ment Officer) and Karl C. Kohler (rar.:ior.t "-ngi.neer)<br />

conducted its field sur-vey from August 8 to Septe<strong>mb</strong>er 24.<br />

During this time the team visited 3otswana, Lesotho, Swaziland,<br />

Moza<strong>mb</strong>ique, Zamka, Zaire, (enya, Sudan and '"-ou*: (.-aps<br />

attached to country reports). The team. !*ader also consulted<br />

UN and Red Cross officials in Geneva. :n each refugee<br />

country the team met with local authorities, LN representatives,<br />

international, Ae..ican and local volunteer agencies, dipl-omatic<br />

officers of other donor countries, and, of coi-rse, U.T.<br />

e<strong>mb</strong>assy/AmD officials (Contact List, A-=end-x B'. WN.erever<br />

possible, t.hey .inspacted refucee ,-a-.s and z=nen:_-a-ons.<br />

While b-


In addition to general sector reviews of education,<br />

man;ower training and health delivery systems, more<br />

detailed studies were made i.n the fields of tansport and<br />

grain storage. These latter reports will be transitted<br />

separately to AID, although their main pcints are, of<br />

course, included in this<br />

report along with more general<br />

oLservations and recomendations pertaining to other<br />

sectors*<br />

The team wishes to express deep appreciation for<br />

the sup.ort of EMtassy/AID Kisaion staffs throughout the<br />

assessment t=# , where Country Teams appeared deep<br />

concerned about refuqee problems and anxious to<br />

their solution.<br />

help in<br />

3.


ExertijQ: tte Zopaternt message of JV23 and SUb­<br />

..............-- sublect: i-e!uCe* Assessmnt<br />

0a-:z or :cz PREzDr."r u:sHs TO<br />

DEI!ELOP 3ROAD XrJ m GEE ASSISTANCE STRTLGIY<br />

FOR WITYA, ZA.'B3A, BcTSWA;';A, UzSCTHO,<br />

SWAz"AiD MOZA.MQE :AIRE, stDnm AN:<br />

WZDOU'TI. ACCC7RIN'GLY, STAT!v XND AID<br />

ORCANIZING STUDY TO BUTTRESS EXISTIN'G PRO­<br />

=1JJ, AND MIEAVOR A.ITICIPXE FUJTURE<br />

MOMIDVITS IN REFUGEE ?XELD. STUDY<br />

DESZQI "O ASSESS 'NOT ONLY DZRZ(:?<br />

MUMANS FOR RMFUEE ASSZSTANCZ, 3U'" r-X-<br />

PLORE WA~YS TO STRENG'HL'N l3ST:%*o::CA'<br />

AND PHYSZCA. OFATCm ? Z!.<br />

COUN ". 1ES 1 0P R PM: Z-N7 HZ. TO^-C;6aRY<br />

n-ECZSS ARY SEP. OZE0F '12 E BtVZ EN;.<br />

AID TEAM CCoNS"LT:!G W=:H D, HAi/Fd :N<br />

O1MER SYNCONIZE APPROAC!iES TO f<br />

ELJAENS 0f REF.GE:E ?ROBLE:-'. D)/HA/OR.<br />

0OP COURST CONCE!M.RATI"NG ON L-"F LZ-<br />

TENIANCI.P PROCGRAMS CH 1TELED TIMCtGH t"'HC.R<br />

AND FVWO THROUGH~ STATE lRET"Gr- AND<br />

MIGIRATION ASS:STA24C! APPYRCPR:AT^.<br />

AID CO'1CIVROED W:TH HROAZER C01t.As RY<br />

DEVELOPMOIT NEEDS, Pr. T S SPEC":!:C GE<br />

RECvIl.rmlTs -NCL=ADI.G Z-0 vC:D TY<br />

?T.ANSPORT, TCOOD STORAGE ~ZTS<br />

HIALTH CAME: DEL-l"VRY, MND EDUCATI FACIL­<br />

4.


:z. OVERV:Ew (StMARY)<br />

Political, civil and t-ribal strife in certain troubled<br />

countries Of Southern, Central and -astern Africa has, in<br />

recent years, caused hundreds of thousands of Africans to<br />

seek refuge in neighboring countries. Breeding spots include<br />

South Africa, Zi<strong>mb</strong>abwe, Namibia, Angola, Vqanda and<br />

Ethiopia. Havens include Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland,<br />

Mozam:I.ue, Za<strong>mb</strong>ia, :aire, Kenya, Sudan and D:ibou-i.<br />

Estimates of the tota: magnitude of :he refugee population<br />

in t.his part of the zcntinent range fro" a quarter to<br />

a full million persons. This spread in sta..stics results<br />

from the applicatio,. of dif-ferent criteria and definitions<br />

as to who indeed is a refuge*. The UN defines a refugee<br />

as any person who has been forced to flee his country becaus,;<br />

of race, religion or political belief. There are those,<br />

however, who exclude Libe:ation Moveent .eibers who have<br />

chosen to go abroad for tralning as "Freedom Fighters."<br />

Others add "educational refugeeij" who leave 'but may return<br />

to) South Artca because they prefer ncn-saparthed u--Urricula<br />

in nelgnboring countres; potentia "dcmestc refugees" such<br />

as 200,000 Lesotho miners who may lose their 4obs in South<br />

African manes and become social burdens in theiz own society;<br />

=<br />

and =instant refugees like 700 ethnic Swazi who are residents<br />

in South Africa but study in Swazi schoo's. Statistics<br />

on refugee populations in each country are referred to<br />

in Sect'-on :z1 and summarized in Appendix C of this report.<br />

Great diversity is found in the composition of refugee<br />

groups coming out of the trouble spots of Africa. Ssnce tte<br />

5.


Sharpesville massecre of 1961. Scuth Africa has spawned<br />

succeedinq generations of sophisticated PAC and ANC of!icials,<br />

banned .USAs lqadzrs and rebellious Sowetr students.<br />

Urban, sophisticated Uqgadan civi. ser:ants and .r.:ess.ona.s<br />

have fled from :di ;=in, Ethiopian and Erit:rean .eiectuals<br />

have becoa refugees since tlie fall of Hail. Selassie.<br />

On the other end of the scale, there are thousands of unedu­<br />

cated, r-a! CabindAu and =or ncmadic resients of te<br />

Oqaden who have fled in the face of factional zzrife =; open<br />

warfarv. between, there are ;rcwLnq nu.ers cf =A. a-'eans<br />

and Nianibians who, voluntarily or ".rough reer--e.:, are<br />

moving our for guerilla t"raininq in the ranks of =cli.tical<br />

parties which hope one day to assme powe' in :he countrias<br />

of their birth.<br />

Equal diversity i. found among host cou-ntries with<br />

reference to the way in which they treat refugees. Zctswana,<br />

Lesotho, and Kenya favor una. solut:orns .= refugse<br />

problems, preferring absorption and assi-atcn rathar .. ha.-.<br />

isolation in camps. However, as the numers of refugeis .rzw,<br />

these countries are increasincly aware -nat refugees c ,.pete<br />

for jobs, politicize and ;-ae ca:a, a er:i bur-ens<br />

on their own societies. They view refugee care as pa:t.ly td-.eiown<br />

responsibility and partly that of "ha international<br />

conuaity.<br />

Swaziland, fearing controversy with South Africa, tends<br />

t, isolate refugees to a certain extent from society. This is<br />

officially (and perhaps realistically) rationalized as a necessary<br />

measure to protect the refugees from abduction by South<br />

African security agents across the nearby frontier. The<br />

Government of Swaziland (GO3) is a<strong>mb</strong>ivale:r: in regard to<br />

refugee support, providing some limited facilities but<br />

looking to international donors for most assistance.


: oa<strong>mb</strong>ique and Za<strong>mb</strong>i:., -:_ political and security<br />

reasons, is.:ate most re.,g-;ee_: p.r--tting some to group for<br />

military t:a-nin and others -: ;ather in genuine refugee<br />

camps. A-though ;rovidinc safe havens on the basis of<br />

;i-berazon =cvemen: "solic-.-=.ty," neither iove-rnent offers<br />

muct, material s.pport to rfuqees beyond imediate basic<br />

t.ransportatior./ca=p require=ents.<br />

Za-.-e has erco'zace. re:.~ee ass-_m4.ation 4n Shaba and<br />

.. u =--n:-nces. permits .:em; the Bas-Zaire area, and has<br />

.rovi-,-ed aasic ca--m fau-_ . to .. ;olan/Catindan refugees<br />

in -he latter area. .he Gave-znmen of :ae (30Z) permits<br />

the Z*=CR t-O coord.nate lu-.ed sue.Cf ef forts fro inter­<br />

national sources in Bas-ZL.-e and a lew other places, although<br />

LN.HCR i.tself has not been 7:er' effective in Zai-:e.<br />

Sudan Provides -a.-- ao:omodation to and !.: 'th ioian<br />

refu;ees, both in camps a.-.. :rou;h absorption. Ugandan<br />

refugees in tze scuth are -:irated but poi.ically unrecog­<br />

n-:ed because of de.:ate -' a-icns with Ccanda.<br />

.Z4izout4 cf.fers -a.:r.u. .".tia. assistance to %thMopian,<br />

Somali and Zanakil/:ssa war ".ct.ms in border camps. Families<br />

are permitted to remain i. tne camp, while the men forage in<br />

the countryside or to.- )obs jcr and sustenance, as was<br />

allowed before fighting in -r-thiopi. produced the recent wave<br />

of refugees.<br />

To ceneral.ze, it could -e said t-at ost refugees aze<br />

receiving basic, minimum life-support type of care. Fair<br />

nu<strong>mb</strong>ers, as 'ndicated abcve, are receiving excellent support,<br />

paztiC:.-arly when compared %c the bare subsistence level of<br />

extstence esperienced by lare sectors of the populace in<br />

=any African countries.<br />

7.


Urgent, potential needs do exist among some of the<br />

Cabizidan refugees in Zaire, Zibabwe.ans .n Moza<strong>mb</strong>ique,<br />

Ugandans in Sudan, and possib1y among refugees in D:i1out-:<br />

if the cholera opidemic in the Mtiddle East crosses the Red<br />

Sea. Black/White war or post-independence frac-iona: s: fe<br />

in Zi<strong>mb</strong>abwe, increased paranoia in Uganda, deterlorat-on cf<br />

race relations in South Africa, con.inuing war in r-ho. a or<br />

protracted negotiations in Hamibia, furthermore, could<br />

trigejer mass refugee migrations of even greatr porort.ons<br />

than those presantly arriving i- or being acccmrodated t': the<br />

countries su=reyed.<br />

The first priority for refugee :equirements cbv:ousl'<br />

must go to the continuance and in some oases aucen-at-4on of<br />

life support programs. While UN.NCR wi- remain the pr-a.'<br />

channel for this assistance, AID should zcns.der supplementary<br />

support through altern-ate delivery systems .ncluding :he<br />

ICRC, Private Vol.nteer Agencies tPVos) and bilatera! -.!.us.ons<br />

to organizations, agencies or governments whose rescuz ces<br />

are strained by present demands f.!e rad spect.'---- cf<br />

displaced persons who need help. At -he same time efforts<br />

=ust be made to coor-4i.na-e t.he activi:.ies of al: Qoncrs -­<br />

official and private -- the USG, other gove:r.men-s and international<br />

or,!anizations.<br />

AD can also be helpful to refugees by providing manage­<br />

ment, operational and admiistrative support to host govern­<br />

ments, refugee agencies and organizations. There are a nu<strong>mb</strong>er<br />

of useful dual purpose projects and a few infrastructure<br />

proposacls vhich can be helpful to refugees and locals alike<br />

(Secticns III and IZV), but AID assistance in delivering<br />

services would appear to be more important t-han the provision<br />

of actual relief supplies. Help in broad education/manpower<br />

training fields is a major priority. Almost equally impirtant<br />

is the provision of counselling and placement services to<br />

utilize skills and talents already in refugee comunities.


AZD should also develop a !lexible, rapid relif instrument<br />

by which field missions Can respond to types of :efuqee<br />

emer-encies beond -he mandate of LMHCR or the Office of<br />

U.S. Fore.qn Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Finally, A= must<br />

continue to seek clarification in regard to definitions of<br />

ref'uqeeso, policies pertaining to assistance to liberation<br />

movownts and limitations on MNWCR help to non-Patriotic<br />

Front Zi<strong>mb</strong>aiwean groups in order to define precisely its<br />

unique refuqee relief role.<br />

9.


~"A Dtswazia<br />

3<br />

Stwii~ye'oS op*;gL *:ss e~<br />

Botswana :Quap-att~ed) has lonq-povided a 'vt ml'<br />

wi<strong>mb</strong>rs of Plitical ro!1ligqes 10r1SoUth "Afrca, Z iil~<br />

Sand, Namibia:, Howver.polaiati of Inlc ­<br />

4ima land inceasin:reresionin South A-rc ave<br />

diamatically increased, the flow in the past' fsowye s e<br />

siaorty of :these ecent-refugs.. are Zi<strong>mb</strong>abwe!I.mns -transit<br />

to'-Z<strong>mb</strong>ia, many'-fo .12iltary taining, h r<br />

accomodated at a-w.U-equippod~ modern camp at c. ebis-pi a<br />

and an older, delapidat'd. Installation at ?ranciz0n ss<br />

onf Aug. 24, th~ere were 1,036inthe former and 54i3 th<br />

these loations. Around~ Gabronet there eabu4,0rcsid3<br />

Kj4 South kfr:.cans, not in camps an in more~o les 1e m anent<br />

~tatust 3 and posbyan additional 440 South' A.frc4's, Angolan,<br />

Namibian gosothan, M3alawian aSndMoza<strong>mb</strong>ican reuge liin<br />

'~ ~~i '>' the area (Se* Appendix Cj.. 34 -43'4 3<br />

B~~2-3 otswana'; before disrupin caued. by rcnLevents inL<br />

4Zi<strong>mb</strong>abw and S4outh Aftica,-was aost a =odel' of a, new ' "A4 i±<br />

developinig state--democratic,,tbe f=ee-enterpr,1se oriented<br />

Sandviable Now,it~ i~s$in a delicate pos±iin noitcal ,<br />

~ '~ ~~vulnerable econom~cally, and is being draine~d of ad-earnea<br />

44"'4<br />

r4e":serves-~byj refugeedemands and border'4threats. ofr<br />

Botswana iscoin caemndably with the problems. id presure<br />

caused t by its neighbors, but a nu<strong>mb</strong>er of-factr could'<br />

44'4 shatter the fragility of the moment.<br />

'1i a"" ocu or4'~<br />

'44443~ ~


11111 fihgj3'<br />

Plcn A on resrvs.<br />

*L 'i3- t->3 took ti,4a733'3>3 esi-33heA~fi 3ol<br />

coming fr= ma quars<br />

v~sha<br />

j Council,.~ for~~ Refgee (JCR)Achar attchd) UN<br />

As......... Ac in ... Presiden .r tol the................i<br />

CetrlCmi tee (MCC)at*It. 4 onlUiest<br />

dove++++,+++ lopmetal'eed ......... Sasslkemayote<br />

o emeso!th fu wQi"Pogz. O~ UNH swaha ' cosifR,,<br />

wTN.T<br />

3.3333M~i<br />

deoe<br />

- - -:- .. 3333+(++ . . .....- +7+<br />

devtio~n t al !oradi e mainted aepo-as masn tr u<br />

,5,/++ +#+ Central+<br />

++u+, Exchange+i<br />

+++++,+ Comu Zundm ttee(+$C (IF cotibt<br />

) an th anihl+oert<br />

~ to +tr +,,+;;+++ a U n+: various versity++,++++:++. + +++:,++ +++ +++ +++<br />

-,+ Exchnge in Gatron*,rIs nd txyi IU+)cnrbteadhpoert<br />

toe Ctheu Paraxcommision, scaiwelltas<br />

+++;,++++7+ii++e+ lment of he re ugee prograzus{. WIHCR++... as devoted+ .. ........... ....... .................... ............ . jj+<br />

3j+ p33p + ++ ++ !++++ +77++++++ ++++7/++<br />

+s+'++;++++ ++derable+attention ++++++ Rteuoss. ++ +:+to++++++++++++++++++ l eue el t', re Zi<strong>mb</strong>abwean iand tion:o' transit assC centers++++++ lifne support in++th +'+++++ ++++++ +++++++++++++<br />

n.t..d. he e u ato a ne d SoZ "/,f ?4+i .... in the:+~ ++ +++;> +++:5t<br />

+++++: ++i++++:++++:+++++!+i~i<br />

::!+ :+. pm ins +o++++ C +hu +++ C nS£ ++++ ++++a<br />

aites mette medalcrtersm aes;icrae<br />

so th he U itwi S at s addition+ ++:+i: , ++€++y' +'++>++++++n i ?++;+:+ ' ;,<br />

-,<br />

bution to UNKCR i for life+ maintnanc prog+++;+' rams+:,bt,+;++++++ h,


Splus<br />

-71 N44 IW-7, _ £44fl<br />

Andseo~a prorityto.4 sild!pow~r .<br />

tzitnqtofl<br />

,An<br />

a nu<strong>mb</strong>er of<br />

in-crutr<br />

K Recomenda'tions<br />

PQects r<br />

roiemns<br />

Strictly Rofuget ~4<br />

wahcol sa-if bt44fuo<br />

los*tU ofP*~Q the t4 ' 4,<br />

1~. Since the.United States has not reponded to aU?!MCA<br />

appeal for~ funds for current operating ecpnses in 13or"ana<br />

for thwemainder ~of 14,7, the United States shoudcotibt<br />

$4OOOOO as rocomended by HA.<br />

2. -The United States should provide support~fo<br />

refuge* counseling services, in relation to edu~cation. jobs and,<br />

housing, possibly at a small, modest reception center.<br />

3. In order to help the-mission most refuge *mar­<br />

genie, heUS s*9 4 esals an '"masdr~<br />

cencinency Fund ~ &a.w 'we~w<br />

Dual Purpoe Reue/evlmna<br />

4. The UnitedSaesoldZ:::e::e continui Support<br />

tothe alti -purpose secondary schools and.'uniVersity h~oat 81 ~-~ c<br />

1*See rarah Botswana report, para. 119..' """~ 4<br />

.'R<br />

-tfue*<br />

-


14<br />

14'.1<br />

Ill+''<br />

F<br />

A 44 ti orw l4 th:fio hudIAra "ts<br />

Vhtlco ido<br />

money fo library an<br />

14d<br />

Ao4ial W~QRj Prvd me<br />

:. .... .....<br />

.+.<br />

.... of..ao sw+ SaiIno=n<br />

q viq,<br />

o......<br />

q4Q~car<br />

tace<br />

far&<br />

ly U4'1<br />

T*Izp, us-*~c<br />

_o 4o low14'a.<br />

All)1 #sU3 sod c'" ider<br />

:' ;7, -. ost<br />

+',++;s+++--n6. to serve both+r::+++ts++n<br />

4.+++ame<br />

in1 eaeo $1000 to~ iX znsoag ih<br />

10.14 n light o the present an po~tentia refuge*~Q<br />

10Fr otetmae l<br />

1<br />

+! =+ ++++ ++ + + + .+ + + + +++ + L m + ++ 1+ + +<br />

aiu idFio<br />

++'+ :6++ . +++ ++,+ +1+++ A D + 5i + 1+4 * ++ 4 + ? + ; 1 ;/ o + n ++'+-. 4-4++m + ++;;+ / ; ++ + s u + p p :+ q ,+ c + +& t ++ ++.+ Q++ ++ +O ;1*++ > a +? , , ++ ,+,++++ ++,.... +?+*+ - + ++++++*+++' ? +...... +++++++:'+;++;+ + + +..++++++,+,++;++<br />

;+ + .+++<br />

+ ++++ # ++++ ;+++w<br />

+ _++#+ +1% _ -++;sz<br />

I,,) 'll. 1.+<br />

w+ an4 olui<br />

+ + +7,'+


11. Based on appropr:iae study, the UnIi S:a:es<br />

should consider >oWt assistLc* to 3otswana i a :c:empla:ed<br />

donor consor:ium to help develop, as .*: as ;cssiile,<br />

eel -suffilercy in the critical railway sector.<br />

14.


I ..A<br />

AFRICA I-­<br />

• ~~~Z a.,EA "<br />

/NWLA<br />

, i pow" .. -<br />

%-e<br />

* n, o ____ +oD t -- m_/ -- A<br />

A" Of-<br />

%iiLU<br />

*<br />

*MT<br />

- -- . ~<br />

'~'~<br />

*Rfue<br />

ca 0-ain<br />

•<br />

T 15<br />

AFPod


Chart A. Refuguu Assistance Coordination -- lk)tswana*<br />

IDistrict<br />

officials<br />

-----<br />

Administrative<br />

Stcrutary,<br />

Office~ of ------- 1"ok LNFml<br />

Thl re',.,.nt IU --- UN IK2K etc.<br />

L I'VOU<br />

Kill<br />

j~M.C. C.<br />

otswand r - - I<br />

Chrilitidn 1 Chut ies<br />

Cotitc i I<br />

II<br />

~(tm~ £g 4U1tor-RefugeeJ<br />

ZANU/ZAPI I<br />

Patriot ic Comi;..e I it)9<br />

Fro t WtN3C/IIAC And<br />

et "l. a l.<br />

I)Ai t! r.il,t toesll~ltl * A.l l'a<br />

ailmutu<br />

'<br />

I<br />

I


B. Lesotho<br />

Lesotho has been a t-raditlonal haven of refuSe. It was<br />

settled between the 16th a.d l9th century by people f.lenq<br />

from tribal wars in surrounding reqions. :ith this neritaqe,<br />

the Sasothc 1 people are relatively tolerant of today's<br />

refugees from South Africa (map attached).<br />

However, the Basotho also i.herited a poor tauntaincus<br />

red wit-h rescurcts '-a:ely sufficient to orovide basic<br />

s-"5sis.ence for its peope, :et aicne reller for newcme--rs.<br />

To make matters worse, iasotho is s-.-rroar.ded by, a:nd heavily<br />

depende:n on, South Africa, whi.ch cculd, i! it ce, a:ply<br />

.. tc.e:at.e eccncc-c a.nd political pzessu:es. href-e,<br />

its potential protlems are even =o-e ser.'o-.. thar, its c,':roniO<br />

Cnus, bCe "hev ro144 -n the coneral ~c~cr : specific<br />

refugee needs.<br />

There are o.nly about 150 reqis,'rad pc1 .-..­ cal refugees<br />

esctho ,see AFppendix C), bu- an addiutcni 1-2,000<br />

.o'-callod "educat--onal" ref..ucs choC e to sv.%dy %.ere<br />

rat.ne: tean n '-':ant ed'cation svst m of " e epiublic of<br />

Sout! Az~ca. A.. iven =c-e str-.ous t.hreat ' icms or.nthe<br />

hori:zn; -ress r-.=rs indicate that South Af-ica may *:roibit<br />

the *s.e o L:esotno labor in its mines. 4 implemented, the<br />

ban would mean that more than 200,0GO Lesothc mi:ne workers<br />

and their dependents (totaling o.e-quarter Of Lesotho's<br />

porun.3:ion) wojla :e th own on th" local economy and in<br />

effect "e.-.ome "domestic" refugees.<br />

1. Citizens of Lesot-ho, in mass, are called Bosothans.<br />

As individuals, they are called .asothan.<br />

17.


With n.nsiderable outside assistance, Lesotho is coping<br />

w with ts current refugee population. Under the MInlster<br />

of Interior, a "a:ioonal .efu.ee Cc=-ss;on has been fored<br />

to coordiate re-.ugee relief. u-li zin 0 as i ts<br />

pr~nc~ple<br />

operating aqencv, the Losoe.ho Christ:.'rrn Ccunc:- 4C) 'CChart<br />

attached). 2INHCR he.ps, but Is less involved thin elsewhere,<br />

wh~ll the United Nations Emergency Training Program for<br />

Sou-h Africa (UNETPSA) is more active than in many other<br />

places. '.he United States indirectly helps refugee students<br />

through the Peace Corps' Teaching English as a Foreign Language<br />

(TW.E'L) program.<br />

:n ter--s Cf general assis:nc, A,-: s .:d~ens-ng or<br />

has under des..;n, a nur.ber of usefu. pr .ec--s an,r- ra.-s<br />

(ncluding ? 480) related to rural deve-c..e., ac.r'tu:e,<br />

nutrition, health, African nanpower develo;=en-t, an :r.struct-onal<br />

Material Resource Center, a School's ExL- inatcn Councl1,<br />

etc. AID has agreed to construct a 260 =. sector o! a fcur<br />

donor road pro~ect designed to establ-sh perimeter and<br />

i,W--nal roads i..the souther part Cf the coutr.. .eso:.o,<br />

act-aa.y, has beccome a favorite of ... ernat zona. d--'s,<br />

although many place severe restriti.c-ns on --. e te---s of<br />

their assistarize. ,.'hile Lesctnc's =resen: and fu-"-e need<br />

to achieve econom:c indepoendence<br />

o. Sc. - t . Afr-ca -s tre­<br />

mendous, very real imii.ations are imposed ty the absCr-tive<br />

capacity of the Goverra t of Lesotho (GOL).<br />

care<br />

Lesotho's major current needs pertaining to refugee<br />

involve primarily a range of educational prorects, some<br />

in tne form, as F'rah statez, "of capital investment for the<br />

extension of existing educaticnal facilities." The t-ea:m<br />

particularly notes the need for additional ,ttiffing, proqrams<br />

and accomodations, at all levels from primary and secondary<br />

schools, through the Teachers Training College and the<br />

1.


University of Lesotho (ULI. Refugees also require vocational<br />

traini.nq, help In lozating joLa and subsidies to start small<br />

shops or rades. A need also exists for low-cost housing.<br />

Reccmemndaions<br />

Strictly Refuaee<br />

1. An A=bassador's Refugee Contingency r-=d should be<br />

establIshed.<br />

Dual ?urpose<br />

2. The United States should consider assistinS the GOL<br />

to provde additional educational facilities at the primary<br />

and secondary levels for the benefit of both the local<br />

populaticn %epecially rural) and the student refugees. The<br />

Minis:er of Education has ex;ressed a desire to have more<br />

Peace Zor s' Teachring n~zsh as a Forei4= Lang-uage TE7L)<br />

:nst= z'=s and more Fulbright teachers.<br />

2. The Un::ed States should help the University of<br />

Lesotho to istablish a Maseru campus, primarily for the<br />

development o: extension courses and vocationally :elated<br />

traininq for refugees.<br />

4. Upon receipt of a decision by the cabinet on a<br />

shelter sector analysis for AID': Housing Investment Guaranty<br />

Program, AID should proceed (if indicated) with short- and<br />

long-term technical assistance in developi:g GOL housing<br />

policies and programs for low cost housing. Since such<br />

housing may serve not only refugee but local needs, consideration<br />

might be given to funding portions of const.ruction under<br />

SSA.<br />

19.


mission.<br />

5. Self-Help Fun.s should be -estored tc the t.S.<br />

6. AID siould acce14ra.e :eview and C--..-. erat_.on of<br />

t.e list of projects ;esently iii the desi;:, stage, particu­<br />

lazly those in the field of education, such &s the Schools<br />

Izamination Council, and in rain storage.<br />

Develomental - Ref-cee Related<br />

7. AD should exped-.e feashiity s:u.. and ccnpress<br />

othei prelirinary stems related to :ons-tu--- f its m--cr­<br />

tant section of the southoen per:meter road.<br />

I. The United States should continue =: work with other<br />

donors in considering and developing broad assistance programs<br />

to increase Lesotho's viability and decrease --s dependence<br />

en South A-frica.


R"M4LIC OFI<br />

WL'k ADCA<br />

-,- "" -.<br />

o"


Chart B.<br />

Rtufuqge Assistance Coordination -- Lesotho<br />

Permantnt Secretary<br />

Ministry C'hairman, of lesottho Interior<br />

I<br />

UN 11c C<br />

UlDP bw<br />

Itfuett Committee<br />

KO<br />

(Botswana)<br />

roreiqn Ipniq, L­<br />

Affairs<br />

/tfarstion Security Interior<br />

Dltrc<br />

Io<br />

__ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ f f i c i a l~s<br />

Refugee<br />

housing<br />

Fduca t i)na I<br />

serv i ces<br />

(,ourdinat ion<br />

ilrect rltlonslhip<br />

- - - - - - - -- Lsotho<br />

Chr I tt ifel<br />

Couric i I<br />

I<br />

Iltl:<br />

( amsec I In'j<br />

diad Wel1fare<br />

Ij<br />

ANC/PAC<br />

et. al.<br />

IWVO s<br />

CR5<br />

c ps~<br />

CARL<br />

CARE<br />

UT4IISA<br />

* Aqurl~ oi I m~itt, r l.i~ tL' irt It ,stilOll<br />

3. Joint Cumittee. Naticmal<br />

eIOfuq, C hiu ikbf'ii


C. Swaziland<br />

Swaziland is more fortunate and better endiwed than the<br />

two other former British High Commission Territories,<br />

Botswana and Lesotho. The country is relatively prosperous<br />

with an abundance of natural resouz.ces. It is also not<br />

quite as vulnerable to political and econoami presiures fr.ou<br />

unfriendly neighbors, in part becaus* its eastern border<br />

adoins the now independent black state of Moza<strong>mb</strong>ique (map<br />

atzachedM.<br />

Swaziland also differs in its handling and suppcrt of<br />

Unlike the two previous states, the Government of<br />

ref, gees.<br />

Swaziland (GOS) does not generally follow a policy of assimilation<br />

or absorption; neither is it quite as generous in contributing<br />

from its own resources to refugee care.<br />

:n terms o! numaers, Swaziland identifies 91 "new"<br />

1 ost-ScwetcO refugees and 30-40 families who had arrived<br />

pr.or to last year's rioting in the Republic of South Africa<br />

?see Appendix W). However, there afe around 700 ethnic<br />

Swazi fr-m hcmes in South Af:ica studying in Swaziland, who<br />

could become "instant" refugees -f relations with the Republic<br />

deteriorated. Idditionall,, the PAC and ANC arrange for the<br />

transit of perhaps a dozen refugees a month enroute to<br />

Moza<strong>mb</strong>ique and other destinations.<br />

The GOS separates and, to a degree, isolates registered<br />

political refugees, Aividinq women and men into two camps,<br />

the latter some 40 k.lometers from Mbabane; and both are<br />

closed to public access. Students are bussed under supervision<br />

to schools in tho capitol. Such restrictive procedurex<br />

are necessary, Swazi Wficials assert, in order to protect<br />

23.


the refug.es f.rom abduction by South Africa&n security forces.<br />

Churc -eaders and refugee agency representatives have tried<br />

unsucce'.fully to Wsrsuade the gover-en-t to ner-4 t more<br />

absorption and integration.<br />

Because of its relative prosperity, Swaziland could<br />

afford to provide more for its relatively few refugees out<br />

of its own resources, rather than making constant appeals<br />

for foreign assistance. The government hates to admit to<br />

the existence of a ref r--ee and resence cf its<br />

victims. At the same time, the -CS 3eeks wor d subocrt for<br />

their care. The SCS is, in fact, current.y a..e=t..t<br />

redgfine the status of the 700 eth ic students so t.--<br />

they<br />

might qualify for refugee support. Furt-her ccnplicat-:ons<br />

occTr, even when NHCR, for example, has received funds tc<br />

implement elements of the Farah mission reco..endations.<br />

officials experience great difficuties persuading "OS<br />

UN<br />

officials to summit official requests or even to sign prepared<br />

documents. This =ay be partly because of local .ureaucratic<br />

procedures and partly because of unwillingness to accept<br />

responsibility for refugee related decisions.<br />

Conditions in the two refugee camps are rlatively .cod<br />

in a physical sense, but the inmates suffar f!c= isolation<br />

and boredom. With minimum outlay and consideration, these<br />

conditions could be alleviated by the Swazis themselves for<br />

the less than 100 recistered refugees. The team had the<br />

impression that neither XOS nor UN officials visit either<br />

camp very often.<br />

The UNCHR does contribute to refugee care and maintenance,<br />

working primarily throuq'i the Swaziland Refugee Relief<br />

Conittee (SRRC) (chart attached). United Nations Childrens<br />

Emergency Fund (UNICEF), International Student Exchange Fund<br />

24.


UF), .'PSA,AfricLn Amer:can institute (AA:), the Red<br />

Cross, the Mennonite Church and the Conference of Swaziland<br />

Churches :SC: all prcv4de minor amounts of life maintenance<br />

or educati=nal assistance. A4 .s promoting a departzent cf<br />

extra-mural services at UBS: has developed a regional<br />

tes:ng center in Mbabane; originated a Swazi capability in<br />

educational measurement and career counseling; and is developing<br />

a Health Manpower Training program.<br />

Beyond what is already being furn-ished the -h=uh t,<br />

*,*clneer .enc.es,tSA:: and otner donors, Swaziland<br />

should -nc: reqzire a great deal of addiinal c-utside<br />

assistance =ecause of the cresence of refucees. The constructn<br />

o:f a c-- ined school/she' tr/recet i on center<br />

possibly =an be lustified. The need also exists for counseling,<br />

particularl"=o a osycho-soclal sort. Of a more zeneral<br />

nature, Swaziland's present as well as future refugees would<br />

benefit fr augented educational facilities and starfs at<br />

all levels and - .roved rural he -h c arah, indeed,<br />

on a ret-urn s: in Sete<strong>mb</strong>er ask the United States and<br />

united Kingdom f-or suzport of a-zc.d-:ical pr-ects, including<br />

a 200-stude=n integrated high school and additicnal student<br />

hcste" fac.:..es.<br />

Reccr=.endations<br />

Strictiv Refugee<br />

!. The United States should consicer contributing to<br />

the construction of the school/shelter/raception center<br />

reco-ended in the April Farah report. The Federal Republic<br />

of Ger-ma.y (FRG) has already pledged $150,000 toward the<br />

estim':ted $433,000 construction costs.<br />

25.


2. 3ecause refugees have szecial ;syhc-scc:a: =rc;.e--s<br />

caused by loneliness, dislocation and isolatlon. the Uni.ed<br />

States should respcnd to a specia. :orld " 2-.an.:a._n<br />

(WHO1)ap.ea. to he!; pr.ovide trained scca., psy:1:at-i<br />

workers to deal with their unique o:o~e.s.<br />

3. The United States should, of course, continue<br />

support if ongoing I.NECR orcgrars, bearing 4.-. -,-d -,.at<br />

Swaziland does have lim ts In ter.s of asc-t .e :a.aci:.,<br />

Particularly 4. terms o! imi ted -d<br />

:z:ional sk--s =r. the =ar: f man- _S ­<br />

Dual Pur"cse - e. . ee -'e'zo-e.-a:<br />

4. Beycnd the A:D e.uca-ic.al r---ects .enticned<br />

above, the United States n.ight oo-sider assiq4.me.t of a few<br />

Fulbright teachers to raise t"he ;uai-" Swa:. educa-_::n.<br />

5 State's Bureau cf Education and C.:=. Adfas<br />

(C) and A'D -ight cc.s ide: su.=crtnc a few schc:a.s.-.s at<br />

U.S. and,,or other sccc.._- a-e.<br />

should ze ;o:en to vccaticnai ta'.i.<br />

6. Tf Farn is able to no-esuade the Swa:-s to accept<br />

the concept of an additional integrated secondary school,<br />

the United States m;ht consider contributing to its ccn­<br />

st--uction.<br />

26.


Swaziland i­<br />

e u. .ge e Z. c, . .e . . . a lQ... S.<br />

-<br />

;<br />

-5*<br />

,-<br />

.<br />

am~<strong>mb</strong><br />

" " ", " -.<br />

-<br />

.-<br />

Sowth<br />

La.4-<br />

S f<br />

Africa<br />

(Mom)<br />

- /<br />

27.<br />

Moza<strong>mb</strong>ique<br />

5 . lllm.<br />

I- ~ L u - Atf r.t.<br />

ise5'e 9,<br />

"m W<br />

-?


Chart C. Itfugqe Asuistance Coordinition -- Swariland<br />

J7 IPrmaituiet Secruta'y,<br />

o ftice of the<br />

Functional<br />

Lministries<br />

lDeiputy Prime Mitlster<br />

louu I ng<br />

schoo I i nJ<br />

Confereice of<br />

Swazi Churches<br />

- - - X )d i viatio m<br />

Swazi calid<br />

He fiI(I Ce<br />

Relief<br />

Cm'liell.%;!i Illo<br />

e a IANC/IIAC<br />

W i t-t. al.<br />

UN<br />

ii C<br />

II~l<br />

ION<br />

Family<br />

UNICEF.<br />

I 11-tl'"<br />

AA I<br />

SWAzi P.C.<br />

flitoII i tug<br />

* Alihoulm4t<br />

Dire,:t Rlationsip rt.pi tibilit it I Oi


D. !-1oza<strong>mb</strong>icue<br />

While Moza<strong>mb</strong>ique has a relatively large nu<strong>mb</strong>er of<br />

Zao.wean re!ees, foreign assistance rela-ed to their<br />

needs has been hampered by government and -'4beration *4cve­<br />

ment policies which isolate concentrations of refugees in<br />

relat.vely remote areas and which deny or limit-access to<br />

them -v doncrs who wish to he!p. Moza-_bi-e, 0, .. uzse, is<br />

the -a-n haven for :i-babwean African Naticnal 'Union (,')<br />

,Muaaze; refu-ees, =art of whom are recei:inc mi.i-a-.traini.n<br />

an- part si-ply waiting -uthe stor. 'ma. attached).<br />

Since in e ..... :.n June .'75, -- e q-coer-.-ent u.nder<br />

hne dc-inat-on of the Front for the Lieration of Ma:<strong>mb</strong>ique<br />

(FRr.L : has transf.red .<br />

the co',ntry's political and economic<br />

str'cture according to Marxist-oriented philosophy. Up to<br />

the p-.'esent, this -csture has restr.4cted coperation with<br />

outside ontr~es, es;cay t.hose of t.he .;est. This, plus<br />

-he depar-ureof most ?crt. uese, has caused steady econo.c<br />

decl;.ne and loss of an;-inistrat've efficiency. nturn", the<br />

-- .... t. tc deal w:-n such e-erzences as refucee<br />

.n* aux is a-fec-ed. Added to this _s the -cverren. of<br />

Mc:amzcue 7C!..) desire as a "rontlne state to coccera-e<br />

W-,'.t "AW in assisting the .atter in Patriotic Front efforts<br />

to oust the :an Smith regime in Rhodesia and to assume<br />

control of an independent Zi<strong>mb</strong>abwe.<br />

There are hopeful signs what the GOM is relaxing its<br />

4-ittide toward western cooperation. Along with ZANU, it<br />

is more o.eny seeking wetern assistance in dealing eith<br />

broad develcpmental problems, as well as such specific<br />

demands as those _mp"sed by refugees. A S10,000,000 PL 480<br />

(Title grant - this summer did much to prove the genuineness<br />

of the U.S. desire to help the country and the refugees. The GOM<br />

29.


-IfDoroi<br />

7T*- MI<br />

viitb to.0oroR4Pmp, soe80kloeesnrt fKp<br />

misson i hox=Wiqu me Lutheran Wrld edertion %Wr)<br />

gi9ven acces to * cam Ps.. CAR% ZAS S l ace inWth1.<br />

As of 5epto. 3, hr were approiately~ugses. 35"00<br />

~In the popnco<strong>mb</strong>atant Vsf ih 17,,200 located in the lret<br />

Doroi. (ise 'ApeadLX VI C). There are a estimated 181000<br />

adJ~ioalrefugees scattered t ougu1ooat the country, many<br />

"{Preibl receiving militar trainin~g. .Zt is obvious that<br />

tht4iWhabitants a*'Doroir where te tea= arr~ived wtannounced.<br />

is relatively well organzied and adm istered. Some were<br />

surivos of, an older camp at,Iyazonia which had be :aided<br />

by tboesiz~ orcs.These survivors wetre still exhibiting<br />

shck adoften, wounds, tram that,'experience.<br />

is an examle of the ,refugee camp and it<br />

t'may be the worst in Moza<strong>mb</strong>iques then many refugees are in<br />

serious straits. Basic needs are provided by the GOM1 and<br />

UNCK -saoe s)hlterf, ono feedJW::per daiy of, 'sealies' (maize.,<br />

meal) qrudimentary medical care and limited education.<br />

Hmovver, far more is required to make prolonged stays bearable 2;;;<br />

ktre cmsS.Are located in relat.ively fertile areas, so<br />

self-sufficiency. Motivation<br />

Possibilities exist, to increasea<br />

-:~<br />

.<br />

-**


&.d some skilqs are present among the Zizbabweans, but they<br />

need eq- ipment, tools, and supplies to help thernsel'-us.<br />

Refugees have actually already :feared 200 hectacres of land<br />

zy tne:r ow. .ffo.ts in the past year.<br />

Despite tne organization of a Refugee Directorate, whe<br />

GUH has some way to go to provide adequate logistic support<br />

for its refugees in recogni:ed camps. A gap exists between<br />

t:he p--u-f a wide range of donors, much of it backlogged<br />

or s-:cki:'ed at .-orts, and the a=cunt of su=.ies which<br />

appear -o.reach in ca£ps. Ccr..%ex re'a-.'.ons<br />

w:t.h .eighz :crng countries - all contribute to -­ he .!efugee<br />

problem.<br />

Reco--endations<br />

Strictx'v .efucee<br />

Sce -ficall " for non-military refugees n -amps,<br />

the USG snou ,Cntnue or increase "ts co"tribu-ions for<br />

"=fe-su..cr-.prgras, either hrougn "CR or P'Cs, such as<br />

t.he Lutneran cr " d Federaton. The ).:HCRhas recuested<br />

5.1,303,300 to meet recc..oendaticns of the Farah C.-isson,<br />

and I.A is recc-ending t.he allocaton of $400,300. Refugees<br />

=.zst be supplied wit-h more and better food, clthing, blankets,<br />

sanitation and medical care. However, the degree of our<br />

direct support should be in&ked to the right of access to<br />

the camps b-'y tN- or other qualified observers in order to<br />

oversee distibut.. and utili:ation of supplies.<br />

2. The USG should endeavor t. .ugh the U.N. system or<br />

PV.s to help rov.de bet-te educational equipment for the<br />

refugees. St'.Uctures and facilities are not needed at<br />

presen i al.though they may be later), but there is an almost<br />

total lack of pap.-, pencils, black-boards, reference books,<br />

31.


etc. Trained Zi.habwean teachers who are Capable of carry-ing<br />

the teaching load are among the refugees. ?.t some time 4-.<br />

the future of this fluid situat-cn, acris-deration -ight.be<br />

given to the provision of schdlarsh.ps for certain "i.abean<br />

students or advanced training for teaoners.<br />

Dual Purpose - Refugee/Develocmen-al<br />

3. To the extent possible, given cu:ren:.di rect assistance<br />

contraints, the USG could .ossi.-" and use u he'<br />

the GCM, with ZANU cocperat-.-cr- deve.C. s-e cam.- s:tes .to<br />

potential resettlement areas. 7hey shculd *e designed ::<br />

serve local needs after --he refugees have depared. ?ecu=red<br />

for such progra=s would be land Clear"ng eri;ment<br />

fertilizers, and irrigation systems.<br />

4. T 'b II food assistance will continue to be essential<br />

and effective in bilateral relations, bcth for specific<br />

refugee needs as well as general Mczam ican su;ppe.mrentaY<br />

raqui-rhments. The JSG should plan to . .ute at<br />

$10,00,000 this coming year, if ot ACub'!e -,at amcu-t.<br />

5. While broad deve.opmental assistance and resource<br />

tranvfers will doubtless be requested of the USG i.n such<br />

fields as agriculture, rural road improvement, ports, railways,<br />

education, and health care, the Ebassy has not yet had<br />

32.<br />

sufficient time to discuss requirements adequately or formulate<br />

specific recommendations. Although a delicate subject,<br />

the GOM could benefit from U.S. training in the fields of<br />

public administration and other fields where trained manpower<br />

is currently lacking. Although present congressional<br />

restrictions on assistance to the GOM are recognized, Mozw<strong>mb</strong>ique<br />

appears to be turning more to the Vlest and the USG should do<br />

as much as possible to help them developmentally, at the<br />

same time better serving the needs of refugees.


S-outh<br />

,<br />

Za<strong>mb</strong>ia<br />

Ali<br />

• -. Malmwl I---* .,<br />

-.<br />

-\<br />

,"w<br />

acal<br />

OZZ<br />

&Am' Tanzania<br />

,:ft<br />

o-<br />

: it.<br />

SAfrica-'<br />

Ca o<br />

-<br />

33.


Directl vvlwtiaossllp<br />

Chart D. Iofuqlue Aisistance Coordination -- Moza<strong>mb</strong>ique*<br />

Off ice of the President<br />

Sit er-Governmental<br />

IRLfl(qoi Cormni tteu:<br />

NaLional I)retorst % for<br />

IRetigee Servicesni<br />

- -­<br />

U N tiN<br />

ami IV<br />

Campt~ IAN iiIei' fsiu a I o) tc VS,[f<br />

Ie-%<br />

ii~t i cet Caar a<br />

Admin. o1. 1. I '<br />

i. rormad Aujunt 20. 1977


E. Za<strong>mb</strong>ia<br />

Its central geographical location nas caused Za<strong>mb</strong>ia to<br />

35.<br />

become a haven for refugees (or Freedom Fighters) fromi<br />

nearly a.l the trouble spots in Southern Africa (map attached).<br />

Its role is not passive, however, for as one of the "frontline"<br />

states, Za<strong>mb</strong>ia, in the name of African solidarity,<br />

actively s-pports many of the parties and factions training<br />

and wcrkin to achieve the liberation of their respective<br />

homelands. :.s President, Kenneth Kaunda, has been eminently<br />

successful in dramatizing his country's role in the liberation<br />

stugg.e, and, at the same time, in collect.ng worldwide<br />

support and assistance for Za<strong>mb</strong>ia's own development.<br />

Za<strong>mb</strong>ia, partly in compliancp with wishes of various<br />

liberation parties, tends to segregate and, to a degree,<br />

isolate various refugee groups. Access to camps, especially<br />

where military training is conducted, has been strictly<br />

.imited even for refugee donor organizaticns or countries,<br />

al.hough there are sc=e signs of relaxa. in in these :est.rictiOns.<br />

:n Za<strong>mb</strong>ia as of Septe<strong>mb</strong>er 5, there were an estimated<br />

22,000 pe:sons who could be defined as -efuqees. These<br />

included some 13,200 Angolans, 2,450 ":a<strong>mb</strong>ians, 5,000 ZAPU<br />

Zi<strong>mb</strong>abweans, 300-400 ZANU (Mugabe) Zi<strong>mb</strong>abweans, 200 Zanu<br />

(Sithole) Zi<strong>mb</strong>abweans, 100 South Africans, 200 Malawians,<br />

200 Ugandans, and 100 miscellaneous individuals. The majority<br />

are in camps; about a thousand are resettled; about 500 are<br />

in Lusaka and largely self-sufficie:t; and 3CO are receiving<br />

individual care in locations near Lusaka (soe Appendix C).<br />

There are also as many as 15,000 Freedom Fighters in<br />

training throughout the country and 2,600 children (possibly<br />

of Freedom Fighters) in schools in Lusaka.


Those who claim to be the most neglected are unaffiliated<br />

individuals or those belongin; t -arties other than<br />

SWAPO or the a-.tiotic Front (in other words ZANIU Sithole<br />

and Muzorewa supporters). :n actuality these people do<br />

receive help from tN.1C, but on a. ndiv.dal basis rat"e.than<br />

through party crganiZations wh.ch -s the patt-er., fcr<br />

mst of the -est. Non-co<strong>mb</strong>atant- ma<strong>mb</strong>ers of ZAPU also receive<br />

less attention tan"those in military training. The Patriotic<br />

Front and SWAPO, incidently, would like to see contrib-utions<br />

made dirctly o -tche partis, rather tharn throuch : bodies.<br />

Zn actuality, practically all refugees i.n . ma are rece::-ng<br />

reasonable care and support wi-h -er-.- few i;.- -re stra-is.<br />

the tf conflict in Rhodesia intensifies -r if =cst-:an Snit!<br />

factional fighting develops, certain catecories of refugees<br />

may increase or the lot of others change.<br />

The Government of Za<strong>mb</strong>ia (GOZ) has a C=issioner for<br />

Refugees whose role is largely coordination (chart attached).<br />

Actual relief flows eit--her from tN.rHCR through operating<br />

agencies such as the Zarmian Christian Refugee Co.unc4l<br />

(ZCRS) or from African sources directly to the .iberat.on<br />

party organi.atiins. The UN operates one special fact' "i-y<br />

the Na<strong>mb</strong>ian lnsti:ute where 200 :eventualy 3"00'0 , st-udents<br />

are studying public administratlor. "n ;reprat.zn for<br />

eventual assumption of authority in their own countr-.<br />

UNRCK and ZCS operations do appear to be effective, especially<br />

in the handling of individuals and at a settlement at Maheba.<br />

An a part of its general contributions through MNIECR,<br />

the United States provided an initial grant to renovate an<br />

old camP at Makeni near Lusaka to be used as a refugee<br />

receptinn center.<br />

As for general economic help, Za<strong>mb</strong>ia is almost deluged<br />

with eaqer donors. There are at least 17 foreign countries<br />

providing capital and developmental assistance, plus<br />

36.


the assA3t ncs :rcm the UN, World 3ank and other inter­<br />

national or;anizations. The Canadians, for example, have<br />

maor jrcmec-s f!r improving grain storage capacity, access<br />

road .=provements and railroad extensions. The European<br />

-c-ncn-4c Co=unity -Z.C) and the Swedes are also particularly<br />

active. The United States, a relatively modest donor, saw<br />

last year's program loan of $20 million, which could have<br />

tacn used for emergency assistance, actually go for import<br />

suppcrt :f pr=Marily agr-cultural items. US P.L 480 assistance<br />

has :-en effec-.i-"e. Za<strong>mb</strong>ia, however, does face a 1--t on.<br />

absc.-.::v*e cacacip-:. The GCZ simply does no: have the<br />

adm,.n.isra-.ye struct.ure at tne mcment: to handle -uch ..re<br />

technical assistance.<br />

.rognostications pertaining to the refugee situation<br />

are difficu.. The Naibians probably will be going home in<br />

the foreseeable fu.ure. Many rural Angolans may remain,<br />

regardless of "ha. happens in Angola. Zim.!abwean and South<br />

African refucees could ccnti-ue to increase, even dra.a:icalv,<br />

depend . nc on develop=ents i R-hodesia and tne Republic.<br />

Re c -en da- c.n s<br />

Strictiy Refucee<br />

I. The United States should continue its present level<br />

of contribution to the UNECP, .h±'h efficiently utilizes its<br />

-Yesources for refugee care in Za<strong>mb</strong>ia, plus S450,000 for the<br />

remainder of 1977 in respect to a special appeal to upgrade<br />

educational facilities for 3,000 Zi<strong>mb</strong>abwean students refugees<br />

under 16.<br />

2. The United States should also considar the desirability<br />

of grants to such volunteer agencies as Lutheran<br />

World Relief, perhaps channeled through UNECR.<br />

37.


, faccesas~l -amttd 'oof i :05,rea 1<br />

loua',caps oncc nz WAU and ZAU refugees<br />

Uted St is s 0,uld: con's der moigf rhr con:;..b<br />

to progzram-de elopuent, Pazticu arly! ed 6a na.a<br />

on~s<br />

s ce<br />

Th United States should contiruO -thepo<br />

Nua.±b:i nstiiute, even thugh par studnetcos:, ig<br />

becausetis thh trairnn gron o h at'<br />

trators of Namibia. A great need willexist to proide~<br />

gr"aduates wi practical, experience, n h n-e.Sae<br />

countris or America.~ U.S. schoashinsin, gily s 1'z ized<br />

Sfields will continue to be Useful~, no ol t a=Lias<br />


9. The GCZ has requested U.S. help on one specific<br />

pro~ec- - O.orovment of a road across the Southeast finger<br />

of Shaba .rsv-nce in Zaire. This is only remotel.y refugee­<br />

39.<br />

oriented and poses a pclitical conundrum. However, Zaire<br />

and Za<strong>mb</strong>ia have discu"ssed the project in the past, and i:<br />

=mio.- ie vazle and acceptable to Zaire) if it were developed<br />

as a toll road.


UGANDA<br />

f<br />

ZAMBIA "<br />

/ TANZANIA<br />

Ow a . a 0<br />

Ro-, goo Cncentrations " "<br />

G<br />

Cc a " t / .IM<br />

ZAIRE'-OZAMbSW<br />

-A" L A "'<br />

N77<br />

.m.A<br />

- . X,,,,, ,% / . , .t: .. . .. . .. . ...<br />

S.A.<br />

40.


IChristian<br />

IZid 1<br />

ofZabi<br />

Welftare1<br />

services--------------Cnp/<br />

Chart E. Pu~tits u ALuuiutIance Coord int iti-- Zat<strong>mb</strong>l a<br />

litiuwc AftI a i r n<br />

lit -f tiaje A ff i EU<br />

Coni !uji lonr UN iN Iamily,<br />

.eha i Chr ist id: atV)<br />

Itetujee service29<br />

11twe t ionTrans t 1n41)1al<br />

Ce t l Iii.<br />

SetLlenent C"ounuelIli) AP<br />

__Direc~t relationulp 1. AA(C wugi1IkS 444<br />

a<br />

a


euge<br />

a ~. ~ .4 ~V:2K$ ~<br />

,a~a..4za<br />

~ .a ~ .~<br />

in Zaire is<br />

Altoug ttalUNCR<br />

7.7 e~j74r~<br />

Zaire ,<br />

4 ~<br />

te ounrye<br />

53o00(e<br />

~<br />

tma~<br />

ppni.)<br />

~<br />

P'~<br />

. a.a a~..<br />

fr *cta'­<br />

Vast Uajorty ..av beta reasonay- asiiae wihitei<br />

respective ara',f euei te.cou3ty, iA>udn Shb<br />

adpublic servcest,private .orrliiu ,da care, and<br />

The refugee* re ixements<br />

needs of th Zarois*.a<br />

h<br />

,<br />

420<br />

a*reeeally in consonance 4ih~h<br />

Those-recent refugees :equiring some support nu<strong>mb</strong>er.<br />

perhaps 100,000 Angolans,, aid and Burundians. Of,<br />

these about 4,800 (out of. tot~dasof3#00 a.4si<br />

Bas-Zaire (Tshela and Lu.m!.l<br />

now seriously threatened an<br />

Zones) represent th only group<br />

,,-e<br />

O u1~ltsupport<br />

Wi'th the .xception of,.a reportedly highl 'ffet<br />

lega. processinq of refugees and establishment/lpcentation<br />

of refugeoe statlzs within the UWCR> quidns the Goverlnzv-nt<br />

of Zaire (GOZ) provides little perceptible aS31stance, to<br />

refugees presently beyond the provision of land and settlweet.<br />

GOZ does not' greatly assist in the coordination of UN,<br />

bilateral or,private assijtance (chart attached), and<br />

the burden of short-to~ assistance and-impact, falls upon<br />

these groups,<br />

a<br />

2<br />

,. .<br />

w


IA<br />

''reclivitersupfror<br />

- 443<br />

it is n't~clea' whte refugees have h~ad any signi~iCA=t<br />

th ugenatonofprvae<br />

prmnet eric facili s<br />

Inldn C~hoi Mission4 hopial and*~ 1Wemrrs schols TherefoS.<br />

th eu#bxipcto re ma eve hav been a.Ltive.<br />

~~ezanenuaas<br />

inmntdo Zaire,*<br />

is- exml14 d b heCbnane-prineI<br />

thoaira cly~ mtata.. byS MCR. In V<br />

'especialyu~f~4n<br />

,,n Lukul in theO reinQ<br />

kiloeter fro the antarac roadr~C wihct<br />

BsZie<br />

ate<br />

r in-Zir Za~a irctl<br />

t3.h&ruht<br />

ca~a onan iet h region'# lan dixctl to~r<br />

ailoa th a acir d tCr ''ot:rlefshlert5" ve sistance.<br />

esseiall thosel dirfedtly aot lat fone bysi~cian T<br />

4,00wmnan hildren<br />

abthreat wten apprximelnmdately<br />

rliaed inm taores.f caops nerehe zon caiasofT<br />

-~<br />

th frmi tHRac roiaditschrcts trog AI he<br />

Rcapiartnand iSect thl~le degion, rlau~ dairectl trn<br />

bot'Ahabof zais eaports,EC Boaad stad. The otarma rad e<br />

conissionhs:a tf~ ?a estoepyiin h<br />

4j<br />

-


Th xwsho4- rae;aogchlre n hs<br />

4ari poplaton<br />

~" '4'blankets.<br />

'4<br />

'4~fP re..<br />

centers i a 4-5" imes the atei h urudn<br />

The~~ ~ cacltd oddlvey o h otso<br />

-u*'h -,uy a appo4,~el 30Preto<br />

Ther ~ei~s a hraeo very type of medicine"i<br />

Foo wQ4maste pchaie4 an~d transporte4 '4om a'4.<br />

ditan~ce of' 1,000 miles inth interior 'of Zaire;,<br />

Thee, he clot< -4<br />

While deicecis spcii high.4'''4*4''4..Av 'he<br />

are-'44<br />

emas ndprio sucvfeydaissienciea huficintghg ~eel<br />

finally- receivigl sMorathain assurelega acomdaio<br />

idosntocant rouie'-encoux<br />

-<br />

~44*<br />

. 4' .<br />

basis i Zaiir eth forerhas a pusoliticlasakce;i h<br />

~,iue, n h atr a oiia n ,t oac wlcac 4i<br />

A, Altrag thre i asuhas been poit oa by<br />

e<strong>mb</strong>assyandpr likyeyisos u~cetyhg ee<br />

GO ffieyoand,deasmnt adresponile refn eebaffars o<br />

itsemsocadofitte mor than ssr pracomodationa<br />

lega<br />

anadsttisisateive y.:'>i>n.


It has' nt,(r annt.asis<br />

priateconrac, dspues ndother agreement<br />

Whlmuch of the wmHcu's ineffectiveness of assistance ~<br />

efoti ttiual to G0Z disinterst, lack~of coordJ*inton<br />

an'nn-upor or sipl to condtons socil and economic<br />

in airo UK has not done much in the past to stimulate<br />

~GO action or to deelpate aivs<br />

.aprprate departments and,1 l., TheGOZ Comisuioner<br />

for eues:accompanies, the U-C~ireettveo<br />

il<br />

Visits. Hlowever, the essential ka of dfiutseemed~t<br />

h~av been: ~a diiclyo,*<br />

UKHNC/inshasa has not believe4l significant<br />

rfugqe problems beyond legal, accouoation<br />

and, some, minor life-support supplementation,<br />

j In Zaire,.'or, has not been<br />

'existed<br />

greatly interes ted: in' such problems;<br />

UNCR does not seem to have developed or encouraged<br />

- -- anytassistance coordination within the UN family,<br />

donor/Pvo cuunity or the GOZ;<br />

.....UNXCR~ has clearly not supportedat<br />

principle private contaictor (AIDR).<br />

adequatelyf eiter with' suffioant 7<br />

resouces, ,staff or with backAUlp<br />

'4...'c 'doitnation/cleaance.-Qn.vital1 GOZ<br />

and'other- JsuesiUafecting assistance<br />

delivery;<br />

'UIICR does-not appear to have siuae n<br />

: ~;~VapparentGOZ organizational development or interest<br />

-<br />

innon-legal refugee euirements. V<br />

4The<br />

Cabindan refugee situation Is'-~o unded: by another<br />

~Problem, which-neither UNHCR nor GOZ seezi able to rosolve.<br />

UNCER policy provides relief to refugeAi onl at camps on<br />

-4


loctins20 km- b~'rA 'iearo eir ,.etily_ tca3Minmiz<br />

' Vbinvolvment: i.n frontier political dsputes. minma faciltes<br />

>~m~ are povided beyon~d th2 kum' t to atract refugees.4~<br />

~2~A1~~-choos!e to say cloet h borer Fo t~emz Nonly PVOs,<br />

pariculii te I C CR nEZ re providin.g help.<br />

~~h present~'~i emergency assistace sitation ini Zaire<br />

Cabi~~ns i will be reso .-Ve in patthrough<br />

future relief or loncer t-a= effort with respect to refugee<br />

can. be possible unless there is a majo'r mprove.ment i;n ath<br />

present GOZ' and UNHCP onor -mechanisms responsible !or<br />

>2'-Problem identificat-on'and assistance.' Inherent social and<br />

economic problems are sufficiently constraining in ZaPires<br />

without the added aprzbles 'presented by inept management.<br />

4a-<br />

As,jar general assistance,.Zaire has received a tremendous;<br />

amount of foeign C support since id~pendence in<br />

1960. Belqium,, 'of course, continued, 'to help its':for.-mr<br />

colony, while UN agencies ,aid foreign donorlz contributed in<br />

all' sectors. The United States has also-been a majo: ,con r.­<br />

uorin-an effort tc'-'pzrcmote economic, and- olitical :stl~$<br />

in the late 60S and early 70s, the United States'wasa'able to<br />

­<br />

'a~ -... reduce the level of its support as Zaire, becm mr capable~ a<br />

of financingqts own dw evealo pment through high earnings fro<br />

mineral exports. A:D then turned its attention to improving.<br />

the quality of life !or the ma jority poor of the country. The'4<br />

a- :c.pper,<br />

recent worldwide racession and a dramatic fall in tkhe price of<br />

howv*ve has prompted the~United States and~oathe:r donors27~<br />

to rsume balance-of-payments support programs. Although 'such--X:<br />

steps seem necessay for the moment at~least, USID hope s to


Recomendat.ons<br />

Strictll Refugee<br />

1. The United States should be carefully selective in<br />

supporting specific relief requirements identified through<br />

UNHCR, consulting wherever possible with AIDR, and the PVOs<br />

in Zaire. To the extent feasible, such assistance should be<br />

in-kind, consigned to the recipient agency and including<br />

transport funding to final dest.ination.<br />

2. In regard to PVOs, the team believes that special<br />

attention should be given to 1RC and CRS for their work with<br />

refugees between the frontier and the 20 km zone. :n fact,<br />

if UNHCR does not improve its performance in other pats of<br />

Bas Zaire, the United States might consider shifting some<br />

supprt from UNHCR to PVOs.<br />

3. To meet refugee emergencies, the mission should be<br />

allocated as "A<strong>mb</strong>assador's Refugee cntingency Fund".<br />

Dual Purtose - Re"-ee/De'ec".mental<br />

4. Should the Cabindan refugee situation stabilize,<br />

AID might consider providing technical support for refugee<br />

resettlement projects.<br />

5. AID should approve the Grain Marketing Project now<br />

pending in Washington, as a measure beneficial not only to<br />

the general economy but to potential refugee needs in<br />

particular because of the storage facilities it would provide.<br />

47.


Developmental - Refugee related<br />

6. AID should continue witn lonq-range assistance<br />

pro. rams in the fields of agriculture, health/nutrition/<br />

population and human resources.<br />

48.


' .q Cimi alAtncam I cM<br />

Gab -<br />

Ignda.-<br />

( - ",.-7'<br />

- " -<br />

) " -I .- .. ,- - -,_ . _ .j, ,<br />

-. -o-a :- - - -' *' O\-'EJu'I<br />

W.4,: - . , . " . z. ,.. . *<br />

•~~A "_ . W .. ,<br />

I, u .ale o c n a-._,_.-.o:.. r ,n.si<br />

II~~~~~~ MOM-i . ; - ./ -:-ji<br />

',. ,t<br />

I ~ ~~. 3w" .- " )- ,---'''''<br />

49.


Refuqee<br />

assistance<br />

Presidential<br />

Church<br />

of<br />

Christ<br />

Ile fteu(cc<br />

assistU4i1ce<br />

Chart F. Refujee Assistance Coordination -- Zairee<br />

__ _ _ _ _ _<br />

l.eLJl I<br />

cerLificates<br />

Secretary/L'oord inator<br />

Nitiatry for Territorial<br />

Admi ni st ration<br />

I _ _ .<br />

Caritas<br />

_I<br />

?4idicin<br />

salls<br />

Front-<br />

Collectivity<br />

chiefs 1<br />

_<br />

_<br />

RSefugjee<br />

rejiatrat iton<br />

Miss lunar let; _____<br />

I<br />

I1 N "C tIN a<br />

Fami I<br />

Gema<br />

I:F.CL Aid<br />

1A. I.I.R.<br />

Refuqec<br />

assistance<br />

ltte ad S fcu.ee<br />

Irn t .welfd're<br />

IliH -zi i rI.<br />

C11141 KiVit<br />

- - - (cnrditidt[oet_<br />

Vilroget toU It i'muh|ill .Aol|, bi~be o i.t<br />

1,, Iti UU44i i<br />

4.<br />

+sti oI<br />

LC<br />

U1


G. Kenya<br />

DurLng the past 10 years there have been small and<br />

sporadic !.ows of refugees into Kenya f!rm surrounding and<br />

nearby couztries (map attached). At first largely from<br />

Rwanda, Bu.-undi, M:a<strong>mb</strong>ique and, recently, from Uganda<br />

and Ethiopia, these few thousand early refugees, assisted<br />

by Kenyan church and volunteer organizations, have<br />

generally made a sm-oot, unob-usive transition, either<br />

successful'y assi ilat.ing or, in time, =oving on cr retrning<br />

to their cw. countries. The presence of these refugees has<br />

had li.-ted i-pact on Kenyan society.<br />

Within t-.he past two years, additional tu.mci' in Uganda<br />

and the revclution in Ethiopia have increased sig0ificantly<br />

*he nationals from those two countr.ies who turn to Kenya for<br />

:efuge. These now nu<strong>mb</strong>er perhaps . as many as 5,000 "cfficial*<br />

and possibly as many as 13-15,000 "unofficial" (see Appendix C)<br />

refugees. These later arrivals have tended to be students<br />

or educated =rofessionals and, more recent.y, business<br />

class or shopkeepers and --he ordina-y u%=ban cit.izens.<br />

Despite the.r inc-reas-ng n.=bers, 'Iesti~ated by k.ECR at 13<br />

new official cases per day) , -ost have !een al.e, fo- =he<br />

moment, to cape with iediate subsistence needs without<br />

ext-raordina-y assistance. There .:as been, however, a mounting<br />

strain on refugee and Kenyan resources and growLng difficulties<br />

arisLng f!om refugee ccmpe*ti-ion for employment, land,<br />

schools and social services. The refugee, of course, bears<br />

the most difficult part of the strain.<br />

Beca,',se of Kenya's extensive national infrastructure<br />

and long time flexibility in absorbing Ugandans within<br />

the old East Afrirsyi co=nmity, the impact of the growing<br />

refugee burd'en has not been viewed by the Goverment


52.<br />

of Kenya (GOK) as severe until =his year. Even now it is<br />

Because of<br />

not considered insupportable, except in Nairobi.<br />

L'NHCR/GOK registratiCn and assistance policies, refugee! are<br />

required to come to Nairobi. They invariab!l' re-ai.n<br />

there and add to an already overcrowded and inadequate urban<br />

infrastructure where tnheir presence and competition meet<br />

increasing antipathy and frequent hostility.<br />

This impact has recently led the Government of Kenya,<br />

at the urging of 'NHCR/Nairobi, to form an .ter-m.nistera.<br />

cittee on refugees within the office of the President,<br />

io<br />

charged specifically with problem ientif-c n, oIanni.n<br />

a :<br />

- assistance within<br />

and coordination of short- and long-te­<br />

the GOK and among the =utiplicity of private orcani..ations<br />

dealing with refugees (Chart attached).<br />

During the past 3 months additional useful actions have<br />

been taken by the GOK and refugee agenc5 :<br />

Assiqnmefnt of a fui2-tlme GOK .efucee Officer,<br />

in the Office of the President;<br />

-<br />

Addition o an Eployment :u nse r an: a<br />

Education Counsellor to U.NHCR Staff;<br />

Initiation of planni-ng for a Recept:.on/Screening<br />

Transit Center outside of the iediate Nairobi<br />

town area.<br />

The average refugee in Kenya, Lncluding the Ugandan<br />

refugee, arrives in generally'good health and with relatively<br />

few nutritional problems or demands. Food, medical assis­<br />

tance, and personal care materials are all available at a<br />

cost in Kenya, so life maintenance becomes a matter of sub­<br />

sistence allowances or the hope of jndi cbs. i- The for.er


are cur-rently inadequate and the latter extre-ely rare.<br />

Inf!lation has exacerbated the Problems.<br />

The t.ree -incipal refugee -riorities are shelter,<br />

employment and education. :t is clear t.hat Naircbi cannot<br />

-rvide these needs adequately for its own citizens, let<br />

alone for -efugees, and requires outside assistance.<br />

The U'HCR, the Jo.nt.Refuge* Serice Cc='ri-tee CJRSK),<br />

and the ZCK believe that, if the refucee ;c.ula-.on were<br />

d_'.-erted frz-. :airobi and dispcersed more evenly t-r-ughcut<br />

nte :cun-_rv's :ess zrowded towns and rural a-eas, sufficient<br />

and ade-:ate snelter, e=lo.nent and school capacity is<br />

available n...Kenya. 'What these agencies, w'.h.. are now<br />

handling a case load of 4,000 refugees, lack to accomplish<br />

these cobect-ives, as well to provide basic serv*ces, are<br />

facilities and sufficient staff. This pertains to Kenya's<br />

emergency respcnse in'rastructure, nctably t.he Kenya Red<br />

Cross, .ZRC representa-.'cn as well as t zc Gn K ,te.-K4nisterial<br />

Zc.mmL-i_ttee on Refucees and ..ch-... anizaticn, such<br />

as the A:- African .o.n_'' ^- hurches . At the same<br />

t-e oc =curse, these agencies require !-recti or t-rough<br />

NFHCR cash, supplementary fcod and medicine.<br />

This assessment does not consider the problems and<br />

demands which Massive nu<strong>mb</strong>ers of Somali or EZthiopian nomads<br />

could cause if they bec=me victims of t-he civil strife in<br />

Ethiop:a or further upheavals im Uganda. It is clear that<br />

should such situations develop, speci-ic disaster measures,<br />

to include the prcvision of the full range of temporary<br />

shelter, feeding sup.-crt, on-site medical aid, water and<br />

sani.tatin -cntrol would be required on an emergency basis.<br />

53.


AS fo eneal 4eVGLOpse4At~" s5 sac Key hs<br />

r i f a -J ieao d,4:..e;onors. Thw­<br />

mant, health .nd nut.-t.on. Isntligt of refugee prsurs<br />

t g~~5'<br />

consideation perha should be &-nso gie4oaxadn<br />

1. The United 7 States should continue to. respond to,<br />

speci:ic UNRCR appeals for short-term support of iadiateo~<br />

relief requieinents.<br />

-, -­ j 2. The United States should ,be,.prepared to joinwih<br />

t..-GOK. St and other dnr in suppot of te p<br />

Reception Center in Konya.<br />

3. The United States sh.ould consider the provisions<br />

4>of proportionate fundAing support of RSK, either directly or,<br />

through UNHCR, to permit expansion o! .7RSK~ -administration'- -~-.<br />

andthe - addition of at least 6 dunse2 t orsn<br />

education,' loymnt{/scia svic andbsies/<br />

mat development.<br />

. *,,- ...<br />

4. If<br />

,:, . . . .... ... ..<br />

openings are not available 'in Kenyan institutions<br />

for qualified refugee students, scholarships should be<br />

provided for study elsewhere in Africa or,for exceptional ~<br />

Fcases in the Uiited States. '<br />

Dua Pups Refuaee/Devetlopmental<br />

5.- The USG should consider specific support -or ~ -'<br />

refugee education in Kenya to include staff Y,-,and~casdr<br />

f acilities, at the University of Kenya; N.16T.C.,' and ~~<br />

. .. ........<br />

* -' -4 -"<br />

l',t "A4{?


*'ementaryseccndar. -ac-i4.itzes as may be proposed.<br />

. A:: =I- "wisht- cons der ;ar :-:.pat on ia<br />

.e-.s-er -a2. plan, now 'nde. s-u ", t- ,evelop:aent one<br />

or two sma-:. :es..e=en- -r-:ects f!r *-a.andans in<br />

order to .elp-rel-eve concenraions in 'Naiobi. A:D could<br />

be particular'Iy helpful in<br />

irrigation works.<br />

planning, financing and constructing<br />

55.


UGAPOA ' .-<br />

N, VALL.Y ""VSC 'A<br />

" E<br />

U"G ENYA ","<br />

II<br />

RANDA16 2~<br />

RWANDA -"-, '-,<br />

V"A L L., E<br />

'EASTER.<br />

im~eol)o* aoeoell~all<br />

:T :A N "'" Z A 'N I A"\*S **4 .IA.<br />

"am


CharL G . l~i'tiuu Asi ULdflit- Cool-iuIiIon - Kenya<br />

T l Pacti 01ll<br />

NI it I1 I ItbI I I: ve CI (mI<br />

iiwi S WHO)<br />

---------- - - -4-<br />

itt±C Uttt5ClAO/W It 11I CIt<br />

IDiuLricL r Iof I,iceli<br />

Co i i. asa ione r I__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-IA rc__<br />

L<br />

I ________ J2S/(<br />

II<br />

Jo ijL lie f u'jpi<br />

-I;trVi(cfl ot<br />

- - - Coordination pemnlist<br />

-<br />

I<br />

I<br />

It­<br />

i IIIc ot<br />

I ~Nettiona Chr iti an<br />

-- irect relationship jiImuinqt Andt social Sus vicuu<br />

2. litcitleu a<br />

Kenya Mtti i~sut, oiaO rstm<br />

(41ils I , YWIA. 41.o. K., * igu lut. louagry. 9A<br />

11 *I4 ,<br />

1114 11 1c 1uc 'AAH)t t<br />

t* 1


in, sothr Afric an Anoa Sda n~ curnl A' haA4A' ,, ( _ .<br />

4<br />

g<br />

la4rgest re4414ole A 1A:i'A Surrounded- , by- e'i h t<br />

..... ++ --- 'A :m++ +++ 'X. +m+++++++•+ 4 A 'A " '" '+- r'" ' i++ i +++++ ,. +44 +: + ++?+ +++-­ ++i+++++++++<br />

4--++<br />

w -494499quize4 some limited settlement assistancei and '4,500A<br />

oh -' Sudan also h aa ge potenti...l.................<br />

for continue refugee ++ r p4 , 444><br />

+ ++1+ reM++ ++++ ++ ++ ++++ ++++m+++++ ++ ++4 . ++++++++L><br />

+? . + ]++ + .+++ + + 4 ' ',- - 4 +++:+ 4:+]+++'> +++ + + +++++++++ ++ ++++ +++ + ++ .. 4-+? + 4<br />

4 4<br />

'- - 1- ' + '''9.4';A -'<br />

... 4 ­<br />

2<br />

4 . + +++++"+:+' ++++++ l > ++:+ l++++ + +++ '4';+++d A 4' 4S+++++ + ++ A'+ +++ + ++ +++++++ + ++ +++49 A.4 '' ++++ A>A,'->y + ++++++ 444+-'+ +' +1 ++++' + +++ +++ ++ + +<br />

4, >44 A-' 9, 44 >4 + O' l+ + + + + tld ?+a++ +: |+ +5 ++n +++++++ :++ ++l . ... £ +++*++4..4-4'- . *+) ++++ j-9 ........ ++'+A++><br />

++++: m++++++ ++++ :+:+ + ++:++ + + ? ++;++ ++ + +++++ +++++: 4 4 4 ++: + ++ P++++ + + +- :+ + ++++ +<br />

Officia y i is estimated ht t re now, 4<br />

A4 + 5++++++++++ A +-+++i+'+" +++: J2 .2 j-4 . 4144 + ++++ , ++++p++++ 4 +++ +++++++=++++i+ -'-4j' ' p++414 + +++ + + ';+ + > 4 :., + ++++++::<br />

4 1 1<br />

!++!+++++++++++ + -- --- 4 A> 9<br />

+ "A+++i+ +++ + + 4a ­<br />

Q E<br />

'.4'-'41.4' '! -'9 A-4 4 "' l'-- .. 1 4 9 '4 > .4....... !94>4.49'49.4. > ''44'A.......'44 .....<br />

.4' 4 4+ ++++++ . ++++ + ' + + ++4-44- + ' +++ 4+ + + ++ +.+ ' ............... + ++++ ++ ++ + +......+++ ...... ...... . 914' ...... 4' >>44<br />

++ +<br />

A'+9 .9 ++ 'A'+++++++++++<br />

''' - +L~ A ''' 4 + ++++++:+++. ++# A<br />

+!+ ++ ++++++++++; I+ +++•+++ ++++!++ ' +!:3+ ++: !i•++++ A"+++ A++<br />

Asid fro sp ci i ieradon+++++ naovesez+++++++++++++++++ circumstances+++++++++++<br />

++ !i ~i!i++t ++++++i+++i+++ . +++++++<br />

+ + + +<br />

++..... +++++++ +++++++++ ..++++ ++!++++++ + ++ +:+;+++ +++++++ ++ '+++ + ++++<br />

++* ...... +++ ++++ ++ + . + .+ . +:++++ ... +++ + • ++ :++++ + +++ + + +++++i +++ ++++ '++<br />

+ +i ++++:+ !ii~+ + +++ ++: ++ + + .<br />

'A '"++ " A' '"<br />

++++ +++++++ ++++ ++++++++++++++ +i +the :exception of++approxiatl .e¥+2rOO+:ecenl¥t ++++++ ++++ ++++:++++++ ..........<br />

4-'; 9 isouherin Afria andsuta i ++++++ .+ ent++ .y+++ ;+b s ++ tfri> •<br />

F'"''"" are4 , +<br />

+ ++++L co by<br />

Zaire ' ari+e f4-5 . Ug+as<br />

n all thewho- l rfge+are h,+ ++not. .+ A.+r.ecognized<br />

+.. ,+ +;*+++ + +++for++ t e refug e p rob lem+:++ s. +++++ ++ ++?+++'++ as++refugees +++++ ++ +:+:: ++++++++ +P mthe+ ++ ++ ++ +1 ++++>++ 49<br />

4 ++*(. 4 ++ m 9+++ +++:+++ + 9 + +++' + ++++ +++ .4 49>4 '+<br />

+:u; +::+ +++ + + + ++ /+++ + + : ++ +z +P++:++++ + + + ++:+4' ++<br />

­<br />

++++++'++++++ ++ O fficially , ++it+++ + +++ +is++++++.. e tm te + +++++++++: + + ++++r+ h+++ are+ ++++ now> ++++++......... + ....... K<br />

we'9 160,000 444A.''4- o 4<br />

Krefugees<br />

a's4 s4 1 a W in thel Sudan (see 4 Appendi c C) all bu<br />

9 6,300 require some fo++++ of++ lie-up or :+P+ ++/++++++++ or+ote +++ extended++++<br />

+++/+++++<br />

*++?+ 4<br />

+ ++ + + ++ ++ :+::+iy+ + ++


ealy195.ad4h<br />

ineitnybten16<br />

susq~titni<br />

n 197~ Thora 4..~ has alasbe<br />

clashes occurred Vin th967emand97. ?ere.2ahas ofay btheopia<br />

Thee~a goveQnmnt<br />

icatio<br />

of<br />

f qt<br />

intyentmovnl~a prienve,sseistancea~<br />

infrastucthe uresla area this fuai ofl foamedSelssi itl74 4 .o"<br />

Mostcounriesin Arica an the Eritly*xpran Lierin<<br />

Itrsholeeasnt<br />

Givn additinsald tae 2adifndng uz ecoti e 44e.<br />

!cpaleofreqtoposile<br />

Whi4~ aly the~ copnnisgn'ain<br />

istraive, Anaem and coun4.li .<br />

vzfn<br />

nof =e; adiioa adin<br />

resources44to<br />

sistane ~<br />

the, prin~.cia3l commo further hmpering 4 efavteogas 4<br />

Lzssla xhard~u btw sotwrdtarub&.<br />

at and 17<br />

Phsial asmt<br />

clahe occrm. Such clretinhav resuleda aieathusndirof<br />

sasoant tod hi~e borerit teto'k teGvrm o<br />

blokae codouert agternatoa.,.pivt sssac<br />

l<br />

4<br />

4. 4.


In general, however, transport an. grain. storage -a=s<br />

are now receiving attention wit.1 speci*' o-hysica act-,-ns<br />

or. :ey parts of -he system. The all-weak-.e: ?ort Sudan ­<br />

hartoum rad will be co=pleted in 19-9. The oil- pi.eIl.ne<br />

paralleling .he road will be opened shcr--y freeing rail<br />

wagon space (30 percent of rail capacity is now used for ci<br />

mcveen-) . N.ew locemot-ives and wa-cns, are to -e financed hy<br />

-Z.n. A major double track . e--::-- r-- ?-ort Sudan to<br />

,-um t-o oe financed 'y :3BZ and Saudi .aa, -s .c'.n<br />

-.h .a.nc s--e.<br />

:f the strain on the transoort s-Iste= nas zeeconcern<br />

to the GCS and relief acencies. :-e ==-....<br />

ser-vices, =a-.i=ularl.v .edi-a. and educa.--a-, -as ceen<br />

equally troubling. :n the .edical field, e:ween 30 - 40<br />

pecent of in-patients and 50 ner-ent of Cut-.atens i.n - .e<br />

.<br />

=oncenraticn areas are refugees. Aidd':cna_:-', -ne hea<br />

=roblems of the refugees tend to *e - f -nzer. -.:e ,such as<br />

-uber=,cs-s; and require -- re -ntensi-.'e .: -::-.-.<br />

staff and facil.ites. .. n.:he educat::na: sec::r, : ZZS Ie<br />

!as had to cons:--c: nine addi::na- ele.en:ar: s.nc-s cf<br />

30r students each over =:xe =ast -.hree years :=r re:.cee<br />

ch. .d=e.. At ;he secOndav: a%.-. u.ivers:- "e':ei -:e .rbaies,<br />

because of lanquage a.nd :ac o:f aci-i:.es, are even<br />

more acute.<br />

In order to assist the refugeei toward greater selfsufficiency<br />

for their own benefit and to reduce the burden<br />

on the Sudanese society and econo=y, the GOS/U;NHC.R, with WF? and<br />

PVCs' programs, are continuing and intensifin-c a-'-"uresettlement.<br />

;n additicn to 5,0CC Zhiocian refucees "'c<br />

began ar--. last year, an additional '0,000 will "e relocated<br />

by the end of this year, with plans for the sett.ement<br />

of another 13,000 i. '976. 7-n addition to these<br />

60.


prograns, efforts are being direc:ed toward vocatior.al<br />

tra -in g, OL.-nC, and cottage industry development. USAZD<br />

is concent:ating 4-s efforts in the fields of rural development<br />

and ~range of fore.--n donors are helping in<br />

other sectors.<br />

Zn general, it can be said that the GOS and UNNCR<br />

assistance, direction, coordination and delivery, and the<br />

i . vo.- tary agen.cy effort are effective but, while<br />

c as.. . ­•<br />

su!ficient , are lackng i..resoua.ces and<br />

sta-f-fr th.e ass.ve rec.i-e.ent -- a require.e.. which has<br />

onl: recent-: s-abili:ed. The rincial prob e-s, have been<br />

well identified however, and solution zl-anning, and resource<br />

rec"reent sppor, detailed.<br />

Reccmienda-: ions<br />

Stricti Refucee<br />

The USG sh"" cc.ntinue respcnses to specific -'NHCR<br />

aopeals for s.-.-ter su--or of i--ediate relief require­<br />

-ents t ncl-de a" entatn<br />

-- of transport f.ds and trai-.­<br />

in- :rocra-s.<br />

2. The USG should consider direct assistance to thr<br />

GOS or through for.NHCR the Sudan Refugee Counseling Service<br />

and sup-ort of additional administraive/.-anagerial and<br />

counseling staff of other operating agencies.<br />

3. P--480 reculations sould be revised or amended .o<br />

oer*t ?a.Port of Entry" au.oriz.at.on in order -­o<br />

exped:te the shi-ment of food supplies frcm Port Sudan to<br />

Kassala and :uba.<br />

61.


4. An A<strong>mb</strong>assador's Refugee C...in-en-"c" F',-nd wcu'd be<br />

most helpful<br />

and unexpected needs occur.<br />

62.<br />

n Sudan wner- --he refugee situatio. Is vowat-41e<br />

Dual Purpose - Refucee/Deve.:zmenta:<br />

5. The USG should consider support of initiat-ves in<br />

education to include additional refugee schola-ships at the<br />

secondary/university level, funds f=r consr'uc"ic -r a,""tinal<br />

elementary/secondary classr--cms and !-r e-.'.-.-.ent : ref-c-ee<br />

teaching ad---.-.ist ati*ve sta-f.<br />

6. The USG should consider f.':.. St i C-..<br />

medical ward ex=ansior, and support -ile =ed-c.: c...-­<br />

requirements.<br />

7. A pcrtion of ?L-480<br />

-ants c-uld ;e "wel utili:ed<br />

in providing fumigation trai:.ng for grain storage, wr.ere<br />

currentlv<br />

--here are<br />

losses.<br />

-remend--us<br />

8. .Z= should ex-.cre t.he desira-i:y f e ... e<br />

.Snsta s=a l --ain st-rage "a-- -cuses -- erta.--- ­<br />

o<br />

area w b . d<br />

areas w.hi~h coui-d be of dr_-ec- bene-:it "-o .-efu-ee o=.-'.e.-.-.:',- .


h t<br />

;-IgrRq 7<br />

SSit<br />

*UAPOA<br />

U,,NI11D AaA UJ tJS,,/ -. a\<br />

•40 "ai -> Ie ,<br />

c7 H<br />

N.0 R-, E- -T-<br />

R U R . . .<br />

soo ­<br />

-- ,---- ai ET<br />

SUDAN -- -" '- - .:-<br />

. 9.... , ­ - _<br />

E - - - -z<br />

AMKK A NAL E<br />

, . . . ­<br />

- - - - "--J /N_<br />

. .... N." " ... / N . ;O O<br />

SUDAN(\mI_<br />

- ~:.a ~*t<br />

:NY<br />

- -4 *1DA<br />

co.G.<br />

K<br />

63.<br />

__


4<br />

.14 Ir~'<br />

ji~<br />

-. V<br />

IVI<br />

00<br />

ii IV<br />

a Z<br />

0<br />

to<br />

3:2<br />

,YIV<br />

~I<br />

)A


I. D ibouti<br />

Although a traditional hose to E-.iopian and coasta!<br />

populations -n tizes of previous poitical stress, and a<br />

trade and empov-ent magnet because of the French presence,<br />

DIibouti is now faced with potentially serious administra­<br />

tive and economic problems as a result of an inherited and<br />

;-rwing refuqee burden (map attached).<br />

:n addi:tion to about 350 Eritreans and scme 750 Mfars<br />

w!-c ca.ze in earlv 19-5 from A:i- Mirah' tribal area near<br />

Asiata in t i:hp-a to the north, ::ibouti, -onits inde en­<br />

dence -a-. J.---e 27, 1977, estimated its "refugee" population<br />

at between 9--0,000 within D:ibouti aity itself and about<br />

3,300 cther Afars and :ssas 4n the countryside. The ?r=e<br />

%.in-ster now esti=ates the tora: at 16,300.<br />

Since Ma" with -.;.-.e ;ntensf'icati4n. of fi=htinc in the<br />

,caden - especially "wtint.e Chercer highlands and along<br />

the rai = etween the Dire ,awa and D:iti - "-t is<br />

true .nat the refuzee .=c=uati4Cnwithi.n the new country has<br />

crzwn -. at :east an esti=ated 5,2010 additcna. persons,<br />

.cst of wnhm are *dcmen and c....-en. Th-s new populat.on is<br />

:oncentrated in two rellef areas, Dikh_: and Al Sabie.h,<br />

near the Ethiopian border. :t is growing by roughly 100<br />

persons per day. While the GOD may claim some 16,000 refugees,<br />

other sources assert that "legiti=te" refugees total only<br />

about 6,500 (see Appendix C) .<br />

Totally"dependent on income from port operations, the<br />

Addis Ababa to Djibcuti railroad, and French military pay­<br />

rolls, the Republic's overall economic viability at independence<br />

65.


was co.sidered Marginal, at 'est. ..-h the *halt o4 a:. rai.<br />

traffic in :u!v and ccnseq-en-t reducticns in .c:-. c er7az- n..<br />

the country now-relies increasing v cn sud.-etasu<br />

en:.cns<br />

frc= France. - inemco-en is r-sing dail':, and -nf a:.zn "s<br />

pegged at 30 percent. The new qcvernment's a-m.nistra:.'-e<br />

and pubiic services, already strained tnde :.e revic.;s<br />

French territorial administration, are not prepared for any<br />

addiiona. burden --<br />

.:opu-'a-.on.<br />

articularv: a -ar-e and zr-winc men=-.cant<br />

In a----cn t the di-ect .ver-ca- .:- . -<br />

fragile systems req::Uirin e .r a:oc.<br />

other l.fe su=cr:t measures for ref-uees, :he<br />

Ethiooia has -roduced another cten-ia - sercs ia-t on<br />

Djibouti. raditiona. food and Ot3er tradt:<br />

the western an,-d scuthwes.ern b:c-der have been<br />

estimated :_00,000 i*oa.-.ennes .*rev-us..: re.<br />

scurces<br />

:--sed<br />

- --:n<br />

'..<br />

f'f<br />

-nat<br />

66.<br />

mechanis= -.. st nCw deve _ t.her -eans su=cr-- :.........<br />

to Djib'-ou,4 y's a.:ead -..-- ted rescur:es.<br />

Despi-e i.ts see.-nc> o:e-'-.-. - es, -zc::",<br />

.'nth assistance, has taken Lts -r; r -- e - ­<br />

in stride. _n adi .in t. surr.' -c .- eda:e f:cd,<br />

heal.th, clo%.-4ng and she.ter assistance, the ccuntr: nas<br />

already proceeded to develop Lcnger ter-_ sett'.eent -cssizi:-" -es<br />

in which zefugees may participate.<br />

A special officer !or refugee affairs has been appc.n-ed<br />

and refuqee requirements appear to receive a hich.ri .:.<br />

both in the capitol and in the field (chart attached).<br />

By all accounts, Djibouti's refugee per-fcr..nce to -ate<br />

.-. singular and Much this has<br />

as been effect-ive. cf effort<br />

been accopl;shed singlehanded-y. There has been scme<br />

church assistance via Caritas and the temporary assignment<br />

An


of a ,--=C= headquar.ers :f ficer and S-: C ,:30 in emerzencv<br />

fnds ar' ff-=e z- Disaster Assi.st.ne has sent a team<br />

': -e.: --i ou-- protect itself fro= :he -hc:ra epidemic in<br />

-.. e Mid:e Zast. :crdav, Sweden and Ge.ranv have also -ade<br />

sm3.all ....". .<br />

,espite -.he effectiveness to date, it is clear that the<br />

cct-" :.-annot sustain such 5ucrt s ocerations !or any<br />

extended =eriod f :z-me without additicna. externa! assistance,<br />

.:=, _v_.-1-.n -:r -:e - e :=re -~ -efuzees.<br />

S--ze e':e r .. z " sa.n.d - - " .r.eeds t e i.,.or ted<br />

-".... ::.e =resent n:. ,,-" a: gaps --'n assistance<br />

are .ar-:e. :'eeinc -..edla-e fzc- and *ea-'-:- needs _ -r -oth<br />

refucees and -.e ..di:enesus =c-u-atin are _;k2:- to be the<br />

.cst ser:z'us :=r -e near ter-.... =owever, -. he lack of ccrres-­<br />

.=c-ndi.--= re" " , : a aze-ent str-zcture "'41! an.-.-l,- .'rassls­<br />

"..-.e 7ei::. The azsence of anv 1cal materal,<br />

ex:ept an.d ::a. relianze on -­=crts ill m:- .aterials<br />

.resen: serizus she-------:aticns. Scc:a " -.... ements,<br />

- , -- -a__'-" ierenen.....:. e :reat-:-n<br />

.f -.e entire s:sta-. Si:nhe refuee .c-.a:.. ces . not<br />

sea. . ren.-­ -,, e.o- . .-. e n s .toss. -'-.e. Ler..--ent ..<br />

- u,,; "s 5" =ercent L-d ris:ng.: Settlement zros­<br />

pects are ncref!l, :t at .n the fu,-,,-e and i:. totally<br />

untested acricu.ltural areas.<br />

Recc-endati-.ns<br />

-<br />

Str4ct . , Refucee<br />

" The USG should con:inue t be res--cnsive bcth<br />

oirectl-" as well as through :CRC and L%,HCR to present Djibouti<br />

emergency requests including healt-h, shelter and overall<br />

relief recurements.<br />

67.


2. Cnce agai.n an E'-I-assv Ref':ee Ccnt.nenz7 .* .<br />

be most hlu"in dealin- "-th e.-.erzencv requ,;Lre-ents.<br />

Dual .-zr~cse - .efuee :ez,-en­<br />

3. Th.s Gcver---ent soCuld alsc zonslet -_;crt..-a<br />

emergency 7L-480 bilateral rant assstance and suple­<br />

menta- food aid .. ough .CT2 /.,T- based :n "'Tn:ed -'ares<br />

Gcvernen: of Z-:bcu:i and inter.a-.lzna. -eeds assess-en-_<br />

for * ==ec: rzotn refugee and =--"-r'" re eens are<br />

should 'e taken -ere, as elsewhere, -.a-. re.<br />

receive t-t-r- --e=--en-:.-_an e .ctz_­<br />

thereby crea:'n, resen-en: a=-- -:.-e oca-s an-- ­<br />

ever. -ore ref:uees.<br />

4. The USG should =:nsider _.'ediate -.. es<br />

eit'her t.o.-Ugh the U . e.: .'---­<br />

appropriate vc!-ntar- agencies :=r direct -anazeme "t as.s­<br />

tance to -!ne 5cver.en- of c---: :r n cer: "-:., 2 Z?,<br />

for re'i.ef shelter ass-s-ance =;era:-zns. :n to<br />

shel-ter, :a.-. ranace_-ent, feedn , s-.'s _n: san:-..,<br />

--<br />

such orocra=s ....d alsc inclu:e -n--:a;:-r r - ...<br />

operatmions, ==t-ace craft and sel ::ns.<br />

initiatives shculd b-e -rncipa- 7 u;.ed zy ", al<br />

and suppo-t.ive cf its recc-endaticns and re-u._re~ents.<br />

-<br />

5. 'n the context of any .-....-ecisicn, the "SG<br />

shoule consider the conduct c! an appropriate feas-.i'i4.­<br />

study with respect to specific grant assistance for acr*­<br />

cul-e settle:e nt/trod-uctc.o in the Petit and Grand Bara<br />

areas, as well as<br />

such other deve op=ent prcgr-.s as may he<br />

proposed t'" the Gcver.-nent of ' 0out


I-- ..<br />

i ' - '' :"<br />

I<br />

I!Irv<br />

I /<br />

e-.., c.,<br />

i:.:: " -.- - " "<br />

ETMI'P<br />

s-5<br />

w<br />

-<br />

69.<br />

, .- •- - . ~ - - - . -. : _ _ _ _ _ _<br />

"<br />

-'<br />

.<br />

-<br />

__ -<br />

- ." - ..::.<br />

h<br />

SS 0 M. A- l


33.3333333333333+++++3333L t3 ~ < +:3~12 +i++3 +++ AM++%i3T&3423i + '<br />

+++< ,<br />

+33:<br />

4+ + + ,++++m++ ++.+ ++?+?+ p+(+ S N ++++++ + +++!++++i<br />

I:?<br />

++++..+ .. ++ .. . .3<br />

­<br />

+++p + 1++ ++++++ +++++++ '+ + ++++<br />

0 ++++i 33<br />

3 W++++ &I + ,+++++++++++++++++++++++++++0+<br />

Ii i +++++ 3 +++ +++++ +.+3+ +++<br />

323 3 +<br />

•..........++++<br />

i!+++. +:++ +++++ + -++ ++;'+++++++++++ +,-<br />

3+ . . + ++i+++++ ++' 3 C f .<br />

.333 . 3... 3<br />

++ +?++ + •<br />

++'+5++ + _+++++++, +S<br />

3333333+++4<br />

?+++ :++ + +++ 3 ;i.+s++++ 3 33333333+:+<br />

3++33.3333 33 +++++++++. + ++.<br />

33++3333<br />

3333+ ,.+3 +++3<br />

33 33333<br />

. ...........<br />

*~33 3.........................<br />

_ _ i ' )<br />

3333 u 3 +?++ +++ ++ +++<br />

32+3 3<br />

_<br />

3<br />

_<br />

+ ++ +:+#+ _<br />

4-' + :t++ ++++ + + +++++ _+ +; __+++<br />

.... 3 33333 3<br />

?+++++L+i<br />

..33.3...............++++++++ +'+++ + +++ ++++++ ______________+<br />

333333, i<br />

13 3 3333 ...+...... 5++z++++....<br />

++ +...,<br />

.... ,+ + 33334 -33) + ,+++ +++<br />

33 + +++++i++ 33.3.3+++i+:+13<br />

++0+33.. +: 3333. + .33 ++<br />

32334 33 '2<br />

3+3 333<br />

3 , 3 3 3 )13333333 + +.313 + ,? -+<br />

333 3333 ++"++;++X+++i<br />

'3333 ++++-<br />

3+++ +.. '33 . +<br />

333 3,3 < .. .. ...++!+ ... 37<br />

+++ ++ 3333.33<br />

<<br />

i.3313351..33.<br />

.<<br />

3333 333333 +;+++++++<br />

33333333343.3<br />

+++.++ +++++,+<br />

33 3.3 33<br />

333.333.3333 ' + . 3333 3333 3 3+33 33 33+3333 .3+<br />

.3 3)3


A :hcu# eac, and its ref.cee ;c;u at-on in<br />

Afr ca ctv:cusL-" ha'e =d.v..u" roiems f= w . no<br />

".crcu" so'u-ns exist, certaln -- on meast-es .oe--antn:<br />

to refugee-reated assistance suggest themselves. These<br />

inc'ude: -- he education field; aspects cf e.plo.--nt;<br />

exzanszn -.-s ec.:~c k*nds -f P'V activi-es .n. ct-h relief<br />

.... .ev:e: en:; -=r--ve-e.-.-f :=vern­<br />

-el:-_ ,- 'aei-:-strati:e an-- sta:: ----c" es t<br />

:nzrease -.e effe-.ti:e.ess and ran-e=ent z:f assis:ance<br />

.n sc-e -ases, t-s -o"nz ean. a s ezif-z ..... w­<br />

zeff- t":e t:-rea-e to =r au----_en- .ar-- _-n-.-' ­<br />

:u:i-na. -echanlsms, -r the redefiniticn of a-n .roach or<br />

The following :.-ents are di_-ec-ed toward these .oss:­<br />

oie c--n areas:<br />

A. Life Suoor:<br />

:n all cuntries vs:-ted, -HC. and t.'-er . agencies<br />

are .r=vidi.ng varicus amoun-s and fors of ref-...ee assis­<br />

tance, with varied degrees of effiaiency. ",,,ihout t;.hs<br />

assistance -he plight of the average refugee would be much<br />

worse. ?ur-he.----ore, these internaticna. organ" ations are<br />

c=:oal and experienced channels of assistance.<br />

Rec..enat on<br />

The United States, of course, should continue its<br />

support of the UN.programs in keeping with a.o=urt and<br />

objectives determined by State SA/ORM (which is currently<br />

71.


seeking at least S. .,.i..Cu.h ee... '=3*<br />

under the _,nited States 'Energency Reuugee and .ra:s:: ss­<br />

tance nd. shouId be =repared to backst:z and s-.:= ....<br />

. *.<br />

these programs wnen necessa--, ar :<br />

education, manpower :rainin;, hea:.h de---.e." s:s:ens,<br />

storage, and supp7eentary<br />

- 1ations ­<br />

vides a ready and flexible ins:-ment for sc=e aspects cf<br />

supplementary relief as<br />

pro~ect5.<br />

well as =edium :e-= refugee related<br />

The protle= cf fac "' ref' e-ati°<br />

r.-... and....<br />

Africa :s growing ... increas.n.y.--n.-moers<br />

cf ref:ees ard<br />

=eca.se f<br />

because of greater<br />

=cns:raints. The r :c:en .s especialy."<br />

*olitica! and lanquage<br />

*-. u: s als serzsf e<br />

serious at the secondary le-el,<br />

not of eyen ::_:er<br />

prima, grades. Perhaps Cf ecua: if<br />

provide vocaticna: traininq.<br />

tance is t.e need to<br />

::n:tnent-wide, se-rin­<br />

There are nechanisms, so-e<br />

-zr<br />

ccrd.i.nain speci:f<br />

schCl'a:s* ;S -nd scncc: sma:e,<br />

:~e Lke. cne are<br />

scnccl and studen: re.iremCns a<br />

=*en :-e sc..e ­<br />

really more than =aar:nally e!ective,<br />

scme cases, they address only za&r: of even<br />

the prcblem. Zn<br />

c-crdinated<br />

the individual's requirement, let alone providing a<br />

basis for augmenting other areas to include classroc=, staff<br />

Here again vccational :rasnn should -<br />

and doritory needs.<br />

and in some cases mcre so, than<br />

be regarded as important,<br />

crder to f-fil! Africa's manpower recuqre.e-ts<br />

academic, in<br />

cf society.<br />

and turn refugees into productive remrers<br />

involved in ecu-<br />

Among -he organi:ations/echanisms<br />

onl<br />

cational assistance noted currently (and this list is<br />

suggestive, it is realized) in Africa<br />

are:


The CAU's Bureau fcr Placement and Elucation<br />

of Refugees '. ;<br />

:=ernat-ona:.-. -xhange u-d .<br />

.~ic. "" t-n A= FD -" sup.-crted b- ?hlps-Stokes<br />

.".<br />

United "a:ins -M.erge.cy raining Program for<br />

South Africa ('..NETSPA;<br />

I*nteo "atL-. . '--issioner !2r Refugees<br />

"::HCR.><br />

• * A.u.-.:ci .=r : C... :es ,:A:<br />

- _ ­<br />

A*.friz - Ass:ci',_Ln =- *n_-ers :tes G hana AA;<br />

. :ndli.'dual<br />

._:ned3cteate-e; "<br />

ooncrs, da:era including -he<br />

":-'vida:":- t.ar': agencies.<br />

Despi_e the I.neres: .-. d cenerai'- dedicated invol-ement<br />

of -_ese :roa:a:.., each specific educational assistance<br />

recu_re-e%: :s :e'.'_:ed arel" :.. -- .e ;o:ex: of an<br />

-:nd-'v-ua* -o.ree --~= CoUntrV., In= isolat_-. The<br />

cccrtinac.- c rescuz:e and recipient, user and su.==:er<br />

needs of eazh is ha=ha:ar_, a: zes:. As a<br />

resu.:, a.c.-alies nave deve.:=ed "..:n effectivel: zar =any<br />

o:herw.se zua~ified refuzees fr. :c-.:inuing study. These<br />

range !r-= schcol spaces withou: supporting scholarships or<br />

spcnsors; scho.arshi-ps withou: spaces; schools with spaces<br />

but nc funds and sc.-.ocls with funds but nc spaces. There<br />

are ather ;roblems, rLging frem the ineligibility of a<br />

student because his =c:.4itical views are not acceptable,<br />

: s=ecialized visa requirements, which might also be<br />

suscetible to i=proved coordination or more enlightened<br />

reculation.<br />

73.


' €+<br />

t jI<br />

o'43~ ~ i.... ( ' +y~ -3 ~"'' ~ 3~<br />

4~La4.4nd- cooOfr3t';din aticule coucaiona<br />

assistancetorfge.,i<br />

c4 5 33. 3 ,,./.,13 y ,'i<br />

y ith pctt inrsrcueUe hscl~os<br />

consnecen -hould s also *amerkn.e te to an iniida 0....icanjucio ne c:4rsca'ci anatc~ t oteandnorsn,<br />

.<br />

abs'r.zqref<br />

a<br />

..<br />

iv4en/70?t<br />

e student .<br />

-vational tri<br />

44g.<br />

S'<br />

4. tj4e<br />

a.<br />

o4*iOQ..ac.j+e +d an o.. ++e<br />

should'alsoinclsudy andU.S i gpove4 thents'.rutuien if igratio<br />

+m++ +: + +++++++++provided<br />

G +?+ +P ++ ++7 to +++++ Afrca :++' ref ey + +;+th++ +++++ ++++!'<br />

+ gee ih a t i provin<br />

..<br />

' +++ f + ++S + +++e € + S + ++ +++ + +++ ++++ + ++++ + ++ +++ + ............ +.......+ ++++ ++++.......++ ++ ++++ +' ++ .. ++ ,,,,'','3 ++ .3333I<br />

43 4'+<br />

++ +++; + +++<br />

av++!:ila++<br />

3.++++++++++++++++<br />

!+ '++ 4 +I#++.'. + #<br />

3 , +<br />

++++ +++ + + + ++ + ++ ++ +.+++ .......+ + + .. .. + + ++ IP+;++<br />

z++ es s++++ +i;+ity/ef+I+ of that +++ectiv+++++ assistan +: +++:+ .]iuch +:::+ +ezaminat)i+on ."+:+, + ++ ++!.,'. i+#<br />

i;:iiiiiflS a ~~ U' operattionalsupo<br />

... ++>+ + . + . :. ....... ' ++ :+ 3:. '. + saar . 3++ 44. .. ..... e 3..... . + + supot + .''<br />

... ...... . ... '4. ... 3 .<br />

.increasi*na-rne ;Ii)II++?++iI +:++ii+++ 1+;+<br />

r++++ +' ++++++ , -- g'3. "'4 "3' + teachin availability '3 4.44 3+++ /7<br />

.,,.. ..<br />

ss 2tnc itrngtenicng tp aindivdual onntity caaity<br />

ion<br />

4.+4 3. .33 3'4 43 +++++ + 34' 4 3.y44..34.3.4.34...34+ i f,+ terng opilf aceicani astce eing<br />

3. 2. i~<br />

J",<br />

3334474IL+<br />

,ho,,43a43,.......,.. '.'2'.2+..................<br />

'4++"3 43....<br />

m+ educ+,+-1"at++%io i i ti u i n 4"3'" ' 444337,.334<br />

+'++++ t : ++ +43.3s ++++ d+++<br />

3-<br />

.3 +.++:1'+)+ 4 4+ 3 4 .43343334' 33#,<br />

3/ 3,4. ++++:+++ I' £ 3.+++ .4 .333' ++++.. ..... 4'....3 ...3+...A..3 .3.3.4.3+3....3 .. "3. 4<br />

3 +33 4 ..... ....... 3 ,443',.,3.3 3 3; .4 . ...3,43444.3 ,,4.3433' 3 ,34 ,,3<br />

43 4'.'544'" 3, '33 '43,.'. 4' 343.4~<br />

3 ,. . ,, . 3 ,,,, 3 . '.33,333.. , ,. 44j 4~.'33~4..,.'344434'44433.33"34,3 ". 453l.3<br />

7+33 ..... + +++++ +++ + .... + + !++++ ,31433' ++ 334433'.33' +43# .3 3.3 43444. . + .33'4333 ...3'3.44 ,,<br />

"' 3' '. ( + 2 +i,:+++++ - +.'3', ++- ' 4''3"'74.4'1.."'4i'2'54.44.4' 44 2+' 5243k/4q+++++ +'4, , , +, 333..+++:.3+ 4 . ++;,7-'. . . . . . .+++ +: + ,,,-/+ + :.<br />

4.<br />

,<br />

4<br />

: ,4 +> "'.. ' 3'-,:- 3' 3<br />

4433.4. '0+3'.+3+4442 4'<br />

,,343'33 33'4~~~3433~3. 33423.4433.3.3433 +"4 ',5l~i7 4 "':4<br />

-<br />

4"1;:44.' .334433..<br />

'. '2;~('7f~3'j44<br />

~,,~33433<br />

'.'+<br />

: ll44 4444 +<br />

z .343+M ;<br />

++ ,".2+'542("3/7i+<br />

..,'"<br />

333 33. '<br />

- ,4<br />

'3


3. A continenta'V r iated .---- effort to develov a!<br />

Afr:a-wide refuqee student p:ace-ent mechanism.<br />

?a_:ivu.ar a:ten2 c n. sh uld'-e given to =ctentia:<br />

help fr - the -AU s 3 AXR, A L.d :Z.<br />

4. An~ A::, CU and HA conference --f educators to<br />

Consider -his whole Problem. The conference should<br />

include African and American educators, representatives<br />

of African goverrents with refugee<br />

problems, the OAU, PVOs handling refugee educational<br />

needs, and representatives of various refugee<br />

groups. An effort should be made to help Africans<br />

take the lead ,n sucgestin; sclutions to refugee<br />

educaticnal reqzirements.<br />

,:. Az:-env: ' sistance<br />

After the host cunt- ver.ent and he United<br />

Natins cocrdnat.on and e t is phe rivate voluntaagency,<br />

especially the Christian church or;ani-atiofs, that<br />

carry-out the bulk of the refugee assistance effort in Africa.<br />

r-n the :ounes visited, the voluntary organizations are<br />

pricipally:<br />

Bc:swana<br />

Mafnncnze Central Z=o-itee<br />

Bcswana Chrstian ".nc - Joint Council for Refugees<br />

'.-'CA<br />

Botswana Red Cross<br />

Lesotho<br />

CARE<br />

Catholic Relief Service<br />

ennor~te Central Cc==ittee<br />

Lesotho Christian Council<br />

Swa:iland<br />

Swaziland Christlian Council<br />

75.


.4oza<strong>mb</strong>icue<br />

Lutheran World Relief<br />

CAR:TAS tC :nte--ai.ona:<br />

Za<strong>mb</strong>ia<br />

Lutheran World Relief-Za<strong>mb</strong>ian Christian Refugee Ser.c,.t<br />

Za<strong>mb</strong>ian C.h.ist-ian Council<br />

In---n -nalJ UnZrs~ xchan e Y.d<br />

Car i .as<br />

Znternationai Rescue . -ee<br />

Church ;wo.-d Ser::e<br />

Medicin Sans Fronie res<br />

Eglise du C.hrist au Zaire<br />

Kenya<br />

inter-..ationa!. Rescue C- i'=ttee<br />

National Christian :uci: of e..a-Jcin: Refugee<br />

Services *f Ken-­<br />

-ood f!r Huncry<br />

Cati: ..elief Se.ice<br />

Sudan<br />

Church World Service<br />

Sudanaid<br />

Caritas<br />

CRS<br />

Lutheran World Federation<br />

OXFAv.<br />

Sudan C.--istian C"uncil-cint Refugee Cc itee<br />

Swedish Church Relief<br />

Asme Humanitas (FRG)<br />

Di ibouti<br />

CARITAS<br />

76.


n Kenya, 3c-swana, -esotno and :he Sudan, -. he ieda-e<br />

refucee assistance .rocq-a=--rCp-- t.n, screening, delfare,<br />

educat-Ona: and settlement ad--i.s providded by a 4oint<br />

refugee c-ttee c==-=r-sng -- e host government, .HCR and<br />

generally othe: vountary agencies as noted. :n addition, a<br />

secretariat is organized and run by t-he local Christian<br />

the All Africa Council<br />

cCunci: w:th- signi-ficant funding by<br />

Cf 2h..-nes and the ""I J.C.. As or..anizatj-fn exists<br />

a a -. t is not ncw<br />

-<br />

_--~--s-"----- -s ei- -s<br />

q.... . :n :a--!.a, the<br />

s. .. e....e<br />

s....v the<br />

.:- a: .. r :-...nef,.cee -­ Ser.:e, a local .rocrar- of Lutheran<br />

cR~ eief is pro-id-ng direct set__eent assis­<br />

-ace. Nc s-i4ar crganzat.ions exist n Mza<strong>mb</strong>ique or<br />

Zaire, althouh t-.here<br />

church concils.<br />

are local Cathclic and Protestant<br />

:n genera., the cin: Refugee Service coerations in<br />

Botswana, Lesotho and the Sudan are well crganized and highly<br />

effective, but ;reatly understaffed in both the administ-rat-ive<br />

and ser--ice-utreach ocrtions of! their cperations.<br />

Beyond t.he ".C. oordina.edfu-.ded -. nt Refugee­<br />

:hrist.an Council operations, and those ""'--- voluntary<br />

acenc'es, refugee assistance efforts are varied. They range<br />

frc- exoer-mental :eachln to provision of to..,s doctors,<br />

medicine, tec.hnical expertise and supplies for agricultural<br />

settlement, handicrafts and si-ple distribution of food,<br />

blankets and personal care items. There are volun'.&ry<br />

agency programs in both urban and rural settlement assistance.<br />

For th2 .cst part, local level efforts by voluntar-y<br />

They<br />

organizaticns are the result of their own initiatives.<br />

are su.,ec-. to either the iediate availability of funds


-dor- redgeeass.tnc<br />

Secyineit isivea thtuls oeemns nldn<br />

regar sod tate ae prd oicraethi w<br />

measnaemstt, effots to ass ndaet~out<br />

systems.<br />

Recoen"dation<br />

-~<br />

;<br />

The United' States should spcfial eai*the i<br />

present prorams and requiewmnts of PVOSL dealing with><br />

reuesin Alr4.ca with the view to stegheig present<br />

assiLstanice delivery - relief, welfarel and counselling e--vices,<br />

foster homes - and to stimulatinq excpansion addvrii<br />

cton of siuch activities. In pursuit of this rec snai~.<br />

~~;thi ~Govenment ' might consider: ~<br />

1 I 1+k;+, ++t+; j+ +++:+' 1+++++ +]++ ? ++ +++++++++ ,+<br />

+3!! +? + +++ + 1 +,:::h;++: I,;;+ ++'+" ++++; ?+V ;<br />

1. Convening .aconference of 4voluntary agencies<br />

+++ + ++ ++++ + +pl'+ + ?#++.; !+i :.+++ ++ + !i!+ 1 <strong>mb</strong> +j +++++ '':+m+ Il++ ++ '+;++;++++b'+;jj+.+!+ +j­<br />

2Z-<br />

-- -1<br />

involved~4ith rzef 4seitance in Afric to<br />

dikj'iespec'ific pqimii'nsrto ed hc<br />

USG/other donors should,"consider and during<br />

vbwich USG assistance possibilities couild be ~v.<br />

ex pl1.ored. During this conference PVOs could >v -II-I<br />

II~I~supplementaI<br />

~ ~<br />

berequested to country requests:!or fustified<br />

!3ndi.ng in each onr foeain<br />

Their sil)sissions should henA be checked with-I<br />

1<br />

AZD missions and E<strong>mb</strong>assy refugee officers<br />

I~~*<br />

L o very th~Iair vaiiy Ifsasme htH<br />

~ ~would play-ama~ ro*i coven.ing the~conference<br />

4~~ 1~ ~ ~ and insuring American PVO coordi:iiation. Ameican<br />

~ s5 ight conceivabily wish to1 form a consoi.<br />

I?<br />

II~ -V


mih<br />

- i,44'44s)<br />

<<br />

2. Augmenti g OPGw/tDq4fnigoreueasuistance&<br />

rograms~ ~ ~ ~ in<br />

~po~/iso5fs ~ oedures for<br />

I 1ocal USGiit*aives t augment /ipp~t~~n<br />

whl<br />

loda<br />

-i<br />

a g n c ef f r t s<br />

ha<br />

ANC<br />

--- td 4'-n St t s7a<br />

ietl<br />

44~' 4<br />

ihpso<br />

neesar to cope,~ with4 prblm whc<br />

overzeaous<br />

volnters<br />

no-aIioi.rn<br />

*a supont-funinti<br />

eshoul AID<br />

th The<br />

___ge<br />

PViOc hsmetimsofIo<br />

PVsupport<br />

Ftot<br />

s prtn '4tinlyued1O<br />

d ar icla l AID)~44"4 ~<br />

­<br />

4ez'.444a,'p1-s<br />

grusorsm<br />

th 4uik4s<br />

iat4ra<br />

ano<br />

cbn<br />

a swe<br />

anl<br />

ma 4-ho ..<br />

Pefuqe throups oNHr aome Cabr~stdac<br />

the taice t eplorewt<br />

introd cing s ecialits in trfama' m semionr i n~<br />

tro rsoain<br />

Untd effots shouldeb m ades tet4<br />

junor<br />

depedin<br />

promfessaional


.Reco~endati~on<br />

augmen-t t:he admtnistrative ca~aC:I:y : --.e~ azencisn<br />

.frica w4-1-g~it re-;gees ~o ~ ~ az ~aa<br />

pos.4t.ofS !or :,pos or s4-41ar :unior experts to work in<br />

relief delivery and counselling assistance posi4tions. Ascec--aa<br />

-­aining prograri might !:e cr ;ani=:d t- =rod,-,c ref .zee rmanace­<br />

m -nt specia2~ists.<br />

-. Peace Czr=s<br />

peace Corps Vc'-:-;rteers .nseveraL----e are 'wr~n­<br />

could hel= in a v~riety cf at:;-er =efucee act-.,izes.<br />

Reco~endatiCr<br />

An exploratory zcnversat~on m~z"- *-e '-e:--.:n<br />

Directc-r o! the Peace Cc -s to exa~ine tm'e feasioi:-;t<br />

estaishino a scecia: catecory --f refugee s-,;=cr-: -:-nteers,<br />

along thm :e prm .. nacerent za~a*z;.*-:y -!..


+<br />

181<br />

i..<br />

...i+n++ 7re ug'e*- tilli+ed_ iniiatd "n+++pr i........<br />

Funds, - u4 -. ct 2+ 3<br />

'.4r"'f_ i+"un +++++ groups or"b; &,device for involvement<br />

i ip.•ReFeind'n k" '<br />

,<br />

The asenc of ~the l-epFn~ue the capacity<br />

andflaibi 'tt ofth dinisasitnerectns to'.4."..4'.<br />

sta heue i hys.1 nterfge~otz i h ~<br />

4 +:+++++++++++ ? ++;+:++!+++++i+++ ++ ++;+++7+!+++ ++ +:+ .+++:+ +:++! ++ i-p<br />

+t+ ++ J+++ + ++¢+::+++++W S+ :;+: + ++++++.44 .4 +++/ . ,+ 5 ++++ 3 i+ + 4+ + + 7.+?+ +;.4 1-<br />

R e ozm en i +++> on+,4.4) ++++ 7+:+{?++++++++ + + ..<br />

i+p :++!<br />

a el i&el !=d inaz Botna Leoh, waiad Za<strong>mb</strong>ia actsd<br />

++ :+{++ + ++: ; ?++++ + + +'y+ +++: ++ + p ++ ++] + + '+]> p<br />

elehrin inul Aiadwhere IoTabe atdevc orioaleet<br />

'44 ++ ;+;++ ++ 4. 4:<br />

'.4.4.''-' +: +? ++ .47 4.<br />

Self-5++ fun .elpin+ + Eostwana Lsotfr, Swaziand, Zabia an<br />

'4.41<br />

adcn~iu.iost<br />

e++ in +isew+++++++ere+++++<br />

A f ia+++M;++++ where ++ ++ ; ety. : ':+++ .+<br />

4'4'4asons4<br />

+++.++++<br />

G Ama sori CninecyFn<br />

[.4 s ++


--<br />

A<br />

Intedsstrfilno novn refugees, ther<br />

united states has a highly flexible response capacityi whichV~<br />

perit te i~eiate obligation of $25,000 by the Absao<br />

on hii'x.aclaration<br />

++++lI ++<br />

I of a specific ... 1 ++ disaster circsc. A2++m<br />

-- ti an'efetv<br />

similar-or<br />

response in sudden iad unexpected mRigrationhi n southern<br />

AfrcaanHrnwoud th<br />

ddmeasur~ably to the overallWA~~~<br />

coutrycontingency assncavibltyand h efc<br />

Reco~andatsin<br />

Th United.a States should consider the eibshntof<br />

a mechanism to permit the U.S.* A<strong>mb</strong>assador in a count.r­<br />

experiencing a serious refugee emergencyj on determinitiof<br />

of specific4 conditions (including the possibility that UNHCR<br />

cannot respond quickly enough), to make funds or other emer-<br />

Ilency assistance available to the host country or responsible<br />

agencies until reua prgam assistance is established. A . A<br />

*forinulainvoking $25#000 for instant obligation, with a reserve<br />

• @ ,+ ++ +++ + ++++A ++<br />

of up to $100 1000 per crisis per country, would be reasonable,.<br />

'++:++++++++++ ;+ /+ ++!++--- -,--k+<br />

+ +;;+++m+++*t++++<br />

+++ + + ++! + +.++++++++++,+ +l +i+OAA~ + in one<br />

j +++;++ +; +++1+/+ + + ++++ +: +>++ +++i + + ++++;j~ ;% + ; ++;¢?++++ ++ +++i ++++++ ++++ +++a b ++ 1I+<br />

tory,state. Amng the first group are Sithole and ftuzorewa.<br />

Zimnbabweans who cannot, receive UNHCR assistance as a group<br />

because OAU pressure limits assistance to .patriotic Front<br />

Refugees. "Transitional" categories range from Ugandans or<br />

coutr<br />

lve<br />

A-= 'I 74V. -AA.h ++++++++ ++,I­<br />

7specific '. - -K+ ... K A0+' .------........-- ++++ -+<br />

AAA rA 1-.......... 4 ..I ...- ..<br />

A-- + ' ++ organs orl because'thuy +++% 4++ ++'++++++++ }!ip transi-<br />

I - ++;<br />

K++


is4<br />

Angol.ans on thzeir way to local abopi,'- "educational'' "'~<br />

refugees in Lesotho and Swaziland. The trnsitionals" need ><br />

continuing help, less if o'n te way to absorption, but mor<br />

if~their currnt stat-j3 a . '" 4 *oing stdet becme<br />

untenus becuse of political developments in their native ~<br />

countries. There are many oth~er wref4gees" or displaced."' 4<br />

pesos-f u.&oinod~statgs<br />

* whm theUUn ited States woul '4<br />

liet sitor uanitarian or other reasons.>2 a<br />

Sinc Stat HA mayea<br />

conriuton thog U'444 to hepsmwstee rus<br />

AIDshul utlz haaiueadfeiiiynwcr<br />

r~lines; SineSelin newy'gisave dfct o ini individuals<br />

deserving1~C omo uaiainor so edofatioese groups<br />

44toAI recould tlpie the 1 * ~andie flxiilt prsnopr.<br />

future reee of anefee orespaedshi eros ay.<br />

~' K 4'.Swited under SS t orfll currlentgaps iadto antcipates..<br />

require hat ofbrader ad utirze fud fo asitac<br />

a'line;odeveloing'cetagislationSo ientfeinin the<br />

intrfI'ffir of a gie conty vaiu atossol<br />

be take inLniea~niberaion Inshaavneo<br />

'44' '' 2,J<br />

83..


efutheeassisae. 7 efforto exmpe temie:. vol ol Pay inK~2<br />

____ ;+i.+?<br />

7.....<br />

i +~i!?+ + ++ . p.4... -:++ 'e<br />

aaRecommaeeden Re0ugiee werec ande4Srtegy anda<br />

in dsin inogmeic andl btat~ei for} eva spyw pcecom-~,<br />

ovecoinsnqudeli s~rcoe prcsbetvs hr r<br />

Aif&rnd + s~f 3++ toge+++.... ewther ee theul oiyadSaea................................................<br />

exie +++,++,+,+++++++,+++<br />

trhpo and ..........cons,<br />

legotisaisse irnch ltodetw ±llustrate eem ++.++ ents,: a+ a off jo b.othy~as'7,<br />

problem+++++<br />

+ ++.+ +/+ /+ +, ;++:++++. ++,+ +++ l ++++.... share'ol i'the ++++++ huea I taran. +++++++++++++


the Gabron seodr<br />

schools4,, a setionof<br />

t* Leoth<br />

_ _ _: _ . .... .... ..... .1 ><br />

-- 3"I ne-tg. y--to-Btwn ralwy.ss e, ec<br />

E<strong>mb</strong>assy an IDi A mision~i ' d:!iiiIiretr ar e s t hs<br />

menato's. enralys-akn4 itioe not,'appa advisabl<br />

4 i ntria3 V !i:1 i !>e > ! :<br />

4eFypro4ets"> Hoab4e an Djibouti,4 whchethra<br />

.1.44 j:!cI!4..>.. '........ . 4. I<br />

t4'o>>' construct<br />

>4j, >44'> for refugee requirements<br />

a-eaintd;><br />

havethe irtu of4 decen--al ore 441c<br />

oj2<br />

{>V >!: - : 'a{< ,I:-' '>4<br />

The4tea >'po was1' trukbyth =ltplcitpleof donors.and<br />

P ~ is)i .rz, WIiA3rI!.iiiDJi~)f Wll!<br />

!]gU U1 ' >44 4 14'<br />

.... ....... maxi=<br />

~ assy and it! i% i. also deosrt r.....se S X2 V flexibilitytlS in<br />

h<br />

eac4contr. > 4 4 4 4. refuees ' .41t ost >444 1'<br />

comlsex:)iy,<br />

Sfu**asistanc coviuintio chn isms;=.=:i::i:liiii~i5:ii


countries, and !oncrs - wculd be better served if connenzal<br />

and/or regi4onal s=°nda-,'--.--., p-rocedures a.n_ =-.,~an-s.-ns<br />

could be developed.<br />

Withn t-..e %SG itseif, tnere Is a need for :rea-er<br />

coordinat.ion. As far as Africa is concerned, State :s<br />

endeavoring to fulfill something of this function, but<br />

lacks staff and authority.o plan, sv:nthesi:e and determine<br />

priorities among respective agenc--es.<br />

Recc---endat ions<br />

The U-it'ed States sho-ld ur-e ":;NF. ., :r seek an al-erna--:e<br />

•--e-.a, to achieve this _._d ccr- na- . Per"a-.s =<br />

funding should be augmented t- increase its :3ene%:a -anaemen­<br />

staff. Azcng other alte-a-.rvcs -. :zere .- ;-:;cssibly be a<br />

role for the CAV..Trovided it l-fted Its ban on ass-st-ance<br />

to non-Pat.:otic -ont groups. 7he Un:-ed States =.#th:<br />

consider convening, or -.C.t t=n3 zcnvene, a<br />

operat-i::g agency conferen-e--- = ursue .- _-- :ocr:- at.-n<br />

object-iVe. The CAU, -. f course, s'cu ze - -nv tec .ar-.c--e.<br />

86.<br />

"<br />

;hihin -.he , a spef'.al, Zc.t e on Reffuees n.n.­<br />

be formed by the Depty Secreta--5" cf State t-- ac-.eve greater<br />

coordina.tion between and among involved U5 acencies and<br />

PVs.<br />

M • Self-Sufficiency<br />

one "strategy, a rinciple which AID micht be uniq"ely<br />

y, ,<br />

qualified to adapt and i--plement, is well defined, act-uaar--t:<br />

by a UNTCR -oster which reads in


"we do not ask your help tc support refugees for<br />

ever and ever."<br />

We n~eed you: help to ma&ke refugees self-su oorti~.-1<br />

Recorendaticn<br />

AID should give p&artioula~r attentloz t* those projects<br />

W± acc=m1lish the ftregoing objectiJve. This could<br />

-ncu,-e ed-cat:,cn, vocat4-nral t:aii-oq, re~ette~ent pro~ectsy<br />

re~ugee ei =--ocrams t.-ernse~ves, cr increased 'sett:.erent<br />

:cans" tc '-e~p zra-s~en, trade s~en and smal! t-.sinessmen<br />

estabish thernse-'ves In new ntonnns<br />

87.


Without question, several -.housand refugees ..n Afric<br />

u:ently need 1i4e-support .. "oreassistance. many Usan.s<br />

requi-e suppl.men-.a.- help, ra.g..., fro= educat.on and<br />

lodging to "settlementaloa.s. Even =ore are now reasonably<br />

absorbed (assimilated), but with the shifting tides of<br />

African -Olit cs' t,y - may again som day require atent.4on<br />

(see Appendix C) Regardless of .c_'itical fact-rs n:ol:ed<br />

in the st.atus cf var-i'-uso gtors .s, . each ah zere -n are -ar-e<br />

n=bers of .nnccent :i:tims who !eser:e *e . .<br />

.<br />

huma-i.rlan<br />

-nds.<br />

Most host coun"tres in Scuther. Cenra: an<br />

Eastern<br />

Africa require some degree of assistance ;n deali_-n with<br />

-efugee problems. This may rane fro- f=nancia: and Prsgra.support<br />

to .a.ageria_ training and a-'ce Sevzeral co-.-rles<br />

require broad assistance to stre:gthen ..er :--"--...<br />

and physica. ras--ct-.;re t- -ce " --.. -.-­<br />

needs, wh-oh are .ein exacera--ted ,:t.e =.esence cff refuees.<br />

others require addi-inal i.sion "- -; e ass.staine t<br />

build rese--'es _.n a.nzici. a--ia.- '4 .=ss-2.enew * -.'a:es<br />

refugees. Care shou. be .a'en, hcwever, "hat refue acii.t-es<br />

are not developed to such a level of ccmor-t that they, -. n thesselves,<br />

attract even .morerefugees.<br />

The UNECR, wit-h contributions from the USG and others, 4s<br />

doing a reasonably good job in most cou.t-ries providing life mai.ntenance<br />

and should continue to be solidly supported by the Gcv!.rnment.<br />

PVOs, for the .mostpart., are ef!ectioe cperatnq .ns::.ments<br />

for delivering refugee se-vices. The World Bank, 7N and ther ir­<br />

ternational organizations are providing assistance and c-ns-derable<br />

capital to the most needy countries, as are many of the developed<br />

countries of Western Europe and :orth America, including the USG.<br />

88.


Gaps and needs<br />

wn.a-ever t: e source<br />

89.<br />

do exist between assis.tance funished -<br />

and whatever te :'-e - and<br />

refucee<br />

we2. as c-.st country requiements. "he United<br />

needs, as<br />

of i=" ce ;a=s fr=m 4-s riCh reservci­<br />

States is ca.=ab'e<br />

- a-ed to sh.are it.s<br />

-skils and talents and is mra2-," -b"<br />

cuntv-. .:'. the disadvantaqed and disloca:ed of the world.<br />

With three decades of experience in providing help,<br />

.ilitati. and rese.ttleent fr victims<br />

reconstruction, ret.,<br />

wars, -f ife and disasters all o.'er the world, A'D<br />

c'vi. s<br />

-s e.' .,;al;-fied to assist ref!cees in certain sectors<br />

espec:a.li e&uca:- . nacuer :*a:ning, and hea:t" care<br />

-.. e- - n .a c-e -za n ,- -- .- ia<br />

:n -erta n cases : ca. also ij..r-"­<br />

.nks. There are a variety -f ways ;n whic<br />

trans=Crt3a-on<br />

-e,"gee related assistance, --6.hemost<br />

A:- can :.e-nei :=s<br />

e appears to be through prv.-ate volun­<br />

'ogcal at =oment<br />

AZD field =issions in a'l countres<br />

teer agencies (P"VOs).<br />

visited are working with certinent, reasonable assistance<br />

=cr-fl s. k:D/W should<br />

make every-%, eff -rt to 4m-pement<br />

n ss in assistance rec-.endat-ins as expedit.iously as<br />

ncss_-" e1 and to -revide em!:assies 't: :exblhe tools for<br />

resccnd.n<br />

to emergency refugee requirements.<br />

-


AACC<br />

AAI<br />

AAU<br />

AID<br />

AIDR<br />

ANC<br />

BCC<br />

BDF<br />

3OOTZAM<br />

BPEAR<br />

CARITAS<br />

CCZ<br />

CRS<br />

CSC<br />

CU<br />

C01S<br />

ECZ<br />

EE.C<br />

FLEC<br />

FMIA<br />

FRELIMO<br />

GOB<br />

GOD<br />

GOK<br />

GOL<br />

GOM<br />

APPEMIX A<br />

Glossa.r. of Abbreviations<br />

All Africa Council of Churches<br />

African-Arne '-7a. 'n.s.i-tute<br />

African Association of .. "versi.ties<br />

Agency for International Development<br />

International Association for Rural<br />

Developmen- (Belgian)<br />

African :aticnal Cngress<br />

Botswana C.-ist-ian C.-'c.<br />

Botswana Defense F-O:e<br />

Botswana-:a<strong>mb</strong>ia<br />

Bureau of ?acemen. and Educational Assistance<br />

for ,Refugees (CAC)<br />

Catholic Charities, : er-,ational-<br />

Christian Council cf Za<strong>mb</strong>ia<br />

Catholic Relief Services<br />

Council of Swazi Churches<br />

Bureau of Education and 0u.ura! Affair-s<br />

(U.S. State Oepa.xten,,<br />

Church World Serv:e<br />

Eclise du Christ a,- :a.e<br />

Euroean Econcm.-'c C-.-unt.<br />

Front for the ibera.ion cf tne Cab.ndan Enclave<br />

National Front for -­he Liberation of Angola<br />

Moza<strong>mb</strong>ique Liberation Front<br />

Government of Botswana<br />

Government of D-ibouti<br />

Government of Kenya<br />

Government of Lesotho<br />

Government of Moza<strong>mb</strong>ique<br />

90.


GOS Government of Sudan or Gcvernment of Swaziland<br />

GOZ Government of :a±:e or Gcver.Mefl Of Za<strong>mb</strong>ia<br />

4A/CR.4 O!fice of Refugee and .irast-on Affairs,<br />

Humanitarian Affa-s (U.S. State De.artent)<br />

IBRD World Bank<br />

--­*rational C,:mttee of the Red Crcss<br />

:LO International Labor Crgani:ation (U.N.)<br />

IRC<br />

International Rescue Cozittee<br />

IUEF International University Exchange Fund<br />

JRC Joint Relief Council (Botswana)<br />

:RSK<br />

i =<br />

joint Refugee Services of Kenya<br />

Lesc--!ho Chr-ist.ian Ccun-cil<br />

LA? Lu-_heran crld Federation<br />

MCC Menncnite Ce::tral Co-ti..ee<br />

.MPLA Popular Mcvement for "iberation of Angola<br />

.4AM:3B<br />

South~westAfic<br />

NRC National Refugee Cozission (Lesotho)<br />

OALU<br />

Organi:ation of African Unity<br />

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (AID)<br />

:UCCR .NationalC.hristian Council cf Kenya<br />

.,:TC<br />

National -d's-ial Traininc Center<br />

?AC Pan Afr_-ican Congress<br />

P13 Private 'cl-.:nteer Agency (also called 7GLAG)<br />

RDSG Regional Econc.ic .ee!.-.=ent Cff-A-<br />

SA Scut. Africa Republic of)<br />

SCC<br />

Sudan Council of Churches<br />

SRRS Swaziland Refugee Relief Commissior<br />

SSA<br />

Security Supporting Assistance<br />

SUDAMIAD Gover-ment of Sudan Aid<br />

SWXNU South West Africa Nationalist Union<br />

SWAPO South West Africa People's Organization<br />

TELF<br />

91.<br />

Teaching English as a Foreign Language (Peace Cor--s:<br />

UBS<br />

Teachers Training College (Lesotho)<br />

University of Botswana and Swaziland<br />

UL University of Lesotho


UN<br />

UNHCR<br />

U4.'06cZE<br />

UNITA<br />

USG<br />

Wcc<br />

WrP<br />

WHO1<br />

zxvu<br />

ZAPVr4<br />

z to,s<br />

ZIMABWE<br />

United NatiOnS<br />

South A:. c<br />

­<br />

Office of _-e united Nsations<br />

focr Ref-zq*@S<br />

i ze<br />

ited Nat_40ns d"'-gn' , me:;elcY<br />

~on k~tca :o o . n epende.-:e ~<br />

Angola<br />

United States Goverr~nft<br />

World Council of Chiurches<br />

World Food ?:ogram<br />

worI :.lea-'-.~ oraiaton<br />

:inbabwea<br />

Zi-=abwea Af:: :_an<br />

Pec~les ~o<br />

"n::a i c<br />

61az~bia Chr!.st-an Re.fzee Sev-,ce<br />

Rhodesia<br />

92.


APPD7.X S 93.<br />

CO?.ACT LS?<br />

Afri:ar. Refucee Assessre.": Team<br />

ashinc-on, .u2.y 15 - August S. -977<br />

A. A -. .,s- "-a-. n for -nter.-.tuonal Deve-IO=me.n., A_'=<br />

1. GOLER T. BUTHCER, Assistant Adm;iistrator for Africa<br />

2. W. HAVEN NORTH, Deputy Asmistant Administrater for<br />

Afri ca<br />

3. THCMAS H. Z. ULY- , Director for Sc,,..r AriLar.<br />

Affairs<br />

4. V:V:AZ"%ERSCN, :euv Director for Southe.-..<br />

"-"---" Afairs<br />

5. LEONA20=Z POMA, Desk ...-e-, -.-- r Africa. Affairs<br />

6. ROBERT WR.N, Desk Officer, Sout.hern Arican Affairs<br />

7. H.AR/ADENE JOHNSCN, Director for East Al-i-r- af-fa-s<br />

8. T OMAS 0'KE=?E, Desk Officer, Renva<br />

9. AN'==E RC:.'i:::S, :esk Off!icer, E -ciSo-alia,<br />

Suda.<br />

10. D-A..TCN .. Director for Ce. - ra. a.c Amz.ophone<br />

West Afri.an Affairs<br />

:. . .rE M..T :DEA, o,~-"o i "::ai:e -- Fcrejn<br />

Disaster Assistance<br />

12. CP.STZAN HOIMES, Deputy Coordinator Office of<br />

Foreign Disaster Assistance<br />

13. STMZY GLTFF, Disaster Operations Center<br />

14. ROBERT ClRY, Disaster Operations Center<br />

15. PALMER STEARS, ChiefEngineering Services for Africa


3. Deac!e:o State<br />

1. -?LI.'.*YOSC, eutvy kssistant Secretar-. for<br />

Arica<br />

2. 7AVZ-' BCLN, De~cuty Assiztant Secret.ary ::: '%-=4a<br />

3. S'M=14 L%-W, ;=rn-assador to Za<strong>mb</strong>ia<br />

94.<br />

4. W~.iZZLUU ZAroS, :-;ector, 'Office --f erA ;a<br />

Afffti-rs<br />

S. SHARON MERCITRO, Cffice c! 1Mnter-African A-ffair-s<br />

6. 7HOIAS TH~ORY=D Zir4-ector, :ntelligence and ';esearch<br />

-6oz ZAr-4ca<br />

-. CKi.LP.-S Rl~Pe-a' ;L-.sc:, ~a ~~<br />

.-fairs<br />

9. SEEP WMS ffic-e of Refugee an-Migraic'<br />

IC. GR j !TO, Off!ice of Refucee and niratic.-<br />

Af f airs<br />

V.. ES R'~ H, :4rector for ;Lfrica, Buea- cf<br />

74ducation-al and Cu;,"Afairs<br />

12. Ew-:iS KZ-GH, -e=,-t* -4rectcr, Soutnern A::ica<br />

13. KZ'7.1U McZ*Z esk f'--ce - Bctwa-nna, Lesc-c<br />

Sw a= i -and<br />

14. RZHAPZ ?CST, E:corA:cnA:.: ast<br />

15. GZPALO SCO~. 3*sk "lffjjCex -; ou4 Somalia<br />

16. RICHARD 3ALK=-, Oesk 0!ffice: -:ny&, U~ganda<br />

17. :'HCSON BUCHAN, Di4rector, Central African ASf~zirs<br />

18. EDWARD MATS, Deputy Director, Ceta ican<br />

'-4<br />

Affair-s


C. U.S. Senate<br />

95.<br />

1. FRANK BALAINCZ, Counsel, Senate Foreign Relations<br />

Committee<br />

2. CONNIE FRELMAN, Staff, Senate Foreign felations<br />

COMIittee<br />

I. Geneva, Aumust 9-11<br />

A. U.S. E<strong>mb</strong>assy<br />

1. A<strong>mb</strong>assador WILLIA VAJn DER BEUVEL<br />

2. A<strong>mb</strong>assador BEVERLY CARTER, Deldgate<br />

3. ZWARD T. BREMLN, Counselor for Humanitarian<br />

A.!fairs<br />

Be United Naticns High Co:!cission for Refugees<br />

1. JACQLIES CUENOD, Acting Assistant Division<br />

Director (Africa)<br />

2. RAYMOND MKANtA, Chief, Sout-he-n Africa<br />

3. GEORGE :ACOBCU, Chief, Eastern Africa<br />

4. J. J. CZ.RZR, Prora= Officer, West and Central<br />

Afr-ica<br />

C. international Cc=tittee of the Red Cross<br />

1. JEAN-PIERRE HCCZ, Director of Operations<br />

2. FRANK SCMIIDT, Delegate General for Africa<br />

3. JANE-M_.XY EGGES, Deputy Delegate General for Africa<br />

II. Botswana, August 19-25<br />

A. U.S. E<strong>mb</strong>assy<br />

1. A<strong>mb</strong>assador DONALD NORLA!D<br />

2. R'.APD HOOVER, Political/Economic Officer


A. U.S. Zwdwssy (Continued)<br />

3. LAXRY W.APER, International Re*! jicns Officer<br />

4. ROEIR FPZZELN.E, AID Operations Officer<br />

5. DON JONES, Public Affairs Officer<br />

6. PAUL HOOPER, Administrative Officer<br />

B. Governmnt of Botswana<br />

96.<br />

1. Dr. Q. K. J. MASIRE, Vice President (Acting<br />

President)<br />

2. CHARLES TIBONE, Admi-.nistrative Secretary to the<br />

President<br />

3. .PHIL:PPUS .. STEE:.KM, Secretary to --he :a!,net<br />

4. DAVID F:.LAY, Permanent Secretary, .inistry of<br />

Education<br />

5. STEPHEN R. LrEWS, Economic Consgltant, .-inistzy<br />

of Finance<br />

6. L. M. L. J. LEGWAILA, Private Secretary to the<br />

President<br />

7. T. D. .CGA.%--, Deputy Secretary, .inist-y of<br />

External Affairs<br />

9. N. 0. H. SET:D:-rHO, Rector, niversity of<br />

Botswana and Swa:iland<br />

9. PHINEAS .AMURANE, Deputy Rector, University of<br />

Botswana and Swaziland<br />

10. C. M. OLIPHANT, Mayor of Gaborone<br />

C. Refugee Services<br />

1. GARY PERKINS, UNHCR Representative<br />

2. JOHN McCALLIN, Deputy UMCR Representative<br />

3. Rev. P. G. 1. NDEBELE, General Secretary,<br />

Botswana Christian Council


c. Refugee Services (Continued)<br />

97.<br />

4. Rey. MORRIS .NGAKA.M, All African Council Of Chuzcheb<br />

5. ZRENE SNYDER, Botswana Council for Refugees<br />

6. LOWELL H.STAT,, International Voluntary Service<br />

7. Rt. Rev. SHALNVCN .MILLORY, Anglican Bishop of<br />

Botswana<br />

S. C. A. ERULAYO, UN Deputy Resident Representative<br />

D. Diplomatic Corps.<br />

I.. W-:LFRED ?JRNER, British High Coumissioner<br />

E. Refuges Nationalist Leaders<br />

1. E"ASL xUZOREA, UANC (Rhodesia)<br />

2. ALFRED DLAMINI, UANC (Rhodesia)<br />

3. Z. L. MUSHONGA, UA2UC (Rhodesia)<br />

4. ISAAC MAKCPO, ANC (South Africa)<br />

5. DA*'N:ZL T10CME, ANC iScl.t-n Africa)<br />

6. RA1WEZZ E:G;TWEXHU'LU, BPC S-ou.i Africa)<br />

F. Selebi-P:=we Refugee Ca=p)<br />

. %RAMS 3EKWA, Assistant District Coiissioner<br />

2. DR. GOSLER, Camp laLnaqer<br />

G. Francistown (Refugee Camp)<br />

1. F. ASALLMA, District Comissioner<br />

IV. Lesoth , August 26-28<br />

A. U.S. E<strong>mb</strong>assy<br />

1. BIRNEY STOKES, Charge' d'Affaires<br />

2. PETER BIELEK, Public Affairs Officer


A. U.S. E<strong>mb</strong>assy (Continued)<br />

3. JOHN KEAN, Regional 0i-ector, AID<br />

4. FRA.K CAM)WELL, Operations Officer, A.D<br />

3. EARL AMRE, Acting Peace Corps Director<br />

6. CAROL ROSE, Znternational Relations Officer<br />

3. oveznmant of Lesotho<br />

1. DR. LEADUA JONATHAN, Prime Minister<br />

2. E. R. SEKHOhiANA, Mitnister of Fi.-.nce<br />

3. ALBERT MFC.A.E, .U.-.ister f uc :-on<br />

4. J. KCTSCKCOA , Acting Forein Ln .i. se<br />

5. K. ALEMAYEHU, Permanent Secretary, .- nistry of<br />

Works<br />

9b.<br />

6. M. T. THABANE, Per-anent Secretary. .instry of<br />

Interior and Chai-man, Lesct.o Refugee Cc.-ttee<br />

7. P. MANGOAELA, Per--anent SecretarI, .ist:y of<br />

Ports and Telecomunications<br />

S. C. .SA*'E, :eputy Permanent Secreta-ry, ... stzy of<br />

Aqriculture<br />

9. PHZLLIP .AATMOANA, Senior Permarent Secretary to<br />

Prime .Ltniste­<br />

10. PROF. MUDE GE, University of :esot w<br />

11. Principal, National Teachers Training College<br />

C. Refugee Services<br />

1. EDUARDO GALINDO, UNDP Representative<br />

2. BRYCE ATK:NSON, C.A.R.E.<br />

3. D'CNNIS O'BRIEN, Catholic Relief Services<br />

4. ALAM JO TZ3, World Food Program<br />

5. KE?, HARROP, ILO Regional Labor Advisor


D. Diplomatic Corps<br />

1. RZGI.UA.D HOBZE., British High Commissioner<br />

2. A<strong>mb</strong>assador TA-JEN LIU, Republic of China<br />

E. Refugee Leadear<br />

1. JOE MOLEFI (South Africa)<br />

2. WILLIAM LESLIE (South Africa)<br />

Plus group meeting of approximately 20 refugees.<br />

7. American Comunity<br />

1. Group meeting of approximately 30 Americans<br />

work ng in Lesotho.<br />

V. Swaziland, August 29-Septe<strong>mb</strong>er 1<br />

A. U.S. E<strong>mb</strong>assy<br />

1. JA .S WACHOB, Charge' d'Affaires<br />

2. JOHN KEAN, Regional AID Directr<br />

3. BYRON 3AHL, Regional Programs Officer, AID<br />

4. HOWARD PERLCW, .nternational Relations Officer<br />

5. THOMAS .cOONCUGH, Regional Programs Cfficer, AID<br />

B. Government of Swaziland<br />

1. Dr. ZONKE MHUMD, Deputy Prime Minister (Acting<br />

Priae Minister)<br />

2. STEPHEN MATSEBULA, Minister of State for Foreign<br />

Affairs<br />

3. S. Z S. DLZA.INI, Permanent Secretary for Foreign<br />

Affairs<br />

4. A. R. SHABANGU, Permanent Secretary to Prime<br />

minister


B. Government of Swaziland (Continued)<br />

100.<br />

S. GMLBERT MAILA,<br />

of Education<br />

Pe---anent Secreay.-Y, Mlnist:<br />

6. .UONZ DLAKINI, rerzanent Secretary, Min.istry of<br />

Health<br />

7. Dr. MICHAEL DLAIJNI, Director of Public Health<br />

S. A. C. DAWSON, Education Planner, Ministry of<br />

Education<br />

C. Refugee Services<br />

1. HXMS VEZE AAS, C.arge Lt'NHCR<br />

2. S. S. HUSAZN, L.tDP Residen-t .presentative<br />

D. Refugee Camps<br />

1. Women's Camp, Swaziland College of .echnolo-y.<br />

Czoss section of refugees<br />

. en's Camp, .avwelaeie, near .AIkerns.<br />

Cross section of refugees<br />

VI. Moza<strong>mb</strong>t;",,... Secte<strong>mb</strong>e 1-4<br />

A. US. Ebassy<br />

1. A<strong>mb</strong>assador WZ.LA A. DE PREE<br />

2. JCINNIZ CARSON, Deputy Chief of missicn<br />

3. JON MOODY, Administration Officer<br />

4. J. KOEZR, Economc/Comnercial Cfficer<br />

a. Government of Moza<strong>mb</strong>ique<br />

1. SHR&LFRDINE KHAN, Ministry of Foreign Af!ai-s<br />

2. Commandant FRANCZSCO LANGA, Director, National<br />

Directorate for Refugee Services


C. Refugee Services<br />

1. SERGIO VEZRA'<br />

L,1HCR<br />

de .4LO, Departing Director,<br />

2. E£EEZER BLAVO, Sev Director, tNCI M<br />

3. BJORN JOHANSSON, UNHCR<br />

4 EZRIK ZZTTRZRG, UNDP<br />

S. YVES PELLZ, UNICEF<br />

D. Patriotic Front Headquaers, MAPUTO<br />

1. R. C. HOVE, ZAW Representative<br />

E. DiploMatic Corps<br />

1. P. JON1R, Netherlands E<strong>mb</strong>assy<br />

2. Counselor, British E<strong>mb</strong>assy<br />

F. Doroi Camp<br />

1. FRANCISCO KUPA, Deputy Director,<br />

!or Refugee Services<br />

2. Comandant de Cercle, CHZOI<br />

3. M. AIL.A.N:S, Camp Leader<br />

4. Cross section of refugees<br />

VII. Za<strong>mb</strong>ia. Septe<strong>mb</strong>er 5-9<br />

A. U.S. bassy<br />

1. A<strong>mb</strong>assador STEPREN LOW<br />

2. RICHARD TIER.NEY, Political Officer<br />

3. JOHN BARCAS, Economic Officer<br />

B. Government of Za<strong>mb</strong>ia<br />

lol.<br />

National Directorate<br />

1. A. NPNGUXA, Director for Amrican Affairs,<br />

miist y of Foreign Affairs


. Governxent of Za<strong>mb</strong>ia (Continued)<br />

2. SEX :QARA, Comissioner for Refugee Afairs,<br />

Ministry of Nome Affairs<br />

C. Refugee Services<br />

1. SOREN JESSEN-PETERSEN, Acting Representative,<br />

LUNCR<br />

2. WVNSTON R. PRATLEY, Resident Representative,<br />

3. JERRY 3URKE, Deputy Resident Rpresentatie,<br />

UNDP<br />

4. RAGE GEI.Gt'3, i:ecv.)r, .abibia.- . tiute<br />

5. M.RK BOMAN, Deputy Director, :'b:ian .s:tu.e<br />

6. NILS GUSSING, Za<strong>mb</strong>ian Ciristian Refugee Service<br />

(Lutheran World Federation)<br />

7. KASSIM SAMCURE, :,nternational University Exchange<br />

Fund<br />

D. Diplomatic Corps<br />

1. BETHANY AX.V.STRONG, Canadian High Commission<br />

2. 3. WALL.'ER, Cornission of European Conuntia<br />

3. L. HOLLANDER, Swedish Mabassy<br />

Z. .4akeni Camp Site<br />

1. VAL DIALLO, O.I.C.<br />

2. S. R. NAYLOR, Commission for Refugees<br />

F. Liberation Organizations<br />

1. DAVID ZAMCHYE, ZANU (Sithole)<br />

plus six colleagues<br />

2. 24OES GAOEB - SMAPO


F. Liberation Or~anizations (Continued)<br />

3. .4ISHAKE .=0O:1GO, S9APO<br />

4. . NMI HEO."DO, SwAiPe<br />

103.<br />

5. M. K. SLM70A, O.A.U. (Mot refugee organization*<br />

but primarily concerned with the refugee<br />

organizations)<br />

VIl. Zaire, Septe<strong>mb</strong>er 10-17<br />

A. U.S. E<strong>mb</strong>assy<br />

1. Abassador WALTER CUTLER<br />

2. ALLEN DAZS, Deputy Chief of Mission<br />

3. ROBERT REMC.~*E, Political Counselor<br />

4. R:CHARD SULL:VAN, Political Officer<br />

5. ROBERT MOSHER, Political Officer<br />

6. VICTOR MATSUI, Political Officer<br />

7. CLAY NETLES, Economic Counselor<br />

8. M1ARY LEE GARRISON, Economic Officer<br />

9. JACOB CRA1E, AID Proqram Officer<br />

10. Dr. JOHN KENNEDY, Public Health Officer<br />

U. JOJI FL.GINGER Aqricaltural Attache<br />

12. ROBERT DMMAS, Public Affairs Officer<br />

13. DAVID FREMIRCKS, AID Assistant Progrm Officer<br />

B. Government of Zaire<br />

1. CITOTEN MUKE-KADNG, Counselor to the President<br />

2. Prof. KASONGO MUIDINGE MALUILO, Secretary-Coordinator<br />

(Refugees), Ministry of Te.-±,torial Administration


C. Refugee Services<br />

1. ANTOINE NOEL, -Representative, UNCR<br />

2. RON SCHZ&.WIA, UNH R<br />

3. GUARDtS ?T?:.'S. Resident Aepresentative,<br />

UNDP<br />

104.<br />

4. B. CAVALI, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP<br />

S. NICKOLAS EJAVEC, International Rescue Conmittee<br />

6. MBhLUNGI GANMA.. Secretary General, Eglise du<br />

Christ au Zai.e<br />

7. JACWES GABvA.G". , Assis.-int to the Directo..,<br />

CARZTAS<br />

D. Ras Zaire Province, Cabindan Refugee Camps<br />

1. MATTHIEU HOUBBIN, Representativu, 7nter-national<br />

Association for Rural Developrient ": gi4n)<br />

(AID/R) at BOMA<br />

2. Dr. EVELYn JACCZ, Mission Hospital, KZU, TSHELA<br />

3. Dr. BADOUX, Represe.tative CA.;ITAS, K:'.49A Hospitai,<br />

TSEzLA<br />

IX. Kenya, August 12-_.9<br />

A. U.S. E<strong>mb</strong>assy<br />

I. A<strong>mb</strong>assador JOW1 LE MLLE<br />

2. CURTIS XIINAN, Counselor for Political Affairs<br />

3. CARL PEONDOYR, Program Economist, AID<br />

4. LOIS RICUARDS, Program Officer, AID<br />

S. CUARLES NELSON, Director, AID<br />

6. EXtrEST WILSON, Assistant Director, AID<br />

7. TOM LYONS, Population/Health Officer, AID<br />

8. MIKE RUGH, Program Assistant, AID


A. U.S. E<strong>mb</strong>assy (Continued)<br />

9. LOU COHEN, Director, AID, REDSO/EA<br />

105.<br />

10.. tOSEl DELL, Assistant Di:ector, AID, R DSO/EA<br />

11. GM SWMANSON, Agricultural Engineer, AID, REDSO/tA<br />

12. MARTIN BILLINGS, Agricultural Economist, AID, REDSO/ZA<br />

13. LOU IW5VOVSKI, Engineer, AID, REDSO/EA<br />

14. AL KARAN, Sr. Engineer, AID, REDSO/EA<br />

15. STAFMORD lAKER, Engineer, AID, REDSO/EA<br />

B. Government of Kenya<br />

Office cf the President-Inter-ministerial Comittee<br />

on Refugees<br />

1. P. K. DOZT, Provincial Commissioner fo-- Nairobi<br />

2. JONATHAN NZINGA, Deparcm nt of Inigration<br />

3. K. ONYONI, Housing and Social Services<br />

4. I. M. WAJENGA, Headquarte:r, Kenya Police<br />

5. F. J. M. KWINGA, Departmnt of immigration<br />

(Assistant Tmingration Officer)<br />

6. E. K. KION, Kenya Pol.ce, Spec;-1 Branch<br />

7. E. A. .WAGERE, Zxecutive secretary, INT-MIN<br />

Co ittee<br />

8. L. K. MARGI, Ministry af Foreign Affairs<br />

9. MIXCAM J. TJENGX, Principal I.i.gration Officer<br />

C. Refugee Services<br />

1. USAMAH T. KADRY. Representative, UNHCR<br />

2. JOBANES BLANZENDERG, Education Specialist for<br />

Kenya, UNDP


C. Refugee Semrices (Continued)<br />

3. ULRICH FREYSCrn.MD, Program Officer, MIHCR<br />

4. LUKZKA SHINGA-VZLE, Leal Advisor, -.,t'HCR<br />

106.<br />

5. GERALD .4WP-ZUKZ, Deputy Secretary, joint Refugee<br />

Service Connittee of Kenya<br />

6. BEN MARINGA, Joint Refugee Service Co :ittee of<br />

Kenya<br />

7. Dr. MARTIN ALIKER, Founder, St. Francis Fund<br />

8. D. A. KIPLEGAT, Deputy General Secretary, National<br />

Christian Council of Kenya<br />

9. JOEM KAIMAU, General Secretazy, Nat;.cnal C.-ristian<br />

Council of Kenya<br />

10. AIDA GI-;CY, Regional Director for East Africa,<br />

0<br />

UNICEF<br />

11. JOHN GEARHEART, Di.-ector, Ford Foundation<br />

12. JOHN ROGERS, Director, Food for Hungry/Nairobi<br />

13. ROSEMARY FOLDER, Counselor, Food for Hungry/Nairobi<br />

14. ULRZCH G. BEDERT, Regional Delegate for 7.A.,<br />

ICRC/%.Iai.-obi<br />

15. JEAN-FRANCOIS 3CREL, Assistant Regl.ona. Delegate<br />

for E.A., -CRC/Na4iobi<br />

16. GODFREY SABITI, Projects Director, All-Africa<br />

Council of Curches<br />

D. Miscellaneous<br />

1. ERIC R. KRSTALL, Project Manager, Programs for<br />

Better Family Living<br />

2. PETER DELPH, arvard Institute for International<br />

Developmnt<br />

X. Sudan, Sepe<strong>mb</strong>er 18-20<br />

A. U.S. Eassy<br />

1. Awassador DONALD DERGUS


A. U.S. E<strong>mb</strong>assy (Cntinued)<br />

2. ROGER .MERRICK, Acting DCH<br />

3. RICK .ACHHER, AID<br />

B. Government of 3udan<br />

1. SAVED MOKAMED OKER ISMAIL, Comiissioner of<br />

Refugees, Mirist.y of interior<br />

107.<br />

2. AWMED KORA DAW:, Assistant CoNmissioner of Refugees<br />

C. Refugee Services<br />

1. ANTHOUY KOZLOWSKI, Representative, UNHCR<br />

2. CHARLES LA MLNIERE, Resident Representative, UNDP<br />

3. J. P. NOBLET, Representative, World Food Program<br />

4. ROGER IKHALE, Pepresentative, World Food Program<br />

5.<br />

DA4AS DENG RVAY, Refugee and r'nergency Coordinator,<br />

Sudan Council o Churches<br />

XI. Diibou-i, Septe<strong>mb</strong>er 21-23<br />

A. U.S. E<strong>mb</strong>assy<br />

I. WALTER C!ARKE, Charge . d' A faires<br />

2. DAVID ARlPER, Political Officer<br />

3. JAMES DERRICK, Acting Administrative Officer<br />

4. PETER STRONG, Food for Peace (TDY from AID, Nairobi)<br />

B. Governent of Djibouti<br />

1. ARMED DINI ALMED, Prime Hinister and Acting President<br />

2. IDREES FARAH ABAKE,<br />

Minister of Agriculture


C. Refugee Services<br />

1. KMLL MORJANE, Reprosztat~ive, tNHCR<br />

D. Westen Djibouti, Refugee Camps<br />

1. ARMED OBSYIE, GOJ Escort Officer<br />

2. M. SALAH, Coandant du Ce.-cle, ALI SABIEH<br />

3. H. OSMAN, Commandant du Corcle, DIKHIL<br />

108.


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