NTSB/AAR-84-09 - AirDisaster.Com

The cockpit door was left open throughout the descent. The ceptak testified
that he did not remember the door's being open and that he did not order it opened.
During the initial stages of the descent, the cabin crew completed moving tbe
passengers forward of row 13. They briefed them on the emergency evacuation
procedures and passed out wet napkins until instructed by the first officer to sit down.
They also designated passengers to open the overwing exits and briefed them on opening
them; they then prepared them for the landing.
After the initial level off at 3,003 feet, the captain ordered the first officer to
depressurize the airplane in preparation for landing. The first officer complied, and
although it is not required by the emergency procedure checklist, he turned the air
conditioning end pressurization packs off. He testified that although he knew this was not
required by procedure, he did so "because the smoke was getting bad at that point ana my
reasoning was I have to do something. . . .'I He said that he thought the packs were
feeding the fire. A few moments afterwaid, he opened his sliding window in an effort to
clear the smoke Prom the cockpit, but closed it almost immediately because of the high
noise level. The first officer opened and closed the window several times during the final
stage of the flight.
%-hen the captain sighted the runway, he extended the landing gear. Since the
hOFiZGR?al stabilizer was inoperative, the captairi extended the flaps and slats
incrementally thrcugt! the Oo, j0, Iso, 2.53 End 40" positions. He allowed his indicated
airspeed to stabilize at each flap position as he slowed to approach speed. He flew the
final approach at 143 KIAS md completed ?he landirg. After touchdown, he made a
maximum effort stop (using extended spoilers and full brakes). Because of the loss of the
left and rlgh? a.c. buses, the antiskid system iues inoperative and the fow main wheel
tiires blew out. The airplane was stopped just short of the intersection of taxiivay J. (See
figure 1.) Ailer thc captain completed the emergency engine shutdown checklist, 5o?h he
and the first officer attexpted to go back into the cabin an$ assist in the passenger
evec~ation~ but were driven back by the smoke and heat. Thereafter, they exited the
airplaze through their respective cockpit sliding windows.
After :he airphx stopped, the left (5-1) and right !X-?) forward cabin doors,
the left forward (L-2) .,verwing exit, &id the right forware (R-2) and aft (E-3) overwing
exits .were Gpened, and the slides at the L-I end R-I doors were deployed and inflated.
The 3 cabin zitendants ad i8 pasengers used these 5 exits to evacuate the eirplerre.
After the 18 passengers aqd 5 crewmembers >eft the sip:ar;e, the cabir,
interior burst into flanies. Twenty-three passenge:s perished in the fire. ?;either thc
passengers, crew, imr wi%esses outside of the airphe saw I?&rnes i~side 'he cabL? before
ths survivors lef? the plane. The fuselage and passenger cabin were g;ltted before airpart
fire personnel eouid exringuish the fire. !See figwe 2.:
I.% Injuries to Persons
Lqjuries - Crew - Passengers Others - Tots!
23
3