NTSB/AAR-84-09 - AirDisaster.Com

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!n addition, several samples of qliced eieet-ice1 wiring were reaoved for examina:ion from the forward side of the eft pressure bulkhead. Al! of these semples exhibited evidence of exposure to extre-ely high tenperatures. The insuiation eoverirg was missing from a! of the splices; however: no evidence of elccrricsi arckg ?: shortirg was observed. 1.16.4 Flu* Motor Sei- Test At Air Canada's Dorval Ne%tenance sese, the Sefeq Board siir.s!af.ed the conditions produced by a seized or :rozen flush sotor assembly driire shaft. A Western Gar Motor, ;!ode1 353JC2, identicnl ta that on Flight 797: was connected to a tcst fixture which 2-ovided 115-vcit 8.c. th:ee-phase power through 5-ampere circuir breeiiers connected to the motor power leads. Th,5 rotor shaft was locked? the motor was operated. anl the internal motor temperature and motor case temperature were meastired. The inzernal motor temperature began to ;ise 9s soon as power was e>pliied. .a: I minute 30 seconds after power was ap?Iied, smcke was visi!;y emaxting from cover piate. At this time, the motor temperature was 331°F. At 5 eround the ~ O ~ O F minutes 15 seconds afte- power xes applied, maxiram rotor temperalure or 517'F iw35 reached. .-1 few seconds later, two phases of the motor stetor windings epened. At 7 minutes after power application. maximum motor case temperaturel 405* F, was reached. at which time both rotor and case temperature I began to decrease. Bozh temperatures continued to decrease until the test was terminated. it 27 ininures 16 seconds afze: power eppiication, the reiliaining motor stator windip! opened. Since no further curent 2o;v 'was observed in any of the three-phase motor leads, the test w6s terminated. The -o:or temperaiure observed at this point was 546'F and the case temperature WES 374"F. The S-empere cixul: breekers did not :rip during the test. The maximum current flow recorded during the tes: was 1.85 entpe-es per ;?base. After the inntor assembly cooled. it was examined. Examination revealed the; the rotor %'as heavily darkcned around the circumference of the rotor area which &!igns the stator. The rotor was intact and appeared undamaged. The stator eshibited t? heavily darkened area around its circumference where it aligned with the roior. S-~eys of :he staior did no? reveal any in;ernei electrical arcing or melting. guring tke investiga-aiion. the Safety Board conducted flemn>a5i!ity tests on the xaterials contained in the Heath Tecna cabin interior assembly kit. in addition, tests . A.,. 'p'e eoncwtcd to determine the effecs of fire and.!or heat flus on DC-9-32 lavatory com20nen:sl Eush motor pump components. wiring bundies, wire insulation. and waste zx:erials. Jersey. These tests were ccnducted at :he F.4A Technical Center. Pomona. Sew Cs3-n Siateriais Burn Tests.--The mate-ials contained in ?he Heath Teem Kit were subjectel to the cuxent standard Runsen Burner tests as set inrth in 11 CFR 25.853. (See sppendis F.) X 1 of the materials tested met prescribed si;anda.-ds. A piece of poiyurethene seat cushion, similar both in time of service find ir: cornomition io :he seat cushions on Flight 797, was subjected to vertical and h0rizon:r.i Sunsen Burner tes?s. The materia! fai!ed the ver:ical test Stit passed the horizonftk! test.
t -39- -. :.qe FAA project manage; in cherge of fuli-scale fire testing a% :he TecPaical Ceczer was asked why ~e materia! had failed the :est ar':er only 18 mon:hs in service. He speculated 128: :he partieuier piece of foan res:ed hac 10s: some .~f its :^ire-reiardant capkdities becaxse of the effects of wear and body mckstxe on t$e ouxe? surfece. He Testified 81 the 80.~rd3 public hearing that Center technicians had encountered sim!laar failures whet testirtg older seat cushion materials ana *ha7 he did not 3elieve ~hal L5e depraded -. eape3i:iry of the seat cushion would have cont;ibu:el to the propagation of :3e Ire OR Eight 737. Cold Air Su~~iy Line Tesrs.--'Ths susce$ibiii:y io heat of a cold aii sup?Iy line similar to the ope that had melted thrmgh on Flight 79; 'ha evskared. .X sample co!d ak sspp!y line was piaces near m ekcct-icgliy poxered ;heat elerner,r capble of pr0.?3cing a radiant hea: 2u.u of about 7 l5TL':ft--sec. The amount of heat fP~x wes conrmlled by Fiacirg tine subject line at predeternined dis:en.ces from %e heat socrce. The cold air suppi;: line was ctlpped at one end. and as the line >ea:edt e conslen? internal pTesure of 1 psi was maintained by a:snuaLy opening a reiief valve. 3tirkng .. each test, the ahminun cold air supply Erie was held stationary for about 15 minztes unt!i there wes no no?iceab!e increase ef pressure witfin the !;ne. Tpzee tests x$re conduc;ed. Ths heel fluxes in the eole air suppiy line were abcui 2. 5, and 7 3TU.lEt-sec. There WES 20 eitiiience of heat &.=age io the iir,e and ;hardness test resui% showeS :ha: the line remeined within its spsciiied to?er&nces. The i3Tt"s generaled from oumixg paper Iowek were also evaluated. Three paper towels were cmnpled by hand and ignited by a .ne
Page 1 and 2: P
Page 3 and 4: Abstract Cont‘d The National T?a.
Page 5 and 6: 4 . 5 . RECOMMENDATIONS ...........
Page 7 and 8: 1.1 History of the Plight The in-fl
Page 9 and 10: -4- electrical systems had lost pow
Page 11 and 12: target of Continental Flight 333 as
Page 13 and 14: At 1915:11, Flight 797 reported tha
Page 15 and 16: -9- Figure 2.--Airplane after fire
Page 17 and 18: B b -11- Between May 7, 1983, and Y
Page 19 and 20: -13- l surface, HIRL, and runway en
Page 21 and 22: -1 5- Figure 3.-Left side. of the a
Page 23 and 24: -1 T- Figure 5.-SOOt trail deposits
Page 30 and 31: -. :'ne gush fixer elow and ro the
Page 32 and 33: -26- Between FS 980 anti FS 965 the
Page 34 and 35: -28- Autopsies were performed on fi
Page 36 and 37: -30- cabin. About 2 to 3 minutes af
Page 38 and 39: -ZE-
Page 40 and 41: -34- joined by the No. 2 attendant,
Page 42 and 43: -36- 1.16.3 Flush Motor and Lavator
Page 46 and 47: -4F- Three-?hase power was applied
Page 48 and 49: -12- The first chafe test was condu
Page 50 and 51: Individual units are protected Sy i
Page 52 and 53: -46- c "auto" position and the low
Page 54 and 55: -48- block displays the airplane's
Page 56 and 57: I -50- The approach emtroller said
Page 58 and 59: CI D U W U wx Om NORTH RANGE IN N.M
Page 60 and 61: -51- Since the tests of tine materi
Page 62 and 63: -56- fire damage in the area, it co
Page 64 and 65: -53- The path of almost sll fires i
Page 66 and 67: -60- audible to either the captain
Page 68 and 69: -62- to 85Sume that, given the cond
Page 70 and 71: -64- Q judge whe:her survival depen
Page 72 and 73: -66- in spite of these efforts, sev
Page 74 and 75: -68- flight attendants to move fart
Page 76 and 77: 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 1
Page 78 and 79: Requfre tha: transport category air
Page 80 and 81: -74- cabin emergency lights, tectii
Page 82 and 83: -76- Issue a Maintenance Aiert Bull
Page 84 and 85: 1. investigation -79- 5. APPENDIXES
Page 86 and 87: B Flight Attendant Benetti -81- APP
Page 88 and 89: -33- APPENDIX D 'T2,5-SCili?T DF A\
Page 90 and 91: 1 r; 0 b. 3 ip 1 2 C h it r; Y b..
Page 92 and 93: 0 n a - 4 0 U a rt rt *rt *- 0 d x-
Page 94 and 95:
TIME 8 SOURCe 1859:47 CAM-1 1859:5%
Page 96 and 97:
8. TIME 8 SOURCE CAM- 2 CAM-2 1902:
Page 98 and 99:
- I! a c. 3 - is - Q
Page 100 and 101:
INTRA-COCKPIT TIME fi SOURCE comrrr
Page 102 and 103:
APPENDIX E 14 CFR 25 FLAME RESISTAN
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NTSB/AAR-84-09 - AirDisaster.Com

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