British foreign policy and the problem of Hungarian revisionism in ...

British foreign policy and the problem of Hungarian revisionism in the 1930s
Dr Gábor Bátonyi, University of Bradford
Revisionism was a defining theme of Anglo-Hungarian relations in the interwar period.
Not that the British government was ever ready to give the slightest encouragement or
support to Hungarian territorial demands. On the contrary, the Foreign Office invariably
tried to temper Hungarian resentment about Trianon, making it a priority to curb the
‘unbounded propaganda’. 1 Indeed, Hungarian revisionism and a ‘continual harping on the
theme of the “thousand year old civilisation” of Hungary’ 2 were interpreted by British
officials as telling signs of a ‘national lack of balance’. 3 At the same time, it was noted in
the Foreign Office that an ‘almost insane nationalism’ 4 was rampant throughout Central
Europe. It was also observed, with some empathy, that the Hungarian government was
prone to use revisionism as a ‘narcotic’ in order ‘to divert attention from the
accumulating stresses of the administration’. 5 Accordingly, British representatives in
Central Europe were ready to lend a sympathetic ear to complaints about the Little
Entente or the treatment of Magyar minorities, but persistently refused to accept the
Hungarian argument that revision was the essential precondition of normalisation in the
relations of the successor states.
In this, Sir Joseph Addison, the British Minister in Prague, was a notable
exception. Time and again he singled out Czechoslovakia as the ‘chief stumbling-block
in the way of any arrangement’ with either Germany or Hungary. 6 In 1934 he went as far
as to state:

No permanent settlement of Central European problems was possible without
territorial readjustments, and such readjustments – things as they are and not as
we would have them – must precede all attempts to bring about general
pacification. 7
It is hardly surprising that Hungary’s Minister in Czechoslovakia, Szilárd Masirevich,
cultivated such close links with the British Legation staff. After a lengthy conversation in
March 1932 Masirevich was so encouraged by Addison’s views that he felt emboldened
to suggest closer cooperation with Britain. Masirevich was seduced by the siren song of
his British colleague about the ‘reckless disruption of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’:
There is a growing realisation in Britain that the international ‘order’, which
France tries to perpetuate at all costs, is leading to an unsustainable financial,
economic, and political situation…In 1919, after a four-year struggle between life
and death, it was not just a misdeed but sheer folly that the British gave
insufficient thought to the issue of postwar security and European
equilibrium…Today we are all groping around in the dark, trying to rebuild the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in some shape or form... 8
Senior civil servants in the Foreign Office, such as Sir Robert Vansittart or Sir Orme
Sargent, were not quite so nostalgic about the Habsburg Monarchy or ‘the pre-war
paraphernalia euphemistically called the “balance of powers”’. 9 Yet Addison was not
alone amongst British diplomats in holding a damning view of the peace settlement.
His colleagues, however, stopped short of endorsing Hungarian revisionism. Even
such ‘appeasers’ as Sir Neville Henderson or Robert Hadow limited their advocacy of
territorial revision to the Treaty of Versailles. 10 During his five years of service as
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Minister in Belgrade, the ‘notoriously and tenaciously pro-Yugoslav’ 11 Henderson proved
positively hostile to Hungary. He protested at the Hungarian determination to ‘keep the
pot of revisionism boiling’, 12 and he squarely put the blame on the Hungarians for the
steadily deteriorating relations between Budapest and Belgrade in the first half of the
1930s. In contrast with his readiness to back German demands, notably over Danzig and
the Polish Corridor, Henderson was not moved to support Hungarian claims concerning
Voivodina. Although he accepted the prevailing view in the Foreign Office that ‘an
Anglo-Little Entente bloc would indeed be a monstrosity’, 13 he proposed that Yugoslavia,
‘a not unimportant pawn in the Central European and Balkan chequerboard’, 14 should be
the focus of British attention in the region. He also specifically warned the Foreign Office
that ‘where her revisionist ideas are concerned Hungary may well prove intractable’. 15
Consequently, in less than four months he earned the reputation in Budapest of being ‘a
busybody’, ‘imbued with anti-Hungarian sentiment’. 16
By comparison, most British diplomats posted to interwar Hungary were
reasonably well disposed towards the Horthy regime, but were increasingly tight-lipped
on the subject of territorial revision. After all, no British representative could have
wished to follow the example of Sir Thomas Hohler, the first British Minister in postwar
Budapest, who was removed from his post on account of championing the Hungarian
cause. 17 The reserve of British diplomats was not, however, just a sign of prudence.
Unwittingly, the more vocal the Hungarian demands became, the more difficult it was for
any British official to support them, whether publicly or privately.
The intensification of the revisionist campaign in the late 1920s and early 1930s
proved counterproductive as far as the British government was concerned. The well-
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documented trend of British disentanglement from Central European affairs was, if
anything, furthered by the radicalisation of Hungarian politics and the revisionist
campaign. The Foreign Office showed particular concern about the ‘ultra-chauvinist and
extreme nationalist’ tendencies and the ‘dictatorial leanings of General Gömbös’, 18
although the cooling in Anglo-Hungarian relations predated his appointment as Prime
Minister in 1932. The evident British unease about the direction of Hungarian foreign
policy during the last years of the Bethlen administration was to a large extent caused by
the realisation that in the face of the Great Depression ‘any proposed economic
collaboration between the Danubian states’ was ‘liable to be prejudiced by a clash of
political interests’, 19 especially over territorial issues. Moreover, British diplomats
reported a ‘subtle change of tone’ in the revisionism of the defeated countries, a move
‘from the mechanical to the spontaneous, from impotent bitterness to something
approaching self-confidence’. 20 Some of the early warnings of this bolder nationalism
were sent from Sofia:
The conviction is growing that economic catastrophe is inseparably bound up
with political malaise, and that the steady approach of the former is tending to
bring home to European statesmen the necessity of remedying the latter… 21
The ‘chorus of despair’ 22 gradually gave way to a more aggressive, demanding style
amongst all the former enemy states, which allowed little scope for pursuing the policy of
a British-sponsored reconciliation in Central and Eastern Europe.
To this negative development was added the rapid growth of Italian influence in
the region and, in the case of Bulgaria, the ‘discreet stirring of activity in the German
Legation’. 23 The potential convergence of German and Hungarian revisionism was of
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particular concern to the British from the late 1920s. Hence, the increasingly negative
assessment of Hungarian foreign policy was only exacerbated by the embarrassing Daily
Mail campaign and Mussolini’s overt sponsorship of Hungarian revisionism. Arguably,
Italian support for Hungary, ‘the greatest of the war-wounded’, 24 was not taken too
seriously in London. As Sir Ronald Graham observed:
The recent comings and goings of Hungarian statesmen and the much advertised
friendly feelings entertained here for that country are suggestive of…an Italy
conscious of her own weakness…It is seldom profitable to endeavour to fix
responsibility for the state of international relations, but especially so when
dealing with the compatriots of Machiavelli… 25
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Hungarian revisionism was a thorn in the side of the
British government, affecting its policy in Central Europe and Italy. In November 1929
the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson, felt compelled to spell out the government’s
position:
The question of the revision of the Treaty of Trianon has never come under the
consideration of His Majesty’s Government. 26
Although a few years later the same Labour politician admitted to a journalist friend in
private that he had been ‘trying to prepare the ground’ 27 for treaty revision, he was
undoubtedly thinking of German reparations and disarmament and not of Hungary’s
frontiers.
Despite occasional prompting by various Tory MPs ‘to remove this very potential
source of trouble in Europe’, 28 the official British verdict on the flaws and possible
alterations of the Treaty of Trianon changed very little over the years. As early as
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November 1927 Headlam-Morley, the Historical Adviser of the Foreign Office, admitted
that ‘it would be extraordinarily difficult to make any statement against revision’. 29 Still,
he was emphatic about the complications inherent in any reconsideration of Hungary’s
frontiers. Whilst he maintained that ‘at some time or another, the case for revision should
be considered’, for the moment he was far more concerned that any official discussion of
the subject would only ‘encourage the agitation’. 30 In the late 1920s British weariness
with Magyar claims was summed up during a parliamentary debate on the economic
disputes between Hungary and her neighbours:
This is a question which long ago lost the charm of novelty. Everybody is sick of
the whole thing… 31
Yet, the Hungarian government stubbornly refused to take no for an answer. It
also took comfort from the periodic wrangling by both Houses of Parliament, in
particular the Lords, about the territorial settlement, viewing this as testimony to a
division in British public opinion on the subject. More significantly, by the turn of the
1930s the supporters of the Hungarian cause appeared to be both more numerous and
more active. In November 1933 more than 160 British MPs signed a motion ‘to perform
an act of justice to the Hungarian nation’. 32 Several MPs, including Sir Robert Gower and
William Mabane, became such frequent and esteemed guests of the Horthy regime that
even the British Minister in Budapest was embarrassed.
The Czechoslovak government launched a counteroffensive to entice the same
deputies to visit Prague, ‘where they would be well received and provided with
interpreters, though they would not be entertained on a lavish scale as in Hungary’. 33
Pointedly ignoring both the diplomatic protocol and the advice of the British Minister, the
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British MPs refused even to visit the Czechoslovak Legation in Hungary. 34 The reaction
of the slighted Czechoslovak Minister was typical of the petty bickering and rivalry
between the governments in Budapest and Prague. The seething Czech diplomat turned to
his British colleague, Sir Patrick Ramsey, who recorded:
He asked how we would like to be perpetually accused of owning other people’s
land, to which I replied that we had done it so long that we were quite used to it,
and I recommended to him not to attach too great importance to the private views
of a section of Members of Parliament on foreign affairs. But Mr Kobr went on
with the subject and said that it was time something definite was done to put a
stop to this intolerable revision propaganda. In short, the impression I derived
from the conversation was that Mr Kobr was…interested in using the occasion 35
for anti-revision propaganda… 36
Sir Patrick was weary of Czechoslovak diplomacy and the ‘mischievous alliance’ 37
between Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade. All the same, he regarded Hungarian
revisionism as ‘inopportune and exaggerated’, if for no other reason than because ‘it only
resulted in strengthening the Little Entente’. 38 During a conversation with András Hory,
Secretary-General and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, he explained that ‘from a
sentimental point of view’ he could sympathise with ‘this remote aspiration’ of Hungary,
but he strongly advised against any official revisionist campaign:
It was obviously a hope to think about but not talk about so much, as it was not a
practicable and therefore not a sound policy… 39
Such a mild admonishment, however, could hardly stem the tide of Magyar
propaganda when even the British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, broached the
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possibility of revision in public. 40 Commenting on the Prime Minister’s new position in
The Times, the political columnist A. L. Kennedy described treaty revision as ‘the biggest
and most immediate problem’ in European diplomacy. Following Anglo-Italian
negotiations, which touched upon the issue of revision, Kennedy wrote on March 27,
1933:
What used to be debated only academically or mentioned in the chanceries with
bated breath has now to be officially discussed; and it will be a great misfortune
for Europe if, when this pregnant issue has once been raised, the discussion is not
carried to some practical conclusion. It had been a commonplace of diplomacy
that to open the question of Treaty Revision would be to set Europe in confusion.
It has now been opened; and in spite of the many voices raised in protest their
outcry does not sound so loud as might have been expected… 41
Arguably, the support of revisionism in The Times, whose columnists were in
‘hamperingly close association’ 42 with the Foreign Office, was far more important for the
Hungarian government than the pro-Magyar articles in Rothermere’s Daily Mail.
Accordingly, Count Bethlen paid due attention to the views of A. L. Kennedy when they
met at a luncheon given by Lord Newton. Kennedy was not impressed by Bethlen’s claim
that the territorial changes had to be ‘big ones’. He recorded in his diary with dismay:
This is playing straight into the hands of the non-revisionists – the Titulescus &
others who refuse even to consider the question of revision. ‘Force alone can do
it’ said Bethlen, because the others would never agree to negotiate. I can quite
understand that they would refuse to do so with Bethlen. 43
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Despite, or perhaps because of, his reservations, Kennedy suggested to Bethlen that the
Hungarians should change tack and propagate a ‘negotiated peace’ rather than
‘Revision’:
‘Revision’ has become a sort of red rag to the Little Entente & others; & in this
country the grievance that was universally admitted to be real was that the
vanquished countries had had no chance of negotiating the Peace Treaties but had
had them imposed upon them…He was very pleased with my suggestion, & said
he would work on those lines. 44
The suggested new rhetoric posed no problem for the Hungarians. Even Gömbös
made a habit of emphasising that he aimed at ‘revision by peaceful methods’, 45 although
as Lord Chilston reported from Budapest, ‘when tackled seriously as to the prospects of a
“peaceful revision” most people will frankly admit that such a solution is not
practicable’. 46 Chilston’s successor, Sir Patrick Ramsey, argued that ‘neither the Prime
Minister nor his Chief of Staff ever had any very great illusions about the feasibility of
revision by peaceful means’. 47 All the same, in a speech delivered in Doncaster, László
Bárdossy, Chargé d’Affaires of the Hungarian Legation in London, made a point of
reiterating Hungary’s peaceful ambitions:
Hungary made the principle of arbitration the nucleus of her foreign policy…No
one with a sane mind thinks or even dreams of altering the situation by means of
arms…Led by the conviction that an ‘unjust settlement seldom lasts’, the nation
firmly believes that the will to right wrongs will soon prevail… 48
Ironically, Bárdossy, who was to play such a controversial role in Hungary’s entry into
the Second World War, revelled in the rhetoric of peace in 1933. He told his British
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audience that ‘friendship and peaceful reopening of the post-war arrangement will come
by themselves’. 49 However, subsequent Hungarian governments refused to accept the
official British verdict that a negotiated settlement was for the time being only an
‘illusion’. 50 In the view of the British Legation staff in Budapest:
In characteristic Hungarian fashion, every press article abroad, every statement
made, or visit by any prominent foreigner is seized upon and interpreted as a sign
of the determination of the world to right Hungary’s wrongs… 51
Undoubtedly, Hungarian wishful thinking was linked to heightened expectations
of German revisionism. Yet the attempts to use the German connection invariably
backfired. As Lord Chilston concluded:
Hungary had often enjoyed the support of Bismarck’s Germany, but never that of
‘Weimar Germany’, and could expect much less from Hitler’s Germany… 52
The Foreign Office acknowledged the common interests between Budapest and Berlin,
but categorically disapproved of any attempt to link Hungarian and German demands.
The search for Hitler’s support undermined the moral case of Hungarian revisionists.
Meanwhile, the visible strains in German–Hungarian relations raised doubts about the
strategic imperative of dealing with Hungary’s demands. As late as 1937 it was
acknowledged by the Foreign Office that despite the ‘closest liaison’, Hungary was ‘not
bound body and soul to Germany’. 53 The British government clearly understood
Hungary’s divided loyalties to Germany and the West, but anticipated that the country
would sooner or later fall on the ‘German side of the fence’ 54 :
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Hungary is…in a rather delicate position, and it may be a hard task for the
Government to keep ‘their hands free’ and to remain friends with everybody,
which has been their policy up to date… 55
In any case, using the bogey of Nazism only alienated potential supporters of Hungary in
Britain, without compelling the Foreign Office to accept revision. In a long
memorandum, Bárdossy produced a piercing analysis of the first major setback for
Hungarian revisionist propaganda in Britain:
Today we witness a paradoxical development. The same German nationalist
movement that has convinced the English political elite of the evident need for
revision is now having the very opposite effect…Despite the strong distaste in this
country for Nazi methods, the revival of German nationalism…has had a huge
impact on the British Government and public opinion in accepting the revisionist
thesis…But the focus is solely on Versailles…It is assumed that after redressing
German grievances it will be fairly simple to satisfy Hungarian demands. In this
respect, we should not be fooled by the favourable pronouncements of British
MPs and publicists… 56
Bárdossy clearly understood that the British public was no longer interested in judicial
arguments or historical ‘justice’, but simply wanted to avoid war. The only crumb of
comfort for him was the realisation that the changed political climate in Britain had little
or nothing to do with Little Entente propaganda.
In the mid-1930s Anglo-Hungarian relations seemed to be at their lowest ebb. The
waning British interest in the question of Trianon coincided with a growing apprehension
about the dictatorial ambitions of Gömbös. In spite of his high opinion of Foreign
11

Minister Kálmán Kánya, Sir Patrick Ramsey was also alarmed by the country’s
dependence on Germany:
The relations between the Hungarian and the German War Offices are very close,
and they probably don’t work on parallel lines with M. de Kánya’s
department… 57
The main target of Sir Patrick’s criticism, however, was the ‘revision policy’:
General Gömbös has gone so far in his revision policy that it has eaten into the
soul of the people… 58
Sir Geoffrey Knox, who took over the Legation in the autumn of 1935, adopted an even
more hostile tone on the Hungarian political elite, which was so ‘sedulously educated’ in
the ideas of treaty revision. 59 Knox had an intense dislike for Kánya, and he ‘was no more
sympathetic towards Hungary’. 60 As C. A. Macartney put it:
While Henderson, in Berlin, was advocating the German cause ad nauseam, and
Kennard, in Poland…was yet admitting the existence of a Polish case, and even
the pragmatic desirability of doing something to meet it, Knox never went further
than to write, in chilly terms, that when the crisis was over, and the ‘larger issues’
out of the way, he would express his views on ‘what support, if any, ought to be
given to the eventual pressure of Hungary’s claims to territorial revision’. At the
time (which was the time when the Government had to decide whether those
claims were justified or not) he did not propose to ‘weary’ the Foreign Office with
his views. 61
By 1937 Tibor Eckhardt, a confidant of the American Minister in Budapest, bitterly
complained of British ‘inactivity’ in Hungary. He was so exasperated by Knox that he
12

thought that the British might as well close down their Legation in Budapest. 62 The
British Minister was also accused of Little Entente sympathies. 63 As his successor put it
in his memoirs:
There was in the Foreign Office and in most Ministers’ minds a hard core of
feeling and opinion about central Europe built up by what may roughly be called
the pro-French school of thought… 64
Be that as it may, Sir Geoffrey had a brief from the Foreign Office to try to end ‘eighteen
years of sterile recrimination’ 65 between Hungary and her neighbouring states. His efforts
to damp down the note of revisionism were in line with instructions from the Foreign
Secretary, Anthony Eden.
Following the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, Eden initiated a major rethink of
the possible alterations to the territorial status quo. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Assistant
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was asked to provide an analysis. Cadogan
admitted that British policy in Central and Eastern Europe was ‘vitiated by the fact that it
was founded on the Peace Settlement’ and argued that a British-sponsored ‘review of all
the peace treaties’ was inevitable. 66 He recommended a complete redrafting of the
Covenant of the League of Nations and a substantial redrawing of the European
frontiers. 67 Although, admittedly, Cadogan was only half-heartedly ‘fumbling with the
idea of revision’ 68 in order to regularise and defend what was left of the Versailles
settlement, he arrived at some bold conclusions:
I am aware that this is an awful prospect…but what is the alternative? And if
the Treaty of Versailles is to be recast, that, in all justice, must be done to the
other Peace Treaties. And, particularly in the case of the Treaty of Trianon, the
13

territorial settlement certainly would be called in question! And quite possibly
these other Treaties might cause more trouble than the Treaty of Versailles. But
without revision, I fear that we should be building on sand, and without revision I
fear that the process of treaty-breaking will go on… 69
Cadogan’s analysis demonstrates how far Britain was forced to reckon with the issues of
treaty revision and territorial change. Nevertheless there is also a clear indication that the
Treaty of Trianon was considered to be a less pressing, and more intricate, problem than
that of Versailles. Thus, while the reconsideration of the territorial status quo led to the
‘active appeasement’ of Germany, Anglo-Hungarian relations deteriorated further.
Characteristically, the correct but frosty attitude of the Foreign Office did not
immediately change after the death of Gömbös. In fact, the appointment of a succession
of reputedly Anglophile Prime Ministers in Budapest had little impact either. The British
interest in Hungarian affairs was only to intensify in 1938, shortly before the idea of a
‘peaceful revision’ became a reality.
1 Viscount Chilston to Sir J. Simon, Budapest, June 9, 1933, in C. Seton-Watson (ed.),
British Documents on Foreign Affairs (BDFA): Reports and Papers from the Foreign
Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series F, Vol. 3, University Publications of America,
1990, p. 317
2 Sir P. Ramsey to Sir S. Hoare, Budapest, June 8, 1935, BDFA, Vol. 11, p. 340
3 M. Lampson to E. Phipps, Foreign Office, January 8, 1926, Phipps Papers, Churchill
College Archives Centre, 2/20 f. 30
4 Memorandum by Sir O. Sargent, Foreign Office, April 21, 1931, BDFA, Vol. 3,
pp. 73–9
5 Viscount Chilston to Sir J. Simon, Budapest, June 9, 1933, BDFA, Vol. 3, p. 317
6 Sir J. Addison to Sir J. Simon, Prague, November 13, 1934, BDFA, Vol. 10,
pp. 397–404
7
Ibid.
8
Memorandum by Sz. Masirevich, Prague, March 31, 1932, Hungarian National
Archives (MOL) K63-4-1932-2/7
9
Memorandum by Sir O. Sargent, Foreign Office, April 21, 1931, BDFA, Vol. 9,
pp. 73–9
14

10
L.W. Michie, Portrait of an Appeaser: Robert Hadow, First Secretary in the British
Foreign Office, 1931–1939, Praeger, London, 1996; P. Neville, Appeasing Hitler: The
Diplomacy of Sir Neville Henderson, 1937–39, Macmillan, London, 2000
11
P. Neville, Appeasing Hitler, p. 15
12
Sir N. Henderson to Sir J. Simon, Belgrade, May 24, 1934, BDFA, Vol. 10, p. 308
13
Sir N. Henderson to E. H. Carr, Belgrade, October 8, 1934, in W. N. Medlicott, D.
Dakin, and M. E. Lambert (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy, Second Series,
Vol. XII, p. 147
14
Ibid.
15
Sir N. Henderson to Sir J. Simon, Belgrade, May 24, 1934, BDFA, Vol. 10, p. 308
16
A. Valdemár to L. Walkó, Belgrade, April 15, 1930, MOL K63-3-1930-2/7
17
The charge of ‘going native’ was levelled against Sir Thomas Hohler in the early 1920s
and to a lesser extent against Sir Owen O’Malley on the eve of the Second World War
18
Viscount Chilston to Sir J. Simon, Budapest, June 12, 1933, BDFA, Vol. 3, pp. 318–19
19
M. Palairet to Sir J. Simon, Bucharest, November 11, 1932, BDFA, Vol. 3, p. 195
20
S. Waterlow to Sir J. Simon, Sofia, December 9, 1931, BDFA, Vol. 3, p. 68
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
E. Drummond to A. Eden, Rome, November 4, 1936, BDFA, Vol. 12, p. 91
25
Sir R. Graham to Sir J. Simon, Rome, January 13, 1933, BDFA, Vol. 3, p. 218
26
House of Commons debate, November 13, 1929; see also V. Williams and R. E.
Lomax (eds), The Hungarian Question in the British Parliament, Grant Richards,
London, 1933, p. 428
27
G. Martel (ed.), The Times and Appeasement: The Journals of A. L. Kennedy 1932–
1939, Cambridge University Press, 2000
28
V. Williams and R. E. Lomax (eds), The Hungarian Question, p. 428
29
J. W. Headlam-Morley to H. W. Temperley, November 10, 1927, Headlam-Morley
Papers, Churchill College Archives Centre, Cambridge, HDLM ACC 727 Box 40
30
Ibid.
31
Debate in the House of Lords, June 25, 1928, in V. Williams and R. E. Lomax (eds),
The Hungarian Question, p. 366
32 T. L. Sakmyster, Hungary, the Great Powers, and the Danubian Crisis 1936–1939,
The University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1980, p. 79
33 Sir P. Ramsey to Sir J. Simon, Budapest, October 29, 1934, BDFA, Vol. 10, p. 386
34 Ibid.
35 Reference to the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934
36 Sir P. Ramsey to Sir J. Simon, Budapest, October 29, 1934, BDFA, Vol. 10, p. 386
37 Report by the British delegation on the Stresa Conference, London, October 8, 1932,
BDFA, Vol. 3, pp. 215–31
38 Sir P. Ramsey to Sir J. Simon, Budapest, December 8, 1934, BDFA, Vol. 10, p. 407
39 Ibid.
40 See L. Bárdossy’s reports on March 28 and April 14, 1933, MOL K63-5-1933-2-1024
41 G. Martel (ed.), The Times and Appeasement, p. 91
42 G. Martel (ed.), The Times and Appeasement, p. 10
15

43
G. Martel (ed.), The Times and Appeasement, p. 114
44
Ibid.
45
See, for example, Viscount Chilston’s reports from Budapest on October 6, 1932,
March 14, 1933, and June 9, 1933, BDFA, Vol. 3, pp. 232, 292–3, and 317–18
46
Ibid.
47
Sir P. Ramsey to Sir J. Simon, Budapest, June 25, 1934, BDFA, Vol. 10, p. 322
48
Draft of a speech given by L. Bárdossy in Doncaster on February 28, 1933, by
invitation of the Near East Association, MOL K63-1933-2/7
49
Ibid.
50
Viscount Chilston to Sir J. Simon, Budapest, June 9, 1933, BDFA, Vol. 3, p. 317
51
Ibid.
52
Viscount Chilston to Sir J. Simon, Budapest, March 22, 1933, BDFA, Vol. 3, p. 297
53
Sir G. Knox to A. Eden, Budapest, March 11, 1937, BDFA, Vol. 13, p. 293
54
Sir P. Ramsey to Sir J. Simon, Budapest, June 25, 1934, BDFA, Vol. 10, p. 322
55
W. E. Houstoun-Boswall to Sir J. Simon, Budapest, September 17, 1934, BDFA, Vol.
10, p. 377
56
Memorandum by L. Bárdossy on the changes of British Government policy and public
opinion in relation to the question of revision, MOL K63-5-1933-2-1024
57
Sir P. Ramsey to Sir S. Hoare, Budapest, June 8, 1935, BDFA, Vol. 11, p. 340
58
Ibid.
59
Sir G. Knox to A. Eden, Budapest, April 9, 1936, BDFA, Vol. 12, p. 319
60
C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary 1929–1945,
Edinburgh University Press, 1957, Vol. 1, p. 251.
61
Ibid.
62
T. Frank (ed.), Roosevelt követe Budapesten: John F. Montgomery bizalmas politikai
beszélgetései, Corvina, Budapest, 2002, p. 151
63
T. Frank (ed.), Roosevelt követe Budapesten, p. 109.
64
Sir O. O’Malley, The Phantom Caravan, John Murray, London, 1954, p. 202
65
Sir G. Knox to A. Eden, Budapest, April 16, 1937, BDFA, Vol. 13, p. 301
66
Cadogan Papers, Churchill College Archives Centre, Cambridge, ACAD 4/1
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
16