The Economic History of Byzantium - Dumbarton Oaks

1016 NICOLAS OIKONOMIDES
that seem unquestionable. When Theophanes is describing the humiliation of Emperor
Nikephoros by Caliph Harun al-Rashid (805), he tells us that the Byzantine emperor
(whom he profoundly disliked) undertook to pay the caliph 30,000 gold coins
per annum for the state plus 3 nomismata as his own poll tax and a further three for
his son Stavrakios. 112 It is clear that by this pact the Byzantines were compelled to accept
a public humiliation much more painful than any financial loss would have been,
yet the loss itself was not so terrible if we bear in mind that to have fought a major
campaign against the caliphate (with very little chance of success, as things stood at that
time) would have cost a great deal more.
As far as the tenth century is concerned, we know exactly how much an Italian noble
was paid to suppress an anti-Byzantine rising with his own forces and to deliver the
territory that had been in revolt into the hands of the strategos of Longobardia: 7,200
nomismata plus some silk cloth and valuable plate for himself and some more for his
bishops and feudal lords. 113 To fight a campaign overseas in Italy, even on a small scale,
would have cost much more. There are other examples such as this.
State Gold Reserves
Idonot believe that it is possible, with the figures at our disposal, to arrive at even an
approximate estimate of the Byzantine budget. The attempts made in this direction
have relied on sources—most of them Arab—of dubious reliability that flatly contradict
the most reliable of the Byzantine sources. Moreover, these estimates call for so
much arbitrary assumption and abstraction in reaching any kind of conclusion that
even when apparently “reasonable” they are actually the product of the modern author’s
will and of the various patterns and molds he has imposed on the medieval
past—none of which has anything at all to do with the real data given by the sources. 114
The only general figures we possess in connection with the magnitude of the Byzantine
state economy are those that state the reserves of gold the various emperors passed
on to their successors, and on the basis of which they were judged to have been successful
or otherwise. Of course, many texts refer to the mythical wealth of the imperial
treasury. In others, however, we are told that the emperor was forced to melt down
precious plate or the jewelry of the palace and the churches and turn it into coin 115 in
order topay the salaries or deal with a sudden and urgent threat to the defenses of
the empire. If we consider the consequences this must have had for the morale of the
population and the reaction it could (and did) trigger, especially where the assets of
112 Theophanes, 482.
113 De cer., 1:661–62.
114 Treadgold, Byzantine State Finances.
115 This is what Michael III, who had squandered the wealth of the empire, was said to have done
not long before 867 (Theophanes Continuatus, 173). However, the information is questionable, coming
as it does from historians who constantly criticize Michael III in order to praise and justify his successor
(and assassin), Basil I.