The Economic History of Byzantium - Dumbarton Oaks

1020 NICOLAS OIKONOMIDES
of lower value. However, it has to be admitted that this is not the only possible interpretation
of the tetarteron.
The problems in the gold coinage reappeared in the eleventh century, in a different
manner. Now the nomisma was debased by reducing its gold content, though without
changing its weight. Analysis of these coins has shown that the first and insignificant
devaluation probably occurred under Michael IV the Paphlagonian (1034–41). Further
devaluations were restrained, and by the time of Romanos Diogenes (1068–71)
the nomisma, whose gold content was originally more than 22 carats, was down to 18
or slightly less. After this, however, the gold content dropped dramatically: from 16
carats to 10 under Michael Doukas (1071–78) and then to 8 carats—one-third of its
original value—in the reign of Nikephoros III Botaneiates (1078–81).
According to Cécile Morrisson, 124 what we have during the first phase—to the end
of the 1060s—is a deliberate devaluation for the purposes of development, decided
upon because the volume of trade had increased much more rapidly than the quantity
of gold available. A similar phenomenon occurred in Italy at about the same time. Sure
enough, there was no significant reaction to this devaluation in Byzantium. In the
1070s, on the other hand, we have crisis devaluation and the collapse of the entire
middle Byzantine monetary system, sweeping away with it the fiscal and tax systems
as well.
Morrisson’s theory has been questioned by M. Hendy, 125 who believes the crisis is
one and the same from the start and that the only change was in the severity of the
problems that appeared. However this may be, it is certain that around 1071—that is,
in the wake of the battle of Mantzikert and the loss of Asia Minor—we have a crisis far
more acute than any that had gone before. Consequently, I shall examine the eleventh
century by drawing a dividing line at 1071—a line that no one calls into question, regardless
of his or her understanding of the crisis. For my part, I agree with Morrisson’s
position, and this statement will affect the account I give below.
Among the other phenomena of the eleventh century, which may be indicative of a
shortage of cash but also reveal confidence in the state economy, are a rise in interest
rates and a corresponding reduction in the yield of the roga on honorary titles. Both
phenomena are reported in the Peira of Eustathios Rhomaios, a text certainly written
before 1045. The average interest rate for loans in cash rose from 6% to 8.33%, and
other interest rates followed proportionally. 126 Given that this phenomenon occurred
before the devaluation of the nomisma had really got under way (interest rates may
have begun to rise, and probably did, some decades before 1042), it could be seen as
an indication of a shortage of cash, or of increased demand for it. At about the same
period—indeed, in the same text—we are told that the annual roga of those appointed
124 C. Morrisson, “La dévaluation de la monnaie byzantine au XI siècle: Essai d’interprétation,”
TM 6 (1976): 3–48; cf. Lemerle, Cinq études, 285, 307; cf. Morrisson, “Byzantine Money,” 944.
125 Hendy, Studies, 236.
126 A. E. Laiou, “God and Mammon: Credit, Trade, Profit and the Canonists,” in Byzantium in the
12th Century: Canon Law, State and Society, ed. N. Oikonomides (Athens, 1991), 266–85.