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In Search of an Enforceable Medical Malpractice Exculpatory

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June 2009] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS 863<br />

responsibility is a necessary element <strong>of</strong> every patient-provider relationship.<br />

It is import<strong>an</strong>t to note that the Ash court does not explain<br />

why one party owing the other a greater responsibility might undermine<br />

a contract. Thus, there is no underlying purpose that could be<br />

used to guide application <strong>of</strong> the greater-responsibility justification on<br />

a case-by-case basis. <strong>In</strong>stead, it seems like a categorical rule.<br />

If courts applying Ash as a categorical rule base this finding on<br />

the greater-responsibility justification, the next step for a doctor<br />

hoping to craft <strong>an</strong> enforceable medical malpractice exculpatory agreement<br />

is unclear. An agreement incorporating the suggestions <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Private <strong>Malpractice</strong> Symposium scholars could meet both the publicinterest-in-healthcare<br />

prong <strong>an</strong>d the bargaining-power justification for<br />

the special-relationship prong <strong>of</strong> the void-for-public-policy rationale<br />

because the contract need not affect quality <strong>an</strong>d would not be adhesive.<br />

But courts have not articulated the reason why the “greater<br />

responsibility” owed by doctors to patients justifies invalidation <strong>of</strong><br />

medical malpractice exculpatory agreements. Without a more specific<br />

articulation, there is no obvious way to craft <strong>an</strong> agreement that could<br />

avoid a broad reading <strong>of</strong> the greater-responsibility justification <strong>an</strong>d<br />

the Creed line <strong>of</strong> cases. The next Part puts forward a reason why the<br />

greater responsibility doctors owe to patients justifies invalidation <strong>of</strong><br />

some agreements, but not all.<br />

II<br />

HOW SIGNALING EFFECTS CAN ENCUMBER THE DECISION<br />

TO SIGN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE<br />

EXCULPATORY AGREEMENT<br />

This Part uses a behavioral law <strong>an</strong>d economics <strong>an</strong>alysis <strong>of</strong> the<br />

patient’s decision to sign a medical malpractice exculpatory agreement<br />

to show why the simple presence <strong>of</strong> the doctor-patient relationship<br />

might justify invalidation <strong>of</strong> the agreement. Behavioral economic<br />

<strong>an</strong>alysis is largely theoretical: It uses as a starting point the economic<br />

model <strong>of</strong> the purely rational, self-interest-maximizing decisionmaker<br />

<strong>an</strong>d qualifies that model with the insights <strong>of</strong> behavioral psychology.<br />

First, a caveat: Behavioral economic <strong>an</strong>alysis is not the only way<br />

to illuminate patient decisionmaking. If it were possible, a case study<br />

or survey <strong>of</strong> patients or doctors actually involved in the decisions<br />

would be preferable as a replacement for, or supplement to, theoretical<br />

<strong>an</strong>alysis. <strong>In</strong> cases like this, however, in which few examples <strong>of</strong><br />

medical malpractice exculpatory agreements that could be used for

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