„The Brighter Side of Europe” / Piotr Kaczyński

PART THREE
Difficult
Partner
The EU enlargement of 2004 was probably
the most important development
in the history of European integration since
the process first began in the 1950s.
A common pre-enlargement perception of this historic development
was that a group of reasonably democratic and wealthy nations of Western
Europe embraced a crowd of poor and semi-civilised cousins from
the Eastern flanks of the continent. Another view defines the process
as a mere enlargement of the status quo, expecting the newcomers to
behave and follow the leadership of the older, Western democracies.
The reality, however, is quite different. In the years following the 2004
enlargement, old European coalitions have been reshaped with the emer-
gence of new actors in the East. One partner in particular has certainly not
adapted to the prevailing pre-enlargement status quo: Poland.
There could have been no EU enlargement in 2004 without Poland. The
country is populated by the total population of the nine other countries
which joined that year, while its economic strength is equal to that of the
nine others combined. Furthermore, Poland is strategically located and
– perhaps most importantly – it is a country which the other post-Communist
states view with a combination of reluctance and respect as a political
heavyweight.
France and Germany and most Western European nations also considered
that “the Eastern enlargement” without Poland would have been a political
impossibility. This strengthened Poland’s hand in negotiating its own terms
of accession, but as long as Poland remained a mere applicant its position
would never be equal to that of its Western European allies.
3
For tomorrow, you’ll learn
the whole “Ode to Joy”
by heart.
Marek Raczkowski
This changed in December 2002, when the terms of enlargement were
completed. Only days after the first round of negotiations, the government
in Warsaw sent a strong message to the EU: we think independently and
assertively. Poland’s flexing of its diplomatic muscle upset the political
consensus within the EU; the French President even commented that Poland
should know when to “keep quiet”. This was during the time leading
up to the US-led invasion of Iraq, which divided European nations. In December
2002 the Polish government took the decision to buy American
F-16s over the European Mirage (French) or Grippen (British-Swedish)
fighter jets. This was the first bold decision of many that caused consternation
among some Western European capitals. The following months saw
Polish troops deployed to Iraq and Warsaw adopted an equally aggressive
stance during the negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty during the
Intergovernmental Conference.
This was a shock to the EU system; an early sign that there was a new actor
in the European Union to which the older members would have to adapt.
Poland was not abusing its position or its rights – the Union was split in half
over the Iraqi conflict and many older EU states pursued similar policies
(including Italy, the Netherlands, the UK and Spain). Therefore it had every
right to have its own policy, whatever the moral stance of the governments
in Paris or Berlin. Looking back at the decisions, policy-makers in Warsaw
understood that following the US in its Middle East policy was probably
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