„The Brighter Side of Europe” / Piotr Kaczyński

the wrong move; however, it generated important positive aspects for Poland. First,
its standing in international affairs was improved as it has proven itself a reliable
partner for the United States. Second, Poles were able to use their own military
capacities in the Iraqi and Afghan wars as a means of modernising the Polish army.
Following Poland’s accession to the European Union, it began contributing to the
EU’s policy on its new Eastern neighbourhood. When the presidential elections
in Ukraine were rigged, the Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski along with
his Lithuanian counterpart Valdas Adamkus called for a strong EU engagement
in resolving the conflict. Their role was decisive in convincing Western European
leaders to engage with and convince the Ukrainian leaders to allow Europeans
to provide external assistance. The Ukrainian Orange Revolution was successful;
elections were repeated and by the end of the 2004 the president had been elected
through fair elections. This seemed like a positive beginning of an EU policy
towards Eastern Europe where Poland and other post-communist states would
be at the centre of policy formulation.
2005 saw the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in referenda held in France and
the Netherlands. Some commentators have attributed the failure to “enlargement
fatigue” – hostility among Western European societies of their respective governments’
openness towards migrants. Among other things, the 2004 enlargement
was expected to produce a further wave of migration, this time from Central and
Eastern Europe. In France the spectre of the “Polish plumber” depriving French
workers of jobs was popularised in the media. Poles took this fear and turned the
argument on its head. The Polish Tourism Organisation produced a very popular
advertisement featuring a male model dressed as a plumber with the caption, “I’m
staying in Poland. All are welcome.” (Je reste en Pologne. Venez nombreux).
Poland did not suffer from enlargement fatigue or fears related to migration (not
even that of a “brain drain”). On the contrary, many of the 40% unemployed young
Poles were eager to test the limits of the EU’s free movement of labour, with over
a million Poles migrating after 2004 mostly to the United Kingdom and Ireland.
The reason why there was no fatigue in Poland is linked to the simple fact the all
the newer EU members and societies prepared themselves for EU accession. They
were not, however, anticipating accession to a different kind of a Union. In becoming
members they changed the very nature of the EU. At the same time a surprise
of a different nature was felt in Western Europe. The EU-15 societies were socially
unprepared for enlargement, with fears manifesting in popular caricatures such
as the “Polish plumber”. After all, it was the new members adhering to the EU, not
the other way round, so why should the older members need to adapt? At least, this
was the attitude among Western European states.
Enlargement did bring a certain “confidence” to Poland. In fact, a combination
of factors (such as accession, but also high unemployment, corruption and death
of John Paul II) culminated in the election of a new conservative-nationalist governing
coalition in 2006-7 under Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and President
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Lech Kaczyński (2005-10). The election of the Kaczyński brothers inaugurated
a new period of Poland’s EU membership during which its reputation had been
largely compromised.
During late spring of 2006, Jarosław Kaczyński formed a government which included
extremist right-wing nationalist and populist parties. Conflicts between
Warsaw and a number of Western European countries emerged as the new government’s
rhetoric created friction with its EU partners. With Germany, numerous
unresolved historical conflicts such as the restitution of property on post-German
territory and the creation of the Centre Against Expulsions; treatment of Polish
nationals in Germany; and debates on the Russian-German pipeline under the Baltic
Sea caused tensions between Warsaw and Berlin. On EU issues, Poland and
Germany usually found themselves on opposing sides. Relations with France were
frozen ever since President Chirac’s comments on what he perceived as Poland’s
“missed opportunity to keep quiet” during the prelude to the Iraq War in 2003. The
Warsaw-Madrid axis on the Constitutional Treaty evaporated with the arrival of the
new socialist Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero. Relations with other new
Member States remained conditioned by the evolution of Polish-German relations.
Faced with lack of support in many of its policy battles, Poland of the Kaczyński
twins became increasingly isolated.
With the EU, Poland started to behave at times unpredictably and began to be per-
ceived as an unreliable partner. There were quite a few conflicts between Poland
and the European Commission or other institutions during the tenure of the
Kaczyński twins, including on milk quotas, pan-European banking consolidation,
the application of the Natura 2000 programme, state aid to shipyards, treatment
of minority rights, a Polish veto of the EU-Russia partnership and cooperation
agreement negotiations, total opposition to climate change policy, refusal to accept
the Charter of Fundamental Rights; opposition to the double majority voting system
in the Council; and the final delay with ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in Poland.
As a result, Poland gained a negative reputation as conducting unrealistic EU
policy as well as new labels of “Russophobes” and “homophobes”, usually employed
unfairly by some left-wing politicians, but the Kaczyński government did little
to demerit the labels. It is quite unfortunate that even when the Warsaw government
was right (for example in its sceptical position on Russia), it was rarely able
to convince its EU partners due to its low credibility.
The people voted the conservative-nationalist government out of office in 2007.
Since taking office the centre-right government of Donald Tusk has established
itself as an influential and reliable partner in European politics. Relations with Germany
and France have been repaired, allowing for the solution of many previous
conflicts. Constructive dialogue with Russia turned out to be possible. Other ongoing
and new differences with the EU are dealt with through reasoned dialogue. The
2011 presidency of the Council is a culmination of the process of putting Poland
– the smallest and the poorest of the big EU nations and the largest of the small
nations – on the map of European politics as a respected, competent and reliable
partner.
20 | Difficult Partner
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