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Noam Chomsky - Turning the Tide U.S. intervention in

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The Race to Destruction<br />

Soviet Union <strong>in</strong> a first strike, leav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> heart of its nuclear<br />

arsenal with too few surviv<strong>in</strong>g warheads to be able to penetrate<br />

American defenses. This threat can only streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />

predilection to attack preemptively <strong>in</strong> a severe crisis.<br />

Classics <strong>in</strong> Politics: <strong>Turn<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Tide</strong> <strong>Noam</strong> <strong>Chomsky</strong><br />

291<br />

George Ball describes <strong>the</strong> President’s SDI proposal as “one of <strong>the</strong><br />

most irresponsible acts by any head of state <strong>in</strong> modern times.” 35<br />

The first strike threat is <strong>in</strong> my view exaggerated, s<strong>in</strong>ce, as already<br />

noted, no imag<strong>in</strong>able system would prevent a crippl<strong>in</strong>g Soviet response<br />

(or conversely), and a first strike might itself have immensely destructive<br />

global consequences. But <strong>in</strong> situations of crisis all bets are off,<br />

particularly with reliance on computer-based response systems. And one<br />

can hardly have any confidence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rationality of planners who have<br />

repeatedly shown that <strong>the</strong>y are will<strong>in</strong>g to approach <strong>the</strong> br<strong>in</strong>k on <strong>the</strong> most<br />

astonish<strong>in</strong>g grounds, and who are much honored for this display of<br />

courage—<strong>in</strong> reality, lunacy (see chapter 4, section 1).<br />

It is a noteworthy fact, not adequately stressed, that SDI was not<br />

motivated by military considerations; <strong>the</strong>se were devised after <strong>the</strong> fact to<br />

justify a program undertaken on o<strong>the</strong>r grounds. The idea was proposed<br />

well before <strong>the</strong> President’s surprise announcement of March 23, 1983,<br />

<strong>in</strong> a privately-funded study <strong>in</strong>itiated by right-w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dustrialists<br />

associated with <strong>the</strong> Heritage Foundation, with technical advice from<br />

Edward Teller and General Daniel Graham, though Teller (who<br />

none<strong>the</strong>less supports SDI) noted that <strong>the</strong> USSR could overwhelm <strong>the</strong><br />

proposed system at 1/10 its projected $100 billion cost. A high-level<br />

Pentagon review dismissed <strong>the</strong> project, as did a congressional Office of<br />

Technology Assessment, George Ball reports. He comments that <strong>the</strong><br />

project “was opposed until <strong>the</strong> last m<strong>in</strong>ute by [Reagan’s] secretary of<br />

defense and o<strong>the</strong>r pr<strong>in</strong>cipal members of his government.” Top Pentagon<br />

specialists were nei<strong>the</strong>r consulted nor <strong>in</strong>formed, knew noth<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong>

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