MAGNETISM DURING THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY HH Ricker III

Unfortunately, there was a grain of truth in Bacon’s criticisms, which was best revealed when he
said of Gilbert, that he has “not unscientifically introduced the question of magnetic force” but
that “he has himself become a magnet; that is he has ascribed too many things to that force, and
built a ship out of a shell”. Here Bacon means that Gilbert’s magnetic philosophy overreaches
what can be proved by his experimental demonstrations. Frankly, one can see why this criticism
made sense. The idea that the magnetic force of mother earth caused it’s rotation seems to be a
pure Copernican fantasy. The arguments presented to support it were weak and the connection to
the demonstration experiments that Gilbert claimed proved it were unconvincing.
On the other hand, Bacon resisted the thesis that the earth was fundamentally magnetic. Today
this seems absurd, and totally hardheaded, because the discovery of the magnetic dip offered
indisputable proof of it. But, Bacon seems to have objected fundamentally to the idea that the
earth had a soul or animate force within it, which was the source of it’s Copernican movements;
ie, rotation and revolution. When this idea was extended to the entire universe so that all the
planets, moons, and stars had animate souls, we can see why Bacon opposed Gilbert’s magnetic
philosophy.
Another reason is that Gilbert’s theory of magnetism is fundamentally Aristotelian. When we
examine it carefully, we see that essentially it is an immaterialist theory of secondary occult
qualities. As presented by Gilbert, it is greatly enhanced by the fundamental idea of the orbitus
virtus or sphere of influence, and his magnetic demonstrations which clearly show how this
magnetic influence is propagated and acts across space. But, his rudimentary field theory was
still Aristotelian in its vocabulary, and maintained the fundamental idea of the form. What
Gilbert contributed was a series of demonstrations combined with an attempt to develop a new
magnetical vocabulary. Gilbert’s new magnetic vocabulary was excellently suited to his
rudimentary field theory, but when he sought to discuss the fundamental nature of magnetism, he
was forced to return to the old fashioned concepts of the scholastics, which Bacon sought to
overthrow.
Ultimately Bacon opposed Gilbert’s ideas because Gilbert was fundamentally out of tune with
the new scientific philosophy advocated by Bacon. Gilbert’s methods were old fashioned. He
expressed himself in terms that were fundamentally scholastic and Aristotelian. This was the
approach which Bacon sought to supplant. Hence, Gilbert’s work was flawed and provided an
example of bad philosophical method. The result of Bacon’s polemic was unfortunate. In
England Gilbert’s magnetical philosophy didn’t take hold. The result was a rising interest in
mechanical and corpuscular theories of magnetism, consistent with the mechanical theories of
electricity. This gives us insight as to why Gilbert’s experimental work in electricity was fruitful.
It was based on a materialistic effluvial theory. His immaterial magnetic theory was stillborn,
and we should not be surprised that magnetic science makes little progress for another two
hundred years.
It is ironic that the publication of On The Magnet stimulated English interest in materialistic
theories of magnetism. This was clearly a reaction against the traditions of natural magic and
aristotelian philosophy. The new effluvial theories of magnetism are clearly a return to the
theories of Empedocles, Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. These theories were clearly
doomed from the beginning because the experimental facts were inconsistent with them. Gilbert