26.03.2013 Views

The 9 11 Commission Report Omissions And - Amazon Noir

The 9 11 Commission Report Omissions And - Amazon Noir

The 9 11 Commission Report Omissions And - Amazon Noir

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Page 43<br />

CHAPTER FOUR 43 <strong>The</strong> 9/ <strong>11</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> should have had some pointed<br />

questions for the president's Secret Service detail, to which they<br />

should have demanded satisfactory answers. But here is the <strong>Commission</strong>'s<br />

entire statement about why the Secret Service did not whisk President<br />

Bush to safety once it was clear the country was undergoing an attack by<br />

terrorists using hijacked airplanes: <strong>The</strong> Secret Service told us they<br />

were anxious to move the President to a safer location, but did not<br />

think it imperative for him to run out the door. (39) It evidently did<br />

not occur to any of the <strong>Commission</strong>ers to point out that there would have<br />

been an option somewhere between "run[ning] out the door" and remaining<br />

at the school for another half hour. <strong>The</strong> agents could, for example, have<br />

simply walked out the door with the president, gotten into one of the<br />

cars, and driven to an undisclosed location. But the <strong>Commission</strong>ers<br />

appear to have accepted the Secret Service's totally unsatisfactory<br />

explanation. To accept that explanation would require us to believe that<br />

these highly trained Secret Service agents were, like the president,<br />

more concerned about appearances than about the possibility that a<br />

hijacked airliner might crash into the school, killing the president and<br />

everyone else, including themselves. As far as we can tell, no one on<br />

the <strong>Commission</strong> found this sense of priorities strange. <strong>The</strong> Kean-Zelikow<br />

<strong>Commission</strong>'s evident lack of curiosity is suggested by the fact that its<br />

"exacting investigative research" on this matter was evidently limited<br />

to an interview with one member of the Secret Service (463n204). <strong>The</strong><br />

fact that the president should have been regarded as in real danger is<br />

suggested in the account provided of that morning by Richard Clarke, who<br />

was the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism. In his<br />

2004 book, Against All Enemies, Clarke says that shortly after the onset<br />

of the teleconference he was running from the Situation Room in the<br />

White House, he and the others paused to listen to the president's<br />

speech from the Sarasota school. During this pause, says Clarke, Brian<br />

Stafford, the Director of the Secret Service, pulled him aside and said:<br />

"We gotta get him out of there to someplace safe... and secret," after<br />

which Clarke told his assistant to work with Stafford to "[f]igure out<br />

where to move the President." 6 Although this account suggests some<br />

later sensitivity to criticism, it

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!