The 9 11 Commission Report Omissions And - Amazon Noir

Page 47
CHAPTER FOUR 47 "The only decision made [by the presidential party]
during [the period between 9:15 and 9:30]," we are told, "was to return
to Washington" (39). But during the motorcade to the airport, the
presidential party learned about the attack on the Pentagon, and this
led the decision to be reversed, in spite of the president's wishes to
the contrary: The [lead] Secret Service agent felt strongly that the
situation in Washington was too unstable for the President to return
there, and [Andrew] Card agreed. The President strongly wanted to return
to Washington and only grudgingly agreed to go elsewhere. The issue was
still undecided when the President conferred with the Vice President at
about the time Air Force One was taking off. The Vice President recalled
the Vice President at about the time Air Force One was taking off. The
Vice President recalled urging the President not to return to
Washington. (39) The note to this discussion, furthermore, provides
"additional sources on the President's desire to return" (463n207). The
Kean-Zelikow Commission, accordingly, certainly did not consider it
beyond its assigned task to defend the president against the charge that
he stayed away from Washington most of the day because he feared for his
own safety. This defense, however, makes it even more puzzling that the
Commission did not discuss the much more serious charge-that the real
problem was not that he appeared to be afraid later that day, but that
neither he nor anyone else in his traveling party seemed to have any
fear earlier, when they should have been very afraid. THE DENIAL OF
PRESIDENTIAL PARTY KNOWLEDGE The reason the apparent absence of fear is
important is, of course, that it suggests that at least some members of
the presidential party, especially the lead Secret Service agent, knew
that they were in no danger. That would in turn suggest that they knew
what was going on. The 9/11 Commission obviously claims that no one in
the traveling party had advance knowledge of the attacks. As we just
saw, however, the Commission makes an even stronger denial of
presidential party knowledge, saying: "No one in the traveling party had
any information during this time that other aircraft were hijacked or
missing" (39). This claim is essential. Without it, the decision by the
president to continue with the reading lesson and the decision of the
Secret Service to remain at the school could not have been rationalized.