FM 3-01.85: Patriot Battalion and Battery Operations - BITS

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FM 3-01.85 5-14 The defense design process should ensure that the final design is balanced in order to be effective against the most likely as well as the most stressing threat. • RL should be employed only if local launchers cannot accomplish the mission. An RL operation significantly increases manpower, logistical, and security requirements. RL should be employed only after making every effort to meet requirements with locally deployed launcher platoons and taking advantage of upper-tier systems to protect widely dispersed assets from TBMs. • Remote launchers must be sited within the radar surveillance sector, and should be within the maximum remote launch distance of the greatest number of battery fire control sets (ECS and RS) that defense requirements and terrain will allow. This will maximize the availability of firepower and the ability to dynamically reconstitute. • The remoting of launchers for air threat protection is not recommended due to extended dead zones. When an ECS assumes control over another FU’s launcher sections that are protecting assets from airthreats, the extended low altitude dead zone may not allow adequate protection. The dead zone surrounding an LS is relative to its emplacement range from the radar and expands from the LS out to a given distance along the LS emplacement azimuth. The dead zone is not a discriminating factor for TBM defense. • RL-3 provides a marginal improvement from the RL-1 in the ability to engage medium-to-high altitude, high-speed aircraft at maximum effective ranges. AMD TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 5-45. In theaters where the threat includes a mix of medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), other TMs, and aircraft, an AMD task force (AMDTF) may be employed to protect forces and high-value assets. The AMDTF is normally comprised of a THAAD battery and several Patriot batteries under the control of a TF TOC (Patriot ICC/TCS), as shown in Figure 5-6. The AMDTF may also include SHORAD units. 5-46. The primary advantage of an AMDTF is that it provides a higher level of protection than is achievable with a single system. The THAAD and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) weapon systems will provide a twotier defense for high value assets located under their protective envelope that denies the enemy a preferred attack option. THAAD provides the upper-tier defense against MRBMs and is needed to provide near leak proof defense against SRBMs in the common target set, while Patriot provides the lowertier defense against SRBMs, other tactical missiles (CMs and ASMs), and aircraft. TBM tracks are handed-off to the lower-tier by THAAD in time for Patriot to engage at optimum range and altitude, and to obtain an intercept above a prescribed keep-out altitude minimizing the effects of weapon of mass destruction. SHORAD units supplement lower-tier defenses, by providing additional protection against low altitude FW, RW, UAV, and CM threats. The Patriot battalion normally provides the task force command and control.
SHORAD BTRY SHORAD PLATOONS SHORAD FUs (5 EA) AMD TASK FORCE PATRIOT FUs (5 EA) Figure 5-6. AMD Task Force THAAD FU Operations PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 5-47. To properly implement an AMDTF, task force planners should have a detailed knowledge of the threat. They must also understand the capabilities and limitations of all systems that comprise the task force, and have a working knowledge of THAAD, Patriot, and SHORAD system software and communications. Planners should refer to applicable manuals for technical details and specifics on system performance and software capabilities and limitations. 5-48. The task force will normally receive the mission, defense priorities, and commander’s intent from higher headquarters. After assessing METT-TC and developing a detailed IPB, planners develop level of protection requirements; taking into consideration the JFC defended asset list and CVRT assessments. The level of protection requirements drives the allocation and positioning of resources as well as system initialization, firing doctrine, and integration of fires. 5-49. Task force planning requires cooperation and close coordination among Patriot, THAAD, and SHORAD planners. In planning task force defenses, THAAD defense design is first developed. This involves determining the upper-tier search requirements, establishing the PTL(s), determining the optimum FU location, emplacing the radar and launchers, and planning communication links within and external to the THAAD battery, including linkage with the AMDTF TOC. Planners next develop the Patriot defense design, which involves determining the lower-tier search requirements, establishing PTLs, emplacement of the radar, LCSs and launchers, and planning communications links within and external to the Patriot battalion. 5-50. This planning results in an AMDTF defense design, illustrated in Figure 5-7. This example shows five Patriot FUs and a THAAD FU. The THAAD FU is capable of defending selected assets against MRBMs and some SRBMs. Normally; THAAD is initialized to protect the lower-tier Patriot FUs. 5-51. The Patriot FUs are capable of defending selected assets within their respective lower-tier defended areas (LTDAs). An LTDA is defined as a two 5-15
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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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FM 3-01.85 Chapter 5 OPERATIONS....
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FM 3-01.85 Movement Warning Order
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FM 3-01.85 MEDICAL SECTION A-12. Th
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FM 3-01.85 A-6 PMCS is performed in
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FM 3-01.85 B-2 engagement prioritie
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FM 3-01.85 B-4 Figure B-2. Informat
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FM 3-01.85 B-6 Figure B-4. Communic
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FM 3-01.85 RADAR SET B-8 • Told i
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FM 3-01.85 B-10 B-24. An M983 is th
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FM 3-01.85 B-12 Figure B-10. Electr
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FM 3-01.85 B-14 MISSILE VERSION STA
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FM 3-01.85 B-16 EQUIPMENT Radar Set
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FM 3-01.85 B-18
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FM 3-01.85 C-2 AAMDC ADJACENT PATRI
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C-4
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FM 3-01.85 C-6 BTRY NET BTRY COMMAN
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FM 3-01.85 C-8 X X X T T X HEADQUAR
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FM 3-01.85 C-10 B attery XO Com m u
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FM 3-01.85 C-12 15 16 17 18 19 20 2
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FM 3-01.85 C-14 Figure C-11. AMDTF
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FM 3-01.85 COMMANDERS TACTICAL TERM
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FM 3-01.85 PRIMARY CONSIDERATIONS C
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FM 3-01.85 DATA CHANNELS C-40. Chan
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FM 3-01.85 PADIL NETWORK C-45. In d
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FM 3-01.85 SYSTEM LOADING REDUCTION
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Appendix D Intelligence Preparation
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INPUTS LEAD TO … Analysis O f Bat
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Intelligence Preparation of the Bat
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Weather Intelligence Preparation of
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Appendix E Safety This appendix des
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Table E-1. Special Hazards HAZARD A
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HAZARD High noise (RS, ECS, ICC, EP
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Safety • Assistant drivers must e
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Safety E-9
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FM 3-01.85 F-2 loaded on special fl
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FM 3-01.85 F-4 1 x Radar Station 2
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FM 3-01.85 F-6 X 6 X 6 X 10 X 4 X 6
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FM 3-01.85 LAUNCHING STATION, SEMIT
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FM 3-01.85 ENGAGEMENT CONTROL STATI
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FM 3-01.85 F-12 in the cargo area.
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FM 3-01.85 ELECTRIC POWER PLANT III
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Appendix G Reconnaissance, Selectio
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Reconnaissance, Selection, and Occu
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SURVEY TEAM LOAD PLANS Reconnaissan
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G-9
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FM 3-01.85 Glossary-2 AI area of in
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FM 3-01.85 Glossary-4 C 4 I command
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FM 3-01.85 Glossary-6 DST decision
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FM 3-01.85 Glossary-8 FSOP field st
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FM 3-01.85 Glossary-10 effort in th
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FM 3-01.85 Glossary-12 JTT-T/R join
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FM 3-01.85 Glossary-14 MILVAN milit
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FM 3-01.85 Glossary-16 PDB post dep
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FM 3-01.85 Glossary-18 RX repairabl
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FM 3-01.85 Glossary-20 serial trans
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FM 3-01.85 Glossary-22 TSOP tactica
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FM 3-01.85 Glossary-24
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FM 3-01.85 Bibliography-2 FM 100-10
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FM 3-01.85 critical information req
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FM 3-01.85 reconnaissance, selectio
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FM 3-01.85: Patriot Battalion and Battery Operations - BITS

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