Old Lessons, New Thoughts - AF Logistics Management Agency

ang for the buck), treats war merely as an extension of technology. This is
not to say…that a country that wishes to retain its military power can in any
way afford to neglect technology and the methods that are most appropriate
for thinking about it. It does mean, however, that the problem of making
technology serve the goals of war is more complex than it is commonly thought
to be. The key is that efficiency, far from being simply conducive to
effectiveness, can act as the opposite. Hence—and this is a point which cannot
be overemphasized—the successful use of technology in war very often means
that there is a price to be paid in terms of deliberately diminishing efficiency.
Since technology and war operate on a logic which is not only different but
actually opposed, the very concept of “technological superiority” is somewhat
misleading when applied in the context of war. It is not the technical
sophistication of the Swiss pike that defeated the Burgundian knights, but
rather the way it meshed with the weapons used by the knights at Laupen,
Sempach, and Granson. It was not the intrinsic superiority of the longbow
that won the battle of Crécy, but rather the way which in interacted with the
equipment employed by the French on that day and at that place. Using
technology to acquire greater range, firepower, greater mobility, greater
protection, greater whatever is very important and may be critical. Ultimately,
however, it is less critical and less important than achieving a close fit between
one’s own technology and that which is fielded by the enemy. The best tactics,
it is said, are the so-called Flaechenund Luecken (solids and gaps) methods
which, although they received their current name from the Germans, are as
old as history and are based on bypassing the enemy’s strengths while
exploiting the weaknesses in between. Similarly, the best military technology
is not that which is “superior” in some absolute sense. Rather it is that which
“masks” or neutralizes the other side’s strengths, even as it exploits his
weaknesses.
The common habit of referring to technology in terms of its capabilities may,
when applied within the context of war, do more harm than good. This is not
to deny the very great importance of the things that technology can do in war.
However, when everything is said and done, those which it cannot do are
probably even more important. Here we must seek victory, and here it will
take place—although not necessarily in our favor—even when we do not. A
good analogy is a pair of cogwheels, where achieving a perfect fit depends not
merely on the shape of the teeth but also and, to an equal extent, on that of the
spaces which separate them.
In sum, since technology and war operate on a logic which is not only different
but actually opposed, the conceptual framework that is useful, even vital, for
dealing with the one should not be allowed to interfere with the other. In an
age when military budgets, military attitudes and what passes for military
thought often seem centered on technological considerations and even obsessed
by them, this distinction is of vital importance. In the words of a famous Hebrew
proverb: The deed accomplishes, what thought began. 16
Old Lessons, New Thoughts is a collection of seven essays or articles
that lets the reader examine logistics and technological lessons from
history that are particularly applicable in today’s transformation
environment.
In “Oil Logistics in the Pacific War,” Lieutenant Colonel Donovan
makes the case that the Japanese strategic disregard of the fragile US oil
infrastructure in the Pacific was an incredible oversight on their part. The
Japanese should have attacked the US oil supply at Pearl Harbor and
Introductiion
Chester Carlson, the
inventor of the photocopy
machine (often referred to as
the Xerox machine) was told
by business that his
invention was unnecessary
because libraries and carbon
paper already filled the
need. This was a technology
that drastically altered the
way people approached
information, yet finding
interested businesses and
investors in the beginning
proved elusive.
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