YeArBooK 2007 - US-Korea Institute at SAIS

saIs U.s.-Korea YearbooK
16
IV. ProSPeCTS for PeACe
The second inter-Korean summit was held in October 2007 in Pyongyang
between South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim
Jong Il. This summit raised speculation about a historic peace declaration for the
Korean peninsula. There was similar euphoria after the first North and South
Korean summit in 2000. But this hope was dashed soon after the summit by a
naval clash along the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea of Korea. That clash
served as a reminder of how delicate the military balance is between the two
Koreas.
The recent uncertainty in the Alliance was exacerbated when Roh Moo-hyun
and Kim Jong Il agreed to arrange three-way or possibly four-way (the fourth
being China) summit talks to replace the armistice with a permanent peace
treaty in the peninsula. The disagreement between Seoul and Washington was
over South Korea’s claim that the official end of the Korean War can be declared
at the start of the negotiations to sign a peace treaty. South Korea maintained
that the declaration to end the Korean War by leaders of the three or four states
would be a turning point to begin negotiating a permanent peace treaty.
Challenges to Peace
The United States, on the other hand, disagrees and argues that North
Korea’s nuclear issue and signing a peace treaty cannot be separated. The U.S.
government’s stance is that it, instead, must be done concurrently. Because
signing a peace treaty would constitute a “legal and political” end to the war,
the U.S. position is that North Korea must disable its nuclear facilities and
verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program, as it agreed to do in the aidfor-denuclearization
deal signed in February 2007, before any peace negotiations
can begin.
The core issue that stands as a roadblock to a peace treaty is the denuclearization
of North Korea, which also is the central issue discussed at the ongoing Six-
Party Talks. The United States goal is for the Yongbyon reactor to be shut down
and the nuclear capabilities of North Korea to be permanently dismantled.
The South Koreans have temporarily put the North-South Korea engagement
policy on the back burner for the sake of the six-party talks and the goal of
denuclearization. The question over whether a peace treaty can be signed without
denuclearization remains a sticking point between the policy views of the United
States and South Korea.
roK-U.s. allIanCe adJUsTs To neW realITIes
Implications of Peace for the ROK-U.S. Alliance
If the South Korean armistice regime transitions into a peace regime, North
Korea will no longer be a common enemy. A peace agreement signed by North
Korea, South Korea, China, and the United States would be a monumental
step in officially ending the Korean War. But how would it affect the ROK-
U.S. Alliance? If North Korea is no longer designated an enemy and the North
Korean threat is significantly reduced through a peace agreement, will there be
a need for a ROK-U.S. military alliance at all? More questions will arise from
a peace treaty on the Korean peninsula than answers. However, the U.S. and
ROK governments are likely to welcome these challenges because it would be
a positive step toward the long awaited peace and hopeful reunification of the
two Koreas. Important questions remain on how the ROK and U.S. government
along with Korea’s powerful neighbors China, Russian, and Japan would follow
up a peace treaty with a re-configuration of the military alliance between the
United States and a unified Korea.
V. ConClUSIon
The Alliance has managed to resolve its issues and overcome its differences
in the past, and it is likely that it will do so in the future. It is inevitable that
the ROK and the U.S. government will differ in their policy goals for security
in the Korean peninsula. The ROK-U.S. Alliance in 2007 endured many
transformational challenges in the evolution of the alliance. Despite their
differences, the Alliance remains intact and has matured by weathering difficult
negotiations to reach compromises between the divergent viewpoints. The
Alliance will again in the future go through evolutionary changes as it adjusts
to the new realities such as changing of inter-Korean relationships, increased
traffic along the DMZ, increased economic cooperation between the two Koreas,
continued U.S. military transformations, and dealing with the rise of China’s
power in the region. If history is a good precedent of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, it
appears that the two governments will adjust to these new realities and become a
stronger alliance from it.
17