YeArBooK 2007 - US-Korea Institute at SAIS

saIs U.s.-Korea YearbooK
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo
reached an agreement in February 2007 to transfer wartime operational control
(OPCON) to the ROK on April 17, 2012. This is a major breakthrough in
the negotiation of security alliance adjustment. Once wartime OPCON has
been transferred, U.S. and United Nations (UN) forces will play a supporting
role and the ROK forces will have their own commander. To prepare for this
transformation, the ROK military has been pursuing a Five-Year Mid-term
Defense Plan (2007–2011) that aims to acquire improved reconnaissance
capability, command-control-communications and precision strike capability.
U.S. forces realignment moved into the implementation stage in 2007.
Construction for the Pyongtaek base began late in 2007. The ROK agreed to
cover the majority of the restationing costs, including new facility construction.
Thus, significant resources have been committed by the ROK to acquire land for
the relocation of the Yongsan Garrison in Seoul and the 2 nd Infantry Division
north of Seoul under the Land Partnership Plan. According to the plan, U.S.
forces would return 59 camps and all their associated facilities to the ROK and
consolidate into two main hubs south of Seoul.
The two sides continued to work on an agreement for sharing the costs of the
U.S. military presence in Korea. In 2007, South Korea took on 41 percent of the
nonpersonnel stationing cost, a 3 percent increase over 2006. This is one step
toward implementing the Special Measures Agreement signed in 2006 for cost
sharing in 2007 and 2008. The U.S. continues to push for a 50-50 ratio.
All these adjustments move the ROK into the front lines of self-defense, and the
ROK has been expanding its defense capabilities. The defense budget in 2007 went
up to 24.49 trillion won, a 9.8 percent increase from 2006. The budget for 2008
will rise to 26.7 trillion won. The Ministry of National Defense has a long-term
reform plan (Defense Reform 2020) that will increase the defense budget annually
until 2020. These increases have been essential for ROK government initiatives to
improve military preparedness. Forty-six percent of the 3.7 million South Korean
forces (mostly ground troops) are expected to be cut in the next 13 years, while
significant improvements are expected in naval and air forces. The budget increases
are largely earmarked for purchasing high-tech weaponry and improving the level
of training, which will improve the readiness and strength of South Korean forces.
Even after a third extension, 1,200 South Korean forces continued to play an
important role in Iraq in 2007. Despite the criticism and controversy it faces
from the South Korean public, the South Korean government decided to remain
in Iraq in 2008 and contribute to the U.S. global strategy against terrorism.
Its peacekeeping soldiers in Lebanon show its steadfast commitment to UN
operations worldwide.
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U.s.-roK allIanCe: looKInG ToWard THe fUTUre
All the progress in 2007 represents a stable adjustment of the military alliance.
The global situation has been changing rapidly since the end of the Cold War,
and the strategic and security concerns of the U.S.-ROK alliance have changed
accordingly. The Soviet Union no longer exists as the biggest threat to the U.S.;
nor does North Korea represent the largest and most direct threat to South
Korea. Crucial security problems such as the North Korean nuclear issue are
being tackled in a multilateral venue, and bilateral military alliances must adjust
to the changing environment. With its strong economy and impressive cultural,
political and social achievements, South Korea naturally seeks to regain control
of its own military. The strong U.S. military command made sense when South
Korea was weak and vulnerable to a North Korean attack; however, to eventually
become a genuinely self-sufficient nation, it should have control over its own
military. Now is a good time to make this important adjustment, because South
Korea is strong enough to assume greater responsibility and the global strategic
concerns facing the U.S. make it more important for South Korea to take a
leading role in its own defense. The agreement during the SCAP meetings in
2006 underscores the strategic change in the alliance members’ priorities: “The
Republic of Korea supports the strategic flexibility of the United States forces
in Korea, and the United States respects the Republic of Korea’s position that it
shall not be involved in a regional conflict against the Korean people’s will.”
Regarding the relocation of U.S. forces to positions south of Seoul, some people see it
as an unfriendly gesture from South Korea and the beginning of a U.S. pullout. But it
is superficial to think this way. First, the area in downtown Seoul that U.S. forces have
occupied is very precious urban land. No one would welcome a large military presence
in the middle of Manhattan. And moving the 2 nd Infantry Division farther away from
the DMZ does not mean that the U.S. is less committed to the defense of South
Korea. One clear shift in the U.S. global defense strategy is to improve the flexibility
and mobility of its forces. A significant amount of energy has gone into building a
strong U.S. naval and air presence on the Korean peninsula. Concentrating U.S. forces
in the south helps further that goal and fits into the strategic shift of U.S. forces playing
a supporting role in South Korea’s self-defense. The ROK has more than a million
ground forces concentrated on its northern border.
There are also some practical reasons for this move. More than 60 percent of the
U.S. troops in Korea are married, and the U.S. commander is trying to extend the
tour of duty from one year to three years so their families can accompany them.
Realignment offers a chance to upgrade facilities and provide more space for the
soldiers and their families. With longer tours and the presence of their families,
the U.S. troops would enjoy a higher quality of life and more easily integrate into
the local Korean society.
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