Sample Prospectus

Model Prospectus
MMW 22
A Few Words of Caution about this Model:
You should treat this sample as a sufficiently reliable model for the kind of presentation you need
to produce, but you should also be aware that it is not the only possible model. Given the logic
of your particular problem, you might be able to vary the structure somewhat, e.g., by changing
the order in which arguments and counterarguments are presented. Nevertheless, while some
flexibility may well be appropriate, you need to be absolutely certain to address carefully each of
the required elements of the assignment set forth on the handouts. If you have questions about
how to prepare the prospectus, consult with your TA as soon as possible.
The bracketed notations in the model are for your reference only; they are designed to help you
identify important elements of the assignment – they are the “parts” that the assignment
absolutely requires. You may find it helpful to use these notations in your own work as you draft
the prospectus, but do not include them in the version you submit.
This document is intended primarily as a model for the substance and organization of the
prospectus. Be wary of copying the format of this document too slavishly; you should follow the
MMW Style Sheet and the APA rules set forth in your writing manual. Note, however, that you
are required to submit a title page and abstract with this prospectus, and you are required to
include page numbers in your in-text citations.
Revised January 2012

Running head: PAPER TITLE IN ALL CAPS FEWER THAN 50 CHARACTERS 1
Paper Title
Your Name
Section Z01
Assignment Title or Number
Date Due

TITLE OF PAPER USING FEWER THAN 50 CHARACTERS 2
Abstract
Your paper is required to have an abstract. Please write one here. A good abstract is a
brief, comprehensive summary (usually one paragraph) of the contents of the prospectus; it
allows your TA to survey the contents quickly and helps you to communicate the important
elements of your prospectus (problem, thesis, and counter-arguments). You will reserve your
discussion of evidence for the body of the prospectus.

TITLE OF PAPER USING FEWER THAN 50 CHARACTERS 3
[Title:] Talleyrand and the Resurrection of France
[Introduction to the topic] The Congress of Vienna marked the end of nearly two
decades of continuous war in Europe. Napoleon had been defeated and the Bourbon monarch
Louis XVIII had been restored in France. The Congress, led by the war-time alliance of Russia,
Prussia, Austria, and Britain, sought to right the wrongs of the Napoleonic Era and craft a lasting
peace in Europe. But a France defeated was not a France destroyed. [Problem/Question] Louis
XVIII, as the newly crowned monarch, sent Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord to ensure
that French interests would not be unduly violated at Vienna. According to the king, Talleyrand
was the only man in France with the intelligence, stature, and cunning to prevent France from
being pillaged by the bitter enemies of Napoleon's wars (Blinn, 1935, p. 151). Talleyrand felt
that the creation of a European “balance of power,” with France as an integral component, would
pay enormous dividends by providing France with a safe and secure Europe in which to flourish.
Naturally, as the representative of a defeated and maliciously-hated nation, Talleyrand had his
work cut out for him. How well did Talleyrand negotiate French political interests and advance
his belief in a European “balance of power” at the Congress of Vienna? [Thesis] In response to
this question, I will argue that Talleyrand successfully articulated his notion of the balance of
power and, through clever maneuvering, he helped secure France a strong position at the
negotiating table in Vienna and in continental politics writ large. Although France had been
resoundingly defeated on the battlefield, Talleyrand ensured that her interests would not be
ignored in the new European order.
[Different scholarly interpretations/counter-arguments] While some scholarship
supports this interpretation of Talleyrand's legacy, there are plausible arguments that indicate that

TITLE OF PAPER USING FEWER THAN 50 CHARACTERS 4
Talleyrand may not have been as cunning as he believed himself to be and that his efforts at
Vienna may not have been as beneficial to France as he had hoped. Sometimes his grand notion
of collective European security (underpinned by a balance of power) came at the expense of
France's national interests. Talleyrand viewed the German states as hopelessly weak and divided
and thus did not foresee that by supporting the Prussian acquisition of the Rhineland he was
contributing to Prussia's regional dominance and to their ultimately successful attempts to unify
much of the German lands. This eventual unification was capped in 1871 by the crushing defeat
of France in the Franco-Prussian War and the crowning of Wilhelm I as German Emperor in the
Palace of Versailles’s Hall of Mirrors (Blinn, 135, p. 157). A second possible misstep was his
advice to Louis XVIII against a marriage alliance between his nephew, the Duke of Berry, and
the Tsar's sister. Instead, Talleyrand negotiated a “Triple Alliance” with Britain and Austria to
counter perceived Russian aggression (Harris, 2007, pp. 253- 244). According to some,
Talleyrand put a European balance of power before French national interests. Sharp attacks came
from multiple statesmen, such as Etienne-Denis Pasquier, who believed Talleyrand should have
allied French interests to Russia (France's frequent partner prior to the Napoleonic Wars) instead
of trying to counter the Tsar's claims over Poland (Harris, 2007, pp. 253-254). These statesmen
argued that the strategic and territorial interests of Russia conflicted far less with those of France
than the much more proximate empires of Britain and Austria. The third and arguably the
greatest of Talleyrand's failures emerged with the Second Treaty of Paris. After Napoleon's
Hundred Days, the Congress of Vienna drew up a particularly vicious and punitive treaty when it
became clear that neither Talleyrand nor his master Louis XVIII could be trusted in their repeated
assertions that the French people were tired of Napoleon (Chapman, 1998, p. 55).

TITLE OF PAPER USING FEWER THAN 50 CHARACTERS 5
[Rebuttals] Despite these arguments, I argue that Talleyrand successfully used the
platform of European balance of power to advance French political interests. Talleyrand
effectively argued against the Austrian acquisition of Sardinia by raising the specter of Austrian
dominance of northern Italy (Blinn, 1935, p. 144). When Talleyrand maneuvered France into the
Triple Alliance with Britain and Austria to counteract growing Russian influence, he did so in
order to decrease border friction and turn bitter enemies into allies who would support France's
international agenda (Ferrero, 1941, p. 275). While France had fought Britain and Austria on and
off for nearly 200 years prior to the formation of the Triple Alliance, France has not since been
involved in a major conflict with either country. Furthermore, Talleyrand used his adept
diplomatic skills to keep the defeated France at the negotiating table by insinuating that only
France would be capable of forcing Tsar Alexander to give up his 1813 alliance with Prussia and
enter into a broader European balance of power (Chapman, 1998, pp. 18-19). In order to prevent
a future conqueror (à la Napoleon) from destabilizing this new system, Talleyrand used his
influence to delegitimize the “right to sovereignty by force” within the Congress and ensure that
the other powers would not tolerate aggressive or illegitimate conquests (Dwyer, 2002, p. 146).
[Conclusion/Explanation of Significance] Despite Napoleon's defeat, Talleyrand
ensured that France would continue to have a voice in European affairs through his collective
security scheme. He maintained that this system was in France's long-term interests and spurned
warfare as an effective political tactic. Talleyrand argued that war inflicted nearly as much
damage on the conqueror as on the conquered. Even if Napoleon had been victorious, he would
have left Europe in a perpetually unstable condition with the threat of war ever-looming.
Talleyrand firmly believed that an unstable Europe was ultimately incompatible with a strong

TITLE OF PAPER USING FEWER THAN 50 CHARACTERS 6
France. At Vienna, his unenviable task was to convince his colleagues that what France desired
most was peace and security for all of Europe. This was particularly challenging given that
France had been the greatest enemy of European security for the better part of twenty years.
Eventually, he was successful in convincing the Congress that a Europe with well-established
boundaries and a universal understanding that war would be detrimental to all parties could keep
the power-hungry in check.
The relative peace in Europe for a hundred years following the Napoleonic wars
(with the struggle for German unification serving as a notable exception) is a testament to the
enduring strength of the balance of power crafted at the Congress of Vienna under the guidance
of Talleyrand. He was able to resurrect and secure French power in Europe through peace and
the balance of power rather than through war and conquest.

TITLE OF PAPER USING FEWER THAN 50 CHARACTERS 7
References
Author, A.A. (Year of Publication). Title of work: Capital letter starts subtitle as well if there is
one and is also used with Proper Nouns. Location: Publisher.
Blinn, H. (1935) New light on Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna. Pacific Historical Review
4.2, 143-160. [Although this source was retained for use in this model, sources this old
should only be used in consultation with your TA.]
Chapman, T. (1998). The Congress of Vienna: Origins, processes, and results. London:
Routledge.
Dwyer, P.G. (2002). Talleyrand: Profiles in power. London: Pearson Education.
Ferrero, G. (1941). The reconstruction of Europe: Talleyrand and the Congress of Vienna, 1814-
1815. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons.
Harris, R. (2007). Talleyrand: Betrayed and savior of France. London: John Murray, 2007.