The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

ISBN 978-963-284-164-9

Unknown Clauses: The Background Deals of 

Totalitarian Systems in the Face of World War II 

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 

edited by Zoltán Maruzsa




The project was supported by the 

Edited by Zoltán Maruzsa 

Published by 

ELTE BTK Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék 

(Department of Modern and Contemporary Global History) 

Budapest 

2010




© Zoltán Maruzsa 

ISBN 978-963-284-164-9 

Published by 

ELTE BTK Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék 

Printed by Robinco Kft, Budapest. (Kecskeméthy Péter) 

Cover design: Bálint Bak

CONTENTS 

Foreword (István MAJOROS, Zoltán MARUZSA) 7 

The Historical Judgement of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 

MARUZSA, Zoltán 

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and What is Behind 11 

LACHAISE, Bernard 

Historiography of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in France since 1945 23 

ORTOLAN, Guillaume 

The 70th anniversary of the German-Soviet pact in France 

and in Germany: a compared study 33 

Some Issues of the International Political System before World War II 43 

KRETSCHMANN, Vasco 

The ideological origins of German Polonophobia? 

The German-Polish conflict in the eastern provinces 

of the German Empire before WWI - a precondition for 

the anti-Polish chapter of the Ribbentrop-Molotov-Pact 45 

PRĘTKIEWICZ, Przemysław 

The system of international connections by 

Central European countries on the eve of the outbreak of war 51 

STERNICZKY, Aaron 

An unfortunate faith. The Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party’s ideology 61 

BALOGH, Márton 

Problems at the Finnish-Soviet Border after the signing of 

the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact 67 

WINKLER, Paul 

Adolf Eichmann’s Vienna model and his attempt to expansion 75 

ROESCH, Claudia 

Spain as a battlefield of ideologies – The Changes of 

International Alliances due to the Spanish Civil War 1936 – 1939 93 

KAŁAN, Dariusz 

The Ukrainian Question in German Foreign Policy 

(March 1938 - September 1939) 103 

5

Public Reactions to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 109 

BAPTISTE, Antoine 

What did French MPs think about it? Political reactions and 

speeches about Ribbentrop – Molotov pact 111 

BRUZEL, Baptiste 

Central Europe in the french reactions about 

the Ribbentropp-Molotov Pact 121 

BARANYI, Tamás 

„A Surprise of a Very Unpleasant Character:” 

British Reaction to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 125 

ITHURBURU, Caroline 

The reactions of a french right departement 

the Basses-Pyrénées following the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact’s 131 

DUBASQUE, François 

The German-Soviet Pact and the toing and 

froing of the French pacifists 135 

DELMOULY, Laura 

The German-Soviet pact in french coursebooks 143 

RICHAUD, Romain 

Politics’ reaction from a left-wing department 

about the German-Soviet Pact 147 

World War II on the territory of Poland 153 

PIEKARSKI, Michał 

Lviv at the Beginning of World War Two 155 

LIGETI, David 

The German-Polish War in 1939 based on 

the Memoir of the Hungarian Ambassador to Warsaw 163 

GRETHER, Sandra 

Pogroms in Eastern Poland after the German Occupation 169 

6

Foreword 

The world remembers in 2009 the 70 th anniversary of the signing of 

the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The alliance of the two totalitarian 

systems, the communist and the national socialist state, the alliance of 

Stalin and Hitler – though proved to be transitory – it determined the fate 

of the whole of Europe for years. It is also obvious that in the case of the 

subsistence of this grotesque coalition, World War II could have taken 

an entirely different turn. 

The anniversary provided to opportunity for reconsidering and 

historically processing the events. The Institute for History at the Faculty 

of Arts of Eötvös Loránd University aimed at the organisation of an 

international conference or workshop. The event was finally organised 

by the Department for Modern and Contemporary Global History. The 

international partners were partly selected thematically (concerned 

countries) and partly along the lines of our university’s existing 

international relations. Our partners were the Humboldt University of 

Berlin, University of Vienna, University of Warsaw, and Michel de 

Montaigne University of Bordeaux. 

Our project was supported by The Education, Audiovisual and 

Culture Executive Agency of the European Union. 

Our aim was to allow the History majors – most of them undertaking 

teacher training – of the five participating countries to discuss the events 

7

elated to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in the plenary sessions and in the 

workgroups of the scientific conference and to get acquainted with the 

opinion and point of view of the students from other countries. 

Every partner sent its delegation to the event, which was organised 

between December 3-5, 2009. As it is clearly visible from the 

presentations uploaded to the website http://www.secretpact.info, and 

from the publications in this book, both students and lecturers gave their 

best and we can consider the conference professionally successful. We 

are also sure that everyone returned home with positive memories and 

many friends richer, and our event contributed to the building of a new, 

common Europe, in which such treaties as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 

have no place at all. 

Budapest, August 23, 2010. 

Zoltán Maruzsa István Majoros 

assistant professor professor 

head organiser head of department 

8

The Historical Judgement of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 

9

Maruzsa, Zoltán 

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and What is Behind 

In our modern age there is a celebrated anniversary every day 

commemorating a significant historical event. However, the importance of 

these anniversaries is not the same and we can say that only those jubilees call 

the attention of the majority of the society that are timely and have a current 

message for us. This is true for the 70 th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop 

Pact as well, which was used not only by historians but also by politicians for 

formulating covert or direct messages, as demonstrated by Guillaume Ortolan’s 

article published in this volume. We shall not be surprised by this, since 

politics, as usual, redefines history from period to period. In our case, the 

„German-Soviet Pact,” the „Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,” or „Hitler-Stalin Pact” 

as it is also known is obviously appropriate for political groups to discredit the 

historical Soviet Union and in a broader sense Communism, what is more, to 

turn people against Russia, which showed authoritarian tendencies according to 

the Western opinion. 1 However, its reverse it also true: seen with the eyes of 

these groups, the protectors of concluding this agreement between the two 

parties try to whiten the dark stains in the co-operation of the two totalitarian 

systems and the two sanguinary dictators; moreover, sometimes pretend that 

these stains do not exist. The stake of the debate is not insignificant: since the 

end of World War II up to the present day, the co-operation with Hitler and 

Nazism has been a serious stigma for any political power or state, which, as a 

result, everyone strives to avoid. 

The debates of historians in Hungary represent the political opinions and 

messages appearing on the international scene as well. 2 Due to this, the debate 

1 Based on the viewpoint of Tamás Krausz „the aim of the adulterations was that the Soviet 

Union could discredit and criminalize the history of the state socialism again and again with the 

obvious intention to strengthen the ideological legitimacy of the new civilian system in Eastern 

Europe and the post-Soviet states.” KRAUSZ Tamás: Néhány megjegyzés a Molotov-Ribbentrop 

paktum értelmezéséhez. IN: HÁDA Béla - LIGETI Dávid - MAJOROS István - MARUZSA 

Zoltán - MERÉNYI Krisztina (szerk.): Nemzetek és birodalmak. Diószegi István 80 éves. ELTE, 

Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék, Budapest, 2010. 365. 

2 In our case the most interesting debate took place on the columns of Élet és Irodalom. Q.v.: 

MITROVITS Miklós: Egy paktum furcsa évfordulója. Élet és Irodalom, LIII. 36. szám, 2009. 

szeptember 4. UNGVÁRY Krisztián: Egy paktumról. Élet és Irodalom, LIII. évfolyam 38. szám, 

2009. szeptember 18. MITROVITS Miklós: A történelem átértelmezése? Élet és Irodalom, LIII. 

évfolyam 39. szám, 2009. szeptember 25. 16. UNGVÁRY Krisztián: Hét pont, Élet és Irodalom, 

LIII. évfolyam 40. szám, 2009. október 2. KARSAI László: Időutazás Hitlerrel, Sztálinnal és 

Trockijjal, Élet és Irodalom, LIII. évfolyam 40. szám, 2009. október 2.; SZ. BÍRÓ Zoltán: Érvek és 

paktumok, Élet és Irodalom, LIII. évfolyam 41. szám, 2009. október 9. SZÉKELY Gábor: Egy vita 

margójára, Élet és Irodalom, LIII. évfolyam 43. szám, 2009. október 22. KARSAI László: 

Vélemények és tények, Élet és Irodalom, LIII. évfolyam 48. szám, 2009. november 27. UNGVÁRY 

Krisztián: A bolsevik gyakorlat, Élet és Irodalom, LIII. évfolyam 49. szám, 2009. december 4. 

11

went often on emotional instead of professional level, which is true even if we 

accept that almost everybody supported his view with professional arguments 

and generally appropriate sources. Nevertheless, the absolute value of these 

sources is reduced by the fact that numerous things were written about the pact 

even at the time of its birth; thus, there is practically no statement that could not 

be supported with documents. This often makes the debate senseless since the 

opposite of the truth can also contain pieces of partial truth, which is not taken 

into consideration by those having an emotional argument. As Bernard 

Lachaise’s study in this volume shows, the same is true for the French history 

writing, though that might be a bit less sensitive topic. 

This analysis is to be a summary of the differing opinions dealing with the 

most crucial questions in connection with the pact as an introduction to the 

studies of this volume – which deal mainly with exciting details – with the 

intention of helping their deeper understanding. We tried, however, to avoid 

discussing those questions that were raised by the disputers as political 

arguments or evaluations and we attempted to examine the agreements and 

their background from more than one perspective taking various views into 

consideration. 

The Content of the Agreement(s) 

We publish the document signed on August 23, 1939 and the text of the 

German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty signed on September 28 as an 

attachment without any explanation. We attach them because during the 

debates in Hungary, the publication of the complete texts did not take place, 

therefore, making distortion and the attachment of non-existing contents 

possible, which we wish to avoid. The texts were not put in a roundabout way; 

the dictatorships signing them did not bother with formalities, thus no 

remarkable philological capability is required to understand them. 

We should not forget that historians were divided even on the question of 

the documents, since, before the change of the regime, the history writing of 

neither the Soviet Union nor the „sovietised” countries acknowledged the 

existence of the secret clause. 3 This problem has disappeared by now, the secret 

clause is existent for everyone; however, the parties are divided on its 

interpretation. According to one of these parties, they were only part of a nonaggression 

treaty reflecting the Soviet Union’s endeavour for peace, 4 while the 

other side considered the same documents Europe’s division among the 

totalitarian systems and a war crime. 5 

3 

DIÓSZEGI István: A hatalmi politika másfél évszázada. História-MTA TTI, Budapest, 

1994. 429. 

4 

CARR, Edward Hallett: German–Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars 1919– 

1939. Ayer Publishing, 1979. 136. 

5 

WERTH, Nicolas-BARTOŠEK, Karel-PANNÉ, Jean-Louis-MARGOLIN, Jeal Louis- 

12

If we accept that a document’s content is what is written in it, we can state that 

the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact itself is a non-aggression treaty between the 

Communist Soviet Union and the Nazi German Empire, which accurately 

demarcated their spheres of interest in a secret clause in order to avoid any 

controversial issues. In this sense we can call this treaty a typical example of 

classic imperial policy, for which we can find numerous examples especially in the 

colonial area. Everything else beyond this can be interpreted only in a broader 

context and does not result merely from the pact. The treaty of September 28, 1939 

is a boundary and friendly treaty according to its title, even if the concept of 

friendship in a political context shall be handled carefully in historical criticism. 

Why Did They Sign the Treaty? 

Since the treaty was signed just before the outbreak of World War II, the 

document is said to have provided Hitler the opportunity to wage a war without 

risking fighting a dual theatre war. This explains why the question of 

responsibility is such a significant issue of the debate about the pact. 

Analyzing Hitler’s responsibility is almost superfluous as his motives were 

well-known: he reckoned that time had come for a localized war against Poland 

and he wanted to avoid a dual-theatre war, 6 which he regarded the biggest 

strategic fault of the imperial Germany even in „Mein Kampf”. For the sake of 

his purpose, he had to come to an agreement either with his western or his 

eastern enemies. 7 As he could not expect remarkable diplomatic success against 

the British and the French a year after Munich, 8 he had to come to an agreement 

with Moscow under the given circumstances, which did not prove to be very 

difficult (in view of the facts). We have to emphasize, however, that this 

cooperation could only be temporary for Hitler: since their coming into power, 

the Nazis advocated the necessity of eliminating Communism and the „Mein 

Kampf” – irrespectively of its political system – set the program of 

germanising the Eastern Slavic territories as a long-term purpose. Still, the 

„peaceful cohabitation” of the two world orders – like in the case of the USA 

and the Soviet Union later – could certainly have been imaginable for even 

decades; nevertheless, this is not the world of historians but that of sci-fi. The 

German Empire obviously wanted the war and regarded the Soviet Union an 

enemy in the long run. The relation of the two powers was far from friendly, as 

pointed out properly even by Tamás Krausz in his above cited article. 9 

PACZKOWSKI, Andrzej-COURTOIS, Stéphane: The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, 

Terror, Repression. Harvard University Press, 1999. 5. 

6 RÁNKI György: A második világháború története. Gondolat, Budapest, 1973. 7. 

7 Arising from the nature of Nazism and German superiority, Hitler had no „friends,” only 

enemies and temporary allies. 

8 ORMOS, Mária-MAJOROS, István: Európa a nemzetközi küzdőtéren. Osiris, Budapest, 2003. 402. 

9 KRAUSZ Tamás: Néhány megjegyzés a Molotov-Ribbentrop paktum értelmezéséhez. IN: 

13

What is much more interesting is the situation of the Soviet Union and the 

reason why Stalin concluded the agreement. According to a notable and more 

and more prevailing view, Stalin considered Hitler a more calculable and 

creditable partner than the Western democracies. Their way of thinking was 

similar in many perspectives: both of them respected military strength, believed 

in power and did not think much of the ideas of freedom and equality. For 

Stalin Hitler’s hostile approach towards the Soviet Union and Communism 

could not be a telling argument against him, as all the other states’ attitude in 

the world was similar to that to a certain extent. We can even claim that from 

the Rapallo Treaty (1922) until Hitler’s seizure of power, the Soviet Union had 

its closest relations with no other but Germany, 10 thus they had something to 

proceed from. Nonetheless, the thesis of the almost allied co-operation of the 

two totalitarian states between 1939 and 1941, the beginning of which was 

indicated by the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, cannot be accepted 

without criticism: the co-operation of Moscow and Berlin as pointed out above 

was only of tactical and temporary nature. However, this collaboration cannot 

be denied; the relations between Moscow and Berlin warmed up spectacularly 

after their mutual operations against Poland. 11 The Communist Soviet Union 

and the Nazi Germany were not compelled to hold a common parade for their 

soldiers in the occupied Brest-Litovsk on September 22, 1939 and Lvov on 

September 23, 1939; 12 hence, it is understandable that hearing such pieces of 

news the sentiments about the collaboration of the two dictatorships appeared 

that time and even Stalin’s censorship could not eliminate them. 

We have to realize that Stalin had no other choice. He recognized that 

during the changes in the international system at the end of the 1930s the 

isolation of the Soviet Union could not be maintained, or at least was not 

expedient. Nonetheless, when he tried to look for partners for his growing 

activity, neither the British, nor the French, and not even Warsaw threatened by 

the Germans enthused over a close co-operation with Moscow. 13 Due to its 

Communist nature, the Soviet Union had been treated as an outcast and an 

unreliable state. This attitude was suspended only for a few years during the 

HÁDA Béla - LIGETI Dávid - MAJOROS István - MARUZSA Zoltán - MERÉNYI Krisztina 

(szerk.): Nemzetek és birodalmak. Diószegi István 80 éves. ELTE, Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes 

Történeti Tanszék, Budapest, 2010. 363. 

10 A major consequence of the treaty was that Germany had the weapons, the possession of 

which was forbidden for them by the Versailles Peace Treaty, tested in the Soviet Union, such as 

airplanes and armours. 

11 The deepening of the co-operation was indicated by the expansion of the German-Soviet 

Trade Agreement on February 11, 1940, signed originally on August 19, 1939, by the Lithuanian 

border’s remodification, or by the population exchange agreement of 1941. ERICSON, Edward 

E: Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany. 1933–1941. Greenwood 

Publishing, 1999. 150-153. 

12 NEKRICH, Aleksandr Moiseevich-ULAM, Adam Bruno; FREEZE, Gregory L.: Pariahs, 

Partners, Predators: German–Soviet Relations 1922–1941. Columbia University Press, 1997. 131. 

13 TAYLOR, A.J.P.: A második világháború okai. Scolar, Budapest, 1998. 308-311. 

14

war and the friendly relations broke up after the mutually achieved victory. It is 

also true that by announcing the „world revolution” and by the continuous 

lashing of the „western imperialism”, the Soviet Union was responsible for its 

own segregation. In 1939, nevertheless, Stalin’s position was favourable: the 

Germans, the French, and also the British wished for negotiating with him 

about collaboration, who, therefore, could exploit this situation. The indulgent 

British and French behaviour at the time of signing the Munich Treaty and at 

its violation, moreover, the inefficiency of their negotiations in July-August, 

1939 14 convinced Stalin about the fact that he could not expect support from 

either London or Paris in case of a potential German-Soviet conflict. As a 

consequence, opening towards Germany seemed to be logical: 15 as the Soviet 

Union was not prepared for the war (it was not prepared even in 1941 as it 

became apparent by the German attack), a tactical partnership with Hitler was 

not a bad decision. 16 The Germans concluded similar non-aggression 

agreements, although lacking any secret clause, with Denmark, Estonia and 

Latvia in 1939, so the treaty was part of a German „peace offensive” – 

posteriorly regarded a policy with misinforming purposes – which made the 

communication of signing the treaty easier for Stalin. It is also a fact that 

London and Paris could not offer the territories marked as Moscow’s sphere of 

interest in the treaty to Stalin, who was dealing with regaining the areas of the 

former Tsarist Russia – from another perspective, narrowing the military 

spring-board against the Soviet Union, – while Hitler did gladly offer, and 

Stalin decided in favour of the more prosperous choice. 17 

It is a different question that the history writing of the „sovietised” counties 

created a myth from the agreement signed under such circumstances and 

presented the signing of the pact as a genius decision of the generalissimo, 

which provided two more years for the Soviet Union to prepare for the war. 18 

This is, however, only partially true because, as we will see, the German 

Empire had strengthened much more by 1941 than the Soviet Union. 

Nevertheless, the main problem of the thesis is not this but that it presented 


15 Some historians consider the exchange of Litvinov, the Soviet foreign minister with Jewish 

descent to Molotov on May 3, 1939 an obvious gesture towards the Germans. Litvinov was 

mentioned only as Litvinov-Finkelstein in the German media. Albeit, it is also true that besides 

some other factors, the failure of the British-French-Soviet anti-Fascist co-operation preferred by 

him contributed to his fall as well. Q. v. LEVIN, Nora: The Jews in the Soviet Union Since 1917: 

Paradox of Survival. NYU Press, 1988. 330. 

16 We could say state that the conquest-seeking Germany was translated as East by the 

Munich Treaty and as West by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact after the Invasion of Poland. 

17 DIÓSZEGI István: A hatalmi politika másfél évszázada. História-MTA TTI, Budapest, 

1994. 428. GROGIN, Robert C.: Natural Enemies: The United States and the Soviet Union in the 

Cold War 1917–1991. Lexington Books, 2001. 28. 

18 This statement was first announced in Stalin’s speech on radio on July 3, 1941, and 

became therefore compulsory and absolute for many. DIÓSZEGI István: A hatalmi politika 

másfél évszázada. História-MTA TTI, Budapest, 1994. 429. 

15

such an international agreement as a genius decision that was concluded by two 

totalitarian empires over the head of millions of Polish, Estonian, Latvian, 

Lithuanian, Romanian, and Ukrainian people without their consent, against 

their wish, deciding upon their fate and their future, which is still unacceptable 

seen from the western democracies’ viewpoint. 19 That is why the majority of 

the Baltic republic’s population expressed their opinion about Stalin’s genius 

decision as soon as it was possible, namely on August 23, 1989, at the 50 th 

anniversary of signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. 20 

Who Were the Agreements Most Beneficial to? 

The German-Soviet agreement apparently delayed the war between Moscow 

and Berlin making them accomplices in dividing the territories lying between 

them. The German invasion of September 1, 1939 and the Soviet attack starting 

on September 17 against Poland were only the first step of accomplishing the 

division of the area – more delicately the demarcation of their spheres of 

interest – comprised in the secret clause of the agreement, which was modified 

on September 28. The Germans acquired the parts of Poland owing to them, 

while the Soviet Union annexed East-Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, 21 

then commenced a war against Finland, and demanded Bessarabia successfully 

from Romania in 1940. With these actions, Stalin practically stepped on the 

way of traditional imperial expansion, the aim of which was to gain buffer 

territories to be used for beating off a potential attack against the Soviet Union. 

All in all, we can lay down that these territories were lost for Moscow even in 

the first few weeks of the war and their temporary possession did not influence 

the outcome of the war considerably. 22 At the same time, the Soviet expansion 

spoiled the agreement with the British and the Americans, who did not intend 

to support Stalin’s expansion. 

On the other hand, Hitler exploited the existence of the agreement 

concluded with the Soviet Union more than Stalin expected; though, he also 

had to explain himself to his allies 23 but only temporarily. After having secured 

his back from the east, his army occupied France, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, 

the Netherlands, and Luxemburg in less than one year. Though the occupation 

of these countries tied up significant German military power, the possession of 

19 Let there be no mistakes about it: in the course of their history, these democracies also 

concluded several treaties that are unacceptable from our present-day viewpoint, and that 

completely ignored the opinion of especially the colonial areas’ population. 

20 URBAN, Thomas: 15 Minuten Freiheit. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 rd August 2009.; VESER, 

Reinhard: Eine Last für die Nachgeborenen. FAZ, 20 th August 2009. 

21 RAUCH, Georg von-MISIUNAS, Romuald J.-TAAGEPERA, Rein: A balti államok 

története. Osiris-Századvég, Budapest, 1994. 179-183. 

22 An exception in the Baltic region is the issue of Estonia, the possession of which made the 

German march against Leningrad really difficult at the beginning of the war. 


16

their war industry and raw materials made Hitler much stronger than Stalin 

imagined. We can mention in his excuse that such German success was not 

supposed to be achieved. In 1939, it was also imaginable – and Stalin probably 

believed in it as well – that an extended position war could evolve on the 

western borders of Germany, in which all parties would get exhausted and from 

this situation the Soviet Union could emerge with much strength. 24 This did not 

happen, and the Soviet Union had pay for it seriously. Still, they might have 

had to pay this price too if they had entered the war earlier, and particularly in a 

way that the British and the Americans would not have been compelled to form 

an alliance against the Nazi Germany. 

Natural Co-operation of Totalitarian Systems or a Typical Agreement 

of Imperial Politics? 

As we already pointed out, the co-operation between Moscow and Berlin 

between 1939 and 1941 warmed up spectacularly. However, could that cooperation 

be considered such an allied relation based on which we can 

speak about the two totalitarian systems’ close collaboration? The answer to 

this question is no. There was no friendship between Hitler and Stalin or 

between their countries; even if they had some common characteristics or 

there was military co-operation between them and their commercial 

relations were developing continuously. The reason is that they did not 

create a world order with principles fixed in a common declaration. The 

meeting of Molotov and Ribbentrop on November 12-13, 1940 could have 

been a starting point for that; nonetheless, the two diplomats realized the 

differences between their conceptions about the international settlement. 25 

The relevance of these negotiations is decreased by the detail that Hitler 

ordered the preparation of the eastern operation before them. The fact that 

the co-operation of the two totalitarian states was not close does not exempt 

either of them from the responsibility of applying imperial policy right in 

the middle of Europe and introducing their own political system and laws 

bluntly on the territories controlled by them. When more and more friction 

took place between them, the Third Reich, being at the zenith of its 

strength, denounced the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact concluded because of 

tactical reasons and, consequently, the alliance working based on the pact; 

and finally the war between them broke out. 

24 DIÓSZEGI István: A hatalmi politika másfél évszázada. História-MTA TTI, Budapest, 1994. 430. 

25 Ribbentrop wished to call the Soviets’ attention to the British colonies and the Middle-and 

Near East to involve the Soviet Union in an attack against the British, while Molotov was 

formulating Soviet (or we could equally say: traditional Russian) interests in the Balkans and the 

straits clarifying for their German partners that the Soviet Union claimed far more territories than 

ensured for them by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. ORMOS, Mária-MAJOROS, István: Európa 

a nemzetközi küzdőtéren. Osiris, Budapest, 2003. 429-430. 

17

Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact 

The Government of the German Reich and The Government of the Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republics desirous of strengthening the cause of peace 

between Germany and the U.S.S.R., and proceeding from the fundamental 

provisions of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April, 1926 between 

Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached the following Agreement: 

Article I. Both High Contracting Parties obligate themselves to desist from 

any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, either 

individually or jointly with other Powers. 

Article II. Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of 

belligerent action by a third Power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no 

manner lend its support to this third Power. 

Article III. The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall in 

the future maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of 

consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their 

common interests. 

Article IV. Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting 

Parties shall participate in any grouping of Powers whatsoever that is directly 

or indirectly aimed at the other party. 

Article V. Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting 

Parties over problems of one kind or another, both parties shall settle these 

disputes or conflicts exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if 

necessary, through the establishment of arbitration commissions. 

Article VI. The present Treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, with 

the proviso that, in so far as one of the High Contracting Parties does not 

advance it one year prior to the expiration of this period, the validity of this 

Treaty shall automatically be extended for another five years. 

Article VII. The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible 

time. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin. The Agreement shall enter 

into force as soon as it is signed. 

Secret Additional Protocol 

Article I. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas 

belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the 

northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of 

influence of Germany and U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania 

in the Vilna area is recognized by each party. 

Article II. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the 

areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the 

U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, 

Vistula and San. 

18

The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the 

maintenance of an independent Polish States and how such a state should be 

bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political 

developments. 

In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a 

friendly agreement. 

Article III. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the 

Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete 

political disinteredness in these areas. 

Article IV. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret. 

Moscow, August 23, 1939. 

For the Government of the German Reich v. Ribbentrop 

Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U.S.S.R. V. Molotov 

* * 

BOUNDARY AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY BETWEEN GERMANY AND 

THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R. 

consider it as exclusively their task, after the collapse of the former Polish 

state, to re-establish peace and order in these territories and to assure to the 

peoples living there a peaceful life in keeping with their national character. To 

this end, they have agreed upon the following: 

Article I. 


determine as the boundary of their respective national interests in the territory 

of the former Polish state the line marked on the attached map, which shall be 

described in more detail in a supplementary protocol. 

Article II. 

Both Parties recognize the boundary of the respective national interests 

established in Article I. as definitive and shall reject any interference of third 

powers in this settlement. 

Article III. 

The necessary reorganization of public administration will be effected in the 

areas west of the line specified in article I by the Government of the German 

Reich, in the areas east of this line by the Government of the U.S.S.R. 

Article IV. 


regard this settlement as a firm foundation for a progressive development of the 

friendly relations between their peoples. 

Article V. 

This Treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be exchanged in 

Berlin as soon as possible. The Treaty becomes effective upon signature. 

19

Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages. 

Moscow, September 28, 1939. 

For the Government of the 

German Reich: 

J. v. Ribbentrop 

20 

With full power of the Government of 

the U.S.S.R.: 

V. Molotov 

SECRET SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL [1] 

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries declare the agreement of the Government 

of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R upon the following: 

The Secret Supplementary Protocol signed on August 23, 1939, shall be 

amended in item 1 to the effect that the territory of the Lithuanian state falls to 

the sphere of influence of the U.S.S.R., while, on the other hand, the province 

of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw fall to the sphere of influence of 

Germany (cf. the map attached to the Boundary and Friendship Treaty signed 

today). As soon as the Government of the U.S.S.R. shall take special measures 

on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present German-Lithuanian 

border, for the purpose of a natural and simple boundary delineation, shall be 

rectified in such a way that the Lithuanian territory situated to the southwest of 

the line marked on the attached map should fall to Germany. 

Further it is declared that the economic agreements now in force between 

Germany and Lithuania shall not be affected by the measures of the Soviet 

Union referred to above. 


For the Government of the German 

Reich: 


With full power of the Government of the 

U.S.S.R.: 


SECRET SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL [2] 

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, on concluding the German-Soviet 

Boundary and Friendship Treaty, have declared their agreement upon the 

following: 

Both Parties will tolerate in their territories no Polish agitation which affects 

the territories of the other Party. They will suppress in their territories all 

beginnings of such agitation and inform each other concerning suitable 

measures for this purpose. 



Reich: 



U.S.S.R.: 

V. Molotov

CONFIDENTIAL PROTOCOL 

The Government of the U.S.S.R. shall place no obstacles in the way of 

Reich nationals and other persons of German descent residing in the territories 

under its jurisdiction, if they desire to migrate to Germany or to the territories 

under German jurisdiction. It agrees that such removals shall be carried out by 

agents of the Government of the German Reich in cooperation with the 

competent local authorities and that the property rights of the emigrants shall 

be protected. 

A corresponding obligation is assumed by the Government of the German 

Reich in respect to the persons of Ukrainian or White Russian descent residing 

in the territories under its jurisdiction. 



Reich: 



U.S.S.R.: 


DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GERMAN REICH 

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R. 

After the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the 

U.S.S.R. have, by means of the Treaty signed today, definitively settled the 

problems arising from the collapse of the Polish state and have thereby created 

a sure foundation for a lasting peace in Eastern Europe, they mutually express 

their conviction that it would serve the true interest of all peoples to put an end 

to the state of war existing at present between Germany on the one side and 

England and France on the other. Both Governments will therefore direct their 

common efforts, jointly with other friendly powers if occasion arises, toward 

attaining this goal as soon as possible. 

Should, however, the efforts of the two Governments remain fruitless, this 

would demonstrate the fact that England and France are responsible for the 

continuation of the war, whereupon, in case of the continuation of the war, the 

Governments of Germany and of the U.S.S.R. shall engage in mutual 

consultations with regard to necessary measures. 



Reich: 



U.S.S.R.: 


21

Lachaise, Bernard 

Historiography of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in France since 1945 

French historians have not worked a lot on the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. 

There is only one work entirely devoted to the subject, by Yves Santamaria, 

which was published relatively recently, in 1998. As the author writes in his 

bibliography: „the number of works in English and German listed here reveals 

how weak French research on the subject is”. 1 A greater number of articles - 

although they are still rare - have been devoted specifically to the event itself. 

Among these, one finds those by Jean-Paul Brunet whose studies on the 

comments of the French press, which appeared in a specialised scientic review, 

are quite dated , and those by René Girault who explained, in a popular review, 

the reasons which led Stalin to sign the pact. 2 The most recent synthesis 

authored by a French historian appeared in the summer of 2009: this was a 

paper read by Stéphane Courtois at a private organisation, the Foundation for 

Political Innovation, which is close to the political party currently in power in 

France, the UMP 3 . This short bibliography which is limited to works especially 

devoted to the signing of the pact between Germany and the USSR during the 

summer of 1939 is very significant from a historiographical point of view: on 

the one hand, the researchers referred to are specialists in Communism and 

only René Girault is a historian of international relations, who specializes 

nevertheless in the history of Russia and of the USSR 4 ; on the other hand, the 

title used in their text to refer to the treaty of August 23, 1939, which is to say 

„the German-Soviet pact” was abandonned by Stéphane Courtois who replaced 

it by „the Soviet-Nazi alliance” which, in itself, announces a change of contents 

in the analysis. 

These remarks are a reminder that one should start by introducing the 

context of French historiography concerning the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. The 

story of this treaty cannot be dissociated, in France as in the other countries, 

from either the international context and in particular from the Cold War, from 

the position of the USSR in the world up to 1989, then from the period 

1 

SANTAMARIA, Yves: 1939, le pacte germano-soviétique. Editions Complexe, Bruxelles, 

1998. 139. 

2 

BRUNET, Jean-Paul: La presse française et le pacte germano-soviétique (août 1939). In : 

Relations internationales, 1974, N°2. 187-212. GIRAULT, René: Pourquoi Staline a signé le 

Pacte germano-soviétique. In: L’Histoire, N°14, juillet-août 1979. 

3 

COURTOIS, Stéphane: Retour sur l’alliance soviéto-nazie 70 ans après. Conférence du 23 

juillet 2009 for the Foundation for Political Innovation (site: www.fondpol.org). 

4 

BRUNET, Jean-Paul has written about the political history of the city of Saint-Denis during 

the first part of the twentieth century; COURTOIS, Stephane is a specialist about communism; 

SANTAMARIA, Yves has written about the French communist party and peace before the 

Second World War; GIRAULT, René is a specialist of the history of Russia and international 

relations. 

23

following the fall of the Soviet block and the disappearance of the USSR, nor 

from the conditions of access to the German and Soviet archives which long 

remained closed, and only gradually opened up from the fifies on for Germany 

and from the nineties on for the USSR. 

But the story of the pact in France can not be studied without taking into 

account - this a French (and Italian) specificity - in Western democraties after 

1945, which is to say the weight of the Communist Party and the strength of 

Communism in French society, of which the intellectual aspect, up until the 

eighties, this „French passion”, according to Marc Lazar. 5 

The study of the French historiography of the pact consists in investigating 

the evolution of the place of the pact in scientific publications, the presentation 

of its contents, the motivations of the signees and the immediate consequences 

of such an agreement for Central Europe and for France … and notably for the 

Communists, who - in 1939 - represented in the Chamber of Deputies, the one 

elected in 1936, that of the Popular Front, a group of 74 elected members, the 

greatest number ever reached by the PCF (French Communist Party) since its 

founding, representing 12% of the total number of Deputies. 

The sources referred to consist in scientific publications on international 

relations, originating from the French University (from Pierre Renouvin, Jean- 

Baptiste Duroselle, René Girault, Robert Frank and Elisabeth du Réau), on 

Communism (among whom Stéphane Courtois, François Furet), and finally on 

the German-Soviet pact itself (Yves Santamaria in particular). 6 The various 

reprints of a same work (like Diplomatic History or History of International 

5 LAZAR, Marc: Le communisme, une passion française. Perrin, Paris, 2002. JALABERT, 

Laurent: Le Grand Débat. Les universitaires français – historiens et géographes- et les pays 

communistes de 1945 à 1991. G.R.H.I., Toulouse, 2001. The French communist party was the 

first party of the left in Fance till 1978. 

6 The bibliography is, from the latest to the present: DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste, Histoire 

diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours. Armand Colin, Paris, 1953. DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste 

(dir.): Les relations germano-soviétiques de 1933 à 1939. Armand Colin, Paris, 1954. 

DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste (dir.): Les frontières européennes de l’URSS 1917-1941, Cahiers 

de la FNSP, Armand Colin, Paris, 1957. RENOUVIN, Pierre. Histoire des relations 

internationales, tome 8, Les crises du XXe siècle. II-de 1929 à 1945. Hachette, Paris, 1958. 

BAUMONT, Maurice: La faillite de la paix (1918-1939), II- de l’affaire éthiopienne à la guerre 

(1936-1939). PUF, collection „ Peuples et civilisations ”, tome XX, Paris, 1961. BRUNET, 

Jean-Paul Brunet: art.cité, 1974. DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste: Politique étrangère de la 

France. La décadence (1932-1939). Imprimerie nationale, Paris, 1979. GIRAULT, René: 

art.cité, 1979. DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste: Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours. Dalloz, 

Paris, 1981. GIRAULT, René, FRANK, Robert: Histoire des relations internationales 

contemporaines, tome 2 : 1914-1941, Turbulente Europe et nouveaux mondes. Masson, Paris, 

1988. FURET, François: Le passé d’une illusion. Essai sur l’idée communiste du XXe siècle. 

Robert Lafont-Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1995. COURTOIS, Stéphane (et alii): Le livre noir du 

communisme. Crimes, terreur, répression. Robert Laffont, Paris, 1997. SANTAMARIA, Yves: 

1939, le pacte germano-soviétique. Editions Complexe, Bruxelles, 1998. DU RÉAU, Elisabeth: 

L’ordre mondial de Versailles à San Francisco juin 1919-juin 1945. PUF, Paris, 2007. 

COURTOIS, Stéphane: Ibidem, 2009. 

24

Relations) are the focus of special attention in which each modification/change 

to the text (addition or editing) has to be closely examined. 

Our approach will consist first in investigating the analysis of the contents 

of the agreement between Ribbentrop and Molotov, then that of the origins of 

the pact, and finally, that of the significance of the event. 

The content of the „German-Soviet Pact”: from „agreement” to 

„alliance”, from „non-aggression” to „crime against peace”. 

The evolution of the designation of the the German-Soviet agreement is 

significant of the analysis historians have made of its content. 

During the fifties, quite neutral terms were used to designate the text signed 

on August 23, 1939 in Moscow by Ribbentrop and Molotov („treaty”, 

„agreement”, „pact”). The focus was on the content of the public document 

(„non agression”) but the secret protocol (revealed in 1946 but only published 

by Russia in 1992) was already presented as a „much more important text” 

whose „existence was absoluteley indisputable” 7 . The second treaty signed 

September 28th, 1939 was presented more briefly and always separately. 

From the seventies on, both texts were thus linked and from then on, 

historians explain that „there was not simply one German-Soviet pact on 

August 23, 1939 but German-Soviet pacts, on August 23 and September 28, 

1939” 8 This approach entails first the following consequence: the pacts cannot 

be considered as a „simple” circumstancial diplomatic or „neutrality” 

agreement but they establish an actual „alliance” between Germany and the 

USSR. In 1957, J.B. Duroselle and his team, concerning Soviet policy from 

August 23 on, explain that they can neither „be moral judges or even political 

ones of the Soviet attitude in these circumstances”, and they write: „Let’s 

simply say that it is perfectly coherent and that in the absence of any moral 

justification in the non-communist perspective of relations between states, it 

had strategic bases for justification. The June 1941 events are a testimony of 

particular significance.” (J.B. Duroselle). „It is perfectly normal that having 

signed a pact of non-agression with the Reich, the USSR had led a diplomatic 

game which was fair and necessary from its point of view in order not to 

ressucitate a state, a satellite of Germany, in this case the Polish state which 

had created so many problems for it since the first day of its founding and 

which in 1939, had been one of the main causes of the failure of the triad’s 

pact” (Benjamin Goriely) 9 . In 1979, René Girault insisted on the meaning of 

the pacts: „it was no longer a question of remaining at an equal distance 

between the two capitalist camps; it was a question of a real opportunity for 

7 

DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste: Histoire diplomatique…op.cit., 1953. 284. 

8 

GIRAULT, René: art.cité. 111. COURTOIS, Stephane and FURET, François also use the 

word „pacts” and not „pact”. 

9 

DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste : Les frontières…op.cit., 1957, XIII. et 284. 

25

the „capitalist fascist” camp”. „Here the transformation is fundamental. No 

doubt this policy still poses a problem today since it is much less 

understandable than the precise point of a simple pact of non-agression” 10 . 

More recently, it is the alliance which is highlighted by French historians. 

Thus, François Furet writes: „the pact of August 23 inugurates the period of 

alliance between the USSR and Nazi Germany. An alliance and not simply an 

agreement of non-agression, according to the first presentation which was 

made at the time…” 11 . As for Stéphane Courtois, in his introduction (which 

gave rise to so many reactions) to the Black Book of Communism, devoted to 

„the crimes of Communism”, he asserts that: „Stalin undeniably committed this 

type of crime („against peace”), even simply by secret negotiations with Hitler, 

through two peace treaties on August 23 and September 28, 1939, the division 

of Poland and the annexion of the Baltic states, of Northern Bukovine and of 

Bessarabia by the USSR” 12 . 

Thus, in half a century, the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact has been read less and less 

as a „simple” diplomatic treaty but as a strong political act implying Staline, the 

USSR and Communism by insisting on the serious Soviet responsibility. The 

second analysis has gained a predominant position since the 1990s, which is to say 

after the fall of the USSR, in the context of the collapse and of the denunciation of 

past Communist history. The wording used by Stéphane Courtois in his conference 

of the summer of 2009 is, in this respect, explicit and summarizes this evolution: 

the „German-Soviet pact” was replaced by „the Soviet-Nazi alliance”. These terms 

of course point to different interpretations of the reasons which led to the signing of 

the texts during the summer of 1939. 

At the origins of the „German-Soviet pact” or „the appearance of the 

defendants” (Y. Santamaria): Staline as the main culprit? 

From the first texts on the German-Soviet pact, historians wondered about 

the motivations of the signees, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, „two states 

whose deep inimity had been, since the coming to power of Hitler, a constant in 

international politics” 13 . But they also questioned more and more the 

responsibilities of Western democracies and of Poland. 

Concerning the reasons which led Hitler to accept the negotiations and then the 

agreement with Staline, at the request of Ribbentrop, historiography has not really 

evolved. Indeed, „differences in opinion on Hitler’s assessment of the Soviet 

threat” 14 do exist. But, very early on, a wide consensus appeared: as P. Renouvin 

wrote: „the motives of the German policy were not dubious” since the „German- 

10 GIRAULT, René: art.cité, 112. 

11 FURET, François: op.cit., 365. 

12 COURTOIS, Stéphane: Le livre noir…op.cit., 15. 

13 RENOUVIN, Pierre: Histoire des relations…op.cit., 180. 

14 SANTAMARIA, Yves: op.cit., 121. 

26

Russian agreement (…) would allow Hitler to conduct war in favorable 

circumstances.” 15 On the one hand, such an agreement enabled Hitler to attack the 

West without having a second front in the East, and, on the other hand, to achieve 

his goal of wiping out the Polish state: „once the Nazi leader had admitted that the 

conquest of Poland would be greatly facilitated by a German-Soviet agreement, 

the Number One antibolshevik would be obliged to deal with him.” 16 

The motives of the Soviet policy are more difficult to distinguish, because 

of the lack of documents wrote Pierre Renouvin fifty years ago. 17 And it is 

precisely on this point that historiography, thanks to the opening of the 

archives, has progressed and evolved. As early as 1953, J.B. Duroselle, with 

caution, since the problem is currently unsolvable considered that, up until the 

summer the USSR intended „to retain two possibilities, in order to choose the 

one it would consider, depending on circumstances, as the most favorable to its 

interests” 18 . This is the beginning of the theory of the several irons in the fire 

which does not answer the question of Stalin’s goals: circumstancial ones, the 

USSR not being ready, or more long-term ones, with an expansion plan, or 

even a revolutionary project in order to bring about the triumph of Communism 

over the ashes of capitalism defeated by the war in the West between Hitler and 

the democracies. In 1957, B. Goriely insisted in putting down the Soviet policy 

of 1939 to the continuity - tradition (?) - of the realistic politics of the 

country 19 . René Girault had a different interpretation for the Soviet choices: 

indeed, he also evoked „the choice of the best offer” but highlighted two other 

considerations, one which was conjunctural and the other ideological. As he 

wrote: „the Polish refusal was thus the fundamental reason for which the 

Soviets opted for an agreement with Germany.” He also added, with less 

certainty, that the assimilation by Moscow of „the Western plutocracy” and of 

„Hitlerian capitalism” or, more exactly, „the fascist avatar of capitalism could 

explain why Stalinian leaders and Stalin were able to pass from a policy of 

close ties with the West to a policy of alliance with Hitlerian Germany” 20 . 

If Poland was accused of bearing responsibility for Stalin’s decision to form 

an alliance with Hitler, the attitude of the Western democracies is also 

constantly evoked in French historiography. „Should one forget the hesitations 

of the great democratic states?” asks P. Renouvin 21 . The memory of Munich is 

always evoked: „didn’t the West throw Stalin into Hitler’s arms by capitulating 

in Munich and by isolating the Soviet Union on this occasion?” 22 . Referring to 

15 RENOUVIN, Pierre: op.cit., 183. 

16 GIRAULT, René, FRANK, Robert: op.cit., 237. 

17 RENOUVIN, Pierre: op.cit., 183. 

18 DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste: Les relations…op.cit., 100. 

19 B. Goriely, dans DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste (dir.), Les frontières…op.cit., 284. 

20 GIRAULT, René: art.cité, 112. The Polish gouvernment doesn’t want the military 

assistance of the URSS in spite of French wishes. 

21 RENOUVIN, Pierre: Histoire des relations…op.cit., 198. 


27

Molotov’s speech on August 31,1939 in which the minister explains the pact 

by Moscow’s apprehensions concerning the real motives of France and of 

Great Britain, Maurice Baumont wrote: „It is certain that the Western powers 

had conducted their negotiatons with Moscow with an inexcusable weakness.”, 

while adding: „it is no less certain that they could not offer the Soviets, as did 

Germany, the occupation of the Baltic states, of Bessaraba and of half of 

Poland.” 23 Other historians underline another aspect of the responsibility of 

France and of Great Britain: „the main mistake the Western allies made was to 

have believed that the Geman-Soviet ideological antagonism would always 

preclude the two dictatorships from getting along, and that, for this reason, 

they could take Stalin for a ride, a Stalin who was constantly depicted by Hitler 

as the embodiement of absolute perversion.” 24 

From the 1990s on, after the collapse of Communism, the responsibility of 

Westerners was minimized in favour of an almost exclusively ideological 

intepretation in which Stalin and the USSR are to blame. Thus François Furet 

writes: „although it is obvious that the appeasement policy towards Hitler 

which was conducted by the British Conservatives and the French leaders 

following in their steps, did play a role in the diplomatic reversal of the USSR 

towards Hitler in 1939, it is not quite right to make this the sole explanation of 

this reversal” 25 . Thus, S. Courtois mainly relies on the Dimitrov papers and 

notably on the report of his meeting with Stalin on September 7, 1939 to 

establish „Stalin’s true intentions”. He concludes with the „absolute cynicsim” 

of Stalin who „with the pact freed Hitler from any fear of a second front to the 

East and made him decide to attack Poland.” In the text of the treaty of 

September 28, 1939, he sees „the extreme cyncism of two totalitarian powers 

which did not respect any international rules.” Referring to the achievement by 

the USSR of the policy inscribed in the pacts of August 23 and September 28, 

S. Courtois insists on „the enormous traumas which shook the nations which 

were victims of the complicity of these two totalitarian states”. And he 

concluded that „as long as the criminal dimension of the alliance with Hitler is 

not clearly recognized - in particular by Russia -, the scars that it left on the 

body of Europe will not heal (…).” 26 Behind the diverging opinions on the 

reasons which may explain the signature of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, there 

clearly appear various interpretations of the effects of this pact. 

The effects of the „German-Soviet pact” or „the scars on the body of Europe” 

What were, according to French historiography, the consequences of the 

German-Soviet pact on the beginning of the war, on the future of Central 

23 BAUMONT, Maurice: op.cit., 872. 

24 GIRAULT, René, FRANK, Robert, op.cit., 237. 

25 FURET, François: op.cit., 368. 

26 COURTOIS, Stéphane: art.cité, 7. et 8. et 14. 

28

Europe and on the French communists? One is forced to note that the 

responsibility of the pact in the war is claimed by all and gives rise to a 

consensus, from Renouvin to Stéphane Courtois: „it was the pact of August 23, 

1939 which decided on the fate of peace”, wrote the professor of the Sorbonne, 

specialized in international relations, a half a century ago. And „the treaty of 

August 23, by liberating Germany from the threat of combat, directly resulted 

in the start of World War II” - writes the researcher specialized in 

Communism. 27 And S. Courtois adds - as we have seen - that this was a „crime 

against peace” according to the definition of the Nuremberg court. 

The analysis of the effects of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact on the future of 

Central Europe occupies an important place in the writing of French historians, 

beyond the case of Poland which, in 1939, was linked to France by a treaty of 

alliance. One should however distinguish the short-term from the long-term 

future. At first sight, Poland immediately and clearly appeared to be a 

threatened state since the entente between Germany and the USSR could only 

be fatal to it, since the two states to the west and the east had always 

represented its main threats. Their agreement could only facilitate, for both 

states, the realization of their ambitions to the detriment of Polish 

independence. The future of Central Europe is analysed from the contents of 

secret protocols and especially with the knowledge of the situation of the states 

which composed it from 1945 on and especially from 1947 to 1948, with the 

setting up of popular democraties and of „the Soviet bloc”. In 1954, J.B. 

Duroselle considered that „the German-Soviet treaty of August 23, 1939” and 

(…) „the beginning of the Soviet territorial expansion” represented „the 

beginning of a whole new era from the Russian perspective”. He explained that 

„the USSR, which had maintained a defensive attitude for twenty years, and 

which had feigned to scorn any territorial ambition, was, from then on, going 

to pursue its progress, and take its place among the most fiercely imperialist 

powers.” 28 With the secret protocol of August 23, „a sort of agreement about 

the eventual dividing up of the East into zones of influence” was reached. 29 

And, of course, in this respect, historiography highlights the 1939 shift which 

signaled the beginning of Soviet control over Central Europe, the first step 

being the annexation of Eastern Poland, of the Baltic states and of Northern 

Bukovine and Bessarabia (to the detriment of Rumania) during the fall of 1939 

and in 1940. Yet, until the collapse of the Soviet bloc between 1989 and 1991 

and the entry of most of the states of Central Europe into the European Union, 

rarely have the distant consequences of the pact for the peoples of Europe been 

evoked in French historiography. Thus, the pact, for example, is little 

mentioned in Hélène Carrère d’Encausse’s book, Le Grand frère, published in 

1983. The historian only writes that: „in 1939, the USSR was confined within 

27 

RENOUVIN, Pierre: op.cit., p.198 et COURTOIS, Stéphane: Le Livre noir...op.cit., 15. 

28 

DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste: Les relations…op.cit., 4. et 100. 

29 

GIRAULT, René: art.cité, 111. 

29

the borders of the Revolution, a space which was reduced compared to the 

imperial space, and isolated from Europe which regarded it with suspicion”, 

and that „the German-Soviet pact of August 1939 and the war in the West 

allowed Stalin to express his international ambitions for the first time.” 30 . S. 

Courtois, again, goes the furthest, by asserting that: „this alliance between the 

two great totalitarian dctators, Hitler and Stalin, were to have the bleakest 

outcome, which today still scar the body of a reunited Europe.” 31 And if the 

historians of Communism are the ones who focus the most on the long-term 

effects of the pact, it is also because they have made the best analysis of the 

immediate and long-term consequences of the pact on the PCF (the French 

Communist Party) and the French communists. As Jean-Paul Brunet wrote in 

1974 - at a time when the left was uniting in France -: „the Soviet-German was 

supposed to (…) and for many years, made people believe that the French 

Communist Party was the „Foreign Nationalist Party” which Blum spoke of 

with alarm. It is true that the dramatic conditions in which the country was 

forced to live for nearly five years, the turnabout of the PCF after June 1941, 

the exemplary patriotic attitude of the Communists up until the end of the war, 

all contributed to keeping this thorny point of such controversial history in the 

shadows.” 32 The shock was a harsh one for the French Communist Party, as it 

was for the other parties of the Komintern. But the International upheld its anti- 

Hitler stance until September 7, which we have already evoked, and which 

corresponds to the Stalin/Dimitrov encounter. 

Indeed, L’Humanité was closed down as early as August 26, in the context 

of rising anticommunism, and many disconcerted Communist activists and a 

few elected representatives took their distances. But the Communists did vote 

the war credits on September 2. From September 9 on, „the anti-Hitler struggle 

was abandonned to the advantage of the fight against the imperialist war and 

for peace”. On September 26, the French Communist Party was dissolved by 

the government and the Communists were severely repressed in the following 

months. 33 

After 1945, due to their massive and essential committment to the 

Resistance, the French Communists found it difficult to evoke the Soviet- 

German pact and the period running from the summer of 1939 to June 1941, 

when the USSR entered the war. Thus, during the peak period of their strength 

as a party, electoral power, and intellectual influence (1945/1956), they 

30 

D’ENCAUSSE, Hélène Carrère: Le grand frère. L’Union soviétique et l’Europe soviétisée. 

Flammarion, Paris, 1983. 13. et 21. 

31 

COURTOIS, Stéphane: arti.cité, 1. 

32 

BRUNET, Jean-Paul: art.cité, 211-212. 

33 

About this subject see BUTON, Philippe: Le pacifisme communiste de la Seconde Guerre 

mondiale à la Guerre froide. In: VAISSE, Maurice (dir.): Le pacifisme en Europe des années 

1920 aux années 1950. Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1993. and COURTOIS, Stéphane et LAZAR, Marc: 

Histoire du parti communiste français. PUF, Paris, 1995. 

30

adopted a stance of denying the facts. In 1957, B. Goriely explains this in a 

volume devoted, under the direction of J.B. Duroselle, to the European borders 

of the USSR up to 1941, as he sees it as an obstacle for historians: „the 

revelation in Nuremberg of the existence of the secret protocol of August 23rd, 

1939, and later, the publication, by the State Departement of the United States, 

of the two confidential protocols of September 28, 1939, came up against the 

hostility of some French Communists who denied the existence of the 

documents in question, with a note refering to the book by Jean Bouvier and J. 

Gacon, La Vérité sur 1939, published by the Éditions sociales in 1953” 34 . This 

episode has been studied by the historian Laurent Jalabert who sees this as an 

example of the „last breath of Marxist hegemony” between 1953 and 1956. L. 

Jalabert explains that the two young historians, members of the French 

Communist Party, were defending „the dominant thesis of French 

historiography justifying the Soviet-German pact: Stalin signed the pact of 

non-intervention with Hitler because of the inability of the Western states to 

support the USSR in the case of German aggression. This idea is kept alive by 

the memory of the Munich agreement (…). Thus, by signing an agreement 

with Hitler, Stalin gained time in order to finish building the industrial basis 

of the military effort which was indispensable to fight against Nazism (…). In 

the conclusion, the Little Father of the Peoples is congratulated for having 

forged from the beginning a long-term victory strategy.” Very quickly, a 

journalist, André Rossi, expressed his indignation: „no historian, whether a 

Communist or not, would have dared to use his name to support such a 

hotchpotch and this endless series of falsifications. Two schoolboys must 

have been requested to do the job.” 35 

How certain is it that this refusal by the Communists to recognize the whole 

Soviet-German pact ended in 1956? In fact it did not, since this is still a very 

controversial topic in France: when a historian - we have witnessed this 

personally - refers to it in front of an audience of militant Communists - 

especially those who lived through the war -, he often arouses reactions in 

which reference is always made first to the Munich agreement (the French 

Communist Party was the only one to condemn it), the Spanish Civil War 

(which the Communists considered as a conflict between democracy and 

fascism and in which they wanted to see France get involved in the name of 

antifascism), and 1934 (when the French Communist Party committed itself to 

the „Rassemblement populaire” and to antifacism), and after to the Resistance, 

of course, and to the heavy tribute paid by the French Communists and by the 

USSR which lost 20 million lives. S. Courtois has an explanation for the 

Communist obstacle in the historiography of the pact. He is convinced that if 

the Soviet responsibility was not highlighted before, and if „the Soviet-Nazi 

34 DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste (dir.): Les frontières…op.cit., 284. 

35 JALABERT, Laurent: op.cit., 113-115. BOUVIER, Jean (1920-1987) was one of the 

famous French historians during the second half of the twentieth century. 

31

alliance is the blind spot of European memory”, it is because „a powerful 

Communist propaganda has contributed, for half a century, to establishing a 

hyperamnesia of antifacism and an amnesia of the Soviet-Nazi alliance.” 36 

What conclusions can one draw from half a century of French 

historiography of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact? Undoubtedly, there has been a 

great evolution between the years following World War II and the beginning of 

the 21st century. What an evolution between the thesis of a necessary evil 

which presents the pact as „an inevitable consequence of the Munich 

agreement” and as „the construction of a useful defensive buffer zone and the 

ultimate map of a regime projecting its preference for democraties it would 

have liked to have been tougher” and the „preventivist” and „offensivist” thesis 

which asserts that „the Second World War was knowingly provoked by Stalin, 

with the aim of weakening the belligerents, and that the months of the strange 

alliance were used not to reinforce the defense but to increase the offensive 

potential of the USSR. With this in mind, the perspective of an armed attack 

was more to Stalin’s advantage than to Hitler’s, the latter „having shot first” 37 . 

There are many reasons for this important evolution. They are related to the 

opening of the archives and to the research this allowed for, but also to the 

collapse of communism and of the USSR, to the conclusions drawn from the 

Cold War and from the socialist system from 1989 on. But then again, the 

historiography of the pact should not be dominated by such a vicious - and 

harmful - anticommunism as that manifested towards Communism at the 

climax of the Cold War. France, which contrary to Central Europe, did not 

experience Soviet domination after the Nazi domination, should be able to 

avoid too Manichean an analysis. Nevertheless, as Yves Santamaria’s synthesis 

pointed out ten years ago, „the end of historiography is nowhere in sight!” 

Perhaps one should end with a few words by this historian who offers an 

interesting conclusion: „the link initiated during the summer of 1939 was 

fraught with danger and full of possibilities for the two partners, offering each 

a considerable increase in power with, in terms of the equipment accumulated 

over the two years, a net advantage for the USSR. The tribute in terms of image 

was quite heavy: the mystery of the two totalitarian states drawing closer to 

each other still carries all of its repulsiveness and the Realpolitikers can do 

nothing about it. Yet, however insignificant it appeared from a strategic 

viewpoint in June 1941, the expansion of the socialist world proved to be 

politically decisive in 1945 and contributed to edifying a model of antifascist 

panzercommunism which functioned perfectly well on the European scene.” 38 

36 COURTOIS, Stéphane: art.cité, 13. 



32

Ortolan, Guillaume 

The 70 th anniversary of the German-Soviet pact in France and in 

Germany: a compared study 

„Today, this treaty does not gather the crowds any longer”. 1 this expression 

used by the German journalist Reinhard Veser about the German-Soviet pact in the 

Baltic States could be appropriately extended to the majority of German and 

French populations regarding this pact, signed on the 23rd of August 1939 by 

Molotov and von Ribbentrop, the foreign secretaries of the USSR and Nazi 

Germany. This pact was originally of „non-aggression” but it very fast became an 

alliance between the two countries in order to divide Central and Eastern Europe. 

On the 22 nd of August 2009 in the German daily newspaper Taggesspiegel, 

the journalist Sebastian Bickerich begins his article on the German-Soviet pact 

with these words: „these days we can note a remarkable political silence in 

Berlin and Moscow about one of the most important commemorative facts in this 

year of memory : no video message from the chancellor, no common statement 

from both countries, no official message of regret - while on the 23 rd of August 

1939, the German and the Russian shared Europe and, with the German-Soviet 

pact, set the bases of the war and of the iron curtain in Central Europe” 2 . 

In France, one of the winning countries, the press, on the occasion of this 

anniversary, would have had difficulties in wondering at the absence of official 

statement regarding this occasion, for very few articles were published about it. 

It can seem all the more surprising at the time of the 27-countries of the 

European Union since this treaty –as the German journalist justly reminds it– 

widely influenced the post-war new European borders, some of which even 

survived the fall of the Wall, but it also can seem surprising when we know that 

the members of parliament of the EU 3 and the OSCE 4 voted resolutions 

suggesting to make the 23 rd of August a day of commemoration for the victims 

of Nazism and Stalinism. 

Seventy years after the signature of the German-Soviet pact, what 

differences in the remembrance of this event can we observe in two countries 

such as France and Germany which did not walk out of the Second World War 

with the same perspectives? 

1 

VESER, Reinhard: Eine Last für die Nachgeborenen. Frankurter Allgemeine Zeitung 

(FAZ), 20 th August 2009. 

2 nd 

BICKERICH, Sebastian: 70 Jahre Hitler-Stalin-Pakt. Tagesspiegel, 22 August 2009. 

3 

European Parlement, Résolution du Parlement européen du 2 avril 2009 sur la conscience 

européenne et le totalitarisme http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type= 

TA&reference= P6-TA-2009-0213&language=FR&ring=P6-RC-2009-0165, date of consultation 

1 st December 2009. 

4 

OSCE, Résolution de l’Assemblée parlementaire de l’OSCE sur la réunification de l’Europe 

divisée, http://www.voltairenet.org/article161169.html, date of consultation 1 st December 2009. 

33

To constitute our sources, we shall mostly lean on articles from German and 

French press (mostly daily and weekly newspapers) but as the need arises, we 

shall resort to official texts and speeches. For that purpose, we shall first see 

whether the 70 th anniversary of the German-Soviet pact is a single anniversary 

or was actually several times commemorated. Then we shall focus on the 

miscellaneous perceptions and the remembrance of this treaty from a country to 

the other and, finally, on the German and French glances concerning the 

Russian positions on this occasion. 

I. The 70 th anniversary of the German-Soviet pact: one or several 

anniversaries? 

At first sight, the commemoration of the German-Soviet pact, in France and 

in Germany before the 30 th of August has been reduced to its minimal (except 

as regards the German press). In fact, and it is what brings us to wonder about 

the identity of this anniversary, the German-Soviet pact is going to take 

importance in the French and German debates on the occasion of the 70 th 

anniversary ceremonies of the beginning of the Second World War on the 1 st of 

September 2009. 

a) The pact is commemorated on the angle of the release of entering war... 

How the anniversary of the pact was put off ten days is a very bothering 

question: the statements of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on the 

origins of the release of the war finally transformed this almost forgotten pact 

into the star of the ceremonies of the 1 st of September: „the 70 th anniversary of 

the Second World War release engendered a politico-ideological heated 

exchange between Poland and Russia. For the Poles, it is obvious that the nonaggression 

treaty, signed on the 23 rd of August 1939 between Nazi Germany 

and the USSR and better known under the name of „Soviet German pact”, 

which allowed the attack of Poland on the 1 st of September 1939, was the 

release mechanism of the Second World War. This thesis is naturally rejected 

by Russia [...].” 5 The beginning of an article from L'Humanité published on the 

4 th of September of this year shows that this pact was certainly revealed but 

under the particular angle of the release mechanism of entering war. If we want 

to be definitively convinced of it, we just have to compare the dates of the 1 st of 

September and surrounding days (from the 30 th of August till the 3-4 th of 

September) with those of the 23 rd of August. First, on the official side, on the 

1 st of September, a big ceremony took place in Poland, in Westerplatte (where 

the first shot of the war was fired), where a lot of heads of state and 

5 th 

ZERROUKY, Hassane: Polémique autour du pacte germano-soviétique. L'Humanité, 4 

September 2009. 

34

government (more than twenty) came, among whom the Russian Prime 

Minister and especially - as regards our study – German chancellor Angela 

Merkel and French Prime Minister François Fillon. Finally, for the press and in 

particular the French press which had „forgotten” the pact’s anniversary, the 

part which is dedicated to it in articles on the commemoration ceremonies of 

the beginning of the war is generally more important than that granted to the 

ceremonies themselves (and to the statements which were made there). 

Consequently, we can say that this treaty, to which other anniversaries were 

preferred for they were doubtlessly easier to commemorate and more likely to 

appear in the media, finally imposed itself. 

b)... but at the same time it was a real and lasting turnover for Europe 

However, this reduction of the pact Ribbentrop-Molotov to a release 

mechanism of the conflict (as the assassination of the Austria-Hungary 

archduke François-Joseph on the 28 th of June 1914, can be), is far from being 

satisfactory for this treaty was a real and lasting turnover for Europe and in 

particular Central and Eastern Europe. The press, the German one in particular, 

in long reports such as that of Ute Schmidt, 6 strive to reconstitute the direct 

consequences of this pact on the populations. This article is about the planned 

displacement (according to the secret clauses of the pact) of more than a halfmillion 

German from the Soviet sphere of influence (Bessarabia, Bukovina, the 

Baltic) towards the territories of the Reich. All this was organized by a 

German-Soviet commission. The journalist reminds that it was often a 

„personal disaster”, for the concerned inhabitants, to leave their native country, 

contrary to the assertions of the Nazi propaganda. But this also occurred in 

dreadful material conditions (50 kg suitcases, ...) and, moreover, during the 

war, there was a segregation on behalf of the German power (citizens of second 

zone, gathering in camps) which ended in 1945 with Soviet repression, and for 

those who had survived it, with an exile towards post-war Germany. In 

Germany as well, the 70 th anniversary of the German-Soviet pact cannot be 

dissociated from the human chain which gathered more than one and a half 

million Estonians, Letts and Lithuanians on 678 km during 15 minutes on the 

23 rd of August 1989. 7 It was a way, for the population of the Baltic States, to 

denounce the pact Ribbentrop-Molotov (on the day of its 50 th anniversary) and 

to demand the independence for their countries in an action which many 

consider as the beginning of the 1989 bend in history (die Wende in German). 

So, we have to agree that the commemoration of the German-Soviet pact 

cannot be limited to the mere signature of it, but has also to be considered 

according to its spatial and human consequences and throughout time as well. 

6 SCHMIDT, Ute: Einwandfreies Menschenmaterial. FAZ, 22 nd August 2009. 

7 URBAN, Thomas: 15 Minuten Freiheit. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 rd August 2009.; VESER, 

Reinhard: Eine Last für die Nachgeborenen. FAZ, 20 th August 2009. 

35

Thus the date of the 23 rd August is of course not exclusive to evoke the 

German-Soviet pact (and to that extent, there are not one but several 

anniversaries of the pact), but better still, in front of the importance of this 

episode for the Central and Eastern Europe, this date also became a day to 

remember the victims of National Socialism and Stalinism, may the proposition 

of the OECD retained or not. 

II. Diversity of perceptions and remembrance from one country to another 

However, within the context of our French-German study, it is necessary to 

mention that France and Germany naturally do not share the same history in 

Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, it is obvious that the Operation 

Barbarossa, launched by Hitler on the 22 nd of June 1941, was much more 

present in their spirit than the Occupation and the Napoleonic Empire. The pact 

was named „German-Soviet pact” or more rarely „Ribentropp-Molotov pact” in 

France, and „Hitler-Stalin pact” by the Germans (which is much more direct 

and probable more relevant). This is a first sign that the perceptions 

(estrangement in one hand, guilt in the other), and thus the commemorations of 

this event, cannot be the same on each side of the Rhine. 

a) On one hand a certain distance and fast indifference for the event... 

In the beginning of our study have we already a first idea of the importance 

that the German-Soviet pact could occupy in the French public debate, 

particularly in the press. We can complete what we have said about the very 

weak cover of this pact, since our meticulous study of every big French daily 

paper near the 23 rd of August did not allow us to find a single article dealing 

with this event. As far as the weekly press is concerned, things get better, since 

L’Express started a serial on the Second World War on the 19 th of August. Also, 

Le Point published Reuters 8 report on the remembrance of the human chain in 

the Baltic States on its website (but it never became a paper article), as well as 

a criticism and extracts 9 of the book of the English historian Richard Overy on 

1939: Countdown to War (which reported of the process of going to war) on 

the 27 th of August. It was thus necessary to wait for the end of August and the 

beginning of September (Russian statements and ceremony in Poland) to read 

the first articles on this matter. This does not mean that this pact is ignored in 

France as having played a decisive role in the baining of the Second World 

8 Reuters. Les Etats baltes commémorent la chaîne humaine contre l'URSS. lepoint.fr. 

http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-monde/2009-08-23/les-etats-baltes-commemorent-la-chaine-humaine - 

contre -l-urss/924/0/37091023/08/2009. date of consultation 1 st December 2009. 

9 LORRAIN, François-Guillaume: Et le monde bascula dans l'abîme. Le Point, 27 th August 

2009. OVERY, Richard: „1939. Demain, la guerre”. Translated by Pierre-Emmanuel Dauzat, 

Seuil, 204. 

36

War. On the contrary, it shows that this dimension is the only one that is taken into 

account. On Monday, the 24 th of August 2009, the monthly magazine Le Monde 

diplomatique alone published an article 10 where this only version (that of the 

exclusive responsibility of this pact in the start of the conflict) is questioned . It is 

indeed the only article of French press which reads that France has „opened the 

way to the destruction of Czechoslovakia” by the Munich Agreement, and that 

eventually „the Soviet Union did the exact same thing”. François Fillon’s speech in 

Westerplatte (ceremony for which France „only” sent its Prime Minister when the 

president of the Republic Nicolas Sarkozy was working in Paris on the subjects of 

the security, the H1N1 flu and criminal procedure) 11 . It was the only official 

statement made by the French government on this anniversary and it is also 

eloquent. Strangely, not a word was spoken by the Prime Minister on the German- 

Soviet pact and on the origins of the war: „in Gdansk, where on the 1 st of 

September 1939, the Second World War was set on fire[…] ”12 . With a rather partial 

vision of history, he only mentions De Gaulle and the „France libre” that resisted 

during the entire war as did the Polish… 

b)... on the other hand consciousness of guilty and duty of memory 

As far as the German side is concerned, the article first quoted (which was 

blaming the authorities for not expressing themselves on this matter for the 

anniversary of this pact) can seem contradictory. But finally it is the sign that 

there is still a feeling of guilt besides the Rhine and that the Germans still 

believe in the necessity of the duty of remembrance. Contrary to the French 

press, every big German daily or weekly newspaper published numerous 

articles (sometimes even files) from the middle of August. Sometimes they 

only consisted on commenting the German-Soviet pact and its history (with 

articles exclusively dedicated to the genesis of this pact). 13 The length of those 

articles also is to be underlined (on average, the German ones are two or three 

times longer the French ones, but this can be partly explain by the size and the 

thickness of the German newspapers with regard to the French ones), as is their 

serious, since many of them are written by historians 14 or even interviews of 

10 Le pacte germano-soviétique...et ses suites. Le Monde Diplomatique 24 th August 2009. 

11 Elysee.fr, Agenda du Président de la République. http://www.elysee.fr/actualites/ 

index.php?mode=agenda&lang=fr&month=9&year=2009&day=1&cyear=2009&cmonth=9, date of 

consultation 1 st December 2009. 

12 Discours du Premier ministre, François Fillon, aux cérémonies du 70e anniversaire du 

déclenchement de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, http://www.gouvernement.fr/premierministre/discours-du-premier-ministre-francois-fillon-aux-ceremonies-du-70e-anniversaire-du. 

date of 


13 REISSMULLER, Johann Georg: Der Pakt. FAZ, 21 st August 2009. 

14 SCHIELE, Ulrich: Der Weg in den Krieg. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 th August 2009. 

Historian who is teaching at the universities of Paris and Berlin. SCHÖLLGEN, Gregor: Als 

Stalin und Hitler den «Teufelspakt» schlossen. Die Welt, 24 th August 2009. Historian an the 

37

historians. 15 This does not mean that this event is much more well-known in 

Germany than in France: journalist Matthias Kolb does not hesitate to say this 

about the 23 rd of August 1939: „in Germany this date is hardly known […] „. 

However, he states there is a conscience of its importance (in particular for 

Central and Eastern Europe) and of the responsibility of Germany in this event. 

The use of the expression of pact of the devil or devilish pact, 16 even in the 

titles of some articles, is, along with the name Hitler-Staline pact a good 

illustration of this fact. And concerning this subject, the official German 

statements for the 70 years of the beginning of the war are significant of this 

state of mind. On the 1 st of September 1st, former Foreign Secretary (and then 

vice-chancellor), Frank-Walter Steinmeier, wrote an article with his Polish 

counterpart on the occasion of this anniversary. 17 On the same day, chancellor 

Angela Merkel came to Westerplatte to apologize in the name of her country to 

all the victims of the war. The german's culpability does not prevent it from still 

having a complex. Indeed, a few days before, having underlined that Germany 

„had caused immense sufferings in the world”, the chancellor also declared that 

she considered the eviction of the Germans of Poland after the Nazi defeat as 

an „injustice”: „The eviction of more than 12 million persons from the 

territories of former Germany that are in Poland today is obviously an 

injustice, and this also needs to be said”. 18 

In France as in Germany, the German-Soviet pact remains above all the events 

that started or allowed (following different points of view) the Second World War, for 

its consequences after the war for these two countries are nothing in comparison with 

Poland or the Baltic States. It is not a holiday and it is necessary to admit that the 

signature of the pact tends to be relegated to History books. However, in Germany, 

the very strong idea of the duty of remembrance, consecutive to this world conflict, 

helps the commemoration of this event to remain strong. 

III. German and French glances concerning the Russian position in this time 

But if there is a subject on which the French and German press agree during 

this anniversary, it is the Russian declarations about the pact on the occasion of 

University of Erlangen. 

15 rd 

TROEBST, Stefan: Eine schmerzhafte Wunde. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 August 2009. He 

is a historian, teaching at the university of Leipzig and researcher in history of memory. 

16 th 

SCHÖLLGEN, Gregor: Als Stalin und Hitler den «Teufelspakt» schlossen. Die Welt, 24 

August 2009. BRÖSSER, Daniel: Ein teuflischer Pakt. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 rd August 2009. 

17 

STEINMEIER, Frank-Walter, SIKORSKI, Radosław: Der Erste September 1939. 

Süddeutsche Zeitung und the Gazeta Wyborcza, 1 st September 2009. They were respectively the 

German and Polish Foreign Minister. 

18 

SAINT-PAUL, Patrick: Angela Merkels' incline devant les victimes du nazisme. Le Figaro, 

2 nd September 2009. Rede Bundeskanzlerin Merkel bei der Gedenkveranstaltung zum 70. 

Jahrestag des Ausbruchs des Zweiten Weltkriegs in Danzig. 

http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Rede/2009/09/2009-09-01-bkin-danzig.html, date of 


38

this anniversary and more widely of the anniversary of the beginning of the war. 

a) Scandal about the Russian statements: reason: the pact 

Vladimir Putin, during his travel in to Poland, condemned the German- 

Soviet pact („It is doubtless that we can rightly condemn the Ribbentrop- 

Molotov pact which was signed in August 1939”) but he really wanted to 

remind that France and Great Britain had a similar agreement with Hitler in 

Munich („but one year earlier, did not France and Great Britain sign the 

famous treaty with Hitler in Munich, ruining all the hopes to form a common 

front against fascism?” 19 ). Finally he also invited „to turn the page” of the 

Second World War in order to improve the Russian-Polish relationships. It is 

all the more possible, according to the Russian Prime Minister, since „Russians 

and Poles had fought against the same common enemy during the war” and 

since the Russians „had [during the war] considered the Poles as brothers of 

weapon” 20 . Le Figaro shows itself very critical because it accuses Russia to 

distill declassified „archival documents” „tending to involve Poland in the 

preparation by Nazi Germany of the invasion of Soviet Union” 21 „in order to 

clear itself of responsibility in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact”. The German 

press uses the same comments by evoking in particular, in the weekly paper 

Der Spiegel, an historical quarrel 22 between Poland and Russia about the Soviet 

Union’s responsibility in the beginning of the war. Piotr Buras, a Polish 

journalist, about Vladimir Putin’s comparison of Katyn’s massacre with the 

death of 17 000 Soviet soldiers in Polish jails in 1920, reminds us that Russian 

historians agreed too because „the Russian soldiers died after diseases and not 

because of a ball in the nape of the neck like the Polish soldiers” 23 . 

b) Unanimous critics against Russian nationalist revisionism 

But even beyond Russian declarations (which are sometimes scandalous), 

the French and German journalists are particularly interested in Russian 

nationalist revisionism which was encouraged if not led by the Kremlin. Marie 

Jégo in Le Monde evokes a Russian attempt to rehabilitate the pact, Stalin's 

„brilliant blow” „having allowed to put the entry of Soviet Union in the Second 

World War two years later”. 24 This revisionism is all the more dangerous as it 

19 st 

AFP: Poutine condamne le pacte germano-soviétique de 1939. Libération, 31 August 2009. 

20 

AFP: Seconde Guerre mondiale: recueillement en Pologne sur fond de polémique. Le 

Monde, 1 st September 2009 

21 st 

AVRIL, Pierre: Varsovie et Moscou s'accusent de réécrire l'histoire. Le Figaro, 31 August 2009. 

22 st 

Geschichtsstreit überschattet Gedenkfeier in Polen. Der Spiegel, 1 September 2009. 

23 

BURAS, Piotr: Kaczynskis Holocaust-Vergleich ist unangemessen. Die Zeit, questioned by 

Katharina Schuler, 2 nd September 2009. Piotr Buras is the Germany-correspondant of the Gazeta 

Wyborcza, the biggest overregional Newspaper in Poland. 

24 th 

JÉGO, Marie: Moscou tenté de réhabiliter le pacte. Le Monde, 30 August 2009. 

39

is not only official but historical since, for example, Pavel Daniline considers 

that „Poland would have been able to avoid the Nazi aggression by agreeing to 

give the Danzig Corridor, by concluding a pact of collective safety with 

France, Great Britain and the USSR”. For the German press which willingly 

compares the German and Russian cases, for whom the pact was a „trauma” 25 , 

if the Russians managed with Gorbatchev and the Perestroika „to assume” this 

Soviet past, they are now reconstructing this lead screed, this „silence” of the 

USSR’s years with, as their main weapon, a control of the information and the 

oversight (61% of interrogated Russians do not know that the Soviet troops 

invaded Poland on the 17 th of September 1939). And to limit the divergent 

views the Russian Duma has just voted (in May) a law which forbids to evoke 

Stalinist crimes between 1939 and 1941. It is what Michael Ludwig regrets, 

whose article’s title is: „A historical Picture without awkward interrogation 

marks” where he reminds that the Russian president has just created a 

commission which has „to chase away the falsifications of history which could 

rewrite history (of the Second World War) and damage the Russian 

interests” 26 . Marie Jégo binds this patriotism which is becoming „the defense of 

the pact” in the Russian-Georgian war of last August and this one prepares, 

according to her, a possible action in order to be able to get back Crimea, this 

„intrinsically Russian” land for the nationalists. 27 

Who is interested in the German-Soviet pact 70 th anniversary’s 

remembrance in Germany and especially in France has, in some way, to thank 

Russia and its leaders’ rather provocative and sometimes revisionist statements, 

who finally, as they wished to limit the role of this pact in the release of the 

war, only provoked more talks about it. 

Conclusion 

To finish and to keep talking about Russia, on the 23 rd of September 2009, 

in an article entitled „The Georgian test”, Vaclev Havel, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, 

André Glucksmann, Bernard-Henri Lévy and Adam Michnik made the link 

between Munich and the German-Soviet pact on one side and on the other, the 

presence of Russian troops today on a part of the Georgian territory, and 

remind that „to regret or to celebrate past events doesn't present interest if we 

remain deaf to their teachings” 28 . This article has to be linked with another one 

published on the 27 th of August 2009 (one of the first ones if not the first one in 

France about the pact), „1939, the last dizzy spells before the war”, which tells 

the rather surrealist summer lived by French people in 1939. The subtitle is also 

25 BRÖSSER, Daniel: Ein teuflischer Pakt. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 rd August 2009. 

26 LUDWIG, Michael: Geschichtsbild ohne lästige Fragezeichen. FAZ, 23 rd August 2009. 

27 JÉGO, Marie: Moscou tenté de réhabiliter le pacte. Le Monde, 30 th August 2009. 

28 HAVEL, Vaclev, COHN-BENDIT, Daniel, GLUCKSMANN, André, LÉVY, Bernard- 

Henri and MICHNIK, Adam: Le test géorgien. Le Monde , 23 rd September 2009. 

40

interesting: „Illusions. In summer 1939, France still enjoys itself. Whereas in 

Berlin, between bluff and arm wrestling, Hitler and the Allies lead a decisive 

diplomatic round. The war is for tomorrow” 29 . 

This indeed summarizes our whole study: the remembrance of an event such 

as the signature of the German-Soviet pact is important for the whole Europe, 

because this pact is certainly, above all, the result of the devilish alliance of two 

totalitarian powers, but it is also the result of the failure of the European 

democracies which were not able and/or did not want to defend earlier and 

more firmly democracy and freedom. The duty of memory as the Germans 

practice it, or at least their press, is thus necessary, for if we want to be able to 

„remember the lessons of History” 30 , it is necessary to know it and in all its 

details and variants in order to not becoming revisionist and nationalist. 

The remembrance of the German-Soviet, Ribentropp-Molotov or Hitler- 

Stalin pact signature has certainly nothing of the media charm that the fall of 

Berlin wall can have for example, but yet the quasi amnesia of the French press 

about this subject can be both incomprehensible and worrisome. We may have 

sometimes blamed Germany for living too much in the remembrance and in 

apologizing but we should neither be in the other extreme nor only remember 

what we want. 

29 

LORRAIN, François-Guillaume: 1939, derniers vertiges avant la guerre. Le Point, Nr. 

1927, 27 th August 2009. 

30 

Vaclev Havel, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, André Glucksmann, Bernard-Henri Lévy and Adam 

Michnik, 'Le test géorgien', Le Monde , 23 rd September 2009. 

41

Some Issues of the International Political System before 

World War II 

43

Kretschmann, Vasco 

The ideological origins of German Polonophobia? 

The German-Polish conflict in the eastern provinces of the German 

Empire before WWI - a precondition for the anti-Polish chapter of the 

Ribbentrop-Molotov-Pact 

The following essay was first presented during the „International 

Conference on the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact” at the Faculty of Humanities of 

the Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest in December, 4 th 2009. The topic is 

based on my Bachelor dissertation, „The Pan-German League and the anti- 

Polish expropriation-law of 1908” 1 . In this piece I will analyse the 

developments in ideology of German right extreme nationalistic organizations 

towards the Polish minority before World War I. The essay will focus on the 

relations between the German and Polish populations in the eastern provinces 

of the German Empire. My argument is based on an analysis and interpretation 

of the Pan-German League’s members’ magazine, Die Alldeutschen Blätter, 

issues 1900-1914. 2 

In particular I will examine proposals to expropriate the Polish 

population’s land. Throughout the pages of these issues emerges the 

dissolution of constitutional legality, the rule of law, towards German 

citizens of Polish nationality. This process of legally excluding a group of 

people marks an important step: the first indication towards the 

development of racially motivated legal segregation as an ideology, later 

executed by the Nazi regime. 

The public dramatization of German-Polish relations in the eastern 

provinces promoted a long-lasting negative public awareness of the „Polish 

question” among the German population. The anti-Polish stereotypes embody 

disrespect, fear and hostility, characterized here by the term Polonophobia. 

There is evidence that German hostility towards Poland in the early 20 th 

century resulted in part from these ideological constructions. 3 

However, it would be historically careless to assume a German tradition of 

anti-Polish hostility, and to draw a direct line from these tensions at the turn of 

the century to the anti-Polish chapter of the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact of 1939. 

Nevertheless, it is important to investigate these pre-WWI developments to 

better understand the events that took place in their wake. 

1 „Der Alldeutsche Verband und das antipolnische Enteignungsgesetz 1908”, Bachelor 

dissertation at the Free University of Berlin, Sept. 2009. 

2 Alldeutsche Verband (edit.): Alldeutsche Blätter (Vol. 10-24). Berlin-Mainz 1900-1914. 

3 WEHLER, Hans-Ulrich: Die Polenpolitik im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871-1918. In: 

KLUXEN, Kurt-MOMMSEN, Wolfgang J. (edit.): Politische Ideologien und nationalstaatliche 

Ordnung. Studien zur Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. München-Wien, 1968. 297-316. 

309, 315. 

45

The Polish Minority in Prussia and the German Empire 

In 1871 6,2% of the German population in the Empire were of Polish 

nationality. Most lived in the eastern provinces of Prussia. The Polish minority was 

especially represented in the areas gained by the Partition of Poland at the end of 

the 18 th century: the provinces of Poznań and West-Prussia. Around the city of 

Poznań Polish-speaking inhabitants constituted the majority of the population. 

After the congress of Vienna (1815) the Poles enjoyed a relatively 

autonomous status in the dynastical state of Prussia. Poznań was constituted as a 

Grand Duchy with certain rights to self-governance until the November uprising 

of 1830. 4 After that the Poles experienced a growing pressure to assimilate, at 

first motivated by policies to strengthen the integrity of the Prussian state. But 

Prussian authorities also launched a growing ethnically and culturally motivated 

assimilation campaign towards the Polish population, mainly aiming at the 

cultural attributes of language and religion. 5 With the foundation of the German 

Empire in 1871 the Polish minority experienced a dramatic change of 

environment. The new Empire claimed to be a nation-state by denying the 

existence rights of minorities within its borders. The first measures were 

restrictions in the use of the Polish language in schools and public meetings. In 

the Cultural Dispute (Kulturkampf) around 1872, the government repressed the 

influence of the catholic church in the public sphere. The Poles were especially 

affected, since many Polish-speaking priests who worked as teachers were now 

replaced by German-speaking civil servants and teachers. 6 This process of anti- 

Polish measures by the Prussian government marks the beginning of the attacks 

against the Polish cultural identity within the German Empire, also known as the 

campaign of Germanisation. 

The Pan-German League and its ideology 

The repressive policies of the Prussian government in the last third of the 

19 th century were not satisfying to big parts of the German nationalistic middle 

and upper class. Wide circles organized themselves into political interest 

groups, promoting an ethnically and culturally homogeneous state. They 

demanded the full integration and assimilation of minorities, including the 

liquidation of their identity. 7 

4 

MAKOWSKI, Krzysztof: Polen, Deutsche und Juden und die preußische Politik im 

Großherzogtum Posen. Versuch einer neuen Sicht. In: HAHN-KUNZE (ed.): Nationale Minderheiten 

und staatliche Minderheitenpolitik in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert. Berlin, 1999. 51-60. 

5 

ALEXANDER, Manfred: Kleine Geschichte Polens. Bonn, 2005 (first: Stuttgart, 2003.). 246. 

6 

TRZECIAKOWSKI, Lech: The Kulturkampf in Prussian Poland. New York, 1990 (first 

Polish: Kulturkampf w zaborze pruskim. Poznań, 1970). 5. 

7 

HERING, Rainer: Konstruierte Nation. Der Alldeutsche Verband 1890 bis 1939. Hamburg, 

2003. 443. 

46

One of the most influential associations was the Pan-German League, 

founded in 1891. The League was dominated by a nationalistic, racist and 

growing anti-Semitic ideology. Before the First World War the League was 

relatively small with 22,000 members. Nevertheless, the organization could 

exercise influence through its exclusive members in high societal positions and 

close ties with the government and local administrations. The Pan-Germans 

advocated territorial expansion of the German Empire on the continent and 

overseas, as well as strengthening naval forces and protecting German culture 

among German emigrants living abroad. One of the League’s main aims was to 

promote Germanisation of minorities like the French population in Alsace- 

Lorraine, the Danish population in Schleswig and the Polish in Prussia. The last 

case received the most attention with a promotional campaign for the 

settlement of German farmers on former Polish land in the eastern provinces. 

Specialized in agitating this point was the German Eastern Marches Society 

(Deutscher Ostmarkenverein), founded in 1894 and operated closely with the 

Pan-Germans. Both organizations lobbied the Prussian government intensively 

for an anti-Polish settlement policy. 8 

In 1885 the Prussian government founded the Royal Settlement Commission 

in Poznań. Its mission was to buy and distribute Polish owned land among 

German colonists. The financial intervention of the state into the real estate 

market caused an exceptional increase in land price. This supported the 

conservation of traditional aristocratic ownership, but had little effect on 

population development. Increasingly people left these areas seeking better 

employment in the prosperous industrial west. The German-speaking population 

in the province of Poznań between 1871 and 1905 dropped from 43% to 38%. 9 

For the Polish population the hostile state intervention was a big threat. To 

protect their cultural identity and territorial position they used the constitutional 

rights that they enjoyed as German citizens. Polish organizations founded 

private societies for education, publishing newspapers and especially building 

financial institutes to buy German and abandoned land for distribution among 

Poles. The Polish members of the German parliament condemned the hostile 

activities of the nationalistic agitation groups and the Prussian government. The 

majority of the conservative and national liberal parties supported the 

restrictive policies toward the Poles. 

These turbulent circumstances led to a poisoning of Polish-German relations 

and an alienation of the Poles towards the German authorities. 10 

8 WEHLER, Hans-Ulrich: Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918. Vol. 9 (=LEUSCHER, 

Joachim (edit.): Deutsche Geschichte). 6th edition. Göttingen, 1988. 93. 

9 KOEHL, Robert Lewis: Colonialism inside Germany 1886-1918. In: The Journal of 

Modern History. Vol. 25, No. 3. Chicago 1953. 255-272. and BROSZAT, Martin: Zweihundert 

Jahre deutsche Polenpolitik. Frankfurt am Main, 1972. (first: München, 1963). 155. 

10 GOSEWINKEL, Dieter: Einbürgern und Ausschließen. Die Nationalisierung der 

Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Göttingen, 2001. 217. 

47

The expropriation-law and its consequences 

Efforts by members of the Polish minority to defend their cultural identity 

were postulated by the Pan-German League as a hostile provocation to the 

Germans, who claimed that the Poles were trying to „invade the eastern 

provinces”. By following this line of argumentation, the Pan-German League 

reversed the cause and impact of their own actions. They described the 

aggressive German nationalist activities as a reaction to Polish threats in a „battle 

of nationalities.” 11 In fact, Polish nationalist activities were only a reaction to the 

denial of their right to exist in the proclaimed nation-state of 1871. 

Beginning in 1899, the Pan-German League’s members’ magazine contains 

demands for „radical measures” against the Polish population. The Pan- 

Germans promoted „the principle of inequality between Poles and Germans” 12 . 

The language of the statements is full of hate and historically incorrect 

argumentation, making special use of the Middle Ages as a source of historical 

justification. 13 When it became evident that state intervention in the real estate 

market was unsuccessful, even supporting the western emigration of the 

German population and strengthening the establishment of a Polish national 

self-consciousness, the Pan-Germans demanded even more radical state 

interventions: by 1901 the statements in the magazine contain demands for the 

expulsion of Polish landowners and expropriation of their property. The Pan- 

Germans used known arguments and prejudices, and dramatizing „the fear of a 

silent Polonization”. Increasingly they criticized the German and the Prussian 

government for being ineffective and weak-willed. 14 Since the right-wing 

government needed the support of nationalist interest organizations, especially 

during the elections, the Pan-Germans maneuvered their influence and lobbied 

successfully for their demands. 

In 1907 the German chancellor publicly announced a planned expropriation 

law. There was also wide opposition against this idea, not only by the centerleft, 

also by the liberals and some conservatives. The last two groups were 

afraid of dissolving the guaranties of property in general and the resulting 

injury against the constitution. After long negotiations and compromised 

conclusions, criticized harshly by the Pan-Germans, the Prussian Parliament 

enacted a restricted version of a national expropriation law for the provinces of 

Poznań and West-Prussia in March 1908 („Measures for strengthening 

11 Cf. Alldeutsche Blätter. Vol. 10, No. 45. 04.11.1900: 439. 

12 Cf. Alldeutsche Blätter. Vol. 12, No. 22. 31.05.1902: 188 et seq. 

13 WIPPERMANN, Wolfgang: Antislavismus. In: PUSCHNER, Uwe (edit.): Handbuch 

zur „Völkischen Bewegung”. München, 1996. 512-523. 520. and THER, Philipp: Deutsche 

Geschichte als imperiale Geschichte. Polen, slawophone Minderheiten und das Kaiserreich 

als kontinentales Empire. In: CONRAD, Sebastian (edit.): Kaiserreich transnational. 

Göttingen, 2004. 129-148. 130. 

14 Cf. Alldeutsche Blätter. Vol. 15, No. 19. 13.05.1905: 158. 

48

Germanness in the provinces of West-Prussia and Poznań” In German: 

Maßnahmen zur Stärkung des Deutschtums in den Provinzen Westpreußen und 

Posen). The Pan-Germans were not satisfied. 

While the Pan-Germans demanded immediate execution of the new law, the 

government hesitated to take action, also because of wide opposition and 

critical comments from the foreign public. Especially the more emancipated 

Polish organizations in the Austro-Hungarian Empire ran a protest campaign, 

influencing the politics of Vienna towards Germany. 15 

After four years, shortly before the parliamentary elections in 1912, the 

Prussian government executed the law in four cases. In total, around 1.700 

hectares of land owned by Poles in the province of Poznań were expropriated. 16 

The measure was welcomed by the Pan-German League, but also criticized as 

too small and only a „very first step.” 17 In contrast the expropriation was 

publicly discussed and criticized by foreign countries. It remained the only 

execution of the controversial law. 18 

With these disappointing results, the focus of the Pan-German campaigns in 

the east expanded. In the few years before the First World War, the Pan- 

German magazine discussed and promoted large colonization and settlement 

plans for the expected new eastern territories to be gained through the coming 

European war. 19 

Conclusion 

We can summarize the positioning of the Pan-German League towards the 

Polish minority in the German Empire as a transformation from the 

organization’s first demands for integration and assimilation, to later calls for 

expulsion and expropriation. Step by step the ideology was influenced by racist 

ideas of inequality between Germans and Poles. 

As a consequence of the hateful debates around the expropriation law, the 

German population became used to the idea of different treatment of minorities 

and their exclusion from society. The promotion of inequality created the 

origins of racial segregation policy, appearing first in the oversea colonies and 

later in a professionalized form as executed in the occupied territories of the 

Nazi regime. 20 

15 

HERING, Rainer: Konstruierte Nation. Der Alldeutsche Verband 1890 bis 1939. 

Hamburg, 2003. 124. 

16 

WEHLER, Hans-Ulrich: Die Polenpolitik im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871-1918. In: KLUXEN, 

Kurt-MOMMSEN, Wolfgang J. (edit.): Politische Ideologien und nationalstaatliche Ordnung. Studien 

zur Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. München-Wien, 1968. 309. 

17 

Cf. Alldeutsche Blätter. Vol. 22, No. 42. 19.10.1912: 371. 

18 

BALZER, Brigitte: Die preußische Polenpolitik 1894-1908 und die Haltung der deutschen 

konservativen und liberalen Parteien. Frankfurt am Main, 1990. 81. 

19 

Cf. Alldeutsche Blätter. Vol. 23, No. 47. 20.09.1913: 325. 

20 

CONRAD, Sebastian: Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen Kaiserreich. München, 2006. 143. 

49

The positioning of German-Polish relations during the inner-German conflict 

before 1914 influenced significantly the foreign political relations between the 

German Weimar (First) Republic and the Polish Second Republic. The prejudices 

and stereotypes continued of Poles as people of a lower culture, incapable of 

maintaining their own state. As a result, the Weimar Republic negotiated a border 

treaty with France but never with Poland. Even the honoree of the Nobel peace 

prize of 1926, the German foreign minister Gustav Stresemann, ran an aggressive 

foreign policy campaign against the independent Poland. 

Despite the above developments, it would be careless to expand an 

argument based on „historical traditions” of Polonophobia. There may indeed 

be an ideological development from the German-Polish conflict before the First 

World War to the foreign policy of the Weimar Republic, and then to the 

Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact of 1939, but that does not imply a logical line. 

History is never predetermined. For example, how do we locate in that line the 

German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934, which led to a significant 

weakening of the Polish-Western European alliance? Political decisions do not 

always operate in a linear way. But however the historical experiences of the 

early 20 th century might have influenced German politics, the Polonophobic 

stereotypes existing among the German public provided a receptive ground for 

the Nazi regime before the invasion of Poland and during its subsequent 

occupation and demolition. 

50

Prętkiewicz, Przemysław 

The system of international connections by Central European 

countries on the eve of the outbreak of war 

The result of the World War I in Central Europe was the sudden appear of 

national countries, some of which did not have any or had just a short tradition 

of statehood. Those countries needed to form their international connections 

and arrange relations, especially with neighbourhood states. The only country 

which existed before the Great War was Hungary, although within the Dual 

Monarchy it was not the fully independent state. However because of the 

process of mapping out the borders even Hungary seemed to be newly founded 

state. Long period of existence within multiethnic empires caused that there 

were many areas with great variety of nations. These areas and also the ones 

which historically had belonged to some of them became a bone of contention. 

At the beginning we need to know what the basic relations between Central 

European countries were. Already aforementioned Hungary was potentially the 

biggest threat for the stabilisation in the region after the War. Its revisionism 

aimed in the territory of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Kingdom of Serbs, 

Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia since 1929). Only Poland had at that time 

good relations with Hungary, which was the effect of common historical fight 

for independence. 1 At that time Poland had a border conflict in Cieszyn Silesia 

with Czechoslovakia, which opposed these countries. Similar problems 

affected on the relations with Lithuania, where there was a problem of 

supremacy over Vilnius. Thanks to the military and political cooperation after 

the Great War Poland created good relations with Romania. 2 

To protect themselves from Hungarian revisionism which I have already 

mentioned Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia signed an agreement in July 1920. 

One year later similar treaties where established between those countries and 

Romania - with Czechoslovakia in April 1921, with Yugoslavia in June 1921. 

What is more the agreement between Romania and Yugoslavia had an 

additional reason, which was the potential Bulgarian revisionism in the areas of 

Macedonia and Dobruja. 3 This system of connections was known as the Little 

Entente, although it was not the formal name. However the cooperation 

between these three countries was not going well. The problems which spoiled 

it were territorial incoherence and different powerful neighbours - for 

Czechoslovakia it was Germany, for Romania - Russian Soviet Federative 

Socialist Republic (part of Soviet Union since 1922) and for Yugoslavia - Italy. 

1 Own notes from the remembrance meeting dedicated to Polish refugees during the World 

War II in the Ipel’ valley, Conference Center of Polish Armed Forces, 19 March 2010. 

2 WILLAUME, Małgorzata: Rumunia. Trio, Warsaw, 2004. 126. 

3 ESSEN, Andrzej: Polityka Czechosłowacji w Europie Środkowej w latach 1918-1932, 

Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pedagogicznej, Cracow, 2006. 64-65. 

51

Although in 1933 Little Entente institutionalised itself, there were lack of real 

cooperation and common goals, instead of protection against Hungarian 

revisionism. The main problems of the Little Entente was the territorial 

incoherence, border problems between Romania and Yugoslavia and rising 

pressure from three different powers: Germany on Czechoslovakia, Soviet 

Union on Romania and Italy on Yugoslavia. 4 

An important country in Central Europe was definitely Poland, because of 

its size, geopolitical localisation between Germany and Soviet Union, 

economical and political impact on the other countries of the region. According 

to this and above-mentioned good relations Romania tried to win Poland over 

to a cause of antirevisionism and Little Entente. It did not come to realise 

because of well-grounded relations between Poland and Hungary. 5 The other 

reason is that Poland did not want to be engaged into regional cooperation 

project which was in fact very weak. Politicians from Poland had different 

projects, in which they would be able to establish the position of their country 

as the regional power and appear as one of the most significant European 

countries. Main project called Intermarium was pursued by Józef Piłsudski. He 

was willing to create a federation of central and eastern European nations as a 

counterweight to the Germany on west and Soviet Union on east. The 

federation leaded by Poland was to contain also: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, 

Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and 

Yugoslavia. The project failed due to annexation of Belarus and Ukraine to the 

Soviet Union. Even though there was still and idea of federation in the narrow 

scope, but it was also denied by the bilateral conflicts which I mentioned at the 

beginning. This idea was later followed by Władysław Sikorski, who put 

forward the project of Central European Union and Józef Beck with his 'Third 

Europe' conception, but in fact both were far from realization. 6 

Due to the failure of an organisation connecting all Central European 

countries, each of them concentrated on developing bilateral relations in the 

region and out of it. Poland after establishing its borders in the years 1918 - 1921 

developed foreign policy. First international alliance treaties were signed with 

France in February 1921 and in the next month with Romania. I am going to 

present the alliance with France in detail later. Concerning alliance with Romania 

the treaty from March 1921 was mainly aimed against possible military action 

from the side of Russia. 7 This bilateral cooperation developed through the whole 

4 

Ibidem. 245-250, 266-280. 

5 

WILLAUME, Małgorzata: Rumunia. Trio, Warsaw, 2004. 127. 

6 

KORNAT, Marek: Realna koncepcja czy wizja ex post? Polska idea „Trzeciej Europy” 

(1937-1938). The website of Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu – National Louis University, 

http://politologia.wsb-nlu.edu.pl/uploadedFiles/file/M_Kornat - Realna koncepcja czy wizja ex 

post.pdf (date of usage: 20 March 2010). 

7 

DEMEL, Juliusz: Historia Rumunii. Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław, Warsaw, 

Cracow, Danzig, Łódź, 1986. 387. 

52

interwar period and the treaty was renewed in 1926 and 1931. In the last one 

there was an additional regulation allowing both countries to organise military 

actions even before any aggression act and to cooperate also in case that the 

attack would be from the other side than Soviet Union. The only problem within 

this coalition was that Poland had also good relations with Hungary. 

As we can see the direction towards Poland was one of the most significant 

also for Romania, next to the Little Entente and alliance with France. But 

Romania needed also to look carefully on the southern direction and the 

possible Bulgarian revisionism. For strengthening the security in this region 

Romania signed in February 1934 a multilateral treaty with Yugoslavia, Greece 

and Turkey. This alliance was called the Balkan Entente. 8 

For Hungary the priority was to get back the international recognition. It 

was happening gradually during the 20s and the first step was made in 

September 1922, when Hungary joined the League of Nations. Then in 1924 it 

signed a treaty with Soviet Union and in 1926 with Yugoslavia. Both were 

directed partly against Romania, because either Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 

had some territorial argues with this country. Hungary regained full sovereignty 

in 1927 when the League of Nations stopped controlling Hungarian military. 

After it Hungary engaged in a friendship with Italy, which had similar goals in 

Central Europe. These were weakening the Little Entente and moderating 

French influence in the region. In the following years Hungary signed also 

treaties with Poland (1928), Turkey (1929) and Austria (1931), what stabilized 

the situation of the country in the international society, apart from the territorial 

demands directed to Romania and Czechoslovakia. 9 

Complicated situation of connotations between Central European countries, 

troubles with forming any regional organisations or cooperation projects and 

internal problems of each nation caused that the position of the region itself was 

very weak. The way of strengthening it was seen in the partnership with western 

countries. The main role was played by France, which created a kind of 

protectorate over Little Entente, but its main goal in Central Europe was formation 

of tripartite agreement with Czechoslovakia and Poland. During the conference in 

Locarno in October 1925 France signed two treaties: with Poland and with 

Czechoslovakia. These were to ensure both countries about French support in case 

of any aggression on the side of Germany. Despite this steps and a will towards a 

tripartite agreement France did not take into consideration the problem of Polish- 

Czechoslovak rivalry. These harsh relations were transferred to the rivalry over the 

main position in France's foreign politics in Central Europe. 10 As a result the 

agreement was not established and then in the late 20s, when the position of France 

weakened, it became less important for Central Europe. 

8 DEMEL, Juliusz Demel: Historia Rumunii, op. cit. 387-388. 

9 KOCHANOWSKI, Jerzy: Węgry. Od ugody do ugody 1867-1990. Trio, Warsaw, 1997. 79-80. 

10 ESSEN, Andrzej: Polityka Czechosłowacji w Europie Środkowej w latach 1918-1932, 

Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pedagogicznej, Cracow, 2006. 57-59. 

53

Unlike France Great Britain did not show any interest in Central Europe. Only 

when the danger of war rose in the late 30s and British interests around the world 

were invaded by Reich, Great Britain showed some interest in the matters of 

Europe, 11 what symptoms were guarantees given to Poland and Romania. 

One of the possible ways of strengthening national security of the newly 

founded states was the peace - oriented international society, with the League of 

Nations as its main representative. But although the League was working, it did not 

have any special impact on the international situation. The most significant 

agreements were negotiated between European powers. First important treaty was 

signed in Locarno in October 1925, when Germany guaranteed an inviolability of 

the borders with France and Belgium, but denied the possibility of signing 

analogous treaties with Czechoslovakia and Poland. This was the potential ground 

for German revisionism in Central Europe, and this showed that Central European 

countries could not be assured of the international support for their independence 

and self-governance. The hopes rose two years later when Aristide Briand, French 

foreign relations ministry, formed an initiative of a pact, in which countries would 

pledged themselves to abjure war. So called Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed in 

August 1928, but in was never of great importance, which was easily visible in the 

early 30s. The marginalization of Central European countries appeared again in 

1933, when four European powers: France, Great Britain, Germany and Italy, 

worked on creating a forum of consulting their foreign policies. Finally it did not 

come to realize, but the proposal of establishing the Four-Power Pact including 

Germany, proved that western powers accepted the direct of political changes in 

this country and became a kind of encouragement for Hitler to keep developing his 

plans. 12 The problems of the relations with Germany, but also with Soviet Union, 

next to dealing with rising fascist movements appeared as key ones in the 30s. 

Poland signed a non-aggression pact with Soviet Union in July1932, but 

denied Soviet attempts to form a multilateral cooperation agreement in Central 

Europe and any possible military pacts. A year after Hitler came to power, in 

January 1934, Poland signed a non-violence declaration with Germany (known 

as Third Reich since 1933). Foreign affairs minister Józef Beck was realising 

the policy of equal distance between Warsaw from one side, Berlin and 

Moscow from another. At the turn of October 1938, just after Munich 

Agreement, which I will describe later, Poland used a critical situation of 

Czechoslovakia to regain a Cieszyn Silesia. This made an impression that 

Poland is an ally of Reich, which was far from true. In October 1938 and then 

at the special meeting in January 1939 Reich put forward demand of 

annexation Danzig and building an exterritorial motorway and railway to East 

Prussia. In exchange offered recognition of Polish borders and prolongation of 

a non-aggression declaration for the next 25 years. Poland disagreed and in the 

11 

ZINS, Henryk: Historia Anglii. Zakład Narodowy i. Ossolińskich, Wrocław, Warsaw, 

Cracow, 2001. 350-352. 

12 

Ibidem. 350. 

54

situation of rising danger accepted British guarantees, what formally caused 

that Reich cancelled in April 1939 the above-mentioned declaration with 

Poland. In August 1939 it stopped trade exchange with Poland. 13 

The situation of Czechoslovak relations with Soviet Union seemed to be 

good. The legal status of the communist party in this country meant for many 

foreigners that Czechoslovakia was a kind of a soviet satellite in Central Europe. 

Good relations were confirmed in May 1935, when Czechoslovakia signed a 

mutual help agreement (with the condition that firstly France, connected with 

both countries by similar agreements, would help the victim of an attack). On the 

other hand the relations with Reich were absolutely opposite. The problem 

concerned German minority in Czechoslovakia. In fact Germans lived in the 

certain part of the country close to the border with Germany and Austria. 

Generally this territory was called Sudetenland and Germans were in majority in 

this region. After the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938, which was not stopped 

by the western powers, despite the fact that the treaties signed after the World 

War I, had forbade uniting those countries, Czechoslovakia was surrounded by 

Reich. In April 1938 Hitler demanded Czechoslovak authorities to give the 

autonomy to the Germans. Czechoslovakia asked western powers for arbitral 

decision, believing that they would support it, due to the solidarity of democratic 

countries. However the arguments given by Hitler convinced French and British 

diplomats suggested Czechoslovakia to make concessions to Reich. This fact, in 

addition to lack of reaction after the Anschluss, convinced Hitler, that western 

powers tried to protect the general stability in Europe rather than took care of 

small states in Central Europe. He put forward a demand to annex Sudetenland to 

Reich, which was rejected. As a result in the end of September 1938 in Munich 

took place a conference and the powers in the Munich Agreement accepted the 

demand of Reich. At the following day Poland regained Cieszyn Silesia. In the 

following months the weakened Czechoslovak authorities agreed to give 

autonomy to Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia and then were forced to accept 

the arbitral decision of Reich and Italy about moving borders with Hungary and 

Poland. The critical moment came in March 1939 when Hitler demanded 

independence declaration from Slovakia in exchange for holding back Hungary 

from military action in Ruthenia. Formally independent Slovakia was proclaimed 

at 14 March 1939 and in the following two weeks newly founded state signed a 

protection agreement with Reich. At 15 March 1939 Reich took control over 

Czech and created the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Despite the former 

declaration of holding back the Hungarian military forces, Hitler did not react to 

Hungarian occupation in Carpathian Ruthenia. Czechoslovakia did not longer 

exist as an independent country. 14 

13 

KUPIECKI, Robert, SZCZEPANIK, Krzysztof: Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1918-1994. 

Warsaw, 1995. 30-33. 

14 

HEIMANN, Mary: Czechoslovakia. The state that failed, Yale University Press, New 

Haven-London, 2009. 75-110. 

55

Different relations Reich had with Romania and Hungary. Romania might be 

situated somewhere between Poland and Czechoslovakia on one side and Hungary 

on another. Concerning Romanian relations with Soviet Union in June 1934 both 

countries recognised the borders and political independence, but the problem of 

Bessarabia was not solved. Two years later, in June 1936, both countries signed a 

mutual help agreement, but in August 1936 Soviet Union cancelled it due to 

supposed change in Romanian foreign policy connected with the change of foreign 

affairs minister. The relations with Reich based rather on the economical platform. 

Romania signed four consecutive trade deals with Reich: in March 1935, 

September 1935, December 1937 and March 1939. In such a way it gradually 

became dominated by German economical system and corporations. Romania 

agreed to sign those deals hoping that it would stop the possible threat of military 

action. It was also a way of creating counterweight to another Reich's ally - 

Hungary, and possible territorial revision. This threat was strong especially after 

the incidents with Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939. Romania made an effort to 

become more independent by getting British and French guarantees in April 1939 

and by signing trade deals with those countries, but it did not change the general 

Reich's dominance over Romania. 15 The internal problem of Romania was the rise 

of Iron Guard, fascist organisation, which in the late 30s had a big impact on 

Romanian policy. 

At the beginning of the 30s in Hungary parties following the example of 

German NSDAP started to appear. Gyula Gömbös, fascist and anti-Semite, 

appointed a prime minister of Hungary in 1932, broke off the profrench and 

probritish foreign policy of the former PM István Bethlen. He rather strived to 

develop good relations with Italy, Austria and Germany. Gömbös was the first 

diplomat, who visited Hitler after he had been appointed a chancellor, but 

eventually stayed closer with Italy and Austria, because Hitler had stressed, that he 

would not support Hungarian territorial demands towards Romania and 

Yugoslavia. Only when in 1935 Italy signed an agreement with France, and Soviet 

Union expanded its diplomatic policy in Europe, Hungary made turn towards 

Reich. It was continued by the next PM Kálmán Darányi, and only when Béla 

Imrédy had been appointed to the head of government he changed the policy, 

trying to improve relations with Poland, Great Britain and Little Entente countries. 

On the other hand Hungary could not resign from the revisionist plans. In 

November 1938 after the First Vienna Award lead by Reich and Italy Hungary 

regained southern Slovakia and part of Carpathian Ruthenia, and the rest of it in 

March 1939, with the consent from Hitler. The strive to revise the Treaty of 

Trianon led Hungary to the alliance with Reich. Despite the next PM Pál Teleki 

was wary of Reich, Hungary did not have any way out - Reich dominated the 

Hungarian economy and was able to offer much more than other possible allies. In 

February 1939 Hungary joined Anti-Comintern Pact and in March recognised 

15 WILLAUME, Małgorzata: Rumunia. Trio, Warsaw, 2004. 131-136. 

56

Manchukuo and broke relations with Soviet Union. Through this period of time in 

Hungary there was a gradual rise of power of the fascist Arrow Cross Party. 16 

In the late August 1939, when the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was negotiated 

and eventually signed the situation in Central Europe was not only complicated 

as through the whole interwar period, but also uncertain about the future. 

Czechoslovakia was in the worst situation as it was divided and both parts were 

dominated by Reich, although Czech part was formally an autonomy 

administrative division and was not annexed to the Reich and theoretically 

sovereign state - Slovakia, which authorities agreed in a secret pact to make its 

economy and foreign policy dependent on Reich. Romania and Hungary had 

their economies strongly connected with Reich, but Hungary also directed its 

policy in the same way as Reich did, while Romanian authorities tried to have 

good political relations with Great Britain and France. Finally Poland which was 

theoretically and practically independent, but felt the threat of German military 

action. Concerning relations with Soviet Union, Hungary had no relations with it 

since March 1939, Romania was unsure because of the territorial problem of 

Bessarabia, and Poland having a non-aggression pact with Soviet Union. 

Since the beginning of 1939 there were some rumours about the negotiations 

between Reich and Soviet Union. Hardly anybody took them serious, because the 

opposition between both political systems could not be bigger. The Ribbentrop- 

Molotov Pact, which was formally a non-aggression pact, was a kind of surprise, 

but the military action against Poland, so the effect of the secret pact making an 

alliance, was a like a bewilderment for Europe and for Poland. 

This whole part presenting what happened in the interwar period was 

necessary to explain the situation on the eve of the outbreak of World War II. 

Central Europe after World War I appeared as an undefined region, with so called 

national countries, many border and minority problems, without international 

recognition and international relations. Activity at the European area let those 

countries to come out of the 'dead ground' in politics and economy. Through the 

several years after WWI they developed a system of international connections 

and alliances, which stabilised their situation. Multipolar Europe, with the 

balance of powers and middle class countries, connected with multilateral and 

bilateral agreements, treaties and non-aggression pact let people hope that the 

experience of the Great War would never come back. Unfortunately Europe in 

the 30s started to polarise and divide into blocks and the national interests 

predominated over general ideas and values so commonly shared just a few years 

earlier, after the WWI. 

In my opinion recollecting past times is useful with the comparision to the 

current situation, following the sentence Historia est magistra vitae. Taking a look 

at the situation in Europe at the turn of the second decade in 21st century, conduct 

me to the conclusion that we are definitely in a better situation. A huge number of 

16 KOCHANOWSKI, Jerzy: Węgry. Od ugody do ugody 1867-1990. Trio, Warsaw, 1997. 86-98. 

57

international organisations such as United Nations, NATO, OSCE, Council of 

Europe, European Union, Central European Initiative or Visegrad Group ensure 

countries about their safety. On the other hand nowadays the biggest threat is not a 

direct military action as it was before, but rather an economical threat or incidental 

attacks pursued for example by terroristic organisations. 

Concerning economical problems, one of the most significant is the problem 

of energy sources and the possible threat for Central Europe is the dependence 

from Russian gas and oil. Some countries like Slovakia suffered in the last 

years because of gas transport problems in Ukraine. The idea of diversification 

the sources and ways of getting energy seems to be the key for the economy 

and stability of those countries. Some people suggest that the project of Nord 

Stream is the new version of Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. This is absolutely an 

exaggerated opinion. Of course the realisation of the economical connection 

between Russia and Germany over the heads of Central Europeans is a kind of 

possible threat, but in my opinion especially Russia cannot resign from such an 

important market for its goods as Central Europe. In my opinion we must 

consider Russia, and Russia considers Central Europe, as a partner and this 

point of view will rise in power. 

I have already mentioned the international terrorism as a potential threat 

more similar to typical military action, but only because of the possibility of 

losses in men. The way of acting is different then at typical war, rather similar 

to partisan, but not same. Also the ways of preventing are different, so we can 

hardly base on the experiences from the past. 

The experiences we can get from the interwar period and the situation on the 

eve of the WWII are rather general. In my opinion the most important thing for 

strengthening peace and stability is developing multiple alliances and entering 

many countries as possible into cooperation. We should also take care of the 

organizations representing interests of groups such as minorities, religion groups, 

nations without countries or other which do not have the direct political 

representation. The developing of the forums of ideas and values exchange might 

positively affect on creating peaceful relations. We should avoid the possibility of 

forming blocks and dividing countries. What is more in my opinion the 

international organizations need to have concrete aims rather than the general aims. 

I understand that the idea of peace is right, but the organizations such as UN need 

to form the idea of developing peace through the defined, specific actions. They 

should also get the instruments for implementing their policies, unlike League of 

Nations which had no possibility to impact countries striving to act in a military 

way. Concerning this aspect, organisations like NATO or EU seems to be well 

developed, of course in different aspects – NATO in military aspect and EU in 

economic. Despite this both of them still need improvements. However there are 

still many organizations without enough strong instruments of influencing such as 

UN, OSCE or V4, which need many improvements to have the real impact on 

membership countries or their area of interest. 

58

I would like to finish my article with the quotation from the Charter of the 

United Nations, where there is said that nations need ‘to practice tolerance and 

live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our 

strength to maintain international peace and security’. This is just a statement, the 

real possible impact may be only the effect of action, but here we have the 

ground for acting in order to get these goals. 

59

Sterniczky, Aaron 

An unfortunate faith. 

The Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party’s ideology 

On March 14th 1939 a new state appeared on the map of Europe: The 

Slovak Republic. That was just a day before the Wehrmacht occupied Prague 

and the „Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia” came into being. This must 

not be seen as a coincidence. On March 13th 1939 Adolf Hitler met Josef Tiso, 

who was going to become president of the Slovak Republic and was leader of 

the Hlinka`s Slovak people’s party. Adolf Hitler urged Josef Tito during this 

meeting in Berlin to proclaim Slovak’s independency, otherwise, and this is 

Hitler’s wording he would not „care for Slovak’s fate” anymore. Josef Tiso 

refused to make this decision immediately and referred to a modus operandi, 

which did not allow him to take this step on his own. A possible declaration of 

independence would require the endorsement of the Slovak national assembly, 

the Slovak Diet. A session was arranged for the next day, and finally the 

deputies voted for independence. This undertaking can only be understood in 

conjunction with Nazi Germany’s policy towards Czechoslovakia. 

The surrounding political circumstances were muddled, and so was the 

interior shape diputabel. The Slovak Republic lacked some necessary 

characteristics of a true souvereign state. Its foreign, militray and economic 

policy were kept under direct control of the Third Reich. 

The Third Reich was not only the powerful neighbour of the new born state, 

it was also very influential in the creation of the state itself. And this close 

connection between Nazi-Germany and the Slovak Republic would proof a 

reliable and a longstanding one. The Slovak Republic would turn out to be one 

of the most uncompromising allies of Nazi Germany, even standing closely by 

it during its decline. For example: The young state participated as only Axis 

nation beside Nazi Germany in the Polish campaign and it also arrayed troops 

for the campaign of destruction against the Soviet Union. 

A dialectical, to some kind a contradictory understanding is demanded: 

Slovak’s self-government was only possibile under the guidance and pressure 

of Nazi Germany, under control and on behalf of a state which limited this selfgoverment 

strongly and defined the new country through a legal setting („the 

treaty of protection”) as its own satellite. The Slovak Republic became the 

vassal of its creator. Independency at command. 

The Slovak national movement 

The president of the new state was Josef Tiso. Beside this duty he led the 

Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party (the HSPP). Josef Tiso was a priest, which 

symbolizes the outstanding importance of the catholic faith not only for the 

61

party itself but for the whole Slovakian national consciousness. If the Slovakian 

national movement is for example compared with the German or the Bohemian 

one, an obvious difference appears. In Germany or in Bohemia the bourgeoisie 

mediated and emphasized the national idea. The Slovakian national movement 

was carried by the catholic church. The nexus between the catholic church and 

the national movement, the mixing between a religious founding and national 

ratio created the possibility to isolate the understanding of a Slovakian identity 

from the national movement of the Czechs. The HSPP bundled this 

understanding within the frame of a political party. 

Founded in 1905, named after its first leader the priest Andrej Hlinka, it 

already embodied the Slovak national movement under the tight conditions of 

Magyarization within the translaithanian part of the Habsburg empire. 

In 1935 30% of the Slovakians voted in the general elections for the 

movement in Czechoslovakia. The party came into power, when the 

independence of the Slovak Republic was proclaimed. Intentions and principles 

could turn into real politics. 

Defining attributes of the HSPP’s ideology 

Anit-Bolschevism built a defining part of the HSPP’s ideological 

conception. Anti-Bolschevism in this case meant neither particularly the 

rejection of the Russian Revolution`s outcome and consequences nor the 

rejection of the bloody reality in Stalin’s empire. It meant a massive reluctance 

against the democratic philosophy, a disaffirmation of democracy itself. 

Democracy, as the political system of the modern age with the capacity of 

general emancipation, equal rights and liberty, was flatly rejected, as the 

modern age with all its social, economic and cultural implications was damned. 

The modern age was seen as a threat to an everlasting order willed by God. 

In this sense Josef Tiso and his followers conceived themselves as 

protectors and concluded – according to Josef Tiso`s wording: „The party is the 

nation, and the nation is the party. The nation speaks through the party, and 

the party thinks for the nation. What is of harm to the nation, is forbidden by 

the party [...] The party cannot go wrong, if it always acts in the best interest of 

the nation.” 1 

According to this credo all other parties had to be forbidden, because they 

would only undermine the nation’s wellbeing, and split the Slovak people, 

which was thought of as a tide and indivisible unity, into fractions. As 

exceptions only two other parties were allowed to participate in the political 

system. Each party would represent a national minority: The Hungarian party 

1 TÖNSMEYER, Tatjana: Kollaboration als handlungsleitendes Motiv? Die Slowakisch 

Elite und das NS-Regime. In: Dieckmann, Christoph (Editor) et al.; Kooperation und 

Verbrechen. Formen der „Kollaboration” im östlichen Europa 1939-1945. Wallstein, 

Göttingen, 2003. 31. 

62

(called Magyar party) and the German Party (called the Karpatendeutschen 

party - it had a close affinity to the national-socialistic ideology). 

The Slovak Republic’s constitution, ratified by the parliament on May 21 th 

1939, planned general elections, but general elections were never held. 

Josef Tiso stated, „the party is the nation, and the nation is the party”. The 

party was understood as the corset of the nation. §58 of the national 

constitution explained formally: „The people of the Slovak Republic participate 

in the authority of state through the party.” 2 Although two other parties were 

allowed, and they represented inhabitants of the national territory, national 

minorities did not play any role in the nation’s self assurance. The minorities 

did not belong to the essence of the nation according to the HSPP`s philosophy. 

The HSPP’s inner friction 

The impression of a uniform, a homogenous unity deceives. There were 

internal differences and frictions within the party and two blocks formed. One 

was led by the president of the state Josef Tiso. The chairman of the party and 

his supporters wanted to create an authoritarianism based on religious, catholic 

principles with clear reverences to the social encyclicals of pope Leo XIII 

„Rerum Novarum” and of Pius XI „Quadragesimo Anno”. The political system, 

which was established, can be defined as a clerical fascistic one. The 

designation „clerical fascistic” in relation to the Slovak Republic must be seen 

critical nowadays, because it was used by the Communist regime afterwards 

and carries therefore an inherent ideological colouration. For this reason the 

term is improper to use it for an objective, scientific purpose. 

The other wing was called the „Radicals”, led by Vojteck Tuka and 

Alexander Mach. They opposed the „Moderates”. The „Radicals” found 

their defining ideal in the German National Socialism. They intended to 

create a radical fascist state , a Slovak National Socialism, following the 

blood and soil principles of the NSDAP. Vojtech Tuka was Prime Minister, 

and Alexander Mach was interior minister since 1940 and head of the 

Hlinka-Guard, a paramilitary organization, allied with the party, but not 

under their control. 

The separation between these two blocks was caused by differences 

regarding the question, how to achieve the independence of Slovakia in the late 

months of 1938. The group, headed by Josef Tiso, chose a „moderate” way, 

this is where the label comes from, the group headed by Vojtech Tuka and 

Alexander Mach preferred a „radical” solution. 3 They urged for a separation of 

the Slovak Republic under the protection of Germany or even of Poland. 

2 Verfassungsgesetz vom 21.Juli 1939 über die Verfassung der Slowakischen Republik. 

URL: http://www.verfassungen.eu/sk/verf39-i.htm [2010-02-04] 

3 TÖNSMEYER, Tatjana: Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei 1939-1945. Politischer Alltag 

zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn. 2003. 94. 

63

In summary, the group of the „Moderates” outnumbered the radicals, 

occupied most of the authorities, and according to their self-conception they 

protected the Slovak nation from any foreign influence. They wanted to keep 

the ideology of the Slovak national movement pure, and referred faithfully to 

the paradigms mentioned above. They wanted to avoid the smell of imitation. 

In their understanding only the party itself had the capacity to create, form, 

develop and implement the Slovak nationalism. They wanted to create a selfstanding 

typology for the young state without using any pre-set position, 

without using the basis of an other prototyp. This self-concept seems illusory, 

but the reactionary policy of the HSPP was either singular, nor exceptional 

during this age in Europe. The ideas were widespread throughout the continent 

and carried on an unfortunate tradition. 

The common enemy 

Slovaks, Hungarians and Germans lived in the Slovak Republic, but all 

political power was bundled in the hands of the HSPP. For hiding this 

imbalance a common enemy had to be found. The community, the three ethnic 

groups, with their inherent inequality, needed a defining antipode. To transform 

the disparity groups into a community it needed a defining „other”. When the 

three groups spot an outsider, suddenly the groups were related and bound 

together. 

The Jews were stigmatized as the connecting enemy, as common hostile 

counterparts. The anti-Semitism did not have to be newly created or developed, 

it could refer to the catholic anti–Judaism, which was widespread throughout 

the country and deeply, devotedly believed by the governing party. The 

HSPP´s anti-Semitism must not be seen as a product of technical consideration 

to deliver a common enemy for welding together the three groups. The HSPP 

preached the anti-Semitic resentment with creed. 

According to a population census in 1940 2,650,000 people lived in the 

Slovak Republic. 89,000 of them were Jews. 4 

The anti-Semitism bound the three ethnic groups together and even 

moulded the belligerent opponents within the HSPP into a close unity. The 

internal split was none existent when it came to the anti-Jewish policy of 

the government. Although originally the anti-Semitism of the „Moderates” 

was grounded in the catholic anti-Judaism, and the anti-Semitism of the 

„Radicals” was leaned on a racial doctrine, the following steps were 

supported fully by both groups. Disagreement existed only when the 

question arose of how to treat converts. The „Moderates” refused the 

deportation of 4,000 converts, but for the „Radicals” being Jewish was not a 

religious question – it was a question of descent. Their understanding 

4 HILBERG, Raul: The destruction of the european jews. Harper & Row, New York, 1979. 434. 

64

stated, that it wasn’t crucial in which god you believed in, the point was 

what your grandparents had stated to believe in. For them it was no question 

of faith, it was a question of blood and race. 

Anti-Semitism was a characteristic of the party since the founding. The 

Slovakian authorities were convinced, that the Jewish population was hostile to 

the Slovak national movement ever since. They endangered it. Their conviction 

was, that the Jewish community encouraged the Magyarization of the Slovak 

people and they blamed the Jews for the general poverty of the Slovaks and the 

underdevelopment of the national economy. 

Shortly after the independency and the HSPP’s takeover, discriminating 

laws against Jews were enacted. Jewish property was confiscated, Jews were 

excluded from state authorities, the Aryanization grabbed at Jewish 

possession, Jews were pushed into social, cultural, economical isolation. On 

squares and in parks signs with the text „For Jews, gypsies and dogs no 

entrance” were placed. 

The situation got even rougher, after the German-Slovakian negotiations in 

Salzburg in summer 1940. German advisers were sent to the Slovak Republic. 

In September 1940 Dieter Wisliceny arrived in Bratislava, the „Adviser to the 

Slovakian government for the Jewish question”. He was a close member staff to 

Adolf Eichmann. 

On September 9th 1941 the „Jewish Codex” was established. Besides the 

Nuremberg laws it was the strictest anti-Jewish law in the whole of Europe. All 

Jews, who were older than six years, had to wear a Jewish star. Even letters had 

to be marked with the sign, so that the police was allowed to confiscate them – 

this was a law, which even in the Third Reich did not exist. In some way the 

codex surpassed its model, the Nuremberg law. 5 

On March 25th 1942 the first train left the train station of Schilina, the first 

thousand Jews were deported to the German death camps in Nazi-occupied 

Poland. 27 trains should follow till the Slovak Diet passed a constitutional law on 

May 15th 1942 about the deportation of the Jews after discussing it half an hour 

without any substantial contradiction. A fact that underlines the broad agreement 

within the party about this approach. From March to October 1942 57,628 Jews, 

two third of the Jewish population, were deported to Auschwitz, Majdanek and 

Sobibor. The only exceptions were the already mentioned converts and so called 

„economically important” Jews, which had a special working permissions. Only 

a few hundred Slovakian Jews should survive the Shoa. 

Did the deportation happen by command of the German adviser? No. Why? 

Because the German adviser, like his title already explains, did not dispose the 

authority to make such a decision on his own. All German advisers, more than 

one was sent to the Slovak Repulic, were only allowed to give 

recommendations. They did not have any formal or legal power, they could just 

5 HILBERG, Raul: The destruction of the european jews. Harper & Row, New York, 1979. 436. 

65

make proposals or suggestions. 6 In short, the deportation of Jews resulted from 

measures undertaken by the Slovak government. The necessary and ultimate 

instructions were given and organised by the Slovak government on its own not 

by command of the German adviser. 

In this sense it is interesting that the adviser for the party agenda, Hans 

Pehm, who was sent from Berlin to Bratislava to organize the HSPP according 

to the NSDAP guidelines, complained about the disinterest or noncompliance 

he experienced. The official Slovakian elite wanted to protect the party 

successfully and easily from any exterior influence. Hans Pehm was powerless, 

he could like all other advisers, just appeal to the voluntary cooperation of the 

Slovak authorities. 

Final conclusion 

The Slovak government acted independently and voluntarily when 

cooperating closely with Nazi Germany in the destruction of the European 

Jews. The Slovak Republic was therefore the only country that was not 

occupied by Nazi Germany, which organized and induced the deportation of its 

Jewish population on its own behalf. 

6 

TÖNSMEYER, Tatjana: The German Advisers in Slovakia, 1939-1945: Conflict or Cooperation? 

2003. 173. 

66

Balogh, Márton 

Problems at the Finnish-Soviet Border after the signing of the 

Molotov-Ribbentrop pact 

Finland was at the beginning of the 20 th Century a part of the Russian 

Empire, and after the fall of the tsarist regime the civil war raged over the 

country. The Finnish Red Guard was beaten quickly by the „white 

Republicans” and its communists left the country 1 and Finland gained its 

independence. The Treaty of Tartu (14 October 1920) guaranteed the borders 

of the new country. 2 The Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with the 

country in the 1932. 

The World changes 

When the great powers invaded and annexed the smaller countries, 3 the 

politicians in Finland felt the air of danger. After claiming Sudetenland, Hitler 

declared in Munich that Germany had no more territorial claims to 

Czechoslovakia. He „generously” said, „I want to take not even a single 

Czech!” The Czechs gave up their frontier region with its well-made 

fortifications, thinking this was the price they had to pay to live in peace. On 16 

March 1939 Hitler said that „The Czech and Moravian territories had belonged 

to the German people for a thousand years; it is violence and immorality that 

separated it!” In the end, Czechoslovakia was cut up by Germany, and the 

Czechs did not put up any military resistance. 

In August 1939 a French-English delegation went to the Soviet Union to 

sign an agreement according to which France, Great-Britain and the Soviet 

Union would have forged an alliance against the aggressive German expansion, 

but Stalin was willing to cooperate only under the condition that the Soviet 

Union could take certain western territories (in Poland, for example). The fact 

that the British and the Polish were allies withheld Stalin's ambitions. Thus, the 

Soviet leader „politely” rejected the delegation. 4 

In this situation – during spring and summer - the Soviet Union tried to 

concuss Finland and claim territories northwards to Leningrad, 5 Ahvananmaa 

1 

JUTTIKKALA, Eino, PIRINEN, Kauko: Finnország történeleme (The History of Finland). 

Kairos, Budapest, 2004. 301-309. 

2 

Ibid. 315. 

3 

Germany annexed Austria and Czechoslovakia and claimed territories from Lithuania; Italy 

annexed Etiophia and Albania. 

4 

SZERENCSÉS, Károly: Revízió, országgyarapítások és kormánypolitika Magyarországon 

1938-1944. (Border-revision, country enlargements and government policy in Hungary 1938- 

1944 - seminar held in the academic year 2009/2010 spring semester. 

5 

JACOBSON, Max: Finnország: mítosz és valóság. (Finland: myth and reality). Minerva, 

Budapest, 1990. 29. 

67

(Aland), Hanko and the islands of the Gulf of Finland. These demands were not 

new to Finland; after the Russian civil war the Bolsheviks tried to get these 

territories. Moreover, we know of documents from the tsarist archives which 

contain similar demands. Tsar Peter I. said once, „None of the ladies in Saint 

Petersburg can sleep in peace, while Finland is in the hand of the enemies”. 6 

After the pact 

The secret protocol was not known after the signing of the pact, but it was 

easy to guess that the Soviet Union was given a free hand in Eastern Europe 

and with the Baltic by Hitler. 7 

After Germany and its puppet, Slovakia, attacked Poland, the Soviet Union 

occupied whole eastern Poland, the country collapsed. In this situation a Polish 

submarine, the Orzel, managed to flee to Tallin, Estonia. The Estonians should 

have disarmed the vessel in accordance with international war law, but instead, 

they let it continue on to London on 18 September. This was an excuse for the 

Soviets to offer military aid to Estonia, saying that by this act the Baltic 

country proved that they were not confident enough in their own military 

power. Thus, the Estonian ambassador was summoned to Moscow, 8 and the 

result of the negotiations was that Estonia and then Latvia and Lithuania (6 and 

11 October, respectively) signed the military assistance agreement, but it was a 

de facto occupation. Although Estonia and Latvia were allies, the small 

countries did not want to take military action because they wanted to avoid 

war; they hoped the military assistance would result in peace. 9 

Thus, the Soviet forces started to gain control over the Baltic States and 

built airports and piers. Stalin wanted to gain control over Finland too, so he 

had ordered the Finnish ambassador to Moscow on 5 October, 1939 and 

Molotov offered Finland the same contract he had offered to the Baltic States. 

The Finnish-Soviet negotiations 

The Finnish government sent State Counselor Paasikivi to Moscow. Field 

Marshal Mannerheim sent Colonel Paasonen with him as a military advisor, 

since the Colonel „was a skilled soldier, who knew the Russians’ manners”. 10 

Paasikivi was instructed to explain to the Soviets that Finland wanted to avoid 

6 



7 

JACOBSON, Max: Finland in the new Europe. The center for strategic and international 

studies, Washington, 1998. 28. 

8 

MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. The winter war). 

Püski, Budapest, 1997. 7. 

9 

Ibid. 8-9. 

10 

Ibid. 9-10. 

68

conflicts. 11 When the Finnish delegation refused to sign the military assistance 

contract, Molotov came out with the Soviet demands, which were so excessive 

that they shocked the Finnish government. Stalin wanted to get territories – 

South-East Karelia and the Fisherman’s Peninsula 12 - near Petsamo, and 

offered some worthless territories in north-eastern Karelia as compensation. 13 

They also wanted to get Hanko as a concession for thirty years because they 

wanted to use it as a military base and pier; they wanted to deploy there 5000 

armed personnel. 14 The city lies a hundred kilometers westwards from 

Helsinki, so the Finns rejected to give it up because they did not want to allow 

the Soviets to build a bridgehead behind the fortified borders, in the heart of the 

country, near their capital. This bridgehead would have engaged a considerably 

big part of the Finnish army, and the Soviets would have dropped 

reinforcements from the occupied Estonia. 

The Soviets insisted on getting Hanko. Stalin reasoned that Finland was an 

easy target for the great powers and many of them would have liked the idea of 

getting Finland into their spheres; thus, Finland would have been a „springboard” 

to attack the Soviet Union. He also said that the Soviet Union was 

congenial to Germany but „this could be changed in this (war) situation”. 15 

The Finnish delegation pointed out that Finland would not let anyone pass 

the border and they could defend themselves, but it did not gratify Stalin, who 

replied: „They would not ask you! They would be there, and that’s all. But do 

not expect that the Soviet Union and the Red Army would allow this and do 

nothing. No. We would advance and meet them there”. 16 

The Finns tried to come to an agreement with the Soviets because they were 

not prepared for conflicts and therefore they were willing to surrender the islands 

- except for Ahvenanmaa - and other North-Karelian territories. They accepted 

the idea that the Finno-Soviet border, running only seven kilometers away from 

the Soviet Union’s second largest city – Leningrad – should be pushed away 

further (13 km) from the city, though it remained only a plan. The Soviet Union 

finally gave up claiming Hanko but still insisted on getting Lapohja port. 17 

Molotov explained that these were the minimal claims. 18 These demands would 

11 MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli háború. (Memoir. The winter war). 


12 Also known as Rybachii Peninsula. 


Püski, Budapest, 1997. 11-12. 

14 JACOBSON, Max: Finland in the new Europe. The center for strategic and international 




16 JACOBSON, Max: Finnország: mítosz és valóság. (Finland: myth and reality). Minerva, 

Budapest, 1990. 28-29. 

17 This is near to Hanko. 



69

have had a less serious effect on the Finnish industry, but the government did not 

approve them 19 since the Finns did not want to be dependent of the Soviet Union. 

Eventually, on 13 November the negotiations broke down. 

Political Situation 

The Finnish Social Democratic government had the country’s support, 

which could be best shown by the fact that when the delegation went to the 

Soviet capital, at the Helsinki Railway station was a support demonstration 

which indicated that the unity within Finland was solid. 20 Two months later 

when the Soviets tried to win the people's trust, the strong unity of the Finns 

became a crucial factor. The idea of a Soviet protection was just as 

unacceptable to the Finnish people as to their government. 

In his talks with the Anglo-French delegation Vyacheslav Molotov 

proposed that the three powers (Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union) 

should guarantee the security of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland, so the 

English and the French government did not believe that the Soviets would 

attack the Finns. They told the Finnish ambassador that the Soviets only 

wanted to avoid the German advance. 21 The Finnish government did not 

believe either that the Soviets would attack; they thought that the nonaggression 

pact between Berlin and Moscow could revise their relations with 

the Soviet Union. 22 At the end of the Polish war, on 2 October the Finnish 

ambassador to Berlin, Vourimaa, wanted to clarify the Finnish-German 

relations. Weizsäcker, Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, said Germany 

would not intervene into Soviet-Finnish relations. 23 The Germans suggested 

that the Finns should be sensible and give in. 24 Not satisfied with this answer, 

the Finnish government now turned to the western democracies. First, they 

tried to get the help of the Scandinavian countries, but Stockholm told them not 

to expect military aid, only military equipments (such as airplanes, for 

example) and supplies. 25 The Finnish government considered protesting to the 

League of Nations, but finally they decided not to provoke the Soviets' anger. It 


studies, Washington, 1998. 29. and MANNERHEIM, Carl Gustav von: Emlékiratok. A téli 

háború. (Memoir. The winter war). Püski, Budapest, 1997. 16. 







23 HELLER, Michail, NEKRICH, Alexandr: Orosz történelem (Russian history) vols II. 

Osiris, Budapest, 2003. 318. 



25 Ibid. 26. 

70

must be emphasized that the western democracies of Europe could not help, 

and when the USA stuck up for Finland, Molotov warned Roosevelt to „care 

about the freedom of the Philippines and not that of Finland.” 26 

The Finnish government realized that they were alone, but as mentioned 

earlier, they did not believe that the Soviets would attack, so they rejected the 

demand to give a port away to them. They wanted to continue the negotiations, 

but the Soviet propaganda-machine started a broadside against the Finns. On 28 

November the Soviets violated the non-aggression pact and launched their 

attack on 30 November, 1939. 27 

Military arrangements 

Both sides prepared for a war against each other. The Finnish army was on 

constant standby. Mannerheim succeeded in having the government call back 

the reservists on 1 September. 28 Later on the reserve officers, who were 

disarmed in 1938, were also called back. 29 During the summer and the autumn, 

a defense line (named after Mannerheim) was built on the Karelian Isthmus, 

which was one of the territories the Soviets claimed. However, the Soviets 

demanded that it should be destroyed and offered that they would destroy their 

defense lines in return. The offer was disadvantageous for the Finns, because it 

would have been meaningless to attack the Soviets and they would have lost a 

most vital means of defense. 30 Finland held an overall military exercise on 14 

October, but it was in fact an overall mobilization of the Finnish troops. 31 

The Finns noticed that the Soviets rallied a large amount of troops on the 

border and made infrastructural repairs on roads and rails. 32 Stalin ordered the 

military commander of Leningrad to barrage on the Soviet village of Majnil, 

800 meters from the Finnish border in order to blame Finland. 33 

The winter war 

The Finnish government offered to investigate the incident, but the Soviet 

troops launched a full-scale attack in the direction of Helsinki. The Soviets did 





28 They were disarmed in August. 



30 Ibid. 15. 

31 Ibid. 10. 

32 Ibid. 18. 



71

not expect strong resistance and hoped for a quick success. They attacked in 

three directions: 1. in the North - aiming at Petsamo in order to cut supplies 

from the allies 34 - this was the only operation of the three that was successful to 

a certain extent; 2. In the South - aiming at Helsinki and other large cities; 3. in 

North Karelia. 35 

The Soviet Union had 26 divisions, one motorized army corps, five 

armoured brigades, and they were equipped with heavy artillery, 1000 

airplanes, 100 submarines and 2000 tanks. The Soviet army that attacked 

Finland consisted of approximately half a million men. On the other hand, the 

Finns had only 9 divisions and 75 airplanes 36 and approximately 120 000 men. 

The Finnish army had no anti-tank artillery, and they had virtually no antiaircraft 

defense, either. Their few tanks – made in the 1920s and at the 

beginning of the 1930s – were out of date; likewise, both their fleet and air 

force were unsatisfactory. 37 

Despite all that, the Finish army held on for three months. The reason was 

simple: the Soviet troops had no winter military training and winter attires. The 

Finns used skis and white clothes, their morale was excellent, while the Soviets had 

brown and thin clothes for the freezing snowy weather and they had only 1 to 3 

weeks training. Jacobson refers to the winter of 1939/1940 as the coldest in the 

century. 38 After losing too many soldiers, the Soviets tried to substitute the troops 

with ski-champions, most of whom died an inglorious death in the fields of 

Finland. 39 The Finnish tactic was simple, but effective, they let the Soviets get 

closer, cut the supply-lines back and rushed the convoy. The Finnish-front turned 

into a Soviet cemetery: approximately 300 000 Soviets died (officially 127 000). 40 

While the war raged over the border of the USSR and Finland, the Soviet 

leaders planned to install a puppet-government led by Finnish Communists, 

such as Otto W. Kuusinen. During the attack in December they created the 

People’s Democratic Government. 41 Kuusinen was a member of the Finnish 

Red Guard during the Finnish civil war. To install a puppet- government was a 

habitual (and temporal) measure by the Soviets: The Bolsheviks did it during 

the Russian civil war with Ukraine and other fugitive states. 

34 An English consession was in Petsamo, to trade with rare materials, like Nikkel. 



36 Ibid. 







40 Ibid. 319-320. 



72

Stalin hoped to gain the support of the Finnish working class, but as mentioned 

above, the unity was too solid in Finland for Kuusinen and the internationalist ideas 

to be seductive. The Soviets advocated the merger of Finland and the Karelian 

Republic (already part of the Soviet Union) in order to make up one SSR, The 

Finnish-Karelian Republic, which would have been a part of the Soviet Union. 

The Finns succeeded in stopping the Soviets, after that the western allies 

took anti-Soviet movements. Paris closed the Soviet trade mission in France, 

and Italy recalled its ambassador from Moscow. 42 Several countries – including 

Sweden, Norway, Hungary, and Britain sent volunteers to aid Finland. France 

and Britain offered an expeditionary arm of 50 000. Franklin Roosevelt spoke 

about the „rape of Finland” and Churchill said this war was a crime against a 

noble people. The League of Nations excluded the USSR. 

Mannerheim realized that the help of the allies would be too late and 

inadequate, and Finland did not want such devastation by great powers on its 

territory as it had happened in the case of Spain during the civil war. Therefore, 

Finland refused the proposal. 

Stalin wanted to avoid a conflict with Britain and France, and decided to 

launch quickly a final attack to enforce a peace agreement. 43 To end the war 

without getting territories would have been unacceptable for the Soviet Union 

and for Stalin. 44 After changing generals, the Red Army’s leadership succeeded 

in the breakthrough. 

Territorial changes 

Finland had to disclaim South-East Karelia, including the cities of Viipuri 

and Sortavala, 45 and the Karelian Isthmus with its defense lines. It is important 

to note that this territory is larger than the former claims of the Soviets. Finland 

lost the islands of the Gulf of Finland, and the Soviets managed to build an 

army base and pier in Hanko. However, it became useless after the Germans 

invaded Estonia, and the personnel had to be evacuated. 

These territorial losses were the reason for Finland to join the axis side in 

1941, when the Third Reich attacked the USSR. Finland reoccupied its 

territories for a while, but before long, in 1944, the Finnish government had to 

disclaim these and Petsamo region, too. The importance of this conflict and its 

consequences for the Soviets was not only these territorial changes, but that the 

war's result could help the Germans to make the decision to invade the USSR. 

42 

JACOBSON, Max: Finland in the new Europe. The center for strategic and international 

studies, Washington, 1998. 29.; Jacobson 1990, p. 28. 

43 



44 

Ibid. 32. 

45 

Most important for its railroad junction. 

73

Winkler, Paul 

Adolf Eichmann’s Vienna model and his attempt to expansion 

Introduction, goal and purpose of this work 

Taking advantage of the international context of this event, my contribution 

targeting to show the Austrian participation in the inhumane crimes, committed 

during the 2 nd World War. Contrary to the unfortunately still far too widespread 

opinion, that Austria had been the first victim of Nazi aggression, and that 

racist and anti-Semitic ideologies of the Austrian population were only 

imposed by an German elite, I will try to show on the basis of the career of an 

Austrian in the Nazi power apparatus how it was really about the attitude of a 

very large part of the Austrian population and their participation in the crimes 

against humanity. 

For this purpose I will examine the career and the role of Adolf Eichmann in 

the bureaucratic system of National Socialism. I will occupy myself also with the 

bureaucratic process and offices specific decisions that the situation of Jews in 

Vienna, significantly co-determined and how this so-called „Vienna model” in 

dealing with the Jewish people under Adolf Eichmann, due to his sad „success” 

became an example for others, Nazi-managed cities, and how it should finally 

prevail as an organizational form for the whole of the Third Reich. 

Therefore I’m going to confine myself to describe the events up to and 

including the year 1939 in order to remain within the topic of our event, 

although a description of the role of Adolf Eichmann in the Nazi Apparatus 

will remain fragmented if I do it in this way. As further reading, I recommend 

here only the book from Jenő Lévai, „Eichmann in Hungary” 1 , which seems for 

me to be interesting, because of our event site. 

Important basis for my specific comments in addition to the titles listed in 

the bibliography below, is particularly the work, „Die Eichmann-Männer” 2 

from Hans Safrian 3 which was recently translated into English 4 under the title 

„Eichmann’s Men” 5 . I can only recommend reading this book. Safrian in turn 

based his work on Raul Hilberg and his standard work on „The extermination 

of European Jews” 6 . 

1 LÉVAI, Jenő: Eichmann in Hungary. Budapest, 1961. 

2 SAFRIAN, Hans: Die Eichmann – Männer. Wien, Zürich, 1993. 

3 Hans Safrian lectures in history at the Institute für Zeitgeschichte at the University of 

Vienna. He was also a Pearl Resnick Fellow at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 

Research Team Leader for the Independent Commission of Experts – Switzerland – Second 

World War, and a research historian for the Historical Commission of the Republic of Austria. 

He is the author of numerous works on World War II and Nazi war crimes. 

4 In the course I will refer only to the English version of the book. 

5 SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men (First updated, English edition published 2010). 

6 HILBERG, Raul: The destruction of the European Jews. Chicago, 1961. 

75

The goal of my work in this international framework will be to further 

deconstruct the outmoded Austrian „Opferthese” 7 and to show, that many 

Austrians were not only working wheels in the NS-Apparatus, but often also, as 

in the case of Eichmann will be significantly, used their granted freedom and 

set accents out of their own initiatives, leading to a „cumulative 

radicalization” 8 of the Nazi power apparatus and consequently to a further 

deterioration of the living condition of Jews and other minorities like the Roma 

and Sinti, homosexuals, the so-called anti-socials and others. 

The functioning of this power structure and its simultaneous continued 

radicalization that took place with the participation also of many Austrians, 

some in high places, as can be seen at the position of Eichmann, was finally 

culminating in a state terror that killed millions of people. 

However, for all these considerations of a unfortunately, all too well 

functioning „machinery of death” 9 , as it is defined in the investigations of Raul 

Hilberg, it must not be overlooked on the fact, that the apparatus is composed 

of individual persons, and therefore of individual offenders. One of those 

7 Under the term „Opferthese” („victim theory”) is meant a long time course of argument in 

Austria. It says that Austria was the first victim of Nazi aggression policy. As a result, an 

Austrian complicity was denied in the collective memory of whole generations. For this reason it 

is also commonly called the „Life lie” („Lebenslüge”) of Republic II. The consequences of the 

„Opferthese” was in addition to an inadequately implemented denazification in post war years, 

also a long time insufficient „compensation policy” from the Republic towards the victims of the 

National Socialism. Accordingly, it lacked until late in the 1990s to a reappraisal of the Austrian 

past in the era of National Socialism. It was not until the year 1986 during the Waldheim affair 

and also in the commemorative year 1988, that a sophisticated discussion of the Nazi past of 

Austria set in. In 1991 Chancellor Franz Vranitzky was the first official representative of the 

Republic, who admitted the crimes, that where committed by Austrians, and also asked for 

excuse. Also the reactions of the Republic to the sanctions of the formerly 14 other states of the 

EU after the ÖVP-FPÖ Coalition formation, is regarded as a late symptom of the „Opferthese”, 

because also in that case the Republic see itself as an innocent victim. 

8 The term comes from the discourse of the various and contradictory interpretations of the 

development of Nazi genocide policies. 

9 This Term, in the original „Vernichtungsmaschinerie” came from Raul HILBERG’s 

standard work „Die Vernichtung der Europäischen Juden”. With this term he refers to the 

Nazi Apparatus, which carried out the genocides and he made clear, that this Apparatus was 

composed out of four hierarchic groups: The officials brought in their incorruptible planning 

and managerial thoroughness. From the Wehrmacht the machinery of destruction got military 

discipline, precision and endurance. The influence of the industry got visible both in the 

emphatically driven accounting, thrift and recycling as well as in a factory environment 

efficiency of the extermination camps. The party finally supplied the machine with „idealism”, 

the „sense of mission” and the sense of „making history” […]. In the original: „Die 

Beamtenschaft brachte ihre unbestechliche planerische und verwalterische Gründlichkeit ein. 

Von der Wehrmacht erhielt die Vernichtungsmaschinerie militärische Disziplin, Präzision und 

Ausdauer. Der Einfluß der Industrie wurde sowohl in der mit großem Nachdruck betriebenen 

Buchführung, Sparsamkeit und Wiederverwertung als auch in der fabrikmäßigen Effizienz der 

Vernichtungszentren sichtbar. Die Partei schließlich versah den Apparat mit „Idealismus”, 

„Sendungsbewusstsein” und dem Gefühl, „Geschichte zu machen”. […]” HILBERG, Raul: 

The destruction of the European Jews. Chicago, 1961. 39. 

76

individual offenders, 10 who used his granted freedom within the system, not 

least to satisfy his own interests at the expense of whole groups of population, 

what further radicalized the apparatus, was Adolf Eichmann. 11 

Eichmann's assessment in the literature 

The assessment of Eichmann and his role in the Nazi apparatus in the 

literature has to be understood in the context of the discourse of conflicting 

interpretations 12 of the development of Nazi genocide policy. 

10 If this work is primarily about the person of Adolf Eichmann, it must no be forgotten, that 

he didn’t work all alone. The careers of the so-called „Eichmann-Männer” („Eichmann-Men”), a 

term from Raul HILBERG, which initially referred to the three commanders of the camp in 

Theresienstadt, Dr. Siegfried Seidl, Anton Burger und Karl Rahm are treated in the books listed 

below, especially at Raul HILBERG and Hans SAFRIAN. Since I will not explain any further 

details about Eichmann’s Men, in trying to keep this work as short as possible, they should be 

briefly mentioned here: Franz Novak born 1913 in Wolfsberg in the Austrian province of 

Carinthia; Alois Brunner,1912 in Rohrbrunn in Burgenland; Anton Burger,1911 in Neunkirchen 

in Lower Austria; Karl Rahm, 1907 in Klosterneuburg near Vienna; Franz Stuschka, 1910 in 

Liesing near Vienna; Herbert Gerbing, 1914 in Mödling near Vienna; Anton Zita, 1909 in 

Göllersdorf; Josef Weiszl, 1912 in Felsöderna; Richard Hartenberger, 1911 in Vienna; Ernst 

Girzick, 1911 in Vienna; Ferdinand Daurach, 1912 in Vienna; Ernst Brückler, 1912 in Vienna; 

Alfred Slawik, 1913 in Vienna; Anton Brunner, 1898 in Bregana. LOZOWICK describes this 

group of men in this way: „Although their social backgrounds and education varied, they were 

all young, male, Christian, and nationalist-minded Germans; they had all voluntarily joined the 

SS.” LOZOWICK Yaacon: Hitler’s Bureaucrats. The Nazi security police and the banality of 

evil. Leicester, 2002. 7. 

11 SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 2010. 1 -13. 

12 Such an attempt of interpretation, called „intentionalistic” in literature, assumes, says 

Eberhard Jäckel, a linear implementation of a „world view”. Also the English historian Gerald 

Fleming makes in his work „Hitler and the Final Solution” clear, that it is a straight way from 

the anti-Semitic statements of the young Adolf Hitler. Related to Hitler’s remark to his childhood 

friend August Kubizek: „that does not belong here in Linz”, as the two passed the small 

synagogue in the Bethlehemstraße in Linz. In: FLEMING, Gerald: It Is the Fuehrer’s Wish. 

Extract reprinted from Fleming’s „Hitler and the Final Solution”. In: NIEWYK, Donald L., ed. 

The Holocaust: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 2 nd ed. Boston, 1997. 12-13. Read 

in: SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 9. Up to the so-called „Final Solution of the Jewish 

Question” followers of this attempts of interpretation, called „Intentionalists” thus trying to draw 

a direct line between the anti-Semitic ideology of Hitler, his plans and orders and the mass 

murders. In contrast followers of the so-called „structuralistic” or also „functionalistic” attempt 

of interpretation deny such a „master plan of evil”, that led to the „Final Solution”. So 

SCHLEUNES, Karl A. speaks in his researches about a „tortuous road to Auschwitz”. Also 

historians like BROSZAT, Martin and MOMMSEN, Hans refer to a „cumulative radicalization” 

of the Nazi actions against humanity. Simultaneously they relativize the importance of a clear 

and unequivocal command of Hitler for the carrying out of the mass murders. In that case the 

Nazi-genocide-policy is no direct implementation of an ideology, but had to be understood as a 

complex branching and Step-by-step aggravatation of individual motives, as well as the 

interaction and bundling of various moments. SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men 9-11. A third 

attempt of interpretation of the genocides, which is for example made by STRAUSS, Herbert A., 

speaks about the fundamental incomprehensibility of the „Holocaust”. DAN, Diner calls, 

77

For example describes Hannah Arendt, who was also a trial observer in 

Jerusalem 13 , in her book „Eichmann in Jerusalem” 14 the normality with which 

Eichmann met the crimes with the words „banality of evil”. She represented 

him as a ruthless command receiver without motives and tried to point out that 

this attitude was more terrible than all the atrocities. For many people her 

„banalisation of evil” represented simultaneously a „banalisation of the 

holocaust”. That’s the reason why her views remain more than controversial in 

historical research. Simon Wiesenthal described Eichmann contrary as an 

„Accountant of death”. 15 Hans Mommsen wrote: „Adolf Eichmann represents 

the mechanism of compartmentalized accountability, associated with 

perfectionism bureaucratic and authoritarian submission.” 16 Gideon Hausner 

however regards Eichmann as the personification of evil. He wrote, that 

Eichmann was the „Incarnation of the satanic principle” 17 . The Historian 

Yaacon Lozowick objects Hannah Arendt in his book „Hitler’s Bureaucrats” 

by making clear, that Eichmann and his comrades had nothing banal in 

themselves and very well knew what they were doing. 18 Even John Weiss 

rejects the theory of the „Banality of Evil” and concludes: [Eichmann followed] 

„a terrible and unshakable personal belief in the ideology of death.” 19 

Eichmann's role in the Nazi power structure and his personal freedom of 

action, motives and initiatives are, therefore, as we see, in controversial 

referring to that, Auschwitz a „[…] No man’s land of understanding […]”. He also thinks that 

Auschwitz is a „[…] black box of explanation, a historiographical interpretation attempts 

absorbing, beyond historically importance receiving vacuum.” DAN, Diner: Zwischen Aporie 

und Apologie. Über Grenzen der Historisierbarkeit des Nationalsozialismus. In: DAN, Diner 

(ed.) Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zu Historisierung und Historikerstreit. Frankfurt 

am Main, 1987. Read in: SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 10. 

13 

Adolf Eichmann had to stand trial in court of the Israeli Government in Jerusalem in 1961. 

After he managed to go underground after 45’he made it to Argentina along the so-called „ratline”. 

In 1960 a target group of investigators of the „Mossad” smuggled Eichmann, in lack of an 

extradition agreement to Israel. The trial against Eichmann in the Jerusalem District Court with 

the case number 40/61 began on the 11th of April and ended on the 15 th of December 1961. The 

judgement, which was to death by hanging, was confirmed by the Court of Appeal on second 

instance. Adolf Eichmann was executed on the 31 st of May 1962 in Ramleh near Tel Aviv. Until 

today it was the only death sentence, carried out by the Israeli judiciary. 

14 

ARENDT, Hannah: Eichmann in Jerusalem. A report on the banality of evil. London, 1963. 

15 

ZDF-Dokumentation: Eichmann – der Vernichter. 

16 

MOMMSEN, Hans: Der Nationalsozialismus und die deutsche Gesellschaft. Ausgewählte 

Aufsätze. Hamburg, 1991. 215. In the original text: „Adolf Eichmann repräsentiert den 

Mechanismus kompartimentalisierter Verantwortlichkeit, die sich mit bürokratischem 

Perfektionismus und obrigkeitsstaatlicher Unterwerfung verknüpfte.” 

17 

HAUSNER, Gideon: Die Vernichtung der Juden. München, 1979. 10. In the original text: 

„Verkörperung des satanischen Prinzips” 

18 

LOZOWICK, Yaacon: Hitler’s Bureaucrats. The Nazi security police and the banality of 

evil. Leicester, 2002. 22. 

19 

WEISS, John: Der lange Weg zum Holocaust. Die Geschichte der Judenfeindschaft in 

Deutschland und Österreich. Hamburg, 1997. 519. In the original text: [Eichmann folgte] „einem 

schrecklichen und unerschütterlichen persönlichen Glauben an die Ideologie des Todes.” 

78

esearch. But how could the suppression of the individual freedom and the high 

degree of voluntary participation and enthusiasm, which apparently occurred 

side by side in the Reich, brought together? 

Bernd Jürgen Wendt tries to give an answer in writing, the Germans 20 in the 

Third Reich perished into a people of leaders and sub-leaders. Their ambitions 

have been fueled by offices, uniforms and stars, which were associated with 

social advancement, when they simultaneously were politically disenfranchised 

as citizens. Performance and loyalty were guaranteed by this system of lifting 

out of the crowd. Due to the demand of duty, order, cleanliness, diligence and 

obedience, at various public officials a striving perfection, as well as 

operational and efficiency ethic was reached. These technocrats tried to 

perform the given or self-selected tasks perfectly, without asking for custom 

and morality. One of these technocrats was Adolf Eichmann. 21 

Eichmann’s younger years 

Adolf Eichmann was born on the 19th of March in 1906 in Solingen, 

Germany. In 1914 he moved with his family to Austria in the city of Linz. His 

academic career is unclear in the literature, but is shown as not successful. 22 

After his mother died, his father married again. Probably because 

Eichmann's stepmother was based strictly Christian, he was also very early 

member of the „Christian Association of young men”. Later he joined the racist 

youth movement „Wandervogel”. He was a member of the so called „Falken”, 

20 Here the Austrians, of course, are included. 

21 WENDT, Bernd Jürgen: Deutschland 1933-1945. Das „Dritte Reich”. Hannover, 1995. 134. 

LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator der „Endlösung”. 

Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 5-8. 

22 This may also be, because Eichmann himself made contradictionary statements about this 

time. After the elementary school he attended the same junior high school, which also Hitler had 

attended, and like him, he also could not finish it. After the junior high school he attended either 

a polytechnic school [ARENDT: 102. See: KNOPP Guido: Hitlers Helfer. Die Täter. München, 

1998. 30. Read in: LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator 

der „Endlösung”. Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 11.], a higher school of mechanical engineering 

[KEMPFER, Robert M. W.: Eichmann und Komplizen. Zürich, 1961. 25. See: MULISCH, 

Harry: Strafsache 40/61. Eine Reportage über den Eichmann-Prozeß. Berlin, 1996. 24. See: 

SMELSER, Ronald/ SYRING, Enrico (Hgg.): Die SS: Elite unter dem Totenkopf. Paderborn, 

2000. 135. Read in: LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. 

Koordinator der „Endlösung”. Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 11.], or a mechanic training. [YAHIL, 

Leni: Die Shoa. Überlebenskampf und Vernichtung der europäischen Juden. München, 1998. 

160. See: JACKEL, Eberhard-LONGRICH,Peter-SCHOEPS,Julius (Hgg.): Enzyklopädie des 

Holocaust. Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden. 4 Bände. München, 1995. 

385. Read in: LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator der 

„Endlösung”. Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 11.] On all official documents of Adolf Eichmann always 

claimed to be a „professional machine builder”, but this is not true, because he never graduated. 

[LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator der „Endlösung”. 

Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 9-11.] 

79

that part of this movement which was in Austria even more racially pronounced 

than in Germany. 

After he had worked a short time with his father, who had bought a small 

mining company, he came 1925 to the „Oberösterreichischen Elektrobau AG”, 

where he worked till 1927. After that, Eichmann found a job as salesman of the 

„Vacuum Oil Company AG – Wien”. As a travel agent he sold gasoline and 

motor oil in the Mühlviertel 23 , until he was transferred to Salzburg in 1933. 

There he was terminated after a short while, allegedly because of his 

membership in the NSDAP. 24 

Entry in the NSDAP and the SS 

On the first of April 1932 Eichmann joined the NSDAP and on the same 

day the SS 25 . After Hitler came to power in Germany, the NSDAP was banned 

in Austria. Whether he lost his job because of his membership in the Nazi party 

or for economic reasons is controversial. Like many others he gave way to this 

prohibition law and went on the first of August 1933 to Freilassing in Bayern. 26 

In the camp of Lechfeld he went through a two months lasting, pseudo-military 

training and joined as a „SS-Unterscharführer” the „Austrian legion”. 

After that, he was with the battalion of the regiment „Germany” until 

September 1934 located outside the Dachau concentration camp, where he 

became „SS-Scharführer”. In October 1934, Eichmann came to the Security 

Service called „Sicherheitsdienst” (SD) of the „Reichsführer SS” (Reichleader 

of the SS), Himmler 27 . In the beginning Eichmann sorted index cards 

in the SD-Main Office in the SD-Department II-111 „Freemasonry” 28 , 

before he was responsible for Zionist organisations as a clerk in the 

Department II-112. 

There Eichmann had found his vocation under his superior SS- 

Untersturmführer Leopold Edler von Mildenstein. After the lecture of Theodor 

Herzl’s work „Der Judenstaat” (The state of Jews) and Alfred Boehm’s 

„Geschichte des Zionismus” (History of Zionism), Eichmann was becoming an 

23 A part of Upper Austria. 

24 The hand written CV from July 1937, printed in: Das Eichmann Protokoll, 

Dokumentenanhang. Read in: SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 17. 

25 His SS-Candidate number was 45.326. About his NSDAP membership number he self 

gave different information. So you can find in literature either the number 889.895 or 899.895. 

LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator der „Endlösung” 

(Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002.12. 

26 LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator der 

„Endlösung” Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002.14. 

27 Ibid.16. 

28 The Masonic Lodges with their mythical rites and secret signs were soon lumped 

together with Jews, Communists and Catholicism in the time of National Socialism. 

ARENDT: 111. LEVY: 92. 

80

expert of this matter 29 and had as a „Zionist” and „Idealist” the goal of a 

„political Solution of the Jewish question” in mind. 30 

Development of the SD 

The Security Service called „Sicherheitsdienst” (SD) of the SS was modeled in 

1931 after military aspects as section Ic. It was established of the SS-Oberstab in 

Munich and was led by Heydrich, who was SS-Sturmführer at that time. In 1932 

the section Ic had been transformed into the SD and should soon be the priority 

intelligence on the model of the Intelligence Service or the Deuxième Bureau. 

In 1935 the establishment of the SD main office in Berlin followed, which 

was divided into the offices I, administration and organization; II inland and III 

foreign countries. The intelligence analysis of the Jewish organizations began 

in 1935 and was for the time business of the SD department II-111 

„Freemasonry”. After that, the department II-112 of the SD main office took 

over the exploration of the Jewish organizations, through the monitoring of the 

Jewish press and meetings in cooperation with the Gestapo. Divided into the 

departments „assimilates, orthodox’ and Zionists”, files were made, diagrams 

produced and reports created. 31 

When Prof. Dr. Six overtook the main department II-1, the cooperation of 

the department II-112 and the Gestapo got even closer. After Mildenstein and 

Kuno Schröder, Dieter Wisliceny overtook the department and he forced the 

so-called „Zionist emigration” and the „elimination of the Jews from German 

economic life”. With the next head leader, Herbert Hagen, the area of work 

expanded. From then on files of all „important Jews” of other countries 

concerning policy, economics and science should be made. In doing so, special 

attention should have been given to Austria. Furthermore Hagen envisioned an 

expansion of the influence of Gestapo and SD on to the economic and financial 

area of the Nazi policy, which he wanted to achieve with the centralization of 

the „treatment of the Jewish question in Germany”. But this should only be 

made possible through the actions in Austria. 32 

The situation in Austria 

Meanwhile Austria respectively Vienna fell into chaos. Already in the night 

before the „invasion” 33 of German troops on the 12 th of March 1938, by which 

another about 200.000 Jews came under the sphere of influence of the Nazi 

29 

POHANKA, Reinhard: Pflichterfüller. Hitlers Helfer in der Ostmark. Wien, 1997. 37. 

30 

KNOPP: 31. 

31 

SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 16-17. 

32 

Ibid. 14-19. LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator 

der „Endlösung”. Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 21-26. 

33 

This „invasion” was hailed by a very large part of the Austrian population. 

81

egime, pogrom riots began, that remained unique. The specific acts of violence 

in Austria, which was called „Ostmark” from then on, the „Völkischer 

Beobachter”, as you can read at Safrian, commented in this way: „Whereas 

National Socialism frequently had to direct the attention of the people of 

northern Germany to the private, in a sense apolitical dangers of the Jews, the 

task in Vienna is the opposite. Concerned to preserve the irreproachability and 

purity of the movement, it is the duty of responsible public education to contain 

the seething radicalism and to guide the understandable reaction to Jewish 

excess throughout an entire century into orderly channels. For, as everyone 

needs to remember, Germany is a constitutionally governed state. That means 

that in our Reich nothing happens without foundation in law….” 34 

The pogroms in the „Ostmark” did not meet the technocratic Anti-Semitism 

of the Nazi party leadership, which wanted their actions to be protected in a 

bureaucratic and pseudo-legal way. Because of that, next to the arbitrary riots a 

state organized terror of the new rulers was added. 

A „Dejudification of the economic in the Ostmark” should be guaranteed by the 

so-called „Vermögensverkehrsstelle”, which checked already performed and new 

„Arisierungen” 35 . The Jewish population was forced to leave the country, but it 

was meticulously made sure that they had to leave behind all their property. Many 

Jews from Vienna also fled the hopeless situation, by committing suicide. 

The situation of Jews in Vienna was far more extreme than in the 

„Altreich”. Many bureaucratic hurdles were put in the path of an „emigration” 

in the „Ostmark”. The Jews of Vienna had to pass gauntlet runs, at which they 

were delivered to the arbitrariness, corruption and wickedness of the officials. 

In addition to that they had to give up their property in most of the times. Very 

good descriptions of these days in Vienna can be found at Carl Zuckmayer 36 

and Hans Safrian with Hans Witek. 37 

Eichmann in Vienna 

In that stage described above, the men of the department II-112 began their 

work in Vienna. Under leadership of Hagen and Eichmann, soon under the sole 

guide of Eichmann, files and documents of Jewish organizations and individuals 

were seized and brought to Berlin. According to lists, which Eichmann brought 

from Berlin, officials from Jewish organizations were arrested to paralyze those 

organizations. 38 

34 Völkischer Beobachter, 26th of April 1938. SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 23. 

35 „Arisierung” means the expropriation of Jewish property by a so-called „Aryan master race”. 

36 ZUCKMAYER, Carl: Als wär’s ein Stück von mir. Horen der Freundschaft. Frankfurt, 1966. 

37 WITEK, Hans u. SAFRIAN, Hans (Hgg.): Und keiner war dabei. Dokumente des 

alltäglichen Antisemitismus in Wien 1938. Wien, 1988. 

38 SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 27. WILDT, Michael (Hg.): Die Judenpolitik des SD 

1935 bis 1938. München, 1995. 52. FRIEDLANDER, Saul: Das Dritte Reich und die Juden. 

München, 1998. 256. 

82

Arendt on the contrary is in the opinion that Eichmann immediately after his 

arrival took Jewish officials out of concentration camps, to enter into 

negotiations with them. But not only has the rest of the literature, but also the 

sources seemed to speak against her in this point. 39 

Jewish persons, who inquired about the guidelines of the new rulers, saw 

themselves confronted with a competency chaos. No office knew about the 

actions of the other offices. Neither in Vienna, nor in Berlin. This chaos was 

used by Eichmann to take over the leadership of the Jewish organizations. For 

this purpose, he allowed certain Jewish organizations again and brought their 

leaders back from the camps. Since May Eichmann’s work was so to monitor 

the coercive Jewish organizations in a dictatorial way, to ask for reports, to 

censor releases and to interrogate detained persons. 

He also made first steps to accelerate the expulsion of the Austrian Jews, 

which was mainly accelerated by the pressure of the Austrian pogrom-Anti- 

Semites. That’s the reason why the re-opened Jewish Community and the 

newly established emigration office had to deal within a very short time with 

about 45.000 completed emigration forms. 

The rush of the persons, who were made penniless through looting and 

expropriation in most of the cases, stressed the coercive organizations 

financially very strong. That was the reason, why they turned to international 

Jewish organizations, like the Joint Distribution Committee for help. 

Eichmann, who was now equipped with executive powers, found pleasure in 

his work right then. This was not the only reason why his superiors Hagen and Six 

sat down for an expansion of his office in Vienna. Although his office was not 

transformed into an own department, Eichmann was given preferential treatment 

because of his „diligence” and in September he was promoted to a SS- 

Obersturmführer and in January 1939 to a SS-Hauptsturmführer. In addition to that 

he got the brothers Rolf and Hans Günther as officials in the rank of SS-officers. 40 

The Vienna „model” 

To make it easier to escape from the inhumane conditions in the country, 

officials of the Jewish Community presented Eichmann in the summer 1938 a 

plan for a so-called „Central office for the emigration of the Austrian Jews” 

39 Since Eichmann already two days after his arrival in Vienna on the 18th of March 1938 led a 

police raid in the Jewish Community, what is supported by photos. The photo in a report in the 

newspaper Profil, issue No. 28. online at: http://www.vwi.ac.at/ausstellung_jmw/ pressespiegel/2007- 

07-09_Profil_Nr28_IKG-Archiv-Austellung_JMW_k.pdf (1.4.2010). At this police raid inter alia a 

document of a donation for Schuschnigg’s plebiscite had been found. Because of that the head 

leaders of the Jewish Community, Dr. Löwenherz, Dr. Desider Friedmann and many more were 

detained. In addition to that, 500.000 Reichsmark had to be paid as an „Equivalent” of this 

donation. 

40 SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 27-31. LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der 

Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator der „Endlösung” Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 29-32. 

83

(„Zentralstelle für die Abwanderung der Juden Österreichs”). This office 

should facilitate the bureaucratic affairs of the Jews. 

Eichmann passed those blueprints on to Reichskommissar Bürckel, who set up 

the „Zentralstelle” under the formal leadership of the SD-leader of the SS- 

Oberabschnitt Donau, Dr. Stahlecker on the 20 th of August 1938, after he had held 

consultations with Dr. Best. Practically, however, Eichmann led this office. 41 

Eichmann claimed in relation to the „Solution of the Jewish Question” 

between 1938 and 1941 often, that he had the crucial ideas for this plans and 

wanted to give the impression that he is the inventor of the „Vienna model”. 42 

The tasks he defined that way: „…providing opportunities for emigration 

through negotiations for entrance permits and obtaining foreign currency; 

establishment and surveillance of retraining centers; supervision of Jewish 

political organizations; publication of guidelines; and effective, sustained 

cooperation with all institutions in Vienna involved in the political, policerelated, 

and financial aspects of Jewish expulsion.” 43 

Eichmann installed this system, which was based on the following 

principles: 1. The emigration should no longer happen on one’s own decision 

and its organization lays no longer in the hands of the Jews, but run under the 

supervision of the Security Police. 2. This forced emigration should be carried 

out by the existing Jewish organizations, who had to act out the instructions of 

the SD. 3. The economic power of the Jews was to destroy and the assets of the 

emigrants to confiscate, so that they remained only the amount that was 

required for entry into the intended country of immigration. 44 

In the installation of the „Vienna model” the initiatives and career 

promotional activities of Adolf Eichmann become clear. Simultaneously he had 

nothing „invented”. He just took present plans on and passed them on to higher 

positions. But inside of the Apparatus he let everyone know, that he was the 

inventor of this frighteningly well-functionating model and therefore he was 

celebrated by the others. 45 

Following an inspection of the „Vienna approach” Hagen praised in his 

afterwards prepared report on the one hand the rapid bureaucratic completion of 

41 SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 31. 

42 LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator der 

„Endlösung” Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 36. 


44 YĀḤÎL, Lenî: Die Shoa. Überlebenskampf und Vernichtung der europäischen Juden. 

München, 1988. 161. LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. 

Koordinator der „Endlösung” Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 37. In the original: „1. Die Auswanderung 

sollte nicht mehr aus eigener Entscheidung geschehen und ihre Organisation nicht mehr in den 

Händen der Juden liegen, sondern unter Aufsicht der Sicherheitspolizei ablaufen. 2. Diese 

erzwungen Auswanderung sollte von den vorhandenen jüdischen Organisationen durchgeführt 

werden, die aus Anweisung des SD zu handeln hatten. 3. Die Wirtschaftskraft der Juden war zu 

zerstören und das Vermögen der Emigranten zu konfiszieren, sodass ihnen nur die Summe blieb, 

die zur Einreise in das vorgesehene Einwanderungsland benötigt wurde.” 


84

the „matter”, where there was a permanent detailed overview of the „emigrant” 

figures, on the other hand he praised the total collection of the instances by the 

SD. So the hegemonic position of the SD was a very important matter for the SS 

leaders. Hagen also noticed in his report that the system is apparently selffinanced, 

which of course was only possible by the robbery of the fugitives. He 

considered it necessary to expand his authority and he was considering a possible 

extension of the „Vienna Approach” throughout the Reich. 46 

Eichmann was not the inventor but the driving force behind the 

„Zentralstelle”. He took care of efficiency and made a million dollar business. 

The horror of it was that the robbery was not completed by SS men, but by 

helpless employees of the Jewish Community. The „Desk Murderer” Adolf 

Eichmann made his victims to „helpers”. 47 As if that fact would not be already 

sad enough, many of these involuntary „helpers” came after the war under the 

suspicion of having collaborated willingly with the Nazis. 48 

So shortly after the foundation, the „Zentralstelle” was pointing the way for the 

whole Reich. As Safrian writes, Hagen had recognized the trend-setting significance 

of the „Vienna model”: 1. Compulsory expulsion of those robbed of their 

possessions; 2. Payment fort he management of „emigration” either by the victims 

themselves or through foreign currency provided by Jewish organizations abroad; 3. 

Extension of the power of the SD by assuming executive privileges 49 . 

In the practical implementation of their bureaucratic work, Eichmann and 

his men did not forget to give themselves as „Aryan masters” towards their 

victims and to harass them. Humiliation and violence were on the agenda. 50 

After two months, Eichmann sent the numbers of his previous „work” to 

Berlin. He proudly told of the increase in the daily „emigration figure” to 350. 

Until the 20 th of September 1939 therefore 38.000 Jews had „left” the country. 

Together with the after Nazi views „illegally relocated” Austrian Jews, he 

came up with a figure of 50.000 displaced persons. 51 These figures were 

inflated. Of the approximately 40.000 „under supervision” expelled Jews could 

have been „treated” at most one quarter by the „Zentralstelle”. Eichmann’s 

superiors were, however, blinded by these figures and took them seriously. 52 

Lozowick’s verdict on the year 1938: „In summary, 1938 displayed two new 

trends: the transition to operational activity, and dwindling active 

46 

SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 32-33. 

47 

KNOPP: Helfer. 35. LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. 

Koordinator der „Endlösung” Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 37-38. 

48 

An interesting as equally sad contribution from the newspaper Profil on the issue No. 28 

online at: http://www.vwi.ac.at/ausstellung_jmw/pressespiegel/2007-07-09_Profil_Nr28_IKG- 

Archiv-Austellung_JMW_k.pdf (1. 4. 2010). 

49 

SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 33. 

50 

Ibid. 34. 

51 

Vgl.: Ibid. 35. BURLEIGH, Michael: Die Zeit des Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt am 

Main, 2000. 372. Profil: Issue No. 18, 28. April 1995. 62. 

52 


85

preoccupation with theory. The transition into an operational mode was 

already evidenced in Berlin, but most of it took place under Eichmann in 

Vienna. From the point of view of the officials in Berlin, Eichmann was the 

Vienna representative of II 112, and his principal tasks had not changed: 

surveillance of Jewish organizations, study of the enemy, and training other 

Nazi bodies in the correct understanding of the Jews. […] While the SD was 

looking for channels of operational activity, Eichmann found one, or perhaps, 

took advantage of the situation and created one. In the framework of a given 

direction of policy set by his superiors, he acted not as drab bureaucrat 

carrying out orders, but rather as a very diligent, very violent bureaucrat who 

was very successfully taking advantage of a fortuitous moment. His personal 

initiative was on such a scale that, even months later, his erstwhile colleagues 

in Berlin still did not understand how much he had changed. The importance of 

this point for our discussion cannot be exaggerated: what put Eichmann at 

center stage, and won him rapid promotion, was precisely his ability to 

perform on a plane higher than that of a drab bureaucrat.” 53 

Adoption of the „Vienna model” 

On 12th of November 1938, Göring invited to a conference into the Reich’s 

Aviation Museum. On this occasion Heydrich wanted to push through two of 

his claims: The establishment of a central office of Jewish emigration in Berlin 

(„Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung in Berlin”) and the takeover of the 

„Jewish policy” of the SD under his leadership. The „Vienna model” was 

recommended at that meeting in a number of points as a model for the entire 

Empire. Heydrich demands were met willingly, after the appalling functionality 

of the „Vienna model” has been introduced. 54 The central office was approved 

as the „Reichszentrale für jüdische Auswanderung” led by Heydrich and was 

underpinned by a legal decision of Göring on the 24 th of January 1939. In 

October 1939 Eichmann was appointed Head. 55 

The creation of the „Reich” won Heydrich and the SS, as planned, a senior 

position in relation to other instances of the state and the party. For that, they 

had an absolute right of say- and decision-making concerning the „Jewish 

policy”. In the policy towards Jews was thus the transition from a state of 

standards to a state of measures finally completed. 56 But with the nationwide 

53 

LOZOWICK, Yaacon: Hitler’s Bureaucrats. The Nazi security police and the banality 

of evil. Leicester, 2002. 38. Lozowick attempted here to demonstrate the initiatives of 

Eichmann clearly. 

54 

At the meeting, Heydrich presented the number of 50.000 Austrian Jews „edited” by the 

„Zentralstelle”, compared to 19.000 displaced German Jews from the Altreich. 

SMELSER/SYRING. 139. 

55 

HACHMEISTER, Lutz: Der Gegnerforscher. Die Karriere des SS-Führers Franz Alfred 

Six. München, 1998. 188. 

56 


86

adoption of the model it became clear, that the form of organization was just 

one of several factors that influenced the acceleration of the expulsion of the 

Jews. The central of the Reich was namely in terms of the numbers from 

Vienna, far behind the expectations of the Nazi leaders. 

It was quickly noticed, that in Vienna mainly through the pressure from the 

state police and the society, the „emigration figures” remained high. Here it 

becomes again evident in a sad way that the Austrians did not act according to 

the ideology of a German elite. Quite the reverse. The Nazis in the „Ostmark” 

had, as it is described by Safrian, those in the „Altreich” well ahead. 57 

Safrian summarizes the reasons of that „well” functioning model in that 

way: „The origin, structure, and „success” of the „Zentralstelle” can neither 

be oversimplified by crediting Eichmann’s organizational talents nor explained 

through the historic growth of bureaucracies and thus exclusively the work of 

technocrats of repression or planning. They can be understood only by 

including considerations of sociohistorical aspects. The example of the 

Ostmark in 1938 reveals to what extent a number of factors influenced each 

other. Specifically, there were the participation of many thousands of „Aryan” 

citizens, non-Jews of presumably „pure” Germanic ancestry, in racist policies, 

such policies and, conversely, the aggressive activities of institutions in the 

formulation of such policies and their conversion into political measures. In 

addition to ideological factors, another reason for the step-by-step 

radicalization of anti-Semitic policies is to be sought in „concrete material 

interests”.” 58 However, Eichmann and his men pretended that those numbers 

of the already fled Jews from Vienna were their work. In doing so, they 

justified their further careers in the Nazi power apparatus. 59 

From the „emigrations” to the deportations 

After German troops occupied Prague on the 15 th of March 1939 there was 

also set up a central office („Zentralstelle”) on 26 th of July 1939 following the 

Vienna example. It was also led by Eichmann, who became SS- 

Hauptsturmführer in the meanwhile. So another about 120.000 Jews came in 

the immediate Nazi sphere of influence. 60 After the Munich Agreement 

57 

SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 38: „Because of stronger pressure from below, Austrian 

pogrom antisemites’ forging ahead, and internal National Socialist squabbles about distribution of spoils, 

Nazi administrators and bureaucrats in Vienna felt pressured much earlier than their counterparts in the 

Altreich to devise pseudo-legal procedures and organizational innovations and to create new 

administrative machinery for handling these challenges. Moreover, these pressures would not lessen after 

1938: They provided the impetus for earlier organization of mass deportations from Vienna than from 

other cities of the Greater German Reich, and for their speedy completion by Fall 1942.” 

58 

Ibid. Eichmann’s Men. 15. 

59 

Ibid. 36-38. 

60 

LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator der 

„Endlösung”. Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 43. 

87

(„Münchner Abkommen”) and the imminent outbreak of World War II it was 

getting more and more difficult for Jewish refugees to get abroad, because most 

of the states closed their doors for them. 61 

In October 1939 Eichmann was transferred to Berlin and SS- 

Sturmbannführer Hans Günther took over the office in Prague, which for 

Heydrich was of secondary importance, because for him the expulsion from the 

Jews of the old Reich („Altreich”) had top priority. For this purpose he already 

had readily plans available. 62 

These plans, and here my work finally connects to our unifying topic, the 

Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, originated on the assumption to be, after the 

conquest and division of Poland which was sealed by this pact, in possession of 

territories, Central European Jews could be forcibly send to. The domination of 

the polish territories meant a sharp rise of Jews, living under direct German 

rule. Their number increased nearly sixfold to over 2 million. 63 

This plans, which would soon go under the name „Nisko project”, were 

from the very beginning on plans that were about the expulsion of Jews, and 

not about a settlement program of Eichmann, as it is often be said. Safrian 

speaks generally assumed that the invasion of Poland was accompanied by an 

increase in racist politics. This was also reflected in the demand of Hitler to 

carry out an expulsion and liquidation program („Vertreibungs- und 

Liquidierungsprogramm”) in the occupied territories of Poland. A so-called 

„völkisch-politsche Flurbereinigung” („ethnic-political clearing-up of land”), 

which was, according to Heydrich directed against the „Judaism, Intelligence, 

Clergy and Nobility” of Poland. 64 

Up to Hitler’s intention Poland should also have been divided into three 

stripes 65 . All Jews should be held in the territory between Vistula and Bug 66 , 

and in this way a „Jewish reservation” should arise according to the ideas of 

Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich and also Eichmann. 67 Such a „Jewish reservation” 

in the so-called „Generalgouvernement” could at this stage, according to 

Safrian, have been understood as the „Endziel” („ultimate goal”). 

In the SD-Main Office, however, deportations of Jews into the 

„Geralgouvernement” and a further „removal” across the German-Soviet 

border were approved by Hitler on the 21 st of September 1939, in the presence 

61 

YĀḤÎL, Lenî: Die Shoa. Überlebenskampf und Vernichtung der europäischen Juden. 

München, 1988. 176-179. 

62 

KNOPP: Helfer. 39. LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. 

Koordinator der „Endlösung”. Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 43-46. 

63 

RIPPER, Torsten: Vom Vorurteil zur Vernichtung. Hitler und die „Endlösung der 

Judenfrage”. Schwalbach/Ts., 2001. 40. 

64 


65 

After Poland had been split on the 28th of September 1939 between the Soviet Union and 

Hitler’s Germany, they agreed on the relocation of ethnic Germans from the Soviet-occupied zone. 

66 

DIETRICH, Adam Uwe: Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich. Düsseldorf, 1972. 249. 

67 

IRMTRUD, Wojak: Eichmanns Memoiren. Ein kritischer Essay. Frankfurt/M. 2001. 104-107. 

88

of Eichmann. For that Heydrich delivered a program, which had 4 aims: 68 1. 

Jews as soon as possible into cities and towns. 2. Jews from the Reich to 

Poland. 3. The remaining 30,000 Gypsies also to Poland. 4. Systematic 

transport of Jews from German territories in freight trains. 69 

On the 6 th of October 1939 Eichmann received the order from the leader of 

the office IV „Gegnerbekämpfung” („enemy combat”), which was part of the 

recently established Reichssicherheitshauptamt RSHA (Reich’s Security Main 

Office), to contact Gauleiter Wagner in Kattowitz. This meeting was about the 

deportation of about 70-80.000 Jews out of the district Kattowitz and the Jews 

out from the Czech-Polish border town Ostrava (Mährisch-Ostrau). Eichmann, 

who must have known about the plans of deportations since September 70 , 

immediately began to act and travelled between Berlin, Vienna, Ostrava, 

Katowice and Galicia to prepare everything. 

Stahlecker thought, that the „Judenfrage” („Jewish Question”) in Vienna 

would also been „endgültig gelöst” („finally solved”) during those expulsions. 

Those expressions, as well as „restlose Lösung der Judenfrage” („complete 

solution of the Jewish question”) are already very similar to the later, at the SS 

common term of the „Endlösung” („Final Solution”). But according to Safrian 

those terms still meant a full expulsion and no genocide at this stage. 71 

On the 15 th of October 1939 Eichmann reported from Ostrava, that the 

railway station of Nisko at the San would be the aim of the deportations. In the 

implementations of the deportations, Eichmann was given full backing of his 

superiors and a very large scope of action. Due to the pressure and initiatives of 

Eichmann, the first transport with more than 900 men left Ostrava already on 

the 18 th of October 1939. Two days after, a train with 912 men from Vienna 

followed. Those men had to be provided from the Jewish Community just as 

construction equipment, which was needed for the construction of a camp. 

Arrived at Nisko, after a cruel five hour walk, craftsmen were assigned to the 

camp, but the majority were chased over the German-Soviet border line under 

the use of guns. They were abandoned to their fate. 

„Test Run successful” 

The Nisko-Plan had barely begun, when the order came from above to stop 

the action. The removal of Jews were instructed to stop. 72 What were the 

reasons for the end? This question is answered in different ways. 

Burleigh lists the following causes: 1. The high transport capacity that was 

bound by it, that were needed by the Wehrmacht or for food shipments. 2. 

68 SAFRIAN, Hans: Eichmann’s Men. 48-49. 

69 Ibid. 49. 

70 Ibid. 51. 

71 Ibid. 52. 

72 Ibid. 56. 

89

Eichmann overused his powers, the action was too little thought-out and ended 

in chaos and not, as his superiors imagined, in a clean solution. 3. Due to the 

deportation of Jews from Vienna city, Katowice or Moravian-Ostrava has not 

solved the problem, where to put the ethnic German resettlers after the 

German-Soviet agreement of 28 September 1939, which arrived in this area. 73 

Burleigh but simultaneously underlines the technical feasibility of mass 

deportations. 74 

Christopher R. Browning is also of the opinion that the settlement of Baltic- 

Germans meant the end of the „Nisko plan”. 75 Peter Longerich agrees only in 

part. As Burleigh he also cites the settlement of „ethnic Germans” as the main 

reason for the stop, but he doesn’t doubt the organizational skills of Eichmann: 

„The improvised way, as the Nisko-action was carried out is not due to the 

inability of organizational Eichmann […] because the expulsion into an area 

that offered no sufficient conditions of existence, would have led within a short 

time to the death of large numbers of people and in the long run led to a 

process in which the surviving deportees would be through a combination of 

poor living conditions and a low birth rate has been sentenced to extinction. It 

was therefore the first variant of a comprehensive project for the „Final 

Solution”.” 76 

In contrast, Safrian sees the reason of the termination of the deportations in 

the lack of cooperation between SS, Wehrmacht and Reichsbahn: „The 

collapse of the far-reaching deportation plans was not the consequence of 

73 BURLEIGH: 670. Read in: LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der 

Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator der „Endlösung”. Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 50. In the original 

German translation: „Die hohen Transportkapazitäten die dadurch gebunden waren, die von 

Wehrmacht oder für Nahrungsmitteltransporte gebraucht wurden. Eichmann überstrapazierte 

seine Vollmachten, die Aktion war zu wenig durchdacht und endete im Chaos und nicht wie seine 

Vorgesetzten sich das vorgestellten in einer sauberen Lösung. Durch die Deportation von 

städtischen Juden aus Wien, Kattowitz oder Mährisch-ostrau wurde das Problem nicht gelöst, 

wo man die volksdeutschen Aussiedler die nach dem deutsch-sowjetischen Abkommen vom 28. 

September 1939 in diesem Gebiet eintrafen unterbringen sollte.” 

74 BURLEIGH: 669-671. Read in: LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der 

Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator der „Endlösung”. Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 51. 

75 BROWNING, Christopher: Der Weg zur „Endlösung”. Entscheidungen und Täter. Bonn, 

1998. 19. Read in: LEGENSTEIN, Roland: Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator 

der „Endlösung”. Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 51. 

76 LONGERICH, Peter: Politik der Vernichtung. Eine Gesamtdarstellung der 

nationalsozialistischen Judenverfolgung. München, 1998. 260. Read in: LEGENSTEIN, Roland: 

Adolf Eichmann - der Schreibtischtäter. Koordinator der „Endlösung”. Dipl.-Arb., Wien, 2002. 51. In 

the original: „Die improvisierte Art und Weise, wie die Nisko-Aktion durchgeführt wurde, ist 

keineswegs auf das organisatorische Unvermögen Eichmanns zurückzuführen […] denn diese 

Vertreibung in ein Gebiet, das keinerlei ausreichende Existenzbedingungen bot, hätte innerhalb kurzer 

Zeit den Tod einer großen Zahl von Menschen zur Folge gehabt und hätte langfristig zu einem Prozeß 

geführt, in dem die überlebenden Deportierten durch die Kombination von unzureichenden 

Lebensbedingungen und einer niedrigen Geburtenrate zum Aussterben verurteil worden wären. Es 

handelte sich demnach um die erste Variante eines umfassenden Projekts zur „Endlösung”.” 

90

esistance […] but of logistics. Not enough trains were available, and 

Wehrmacht transports had priority. Lack of cooperation among the SS, 

Wehrmacht, and Reichsbahn also inhibited the fledging deportation machinery. 

It faltered, then came to a standstill, because its cogs did not yet mesh.” 77 

Why the preliminary failure still represents a successful test run, Hans Safrian 

explains in that way: „Eichmann’s superiors had reason to be satisfied with his 

activities. He had gone into high gear; he and his apparatus had taken the 

initiative within the parameters of the assigned task. They had succeeded in tearing 

thousands of people from their moorings without attracting undue attention, 

fooling them with fraudulent tales of retraining camps and „free settlement”, and 

manoeuvring them into a transit camp in Galicia or, more accurately, driving them 

across the German-Soviet line of demarcation. By accomplishing all that, in the 

eyes of their SS superiors Eichmann and his men had gained status as skilful 

organizers and so had qualified themselves to carry out further, even more 

ambitious assignments. They were ready to climb the next rung of the career 

ladder. Just a few weeks after the failure of additional deportations to Nisko, 

Eichmann was appointed head of RSHA Referat IV D 4”. 78 

Conclusion 

The role of Eichmann in the NS-apparatus and his own initiatives in the 

different phases of the Holocaust may be matters of discussion in literature. 

Nevertheless, after the cancelled Nisko-plan, Eichmann was at the peak of his 

career as head of the Referat IV D 4, which was later transformed into IV B 4 

responsible for eviction matters and Reich Central Office for Jewish 

Emigration. He was then responsible for the deportation of Jews from the entire 

Reich. He coordinated all the transportation, and was responsible for the 

observance of timetables and load factor of the trains. 

Plans for Jewish reservations still remained in the early stages, but since the 

beginning of the German war against the Soviet Union in 1941, the racist 

policies entered a new phase. Eichmann and his unit were directly involved in 

the process of gradual transition from a policy of spoliation, expulsion and 

ghettoization towards organized destruction of human beings. 79 As an organizer 

of the transports Eichmann should later be directly responsible not only for the 

dispossession and deportation but also the extermination of the European Jews. 


78 Ibid. 57. 

79 Ibid. 59-71. 

91

Roesch, Claudia 

Spain as a battlefield of ideologies – The Changes of International 

Alliances due to the Spanish Civil War 1936 – 1939 1 

The Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939 has been analysed by scholars in 

several dimensions: the internal Spanish issues that caused the war, the artistic 

dimension that brought about famous works of art like Pablo Picasso's Guernica or 

Ernest Hemingway's For whom the Bell Tolls, the military dimension, which 

includes the testing of new strategies and the concept of total war, and the 

international dimension, which often is interpreted as a prelude to the Second 

World War. The last interpretation, which is contested among scholars, 2 is based 

on the fact that all major European powers which took part in World War Two 

were already involved in the international debates surrounding the Spanish Civil 

War. These international powers can be seen as representatives of the three great 

ideologies of the twentieth century: liberalism, fascism and communism. In the 

international sphere, it is obvious that Britain and France, who chose to be 

neutral in the context of the Spanish conflict, represent liberalism, Nazi Germany 

and Italy incorporate fascism 3 and the Soviet Union stands for communism. 

In the internal context of the Spanish political sphere, neither ideology has a 

clear representation: Stanley Payne notes that in the beginning of the coup d'état 

Francisco Franco and his Falange were not fascists but a mix of militarists, 

monarchists and conservatives, who only became fascists during the course of 

the war. 4 The Partido Socialista Obrero Española (PSOE), which was the party of 

Prime Minister Francisco Largo Caballero and President Manuel Azaña, should 

have been the protector of the liberal democratic Spanish Republic but drifted far 

more to the left than socialists in other Western European countries. Meanwhile, 

the communist PCE shifted to the centre of the political sphere after the VII. 

Comintern Congress by protecting private property and forming alliances with 

bourgeois parties in the Popular Front government. 

Even though neither of those parties is identifiable with one ideology in its 

pure form, they were perceived as representatives of fascism, communism and 

liberalism by the international press and foreign governments. For example, the 

1 

This paper is based on my master thesis „Spanien kämpft für uns” Die Bedeutung des 

Spanischen Bürgerkriegs für die deutsche Linke im Exil, Berlin 2009, unpublished. 

2 

UHL, Michael: Mythos Spanien. Das Erbe der Internationalen Brigaden in der DDR. 

Dietz, Bonn, 2004. 37. 

3 

Keeping in mind the differences between Adolf Hitler's Nazi regime in Germany and 

Benito Mussolini's fascist regime in Italy, for example in the question of Anti-Semitism, both 

countries will be treated as representatives of fascism, since they were perceived as such by 

contemporaries of the 1930s. 

4 

PAYNE, Stanley G.: Los Orígenes de la Guerra Civil Española. In: Revisión de la Guerra 

Civil Española. DE MENDOZA, Bullón, TOGORES, Alfonso and Luis Eugenio (ed.). Actas 

Edición, Madrid, 2002. 28. 

93

British government refused to give support to the Spanish Popular Front 

government because of the participation of the PCE, since it was feared that the 

party planned to construct a Bolshevik state in Spain. 

The intention of this article is to show how the international alliances were 

changed due to the involvement of European powers in the Spanish Civil War and 

finally lead to the Molotov-Rippentrop pact in September 1939. Therefore, I will 

analyse the international dimensions of six key events and show how they changed 

political alliances in the international domain. Those key events are the outbreak of 

the war on July 17/18, 1936, the installation of the International Brigades in 

October 1936, the bombing of Guernica on April 27 th , 1937, the so called May 

Events in Barcelona 1937, the withdrawal of all foreign troops in October 1938 and 

the speech of Manuel Azaña in the end of the war in 1939. 

The military coup, which was headed by General Francisco Franco on the 

Canary Islands on July 17, 1936 and was translated to the Spanish mainland 

one day later, started the Spanish Civil War. In reaction to the coup, anarchist 

groups in Catalonia and Aragón declared the outbreak of a revolution and 

collectivised factories and farms, while their owners fled to the territory 

occupied by the Nationalist insurgents. Enrique Moradiellos notes that the 

international dimension of this conflict set in one week later, on July 25, 1936 

because all major international newspapers started to write about this event on 

that day. 5 This marks the beginning of an international discourse about the 

events in Spain whose main participants were the governments of liberal 

countries, the left and right wing press, German and Italian exile communities 

and international political networks such as the LSI and Comintern. 

The French Popular Front government under Léon Blum reacted to the coup 

d'état by first lending support to the Frente Popular against the insurgents. But, due 

to internal pressure from French right wings parties, the government had to 

withdraw its support, fearing that a similar coup might take place in France. 

Instead, Léon Blum designed the policy of international non-intervention: all 

European countries would join an international committee to control that neither 

the Republicans nor the Nationalists in Spain received foreign aid. The French 

initiative was motivated by the attempt to help the Spanish Republic by cutting off 

supplies for the nationalist insurgents. It was believed in the first days of the war 

that the Republic would be strong enough to win the conflict, if the insurgents did 

not get any more support from Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany. 6 

Léon Blum passed on the idea to the allied British government, who took 

over the initiative to found the Non-Intervention Committee (NIC). But the 

conservative government under Stanley Baldwin did not share the French 

interest in helping the Spanish Republic, it rather sympathized with the 

5 MORADIELLOS, Enrique: El reñidero de Europa. Las dimensiones internacionales de la 

guerra civil española. Península, Barcelona, 2001. 19. 

6 KNOLL, Viktor: Zur Vorgeschichte des Abkommens über Nichteinmischung in Spanien 

1936. In: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 35 (1987) No. 1, 25. 

94

Nationalist insurgents because the Popular Front government and the 

revolutionary councils in Catalonia and Aragón were considered a threat to 

British business interests in Spain. 7 Germany and Italy were able to remain in 

the NIC despite continuing their support the Spanish Nationalists, which turned 

the whole committee into a farce. 8 In the end, the NIC proved to be ineffective 

in curbing foreign support to the fighting parties in Spain: German and Italian 

aid to the Nationalists was increased and the Soviet Union was the only 

European power, which sold arms to the Republic. 

The common support of the Spanish Nationalists is often considered to be the 

starting point of the axis Berlin-Rome: in the international press, it was soon 

known that Mussolini and Hitler supported Franco because Italian air planes 

loaded with supplies for Spain crashed in the Mediterranean Sea and documents of 

an assumed collaboration between the insurgents and the NSDAP were found in 

the revolutionary Barcelona. Those findings were quickly published in the 

international leftist press, such as the German social-democrats in exile (SoPaDe) 

paper Neuer Vorwärts. 9 Because of that, leftists all over Europe started to consider 

Franco a puppet of Hitler and Mussolini 10 and believed that the coup d'état had 

been planned by an international conspiracy of fascism, 11 a theory that was first 

published by the Soviet journal Pravda on August 1, 1936. 12 

Not only did the European leftist networks believe in an international union of 

fascism, also Benito Mussolini made allusions in that direction. In a speech given 

on November 1, 1936 he termed the expression „axis powers” 13 while speaking 

about the friendship of Germany and Italy, which started with the common 

support of the Spanish Nationalists. Before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil 

War, the relations between the two countries had not been the best due to 

Mussolini's fears that Hitler's aspirations for Austria would endanger his claim 

for South Tirol. However, shortly after the joint support for Franco, an agreement 

in this question was reached, so that historians consider the collaboration of the 

two regimes in Spain as the beginning of the axis Berlin-Rome. 14 

The Soviet Union was the only European power that supported the Spanish 

Republic by selling weapons and by creating the International Brigades, whose 

7 BERNECKE, Walter L.: Krieg in Spanien 1936-1939. Primus, Darmstadt, 1991. 84. 

8 VILAR, Pierre: Der Spanische Bürgerkrieg 1936-1939. Wagenbach, Berlin, 2005. 35. 

9 Neuer Vorwärts 165. 1936 (09.08.1936) 2. 

10 ZUR MÜHLEN, Patrik von: Spanien war ihre Hoffnung. Deutsche Linke im Spanischen 

Bürgerkrieg 1936 bis 1939. Neue Gesellschaft, Bonn, 1983. 128. 

11 ANONYMOUS: „Spanien lehrt: Internationale Verschwörung des Faschismus 

gegen Demokratie und Frieden- Schafft die Friedens-Weltfront”, in: DVZ 1.21 

(09.09.1936), 3. 

12 CARR, E.H.: The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War. Macmillan, London, 1984. 16. 

13 SCHAUFF, Frank: Der verspielte Sieg. Sowjetunion, Kommunistische Internationale und 

Spanischer Bürgerkrieg 1936-1939. Campus, Frankfurt am Main, 2004. 49-50. 



95

ole in the defence of Madrid in November 1936 was considered to be essential. 15 

These troops were formed by the Comintern in September 1936 and consisted of 

communists, socialists and independent leftists from all over Europe and the 

United States. They were recruited by the French PCF and financed by Soviet 

money. However, the International Brigades were explicitly dissolved from any 

political movement and their goal was to defend Spanish democracy and freedom 

in general against fascist aggression. 16 The motivations for the volunteers to 

leave their home countries and join the Republican side in Spain were several: 

many claimed to fight for their ideology or for freedom, while the definitions of 

freedom differed within the political spheres. Others were motivated by a strive 

for personal heroism, while recruits from Germany and Italy in exile hoped to 

initiate the defeat of fascism in their home countries by beating the axis forces in 

Spain. Also, they tried to escape loneliness and boredom in exile by being 

integrated in the international troops. 17 Even though the brigades declared 

themselves independent of any political movement, communist party members 

dominated. It is estimated that 60% of the Interbrigadistas were communists. 18 

Internationally, the Brigades were perceived as Stalin's personal army, an 

expression that sometimes is still found in secondary literature today. 19 

Especially, reports about secret service activities in the Brigades shed a bad light 

on the Soviet and international leadership and made many liberal leftists doubt 

that communism would offer the freedom that they aspired. Many leaders of the 

International Brigades continued their political careers and gained leading 

positions in communist regimes after 1945, such as Walter Ulbricht and Erich 

Mielke in GDR and Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslavia. 

The Soviet support of the Spanish Civil War has always been criticized as 

being only half-hearted because hardly any Soviet soldiers were involved in the 

International Brigades and the weapons sold to the Republic were outdated. It 

can be assumed that this was due to the fact that Stalin feared an attack by 

Germany and did not want to weaken his forces in an attempt to help the 

Spanish. Also, Stalin did not pursuit to create a Soviet republic in the parts of 

Spain controlled by his brigades because he did not want to alienate the British 

and French government. 20 Instead, he was seeking an alliance with them 

15 SCHWARTZ, Stephen: The Spanish Civil War in Historical Context. In: Critique, Journal 

of Socialist Theory 32-33 (2000), 149. 

16 CASTELLS, Andreu: Las Brigadas Internacionales de la guerra de España. Ariel, 

Barcelona, 1974. 93. 

17 McLELLAN, Josie: ‚I Wanted to be a Little Lenin’: Ideology and the German 

International Brigade Volunteers. In: Journal of Contemporary History 41 (2006) No. 2, 293. 

18 SCHWARTZ, Fernando: La Internacionalización de la Guerra Civil Española. Ariel, 

Barcelona, 1999. 203. 

19 SCHWARTZ, Stephen: The Spanish Civil War in Historical Context. In: Critique, Journal 

of Socialist Theory 32-33 (2000), 151. 


Spanischer Bürgerkrieg 1936-1939. Campus, Frankfurt am Main, 2004. 20. 

96

against Germany and Italy trying to show that fascism was a greater danger to 

European peace than communism. 

While Stalin did not want to risk a division with Britain and France over 

Spain, those two countries were not willing to wage a war over a country that 

was perceived as backward and on the periphery of Europe. 21 Nevertheless, 

large parts of the population in these liberal democracies were appalled by the 

Appeasement Policy. The reason for this was the practise of the German 

Luftwaffe to test new tactics of bombing open cities, which culminated in the 

bombing of the Basque city of Guernica on April 27 th , 1937. 

The bombing of Guernica was not the first bombardment of an open city 

risking large numbers of civilian victims. Already in November 1936 the Madrid 

suburb Getafe had been attacked by the Legion Condor and in March 1937 the 

monastery of Durango was bombed. But Guernica became a worldwide symbol 

of the atrocities of modern warfare because international journalists happened to 

come to the city four hours after the bombing and send reports about the killing 

and destruction to the British newspapers Times and Daily Express. 22 Together 

with Pablo Picasso's famous painting that was shown to the public on June 17, 

1937, these articles helped to shape the symbolic meaning of Guernica as a 

warning of the atrocities of war in general. Ian Patterson referred to the atrocities 

of the bomb war as a „propaganda gift” 23 for the Republican side, because soon 

posters appeared in cities in France, Netherlands and Britain showing pictures of 

childhood victims of the bombing of Madrid with the English and French 

captions „If you tolerate this, your children will be next” and „What are you 

doing to prevent this / Que fais-tu pour empêcher cela?” 24 As the language of the 

slogans shows, those posters were directed to the British and French public. Their 

message was to show the atrocities of war to a Western audience and to admonish 

them against the dangers of fascist aggression. The intention of the posters was to 

mobilize the public in these democratic countries to put pressure on their 

governments to change the Appeasement Policy and give support to the Spanish 

Republic. The posters argued that fascist expansionism had to be stopped in 

Spain or else other European cities might be the next to be bombed and British or 

French children would be the next victims. 

But the British and French government did not change their policy and 

about a week after the bombing of Guernica events took place that made the 

21 

PRESTON, Paul: El contexto Europeo y Las Brigadas Internacionales. In: GALLEGO, 

Requena, LOSA, Manuel und Sepúlveda, MARIA, Rosa: Las Brigadas Internacionales. El 

Contexto internacional, los Medios de Propaganda, Literatura y Memorias. Ediciones le la 

Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, Cuenca, 2003. 15. 

22 

SHELMERDINE, Brian: British Representations of the Spanish Civil War. Manchester 

University Press, Manchester-New York, 2006. 168. 

23 

PATTERSON, Ian: Guernica and Total War. Harvard University Press, Cambridge-Mass.- 

London, 2007. 15. 

24 

LEFEBVRE, Michel, SKOUTELSKY, Rémi: Les Brigades Internationales. Images 

Retrouvées, Seuil, Paris, 2003. 77. 

97

public doubt the democratic idea of the Spanish Republican government: from 

May 2 till 7, 1937 riots broke out in Barcelona, the city that was furthest away 

from the front. The fighting took place between anarchists and communist 

controlled police forces after the police forces had tried to regain control over 

the telephone exchange, which was controlled by an anarchist council since the 

outbreak of revolution. The fights continued for several days until the leaders 

of the anarchist labour union CNT summoned their affiliates to lay down their 

weapons. After the so called „civil war within a civil war,” 25 communists 

blamed the ultra-leftist Partido Obrera de Unificaón Marxista (POUM), who 

had been fighting on the side of the anarchists. The POUM was considered to 

be Trotskyist because one of their leaders had met with Leon Trotsky in the 

1920s. 26 The PCE justified persecution of the POUM leaders by accusing all 

alleged Trotskyists of being fascist spies. The statement of Leon Trotsky that he 

doubted whether the Spanish working class would be strong enough to win the 

war was interpreted by communists as a proof of Trotsky's support for Franco. 27 

These events were internationally seen in the context of the Moscow trials 

against supporters of Trotsky and and it is assumed that the order to eliminate 

the leaders of the POUM was given by Moscow. 28 The May Events were thus 

interpreted as a proof of the danger of Soviet influence in Spain. Due to the 

unfair trials in Moscow and Barcelona, communist party members like Willi 

Münzenberg and independent leftists like Leopold Schwarzschild broke with 

communism and started to consider the Stalinist regime as totalitarian as the 

Nazi regime or Italian fascism. 29 For conservative and liberal observers, 

fascism now presented itself as the lesser evil because it preserved private 

property and commercial interests in Spain while both ideologies persecuted 

dissidents and denied freedom of speech in the same fashion. 

In the following 15 months, the European powers negotiated the withdrawal 

of foreign troops from Spain. The NIC had become more and more of a farce 

because it was obvious for all participants that Germany and Italy continued to 

supply arms and troops to the nationalist side. With the aid of the axis countries, 

Franco's troops had managed to conquer the whole northern part of Spain and 

reached the Mediterranean coast, splitting the Republican territory in two parts. 

Under these military circumstances in autumn of 1938, it was only a question of 

time until the Spanish Republic would be defeated. Only then did the German 

25 

SCHAUFF, Frank: Der verspielte Sieg. Sowjetunion, Kommunistische Internationale und 


26 

GRAHAM, Helen: The Spanish Republic at War 1936-1939. Cambidge University Press, 

Cambridge, 2002. 288. 

27 

ANONYMOUS: „Trotzki für Franco”, in: DVZ 2.10 (07.03.1937), 4. 

28 

KNETSCH, Gabriele: Der Bruderkampf der Linken. Die republikanische Parteipresse im 

Spanischen Bürgerkrieg. In: Tranvia 41 (1996), 18. 

29 

JASPER, Willi: Hotel Lutetia. Ein deutsches Exil in Paris. Hanser, Munich and Vienna, 

1994. 110.; BACHMANN, Jörg J.: Zwischen Paris und Moskau. Deutsche bürgerliche 

Linksintellektuelle und die stalinistische Sowjetunion 1933-1939. Palatium, Mannheim, 1995. 34. 

98

and Italian governments agree to the withdrawal of all international troops from 

Spanish soil: the Legion Condor and Italian Corpo Truppe Volontarie from the 

Nationalist side, and the International Brigades from the Republican side. This 

agreement was reached a few days after the the signing of the Munich Agreement 

on September 30, 1938 and left the Spanish Republicans under the impression 

that they were let down by the international community in the same way as 

Czechoslovakia. In a speech at the League of Nations the Spanish Republican 

foreign minister Julio Álvarez del Vayo tried one last time to appeal to the 

international community and remind them of the danger of expanding fascism, 

but the agreement in the NIC over Spain and the Munich Agreement made it 

obvious that the League of Nations had failed to preserve peace in Europe and 

was replaced by bi- and multi-lateral agreements among the different states. 30 

After the latest rejection to help the Spanish Republic and the Munich 

Agreement, Spanish and international leftist commentators were only concerned 

with one question: which country will be the next to be swapped by the fascist 

aggression? Most commentators believed that France would be the next target, as 

a contemporary cartoon illustrates: it shows a German and an Italian soldier 

marching from the destroyed Spain over the Pyrenees to France following an air 

plane dropping bombs on the Eiffel Tower. 31 Also Poland and the Soviet Union 

were discussed as being the next potential targets, leaving Stalin discomforted 

and after the Munich Agreement without an ally to count on. 32 

On April 1, 1939 General Franco officially declared the Spanish Civil War to be 

over and the Nationalists to be the winners. Shortly before that date, the Republican 

president Manuel Azaña had declared in a speech to the international public what 

were the reasons for the defeat of the Spanish Republic: the first and most important 

reason for the loss, according to Azaña, was the reaction of the British government in 

initiating a non-intervention policy that actually helped the Nationalists. The second 

reason was the conflict within the Republican zone between communists and 

independent leftist groups that weakened the defence. As a third factor, Azaña gave 

the military support of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy to the National side. Franco's 

own military power and strategy was only ranked as forth and least decisive element 

in the defeat of the Spanish Republic. 33 Therefore, all three major reasons for the loss 

of the Spanish Republic can be seen in the international dimension of the war. Since 

scholars agree that the fear of communism was the main motivation behind the 

British policy towards the Spanish republic and the communists are blamed for the 

escalation of the May Events in Barcelona and consequent political witch-hunts, 

communists are connected to the two main reasons given for the loss of the 

30 ANONYMOUS: „Von den spanischen Fronten”. In: DVZ 3.39 (25.09.1938), 6. 

31 ANONYMOUS: „Der neue Marsch”. In: Neuer Vorwärts 246 (06.03.1938), B1. 



33 Ouoted from: COLLADO SEIDEL, Carlos: Der Spanische Bürgerkrieg, Geschichte eines 

europäischen Konflikts. Beck, München, 2006. 164. 

99

Republicans. In the refugee camps in Southern France, where Spanish Republicans 

and German Interbrigadistas were placed in the spring of 1939, attempts to reunite 

the leftist forces against fascism failed because socialists, as well as ultra-leftist and 

liberals blamed the communists at least partially for the defeat of the Spanish 

Republic. 34 Therefore, the communists were isolated in the leftist sphere of politics. 

This isolation reflected the isolation that Stalin found himself in after the 

Munich Agreement and the end of the Spanish Civil War. Because of this isolation, 

it is generally agreed, that the experience of the Non-Intervention farce in Spain 

and the Munich Agreement made Stalin conclude that the Soviet Union would not 

receive support by the Western Democracies in case of a German attack. 35 So, he 

tried to break the Soviet isolation by seeking a pact with Germany. This was the 

origin of the Molotov-Rippentrop pact concluded on August 24, 1939. 36 

Therefore, it can be concluded that the Spanish Civil War was in fact a 

prelude to the Molotov-Rippentrop pact and World War Two: already the 

international reaction to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War showed that the 

British government was more concerned about the spread of communism than 

about the expansion of fascism and the French were not able to help the Spanish 

due to internal pressures directed against communism. The formation of the 

International Brigades can be seen as an attempt of the Soviet Union to reduce 

international fears of communism by making them an explicitly non-ideological 

troop and by protecting private property in the republican zone. The bombing of 

Guernica raised fears against fascism in the public opinion of the Western 

countries. But the public was not able to shift their governments' policies because 

soon after the bombing the reaction of the Spanish communists to the Barcelona 

May Events and the connection drawn between the persecution of the POUM 

and the Moscow trials again discredited communism in the liberal countries. The 

Munich Agreement and the NIC made it obvious that the liberal countries France 

and Great Britain were not interested in curbing the expansion of fascism or 

waging a war over the ČSR or Spain, and therefore would also not enter a war to 

defend the communist Soviet Union. This and the general blame on communists 

for the Spanish Civil War displayed the international isolation that the Soviet 

Union was trapped in the beginning of 1939. Therefore, Stalin made the attempt 

to break this isolation by forming a non-aggression pact with the rival, who he 

feared the most: Nazi Germany. This makes the Spanish Civil War a prelude to 

the Molotov-Rippentrop pact. Of course, it can be argued, as Eric Hobsbawm 

34 MALLMANN, Klaus-Michael: „Kreuzritter des antifaschistischen Mysteriums”. Zur 

Erfahrungsperspektive des Spanischen Bürgerkrieges. In: GREBING, Helga, CHRISTL, Wickert 

(Hg.). Das „andere Deutschland” im Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Beiträge zur 

politischen Überwindung der nationalsozialistischen Diktatur im Exil und im Dritten Reich. 

Klartext, Essen, 1994. 47. 





100

does, 37 that World War Two would have even broken out without the conflict in 

Spain but this belongs to „what-if” history and the facts that I presented in my 

article clearly show that there is a direct line between the reactions of the 

European powers to the Spanish Civil War and the Hitler-Molotov pact, which 

serves as prelude to the attack on Poland on September 1, 1939. 

37 

HOBSBAWM, Eric: Das Zeitalter der Extreme. Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. 

DTB, Munich, 2007. 202. 

101

102

Kałan, Dariusz 

The Ukrainian Question in German Foreign Policy 

(March 1938 - September 1939) 

Ukraine has played a great role in German political thought since at least 

18 th century. In the complex of common projects, the essential issue was the 

image of Ukraine as a path to Russia. Writers, politicians and historians, such 

as Theodor Schiemann, Friedrich Naumann or Paul Rohrbach, the author of 

often-quoted maxim „who reigns in Kiev, reigns in Moscow” 1 , were convinced 

that the capture of Ukraine will become the grounds for economic and political 

crash of Russian Empire. 

However, the revival of folkish ideology in the early 1920s along with a 

new geopolitical conceptions designed by Friedrich Ratzel and popularized by 

Karl Haushofer allowed the role of Ukraine itself to be identified and valued. 

Haushofer, a professor of the University of Munich and creator of theoretical 

background of Adolf Hitler’s foreign policy, directed the German geopolitical 

expansion eastward. In his opinion there was a need to search for so-called 

„living space” (Lebensraum) for Germany due to its rise to greater prominence 

in Europe. Ukraine, abounded with fecund soils and numerous of raw 

materials, full of wild unspoiled landscapes, has been considered the perfect 

place for German colonization. Hence, during the 1930s Nazis didn’t lose sight 

of Ukraine as the crucial facet of all the variations of their eastern policy 

projects. The most audacious one, created by Richard Darré in 1932, assumed a 

German leadership role in the territories from Finland in the north through 

Poland, Ukraine, Hungary and Balkans to Georgia in the south 2 . 

Though Hitler did not mention Ukraine itself in an exposition of his political 

ideology in „Mein Kampf”, he clearly knew that Ukraine is crucial for 

Lebensraum to be successfully implemented. Hermann Rauschning, the author 

of „Hitler Speaks”, cited the Poland-related conversation with Führer from 

1934. Rauschning had suggested that Polish government would take back some 

selected western territories bordering with Germany, but in return should be 

given soils located at the Baltic Sea (Lithuania) and at the Black Sea (Ukraine). 

After Hitler carefully analyzed this proposal he finally declared: „These 

gentlemen will have to Ukraine slip their mind” 3 . Obviously, this short 

statement is nothing like how Ukraine was described during the World War II. 

Four months after the Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union Hitler wrote: 

„There is no country that can be to larger extent autarkic than Europe will be. 

Where is there a region capable of supplying iron of the quality of Ukrainian 

1 

WILSON, Andrew. Ukraińcy. Translated by Marek Urbański. Warszawa, 1992. 306. 

2 

RAUSCHNING, Hermann: Rozmowy z Hitlerem. Translated by Ryszard Turczyn. 

Warszawa, 1994. 44. 

3 

Ibidem, 130. 

103

iron? Where can one find more nickel, more coal, more manganese, more 

molybdenum? Ukraine is the source of manganese to which even America goes 

for its supplies. And, on top of that, so many other possibilities! The vegetable 

oils, the heave plantations to be organized. With 100,000 acres devoted to the 

growing of rubber, our needs are covered”. 4 

Among reasons which Hitler was given to explain eastern territorial 

expansion was also strong racial attitude and memories of German control over 

Ukraine in 1918 5 . That experience reinforced his belief that the Ukrainians are 

precarious and untrustworthy allies, almost bolshevists, and even the 

Belarusians were much more prized by him 6 . In the final analysis, Nazi view of 

Ukraine, that so-called „new Indian Empire” 7 , was affected by both the image 

of unused economic potential, which includes Ukraine’s considerably role in 

petroleum transit from Caucasus, and Hitler’s immense contempt for Slavs 

living there, who were find incapable of efficient self-organization. According 

to Nazi ideology Slavs were directly created to either the post of labor force or 

just to undertake diversionary actions against the Soviet Union. 

Surprisingly, Germany enjoyed respect in Ukraine. The issue that inflamed 

pro-German attitude of Ukrainian independence movement in general was in 

fact experience of World War I, namely German intervention in 1918 and 

proclamation the Hetmanate by Pavlo Skoropadskyi. That short period bore no 

resemblance to the bolshevists repressions of that time. On the contrary, the 

German occupation resulted in relative restoration of economic institutions as 

well as comparative political stability. 8 Many Ukrainians pointed to the rise of 

chaos after backdown of the German army in November 1918 as cautionary 

tales of what can happen without their protection. The Germans were very 

often declared to be exponents of higher civilization and counterbalance for the 

wild Russians. Therefore, in the 1920s it was Berlin that has became an 

important centre of Ukrainian emigration. 

Moreover, the Ukrainians found it prudent to cooperate with Germans 

during the 1930s 9 because of mutual resentment. Both Germany and Ukraine 

4 Bormann-Vermerke. cz. I (tzw. „gawędy domowe” Hitlera z lat 1941-1944). In: 

ZABOROWSKI, Jan (ed.): „Generalplan Ost”. Koncepcje i plany polityki wschodniej Adolfa 

Hitlera (wybór tekstów). Warszawa, 1997. 107. 

5 HRYCAK, Jaroslav: Tezy do dyskusji o UPA. In: Idem. Nowa Ukraina. Nowe interpretacje. 

Wrocław, 2002. 92. 

6 HITLER, Adolf: Rozmowy przy stole 1941-1944. Charyzma 1996. 88. 

7 Bormann-Vermerke, cz. I…, 110. 

8 MEDRECKI, Włodzimierz. Niemiecka interwencja na Ukrainie w 1918 roku. Warszawa, 

2000. 306-307. 

9 Although Ukrainian nationalists have kept in touch with NSDAP since 1921, their mutual 

relations developed during next decade, especially when Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933. 

Hitler put the Ukrainians to use in undertaking diversionary actions against the USSR and in 

forming intelligence network in East Europe and Balkans. The cooperation was much strengthened 

in 1933, when in Munich Ukrainian National Federation (UNO) was designed. UNO was formally 

liable for caring for the Ukrainians living in Germany, but its authorities was totally subordinated to 

104

were remarkably dissatisfied with the new world order to be imposed in 

Versailles. For Ukraine lack of international support at the conference cost of 

losing dreams about its own statehood. 10 Ukrainian territory has been divided 

into four countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Soviet Union. 

Indeed, the Ukrainians demanding revision of the borders had much in 

common with German National Socialist Movement. 

The introduce of a German territorial expansion had a great impact on the 

Ukrainian question. The annexation of Austria in March 1938 as well as 

favorable results of the Munich Conference six month later, led Germany to 

facing with territorial claims of other nations, which were encouraged by the 

silent acquiescence of the Western powers in Munich. The object of interest of 

Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Ukraine was Czechoslovakia, yet greatly 

weakened by losing Sudetenland. In late autumn of 1938 partition of 

Czechoslovakia was carried on: backed by Hitler Slovakia declared autonomy, 

Poland regained Zaolzie and Hungary started an occupation border areas in 

accordance with the First Vienna Award. 

Soon after the implementation of Munich Agreement also Rusyns living in 

Carpathian Ruthenia seized their opportunity and declared autonomy within 

Czechoslovakia. Who were they? In interwar period they had succeeded in 

having cultural, language and political freedoms. Those concessions would 

enable them to have their own national clerisy. 11 Likewise Ukrainians from the 

other side of Carpathian mountains, they were also permeated by independence 

thought. The issues of the proclamation of autonomy in October 1938, 

formation of the government by pro-Ukrainian Avgustyn Voloshyn and 

creation of the military organization named Carpathian Sich, swiftly raised 

hope for unification of all Ukrainian territories. Carpathian Ruthenia 

(Carpatho-Ukraine) started to be identified as „Ukraine’s Piedmont”. 

Germans did their best to support Ukrainian hopes, mostly unofficially. 

They not only did not object to the autonomy but also in accordance with an 

economic agreement of 7 December 1938 they increased the food and wood 

supply and pledged infrastructure investment in Carpatho-Ukraine 12 . The 

person in the German government who made the recommendation that 

Germany should seek to back up efforts of the Ukrainians was the Minister of 

Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop. The Ribbentrop’s view was nicely 

summarized by his Italian colleague and counterpart, Galleazzo Ciano. 

Nazis. Contacts between the Germans and Ukrainian nationalists in Ukraine were maintained 

unofficially (by the agency of Riko Jarij) because the Germans were afraid of taking consequences 

of the OUN’s activity, which was becoming more and more extremist. TORECZKI, Roman: 

Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy (1933-1945). Warszawa, 1972. 119-125. 

10 Lack of international support is the main reason for failure of Ukrainian revolution 1914- 

1923 according to Jaroslav Hrycak. HRYCAK, Jaroslav: Nowa Ukraina. Nowe interpretacje. 

Wrocław, 2002. 75-76. 

11 O. Subtelny. Ukraine: A History. Toronto 1994, p. 448-449. 

12 TORECZKI, Roman: Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy (1933-1945). Warszawa, 1972. 166. 

105

According to his diaries, the main reason of Ribbentrop’s attitude was anger 

with Hungarian attempts of imperial policy 13 . In January 1939 at the closed 

meeting with German generals he presented his vision of the future fate of 

Ukraine. He said: „The Ukrainian question allows us coup de grace of Poland as 

well as the USSR to be inflicted. Taking everything into consideration, we can 

carry on implementing the ideological purpose of our eastern policy, which is to 

create „Great Ukraine” consisting of all ethnographic Ukrainian territories in 

the USSR, Poland and Transcarpathia. (…) Obviously, this country will survive 

only thanks to unconditional devotion to Germany. The division of Poland and 

the USSR will result in the augmentation of our activity in the east and finally 

make us to rule according to the maxim „divide et impera”. We are aware that 

the first step to bring it off is „Carpatho-Ukraine” 14 . 

It’s worth mentioning that Ribbentrop’s conception was characterized by 

variation of the famous Alfred Rosenberg’s idea. Rosenberg, in the 1940s head 

of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, observed that the 

Soviet Union was not a monolithic state, but rather a conglomerate of many 

small nations. He suggested that Germany should appeal to the non-Russian 

nationalities’ quest for freedom, arguing that such an appeal would reduce the 

force of Soviet resistance. There is the mistaken impression that Rosenberg as 

well as Ribbentrop acted in opposition to Hitler. Ihor Kamenetsky rightly 

mentioned, that „in reality, there is not a substantial difference in their attitudes 

and actions regarding German Lebensraum” 15 . The ultimate goal of all of them 

was to make Ukraine to be subordinated to Germany on the one hand and to 

adapt eastern territories to the needs of German colonists on the other. 

The Carpatho-Ukrainian experiment lasted only five months and even 

proclamation of independence in a symbolic gesture of Voloshyn did not stop 

Hungarian annexation of that territory in March 1939. There are at least three 

reasons of its failure: 

1. Firstly, there was absolutely no support from Western powers. France 

and England as well as the Soviet Union declared desinteressment. 

Furthermore, it was not just Hungary who has ordered territorial changes. 

Carpatho-Ukraine had to struggle with Polish objections, too. Both Poland and 

13 

On 28th October, 1938 Ciano noted in his diary: „Ribbentrop’s attitude is hostile towards 

Hungary, whereas Czechs are unashamedly supported by him”, and Italian minister has in mind 

the Carpathian issue itself. In November Ciano described negotiations between Italy and 

Germany, which eventually resulted in First Vienna Award. The Italians advocated Hungary 

which strongly requested a recapture of Carpathian Ruthenia, whereas the Germans, represented 

by Ribbentrop, sought to tone down Hungarians’ pretensions. CIANO, Galeazzo: Dziennik 1937- 

1943. Edited by T. WITUCH. Pułtusk, 2006. 258. 

14 

TORECZKI, Roman: Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy (1933-1945). Warszawa, 

1972. 161-162. 

15 

KAMENETSKY, I.: German Colonization Plans In Ukraine during World War I and II. 

In: TORKE, Hans-Joachim, HIMKA, John-Paul (ed.): German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical 

Perspective. Toronto, 1994. 101. 

106

Hungary sought to set up a common border and additionally Polish government 

remonstrated with the recruiting Ukrainian nationalist politicians prosecuted in 

Poland in Carpatho-Ukraine administration. 16 

2. Secondly, at least since the death of Yevhen Konovalets in March 1938 

there was a deep division within Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists 

(OUN), the main independence movement in Ukraine. Therefore, some 

politicians expressed their skepticism about special role of Carpatho-Ukraine, 

while others, the young ones, joined the Carpathian Sich en masse. 

3. And thirdly – the most important thing – the German view. It was 

Hitler who approved Hungarian annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine. What did 

happen with the project of „Great Ukraine” 17 ? Faced with two rival plans, 

Hungarian and Ukrainian, Hitler’s approach was to say yes to the stronger one. 

Hungary, at least since the time that Bela Imredy was appointed prime minister, 

has belonged to the closest allies of Germany. Thus far they had consented to 

German economic penetration and – what probably was decisive – on 24 th 

February 1939, a month before an invasion, they joined the Anti-Comintern 

Pact. Moreover, it’s pointless to pretend that Hitler or anybody from his tight 

inner circle was a slavophile; as a matter of fact day after crash of Carpatho- 

Ukraine Hitler intimated president of Czechoslovakia Emil Hacha into 

accepting the German occupation of the Czech rump state. Yet in this case, the 

idea of „Great Ukraine” – and Ribbentrop must have known it – was 

exaggerated and inconceivably in winter 1938/1939. Questions of Galicia, 

Volhynia and the Soviet part of Ukraine must have been left unanswered, 

because plans of any territorial changes of Poland and – notably – the Soviet 

Union at that moment would go too far. 

What were the consequences for German-Ukrainian relations of failure of 

Carpatho-Ukraine? Although the episode served as a graphic illustration of 

how little Ukrainians could depend on the goodwill of Hitler, he was 

continuously reported to be deliverance by many politicians in Ukraine. It was 

Hungary and Poland that in their opinion bore all the blame for the decline of 

Carpatho-Ukraine. In April 1939 Andrij Melnyk, a leader of the OUN, 

16 PAGEL, J.: Polska i Związek Radziecki w czasie kryzysu czechosłowackiego 

(marzec-październik 1938). In: SIERPOWSKI, Stanisław (ed.): Niemcy w polityce 

międzynarodowej 1919-1939. Tom III- W dobie Monachium. Poznań, 1992. 343. Hungary 

was also afraid of the Ukrainian nationalist politicians, see more: MARUZSA, Zoltán: A 

meg nem valósult területi gyarapodás. Német-magyar diplomáciai tárgyalások 

Magyarország terjeszkedéséről a Keleti-Kárpátokon túl 1941-42 folyamán. 403-415. pp. 

In: Eszmék, forradalmak, háborúk. Vadász Sándor 80 éves. Szerk.: Háda Béla, Ligeti 

Dávid, Majoros István, Maruzsa Zoltán, Merényi Krisztina, Petneházi Margit. ELTE BTK 

Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék, Budapest, 2010. 

17 It’s worth mentioning that project of „Great Ukraine” was not openly supported by 

authorities of Carpatho-Ukraine. On the contrary, Voloshyn stressed that his main aim is to 

maintain good relations with neighbouring countries and he rather opted for „organic work” 

within Carpatho-Ukraine. GRELKA, Frank: Polityka III Rzeszy wobec ukraińskich zmagań 

niepodległościowych w latach 1934-1941. In: Biuletyn Ukrainoznawczy, 12/2006. 66. 

107

announced: „We have no active allies on the world, apart from Germany. They 

are against all our occupants” 18 . Indeed, Germany was described as the lesser 

of two evils, because they were not an occupant on the one hand and were not 

acquainted with the Soviet Union on the other. Moreover, the common priority 

of Ukrainian and German policy, which was a revision of the order of 

Versailles, remained current. 

Surprisingly, groups affected by pro-German orientation did not doubt even 

after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Though, for others that was a sight that 

redefinition of policy needs to be done. The growing resistance against official 

statement of the OUN executives subsequently was exemplified by the OUN’s 

split into two parts in 1940, with the older more moderate members supporting 

Melnyk and the younger and more radical supporting Stepan Bandera. But total 

rejection of hopes connected with the German intervention was quite 

unrealistic; when on 17 th September 1939 Soviet army started an invasion of 

Poland, for Ukraine it meant not only long-anticipated unification of Ukrainian 

territory, but also – soon after – it resulted in Soviet political and economic 

repressions. Hence, the myth of the Germans as some kind of liberators had 

maintained until German army came to Ukraine in 1941 and implemented their 

own prosecutions. 

18 

TORECZKI, Roman: Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy (1933-1945). 

Warszawa, 1972. 182. 

108

Public Reactions to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 

109

110

Baptiste, Antoine 

What did French MPs think about it? Political reactions and speeches 

about Ribbentrop – Molotov pact. 

As French historians have been little attention about it, 1 1939 French MPs 

have little interview in German-Soviet pact. They have remained silence most 

of the time in Hemicycle as in the Palais-Bourbon corridors. And the few 

interventions we could found in the French press are, most of the time, fleeting, 

without any substance. We also find this quietness in French scientific works in 

which the analysis of the MPs reactions is completely reduce very often to a 

few lines. 

Yet the international situation is the most execrable situation : Munich, 

Czechoslovakia, Steel Pact, Italian political expansionism, Spanish civil war 

and the Polish aims of the hitlerian wills. Actually, the German-Soviet pact 

chooses „l'ultime étape [...] d'une longue période de tensions internationales” 2 

during which French political life is influenced by a lot of information and 

different pretension of the Third Reich offensive policy. 

Thus it is more surprising that in such context of the rise of perils which 

leads directed to the war – we don’t know it yet at that time, and we are see that 

a lot of people don’t think about it – the elected people of the Nation were 

prostrated in a silence which become deafening. Such a paradox must drow the 

historian’s attention how is surprised by such dissension. Where are the 

speeches address to the gallery? The invectives between political parties? 

Where are the strong opinions, calls to the people in the press and on the radio? 

Actually, nowhere. In front of this lack of speech and of argued debate, the 

material necessary to the historian, the sources, matrix of his reflexion, is 

considerably reducing. 3 A problem without solution is not a problem, lets take 

this lack of sources on the other way round and makes a demonstration in the 

1 About the french historiographic report of Ribbentrop-Molotov pact read: LACHAISE, 

Bernard: L'historiographie du pacte Ribbentrop – Molotov en France depuis 1945., 

communication (published in this book) at the international conference, Ribbentrop-Molotov pact 

August 1939 and this European effects at ELTE, Budapest, December 3 th and 5 th 2009. 

2 BRUNET, Jean-Paul: La presse française et le pacte germano-soviétique (août 1939), In: 

Relations internationales, 1974, n 2, 187-212. 

3 By lack of informations on the first selected subject : The Ribbentrop – Molotov pact to the 

Palais-Bourbon, the corpus of sources, initially centered on the parliamentary debates of the 

period, was extended to the MPs reactions and speeches in the French press of 1939, in particular 

the great figures and the parliamentary presidents of groups. Were targeted by our research: Léon 

Blum (SFIO), Albert Chichéry (Radical Party), Renaud Jean (PCF), Maurice Thorez (PCF), 

Jacques Duclos (PCF), Marcel Gitton (PCF), Joseph Denais (Republican Federation), Léon 

Barety (Democratic Republican Alliance), Gabriel Lafaye (USR), Georges Mandel (Republican 

Independence), Jean Ybarnegaray (French Social Party) and Édouard Daladier in the double 

focal distance of president of Council, minister for the War and National defense, and great 

figure of the Radical Party. 

111

negative, an analysis of the disappearance of the French MPs from the public 

stage about the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. 

It is seems use for this to take into account the few month previous to the 

signature of German-Soviet pact in order to analyse in a global way the perception 

of the MPs of the European situation. This brief flashback makes us to understand 

better the reactions rather the absence of reactions of the MPs facing diplomatic Uturn, 

an agreement for the war. 4 Yet, the MPs eventually take hold the subject but 

not in analysis way; they take it as a pretext for internal quarrels. The pact is no 

longer the subject of the debate, it is a political excuse. 

„Croquemitaine se dégonflera?” 5 A political analysis of the international 

situation by the French MPs 

We think it is pertinent here to carry out a flashback of a few months, one 

year at the most, in order to understand which was the MPs frame of mind 

facing an alarming European situation and thus to seize a global political 

analysis. 

Still marked by the First World War throes, the French society, and its 

elected representatives, is largely crossed by anxious tensions around the 

macabre memories of the trenches. The French still have under the eyes the 

scares, almost indelible for this generation, felt by the war on the French social 

body and on France in general. As many wounds which did not know the 

cicatrisation. 6 In fact, the desire of peace is a major feeling, almost daily, of the 

French, relayed at the national level by their MPs who do not escape the rule. 

Chamberlain develops in Munich the „gentleman agreement” with a strong 

idea of conservation of peace and Daladier presents the agreement as least bad 

of the compromises in order to safeguarding France. 7 However is it necessary 

to present the parliamentary body like a soft entity will stop at nothing to 

preserve peace or suffering from a political blindness facing the rise of perils? 

Certainly not. And if its international perception is erroneous - we will see why 

- it is necessary to bring a nuance to the MPs blindness about this subject. 

Thus, not very obvious in the text, that is much more in the substance of 

Daladier’s speech, it acts to temporize, save time in order to be able to make 

4 

DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste: Politique étrangère de la France. La décadence. 1932-1939. 

Seuil, Paris, 1979. 

5 th 

CLAUDEL, Paul in Le Figaro, August 18 1939, quoted in DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste, 

op. cit., 1979. 

6 

On psychological impact of the Fist World war on the French society, to see: AUDOIN- 

ROUZEAU, Stéphane: 14-18. Les combats des tranchées. Armand Colin, Paris, 1986. and of the 

same autor: L'enfant de l'ennemi. 1914-1918. Aubier, Paris, 1995. and SANTAMARIA, Yves: 

Le pacifisme, une passion française. Armand Colin, Paris, 2005. These autors explain how the 

extreme violence of this conflict radiated in the society and which were the consequences. 

7 

DU RÉAU, Elisabeth: L'ordre mondial de Versailles à San Francisco, juin 1919 – juin 

1945. PUF, Paris, 2007. 

112

safe Europe, a part to say the least, by the means a Franco-British 

rapprochement way and a rhythmic development of armament of the two states. 

Objective is not to oppose in a frontally way to the fascistic policies but to 

make a counterweight by intimidation. It should be stressed that one speaks 

about rapprochement, it is not question about alliance yet. The year 1939 is 

year of the realization of the Front of Peace around Franco-British alliance 

which aims „étudier les perspectives d'actions communes dans l'hypothèse 

d'une guerre longue” 8 . How to understand this wing? Let us study a significant 

case, that of the Radical Party, 9 which informs us on the phenomenon. Between 

the end of 1938 and the beginning of 1939 the militants and especially radical 

elected representatives decide in favour of the firmness way facing Hitler. The 

frank stances of Daladier which counteract the Italian claims to the French 

colonial empire collect the party assent, and the one of a great majority of the 

political world. The way of firmness is here in preparation and the decisive 

reversal carry out at the time of the parliamentary session of March 17 th 1939, 

two days after Hitler’s trick in Czechoslovakia. For the radical MPs, followed 

by a very great number of their colleagues of different political sensibilities, 

German offensive is intolerable. The tone of the debates lets sting a hardening 

will of the French policy toward Germany. 10 The Radical Party approves the 

speech of Daladier, made on March 29 th 1939, an „énergique fin de non 

recevoir aux propositions de conversation de Mussolini” 11 and expression of 

the French resolution wildly opposite to any new overthrow in Europe. The 

evolution is clear from Munich: the delaying, the French MPs passed to 

assertion of European safety by hard policy expression vis-à-vis the German 

chancellor who cannot be held any more, with his government, like a 

confidence interlocutor. In the governance and in the negotiation, the tone is 

resistance. 

In this context is developing and finalizing the Front of Peace to the West 

but in the governments and MPs mind, clearly affirm the necessity of an 

enlarging of the Front to the East in order to weaken and to contain hitlerian 

expansionist slightest sign. USSR affirms itself as obvious ally around the 

Polish question. In spite of the unquestionable antagonism between Soviet 

ideology and those of the various parties present at the National Assembly, 

excepted the PCF (French Communist Party), national interest precedes and the 

negotiations are committed in objective to lead in a short time to a three-party 

alliance enclosing the Third Reich. Thus the policy toward Germany hardens 

alliances are reflected and unit starts to be done behind the Nation. It 

establishes a context characteristic of international very high voltages which 

8 DU RÉAU, Elisabeth: op. cit., 2007. 

9 BERSTEIN, Serge: Histoire du Parti radical. Presses de la Fondation nationale des 

sciences politiques, Paris, 1982. 

10 JODRF, Mach 18 th 1939. 

11 BERSTEIN, Serge: op. cit., 1982. 

113

can let think of an imminent war possibility. But it is nothing of the sort. The 

theory of Hitler’s bluff is a theorem in Parliament which justifies the firmness 

policy applied by France from an escalation perspective. The principle is that 

which will yield the first. For the French MPs, the war is not thinkable: Hitler 

is bluffing, the Front of Peace imposes itself on West as on East and 

negotiations with the USSR are committed. And it is here the ultimate error of 

the members of House. Stand apart of negotiation by an executive which works 

alone, the MPs are not informed neither the French-British conflicts nor Soviet 

equivocations which make to drag on talks. Deprived of all this information, 

idea of an event contravening the sequences of facts as they perceive it, them 

do not even cross their mind. And Ceretti, communist deputy, to say: „Clément 

[Fried] qui avait tout prévu [...] sauf la guerre.” 12 

A huge quiet in the French National Assembly rows: the nonreactions 

of MPs 

It is initially edifying to note that National Assembly is put on parliamentary 

leave since its last session of August 17 th 1939 and that in spite of the Leon 

Blum’s exhortations to resume parliamentary work, exhortation to which 

Daladier remains deaf, the House meet only one, on September 2 nd in 

extraordinary session before taking again it usual exercise on September 23 rd . 13 

It is necessary to see here a first reason of this absence of speeches and debates 

to the National Assembly, MPs being returned in their districts. It is then 

astonishing to compare attitude of British elected representatives with their 

French counterpart one. They are at the very least antagonistic. Between the 1 st 

and the September 3 rd , the House meets three times. The discussions are largely 

opened, all the subjects are tackled and many are those which intervene and 

inveigh directly, sometimes unceremoniously, Chamberlain for his inaction. 

The debates are surging but they exist and that does not slow down therefore 

the consultation of British public opinion through its elected representatives. It 

is, according to Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, this parliamentary surge which 

decides on the Prime Minister's Office to act. 14 On the other hand, in France, 

12 On the pacifist policy and impressing society of safeguard of peace that Georges Bonnet to 

be led to the Quay d'Orsay, to see: PUYAUBERT, Jacques: Georges Bonnet (1889- 1973). Les 

combats d'un pacifiste. Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 2007. The author proposes 

pacifism, almost like a religion, which lays down the policy of the ministre until beginning of 

war, and lasts even a few days after the French declaration of September 3 rd , as well as the very 

dynamic activity which implements in order to prex-serve peace, a true obsession for this man 

who will say to have „encore quinze heures pour sauver la paix” after the Germans troops 

invaded the Polish territory. 

13 CÉRETTI: À l'ombre des 2T, Juillard, 1973. quoted in VIDAL, Georges: La Grande 

Illusion ? Le Parti communiste française et la Défense nationale à l'époque du Front populaire. 

Presses Université de Lyon, Lyon, 2006. 

14 DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste: op. cit., 1979. 

114

the unique extraordinary session of the House does not demolish its usual 

protocol, although military funds adoption is subjected to the vote, no incident 

is to be raised during session. 15 So takes place the ceremony. Edouard Herriot, 

president of the House, is given an ovation by all the MPs, including 

communists, when he pronounces his speech and expresses „la réprobation de 

tout être droit” 16 for the German-Soviet pact. Follows a text of the president of 

the Republic, Albert Lebrun, the big commonness, read by Daladier expressed 

himself in the name of the government, as president of council. In no way in 

his speech, he makes reference to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. After the 

ceremonial must be directly made the vote, it was expected that nobody speaks 

but a MPs, Bergery, tries all the same to engage an in-depth debate. He must be 

solved with silence under the pressure of an insisting Chairman and a 

disruptive House. There is no argued discussion about foreign policy questions, 

in spite of the requests of isolated MPs. If no discussion is led on the entering 

the war of France during a session dedicated to its financing, we do not find 

more comments on the German-Soviet pact while no session adjoins its date of 

signature, or is particular him. 

However, only once and in only once place, the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact 

was approached as a subject with day order. It is about a session of the Foreign 

Affairs Commission held on August 26 th 1939 in plenary session. 17 Many 

political officials are present and, in Le Temps opinion, this session makes it 

possible to know the position of the various parties of the French political 

world, but this analysis is a little presumptuous. If the majority of the parties 

send a delegation to the Commission, the day order is rather quickly canted: the 

MPs deliver their opinion on the pact – the condemnation is unanimous – but 

very quickly take shape the internal political oppositions and in „une 

réprobation complète et unanime” 18 the elected representatives of all edges 

make fire on the Communists who defend the thesis of an act for peace on 

behalf of USSR. The members of the Commission speak about „acte de haute 

trahison internationale” 19 and analysis does not push further. The remainder of 

the session aims to the condemnation of the intrigues of the Communist MPs in 

adhesion with Moscow view. Elsewhere, the official statement of the 

Commission translates strong intern suspicions towards the Communists almost 

marked spying and voted motion denounces without much enthusiasm the 

signature of the pact but announces all the same that „loin d'écarter le danger 

15 rd 

JODRF, September 3 1939. 

16 

Idem. 

17 th 

We found his trace on page 3 of Le Temps dated August 27 1939 without being able to 

obtain an integral transcription of the meeting what thus obliges us to satisfy us with the report of 

the newspaper, with its information and its analysis. It retranscibes sometimes pieces of the 

debates which took place in the commission. 

18 th 

Le Temps, August 27 1939. 

19 Idem. 

115

de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'aggraver”. 20 We find here another reason of the 

MPs silence. This Commission was as an arena where passions broke out, as 

mush first steps to the internal quarrels which mark the French political life 

during the day which follow. However, this Commission did not make echo, 

that probably explain by the fact that one to tear to pieces in slides but it is 

necessary to make good figure and post unit during the Parliament session in 

these time of extreme international tensions. The House remains rather 

hermetic with any form of debates, relayed in the appendices of the Parliament 

and deprives to us thus an essential dimension in order to understand the 

quietness of the MPs on the pact subject. 

Perhaps is necessary it to continue research out of the Palais-Bourbon walls 

and to delay in the political press columns of the Third Republic. 21 If the 

speeches global board of representatives of the various political parties can be 

reduced to a white page, it is obvious that this additional silence of the MPs is 

not insignificant. More general studies about political parties, 22 even if they 

devote to it some lines, as well as Jean-Paul Brunet’s article about the 

Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in the French press, 23 grant to say that the surprise 

strikes a large part of parliamentary body. And it is Blum which expresses the 

better this state of mind because he is, moreover, the only one to formalize his 

„stupeur” 24 ; this stupor which does it sometimes to mislay in conjecture when 

he tries to replace this diplomatic volte-face in an international context in order 

to give it an explanation. If must see here the main reason of the MPs quietness 

at the time of the signature pact announced. Event is clearly posted in the press: 

the headlines express a feeling of a dramatic turn of events and it there no 

reason to the MPs escape that, taking into account the explanations has which 

we gave higher. But the surprise does not last. The Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, 

20 The officiel statement and motion written by the Commission are retranscribed completely 

in the article of Le Temps, August 27 th 2009. 

21 The studied newpapers all are of the political newpapers, press agencies official party : Le 

Populaire, L'Humanité, or politized: La Dépêche, Le Temps and Le Figaro. The studied numbers 

are published between August 20 th included and on September 5 th included. The choice of the 

dates is subjected to a will of effectivness, in order to not to move away from the selected subject 

and to a temporal constraint, time have suddently missed to undertake a research of information 

on a broader chronology. The number of newpapers studied is subjected to the same constraints 

altought us were tried to provide a sufficient range of titles in order to cover the political 

orientations of extreme left to the right-hand side. 

22 On the Radical Party, to see: BERSTEIN, Serge: op. cit., 1982. On the SFIO, to 

see: CASTAGNEZ-RIGGIU, Noëlline: Socialistes en République : les parlementaires 

SFIO de la IV e République. Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 2004. Altough 

the title can make appear anachronistic work compared to the subject of the 

communication, the author approaches, certainly rather briefly, the problem of the 

reception of the German-Soviet pact. On PCF, to see: VIDAL, Georges: La Grande 

Illusion ? Le Parti communiste français et la Défense nationale à l'époque du Front 

populaire. Presses Universitaires de Lyon, Lyon, 2006. 

23 BRUNET, Jean Paul Brunet: op. cit., 1974. 

24 Le Populaire, August 23 rd 1939. 

116

object of all non-reactions, is then hoarded by MPs and political parties to 

transform it into pretext reviving the old demons of the French political life. 

The Ribbentrop – Molotov pact, an internal politics quarrels vector: 

between „districtism” and settling of scores 

In the days which follow the pact signature, the political subject that it 

represents leaves the field of reflexion and the parliamentary debate, although it 

is never been there. Instead of seizing problem, making a political study object 

and giving a founded and argued analysis, French MPs transform the 

information to an argument, a pretext to release a threats and internal quarrels 

process without real direct links with international circumstances and issues of 

the beginning. And if the international context is evoked, it is to become 

quickly a weapon or an asset for private interests. When we put side Le Temps 

report and the Blum’s leading article, it remains nothing. No French MPs 

during a session tried a global interpretative step and any great political figure 

used the press as opinion column. It is thus definitively visible the MPs 

political reactions are not about international order. 

Diverting impact of the pact signature to the French political life, MPs 

expressed a form of abstract and indirect reaction consequently which shows 

the first and true significance of what is at the beginning a diplomatic reversal. 

In fact, to MPs, the things are presented in such way that the international crisis 

was acted by the institutions, the national policy has a guiding way established 

since March 1939 but the ideological and political internal struggle remain 

open. This attitude lets show the MPs interests limits, proclaimed by them, thus 

their action sphere which exceeds very seldom their district and some places of 

political power, such as the Assembly. This functional pattern common to the 

French MPs majority of the Third Republic proceeds of a „districtism” still 

very marked with the elected representatives – more the share are „districtist”, 

closer to the local interests defence than the great national questions and even 

less international. 25 We can find the proof about the subjects of the MPs 

questions to the government during the September 2 nd session which place 

themselves almost on the level of the individual problem and the local 

quarrel. 26 Thus the Third Republic MP is a representative of his district and his 

party before to be a national elected. 

This priorities definition of elected representatives explains partly the MPs 

attitude in front of the pact signature: after the surprise, none debate, the 

information is immediately used at internal political ends as much national 

scale as party scale. In fact, only direct and frank reaction that the MPs 

majority had, was to open a genuine heavy fire on the PCF (French Communist 

25 MAYEUR, Jean-Marie, CHALINE, Jean-Pierre, CORBIN, Alain (dir.): Les 

Parlementaires de la Troisième République. Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 2003. 

26 JODRF, September 3 rd 1939. 

117

Party), the enemy of the inside. Of course the remarks violence varies 

according to the political edge but overall the anti-communist campaign is 

unanimous and virulent. On the right and the extreme right, nothing is 

surprising, antagonism is already old but occasion is blessed to destroy French 

Communist Party. On the left, the report is not hardy better because attitude 

answers same logics and if arguments differ about tone and nature, the required 

result is the same one: to make disappear the French Communist Party. To the 

left, the report is hardly better because the attitude answers the same logics and 

if the arguments differ from tone and from nature, the popular profit is the 

same : remove the PCF. In the SFIO, divergent opinions were: Blum debate 

with Cachin but he disapproves of the suspension of L'Humanité and expresses 

his embarrassment, shaken by the contradictions between his spokesman's post 

of the party and his personal convictions. But in spite his person, the Blum’s 

moderation does not make unanimity and within the SFIO the tone is the 

condemnation without reserve of which Paul Faure is made the example: 

„Douze balles dans la peau des complices de Hitler! D'accord.” 27 The question 

of the pact meets itself even in the internal debates of the parties when are in 

confrontation the various currents. At the radicals no more that somewhere else 

we know the reflex of union in front of capsizing of Moscou. 28 Jeanneney, 

president of the Senate, advises Daladier, figure of the party and the president 

of Council, to part from Georges Bonnet, radical and Foreign Secretary. For 

Jeanneney, it is a question of getting rid of a disruptive element, often free 

electron, which persists in opposing to the policy of firmness of the 

government after the signature of the pact. At also raises in house problem 

because its pacifist vision of the international situation supported by the right 

wing of the party arises in contradiction with the majority ideology of firmness 

developed by the left current of the radicals which knew since March 1939 that 

it was necessary „indéniablement se préparer à la guerre” 29 - although we can 

strongly qualify such an assertion. 

Finally, the French Communist Party remains a specific case because its 

attitude seems „constituer, politiquement, un suicide” 30 when, at the moment 

when all the French political life projectors are directed on it, align on the 

Stalin’s policy and deploys an argument arsenal which dismays all the political 

world. In spite of the pact signature, which however catches on the wrong-foot 

all communist engagements, the French Communist Party does not vary and 

align, locked in an ideological rationality which must prevent all divergent 

27 

Quoted by BERSTEIN, Serge. Léon Blum. Paris, 2006. 

28 

BERSTEIN, Serge: Histoire du Parti radical. Presses de la Fondation nationale des 

sciences politiques, Paris, 1982. 

29 

ZAY, Jean: Carnets secrets. 1942. 

30 

Remarks made by SADOUL, Jacques, an important figure ot the PCF, in a letter addressed 

on August 26 th to the senator of the Seine, Marcel Cachin, quoted by CRÉMIEUX-BRILHAC, 

Jean-Louis: Les Français de l'An 40, Tome 1: La guerre oui ou non?. Gallimard, Paris, 1990. 

118

interpretations of the political way enacted by Moscow and which could 

contravene the Stalin’s wills. „L'URSS reste un "modèle", le pilier du 

mouvement ouvrier révolutionnaire ” for the French Communist Party. 31 

Not a silence but a whispering, Ribbentrop-Molotov pact does not set MPs 

attention. It has created, it is true, a few reactions but they remain isolated and 

come from shy MPs who did not make them heard. 32 This major event that the 

press clearly identify as a fundamental change of international situation and a 

diplomatic reorganisation to the detriment of France, only provoke slight of 

opposition of Commission with no reaction thus common response and 

discipline in the Hemicycle. Would did be what the elected of the Nation is 

able to do facing the terrible pact announcement ? Of course not. Expression of 

the reaction toward of the German-Soviet pact signature is ingreaved in 

dynamic where time is getting quicker. From this stupefaction, which is the 

reason of a false interpretation of international situation, which makes the MPs 

speechless, nothing emerge of it. It was not event been the subject of a limited 

reflexion on the date following this announcement, come the position of the 

Communists, and this too good opportunity to lay waste to the French 

Communist Party. Finally, in such a short time, in which itch day something 

important happened, the subject of the pact leave the interest, marked by the 

strong „districtism” characteristic of the Third Republic elected representatives 

and by internal quarrels which find in this troubled context a fertilised grown. 33 

As quickly as it is negotiated between Germans and Russians, the pact has 

been a topic for the French MPs. Even if it is a warmonger, he has been 

acquitted quickly. 

31 CRÉMIEUX-BRILHAC, Jean-Louis: op. cit., 1990. 

32 Within PCF in particular, the pact made debate until the cause final threats and departures: 

Renaud Jean, president of the communist parliamentary group to the House puts his reisgnation 

in the balance, on Renaud Jean to see: BELLOIN, Gérard: Renaud Jean, le tribun des paysans. 

Paris, 1993. On the other hand, two deputies of the Dordogne cross the step and leave the party: 

it acts ot Saussot and Paul Loubradou, on Paul Loubradou to see: BOURGEOIS, Guillaume: 

Paul Loubradou, un communiste rebelle. Arkheia, 2008. 39-53. 

33 For a regional study of the impact of the perception of the German-Soviet pact, to see: 

RICHAUD, Romain Richaud: Les réactions politiques d'un département de gauche au pacte 

Ribbentrop-Molotov:les Landes and ITHURBURU, Caroline: Les réactions politiques d'un 

département de droite au pacte Ribbentrop-Molotov:les Basses-Pyrénées, communications 

(published in this book) at the international conference, Ribbentrop – Molotov pact August 1939 

and this European effects at ELTE, Budapest, December 3 th and 5 th 2009. 

119

120

Bruzel, Baptiste 

Central Europe in the french reactions about the Ribbentropp-Molotov 

Pact 

We can first observe that, from a diplomatic point of view, France stands 

near Eastern Europe countries. This is proved by the memo M. Coulondre, 

the French ambassador in Berlin, sent, on August 15th 1939, to Georges 

Bonnet, the French foreign minister : „M. Weischer asks me which 

impressions I have brought from Paris on the international situation.(...) The 

position of the French government, supported almost unanimously by the 

whole country, has remained the same. France, England and Poland have 

committed themselves to help each other and this commitment will become 

operative should one of them be attacked.” 

This refers to the friendship treaty of January 25 th 1925 and to the 

Locarno treaty, signed on October 16 th 1925, which commits France to a 

military help to Poland. „In the event of France or Poland being attacked 

without provocation, France, or reciprocally Poland, acting in application of 

Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, will 

immediately lend aid and assistance.” 

But the German and Italian initiatives break the dream pacifists had in 

France as well as in Britain. The hope of compromise becomes less and less 

credible. In answer to the threat of Ribbentrop to the Polish government, the 

British Prime Minister announces, together with France, also allied with 

Poland, that they will give Poland all neccessary assistance, should the 

Polish government find its independance endangereded and decide to resist. 

And France will also declare itself ready to help Greece threatened by 

Mussolini's troops in Albania and Romania. France knows that Hitler's 

promises will not be respected, and that he is planning to dominate Europe. 

He wants to bring off an other „coup” - as he did in Prag – in Poland first 

then in Romania. 

The French pacifists, just like G. Bonnet, are still looking for compromise. 

On January 26 th 1939, G. Bonnet delivers a speech in the Chamber of Deputies. 

France has told the government of Poland about the agreement it has reached 

with the Reich, which is very pleased, according to G. Bonnet. „The Reich fully 

appreciates the purpose, signification and range of the agreement.” 

We can ask ourselves what diplomatic relationships between France on the 

one hand, Eastern Europe countries - and more particularly Poland - on the 

other hand, were like, at the time of the crisis of 1939 and of the signature of 

the German-Soviet pact. To answer this question, we shall see first the reactions 

of French diplomacy before the signature, and then we shall see what changes 

the Pact brought about in Germany as awell as in France. 

121

Before the Pact 

M. Coulondre, the French ambassador in Berlin, lets G. Bonnet know that 

the Soviet Union will do everything to avoid antagonizing Berlin, knowing that 

the Soviets have not yet replaced their Headquarters after the purges that 

followed the Moscow trials. 

The French government understands quickly enough that the USSR has in 

mind drawing near Germany. On May 3 rd 1939, Litvinov, a supporter of 

collective security, is replaced by Molotov at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs. He is Stalin's right hand and he is more pragmatic than his predecessor 

was. Between the 15 th and the 20 th of August, France urges Poland to make 

concessions on the right of passage the Germans find so important. On August 

21 st evening, the French resolve to disregard the Polish refusal and 

acknowledge this right to the Russian army, in order to avoid any soviet 

alliance with the third Reich. 

Bonnet was indignant at the position of the Polish government during the 

Czechoslovakia crisis. That day, Bonnet said: „It's Czechoslovakia today, it will be 

Poland tomorrow.” France does not want to see Poland isolated between Hitler's 

Germany and Stalin's Russia. Nevertheless, G. Bonnet's policy of compromise 

reaches its limits because Poland's successive refusals make Germany impatient. 

The Munich agreement confirms the dismantling of Czechoslovakia. An opinion 

poll shows that 57% of the French population are satisfied with the agreement, but 

after the Sudéte crisis, 70% refuse any new concessions. Also, the Soviet Union 

does not understand the diplomacy and strategy of France and England. On May 

7 th , Coulondres sends a telegram to the Quai d'Orsay, saying: „Soon, they will see 

that something is going on in the East.” 

In Munich, already, Czechoslovakia had been excluded from the 

negotiations about its fate by the four powers. General Syrovy, the President of 

the Czechoslovakian Council, said that „by making such a decision, the 

Czechoslovakian government lets the world know it protests against a 

unilateral decision that was made without its participating in it.” 

France tries to avoid a conflict but the Germans put heavier and heavier 

pressure on the Poles, as we can see in the telegram the French ambassador in 

Warsaw, Léon Noël, sent to G. Bonnet on August 19 th 1939. „Persecutions 

against the Poles have taken frightening proportions. During the period 

between April 1 st and June 30 th , 976 acts of violence have been reportedly 

recorded (...) and since July 1 st the situation is said to have become even 

worse.” In the same way the telegrams sent by M. Coulondre or Léon Noël 

always mention the German intention to invade Poland. 

The French Consul in Hamburg, M. Garreau, lets G. Bonnet know , on august 

22 nd 1939, that „the German government hopes to overcome Poland by the end of 

the month.The Reich (...) believes Moscow is preparing a big political upheaval 

in order to harmonize the ideologies of the two totalitarian regimes.” 

122

After the Pact 

For Bonnet, „the Polish government must carefully avoid any military 

reaction in the event the senate of Dantzig should proclaim the reunion of the 

Free City to Germany.” Bonnet continues his pacifist policy and tries to avoid 

conflict at any cost, while the French government undertakes a complete U-turn 

and starts getting prepared to conflict, for the German-Soviet pact has sealed 

the fate of Poland. 

As we saw in our introduction, France and Great Britain have made 

alliances and they will defend Poland. It is true that France and Great Britain 

had promised to defend Czechoslovakia, as G. Mandel and Paul Reynaud had 

assured M. Ripka, a Czechoslovakian minister. But these two countries will not 

accept yet another conquest by Hitler. They cannot betray Poland as they 

betrayed Czechoslovakia. 

In a telephone conversation of August 31 st 1939, Bonnet asks Noël „to take 

new steps with M. Beck – the minister of the Polish foreign office – in order to 

obtain from the Polish government a favorable answer to direct conversations.” 

The same day in the evening, he tells him: „We wish direct dialogues 

between Germany and Poland would succed. We want a multilateral 

conference to solve the problems linked with the treaty of Versailles that 

the Germans denounce.” Bonnet suggests that neutral observers should 

be sent in regions where, according to the Reich, the Poles treat the 

Germans badly. 

On August 28 th 1939, Léon Noël sends 8 telegrams to Bonnet about this 

so-called violence : „Ten new cases of attack or ill-reatment” But he says 

later: „There are no precise facts, no dates, no names” According to Noël, it 

might be slander. 

Then G. Bonnet asks that the German and Polish troops in contact in many 

places stand back , in case talks between the two countries took place. The 

purpose of the German manoeuvres is to declare war in the position of the 

attacked country. Moreover, Léon Noël underlines that „maps and monographs 

show that in 1914, the region the Germans refer to in their official statement 

and which they claim because of the German population on the territory, were, 

in majority, peopled by Poles.” 

Conclusion 

For some historians, the Polish government has contributed to its own 

disaster, as if the contacts between Beck and the Reich in 1937-1939 was a sort 

of guilty flirt, or as if the refusal to let the Russian troops station in Poland 

justified the Soviet Union's attack. Bonnet does not agree with this judement. In 

his opinion, Poland is not responsible for this aggression. 

123

Lets us skip a few decades and listen to François Mitterrand. „Then Munich 

came, with betrayed trust and humiliated frienship. I still feel it today and I 

remember that time when I was a student in Paris. At that precise moment I 

wrote about the shame I felt.” 1 

In the year 1988 François Miterrand was the first president since 1939 to 

visit Czechoslovakia. During his trip he recalled this unglorious period of the 

history of France, when a pacifist will was stronger than the fate of a people 

with whom we had been friends for centuries. 

1 Interview of François Mitterrand for the Czechoslovakian television in december 1988. 

124

Baranyi, Tamás 

„A Surprise of a Very Unpleasant Character” 

British Reaction to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 

The signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact caused mayhem throughout 

British politics. Suddenly, the Whitehall had to abandon the policy of 

„appeasement”, and develop an entirely new approach to international politics. 

The present study tries to elaborate on the British opinion and policy responses 

given to the Russo-German Pact. The first question to arise is to what extent 

were the British politicians aware of the Russo-German approximation, and to 

what extent were they surprised by the Russian volte-face? Secondly, the policy 

responses given by London needs to be examined. At the same time, the British 

pursued three different policies: they had a last attempt to appease Hitler, they 

tried to contain German expansionism, and they tried to forge a better 

relationship with Moscow. These responses are of utmost interest in the history 

of the world war. 

Great Britain was seeking peace throughout the 1930s. It was partly due to 

the general anti-war sentiment in the British Empire, partly to English 

suspicions towards French grandeur politics, and partly to the cautious 

recognition of the Empire’s relative weakness. To a certain extent, the Foreign 

Office was consistent: they were willing to concede Hitler in his attempts to 

revise the Treaty of Versailles, but by no means to re-negotiate spheres of 

world influence. 1 

As a response to Germany’s new achievements in 1939, Britain decided to 

give territorial guarantee to Poland in April, and to commence trilateral 

negotiations with France and the USSR, in order to involve the Soviets in an 

alliance to contain Hitler’s ambitions. These negotiations were going on from 

April to August, 1939. In August, a British military mission was also sent to 

Moscow, though their efforts were not of a real significance. 2 British politics 

had often been criticized that they were not really committed to make an 

alliance with Russia. In fact, as Henry Kissinger pointed out, Stalin acted as if 

he was in a bazaar: he had listened to all offers, and then decided who to 

1 Secondary works on the British foreign policy in the 1930s generally have the same 

conclusion regarding the causes of ’appeasement policy.’ This remarkably compact and essential 

summary is given by Gergely Egedy. Cf. EGEDY, Gergely: Nagy-Britannia története. Aula, 

Budapest, 1998. 179-181. 

2 The British were not really eager to make a pact with Russia. The military mission had chosen 

the slowest vehicle to get to Russia (a merchant ship), and there were no front-ranking persons in it, 

comparable to their Soviet counterpart, Voroshilov, etc. Cf. WATSON, Derek: Molotov’s 

Apprenticehip in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939. In: Europa-Asia Studies 

2000/4. 713. As TAYLOR, A. J. P. put it, „If British diplomacy seriously aspired to alliance with 

Soviet Russia in 1939, then the negotiations towards this end were the most incompetent transactions 

since Lord North lost the American colonies...” Qtd. in WATSON, op. cit., 696. 

125

argain with. Hitler had an offer that the Western countries could not have 

outbid. Therefore, the turning point was not really the willingness of the 

Whitehall, but rather profit-based calculations of the Kremlin. There was also a 

lot ambiguity regarding the real purposes of the Soviet. As Churchill pointed 

out, Russia „is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma”. 3 Still, Western 

Powers put their faith in a possible new Entente that would have covered 

Britain, France and Russia against Germany. Therefore, the conclusion the 

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was ultimately a shock to their policies. 

Traditional British policy was anything but faithful to Soviet maneuvers. 

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was disinclined to believe that the 

Russians could make a deal with Germany. In a letter to his sister, dated 10 

June, 1939, he wrote: „I can’t make up my mind whether the Bolshies are 

double crossing us or whether they are only showing the cunning and suspicion 

of the peasant. On the whole I incline to the latter view.” On 2 July, 1939, his 

suspicion was further crystallized: „The Russian continue to create fresh 

difficulties… while I grow more and more suspicious of their good faith.’ 4 ” 

Of course, from the end of March, 1939, the British Intelligence and the 

Foreign Office were relatively well-informed that German-Soviet talks were in 

fact occurring. 5 The conclusion still surprised the British, because they 

previously thought that a tripartite agreement in Moscow could be realized. Just 

a few people foresaw the conclusion of the Pact, as did Sir Neville Henderson, 

then British ambassador to Germany. In a telegram to Foreign Secretary Lord 

Halifax, Henderson stated that „the Hammer and the Anvil will one day join 

forces”; 6 referring to the strategic ‘pincer movement’ these two country could 

facilitate, if agreed upon. 

The reaction in Britain to the Pact was anxious and abrupt. Policy-makers were 

shocked, but their viewpoints ranged from cynical to depressive. Long-time 

Foreign Office official Harold Nicolson wrote the following: the pact „smashes our 

peace-front and makes our guarantees to Poland, Rumania and Greece very 

questionable. How Ribbentrop must chuckle. […] I fear that it means that we are 

humbled to the dust”. 7 Churchill regarded the conclusion of the Pact as ‘sinister 

news’, 8 Sir Alexander Cadogan have called that moment „A black day.” 9 On the 

3 

COLLINS, Thomas: Hand in Glove with Germany: Perspectives of Soviet Neutrality. 

University of Leeds, 2008. 4. 

4 

COLLINS, op. cit., 24. 

5 

Ibid. 23. 

6 

Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP) 3, VI, Henderson to Halifax, No. 347, July 

18, 1939, p. 385. In: DOOLEY, Jacqueline: The Failure of a Mission: The Diplomacy of Sir 

Neville Henderson. University of Leeds, 2008. 48. 

7 

22 August, 1939. Harold Nicolson. Diaries and Letters. 1930-1964. (OLSON, Stanley ed.). 

Collins, London, 1980. 154. 

8 

COLLINS, op. cit., 25. 

9 

24 August, 1939. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan. O. M., 1938-1945. DILKS, David 

(ed.), Putnam, New York, 1972. 200. 

126

22, Neville Henderson told a German interpreter with a bitter smile: „What a joke! 

We have a military mission to Moscow, and you make the agreement!” 10 The 

Russo-German Pact was in fact the most striking to Prime Minister Chamberlain. 

He interrupted his vacation on the Continent, and stayed anxiously in London. He 

and his wife were sitting on the sofa, unable to do anything else but waiting for 

news from Moscow. Finally, bad news had come. 11 Foreign Minister Lord Halifax 

was the only one who thought that „the situation is not so enormously changed”. 12 

Honestly, one thing needs to be added to Halifax’s remark. He made this statement 

during a dinner with one of his friends, so A. Roberts believes that he might just 

wanted to put a brave face on. 

British policy of this period was ambivalent towards Germany. Even though 

they had decided to make one further attempt to mollify Hitler, they had to 

remind the Germans that no further concessions will be given. As early as the 

night of 22 August, Chamberlain had written a personal letter to the German 

Chancellor, claiming that whatever might be the nature of the Pact, „it cannot 

alter Great Britain’s obligation to Poland which His Majesty’s Government 

have stated in public repeatedly and plainly and which they are determined to 

fulfill.” The British Prime Minister had a last attempt to take war off the table, 

and to not repeat tragic mistakes of 1914. As the letter continues: „His 

Majesty’s Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such 

tragic misunderstanding,” 13 as there were on the eve of the first World War. 

Chamberlain’s letter was to be handed over by Sir Neville Henderson. 

Chamberlain also held a speech in the House of Commons, on the 24 

August, in which he said: „I do not attempt to conceal from the House that this 

announcement came to the Government as a surprise, and a surprise of a very 

unpleasant character. […]” He had sent a message to Hitler: if he believes that 

Britain would leave Poland alone, he is wrong. As Chamberlain continues: „We 

felt it our first duty to remove any such dangerous illusion.” 14 On the same day, 

Lord Halifax gave a spookily similar speech in the House of Lords. 15 

On the next day, the 25 August, Polish ambassador count Edward Raczynski had 

signed the Anglo-Polish Military Assistance Treaty in London. Besides the territorial 

guarantee already given to Poland, this treaty had called for military assistance. The 

10 OETTINGER, Erich: The Thirteen Days before the War. In: The XXth Century 1943/5. 

326. University of Hawaii at Manoa Library. http://libweb.hawaii.edu/libdept/russian/ 

XX/PDF/50-Volume5.pdf 6. November, 2009. 

11 FUCHSER, Larry William: Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement: A Study in the Politics 

of History. W. W. Norton & Company, New York-London, 1982. 185. 

12 ROBERTS, Andrew: The Holy Fox: The Life of Lord Halifax. Phoenix Giant Paperbacks, 

London, 1997. 167. 

13 FUCHSER: op. cit., 185. p. 

14 House of Commons Public Debates. Neville Chamberlain on International Situation, 24 

Aug, 1939. 

15 House of Lords Public Debates. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on International 

Situation. 24 Aug, 1939. 

127

secret protocol clarified that the treaty refers to a possible German attack only. 

Thereafter, an attack upon Poland would mean an attack upon Britain also. 16 

The most embarrassing factor to British policy was the fact that they were 

aware of secret clauses existing in the Pact, but they did not know their nature. 

Notice that these articles only came into light for a broader public in 1945. The 

Cabinet urged the Military Mission in Moscow to ask the Russian Government 

whether the Pact let them to negotiate with Britain against Berlin in case of 

German aggression. 17 

Another attempt was made to clarify the German position. British Ambassador 

to Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson was ordered to meet Hitler in Berchtesgaden. 

Henderson did everything to mollify Hitler and to get information about German 

attempts. Henderson had reached out his brief, did everything he could, but his 

mission had failed. The problem was in the German attitude: when Count Ciano 

asked Ribbentrop what they wanted, Danzig or the Corridor, Ribbentrop replied: 

„Not any more. We want war.” As this was the case, no British ambassador could 

have succeeded in reaching the goal of mollifying Germany. 

As the Germans proved to be adamant on the issue of Poland, and the war 

with Germany began, the British decided to redouble their efforts to 

approximate Moscow. People in the Foreign Office, who were long-standing 

anti-Soviet in heart, such as Sargent, Cadogan, Halifax or Butler, now put their 

faith in this opportunity. 18 A series of trade talks were initiated. 19 Despite their 

previous efforts, after the Soviet invasion of Poland on the 17 September, the 

Anglo-Soviet relations had further detoriated instead of being normalized. The 

invasion had recapitalized the fact that Russia could not be taken as a reliable 

actor in international politics. As Harold Nicolson observed, „It may be that 

within a few days we shall have Germany, Russia and Japan against us. […] It 

is not so much a question of us encircling and blockading Germany; it is a 

question of them encircling and blockading us. […] In a few days our whole 

position might collapse. Nothing could be more black”. 20 As Churchill saw, the 

USSR seemed „no longer an ally, not even neutral, possibly to become a 

foe”. 21 It was clear that the Anglo-Polish Military Assistance Treaty does not 

16 The British war blue book: Miscellaneous no. 9 (1939) Documents concerning German- 

Polish relations and the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on 

September 3, 1939. Farrar and Rinehart, 1939. 49. 

17 CAB 23/100 42 (39) 2. 355. 

18 CARLEY, Michael Jabara: A Situation of Delicacy and Danger: Anglo-Soviet Relations, 

August 1939—March 1940. In: Contemporary European History 1999/2. 178. 

19 The reason behind trade talks was twofold: to open a channel of communication with the 

Soviet, and to obtain timber in exchange for British goods, especially machine tools, tin, and 

cupper. However, both parties were reluctant: the Soviets did not want to alienate the Germans, 

while Britain feared of public opinion in the course of the Finnish War, and they did not want to 

be seen as ‘too anxious’ to start negotiations. Cf. DOERR, op. cit., 429. and 435. 

20 17 September 1939. NICOLSON, Harold: The War Years. Volume II of Diaries and 

Letters. (ed. Nigel NICOLSON). Atheneum, New York, 1967. 34. 

21 COLLINS, op. cit., 26. 

128

efer to the present invasion of Eastern Poland by the Soviet. However, the 

British cabinet cautiously expressed their „indignation and horror” to the 

Russian action, and their commitment to restore the Polish state after the war. 22 

There were also some positive aspects in the fact that the Soviet Union and 

Germany had become neighbors. As Ronald Adam, Deputy Chief of the 

Imperial General Staff had pointed out this could lead to a quick rupture in 

Russo-German relations. 23 Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General 

Staff was on the same opinion as Adam: their new neighborhood might 

„compel the Germans to maintain a very considerable garrison on the Eastern 

frontier”. 24 Thus, a serious attack on the West will be certainly avoided. 

In these days, the British repeatedly interviewed Mr. Ivan Maisky, Russian 

Ambassador to Moscow. These meetings were not really effective, as 

Permanent Under-Secretary of State Cadogan had pointed out: „Maisky very 

embarrassed. Of course he knows nothing”. 25 Anthony Eden suggested that 

Stafford Cribbs should be appointed to special negotiator Moscow, since he is a 

committed Marxist. Maisky refused the appointment of Cripps: in his view, any 

negotiator must bear the full trust of his government. 26 Despite Maisky’s warn, 

Cripps was sent to Moscow in September, as an individual person, whose duty 

was to stay in touch with the Russians. Cripps even suggested to the Foreign 

Office that a non-aggression pact should be concluded with Russia. This 

proposal was immediately torpedoed by Cadogan, who said that the „word nonaggression 

pact are somewhat stinky since 23 August”. 27 

There was another path to reach the Soviet, and this was through the Turkish 

Government. As Russo-Turkish negotiations were pending, it seemed to be an 

amenable way. Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu was residing in Moscow 

from 27 September to 18 October. Any progress in these negotiations was 

cumbersome, because a proposed alliance between Ankara and London was also 

pending, and the Soviets demanded ‘extreme control’ over the Straits. The way the 

Russians treated Saracoğlu frustrated him completely: as his visit overlapped that 

of Ribbentrop, he was not able to meet higher official for a very long time. 28 As 

Saracoğlu had to refuse Russian attempts to take over the control of the Straits, the 

Russo-Turkish talks were unsuccessful. This also put an end to the British attempt 

22 LANE, Thomas: The Soviet Occupation of Poland through British Eyes” In: HIDEN, John, 

LANE, Thomas (ed.): The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War. Cambridge 

University Press, Cambridge, 1992. 143. 

23 DOERR, op. cit., 424. 

24 Ibid. 426. 

25 Ibid. 428. 

26 EDEN, Anthony Eden: The Reckoning. Cassel, London, 1965. 75-76. 

27 DOERR, op. cit., 428. 

28 GÜCLÜ, Yücel: The Uneasy Relationship. Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards the Soviet 

Union at the Outbreak of the Second World War. In: The Turkish Yearbook of International 

Relations (Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı). Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, Ankara, 

1998. 132-135. 

129

to reach out for Russia through the Republic of Turkey. 29 

On the contrary, Anglo-Russian relations further detoriated in November, 

1939. On the 26, the Talvisota, the Winter War began with a Soviet offensive. 

Pressure on the British was getting stronger from the French government and 

the British public opinion. They saw Finland as a free, liberal state just being 

occupied by the totalitarian machine, and expected Great Britain to do 

something. During the war, Anglo-French plans to send troops to Finland was 

recurring several times, but the official British politics did not consider the 

Finnish issue a real heavy one, but any further Russian advancement, e.g. in 

Sweden or Norway „would progressively increase the ultimate threat to the 

security of the British Isles”. 30 On the other hand, the Finn case was not heavy 

enough to put wedge between Moscow and Berlin: as Conservative MP Leo 

Amery wrote to Halifax on 6 December, „the two gangsters will continue to 

cooperate so long as there is loot to be got”. 31 

In December, the Finns also appealed to the League of Nations to condemn 

Soviet aggression and intervene. Originally, the British did not support the 

motion, as Cadogan commented: „Talked to H. [Halifax] about this ridiculous 

summons of League Council and Assembly on Finnish issue question. 

Inevitable but insane”. 32 Due to increasing French support, later the British 

joined these efforts and facilitated the expulsion of the Soviets from the League 

on the 14 December, 1939. Finally, the Finnish collapse in mid-March ruled 

out the Anglo-French military intervention in Finland. 33 

All the British attempts, the trade talks, Cripps’s visit, or the Turkish 

connection had failed to get in touch with the Russians. The Soviet invasion of 

Finland in November 1939 cut off all negotiations between Moscow and 

London for a while. After the fall of Finland, the British took up again the line 

to get in touch with the Russians, but this time Moscow was dismissive. The 

Anglo-Soviet relations were settled only after the beginning of the German 

invasion of the Soviet Union. And this is the point which marks the expiry of 

the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as well. 34 

29 

DOERR: op. cit., 430. 

30 

COLLINS: op. cit., 29. 

31 

Ibid. 31. 

32 

Qtd. in COLLINS: op. cit., 31. 

33 

DOERR: op. cit., 438. 

34 

Ibid. 438. 

130

Ithurburu, Caroline 

The reactions of a french right departement the Basses-Pyrénées 

following the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact’s. 

„The Nazi-Soviet non aggression Pact’s signature got to communism a real 

advantage but still minor and temporary: it apprecialy increased the sales of 

one newspaper, „Humanity”.” That’s how beguns the article on the front of 

page of „Patriote des Pyrénées”, the twenty fifth of august in 1939. The 

department (French territorial division) of Basses Pyrénées, border territory of 

Spain have became a ground of reception for Spanish refugees since 1936. In 

this context, and more since Munich’s agreements, the local administrations 

aim consist on preserving peace and security in the department. 

After the Nazi-Soviet Pact’s signature, it is the communists who arouse the 

highest supervision. The study of press and departements archives shows how 

it is the main concern in the days following the 23/08. On a first time, we are 

going to see the censorship, searches and supervisions set up by the authorities 

further to the pact; then we will study the communist world reactions whereas 

they were accused of treason, and their consequences resulting on searches and 

arrets. To conclude, we will interest on the actions lead by Spanish communists 

refugees, and the way of react of the Gurs’ camp. 

The proliferation of tracts in the days following the revelation of the Nazi- 

Soviet Pact is amazing and of quite origin. From the 26th of august, the Prefect 

makes send a telegram to all his subalterns and police stations which order to 

ban all the meetings and process to the closing of any newspaper adopting a 

behaviour similar to the PCF, as well as the seizure of all periodicals which 

could be, or not, dangererous for the National defense. 1 Four days later, the 

Prefect decided to censor the communist newspaper „l’Etincelle” (the spark) 

thinking that it could reproduce some papers of Humanity and therefore spread 

ideas against French government. In the department, censorship has gone as far 

as investigations on each periodical employees to make sure that there were 

any communist working there. 2 These facts can explain that the most famous 

local newspapers as „Patriote des Pyrénées” and „ l’Independant” don’t write 

any word about local actions lead against communists. 

Indeed, were only published general news or papers about changes that will 

occure with the catch of safety précautions in the department because of the threat 

1 Telegram of the 26 th of august in 1939 from the prefect of Basses Pyrenees to all his 

subalterns and polce stations of the department. Source: main city of department act; collection 

M; departmental archives of PAU; 1M78. 

2 Basses Pyrénées communists list communicated to Police Ministry by secret 

correspondence on the beginning of september. All the local newspapers reply on a positive way, 

more particulary the Patriote of Pyrénées. Source: main city department act and newspapaers 

answers: collection M; 1M81. 

131

of a war interesting rather on civil défense (circulation times, lights out).There is 

only one article in the department which deals with communist’s condamnation 

dated from the 3th of September. It relates several arrests of communists in 

Boucau, Anglet or Bayonne for illegal propaganda on the territory and more 

particulary on Gurs’s camp. This is what is called „communist purge” 3 . 

We can futhermore note that the Prefect of Basses Pyrénées ordered to 

confiscate and to cut all the copies of the communist newspaper from the 

30/08 4 . We can add that at the same time, communist propaganda is 

systematicaly repressed. For example, the 28/08/1939, Hendaye’s policemen 

slashed five posters requiring „a front of peace with URSS”, posted in the city 

by the French association of URSS friends coming from Paris. 5 The censorship 

goes increasing to reach essentially communist camp. 

Pyrénéens communists are beyond by the Pact but they go on defending 

their idol and chief Staline. However, many youngs communists of Biarritz’s 

section have been very surprised by the non aggression Pact between Staline 

and Hitler and have thrown their badge as a symbol. 6 In the Basses Pyrénées, 

the administration have to run not only French communists but also the 

propaganda of Spanish communists who are refuged in the departemnt or coop 

up in the Gurs’ camp until the phenomenon called „la retirada”. 7 

For a few mounths, international relationships make debate between the different 

political parties present in the departement. On july, the opposition between 

Communist Party which has its head office in Boucau and the fascist French popular 

party, appears during a conference at Oloron Sainte Marie. One of the participant in 

favor of an alliance between France, England and URSS accuses „Mister Hitler has 

taken advantage of French division to occupy Rhenanie”. An other declares that 

France and England don’t give to URSS any guarantees in case of an attack and 

claims that the PSF (extremist party) apply a policy of treason to France. 

After the 23/08, Communist party of Basses Pyrénées carries on a 

propaganda to support Staline, posters are multipying : „Nothing is possible 

whithout URSS”, „Get together”, „French politicians make Nazis game”. With 

the announcement of the pact, communists pamphlets try to explain to the 

community Staline’s gesture, position. 

3 Article of the third of september in 1939 published in the Patriote of Pyrénées, relating the 

arrests of 12 communists to have carry communists and anti-governmental tracts. 

4 Main city of department act coming from the Prefect of Basses Pyrénées adressed to Pau’s 

police superintendent and to the special superintendant in charge of Gurs’camp supervision. 

Source: main city department act, départemental archives of Pau: collection M; 1M80. 

5 Main city of department act coming from Hendaye’s police station for Basses Pyénées 

prefect. Source: main city department act, départemental archives of Pau: collection M; 1M80. 

6 Basses Pyrénées’prefect’s mail to Ministry. Source: main city of department act; collection 

M; departmental archives of PAU; 1M78. 

7 „La Retirada”: phenomenon whitch beguns in january and february in 1939 since General 

Franco’s seizure of power in Spain. Many political refugees came to France, more particulary in 

Basses Pyrénées, located on the border of both countries. It will lead to the building of refugees 

camp in the region. The first is the Gurs’one. 

132

It is the purpose of one tract found in Bayonne the 28/08/1939: „French 

citizens. The Nazi-Soviet non aggression Pact is a strong act of peace. It breaks 

the fascist aggressors block. For the first time, it forces Hitler to capitulate at 

twice: in his ideology and in his imperialist designs on Poland. Moreover, 

URSS has not denied the mutual assistance pact with France. With the Nazi- 

Soviet pact, URSS has given a first stop to the war. But these ones (talking 

about Daladier’s government) have shamfully hand over Republican Spain and 

cowardly betray Munich, and seeing their plans againts Soviets revealed, by 

the fear of their big responsability, as thiefs unmasked, crying wrongfully to 

treason, and with the help of the eternal rotten press, and corrupted one, draw 

up a destruction plan against communists in the hope of ruin them and break 

workers unity and stop social progress. Communists, who are ready to 

accomplish all the duties required by Nation defense, contest with vigour the 

illegal abolishment of Humanity realized by fear of truth, and being quietly 

united, strongly scream: Long live To the democratic France. -- to URSS. -- to 

the working class union”. 8 At the same time, PC’s meetings are multipying in 

the department while communists are openly considered as treacherous. 

The 26/08/1939, an important meeting is organized at Boucau. One of the 

participant declares that the Nazi-Soviet Pact is a new evidence of Staline’s 

will to save peace. In another meeting, is explained that the Ribbentrop- 

Molotov pact is not a pact of union and that’s why it is not a treason. 9 

However, during the days following the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the arrests are 

numerous. The first communist arrested is André Moine, head of Boucau’s 

communist section the 30/08 because of defeatist comments and malicious 

actions against government. 10 The 02/09/1939, there will be many searches in 

the department; will be arrested nine communists in Boucau as the mayor of 

the city, his son and the deputy mayor, all arrested to have hand out tracts; 3 in 

Anglet one of them beeing the deputy mayor with 2 local councilors; 2 in 

Bayonne and one in Tarnos. 11 

8 Tracts posted by communist party of Basses pyrénées. Five copies were found in Bayonne 

the 28th of august in 1939 and were sent by Bayonne’s police superintendent to the Bassses 

pyrénées’prefect who inquired the Ministry about it. Source: main city department act, 

départemental archives of Pau: collection M; 1M81. 

9 Meeting in rection to the Nazi Soviet Pact. The second one was secret because of the 

prefectoral ban. Description of the meeting by the police super intendent of Boucau to the prefect 

of Basses Pyrénées. Source: main city department act and newspapaers’ answers: collection M. 

10 André Moine: local councilor of Boucau; regional secretary of communist party, he also 

belonged to the comity of distribution of L’Etincelle. Arrested the 30th of august in 1939, he 

would have encouraged military force to desobey orders. He would have said „Dont’move or 

Staline was right when he signed the Pact with Hitler”. Source: main city department act, 

départemental archives of Pau: collection M; 1M80. 

11 Arrests and searches of the 2 nd of september in 1939. 12 arrests: mayor of Boucau Mister 

Lanusse, his son, the deputy mayor of Boucau Mister Landabourre; the deputy mayor of Anglet Mister 

Laporte and two local councilors of the same town. In a main city department act are reported, since 

the 26 th of august in 1939, 69 searches; arrests of 18 individuals ecause of defeatist comments and 

133

At the same moment, we can note an unrest in the camp of Gurs. The 

Gurs’camp is a refugees camp build by Daladiers government between 15 of 

March and the 15 of April in 1939, next to Oloron Sainte Marie to take in the 

former veterans of Spanish civil war after General Franco’s seizure of power. 

The camp icludes at the RM pact signature’s date Brigadistes (Volonteer 

soldiers and mercenaries coming of Central Europe to support republicans in 

Spain in the international squads.), Basques, Aviateurs and Spanish. In the 

camp, international squads’ section fidget against the government, anticommunists 

increase their propaganda, pamphlets pass hand to hand. In the 

camp, we talk about the second treason of communist Party, the first one 

consisting on leading to the defeat of Spanish army. 

As the pact was revealed, tracts against government are carried by the 

communists which shows quite a weariness because of the government 

inactivity. They proclaim that it must stop or question „what are you waiting 

for Mister Daladier to take plane to Moscow?” 12 The Prefect collaborator of 

Oloron put the territory under hight surveillance and call for help military 

authorities of Pau’s 18 em regiment. 

There are a lot of Spanish communists on the whole territory and that’s the reason 

why we find many Spanish names in the investigations of august and september. 13 

Spanish communists are often more virulents than French ones desappointed by their 

defeat against Franco which condamn them to emigrate in France. They feel 

persecuted once again and violent actions are going to be the expression of this feeling 

as an attack against administration’s premises of Boucau in the course of september. 14 

As a conclusion, it appears that the politics reactions are various in the 

department of basses Pyrénées. The authorities of the department intensify 

repression in the course of days and concentrate more and more their energy to 

control communist party and repress actions lead against government. 

The priority is given to preserv civil peace, and to contain any unrest on a 

territory which already knows backwashes for few mounths whith the Spanish‘s 

arrival. So, as long as the anesthesia of communist units of the department permit 

to reach this purpose, the authorities will adopt an organisation to muzzle them 

with a real effectiveness after the Nazi-Soviet pacts signature. 

malicious actions against government and tracts possession. Some of them were released. Source: 

main city department act and newspapers’ answers: collection M; 1M80. 

12 Communists’tracts found in Gurs’camp the 30 and 31 of august in 1939, handed to Basses 

pyrénées’prefect by the special police superintendent in charge of the camp. Source: main city 

department act, departemental archives of Pau: collection M; 1M81. 

13 List of all the communists of the territory wanted by the Ministry in september 

distinguishing french ones and foreigners in 2 separeted columns. Source: main city department 

act, departemental archives of Pau: collection M; 1M78. 

14 Attack of the 16 th of September in 1939 from spanish communists to protest against anticommunists 

actions facilitated by Daladier’s government. Premices were empty so there was 

nobody died, only some injured persons who were walking near the explosion. Correspondance 

between police station of Boucau and the prefect of basses pyrenées. Source: main city 

department act, departemental archives of Pau: collection M; 1M80. 

134

Dubasque, François 

The German-Soviet Pact and the toing and froing of the French pacifists 

While having a destabilising influence on international relations, the 

German-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939 also had significant consequences for 

French political life on the eve of World War II. For many contemporary 

observers, this event sealed the fate of peace. This is why we thought it would 

be interesting to assess its impact on the pacifist movements which existed in 

the country in 1939. The term pacifism should be interpreted strictly as 

political activism in favour of peace via associations, trade unions, media 

outlets and political groups. The idea would therefore be to determine whether 

the German-Soviet Pact caused the reconstitution of the pacifist movement in 

France and its impact and consequences. 

After outlining a brief description of the group of French pacifists in the late 

1930s, we shall initially focus on the attitude of the French Communist Party 

(PCF) so as to highlight the position of other players, in particular those in 

power, in relation to these new national and international issues. 

Pacifism in France in the late 1930s 

The oldest form of pacifism in the country has been represented, since the 

late 19 th century, by the Association de la paix par le droit (Association for 

peace through law) headed by philosopher Théodore Ruyssen 1 . Based on legal, 

internationalist and positivist ideas, this association supports Léon Bourgeois’s 

post-war initiatives, a former radical-socialist president of the Council 

representing France in the 1919 Peace Conference, in favour of an international 

arbitration tribunal and the League of Nations (LoN). Bourgeois is himself the 

originator of the French Association for the League of Nations, defending 

Aristide Briand’s policy, after which, in the 1930s, he campaigns for collective 

security and disarmament. The shock of World War I widened the audience of 

this moderate type of pacifism situated on the centre left of the political 

spectrum. War veteran associations, in an effort to prevent a new murderous 

madness, joined this campaign, which was part of the Geneva movement. 

At the time of the Munich agreement in September 1938, the political 

landscape of pacifism is becoming blurred with the surprising combination of 

two types of pacifism: a doctrine-based pacifism influences the socialist party 

as well as the powerful related National union of school teachers. Within the 

Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière (SFIO, French Section of the 

Workers’ International), a sizeable fraction, led by secretary general Paul 

1 FABRE, R.: Un exemple de pacifisme juridique: Théodore Ruyssen et le mouvement La 

paix par le droit (1884-1950). In: Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire, vol. 39 (1993), 38-54. 

135

Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. Its attitude is that of British „app easers” for 

whom neither the Spanish war nor the Czechoslovakian question should give 

rise to intransigent positions. During the congress of the Party in Montrouge, in 

December 1938, this faction unsuccessfully opposes Léon Blum’s supporters, 

convinced of the need to put a stop to the expansion of Nazism. It is however 

supported by the party’s far left, represented by Marceau Pivert, who advocates 

revolutionary defeatism. An opportunistic pacifism or neo-pacifism dominates 

the right and far right which renounce their anti-German nationalism because 

of their anticommunism (fear of revolution) and admiration for fascist Italy. On 

27 September 1938, À bas la guerre (No to war) is the headline of L’Action 

française, the newspaper of Charles Maurras and Léon Daudet. 

The Munich Agreement therefore marks the convergence of these different 

types of pacifism, with an audience reaching its pinnacle in France at this time. 

Their campaign for peace reflects the profound relief felt by a majority of 

French people after the Sudetenland crisis. Less than one year later, the 

announcement of the signing of the German-Soviet pact radically changes the 

situation. The ideological turnaround of the French communist Party is the 

most visible reflection of this. 

The consequences of the Pact on the French Communist Party: a return 

to ultra-pacifism? 

As with all communist parties, the positions of the French communist Party 

fluctuated in the 1930s according to Soviet diplomacy. Ultra-pacifists until 1934, 

French communists then discover the existence of negotiations between Léon 

Barthou, minister of Foreign Affairs, and the USSR in 1934. With the signing of 

the Franco-Soviet Pact of mutual assistance in 1935, they evolve into a hard-line 

pacifism tinged with antifascism. Their attitude reflects the new international 

stance of the USSR which has become, since it joined the LoN in 1934, the 

champion of the Geneva ideals via Litvinov, the people’s commissar for Foreign 

Affairs. Their participation in the Universal peace Congress illustrates this 

turnaround. This movement, the Paris branch of which is set up by Pierre Cot and 

Louis Jolivet, affiliated to the Komintern, bridges the gap between the supporters 

of the Geneva spirit and radical antifascists. After the Munich Agreement, the 

PCF, in the name of national defence, now believes in a logic of war. 

This state of mind persists after the signing of the German-Soviet Pact on 23 

August 1939. From 23 to 25 August, the communist media tries to demonstrate 

that the Pact is not incompatible with national defence. On the contrary, the Pact is 

presented as a „peace factor” designed to weaken the enemy by disrupting the anti- 

Komintern Pact. The communists are also expressing their desire to defend the 

2 

DOUGNAC, B.: Paul Faure, biographie (1878-1960). University of Bordeaux 3 

(unpublished, 2006). 

136

country in case of aggression in the Chamber of deputies. On 2 September 1939, 

their parliamentary group votes in favour of military credits demanded by the 

Government. Their evolution from patriotism to pacifism is documented by the 

statements made by the parliamentary group between 2 September and 1 October 

1939. 3 Subsequent to the guidelines sent by the Executive Committee of the Third 

International on 8 th September, the national communist parties implement the 

strategic turnaround decided upon by Stalin on 7 th September. However, in a 

statement published on 9 September, French communists extol the virtues of a 

national union against Nazi Germany. While the information on Moscow’s U-turn 

has undoubtedly reached them before mid-September, the statements of 16 and 19 

September are nonetheless also characterised by a marked anti-German patriotic 

tone. In the statement of the 19 th , the Russian intervention in Poland is justified by 

the desire not to abandon this country to the Nazis. 4 The unconventional reaction of 

the PCF is therefore the unquestionable reflection of its leaders’ indecision – led by 

Maurice Thorez and Jacques Duclos – or even of their reluctance to adopt the new 

line imposed by Moscow after years of antifascist propaganda. 

The PCF’s U-turn and final rallying around the position of the Third 

International is effective at the end of September, during the signing of the 

second German-Soviet pact. On 1 October 1939, Arthur Ramette, head of the 

Ouvriers et Paysans de France parliamentary group (French Workers and 

Peasants) created by the communist leaders after the party was dissolved, 

publishes a letter to Edouard Herriot, president of the Chamber, in favour of 

immediate peace with Hitler. A genuine indictment against war, the 

responsibility of which is shifted onto England and France, this letter reestablishes 

the „class vs. class” language. This change becomes even more 

apparent after Molotov’s speech to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1939, 

which confirms the German-Soviet alliance ratified by the second Pact. 5 On 30 

November, communist MP Florimond Bonte, before being arrested, tries to 

read a statement in which he denounces the imperialist nature of war from the 

Chamber’s gallery. Following the Finland war, presented as a Soviet action for 

peace, the communist propaganda increasingly focuses on revolutionary 

defeatism. The communist turnaround and adoption of an integral pacifism, 

dictated by the Russian policy, deeply upsets the pacifist movement in France. 

The toing and froing of pacifists: reconstitution of the political movement 

According to initial IFOP polls, while 57 % of French people surveyed 

approved of the Munich Agreement in September 1938, only 34 % believe that 

3 For a more detailed study, we shall refer in BOURGEOIS, G.: Drôle de guerre et tournant 

de l’Internationale communiste en 1939. Cahiers Léon Trotsky, n 23 (September 1985). 

4 BDIC, World War II funds, F delta rés 139: PCF (1939-1940). 

5 This speech was reproduced in the Cahiers du bolchevisme, organe théorique du parti 

communiste français, 2 e semestre 1939 (January 1940), 48-51. 

137

war can still be avoided in June 1939. The Prague coup in March, followed by 

Albania’s invasion in April, caused a shift in public opinion. In September 

1939, mobilisation takes place without any protest. Reflecting public opinion, 

the press now campaigns against a new Munich. From left to right, they 

unanimously condemn „Stalin’s betrayal”: Albert Bayet writes an editorial in 

L’Oeuvre of 27 August called „Do not ask us to excuse the inexcusable”. In 

L’Époque, Henri de Kérillis castigates „the USSR’s stab in the back”. 

Numerous political formations and trade unions, outraged by the German- 

Soviet Pact, join this alliance and swell the ranks of the pro-war majority. This 

is the case, on the right, of the nationalists of Colonel François de La Rocque’s 

Parti social français (French social Party) and the Fédération républicaine 

(Republican Federation) of Louis Marin and Philippe Henriot. On the one 

hand, the anticommunists are less tempted to perceive Nazi Germany as a line 

of defence against bolshevism, while on the other the supporters of a tough 

stand towards Germany are not seen to be following Moscow’s orders. Rightwing 

pacifism loses its credibility due to the PCF’s troublesome support of the 

pacifist side. The left wing experiences a similar phenomenon. The Pact 

convinces many pacifists to stop initiating actions in favour of peace so as not 

to disrupt the atmosphere of national union as well as to distance themselves 

from the communists. Thus, the vast majority of the Geneva movement is not 

resolved to an outright peace. This is why Théodore Ruyssen sends a telegram 

to Edouard Daladier, president of the Council, in September to assure him of 

his support. As soon as the Pact is signed, the communists are driven out of the 

Universal peace Congress (RUP), while the Confédération Générale du Travail 

(CGT, Federation of Trade Unions) breaks away from the PCF the day after the 

meeting of the German and Soviet armies in Brest-Litovsk on 18 September 

1939. The SFIO’s situation is more original: on 29 th August, an agenda 

criticising the German-Soviet Pact is voted. However, behind this apparent 

unity, the Pact actually confirms the two positions which divide its beliefs. 

Integral pacifists (Faure and Pivert positions), comfortable with their 

anticommunism, want peace at all costs, on the grounds that a war against 

Germany would benefit the USSR. 

Pacifism is therefore only represented by tiny minorities: on the extreme 

right-wing, the headline of newspaper Je suis partout! of 1 September 1939 is 

À bas la guerre, vive la France! (No to war, long live France). Maurras and 

Daudet’s pacifism is fuelled by hope of defeating the Republican regime. On 

the left wing, the SFIO’s integral pacifists are joined by a group of former 

Briand supporters favouring the motto „neither right nor left”. Among those 

are members of left-wing fringe groups such as Marcel Déat or Gaston 

Bergery, advocating a rapprochement with Germany as part of a federal 

Europe. Thus, the pamphlet entitled Paix immédiate (Peace now), written on 25 

August 1939 by libertarian pacifist Louis Lecoin, bears, alongside the 

signatures of philosopher Alain, writer Jean Giono and Victor Margueritte, 

138

those of Déat, Pivert, Zoretti (a supporter of Paul Faure) and Challaye, an ultrapacifist 

member of the League for human Rights. 

The pacifist influence on French society in the late 1930s fails to survive the 

march to war. Prefectural reports highlight the renewed strength of patriotism 

from the summer of 1939. However, the PCF’s shift has caused the dispersion of 

the pacifist group 6 . By specifically targeting the communists, the Daladier 

government succeeds in marginalising the pacifists during the first weeks of war. 

Muzzled pacifism: the government’s action 

Despite its decline since the spring of 1939, the pacifist movement, which 

had impregnated political circles, retained supporters within the circles of 

power. „The peace party” is a heterogeneous entity recruiting from the right 

wing: MP Scapini, close to the leagues, Pierre-Etienne Flandin, head of the 

Alliance démocratique, as well as left wing: Eugène Frot, Paule Faure or René 

Brunet. This small minority attempts to organise itself into a parliamentary 

liaison Committee involving fifteen MPs and twelve senators. It benefits 

however from solid support in both Foreign Affairs committees, headed by 

radical socialist personalities who have supported the pacifist cause: Henry 

Bérenger in the Senate and Jean Mistler in the Chamber (Mistler, imbued with 

visceral pacifism linked to the trauma of World War I, was a cultural attaché 

for the French legation in Hungary and taught at the university of Budapest). 

The pacifist movement manifests itself repeatedly and launches several 

initiatives. At the end of August and during the parliamentary session of 2 

September 1939, its members closest to the fascists – Bergery, Déat or Pierre 

Laval – attempt to promote Mussolini’s proposition of another peace 

conference. Relying on the World War I precedent, others demand that a secret 

committee meeting be convened to debate possible peace conditions. The 

German peace propositions, at the end of September, are another opportunity to 

make their voice heard. 

Even before the signing of the German-Soviet Pact, parliamentary pacifists 

can count on the support of radical Georges Bonnet, minister of Foreign Affairs 

since April 1939. During the Cabinet meeting of 24 August 1939, Bonnet 

claims that the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact does not have to lead to war. He sets 

out to convince the president of the Council, Daladier, of the importance of 

examining the final peace options. Georges Bonnet, backed by Anatole de 

Monzie, minister of Public Works, also plays the Mussolini card for a new 

Munich. During the next Cabinet meeting on 31 August, he tries again to gain 

his colleagues’ support for the italian proposition. However, his last-ditch 

diplomatic effort comes up against Edouard Daladier’s firm stance this time, 

6 On this question see VAISSE, M.: Le pacifisme français des années trente. In: Relations 

internationales, n 53 (1988), 50. See also VAISSE, M. (ed.): Le pacifisme en Europe des années 

1920 aux années 1950. Bruxelles, 1993. 

139

acked by a „belligerent” coalition which constitutes a majority in the 

government, among whom are Paul Reynaud, minister of Finance, Albert 

Sarraut, minister of the Interior, Georges Mandel, minister of Colonies, and 

Jean Zay, minister of national Education. 7 Georges Bonnet is now ostracised as 

attested by the Cabinet reshuffle of 13 September 1939: he loses the Foreign 

Affairs portfolio and is given the ministry of Justice. This eviction is proof of 

the government’s determination to go to war and its desire to eliminate a 

movement hostile to the patriotic consensus. 

Nevertheless, Edouard Daladier perceives the PCF’s support of the peace 

side as the main threat, not parliamentary pacifism. The measures taken by 

the government against the communists must therefore be interpreted in this 

context. Two days after the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the 

government suspends communist newspapers L’Humanité and Ce Soir and, 

on 26 August, bans the communist press from further publication. One month 

later, on 26 September, before the communists even adopt the „fight against 

the imperialist war” stance, the PCF is dissolved, as is its parliamentary 

group. Subsequently, following the publication of the „letter to Herriot” on 1 

October, the government waits until the end of the extraordinary Parliament 

session, on the 5 th , to launch an investigation into collusion with the enemy 

before the Paris military tribunal. As the MPs supporting the Germany-Soviet 

agreements no longer benefit from parliamentary immunity, the police raid 

the homes of Arthur Ramette and Florimond Bonte that very morning. 

Communist leaders decide to flee : Duclos and Ramette take refuge in 

Belgium while Maurice Thorez deserts his regiment and goes to Moscow. 

The Daladier government has therefore killed two birds with one stone : 

liquidating the communists whose support of pacifism was perceived as a 

threat and avoiding the peace debate in Parliament under the pretence of 

fighting against communists 8 . On 29 September, Paris was aware of the 

German-Soviet call for an overall resolution of the conflict. The final act of 

this deterrent policy aimed at preventing the collusion of pacifists against the 

war takes place at the beginning of December. Further to the Soviet invasion 

of Finland, Daladier seizes the PCF’s assets. From an external perspective, he 

supports the action of the LoN 9 which, putting an end to its strict selfimposed 

neutrality observed since the Pact and the declaration of war, 

decides to exclude the USSR on 14 December 1939. 

7 

See the biography by PUYAUBERT, J.: Georges Bonnet (1889-1973), les combats d’un 

pacifiste. Rennes, 2007. 201-207. 

8 

For more information on this question see BOURGEOIS, G.: Octobre 1939: sortir de la 

crise pacifiste pour continuer à faire la guerre. Communication pronounced in the conference 

Exits of crisis, university of Poitiers, 27-28 November 2008. All our thanks to the author who 

had the kindness to pass on to us the text of this communication before its publication in the acts 

of the conference, in autumn 2010. 

9 e 

PAUL-BONCOUR, J.: Entre-deux-guerres. Souvenirs de la III République, t. III: Sur les 

chemins de la défaite 1935-1940. Paris, 1946. 183. 

140

Conclusion 

In the 1930s, pacifism epitomises a collective mentality which transcends 

partisan divisions. It is also a transnational phenomenon. The German-Soviet 

Pact, more so than the declaration of war, deeply upsets the pacifism movement 

in France. This is the hypothesis we wanted to demonstrate in this brief 

communication. The resulting progressive ideological switch of the French 

communists and their return to ultra-pacifism entirely reshaped this movement. 

In September 1939, self-assured, majority, governmental and anticommunist 

pacifism switches to anti-governmental and minority pacifism, deeply affected 

by the communist support. 

After the Finland war, the communists increasingly focus on revolutionary 

defeatism, while the other pacifist groups are seen to capitulate by mid-June 

1940. A significant number of personalities, who were still campaigning for 

peace at the end of the summer of 39, join the Vichy ranks and collaborate with 

Nazi Germany. This is the case of Georges Bonnet, Paul Faure and Jean 

Mistler, members of the National Council, Marcel Déat, founder of the 

Rassemblement national populaire in 1941, or the European federalists who 

perceive their projects as justification of German occupation. 

141

142

Delmouly, Laura 

The German-Soviet pact in french coursebooks 

„The German Russian agreement can be justified if you look at it from the 

angle of the interested powers, but it did mean a war in the West” 1 . This 

quotation is mentioned in a History school book from 1947, and the agreement 

seems to be the most concrete action that will lead to war. 

A study on the Nazi-Soviet Pact in the French school books allows us to ask 

ourselves how this historical fact was perceived. How was this event taught 

from 1945 till today? For this we will use examples out of books edited from 

1945 till today: 5 books were used between 1945 and 1960, 2 for the years 

1960 till 1970, 2 for the eighties, 4 for the nineties and finally 3 for the years 

2000. However, these books come from different editors (Nathan, Hatier, 

Hachette and so forth), and as the school market is private and the books 

chosen by the teachers, not every student uses the same book. Nevertheless 

right after the war the school books include in their pages the conflict, the facts 

until the victory of the Allied. Therefore the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement 

takes an important place in explaining the conflict to the students. Although the 

war is taught to every French student, it isn’t studied at all levels and the 

programs have often changed. Out of the 16 books that talk about the conflict 

one is used in primary school (that is 6 years old), 2 are for the students who 

are 13/14 years old, 2 for the 14/15 years old, 5 for the 16/17 years old, 2 for 18 

years old used in their last year of high school and then 4 used at a University 

level. Automatically there is a difference in the explanation of the agreement 

according to the age of the student and its level. Also, the school book is often 

a tool and not systematically used by the teacher. 

Equally it is important to mention the fact that school books endure the 

current dominating standards during their edition which has an impact on the 

way of teaching. What was the place given to the Molotov-Ribbentrop 

agreement in the programs? How was this event taught? Was the agreement 

influenced by the different historical events? We will study the way the 

agreement was taught right after the war and than we will show a change in the 

seventies in the way of perceiving the agreement. Then finally we will present 

the way the German-Russian treaty was studied in order to reflect on 

totalitarianism. 

The name itself of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement has known a number 

of different versions; the name Nazi-Soviet Pact or Molotov-Ribbentrop 

agreement emerges in the seventies. The names that were used during the two 

former decades where they talk about „treaty” or „German-Russian 

1 GENET, Louis: L’Epoque contemporaine 1848-1939, classes préparatoires de philosophie 

et de mathématique. A. Hatier, Paris, 1946, 830-831. 

143

agreement” sound anachronistic. 

Even so, even if the name Nazi-Soviet Pact wasn’t used at the time, this 

agreement was studied ever since the new programs dated July 31 st 1947 were 

drawn up. „This signature (which means of course the signature of the 

agreement) is considered to be a desertion that will lead to a war” 2 . „This 

agreement which stunned the world, could do nothing else than precipitate the 

war” 3 . These two quotations put forward in the first place the unexpected 

character of this signature and the amazement of the world seeing this as a 

disruption in the possibility of a union between the different powers. In the 

second place it shows the decisive character of the agreement which leads to a 

war. To explain the agreement we can call in two elements: the element of 

reason and the element of consequence. To understand the foundation of this 

agreement, we attend to an explanation of the different advantages of this treaty 

for the two signing parties. As well, the books present the realistic attitude that 

was shown by Stalin; the agreement is therefore considered to be a political 

manoeuvre that helped Russia to gain time before it started the war. 

And to explain the direct consequences of the agreement, the French school 

books in the years 1945 to 1950 emphasize the Russian neutrality as a factor 

that permits Germany to attack Poland. „In September 1939 Germany invades 

Poland. The democracies, in order to keep peace had made too many 

concessions already (for example the Munich accords in 1938 when they had 

agreed on Germany to have Bohemia). They declare war to the invader” 4 . This 

quotation is interesting because it helps us to see the connection between the 

Munich accords on the one hand and the German-Russian agreement on the 

other hand. A connection that was very clear at the end of the war. From 1938 

on and after the Munich accords, France and England try to keep the illusion of 

peace, but the signature of Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement prevents Russia 

from starting a war with Nazi Germany. „Stalin had made his decision, which 

was to accept an understanding with Hitler, and although he thought the war 

was imminent he preferred to stay apart from the conflict, anticipating 

territorial profits and the adversary forces to wear out”. 5 

In the sixties a much more direct version of this agreement shows up: the 

counter nature of the union is put forward. It refers to the fundamental 

opposition between the two powers in the ideological, political and economical 

field. It is the secrecy around the agreement, signed between the two parties, 

which justify this union. The way of telling History will transform French 

2 GENET, Louis: L’Epoque contemporaine 1848-1939, classes préparatoires de philosophie 

et de mathématique. A. Hatier, Paris, 1946. 830-831. 

3 A. MALET, A., ISAAC, J.: Histoire contemporaine depuis le milieu du XIX ème , classes 

préparatoires de philosophie et de mathématique. Hachette, Paris, 1930, réed 1951. 866. 

4 BARON, Etienne: Histoire de la France, Cours Moyen et Supérieur. Nathan, Paris, 1956. 464. 

5 A. MALET, A., ISAAC, J.: Histoire contemporaine depuis le milieu du XIX ème , classes 

préparatoires de philosophie et de mathématique. Hachette, Paris, 1930, réed 1951. 866. 

144

education. As a matter of fact, the student will exclusively find in his books the 

historical events. It’s a history without end and the agreement will be 

thoroughly described and explained. 

The seventies show a break through (the influence of May 1968) in the way 

of teaching history. We don’t deal with rooted and hierarchical chapters any 

more that encourage continuous reading. Clearly we can observe a wish to find 

a balance between the historical facts, the written documents and the 

iconography. Even if the documents are kind of weak, especially when it 

concerns the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. We can also observe the absence 

of a map of Central Europe which is a pity because it would have helped the 

student to understand the territorial claims from Hitler and Stalin. The 

presentation of the historical facts has the upper hand. „The clear position of 

the Soviet Union, the replacement of Litinov, obtained through a co-operation 

with the West, by Molotov, a very strict interpreter of the Stalin’s realism; does 

this mean a change in orientation of soviet’s foreign politics?” 6 . 

The Soviet Union is at the centre of attention of the European powers. Their 

politics stay very ambiguous, an ambiguity that is made very clear in the school 

books. The soviet foreign politics remain complex, a fact which the school 

books have difficulty to define. 

In the nineties, we observe a big innovation in the making of school books by 

illustrating the facts with documents, made in a way to attract the student. The 

historical facts progressively leave room for written or iconographical illustrations. 

The secret protocol of the agreement is partially copied in the books. To clarify this 

protocol, the school books explain on the one hand the reasons of this treaty or 

agreement (the secret protocol) and on the other hand the consequences. But the text 

that explains the treaty is briefer than it used to be before and uses a vocabulary also 

seen before like „counter nature union” and „the world is stunned”. 

The educational process evolves, because the student is now asked to make an 

intellectual step by using documents. This willingness of showing the treaty 

through a different light continues till the years 2000 in which a new program is 

made in 2002 and 2007. The Nazi-Soviet Pact is considered in a more complex 

way comparing totalitarianism, fascism, Nazism and Stalinism. Their 

resemblances, their dissidences and their expansions have to be explained by the 

student. In 2003 new school books appear full of files and close ups explaining on 

two pages the historical facts that were important and decisive. The two pages 

dedicated to the Nazi-Soviet Pact are composed of a documentary corpus full of 

questions to make students reflect on the event. In 2007 there are two definitions 

that illustrate this double page. The word pact is „an agreement with mutual 

obligations” 7 and the Nazi-Soviet pact is defined as „the signature of August 23, 

6 

BOUILLON, J et JOHN, A.M. et BRUNEL, F.: Histoire: le monde contemporaine 1914- 

1945, manuel de terminale. Bordes, Paris, 1980. 312 à 314. 

7 

LAMBIN, Jean-Marc: Histoire première ES, L, S. Hachette éducation, Paris, 2007. 294- 

295., 316-317. 

145

1939 between Germany and the Soviet Union in which both countries commit 

themselves in not aiming for the other one in exchange of sharing Poland” 8 . 

To conclude, the French school books have explained the Nazi-Soviet Pact 

between 1945 up to today in a different way. Chronologically, this is from 

1945 to 1960, the historical events are privileged even if this secret treaty is not 

explained in a very detailed manner. Then in between 1970 and 1980 we 

observe a break through in the way of teaching History, written documents and 

iconographies are inserted in the lesson. 

Since the years 1990, we see a loss of simply narrating history towards a 

profound reflection on totalitarianism. The German-Russian agreement is put 

forward thanks to an extensive documentary corpus full of questions. 

The treaty has been taught in a continuous way even if the ways of 

explaining this event were different. Nevertheless, we can say that, because of 

the absence of texts written by historians in the school books, they are very 

little influenced by the different historical events that took place during the 

studied period. Education takes into account the evolution in historical research 

on the subject. And like I mentioned before it can also be subject to the choice 

of the teacher, who according to his habits and also according to his political 

position, uses the school books or not. 

8 LE QUINTREC, Guillaume: Histoire première S. Nathan, Paris, 2003. 321. 

146

Richaud, Romain 

Politics’ reaction from a left-wing department about the German- 

Soviet Pact 

In the south of the country, The Landes department was firmly left-wing. Until 

the 1930’S, the radicalism was holding the department. During these years, the 

political deal changed lightly. In big cities like Dax extreme right leagues are created 

and in front of this, antifascist committees were born offently led by communists. 

The Communists are strongly established in cities of Tarnos and Boucau, symbol of 

the worker class with the Forges de l’Adour and the Iron Work, in the south of the 

department. A breeding ground in wich we can find the executive of the party. In the 

same time, the socialists are in a full expansion: in 1936, Charles Lamarque Cando 

became the first socialist elected in the Council Department. 

In 1936, the Popular Front won the legislative elections in France, in most 

departments and in the Landes too. The department got one socialist deputy and 

three radical-socialist deputies. We can object that the republican democracy 

played for them, the popular assembly and the left in general. Radicalism kept 

the first place even if socialists were growing up and communists held their 

position. However, quickly there is disunity. Every formation goes back to its 

position. In their weekly, Le Travailleur Landais, The Socialists denounce the 

radical-socialists too much attached to private property while they refuse to work 

with the communists in the council department. The Communists who write in 

L’Etincelle against radicals, newspaper published in the Basses Pyrénées. The 

latter defended themselves and criticized the other parties in „Le Républicain 

Landais” and „Le Démocrate”. 

It’s now interesting to wonder how they reacted to the Ribbentrop-Molotov 

Pact in august 1939 after a lot of negotiations between the different 

governments. First we will look at the immediate reactions in local socialist 

and radical-socialist newspapers. Then, we will analyse the explanations that 

people at the time tried to find to the signing of that pact. Finally, we will deal 

with the tensions between the different parties, and especially with what was to 

become the „communist problem” 1 . 

Between astonishment and obviousness 

Jean Paul Brunet had shown that newspapers from the right and left agreed 

with the idea that pact was a considerable event. However there is no doubt that 

in our department URSS is the most criticized. 2 

1 La Petite Gironde, 28 août 1939. 

2 BRUNET, Jean Paul: La presse française et le pacte germano-soviétique (août 1939). In: 

Relations Internationales, 1974, n°2. 187-212. 

147

Two ideas emerge from the press: on one hand the failure of that pact and its 

lake of logic for the other hand, which lead politics to consider the pact as 

treason. Le Travailleur Landais’s editorial written by Léon Blum is entitled: 

„After the dramatic turn of the events” 3 . The author is not able „to conceal his 

astonishment” 4 . It’s an upstream act. It went against the events. It’s signed while 

there are negotiations between France, United Kingdom and USSR for a peace 

forehead. It’s not the pact itself which „disturbs” the socialists but the moment of 

its publication. 5 It was published in a veritable European crisis 6 . We find this 

topic too in Lamarque Cando’s words 7 . This member of the Council Department 

wrote on December the 17 th , after his newspaper was not published for some time 

for lack of means and personnel. He called the last edition (26 th august): „The 

event which made the headlines was unfortunately the Soviets treason” 8 . 

For the radical-socialists there is the same sensation but it was toned down 

by another feeling. Effectively, they insisted on the obviousness of this event. 

There isn’t just surprise. The fast conclusion of the pact made them think that 

everything had been prepared beforehand for many weeks 9 . This point of view 

is developed by the regional daily; La Petite Gironde. Its editor, Jacques 

Lemoine, gave a severe opinion on the signing 10 . „In the European sky’s 

darkness, this news was a sudden peal of thunder” 11 . He added that „only 

gullible people could imagine that Germany and Russia were made to fight 

because they had antagonist ideologies”. This newspaper kept this tone in a 

double page entitled: „The dramatic turn of the German and soviet pact” 12 . 

Inside article have an enlightened tune: „Mr Ribbentrop has flown to Moscow 

and the Foreign Affairs secretary signed the pact during that trip” 13 . According 

to Lemoine, Germany and Russia are made to get on or to fight but it’s always 

to the detriment of occidental democracies. So it’s an exceptional pact but there 

3 

Le Travailleurs Landais, Editorial du 26 août 1939. 

4 

Léon Blum, cit. Le Populaire, in Le Travailleurs Landais, 26 août 1939. 

5 

Idem. 

6 

Idem. 

7 

Born in 1901, he started as a teacher and came early in the political arena. Member of the 

SFIO, the formation which grew up during the Popular Front, he created Le Travailleurs Landais 

and became the first departmental secretary of the SFIO in 1937. He was the leader of the 

Resistance movement called Liberation-Nord in the department. At the end on the occupation, he 

led the Departmental committee of Liberation in charge to build the department again. Then he 

followed in a big political career; socialist deputy in 1945 to 1958 and 1962 to 1968, member of 

the Council department in 1936 to 1940 , then 1945 to 1951 and 1967 to 1979. Finally, he was 

mayor from Sabres from 1945 to 1953 then of Mont de Marsan from 1962 to 1983. During the 

1970s, he left the Socialist Party which was changing and went to opposition. He died in 1989. 

8 

CANDO, Charles Lamarque, In Le Travailleurs Landais, 17 décembre 1939. 

9 

La France, in Le Démocrate, journal Républicain Radical Socialiste, publié à Dax, 27 août 1939. 

10 

Jacques Lemoine was the Editorial writer of the daily La Petite Gironde which opened its 

page for the Radical. In 1944, he founded Sud Ouest and he kept the direction until the 1970s. 

11 

Idem La Petite Gironde, 23 août 1939. 

12 

Rubrique Actualités Internationales de La Petite Gironde, 23 août 1939. 

13 

In Le coup de Théâtre du pacte germano-soviétique. La Petite Gironde, 23 août 1939. 

148

is nothing surprising. Then he took on a reassuring attitude asserting that 

„France had known other crisis that she had surpassed” 14 . 

Did he want the public opinion to stay quiet? Or did he want to protect the 

radicals in the government? We don’t know for sure but he was indeed more 

vehement with his political opponent than with Germany or Russia. He stays 

always kind to the government because he considered that „the government had 

tried to settle a peace through negotiations, so there was nothing to blame it 

for” 15 . Moreover, at the end of his editorial he put his trust on the government 

saying: „in these dark hours, we have to trust our leaders whose fearsome 

honour it is by right to steer the history of France” 16 . This last sentence is 

completely rooted in the republican and patriotic ideal. So obviousness and 

astonishment are mixed with realism and republicanism. 

The motives of the Crime 

During the first week which followed the 23 of august politicians tried to 

explain it. Concerning Germany, Blum and socialist advance the idea that 

Hitler wanted to put the disorder inside British and French governments and 

public opinions. Hitler hated the communism and the anticommunist ideology 

is a base of Nazism. So, for them it finally seemed logical that Hitler should put 

his signature on a pact that could benefit him greatly. Indeed we know that it 

allowed him to invade Poland. It was just a diplomatic about-turn to satisfy a 

need: to protect himself from the opening of an eastern front and take over 

Poland. Moreover, not long before, Italy and Germany had signed an antikommintern 

pact. Hitler wasn’t scared of rejecting it, as Jacques Lemoine 

emphasized a few days later in his La Petite Gironde Editorial. This daily was 

more vehement against the führer keeping the idea of a trick: „it is a German 

trick revealed in all its real and cynical cunning” 17 . But he kept the line that it 

was only to be expected from Germany. Generally, the political world in the 

Landes agreed more or less about the motives they could find to the Reich's act. 

Blum wrote a sentence which summed up Hitler’s reasons: „the device used is 

shocking for our reason, but tyranny delivers people of all misgivings” 18 . In Le 

Démocrate we can read: „forgetful of everything that he had said and writen, 

Hitler threw himself into the arms of the red tsar” 19 . He is taken for a trafficker 

of conscience that nobody would listen to again. 

About USSR, we attend a real trial for high treason. For the socialists, 

14 

Editorial du 23 août 1939, La Petite Gironde. 

15 

Idem. 

16 

Idem. 

17 

Editorial du 23 août 1939, La Petite Gironde. 

18 

Le Travailleurs Landais, Editorial du 26 août 1939. 

19 

Le Démocrate, Républicain Radical Socialiste, art. Cynisme, L.Barbedette, n°du 17 au 24 

septembre 1939. 

149

soviets didn’t have motive. Blum advanced the idea that the British and French 

delegations' slowness could have had consequences, but later said he reckoned 

it was a bad excuse. It was really the USSR's, and more particularly Stalin's 

duplicity which was denounced. As Lamarque Cando said „the father of 

common peoples whose earlier propaganda pitted public opinion against 

fascism, and who had shown Hitler as the enemy of liberty is now none other 

than the murderer of Finland, after stabbing Poland in the back” 20 . For the 

radical-socialists L.Barbedette wrote in every edition a critical column with 

titles like: „the soviet cynicism”, „torturers”, „bad faith”, or again „nausea” 

and „the odious soviet attitude” 21 . Column, in which, he criticized deliberately 

the „obvious duplicity” of the „real Asiatic despot” who regret nothing about 

the dirty deed done. 22 

Appreciation we can find lead all at the same conclusion. A few quotations 

will help to understand. Blum claimed that „in this situation we can’t count on 

the USSR” and said that „the collapse of the peace forehead is just a question 

of weeks” 23 . Some socialist would have liked to believe in the soviet power to 

umpire the crisis but they stayed sceptical. Le Travailleur Landais published a 

declaration of Harmel a leader of the CGT: „what is new in the last 24 hours is 

that there is no chance to create an Eastern peace front, the USSR being out” 24 . 

Peace in Europe was more than compromised, and the County Council member 

Lamarque Cando added: „The Ribbentrop-Molotov pact is a bandits' deal” 

settled by „two gangsters” 25 . Needless to say that this hostility to the USSR 

was going to have consequences on all communist parties and in the Landes 

too, where as we have seen it was well implanted. 

Repercussion on the politic life and the „communist problem” 

If we haven’t mentioned the French Communist Party in the Landes until now, 

it’s in order to expose its reaction in this last part. It was in a very tricky position. 

Like at the national level, it was a divided and just about to implode in our left-wing 

department. First we will see its relationships with the other political formations. 

Radical-socialists were always afraid of „a red conspiracy”. That’s why 

criticism went on. L. Barbedette kept his state of mind. An anticommunist 

mind. He said that „we have to tear off the masks of the big leaders who 

deliberately deceived the working class and were in fact doing their utmost to 

spark an armed conflict” 26 . A few days after the signing of the pact, the same 

20 CANDO, Charles Lamarque In Le Travailleurs Landais, 17 décembre 1939. 

21 Le Démocrate, tribunes de L.Bardette des 5-7 septembre, 17-24 septembre, 1 er et 22 octobre 

22 Le Démocrate, art. Mauvaise foi, L.Barbedette, 5-7 septembre 1939. 

23 Le Travailleurs Landais, Editorial du 26 août 1939. 

24 Déclaration de Harmel, CGT, Le Travailleurs Landais 26 août 1939. 

25 Charles Lamarque Cando, in Le Travailleurs Landais, 17 décembre 1939. 

26 Le Démocrate, art. Mauvaise foi, L.Barbedette, 5-7 septembre 1939. 

150

writer affirmed that radicals „had never trusted Stalin or his lackeys” 27 . By „his 

lackeys” he meant French Communist leaders like Duclos and Thorez or 

Gilbert Vital 28 in the department. Beyond the fear of Bolsheviks, he couldn't 

accept that the same party which had led antifascist resistance a few years 

before now approved of this pact. 

There was no chance for communists to find support from the socialists' 

side. The split of Tours in 1920 was still noticeable. Lamarque Cando's 

conclusions were final: „Is there still anyone, who yesterday was a sincere 

communist, to believe in the superiority of dictatorship?” 29 He denounced 

communist leaders. „Between Stalin’s servants, Thorez, Duclos, today in the 

pay of Hitler and us there is a moral incompatibility”. „Between them (Stalin's 

lackeys) and us, there is a murdered peace” 30 . Lamarque Cando was a wellknown 

anticommunist in the department. Pierre Brossollette 31 , another member 

of the SFIO incriminated communist writers like Aragon in Le Travailleurs 

Landais. He reproached them for celebrating the pact as an act of peace in their 

newspapers such as „Ce Soir”. He denounced their „blind and aggressive 

commitment” 32 . He underlined their lack of humility, their lack of decency for 

people who were in antifascist sections and who now applauded „the coming 

together of communism and Nazism” 33 . Socialists didn’t believe the communist 

excuse that if the USSR chose Germany’s side it was to blackmail France and 

Britain and because of their negligence. Politicians were aware that something 

important had happened in the country's political life. Le Démocrate published 

a press release from La Dépêche: „it’s an event which will affect in their 

consciences those who believed in Stalin like you believe in Christ” 34 . (Festival 

du Film from Pessac: Once upon a faith the communism). Jacques Lemoine 

dares to say that „there is just a definitive collapse for the party who linked his 

life to a foreign pawn” 35 . 

Besides outside criticism, something was broken inside the PCF itself. 

Indeed, two main political lines were decided upon. One chose to follow 

27 

Idem. 

28 

From the Sarthe he was hurt during the First World War. He came in the department in 1930 

like electrician. He left the SFIO to the PC. He lost the Council Department election in 1934. He 

was elected town councilor of Soorts-Hossegor in 1935. He allowed the win of the Popular Front in 

the department giving his points to the left candidate. In 1937 he became member of the Council 

department. In 1941 he was summed to stay in his house like the other dangerous communist. In 

1944 he led the Council department of liberation with Lamarque Cando. 

29 


30 


31 

Member of the SFIO in 1929, he started as journalist in Le Populaire. Lieutenant in 1940, he 

went to London and De Gaulle and became a leader of The Resistance in France. He worked in the 

BCRA. In February, 1944, he was taken by German and without talking he committed a suicide. 

32 

BROSSOLETTE, Pierre In Le Populaire, in Le Travailleurs Landais, 26 août 1939. 

33 

Idem. 

34 

Extrait de La Dépêche, in Le Démocrate, 27 août 1939. 

35 

La Petite Gironde, 23 août 1939. 

151

Moscow's line, with the national and some of the local leaders, while the other, 

followed by some militants, took a distance with the USSR. It’s interesting to 

note that grassroots militants were less criticized than their leaders. They were 

deemed „naïve people who had followed Moscow” 36 . As G.Dupau, the former 

secretary of JAF (Young French Farmers) testifies in the department, this event 

was only debated in bodies close to the Party. (Organism who trusted on URSS 

sudden change). And political leaders and rank and file militants were not 

trated the same way; as Daladier said:”the government refuses to consider 

France's workers and communist leaders as one and the same” 37 , accusing 

those leaders of „trying to justify a peace by treason” 38 . 

In the department, communists were discredited too. However we could find 

examples of every tendency. Paul Desarps became in 1925 the first communist 

mayor in the department, in the little town of Tihl. 39 He had been elected on a 

list of workers and farmers. He led an antifascist committee, but in 1939 he 

dissociated himself from the Communist Party when he learnt about the pact. 40 

Somewhere else, Jean Paillé, the secretary of the CGT Trade Union in the 

Department was asked to leave his post. 41 So there were different reactions in 

the local PC, but it was essentially about its local leaders. 

As a conclusion we can say that, like at the national level, this pact was seen 

as a considerable event which revealed the USSR's duplicity and Germany’s 

manipulation. The reactions we talked about left scars in the department, and 

some political leaders like G. Dupau 42 were closely watched by the police 

following the pact. The prefect’s desk was covered with reports concerning PC 

leaders and militants. In most of cases the latter went on with their lives 

without thinking about what would happen to them during the following month 

of September, after the start of the Second World War, hesitating between 

following their leaders and taking their distances. There was primarily a 

merciless fight of political leaders through the press, even between socialists 

and radicals, who only agreed on incriminating the communist party. 

36 Le Démocrate, tribunes de L.Bardette des 5-7 septembre. 

37 Le Républicain Landais, 2 septembre 1939. 

38 Le Républicain Landais, 2 septembre 1939. 

39 Institut d’Histoire sociale des Landes, la construction du Front Populaire, Les Communistes 

40 AD, 1M172, Rapports du des renseignements généraux au préfet sur l’activité des partis de 

gauhe, août 1939 ; +dissolution PCF dans les landes. 

41 Institut d’Histoire sociale des Landes, les syndicats et partis politiques 

42 Born in 1922, he was 17 years old when the pact was signed. He was near the PC because 

he led the JAF a near organism of the PC. He was the secretary of the JAF in the department. He 

led action against german during the occupation but denounced he was send to Sachenhausen 

concentration camp. He came back in 1945 in his town of Carcen Ponson. He spend his life to 

search and work about the Resistance in Landes department and had just published a book in 

2008. La Resistance dans les Landes. 

152

World War II on the territory of Poland 

153

154

Piekarski, Michał 

Lviv at the Beginning of World War Two 

Lviv at the present moment is a city in Western Ukraine located about 70 

kilometers from the Polish border. Nowadays the population of the city is 

about 730.000 inhabitants. The city has always been multinational. 

According to the official Ukrainian data from 2001 there were 88% 

Ukrainians (640.000), 10% Russians (23.000) 1 and 1% Poles (about 6.500) 

in Lviv. 2 According to the data from the Polish Consulate in Lviv there live 

about 25.000 Poles. 3 The name of the city in Latin is „Leopolis”, in German 

„Lemberg”, in Polish „Lwów”, in Ukrainian „Львів”, in Hungarian „Ilyvó”. 

The city is also a multi-religional centre. From the 17th century it was a city 

with three Latin archbishop seats: Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and 

Armenian Catholic. Now only two exist: Roman and Greek. Nowadays it is 

also the centre of Orthodox Church (Ukrainian and Russian Orthodox 

churches) and Armenian Apostolic Church. Before World War Two a big 

Jewish community also lived in Lviv. 

From the 14th century to the 2 nd half of 18th century the city was under 

Polish authority. Between 1772-1918 (for 150 years) the city was under 

Austrian authority as a capital of the new Austrian province called Galicia (in 

German: Galizien). After 1867 Lviv quickly became the main Polish national 

centre (sometimes called „Polish Piemont”). In the same time the city also 

became an Ukrainian national centre for those Ukrainians, who lived in the 

Austro-Hungarian empire. 4 It was the cause of the Polish-Ukrainian fight at the 

end of the First World War (The Battle of Lwów, 1918). After 1918, when 

Poland regained independence, Lviv returned to the Polish state. According to 

the decision of the Council of Ambassadors from March 1923 the city was 

officially granted to Poland. 

During the between-war period Lviv was the third biggest city in Poland. 

Warsaw was biggest the which included almost 1 million inhabitants, Łódź was 

the second with 600.000 inhabitants (the biggest industrial centre in Poland). In 

1931 Lviv had 311.000 inhabitants, which included according to the language 

data about: 198.000 Polish-speaking inhabitants (63%), 75.000 Jewishspeaking 

(24%), 35.000 Ukrainian-speaking (11%), and 3.000 others (including 

1 Анна Вилеґала, Росіяни та російськомовне населення у сучасному Львові. In: Eine 

neue Gesselhaft in einer alten Stadt, [edited by] HENKE, Lutz and ROSSOLINSKI, Grzegorz. 

Wrocław, 2007. 243. 

2 Кароліна Фурманн, Ольґа Томіцька, Йоланта Туровська, Від більшості до меншості. 

Поляки у Львові після 1945 року. In: Eine neue Gesselhaft in einer alten Stadt, [ed. by] 

HENKE, Lutz and ROSSOLINSKI, Grzegorz. Wrocław, 2007. 160. 

3 Ibidem. 

4 However the number of Ukrainians in Austro-Hungarian empire was not so big in 

comparison with the number of Ukrainian people in Russian empire. 

155

2.000 German speaking inhabitants). 5 There were almost no Russian 

inhabitants (There was only one small orthodox church in Lviv). A large part of 

Jewish intelligence was Polish-speaking. According to the religion data in 1931 

in Lviv there lived: 157.000 Roman Catholic (50%), 100.000 Jews (32%), 

50.000 Greek Catholic (16%), and 2.000 Protestants (0,6%). 6 Most of the 

Ukrainians were Greek Catholic, but there was a small group of Polish Greek 

Catholics too. 7 Lviv was the second important cultural and educational city in 

Poland after Warsaw. The University in Lviv was famous in whole Europe. 

There worked such famous professors as Stefan Banach and Roman Ingarden. 

Poland and Lviv at the turn of August and September 1939 

In the between war period two important non-aggression pacts were signed by 

Poland. The Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact was signed on 25 of July 1932 

and on May 5 1934 was extended to December 31 1945. The German-Polish 

Non-Aggression Pact was signed on 26 of January 1934 for a period of 10 years. 

In August 1939, when the war was expected Poland started some 

preparations before the Nazi aggression. The Polish emergency defense plan 

„Zachód” („The West”) did not take Lviv into account because the city was far 

away from the Western border. A military garrison was stationed in Lviv, 

which, from February 1938, was commanded by general Władysław Langer. 

Infantry was the biggest part of the garrison. 8 

The events which happened on the 1 st of September were first to show that 

the plan was not well-thought. On the 1 st of September at 11.30 a.m. Nazi aeroplanes 

started to bombard the city. 83 people were killed and 100 were injured. 9 

In the evening of the 2 nd of September, when the message that France had 

declared war on Germany was popularized, plenty of people were singing the 

melody of the French national anthem near the residence of the French deputy, 

who went outside his house to listen to them. On the 3 rd of September Lviv 

railway station was bombarded. There were manifestations in front of the 

French and English consulates because of a declarement of war on Germany by 

France and England. 

On the 2 nd of September in the Polish Sejm (the lower chamber of the Polish 

parliament) in Warsaw Wasyl Mudry – the chairman of the Ukrainian political 

party (UNDO) 10 – assured of the loyalty of the Ukrainian community and also 

5 WNĘK, Konrad, ZYBLIKIEWICZ, Lidia A., CALLAHAN, Ewa: Ludność nowoczesnego 

Lwowa w latach 1857-1938. Kraków, 2006. 263. 

6 Ibidem. 249. 

7 http://www.kki.pl/pioinf/przemysl/dzieje/rus/grekokatolicy.html 28.02.2010 

8 WŁODARKIEWICZ,Wojciech: Lwów 1939. Warszawa, 2007. 16-18. 

9 Kronika 2350 dni wojny i okupacji Lwowa 1IX 1939 – 5 II 1946, [edited by] MAZUR, 

Grzegorz, SKWARA, Jerzy, WĘGIERSKI, Jerzy. Kraków, 2007. 36. 

10 Ukraińskie Zjednoczenie Narodowo-Demokratyczne (The Ukrainian National Democratic 

Alliance). From 1929 in Poland functioned also illegally another Ukrainian political party called 

156

said that Germans are a common enemy for Ukrainians and Poles. 11 On the 5 th 

of September because of the fact that some Ukrainians committed sabotage, the 

Polish general Władysław Langer made a request to the Greek Catholic 

archbishop Andrej Szeptycki to maintain the peace. Archbishop Szeptycki 

wrote an official letter to Ukrainians with information that Germans are a 

common enemy for Poles and Ukrainians. 12 

On the 7 th of September general Władysław Langer started to organize a 

regular defense of Lviv. At that time many Polish scouts and students took part 

in the defense. Most of them held weapon for the first time 13 . Despite the 

official letter of the Greek catholic archbishop some Ukrainians continued to 

commit sabotage cooperating with Nazis. On the 12 th of September the Nazi 

division, which was conducted by Ukrainians, omitted the Polish defense line 

and came to Lviv. The division was stopped by Polish counterattack. Polish 

inhabitants started to be afraid of Ukrainian citizens, and a few Ukrainians 

were shot without any judgment 14 . 

The command of the Nazi army was determined to seize Lviv as fast as 

possible. On the one hand it was an important military-strategic place. On the 

other hand, it was connected with the army’s prestige. 15 During the next days 

there were strong German bombardments. The Lviv power station, the gasworks 

and the municipal water supply system did not work. The city 

population grew by 100.000 people, who were refugees from the central 

Poland. A large part of them came from Warsaw, which was strongly attacked 

from the west side by the Nazi army. Food supplies started to run out. 

Lviv defending itself against two enemies 

The general head-quarters of the Red Army decided to attack Poland, on the 

17 th of September, 2 hours after midnight the Soviet-Ukrainian Front under the 

command of general Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko (Семён 

Константинович Тимошенко) forced the Polish border. In the Soviet Radio 

general Molotov said: „The Soviet government commanded the Red Army to 

cross the Polish border in order to protect inhabitants of the West Ukraine” 16 . 

Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) which was 

under the strong influence of the Nazi Germany. 

11 WŁODARKIEWICZ,Wojciech: Lwów 1939. Warszawa, 2007. 41. 



13 Wspomnienia uczestników obrony Lwowa we wrześniu 1939 roku, [prepared by] 

WOJTYCZ, Janusz. Kraków, 2002. 102. 



15 LEINWALD, Artur: Obrona Lwowa we wrześniu 1939 roku. In: Rocznik Lwowski [red.] 

WASYLKOWSKI, Janusz. Warszawa, 1992. 37. 

16 Ibidem. 50. 

157

The Eastern Polish border was not ready to be defended. The Polish 

government and the Polish army did not plan a two-front war. Most of the 

Polish army was involved in the fight with the Nazi army. The Eastern Polish 

border was not defended by any anti-tank rifle. 17 There was no solution for the 

Polish government. On the same day at 10. a.m. the president of Poland Ignacy 

Mościcki left Poland crossing the Polish-Romanian border. The Commanderin-Chief 

of Poland's armed forces Marshal of Poland Edward Rydz-Śmigły 

commanded Polish army to cross the Polish-Romanian and the Polish- 

Hungarian border. The West-Soviet Military Group was commanded to seize 

Lviv between 18-22nd of September 18 . 

The Polish General Command sent an instruction to general Langer 

including an order to fight only with Germans. Fighting with the Red Army 

was to be taken only in case of self-defense. On the 18 th of September the Nazi 

army pointed the 21 th of September to be the day of the general attack. 

According to the fact that the Red Army crossed the Polish border, general 

Langer said to the mayor of Lviv, Stanisław Ostrowski, that it is impossible to 

fight with two enemies, that is why he planned to surrender Lviv to the Red 

Army, because of its Slavic nature. The mayor of Lviv did not want to do it. 19 

Stanisław Ostrowski made an appeal to Lviv administrative officers and other 

officers calling to appear at work. Most of them came to work helping Lviv 

inhabitants. A large number of volunteers were helping in reparations of the 

municipal water supply system which had been bombarded by Nazi planes. The 

provision of food was organized. Milk was provided only for families with 

small babies. Most of Lviv doctors joined the sanitary points. 20 

German agents tried to have a meeting with the Polish Supreme Command, but 

they had to return because of the Polish refusal. German agents said only that „if 

Lemberg surrenders to Germans, it will still be in Europe. If Lemberg surrenders 

to Soviets, it will be in Asia” 21 . This fact is quite interesting – a local German 

command did not know about the German-Soviet division of Poland, which was 

planned in August. German command decided to attack and seize the city. 

Two hours after midnight on the 19 th of September Soviet tanks came to the 

suburbs of Lviv and were raked by Polish armoured cannon. Soviet tanks 

returned. Soviet division seized a small city Winniki (6 kilometers from Lviv). 

At 2 o’clock p.m. the division of the Red Army was attacked by the German 

17 WŁODARKIEWICZ,Wojciech: Lwów 1939. Warszawa, 2007. 137-138. 


Grzegorz, SKWARA, Jerzy, WĘGIERSKI, Jerzy. Kraków, 2007. 48; see also: 

WŁODARKIEWICZ,Wojciech: Lwów 1939. Warszawa, 2007. 142. 

19 Ibidem. 51-52. In Lviv there were 25 battalions of foot soldiers, 3 troops of cavalry, 78 

cannons, 16 ack-ack guns. The reserve of food for the civil inhabitants were calculated for 2-3 

months. Ammunition was calculated for 2 weeks. 

20 „Goniec Wieczorny”. Lwów 18.09.1939. 

21 LEINWALD, Artur: Obrona Lwowa we wrześniu 1939 roku. In: Rocznik Lwowski [red.] 


158

division because of the general attack on Lemberg which had been planned by 

Germans. Three Soviet soldiers were killed and three German soldiers were 

killed too. Soviet delegation, which came to Winniki required of Germans to 

back away from eastern Galicia. Germans did not want to do it. 22 

On the same day Germans edited a leaflet in Polish to the Polish inhabitants 

and Polish defense ordering them to surrender Lviv in 2 days. The leaflets were 

spread by planes. The main sentences were: „The Polish government escaped 

abroad. […] The Polish army has been totally beaten-up. […] Russians are 

well-disposed to Germans. […]The city must surrender by September 21” 23 . 

The German ultimatum was refused by general Langer. 

On the same day the Soviet head-quarters edited leaflets in Polish to the 

Polish defense, which were also spread by planes. The main sentences were: 

„Soldiers! 60.000 Polish soldiers joined voluntarily to the Red Army. […] Do 

not believe your officers! They want your death! Let’s beat your officers! […] 

Only the Red Army can liberate one Polish nation from war” 24 . 

In the eastern suburbs of Lviv the agents of the Polish defense had a 

meeting with a group of Soviet officers. A Soviet officer said that The Red 

Army had come to fight against Germans. He demanded to come to the city. 

Polish agents rejected. On the same day the Nazi army surrounded Lviv. In the 

evening Germans gave Soviets an ultimatum to back away to the east. Soviets 

refused. 

In the evening of the 20 th of September Soviets came to an agreement with 

Germans. Germans agreed to desist from attacking Lviv because of the 

Führer’s command: „Lemberg has to be left for the Red Army. The attack on 

Lemberg planned before should be immediately halted” 25 . On the 21th of 

September in the morning German army started to move away from the 

surroundings of Lviv. The Red Army was ready to attack Lviv. General Langer 

commanded not to shoot to Soviets. There was the first meeting between Polish 

and Soviet command. The Soviet commander said that the Red Army came to 

help fight against Germans. 

Lviv under the Soviet occupation 

In the evening there was a meeting between the mayor of Lviv, Stanisław 

Ostrowski, and general Langer. General Langer decided to capitulate although 

in the city there were about 15.000 Polish soldiers ready to fight with the Red 

22 

WŁODARKIEWICZ,Wojciech: Lwów 1939. Warszawa, 2007. 176; see also: Kronika 

2350 dni wojny i okupacji Lwowa 1IX 1939 – 5 II 1946, [edited by] MAZUR, Grzegorz, 

SKWARA, Jerzy, WĘGIERSKI, Jerzy. Kraków, 2007. 52. 

23 

Kronika 2350 dni wojny i okupacji Lwowa 1IX 1939 – 5 II 1946, [edited by] MAZUR, 


24 

Ibidem. 54. 

25 

Ibidem. 55. 

159

Army. The mayor of Lviv did not want to surrender the city. Finally at the 

night between 21-22 th of September, the mayor of Lviv decided to surrender the 

city. The mayor of Lviv added conditions to the protocol of capitulation: 1. The 

autonomy of the city authorities has to be held. 2. The management of hospitals 

and schools has to be held. 3. Polish as an official language has to be held. 4. 

The freedom of confession has to be held. 26 General Langer signed the act of 

capitulation on the 22nd of September at 8 o’clock a.m. The act of capitulation 

was also signed by the Soviet agency. Soviets had an ambition to seize the city 

very quickly. In the Red Army there were officers who remembered the fact, 

when in 1920 Red Army could not seize Lviv. 27 On the same day the Red 

Army entered into the city. The agreement of capitulation guaranteed freedom 

for Polish officers and soldiers. Soviets did not keep their word. Most of the 

Polish officers were arrested and murdered by the NKVD (Народный 

Комиссариат Внутренних Дел) in 1940. Soviets rejected the conditions added 

by the mayor of Lviv to the protocol of capitulation. Later a large number of 

Polish professors were also arrested and finally deported to lagers or 

murdered. 28 

Before September 1939 Lemberg had never been under Russian authority 

(except the short time from September 1914 to June 1915). Almost none of the 

inhabitants could speak Russian. On the 24 th of September general Langer was 

talking in Tarnopol (a city about 150 kilometers from Lviv) with Nikita 

Sergeyevich Khrushchev (Никита Сергеевич Хрущёв), who assured him of 

adhering to the agreements of capitulation. A few days later general Langer 

was transported to Moscow. On the 27 th of September the Polish mayor of Lviv 

Stanisław Ostrowski was arrested by the NKVD and transported later do 

Moscow. 29 

On the 28 th of September the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty 

was signed in Moscow by Ribbentrop and Molotov. After the „universal 

referendum” on the 31 th of October Lviv and eastern Galicia were formally 

included to the Soviet Union as a part of Ukrainian Soviet Republic. In the 

official propaganda the results of the referendum showed the political will of the 

inhabitants of Eastern Galicia to join to the Soviet Union, which had been 

expected even before the referendum. 30 After the referendum Molotov 

announced in Moscow: „the end of former Poland”. He said: „There is nothing 

left from the grotesque formation created by The Treaty of Versailles, which was 

26 

Ibidem. 58. 

27 

LEINWALD, Artur: Obrona Lwowa we wrześniu 1939 roku. In: Rocznik Lwowski [red.] 


28 

DRAUS, Jan: Uniwersytet Jana Kazimierza we Lwowie 1918-1946. Portret kresowej 

uczelni. Kraków, 2007. 91-103. 

29 

Kronika 2350 dni wojny i okupacji Lwowa 1IX 1939 – 5 II 1946, [edited by] MAZUR, 

Grzegorz, SKWARA, Jerzy, WĘGIERSKI, Jerzy. Kraków, 2007. 67-69. 

30 

„Czerwony Sztandar” 18.10.1939; see also: „Czerwony Sztandar” 21.10.1939. 

160

ased on oppressing non-Polish nations” 31 . This information was announced in 

„Czerwony Sztandar” („The Red Banner”) - a new newspaper published in Polish 

in Lviv from October 1939. A totally new era started in Lviv. 

Conclusion 

The events from September 1939 in Lviv were very spectacular. The third 

biggest city in Poland was not taken into account in Polish emergency defense 

plan from late August 1939. It was the reason why Lviv was an easy target for 

Nazi planes. Despite the badly prepared defence plan, general Władysław Langer 

was able to organize spontaneous defence, which involved many young people. 

The day of 17 th of September was a final „stab in the back” for the Polish state. 

Lviv was attacked by two large armies from two sides – which had not been 

predicted by the Polish government and the army. This situation perfectly shows 

the essence of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. The Polish city had no chance to 

help them. General Langer and the mayor of Lviv had to choose one enemy to 

surrender the city. Actually they had no choice, because everything had been 

decided on the 23 rd of August 1939 in Moscow. Not so much later the Polish side 

found out the hard way that agreements signed by the aggressor would not be 

adhered to. The events from September 1939 also show two different attitudes of 

the Ukrainian community in Poland. Some of them were loyal to the Polish state, 

others committed sabotages cooperating with Nazis. 

To sum up, September in 1939 for Lviv and Lviv inhabitants started a 

totally new era. Before September 1939 Lviv had never been under Russian or 

Soviet authority. The city through hundreds of years belonged to Western 

European civilization. Poland and Central Europe lost definitely an important 

and interesting cultural and educational centre. The fact that Lviv das not 

belong to Poland nowadays is a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. 



161

162

Ligeti, Dávid 

The German-Polish War in 1939 based on the Memoir of the 

Hungarian Ambassador to Warsaw 

On the 1 st September 1939 at 5 45 a. m. explosions shook Warsaw. The 

Hungarian ambassador András Hory woke up, and realized suddenly, that the 

war started. The Polish capital was under attack by German bombers. One hour 

earlier the operation „Fall Weiß” had began, which meant that the Wehrmacht 

invaded Poland. Two days later the German-Polish war transformed into a 

World War, because Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. 

Although the Polish army fought bitterly and heroically against the Germans, 

she was in a hopeless situation especially when the Soviets launched their 

invasion on the 17 th of September. 1 Poland was divided for the fourth time in 

her history. Hory described the gloomy events of September 1939 in his 

memoir under the chapter called the German-Polish War. It was published 

partly in 1987, however, the rest of his manuscript is available in the Hungarian 

Academy of Sciences. 2 In this paper I want to present some details of the 

German-Polish War on the basis of the memoir of the Hungarian ambassador in 

Warsaw, representing the tragic and shocking effect of the infamous Molotov- 

Ribbentrop Pact. 

Before we recall the events of September of 1939, I want to give a brief 

biographical sketch of Mr. Hory. He was born in 1883 in Kolozsvár (today: 

Cluj-Napoca, Romania). He studied law at the university of Kolozsvár, but he 

spent several months in France and Germany, too. After his studies 3 he worked 

as a public servant. In 1917 in the First World War, he served briefly at the 

Eastern Front. That year he was sent to the occupied territory of Romania, in 

order to organize food transportations for Austria-Hungary. After the war, he 

worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hungary, and his lucky star raised 

fast. Between 1921 and 1924 he worked as a leading clerk in Bucharest. 

Afterwards until 1927 he was ambassador in Belgrade, and held the same 

position in Rome until 1934. One year later he was appointed ambassador in 

Warsaw. This diplomatic post was not too important for Hungary. Although 

Poland was traditionally an important international friend of the Hungarians, 4 

the current international political situation was more relevant both for 

1 It is worth mentioning and emphasizing, that Great Britain and France did not declare war 

on the Soviets after attacking Poland, which was their military ally. 

2 HORY, András: Bukaresttől Varsóig [From Bucharest to Warsaw]. Budapest, Gondolat, 

1987. Ed. PRITZ, Pál. (The original manuscript-signature is: MS 10. 864/1-10., henceforth I 

refer to the two part of the 5 th chapter as HORY/MS/I-II). 

3 Hory received the ‚king-ring’ for his continuous excellent school progress until his doctor degree. 

4 For example, in 1920, Hungary sent valuable ammo transportations to the Polish army, 

which fought in a tight corner with the overwhelming Soviet-Russian invaders. 

163

Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two countries were indifferent to each other, 5 at 

least until 1938. In the time of the Munich agreement both Poland and Hungary 

had territorial claims against Czechoslovakia. Therefore the importance of 

Hory’s post increased also (too). When the Poles annexed the Olsa region, and 

Hungary seized South Slovakia, the relations were more polite and worshipful 

between Warsaw and Budapest. 

On the 30 th January 1939 Hory could speak for two minutes with Mr. 

Ribbentrop himself, when the German foreign minister travelled to the Polish 

capital in order to consult on the latest developments of the European policy. 

Hory would have wished a longer negotiation; because he wanted claim the 

further Hungarian border-revision intentions against Czechoslovakia. 

Ribbentrop rejected Hory’s offer, mentioning that Germans also suffered the 

consequences of the peace treaty of Versailles, and „we hate everything, which 

remind of that”. 6 When Hitler destroyed the truncated Czechoslovak state in 

the spring of 1939, Hungary took over the north-eastern part of its former 

territories, 7 resulting in a common Polish-Hungarian border. Like his fellow 

countrymen, Hory was pleased with this event; he said later that these were one 

of the most beautiful days of his life. 8 Unfortunately, this new border existed 

only half a year. 

The chapter is divided two parts: the first one is a summary about the 

interwar international relations of Hungary, in the second one Hory narrate his 

experiences of September 1939 based on his diary-notes. 

On the 23 rd of August 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed. Like 

most of the foreign diplomats, Hory took notice of this Bolshevik-Nazi 

agreement with astonishment. In his memoir he referred to the Mein Kampf, in 

which Hitler proclaimed a crusade against the red plague. 9 The Hungarian 

diplomatic staff felt and knew, that the alliance and non-aggression pact 

between Germany and the Soviet Union meant the end of Poland, as 

contemporaries used the expression „finis Poloniae”. 10 The Hungarian Minister 

for Foreign Affairs, István Csáky, told Hory on 26 th August, that Poland would 

be divided, but, he thought Kraków and the nearby territories would remain 

independent, like puppet-states. Two days earlier Csáky and Hory declared, 

that Hungary would not attack Poland, and that he will not allow for the 

German troops to cross the country. Although the British-French diplomacy 

made all efforts to prevent and avoid the war, they could not stop the 

5 HORY/MS/I: 8. 

6 HORY/MS/I: 27. HORY: 254-255. 

7 ROMSICS, Ignác: Hungary in the Twentieth Century. Budapest, Corvina-Osiris, 1999. 199. 

„Between 15 th and 18 th March 1939 at the cost of only some minor skirmishes, the Hungarian 

army marched into Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.” The region received this new name after 1920, 

because before that the appellation of the province didn’t exist before the Czechoslovakian rule. 

8 HORY/MS/II: 2. 

9 HORY/MS/I: 33. 

10 The end of Poland (Latin). 

164

aggressive German foreign policy. 11 The escalation of the conflict pressed the 

diplomats to organize a day-to-day meeting in the Hotel Europa. 

In the first hours of the war, as they mobilized their armed forces, 12 the Polish 

government was content and self-confident. The Polish generals believed that their 

troops would be able to march into Berlin. Hory noticed a conversation with Prince 

Czartoryski in May 1939, which well describes the Polish belligerence. The prince 

said: „Lord and peasant will fight with the same enthusiasm, our wives and 

daughters will fight with us.” 13 Hory did not gave any information about the 

German diplomatic effort toward Hungary, which wanted the participation of 

Hungary against Poland, but, „at very least by allowing the German army to use 

the railway lines in the recently regained north of Hungary.” 14 

The building of the Hungarian embassy was only 100-150 meters from the 

Ministry of Defence, and the Headquarter, therefore these buildings were the first 

targets of bombings. While anti-aircraft guns were forced to fire continuously, 

the German shells weakened the resistance shortly. Hory’s office was under 

pressure of many civilians, most of them Hungarians, who asked for help in 

travelling back home. The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Beck met 

Hory in the afternoon of the 1 st September. Beck was angry about the German air 

attack on Warsaw, because it had been declared an open city. The anxiety was 

growing in the capital day to day. In the diplomatic quarter the most alarmed 

ambassador was the U.S. ambassador, Mr. Biddle, who always carried his gas 

mask with himself. On the 4 th September a meeting was organized for all the 

ambassadors. Mr. Ditleff, Head of the Norwegian Embassy invited his 

colleagues. The doyen diplomat stated four questions for the government: 

a) Does the government stay in the capital or prefer leaving Warsaw? 

b) Does it tell the new headquarter the ambassadors? 

c) The embassies which behaviour do present in this situation? 

d) If the diplomatic staffs must have been evacuated, how does the 

government provide for transportation and values? 

There were two opinions about the future of the embassies: the majority of 

the diplomats wanted to leave the capital. The minor group preferred to stay 

with the government, and they proposed the evacuation, if it escapes the 

capital. Hory joined to this group, arguing that the diplomatic staffs were 

delegated to the Polish government, not to mayor of Warsaw. The shrewd 

espousal influenced many diplomats in their decision. In evening of that day 

Hory‘s butler looked on an air combat over the capital, which resulted the 

defeat of Polish fighters and flaks. In spite of the common opinion the Germans 

11 

Great Britain and France guaranteed the integrity of the Polish borders on 31st March 

1939. HORY/MS/I: 30. 

12 

Nevertheless the Polish mobilisation suffered a little delay, because the western Allies did 

not propose the too early war preparations in order to avoid any possible provocations. 

13 

HORY/MS/I: 31. 

14 

ROMSICS, Ignác: Hungary in the Twentieth Century. Corvina-Osiris, Budapest, 1999. 199. 

165

could not destroy the Polish Air Force on the ground at the beginning their 

offensive, but they gained early air superiority. However the Polish fighters 

were outnumbered and swept fast from sky. After that the continuous bombings 

massacred without any resistance the defenceless civil population, by 19 th 

September in Warsaw „so many thousands of Poles had already been killed by 

air […] that the public parks were having to be used for burials.” 15 

On the 6 th September the Polish government resettled the diplomatic staffs 

to Krzemieniec (today: Kremenets, Ukraine). This city was on the Soviet 

border. Hory was afraid of the situation. He recognized that any further 

withdraw was impossible. The relationship between the Polish and Soviet 

border guards was very good. On the 10 th September Hory was ordered: he had 

to follow the Polish government. One day later the Soviet diplomacy casted a 

shadow over Poland: the Soviets called back their ambassador from Warsaw. 

Hory felt that the Soviet revisionism would be deadly for Poland. The diplomat 

noticed that the priests and the believers prayed for rain: the unusually dry 

weather greatly helped the German Blitzkrieg. Next day the Germans could 

bomb Krzemieniec: the city did not have any air defence, so the attack 

transformed to a massacre. Hory was shaken from the bloody events, and 

noticed the cruelty and brutality of the war. He already saw battlefields of the 

Great War, but in this war most of the victims were children and woman. On 

15 th September Hory travelled to Czernowitz, Romania. He decided to travel 

Hungary instead of Romania, rejecting the invitation of the Romanian 

government. Hory distrusted the Romanians, 16 and did not follow the Polish 

government to Bucharest. The coming events justified him, because the 

Romanians interned the Polish government, and that part of the Polish army, 

which escaped to Romania. Romanian troops had deployed in the frontier 

regions, but of course, they did not help their official allies, the Poles, 

moreover Romania would build up a good neighbourhood with the Soviet 

Union. It is a bitter irony, that both Krzemieniec, and Czernowitz were 

occupied later by the Soviets. 

Two days later divisions of the Red Army marched in East Poland. Molotov 

justified the perfidious attack, that „since the Polish Republic was no longer in 

existence, measures were being taken to protect the inhabitants of western 

Byelorussia and western Ukraine.” 17 The Soviet rhetoric used always the term 

‘liberate’ instead of occupy, moreover the Pravda summarized the 

achievements of Nazi-Bolshevik alliance, that we „liberated our brothers of the 

same blood.” 18 In addition, Nazi newspapers also glorified the Soviet military 

15 GILBERT, Martin: The Second World War. A Complete History. Holt, New York, 1989. 10. 

16 Hory’s suspicions were based on experiences of the Great War, when Romania attacked 

his former ally, Austria-Hungary. 

17 DAVIES, Norman: God’s playground: a history of Poland in two volumes. Clarendon 

Press, Oxford, 1981. Vol. II. 437. 

18 DAVIES, Norman: God’s playground: a history of Poland in two volumes. Clarendon 

166

intervention, and the fruitful German-Soviet cooperation. The infamous and 

ignominious defeat of 1920/21, which was ratified by the Peace Treaty of Riga 

was avenged by Bolsheviks. The Soviet aggression was mysterious for the 

shaken western diplomats, who did not know the secret clauses of the Molotov- 

Ribbentrop Pact. 19 The intervention and the alliance with Nazis undermined the 

belief of Hungarian communists and social-democrats, too. After Hory left his 

post, the German-Polish War continued for two weeks. The last Polish units 

surrendered on 5 th October. In spite of the superior German tactics and 

equipment, „the Polish campaign was no simple walk over. The Germans 

suffered a total of 50, 000 casualties and lost 500 aircraft and over a thousand 

armoured vehicles.” 20 It is remarkable, that the Polish army could resist more 

than one month against the Germans, while the Soviets launched an 

unpreventable offensive their hinterland. The Polish performance is more 

valuable, if we take into consideration, that the army of France, the Low 

Countries, and Great Britain could stop the German war machine for the same 

time in 1940. Hory felt pity on the unfortunate fate of Poland, namely in the 

First World War, here struggled the opposite sides for years, so the country 

suffered many casualties. 21 

In autumn of 1939 more than 100.000 refugees arrived to Hungary through 

the common border. The Polish soldiers, who fled to Hungary, were able to 

rejoin the allied forces later, and continue the war against the Nazism, and the 

civil people could stay in security until March of 1944, when the Germans 

occupied Hungary. During the Polish campaign the Hungarian Prime Minister, 

count Pál Teleki „secretly organised a Hungarian legion, which was sent to 

aid the desperately defending Polish army and subsequently after the fighting 

was over, opened Hungary’s borders to a flood of refugees.” 22 Summarizing in 

autumn of 1939 the allied Nazi-Bolshevik war machine crushed the 

international system which was created by the Peace Treaty of Versailles. 23 The 

annihilation of Poland was the first diabolic aftermath of the Molotov- 

Ribbentrop pact. Finland hardly could stop the Soviet aggression in the Winter 

War of 1939/1940, but, the country had to hand over 10% its former territory. 

While the German forces occupied the Low Countries and France in June 1940, 

the Baltic states had fallen victim to the Soviet offensive policy, and lost their 

Press, Oxford, 1981. Vol. II. 444. 

19 

Churchill emphasized the situation: „Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an 

enigma.” DAVIES: 439. The secret clauses of the pact revealed only in 1946, but denied by the 

Soviets until 1989, „provided for the joint division of eastern-central Europe and the partition of 

Poland”. Jerzy LUKOWSKI: A concise history of Poland. Cambridge University Press, 


20 

LUKOWSKI: 225. 

21 

HORY/MS/II: 38. 

22 

ROMSICS: 200. 

23 th 

Molotov declared on 30 October 1939, that „the hideous creation of the Peace Treaty of 

Versailles” [i. e. Poland] has been vanquished. LUKOWSKI: 226. 

167

independence, Romania was forced to deliver up Bessarabia and North 

Bukovina. 24 In spite of the fact, that the OSCE 25 shared the responsibility for 

starting the Second World War between Germany and the Soviet Union, many 

historians denied the role of Soviet state. According to their opinion, the 

Soviets wanted only create a defensive zone on the western border to increase 

their safety. The left-wing historians state that the Soviet Union was not an 

aggressor, but they neglect the fact that the League of Nations excluded the 

Bolshevik state after the sneaky attack against Finland. the European Council 

With these conquests the Soviet Union almost restored the formerly western 

borders of the Russian Empire in 1914. 

Hory went on leave and choose to go home, to Budapest. He met also with 

Teleki, but he did not mention any interesting detail about the discussion. It is 

worth commenting on, that in his memoir Hory did not mention the raising of 

the Hungarian Legion, and the rejecting behaviour of Hungarian foreign policy 

in case of the cooperation with the Germans against Poland. When he finished 

his work in 1959, he wanted also publish it. This was the reason, that the retired 

diplomat did not criticize sharply the Soviet behaviour in 1939/40. Like his 

contemporaries, and the whole circle of Hungarian historians until 1989, Hory 

gloss over the unpleasant fact, that Germany and Soviet Union made an 

alliance, which resulted that the liberty in Eastern Europe ceased to exist. 

In October 1939, few weeks after the Polish Armageddon, Hory saw in 

Vienna a newsreel about the war, and he recognized that the building of the 

Hungarian embassy in Warsaw was completely destroyed by German bombs. 

Hory felt that the Nazi offensive smashed achievements of his life-work. 

Although he maintained his societal status and he retained his importance in the 

Hungarian foreign policy until his retirement in 1941, he was among the first 

Hungarians, who could envision the coming fate of Hungary in the mirror of 

the Polish collapse in 1939. For Hory himself the Polish catastrophe broke his 

diplomatic career and in Warsaw he lost many part of his properties. In 1962 

the elder diplomat could leave Hungary and settled in Vienna, where he died in 

1971. He could not live to publish his memoir. 

The worst consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for Eastern 

Europe was that the Soviet annexations of 1939-1940 were recognized by 

the western Allies, too 26 and Poland got the same Soviet occupation for 

reward which Hungary, and Romania for punishment. Therefore the Soviet 

overwhelming political and military presence was unquestionable in Eastern 

Europe until 1990. 

24 In case of North Bukovina the Soviet revisionism turned into pure expansionism: this 

region belonged to Austria-Hungary before the First World War. 

25 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 

26 In 1945 „on the terriorial issues to the west Stalin’s minimal aid was to preserve the old 

Russian imperial frontiers which had stood before the German assault, and, indeed, were 

recognised in the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.” ROMSICS: 221. 

168

Grether, Sandra 

Pogroms in Eastern Poland after the German Occupation 

The Reich‘s attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 broke the treaty both 

countries had signed just two years earlier, guaranteeing each other neutrality 

and secretly dividing Eastern Europe into two areas of interest, the so-called 

Hitler-Stalin-Pakt, or, more accurate, Molotow-Ribbentrop-Pakt. 1 Following 

roughly sketched borderlines, the territory of the Second Polish Republic was 

divided between the two partners in mutual interest - and left it to further 

negotiations whether these regions were to be incorporated into the Reich and 

the Soviet Union or to be given some state of independence. The Hitler-Stalin- 

Pakt had guaranteed the Reich the Soviet Union‘s neutrality in case of its attack 

on Poland, which took place only a couple of days after the signing and was 

followed by the invasion of Soviet troops into the Eastern parts of the country 

within two weeks. Both countries installed regimes in their respective zones of 

former Poland, forming them according to their plans and also forming the 

people living in these regions. In 1941 the Wehrmacht thus first conquered 

territories that had been occupied by the Red Army in 1939 in accordance with 

the Pakt and the Eastern Polish people‘s reaction to the invasion were in large 

parts due to their treatment by the Soviet occupants. 

One especially prominent phenomenon in this context is the willingness 

locals showed in taking part in German units‘ atrocities against Jews. With 

German soldiers arriving, Poles, Ukrainians and White Russians unleashed 

pogroms against their Jewish neighbours, often triggered by German units, but 

more often without. Their motivation has been the basis of a widespread 

discussion a few years ago, initiated by Bogdan Musial. 2 

The events leading to these pogroms and the question why the Jewish 

population of Eastern Poland fell victim to their neighbours in June and July of 

1941 was the basis for a presentation I gave in December 2009 as part of a 

conference on the Molotow-Ribbentrop-Pakt and is the basis for this paper. I 

would like to show how the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland 1939-1941 

deepened contradictions within the local societies and how these tensions led to 

anti-Semitic riots once the Red Army left and the German armies approached. 

As this paper‘s main focus of interest are events in the summer of 1941, the 

German occupation of Poland from 1939 on as well as developments after the 

German invasion of the Soviet Union will only be taken into account when of 

1 Non-aggression treaty between the Reich and the Soviet Union („Nichtangriffsvertrag zwischen 

Deutschland und der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken”), 23rd August 1939, cited from 

http://mdzx.bib-bvb.de/cocoon/1000dok/dok_0025_pak.html?object=translation&lang=de, 19.3.2009. 

I will use the term Hitler-Stalin-Pakt because it is more common. 

2 MUSIAL, Bogdan: „Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen” - Die Brutalisierung 

des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941. Berlin 2001. 

169

importance for the events considered here. Further developments in Germanoccupied 

Poland and Eastern Europe, especially the Holocaust, would be too 

big a topic for this paper. 

I will first take a look back on the two years of occupation in either part of 

the former Polish Republic, before analysing possible reasons for the pogroms 

in the summer of 1941. 

The Hitler-Stalin-Pact 

The Hitler-Stalin-Pakt‘s ultimate goal, as the secret additions show, was to 

destroy the Polish state, which had only been established in the course of 

remodelling Europe after World War I. 3 The Germans had - ever since the 

treaty of Versailles - lamented the loss of land and people and, in Beata 

Kosmala‘s words: To revise the new borderlines was of the highest priority to 

all parties during the inter-war years. 4 The Soviet Union too had lost territories 

in the wake of WWI, but also had to deal with additional losses after the 

Soviet-Polish war of 1921. 5 Nevertheless - the Polish government felt save in 

its position between two political opponents, who would - as the Poles hoped - 

never find a common ground and would never unite against Poland. 

It was the ever harsher German rhetoric during 1939 that caused Great 

Britain and France to assure Poland of their assistance in case the Germans 

would dare to announce war. Both countries had been negotiating with the 

Soviet government about some kind of alliance, but they did not show much 

earnest and the Soviet leadership reached out for a more eager partner. 6 When 

the Reich showed interest in a non-aggression treaty, it was a matter of days 

before it would be signed on the 23rd August 1939 by von Ribbentrop and 

Molotov respectively. There are various explanations for this sudden change of 

policy of which Geoffrey Roberts‘ can be taken as a good example; he sums 

up: Stalin did not want to start a war in 1939, but feared that he would be an 

easy victim and thus engaged in the dangerous alliance with Hitler. 7 

3 Secret additions to the treaty of 1939 („Geheimes Zusatzprotokoll zum Deutsch- 

Sowjetischen Nichtangriffsvertrag”), 23rd August 1939, cited from http://mdzx.bibbvb.de/cocoon/1000dok/dok_0025_pak.html?object=translation&lang=de, 

19.3.2009. 

4 KOSMALA, Beata: Der deutsche Überfall auf Polen - Vorgeschichte und 

Kampfhandlungen. In: BORODZIEJ, Wlodzimierz (Ed.): Deutsch-polnische Beziehungen 1939 - 

1945 - 1949 - Eine Einführung. Osnabrück, 2000. 21. 

5 OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 26. 

6 OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 79-87. 

7 ROBERTS, Geoffrey: Stalins Kriege - Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zum Kalten Krieg. 

Düsseldorf, 2008. 51. See also 45-63, and OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, 

Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 87-92. Soviet Foreign Affairs 1939: O‘SULLIVAN, Donald: „Je 

später man uns um Hilfe bittet, desto teurer wird man sie uns bezahlen” - Die sowjetische 

Außenpolitik zwischen dem Münchner Abkommen und dem 22. Juni 1941, in: THOMAS, 

Ludmilla und KNOLL, Viktor (Ed.): Zwischen Tradition und Revolution - Determinanten und 

Strukturen sowjetischer Außenpolitik 1917-1941. Stuttgart, 2000. 157-203. 

170

The attack on Poland 

World War II started, when the Reich attacked Poland on the 1 st September 

1939, immediately followed by Great Britain‘s and France‘s announcement of 

war against Germany in favour of Poland. While the Wehrmacht marched 

through Poland in a couple of days, the Soviet leadership hesitated and attacked 

the country only when asked to do so by their German allies from September 

17th on. By September 28 th the whole of Poland was occupied and therefore 

could be divided according to the secretly defined boarders. The German as well 

as the Soviet military leadership immediately started to form an administration. 

There was no more talk about a possibly independent state of Poland. 8 

The German occupation of Western Poland 

The Western areas of former Poland, occupied by the Germans were divided 

into different administrative zones. The once German regions were 

incorporated into the Reich as so-called Reichsgaue, while the Polish core-land 

became the Generalgouvernement für die besetzten polnischen Gebiete. While 

building a civil administration, it was the German Einsatzgruppen‘s task to 

control and persecute the Polish people. The Einsatzgruppen were linked to 

regular Wehrmacht units and were ordered to fight against partisans, to stop 

resistance of any kind and to evict political opponents. They could use all 

means necessary and they did so when hunting down the Polish elite and Jews. 9 

The Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland. The Red Army as liberator 

As did their German ally, the Soviet leadership was eager to incorporate the 

newly claimed areas, starting with a radical change of their social structure. 

Geoffrey Roberts summarises the economical actions taken and also mentions, 

that the main target of Soviet intervention was the Polish minority in 

predominantly White Russian and Ukrainian areas, as they were seen as a 

8 MERRIDALE, Catherine: Iwans Krieg - Die Rote Armee 1939-1945. Frankfurt am Main, 

2008. 89. German-Soviet treaty of friendship („Deutsch-Sowjetischer Grenz- und 

Freundschaftsvertrag”), 28th September 1939, cited from http://mdzx.bibbvb.de/cocoon/1000dok/dok_0027_gre.html?object=translation&lang=de 

19.3.2009. 

9 The Einsatzgruppen‘s order can be seen in the so-called „Kommissarbefehl”: 

Richtlinien des OKW vom 6. Juni 1941 für die Verfolgung und Liquidierung politischer 

Funktionäre („Kommissarbefehl”). In: Europa unterm Hakenkreuz - Die faschistische 

Okkupationspolitik in den zeitweise besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion (1941-1944). 

Berlin, 1991. 145. See POHL, Dieter: Der Völkermord an den Juden. In: BORODZIEJ, 115. 

For the cooperation between Wehrmacht and Einsatzgruppen see OLDENBURG, Manfred: 

Ideologie und militärisches Kalkül-Die Besatzungspolitik der Wehrmacht in der Sowjetunion 

1942. Köln, 2004. 39-49. and ANGRICK, Andrej: Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord-Die 

Einsatzgruppe D in der südlichen Sowjetunion. Hamburg, 2003. 64-68. 128. 

171

possible future opposition to the Soviet system. 10 The Soviet plan too intended 

to erase the political, military and mental leadership of Poland and to leave no 

opportunity for organised resistance. The mass shootings in Katyn and other 

places have reached sad prominence among the many crimes of this war. 11 

With regard to the Ukrainian and White Russian people, the Soviet 

propaganda claimed that the Red Army had come as a liberator from their Polish 

oppressors. 12 According to David Murphy, the Red Army‘s arrival was - in part - 

actually seen as the long-yearned liberation from the Polish yoke. He attributes 

this feeling in large part to the Ukrainian‘s and White Russian‘s hope for national 

independence. As he states, the people in these regions had no actual knowing of 

the Soviet state and thus no idea of what they were to expect. 13 

Following the statement of liberation, the former Eastern Polish territories 

were incorporated into the Ukrainian and White Russian SSRs respectively, 

according to the majority of people living in a given area. The population was 

ordered to elect assemblies and vote in favour of the incorporation, which they 

did. 14 These votes were, as Wanda Krystina Roman puts it, the juridical and 

political basis for overtaking the Polish territories. 15 And George Sanford goes 

even further, in claiming, that the incorporation was the basis for a wide range 

of terror against the former Polish citizens. Passports were handed out to the 

inhabitants of the newly acquired territories, they became Soviet citizens; this 

gave the Soviet leadership not only legal power and control over its new 

subjects, but also unleashed the whole range of terror unto them. 16 The 

liberators and helpers soon became prison-wards. 17 

10 

ROBERTS, Geoffrey: Stalins Kriege - Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zum Kalten Krieg. 

Düsseldorf, 2008. 61. 

11 

For Katyn see SANFORD, George: Katyn and the Soviet massacre of 1940 - Truth, justice 

and memory. London, 2007. OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei 

Hamburg, 2003. 95. 

12 

SANFORD, George: Katyn and the Soviet massacre of 1940 - Truth, justice and memory. 

London, 2007. 20. Soviet Note to the Polish government, 17th September 1939, cited from 

KENNAN, George F.: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941. Princeton, 1960. 179. 

13 

MURPHY, David E.: What Stalin knew - The enigma of Barbarossa. New Haven, 2005. 31. 

14 

According to GROSS, the population became accomplices by taking part in these elections, as 

they accepted the Soviet‘s rules. GROSS, Jan T.: Revolution from Abroad - The Soviet conquest of 

Poland‘s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. 54. By contrast Honigsman, 

whom one has to attribute a very subjective Soviet-Ukrainian-Jewish point of view, speaks of an 

atmosphere of euphoria. HONIGSMAN, Jakob: Juden in der Westukraine - Jüdisches Leben und 

Leiden in Ostgalizien, Wolhynien, der Bukowina und Transkarpatien 1933-1945. Konstanz, 2001. 114. 

15 

Nevertheless her Polish perspective: ROMAN, Wanda Krystina: Die sowjetische Okkupation 

der polnischen Ostgebiete 1939 bis 1941. In: CHIARI, Bernhard: Die polnische Heimatarmee- 

Geschichte und Mythos der Armia Krajowa seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. München, 2003. 94. 

16 

SANFORD, George: Katyn and the Soviet massacre of 1940 - Truth, justice and memory. 

London, 2007. 24. Sanford further explains that Stalin used these events later to claim the 

incorporation of these territories on the conferences of Yalta and Teheran. The treatment of Polish 

prisoners as counterrevolutionaries was, according to Sanford, another output of it. 40-42. 

17 

OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 93. 

172

The Soviets were - officially - not occupying former Eastern Poland, but 

started building local administrations immediately. 18 These administrations 

were to consist of the dominant people, that is, Ukrainians or White Russians. 

Both nations, even though they made up the majority in their main regions, had 

been subdue to forced Polish polonization politics during the inter-war years 

and had thus, especially the Ukrainians, adapted a very aggressive nationalism. 

They now expected, believing the Soviet propaganda, to be able to build their 

own state within the Soviet Union. 19 

Jews as part of the new administrations 

Naturally, the Soviets had no intention of having these nationalists in the 

new local administrations, at least not in leading positions; and, in addition, 

most Ukrainians and White Russians were peasants and did not posses more 

than basic education. Old civil servants, who had been part of the Polish 

government, were no basis for recruiting new cadres either. Because of this, the 

Soviet leadership had to take whatever else they could get. 20 While many 

leading positions were taken over by cadres from the Soviet union, middle and 

lower ranks had to be filled with locals, and, as Jan T. Gross states, the Soviet 

power expected to be able to teach everyone the necessary knowledge. 21 

Considering this situation, the new administrations welcomed every 

acceptable person willing to help; their first choice were often Jews, even 

though they were not part of one of the titular nations. Jews had been 

discriminated against in the Polish Republic and did not have the chance to be 

government officials but were educated and ambitious. When the boundaries of 

the old regime broke down, they were eager to take any possibility they could 

get and involved themselves with the new regime. The new state symbolised a 

chance for social mobility which they embraced. 22 

Proportionally Jews were not represented in a bigger amount in the new 

administration than the other nationalities (besides the Poles), but in the eyes of 

the locals, they were. According to Jan T. Gross there was a proportionally high 

18 MURPHY, David E.: What Stalin knew - The enigma of Barbarossa. New Haven, 2005. 32. 

19 POHL, Dieter: Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944 - 

Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens. München, 1996. 25-27. 

GROSS, Jan T.: Revolution from Abroad - The Soviet conquest of Poland‘s Western Ukraine and 

Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. 31. ROMAN, Wanda Krystina: Die sowjetische Okkupation 

der polnischen Ostgebiete 1939 bis 1941. In: CHIARI, Bernhard: Die polnische Heimatarmee- 

Geschichte und Mythos der Armia Krajowa seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. München, 2003. 91. 


des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941. Berlin 2001. 39. 

21 GROSS, Jan T.: Revolution from Abroad - The Soviet conquest of Poland‘s Western 

Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. 52. 

22 For anti-Semitism in interwar Poland see WEISS, Yfaat: Deutsche und Polnische Juden 

vor dem Holocaust - Jüdische Identität zwischen Staatsbürgerschaft und Ethnizität 1933-1940. 

München, 2000. 105-116. 

173

ate of communists within the Jews of former Eastern Poland, who, in fear of 

the Germans, attached themselves to the Soviet state. He claims that the Soviet 

occupation was the lesser evil to them. 23 Bogdan Musial on the other hand puts 

great impetus on the thesis that the Soviet administration of former Eastern 

Poland was dominated by Jews and that they, enthusiastically took part, 

especially the youths, because they hoped to become part of a new society. His 

sources are, as he admits, subjective impressions of the then living. 24 

The various nationalities of Eastern Poland had been constantly struggling 

with each other but it had almost always been the Jews who were the weakest 

part. The other nationalities could at least always rely on the common victim, a 

victim who was also socially distinctive from the mostly peasant Ukrainians 

and White Russians and the Polish upper classes. 25 Pogroms were not 

uncommon and had only found an end in inter-war Poland but historical 

relations had so far not had the chance to be overthrown. 

Jan T. Gross explains that every nation only saw its own suffering following 

the Soviet invasion with no regard to the others, which he attributes to the 

already existing animosity between the different nationalities. 26 The non-Jews 

were thus more than suspicious regarding the Jews‘ role in the new 

administration: They were helping the Soviet occupying forces and they took 

over positions that had not been open to them in the past. Their sudden 

presence could not be not realised. Where there had been no Jewish civil 

servants at all, the appearance of only a few was already a great change. 27 As 

Jan T. Gross tries to explain further, the people considered authority as 

something alien to the peasant society of Eastern Poland to which one had to 

subdue oneself. To be ruled by the Jews, who were traditionally the lowest 


Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. 32. „And here is the principal clue to the 

joyous atmosphere surrounding the entry of Soviet troops: where they came, the Germans did 

not.” But, Gross further states, soon many Jews, having fled from the Western part of the country, 

changed their minds and opted to return there. 206. 


des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941. Berlin 2001. 58. http://h-net.msu.edu/cgibin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-soz-u-kult&month=0105&week=b&msg=ZHvgkM0ea75 

Uep82ym 

%2B8uA&user=&pw= 21.3.2009. For a similar opinion see HONIGSMAN 113. 


Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens. München, 1996. 24. 

MUSIAL, Bogdan: „Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen” - Die Brutalisierung des 

deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941. Berlin 2001. 27. 


Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. xxii. 

27 MUSIAL, Bogdan: „Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen” - Die 

Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941. Berlin 2001. 65. POHL: 

Judenvernichtung pp. 29-31. For an analysis of the „traditional” connection of Jews and 

Communism see POHL, Dieter: Der Völkermord an den Juden. In: Borodziej 113. For the 

connection of nationalism and anti-Semitism see LEY, Michael: Kleine Geschichte des 

Antisemitismus. München, 2003. 103-111. 

174

anks of society was considered an insult by the Soviets. 28 Jews were now 

associated with the Soviet regime. 

Terror against society 

It was the Soviet leadership‘s intention to implement the same political and 

economic rules in their newly acclaimed territories that had been existing in the 

Soviet Union for some 20 years. 29 Following Dieter Pohl, the conditions of life 

in the Soviet-occupied areas worsened constantly. 30 The occupying forces, even 

if they liked to not see themselves as such, persecuted anyone whom they 

expected to act against the new regime. Who had been registered as a political 

enemy was put into prison or was deported. 31 Jan T. Gross and Wanda Krystina 

Roman show, how the Soviet leadership used existing tensions within the 

nationalities of Eastern Poland and how the people themselves got rid of 

possible enemies. 32 

The regime soon terrorised its new subjects as it had been doing so with the 

people in the Soviet Union for over 25 years. While on the one hand, local 

animosities were used, on the other hand systematic terror was unleashed: It 

was the NKVD (the Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, Народный 

комиссариат внутренних дел), the Soviet secret police, that exercised this 

terror. Thousands of people were arrested and put into special prisons where 

they were tortured and killed. The NKVD soon symbolised violence and 

injustice - and the horrors of occupation - and was one of the main reasons why 


Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. 56. 

29 OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 93-95. 

ROMAN, Wanda Krystina: Die sowjetische Okkupation der polnischen Ostgebiete 1939 bis 

1941. In: CHIARI, Bernhard: Die polnische Heimatarmee- Geschichte und Mythos der Armia 

Krajowa seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. München, 2003. 96-99. 



31 SANFORD, George: Katyn and the Soviet massacre of 1940 - Truth, justice and memory. 

London, 2007. 28. GROSS, Jan T.: Revolution from Abroad - The Soviet conquest of Poland‘s 

Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. 149: „Poles were typically sentenced 

as counterrevolutionaries in the service of the bourgeoisie, Ukrainians were sent to labor camps 

as nationalists, and Jews were imprisoned as speculators.” And further: „Under the new regime 

anyone, at any time, in any place and for any reason was vulnerable to arrest.” 151. Numbers 

related to the deportations vary, to give an impression see ROMAN who states that according to 

new calculations some 316.000 to 325.000 former Polish citizens were deported into the Soviet 

Union, including 200.000 Poles, more than 70.000 Jews, 25.000 Ukrainians, 20.000 White 

Russians and a few thousand Germans, Lithuanians, Czechs and Russians. 105. 


Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. 39. ROMAN, Wanda Krystina: Die 

sowjetische Okkupation der polnischen Ostgebiete 1939 bis 1941. In: CHIARI, Bernhard: Die 

polnische Heimatarmee- Geschichte und Mythos der Armia Krajowa seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. 

München, 2003. 93 and 99. 

175

the initial positive feeling towards the Soviet Union changed. Many NKVDactivists 

had been sent to the occupied regions from the core regions of the 

Soviet Union, but there were also locals who cooperated and got involved with 

the NKVD‘s crimes. It was in this context that Jews were disproportionally 

high noticed. 33 

The German attack on the Soviet Union. Militia 

The Wehrmacht marched over the border between the two occupational 

zones in June 1941, starting a new phase of the war. While approaching rapidly 

towards Soviet core land, the Germans were greeting by locals with mixed 

reactions. Some cheered the them as liberators from the Soviet occupation 

while expecting national independence under German rule, some had heard of 

German atrocities in former Western Poland and did not expect anything good 

from the new occupation. 34 

The retreating Red Army was hunted by militia units that popped up 

everywhere and often acted in accordance with the Wehrmacht. The formation 

of these units most often took place after the Germans arrived and it was their 

duty to implement Ruhe und Ordnung in the hinterland. 35 It were mostly 

Ukrainians, who again hoped to be able to form an independent state, who were 

eager to help the Germans. 36 The militia cooperated with the German 

Einsatzgruppen on their mission to persecute Jews and communists merciless. 37 

Pogroms 

After having taken a look back on the events leading up to the German 

invasion of former Eastern Poland in 1941, attention will now be thrown, for 

the rest of this paper, on a single aspect of the following events.: The pogroms 

that took place in many smaller and larger towns and cities of former Eastern 

Poland as the Germans approached. 38 In cases these excesses had already been 

33 

ROMAN, Wanda Krystina: Die sowjetische Okkupation der polnischen Ostgebiete 1939 

bis 1941. In: CHIARI, Bernhard: Die polnische Heimatarmee- Geschichte und Mythos der Armia 

Krajowa seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. München, 2003. 91. 

34 

GROSS, Jan T.: „Jeder lauscht ständig, ob die Deutschen nicht schon kommen” - Die 

zentralpolnische Gesellschaft und der Völkermord. In: BORODZIEJ, 230. See also 

MERRIDALE, Catherine: Iwans Krieg - Die Rote Armee 1939-1945. Frankfurt am Main, 2008. 

308. and ANGRICK, Andrej: Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord - Die Einsatzgruppe D in der 

südlichen Sowjetunion. Hamburg, 2003. 132-134. 

35 

38 Ruhe und Ordnung meaning „quiet and order”, a phrase used in German to symbolize a 

situation under control. 

36 

POHL, Dieter: Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden. In: PAUL, Gerhard (Ed.): Die 

Täter der Shoah - Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?, Göttingen, 2002. 207. 

37 


38 

POHL, Dieter: Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden. In: PAUL, Gerhard (Ed.): Die 


176

started when the Germans entered a town or city, triggered by a vacuum of 

power in the short period between the abandonment of these towns by the Red 

Army and the arrival of German units. In other cases, Germans took advantage 

of an already existing mood to start pogroms or they initiated such anti-Semitic 

riots. 39 Although he could not find any written directive, Dieter Pohl assumes 

that these events had been coordinated because they took place in such similar 

forms and in such parallel ways everywhere. 40 

Background to these riots were the experiences of local people during and 

with the Soviet occupation as well as historical relations of the region‘s 

nationalities as shown above. After their torturers had left, people were looking 

for someone they could hold responsible for everything they had to endure and 

they accepted whomever they could find, which in these cases most often were 

their Jewish neighbours who stayed behind and who were associated with the 

occupational regime. 41 As I already showed, the Jewish percentage within the 

administration was not higher than that of any of the other nationalities, but 

people felt it was. Jews were generally associated with the Soviets. 42 

The Bogdan-Musial-controversy 

A few years ago, the historian Bogdan Musial made a case, when he 

claimed that the NKVD‘s crimes where the one initial that caused the violent 

excesses against Jews. When the local people discovered the thousands of 

bodies the NKVD had killed only hours before they fled, the people, according 

to Musial, had wished to take revenge. - A good description of these atrocities 

may be found in Richard Overy‘s book. 43 

Musial is eager to explain the riots not as actions triggered by the soon-to-be 

German arrival, but as a sole reaction to these discoveries. The locals had 

POHL, Dieter: Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944 - Organisation und 

Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens. München, 1996. 60. An.107 lists, with regard to 

Weiss, pogroms in 58 towns in the Western Ukraine, as well as in various villages. 

39 For example the pogrom in Lemberg (Lviv) had been initiated by Wehrmacht units, see POHL, 

Dieter: Schauplatz Ukraine - Der Massenmord an den Juden im Militärverwaltungsgebiet und im 

Reichskommissariat 1941-1943. In: FREI, Norbert et al. (Ed.): Ausbeutung, Vernichtung, Öffentlichkeit 

- Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Lagerpolitik. München, 2000. 139. 


Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens. München, 1996. 57. See 

also HILBERG, Raul: Täter, Opfer, Zuschauer - Die Vernichtung der Juden 1933-1945, Frankfurt 

am Main, 1992. 220. 



42 POHL, Dieter: Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden. In: PAUL, Gerhard (Ed.): Die 


43 OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg-1941-1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 185. 

BERKHOFF, Karel C.: Harvest of Despair-Life and death in Ukraine under Nazi rule. 


177

wanted to take revenge for the NKVD‘s crimes and had unleashed their grieve 

in pogroms. He puts this explanation in contrast to older interpretations of the 

events by insisting on these riots being started before the Germans could 

motivate the people to such reactions. 44 He further claims that the riots had 

been of anti-communist character whereas one not only has to understand 

members of the communist party, but also everyone who had been working 

with the Soviets. 45 The German troops, according to Bogdan Musial, only took 

part in already initiated riots. 46 

In fact, one has to look at the events from quite a different angle: When the 

Soviet power crashed, and when troops as well as political personal fled, a 

vacuum of power appeared of which the local people took advantage. 47 They 

wanted revenge for everything they had had to endure during the Soviet 

occupation and without hesitation they turned their violence against those who 

were the one logical victim. 48 During the years of occupation people adapted to 

violence and gained the willingness to use violence themselves, on the other 

hand there were also material interests as well as traditional anti-Semitism and 

nationalism. 49 The victims that were singled out now were in most cases not the 

responsible ones, because those had fled eastwards. 

Following Dieter Pohl, Bogdan Musial has to be corrected: For once, as I 

showed before, the feeling of revenge had its roots in the whole period of Soviet 

occupation, and, additionally, the Jews became victims because of their historical 

role as such and because they were the weakest parts of society. The NKVD‘s 




des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941. Berlin 2001. 193. For a similar argumentation 

see Honigsman, who calls the Jews a scapegoat but who contrary to Musial states that the 

population had been motivated by the Germans. 138. 

46 Parts of the discussion can be seen here: http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/id=546 

21.3.2009, http://www.zeit.de/2000/36/Opfer_zu_Taetern_gemacht?page=1 21.3.2009, http://library.fes.de/ 

fulltext/afs/htmrez/80130.htm 21.3.2009, http://h-net.msu.edu /cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-soz-ukult&month=0105&week=b&msg=ZHvgkM0ea75Uep 

82ym%2B8uA&user=&pw= 21.3.2009. In favor of 

Musial one has to admit that he does not take positions similar to those of the German Historikerstreit of the 

1980s. He explains, that he solely compares the national-socialist and soviet terror of 1939-1941, but 

that he will not deny the singularity of the Holocaust. 220. According to MUSIAL it were not 

Soviet crimes who triggered German atrocities, but seeing Soviet cruelties had brutalized the 

German soldiers. 221. Compare GROSS 229.: „Life was more dangerous in many respects under 

the Soviets than under the Nazis. And, as I have stated before, people at the time compared the 

two. Many, including thousands of Jews, came to this very conclusion and voted ‚with their feet.” 


48 As MUSIAL himself states: „Es kann zwar nicht ausgeschlossen werden, daß es auch ohne 

die sowjetischen Verbrechen zu Pogromen gekommen wäre. Aber meines Erachtens ist es 

unwahrscheinlich, daß sie ohne den sowjetischen Terror und die Massenmorde derart ausgeufert 

wären. […] Sehr oft, um nicht zu sagen meistens, diente der Vorwurf der Kollaboration mit den 

Sowjets als Vorwand, um mit allen Juden abzurechnen.” 199. 

49 POHL, Dieter: Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden. In: PAUL, Gerhard (Ed.): Die 

Täter der Shoah-Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?, Göttingen, 2002. 220. 

178

atrocities were not the reason but the initial for the riots and pogroms. The powervacuum 

opened the possibility to let loose of grieve and hatred against the weakest 

part of society, Jews were eagerly accepted as scapegoats altogether. Jews were not 

haunted because people found the victims‘ bodies. These findings were on the one 

hand taken as an explanation for the riots - the association of Jews and Soviets - on 

the other hand one must not underestimate the motivation drawn by the Germans‘ 

expected arrival. The discovering of the NKVD‘s victims was the occasion rather 

than the reason for the pogroms in the summer of 1941. 

The anticipation of German wishes 

Richard Overy remarks that the riots would never have taken place had they 

not been encouraged by German propaganda that denounced Jews as nothumans, 

as vermin that could and should be destroyed. 50 It is quite possible that 

news about the Germans‘ treating of the Jews in the Western parts of former 

Poland had reached people in the Eastern regions and that they knew that 

violence against Jews would be in favour of the Germans. 51 

Ben Shepherd and again Richard Overy are eager to explain that the population 

in former Eastern Poland had as well a reason to hate the Soviets and to see the 

Germans as liberators from their yoke as they were careful in regard to things that 

may come as they could not know what the Germans‘ regime would bring. 52 Many 

Ukrainians took sides with the Germans and in trying to act in their interest they 

saw pogroms as a favourable means. 53 As Martin Dean shows, no-one had to 

cooperate with the German units when they first arrived. Those who volunteered to 

do so had their reasons and power and gain were not least. 54 

The German armies‘ approach was a motivation to parts of the population to 

unleash their anger independently, but as soon as the Germans had arrived they 

took over control. This is especially important in cases where no corpses were 

found but riots occurred anyway. As Dieter Pohl states: Besides some villages, 

the pogroms can not bee seen as spontaneous uprisings but as planned action 

by German units. But it were local actors who played the active part. 55 



Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. 231. and 60. 

52 SHEPHERD, Ben: War in the Wild East - The German army and Soviet partisans. 

Cambridge, 2004. 60. OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei 

Hamburg, 2003. 138. 



54 DEAN, Martin: The ‚Local Police‘ in Nazi-occupied Belarus and Ukraine as the ‚Ideal 

Type‘ of Collaboration - in Practice, in the Recollection of its Members and in the Verdicts of the 

Courts. In: TAUBER, Joachim (Ed.): ‚Kollaboration‘ in Nordosteuropa - Erscheinungsformen 

und Deutungen im 20. Jahrhundert. Wiesbaden, 2006. 422. 



179

German Reactions 

A last point that must not be underestimated is the output the Germans took 

from these incidents. On the one hand they started a large propaganda-campaign in 

which the Soviets were depicted as murderers, on the other hand they could easily 

gain the local people‘s support in persecuting Jews from the start on. When the 

German units took over control they had to rely on the population‘s help because, 

as Martin Dean noticed, they would not have been able to identify Jews on their 

own. 56 The Germans did not put an end to the riots but let them go on or even 

motivated them. 57 Initially the Wehrmacht had been ordered to shoot political 

commissioners and the Einsatzgruppen had to persecute Soviet political personnel 

and especially Jewish cadres. After they discovered the NKVD‘s victims, the range 

of victims grew and it was no longer only certain groups within the Jewish 

population but the Jews as a group of their own. 58 

The German propaganda used the NKVD‘s crimes to justify their own crimes. 

but after the first wave of violence slowed down, they restricted further riots because 

they feared to otherwise lose control. 59 It was now solely the Einsatzgruppen‘s duty 

to persecute the Jewish population, even though they had help of local volunteers. 

The further atrocities against the Jews were carried out according to plans and can 

not be compared to the initial spontaneity of actions. 60 

Final statements 

As the controversy of Bogdan Musial‘s theses shows, it is still not easy to 

discuss violence against Jews during the Second World War. The Holocaust‘s 

shadow often prevents a view on the local population‘s part in the persecution of 

their Jewish neighbours. One must not compare one phenomenon with another, 

but rather regard the Ukrainian and White Russian‘s pogroms as something that 

happened independent from the later German crimes against the Jews. - And by 

independent I do not mean on their own initiative, as stated above, but without 

initial connection to the later events, as they could not be foreseen. 

56 

DEAN, Martin: The ‚Local Police‘ in Nazi-occupied Belarus and Ukraine as the ‚Ideal 

Type‘ of Collaboration - in Practice, in the Recollection of its Members and in the Verdicts of the 

Courts. In: TAUBER, Joachim (Ed.): ‚Kollaboration‘ in Nordosteuropa - Erscheinungsformen 

und Deutungen im 20. Jahrhundert. Wiesbaden, 2006. 418. 

57 

POHL, Dieter: Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944 - 


58 

Ibidem. 138. 

59 

Ibidem. 66. HILBERG, Raul: Täter, Opfer, Zuschauer - Die Vernichtung der Juden 1933- 

1945, Frankfurt am Main, 1992. 198. 

60 


POHL, Dieter: Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden. In: PAUL, Gerhard (Ed.): 

Die Täter der Shoah - Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?, 

Göttingen, 2002. 212-219, 224. 

180

On the other hand one has to be aware that these later crimes, leading 

ultimately to the Holocaust, did not accidentally take place in former Poland. It 

was here that the local people had traditionally been rooted in deep anti- 

Semitism and it was here where many Jews - and especially those matching 

national-socialist clichés - lived. The pogroms of locals in the summer of 1941 

did not activate but prelude to the Eastern European Jew‘s extermination. 

181

182

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