Unaccusativity and the Resultative Constructions in English and ...

1. Introduction
Unaccusativity and the Resultative Constructions
in English and Japanese
Ken-ichi Takami
Tokyo Metropolitan University
[January 1998]
It has long been recognized in the literature that the so-called resultative predicate is predicated
of the direct object, but not of the subject, indirect object or oblique complement. Observe the
following examples:
(1) a. Mary painted the shed green.
b. The blacksmith hammered the metal flat.
c. They knocked him out.
d. The boy broke the glass to pieces.
(2) a. *The boy broke the glass to tears.
b. *John gave Mary flowers happy.
c. *The hunter shot at the tiger dead.
(cf. √The hunter shot the tiger dead.)
d. *John loaded hay into the wagon full. (Williams 1980: 204)
(cf. √John loaded the wagon full with hay.)
Each of the resultative predicates green, flat, out and to pieces in (1a-d) describes the state of the direct
object referent resulting from the action denoted by the verb. For example, (1a) means that Mary
painted the shed, and as a result of it, it became green, and similarly, (1b) means that the blacksmith
hammered the metal, and as a result of it, it became flat. Simpson (1983) observes that resultative
phrases are always predicated of the direct object in English, which Levin and Rappaport Hovav
(1995) call the Direct Object Restriction. In (2a-d), the resultative predicates to tears, happy, dead and
full are intended to be predicated of the subject the boy, the indirect object Mary, and the oblique
complements the tiger and the wagon, respectively. However, (2a), for example, cannot mean that the
boy broke the glass, and as a result of it, he shed tears, and similarly, (2b) cannot mean that John gave
Mary flowers, and as a result of it, she became happy. Hence, (2a-d) are all unacceptable.
It is important here to differentiate resultative predicates from the so-called depictive predicates,
which can be predicated not only of the direct object but also of other elements (see Halliday 1967,
McNulty 1988, among others). Observe the following examples:
(3) a. John ate the meat nude. [depictive] (subject-oriented)
b. The hunter shot at the tiger exhausted. [depictive] (oblique complement-oriented)
c. John ate the meat raw. [depictive] (object-oriented)
The predicates nude, exhausted and raw in (3a-c) are predicated of the subject John, the oblique
complement the tiger and the direct object the meat, respectively. (3a), for example, means that John
ate the meat when he was nude, and cannot mean that John ate the meat, and as a result of it, he became
nude. Similarly, (3b) only means that the hunter shot at the tiger that was exhausted, and (3c) only
means that John ate the meat that was raw.
It has been observed in the literature that there are cases in which resultative phrases can be
predicated of subjects of intransitive and passive verbs. Observe the following examples ((4d, e) and
(5d, e) are from Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 39)):
(4) a. The pond froze solid.
b. The butter melted to a liquid.
c. The glass broke into little pieces.
d. The gate swung shut.

e. This time the curtain rolled open on the court of the Caesars . . .
(5) a. The ice cream was frozen solid.
b. The shed was painted red.
c. The bones were all picked clean by the dog.
d. She was shaken awake by the earthquake.
e. The floor had also been swept quite clean of debris . . .
The resultative predicates in (4) and (5) are all predicated of the subjects. For example, in (4a) the
pond, which is the surface subject of the sentence, froze, and as a result of it, it became solid. Similarly,
in (5b), the shed was painted, and as a result of it, it became red. Simpson (1983) and Levin and
Rappaport Hovav (1995), among others, noting that the intransitive verbs in (4) (i.e., freeze, melt, break,
swing, roll) are all unaccusative verbs, and that passive verbs, as in (5), also belong to unaccusative
verbs, argue that the acceptability of (4) and (5) automatically follows from the Direct Object
Restriction. That is, the surface subject of an unaccusative verb is the underlying direct object.
Simpson (1983) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 35) claim that unergative verbs, unlike
unaccusative verbs, cannot take resultative phrases, because their subjects are also the underlying
subjects; they take the specifier position of IP throughout the derivation. Observe the following
examples, taken from Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 35-36), Carrier and Randall (1992: 191,
215) and Tsujimura (1990a: 281):
(6) a. *Dora shouted/yelled hoarse.
b. *Those teenagers laughed sick.
c. *My mistress grumbled calm.
d. *Joggers often run sick.
e. *The teacher talked blue in the face.
f. *John danced/walked tired.
Shout, yell, laugh, grumble, run, talk, dance and walk are all unergative verbs, expressing volitional
actions of their subject referents. Sentence (6a) cannot mean that Dora shouted/yelled, and as a result
of it, she got hoarse, and similarly, (6b) cannot mean that those teenagers laughed (too much), and as a
result of it, they got sick. Therefore, the sentences in (6) are all unacceptable on the intended
resultative interpretation. 1
The observation given above can be formalized as follows:
(7) Unaccusative Restriction on the Resultative Construction: Since resultative phrases are
only predicated of the direct object, unaccusative (and passive) verbs are compatible with
resultative phrases, while unergative verbs are not. This is because the surface subjects of the
former verbs are underlying direct objects, while those of the latter are not.
It is important to note here that the intended meanings of (6a-f) can be expressed through the
addition of what Simpson (1983) calls a “fake reflexive object”: (8a-f) mean precisely what (6a-f)
cannot mean (see Burzio 1986, Carrier and Randall 1992, Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995):
(8) a. Dora shouted/yelled herself hoarse.
b. Those teenagers laughed themselves sick.
c. My mistress grumbled herself calm.
d. Joggers often run themselves sick.
e. The teacher talked himself/herself blue in the face.
f. John danced/walked himself tired.
Note here that the resultative predicates given in (8) are interpreted as being predicated of the fake
reflexive objects, which are themselves coreferential with the subjects.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 36-37), among others, point out further that unergative
verbs can be compatible with resultative phrases when they take nonsubcategorized object NPs.
Observe the following examples ((9a, b) are from Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 36), (9c, d) and
(10b, c) from Jackendoff (1990: 227), and (10d) from Carrier and Randall (1992: 173)):
(9) a. Sylvester cried his eyes out.

. Sleep your wrinkles away.
c. Amy walked her feet to pieces.
d. Beth chewed her gums sore.
(10) a. The dog barked the baby awake.
b. The professor talked us into a stupor.
c. His friends laughed Bill out of town.
d. The joggers ran their Nikes threadbare.
Note that the verbs used in (9) and (10) (i.e., cry, sleep, walk, chew, bark, talk, laugh, run) are all
unergative verbs. Note also that each of the postverbal NPs in (9) is an inalienably possessed NP
denoting a body part, where the possessor is coreferential with the subject of the verb. The postverbal
NPs in (10) are neither reflexives, as in (8), nor inalienably possessed NPs, as in (9), and the
resultative predicates are interpreted as being predicated of the postverbal NPs. Thus, (10a), for
example, means that the dog barked, and as a result of it, the baby got awake.
What sentences (8)-(10) have in common is that the postverbal NPs are not considered true
arguments of the verbs (see Carrier and Randall 1992, Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995), since the
verbs are in themselves intransitive verbs, which do not generally take objects, as partly shown below:
(11) a. *Those teenagers laughed themselves. (cf. 8b)
b. *Sylvester cried his eyes. (cf. 9a)
c. *The dog barked the baby. (cf. 10a)
Then, why are sentences (8)-(10) acceptable? Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) argue that the
acceptability of these sentences follows from Burzio’s Generalization, given below:
(12) Burzio’s Generalization: All and only verbs that can assign θ-roles to the subject can
assign accusative Case to an object.
Burzio (1986) argues that unergative verbs can assign θ-roles (i.e., Agent θ-role) to their subjects, and
therefore that they have the ability to assign accusative Case. Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 37)
further assume that English allows the marked option of accusative Case assignment to
nonsubcategorized objects. Therefore, the postverbal NPs in (8)-(10) are assigned accusative Case;
hence no violation of the Case Filter, given below:
(13) Case Filter: *NP if NP has phonetic content and has no Case.
Hence, Levin and Rappaport Hovav claim that the acceptability of the sentences in (8)-(10) results. 2
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) further argue that Burzio’s Generalization (12) provides a
natural explanation for the unacceptability of sentences such as those given below:
(14) a. *The snow melted the road slushy. (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995: 39)
b. *A big earthquake occurred the building into pieces.
c. *The barrel rolled the door open.
d. *The old man fell himself dead.
The verbs in (14) (i.e., melt, occur, roll, fall) are all unaccusatives, and therefore they do not assign θroles
to their subjects. It follows then from Burzio’s Generalization (12) that they cannot assign
accusative Case to an object. Sentences (14a-d) involve two postverbal NPs at D-structure. One of
these NPs (e.g., the snow in (14a)) can receive nominative Case by movement to subject position at Sstructure,
but there is no way for the second NP (e.g., the road in (14a)) to receive Case (Levin and
Rappaport Hovav (1995: 40)). This results in a violation of the Case Filter (13), and the
unacceptability of (14a-d) results.
Miyagawa (1989: 96-100), Tsujimura (1990a, b, 1996: 274-276), Takezawa (1993) and
Koizumi (1994) argue that the Unaccusative Restriction on the Resultative Construction (7) holds
exactly true of Japanese as well. Compare the following examples, taken from Miyagawa (1989: 98-
99) and Tsujimura (1990a: 282, 1990b: 934, 1996: 275):

(15) a. Hanako-no kami-ga nagaku nobita.
-Gen hair-Nom long lengthened
‘Hanako’s hair grew long.’
b. Pan-ga makkuro-ni yaketa.
bread-Nom really black-to toasted
‘The bread burned black.’
c. Hune-ga suityuu hukaku sizunda.
ship-Nom in water deep sank
‘The ship sank deep in the water.’
d. Sara-ga konagona-ni wareta.
plate-Nom pieces-into broke
‘The plate broke into pieces.’
e. Ame-ga betabeta-ni toketa.
candy-Nom sticky-into melt
‘The candy melted into (a) sticky (state).’
f. Gake-ga taira-ni kuzureta.
cliff-Nom flat-into collapsed
‘The mountain collapsed into (a) flat (state).’
g. Kami-ga hanbun-ni kireta.
paper-Nom half-into was cut
‘The paper was cut into halves.’
h. Huusen-ga sora takaku agatta.
balloon-Nom sky high went up
‘The balloon went up high in the sky.’
(16) a. *Taroo-ga kutakuta-ni hasitta/aruita/odotta.
-Nom dead tired ran/walked/danced
‘*Taro ran/walked/danced tired.’
b. *Kodomo-ga 2-3-nin-no guruupu-ni hasitta.
children-Nom person-Gen group-into ran
‘*The children ran into two or three groups.’
Sentences (15a-h) are all acceptable, while (16a, b) are not. (15a), for example, means that Hanako’s
hair grew, and as a result of it, it became long. (16a), on the other hand, cannot mean that Taro
ran/walked/danced, and as a result of it, he became tired. Note here that the verbs in (15) (i.e., nobiru
‘grow’, yakeru ‘burn’, sizumu ‘sink’, wareru ‘break’, tokeru ‘melt’, kuzureru ‘collapse’, kireru ‘be
cut’, agaru ‘go up’) are all unaccusative verbs, expressing non-volitional actions of their subject
referents. On the other hand, the verbs in (16) (i.e., hasiru ‘run’, aruku ‘walk’, odoru ‘dance’) are all
unergative verbs, expressing volitional actions of their subject referents. Miyagawa and Tsujimura
claim that the difference in acceptability between (15) and (16) is indeed attributable to the
Unaccusative Restriction on the Resultative Construction (7): the surface subjects in (15) are
underlying objects, since the verbs are unaccusatives, while those in (16) are also underlying subjects,
since the verbs are unergatives.
Tsujimura (1990a, b) further argues that the above account also applies to the difference in
acceptability of the following examples involving complex predicates comprising a noun and the light
verb suru ‘do’ (the examples are from Tsujimura (1990a: 284)):
(17) a. Taroo-wa otona-ni/ookiku seetyoo-sita.
-Top adult-to/big growth-suru-Past
‘Taro grew into an adult/big (person).’
b. Hune-ga suityuu hukaku tinbotu-sita.
ship-Nom in water deep submersion-suru-Past
‘The ship submerged deep in the water.’
c. Saiboo-ga nibai-ni kakudai-sita.
cell-Nom double-to enlargement-suru-Past
‘The cell doubled in size.’
d. Gizyutu-ga sensinkoku-nami-ni koozyootechnology-Nom
advanced countries-average-to improvement-

sita.
suru-Past
‘The technology improved to the level of the average advanced country.’
e. Uti-ga makkuro-ni zensyoo-sita.
house-Nom really black-to burning down-suru-Past
‘The house got burned black.’
(18) a. *John-ga kutakuta-ni sanpo-sita.
-Nom dead tired taking a walk-suru-Past
‘*John took a walk tired.’
b. *Mary-ga kanasiku bisyoo-sita. (*on resultative reading)
-Nom sad smile-suru-Past
‘*Mary smiled sad.’
Sentences (17a-e) are all acceptable, and (17a), for example, means that Taro grew, and as a result he
became an adult or a big person. On the other hand, (18a, b) are unacceptable on the resultative
reading. (18a) cannot mean that John took a walk, and as a result, he got dead tired. Similarly, (18b)
cannot mean that Mary smiled, and as a result of it, she became sad. (This sentence is acceptable on
the reading that Mary smiled sadly.) Tsujimura (1990a, b) and Miyagawa (1989) maintain that the
complex predicates seetyoo ‘growth’, tinbotu ‘submersion’, kakudai ‘enlargement’, koozyoo
‘improvement’, and zensyoo ‘burning down’ are all unaccusative nominals, as witnessed by the fact
that they have synonymous verbs of Japanese origin, namely sodatu ‘grow’, sizumu ‘sink’, hirogaru
‘enlarge’, susumu ‘improve’, and yakeru ‘burn’, respectively, which are all unaccusative verbs. On
the other hand, the complex predicates sanpo ‘taking a walk’ and bisyoo ‘smile’ in (18a, b) are
unergative nominals, as shown by the fact that they can be paraphrased as the verbs aruku ‘walk’ and
hohoemu ‘smile’, which are unergative verbs. Hence, the surface subjects in (17a-e) are underlying
objects, and therefore the sentences observe the Unaccusative Restriction (7), while those in (18a, b)
are also underlying subjects, and therefore the sentences violate the Unaccusative Restriction. Thus,
the difference in acceptability between (17) and (18) results.
2. Problems with the Above Account
In the above section we have seen that while unergative verbs in English cannot take resultative
phrases unless they take fake objects, unaccusative verbs can. However, it is important to note that not
all unaccusative verbs can take resultative phrases. Observe the following examples:
(19) a. *John came to my house breathless.
(* in the sense that John became breathless as a result of his coming to my house.)
b. *The guests arrived happy.
(* in the sense that the guests became happy as a result of arriving.)
c. *The ship sank out of sight.
(20) a. *The portrait hang on the wall famous.
b. *The king lived old.
c. *Many silver spoons have been placed there rusty.
The verbs in (19) and (20) (i.e., come, arrive, sink, hang, live, be placed) are all unaccusative verbs, but
the sentences are unacceptable on the intended resultative readings. (19c), for example, cannot mean
that the ship sank, and as a result of it, it became out of sight. Similarly, (20a) cannot mean that the
portrait hang on the wall, and as a result of it, it became famous. Therefore, the unacceptability of (19)
and (20) is left unaccounted for by the Unaccusative Restriction on the Resultative Construction (7).
We must hasten to add here that Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 56-62) are well aware of
the fact that not all unaccusative verbs can appear in the resultative construction. They argue that (i)
verbs of inherently directed motion such as come, go, and arrive and (ii) stative verbs such as remain
and survive are incompatible with resultative phrases due to the characteristic of the resultative phrases
as “delimiters.” In (19a-c), come and arrive (and possibly sink) are (regarded as) verbs of inherently
directed motion, and they express delimited (telic) eventualities. That is, they are bounded in time (see
Tenny 1987, 1992), and therefore they cannot cooccur with durative phrases, as shown below:
(21) a. *John came to my house for an hour.

. *The guests arrived for an hour.
c. *The ship sank for an hour.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav further argue that resultative phrases too serve to delimit an eventuality,
and therefore that resultative sentences, just like sentences involving verbs of inherently directed
motion, as in (21a-c), cannot cooccur with durative phrases. Hence, they claim that a sentence such as
the following is unacceptable:
(22) *The waiter wiped the table dry for half an hour.
(cf. √The waiter wiped the table for half an hour.)
Levin and Rappaport Hovav claim that the unacceptability of (19) is attributable to the following
generalization given by Tenny (1987: 190):
(23) There may be at most one “delimiting” associated with a verb phrase.
In (19a), for example, the verb come expresses a delimited eventuality, and the resultative phrase
breathless also serves as a delimiter, thereby violating (23), and the unacceptability results. The same
is the case with (19b, c).
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) subsume the unacceptability of (20a-c) under the more
general fact that resultative phrases are incompatible with all statives, whether expressed by transitive
or unaccusative verbs. Then, they attribute this fact to ontological categories of eventualities: a state is
not delimited in nature, and a resultative phrase serves as a delimiter, but there is not such eventuality
type as a delimited state. Hence, the unacceptability of (20a-c) results.
Though what Levin and Rappaport Hovav argue above seems ingenious, however, it should be
noted that unaccusative verbs that are incompatible with resultative phrases are not restricted to verbs
of inherently directed motion and stative verbs. Observe the following examples:
(24) a. *The general died/was killed famous.
(* in the sense that the general became famous as a result of his death/being killed.)
b. *Mary slipped on the ice unconscious.
(* in the sense that Mary became unconscious as a result of slipping on the ice.)
c. *The flowers wilted small.
d. *The plane crash occurred famous.
e. *Because of the earthquake, the old building trembled apart.
f. *The snowman rolled flat. (Kageyama 1996: 226)
g. *The dish dropped into pieces.
The verbs in (24) (i.e., die/be killed, slip, wilt, occur, tremble, roll, drop) are all unaccusative verbs, and
further they are neither verbs of inherently directed motion nor stative verbs. But the sentences are all
unacceptable on the resultative reading. Hence, the Unaccusative Restriction (7), even if coupled with
Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s further restriction, fails to capture the unacceptability of sentences such
as (24a-f). 3
The above observation on the resultative construction in English applies to Japanese. Observe
the following examples:
(25) a. *Sono gaka-wa yuumei-ni sinda.
the painter-Top famous-to died
‘*The painter died famous.’
b. *Rooba-ga muisiki-ni koronda.
old woman-Nom unconscious-to fell down
‘*The old woman fell down unconscious.’
c. *Hana-ga tiisaku sioreta.
flower-Nom small wilted
‘*The flowers wilted small.’
d. *Zisin-no tame-ni tatemono-ga konagona-ni yureta.
earthquake-Gen because of building-Nom into pieces trembled
‘*Because of the earthquake, the building trembled into pieces.’

e. *Chomsky-no hon-ga yuumei-ni deta/syuppan-sareta.
-Gen book-Nom famous-to appeared/was published
‘*Chomsky’s book appeared/was published famous.’
The verbs in (25) (i.e., sinu ‘die’, korobu ‘fall down’, sioreru ‘wilt’, yureru ‘tremble’, deru ‘appear/be
published’) are all unaccusative verbs, and they are neither verbs of inherently directed motion nor
stative verbs. But these sentences are all unacceptable on the resultative reading. (25a), for instance,
cannot mean that the painter died and then became famous, though an event like this could sometimes
happen in the real world. Similarly, (25e) cannot mean that Chomsky’s book came out and then it
became famous, in spite of the fact that such a thing could actually happen in our society. Hence, the
unacceptability of (25a-e) is left unaccounted for by Miyagawa’s (1989) and Tsujimura’s (1990a, b,
1996) analyses.
As a second problem with the Unaccusative Restriction on the Resultative Construction (7), we
can point out that not all the direct objects of transitive verbs are compatible with resultative phrases.
Observe the following examples:
(26) a. *John drove his car into a piece of junk.
b. *Mary used the sheet of paper crumpled.
c. *John kissed Mary speechless.
d. *Fido licked the bone shiny.
e. *The man patted the dog angry.
f. *She touched the vase into pieces.
The sentences in (26) all contain transitive verbs (i.e., drive, use, kiss, lick, pat, touch), and therefore the
Direct Object Restriction, as it stands, predicts that the sentences should be all acceptable, with the
resultative phrases being predicated of the direct objects. However, they are all unacceptable. (26d),
for example, cannot mean that Fido licked the bone, and as a result of it, it became shiny. Therefore, it
can be concluded that the Direct Object Restriction is not sufficient for capturing the acceptability of
the resultative construction.
Van Valin (1990) argues that the Direct Object Restriction can be replaced with a restriction
that refers to the notion of “undergoer”. He claims in the framework of Role and Reference
Grammar (see also Van Valin 1993) that the NP that a resultative phrase is predicated of is an
undergoer, and he writes (p. 255):
(27) [C]onstructions allowing resultatives are either accomplishments (53a, e) [=Terry wiped the
table clean; He talked himself hoarse] or achievements (53c) [=The river froze solid], all of
which code a result state as part of their inherent meaning. Activity verbs, which are
inherently atelic [=nondelimited] and therefore cannot in principle code a result state or
have an undergoer argument, do not take resultative phrases.
Role and Reference Grammar uses predicate decompositions in the semantic representation (=logical
structure) of a predicate. Van Valin essentially claims that the resultative phrase is always predicated
of the argument of the predicates BECOME (STATE) in the logical structure of the verb. Because
only achievements and accomplishments have this substructure in their logical structures, resultative
constructions are possible only with achievements and accomplishments. Unergative verbs are
typically activity verbs that have no state in their logical structures, but unaccusative verbs are typically
achievement verbs that code a result state predicated of an undergoer.
The above account offered by Van Valin (1990) seems informative and promising, and in fact
it can account for the unacceptability of (26a-f), since the verbs employed in these sentences (i.e., drive,
use, kiss, lick, pat, touch) are all activity verbs. However, it encounters some major problems. For
example, hammer/pound and push are activity verbs and therefore are atelic, as shown by the
compatibility with durative phrases (see (28a, b)), but they can take resultative phrases (see (29a, b)):
(28) a. John hammered/pounded the metal for three minutes.
b. Terry pushed the door for three minutes.
(29) a. John hammered/pounded the metal flat.
b. Terry pushed the door shut. (Goldberg 1995: 188)

On the other hand, die and arrive are achievement verbs and therefore are telic, as shown by the
incompatibility with durative phrases (see (30a, b)), but they cannot take resultative phrases (see (31a,
b)):
(30) a. *The general died for an hour.
b. *John arrived for an hour.
(31) a. *The general died famous.
b. *The guests arrived happy.
Hence, it would suffice to say that Van Valin’s analysis, though ingenious, also seems to fall short of
capturing the real conditioning factor.
As a third problem with the Unaccusative Restriction (7), we have to point out that even the
verbs that generally take resultative phrases turn out to be incompatible with a certain class of
resultative phrases. Observe the following contrast:
(32) a. The vase broke into pieces.
b. *The vase broke worthless. (Jackendoff 1990: 240)
(33) a. John wiped the table clean.
b. *John wiped the table valuable.
(34) a. He hammered the metal flat/shiny/smooth.
b. *He hammered the metal beautiful/safe/tubular. (Green 1972: 84)
In our real world, just as a vase can get into pieces as a result of its breaking, so it can be worthless as
a result of its breaking. In spite of this, sentence (32a) is acceptable, while (32b) is not. 4 Similarly, in
our real world, as a table can be clean as a result of being wiped, so it can be valuable as a result of
being wiped. But only (33a) is acceptable. The same applies to (34a, b) as well. Hence, the difference
in acceptability between the (a) and (b) examples of (32)-(34) is totally left unaccounted for by the
Unaccusative Restriction (7).
3. An Alternative Semantic/Functional Account
3.1 Change-of-State Verbs
First, observe the following examples:
(35) a. The boy broke the glass to pieces. (=1d)
b. Mary tinted her hair blonde.
c. John dried it out in the sun.
(36) a. *John drove his car into a piece of junk. (=26a)
b. *Mary used the sheet of paper crumpled. (=26b)
c. *Sue loves Mike happy. (*on resultative reading)
In comparing the acceptable (35) with the unacceptable (36), we intuitively feel, as Van Valin and
Kageyama note, that each of the verbs in the former (i.e., break, tint, dry) inherently contains the
meaning of causing a change of state of the object referent, while that in the latter (i.e., drive, use, love)
does not. That is, each of the verbs in (35) implies the resulting state of the object referent denoted by
the resultative predicate, whereas that in (36) simply expresses an action or state, and hardly implies
the resulting state of the object referent. This difference is reflected in the definitions of these verbs
given by, say, Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, as shown below (emphasis ours):
(37) a. break: to (cause to) separate into parts suddenly or violently
b. tint: to give a slight or delicate colour to (the hair)
c. dry: to (cause to) become dry
(38) a. drive: to guide and control (a vehicle or horse)
b. use: to employ; put to use
c. love: to feel love, desire, or strong friendship (for)
We understand that the events denoted by the verbs break, tint and dry have necessarily end
points, while those denoted by the verbs drive, use and love do not. If we follow lexical semantics

incorporating lexical decomposition, we can say that, as partly shown in (37c), the verbs in (37) have
the conceptual feature (or primitive) BECOME in their lexical conceptual structures (or semantic
representations), and their conceptual structures can roughly be shown as in the following (see, for
example, Jackendoff 1990, Van Valin 1990, Kageyama 1996, Green 1972):
(39) a. break: [ ]x CAUSE [[ ]y BECOME [[ ]y BE AT-[SMALL PIECES]]]
b. tint: [ ]x CAUSE [[ ]y BECOME [[ ]y BE AT-[COLORED]]]
c. dry: [ ]x CAUSE [[ ]y BECOME [[ ]y BE AT-[NOT [WET]]]]
Hence, we can say that each of the resultatives in (35) specifies the resulting state of the object referent
induced by the feature BECOME. On the other hand, the verbs in (38) do not have the feature
BECOME, simply expressing an action or state. They do not induce any change of state of the object
referents, in spite of the fact that resultatives essentially serve to indicate a change of state of an object.
Hence, the functions of the verbs in (36) are incompatible with those of the resultatives, and the
unacceptability results. In short, the acceptability and unacceptability of (35) and (36) are attributable
to the fact that the verbs in the former are change-of-state verbs, while those in the latter are not. 5
Intransitive verbs can also be distinguished between change-of-state verbs and non-change-ofstate
verbs, and this difference also plays a crucial role in the acceptability of the resultative
construction. Observe the following sentences:
(40) a. The pond froze solid. (=4a)
b. The butter melted to a liquid. (=4b)
c. The potatoes have burned black.
(41) a. *The guests arrived sick. (*on resultative reading)
b. *John came to my house breathless. (=19a)
c. *Many silver spoons have been placed there rusty. (=20c)
The intransitive verbs in (40) (i.e., freeze, melt, burn) are change-of-state verbs, inherently containing
the meaning of causing a change of state of an object. For example, if something melts, it changes
from a solid state to a liquid state. On the other hand, the intransitive verbs in (41) (i.e., arrive, come,
be placed) are not change-of-state verbs; arrive and come are motion verbs, and be placed is a stative
verb. They do not contain the meaning of causing a change of state of an object. For example, even if
something is placed somewhere, it does not turn into something different. This difference is clearly
indicated in the following definitions of these verbs given by Longman Dictionary of Contemporary
English (emphasis mine):
(42) a. freeze: to become solid at a very low temperature
b. melt: (of a solid) to become liquid
c. burn: to change for the worse or be destroyed by fire or heat
(43) a. arrive: to reach a place, especially the end of a journey
b. come: to move towards the speaker or a particular place
c. place: to put or arrange in a certain position
Observe in the above definitions that the verbs in (42) contain the meaning of causing a change of state,
as shown by the verb become or change, while those in (43) do not. Note further that freeze and melt
in (40a, b) in fact contain the given resultatives solid and to a liquid as part of their meanings, as shown
in their definitions (42a, b).
The above observation given for the English resultative construction seems to hold of the
corresponding Japanese construction. Observe the following:
(44) a. Taroo-wa sara-o konagona-ni watta. (cf. 15d, 35a)
-Top plate-Acc pieces-into broke
‘Taro broke the plate into pieces.’
b. Hanako-wa keeki-o yottu-ni kitta.
-Top cake-Acc four pieces-into cut
‘Hanako cut the cake into four pieces.’
(45) a. *Taroo-wa sara-o konagona-ni sawatta. (cf. 26f)

-Top plate-Acc pieces-into touched
‘*Taro touched the plate into pieces.’
b. *Hanako-wa hon-o boroboro-ni yonda.
-Top book-Acc crumpled-to read
‘*Hanako read the book crumpled.’
The transitive verbs waru ‘break’ and kiru ‘cut’ in (44a, b) are change-of-state verbs, as the events
denoted by these verbs have end points. This is shown in the following definitions of these verbs
given by Gakusyu Kokugo Sin-Ziten ‘The New Learning Dictionary of Japanese’ (emphasis mine):
(46) a. waru: kowasite konagona-ni suru
break pieces-into make
‘break something into pieces’
b. kiru: hamono-de betubetu-ni suru
sharp tool-with separate-into make
‘make something into separate pieces with a sharp tool’
Therefore, the verbs waru and kiru are compatible with the resultative predicates konagona-ni ‘into
pieces’ and yottu-ni ‘into four pieces’, respectively. On the other hand, the transitive verbs sawaru
‘touch’ and yomu ‘read’ in (45a, b) are not change-of-state verbs, expressing only the actions of the
subject referents. They do not contain the meaning of causing a change of state of the object referents.
Hence, they are inconsonant with the resultatives, and the unacceptability of (45a, b) results.
The above discussion applies to the following Japanese resultative sentences involving
intransitive verbs:
(47) a. Ike-ga katikati-ni kootta.
pond-Nom solid-to froze
‘The pond froze solid.’
b. Pan-ga makkuro-ni yaketa. (=15b, cf. 40c)
bread-Nom really black-to toasted
‘The bread burned black.’
(48) a. *Taroo-ga kutakuta-ni aruita. (cf. 16a)
-Nom dead tired walked
‘*Taro walked tired.’
b. *Sono doozoo-wa Ueno-kooen-ni yuumei-ni tatte-iru.
the bronze statue-Top -park-in famous-to stand
‘*The bronze statue stands famous in Ueno Park.’
The intransitive verbs kooru ‘freeze’ and yakeru ‘burn’ in (47a, b) are change-of-state verbs, as easily
understood from the corresponding English definitions of these verbs, given in (42a, c). Hence the
acceptability of these sentences results. On the other hand, intransitive verbs aruku ‘walk’ and tatu
‘stand’ are not change-of-state verbs, as the actions (or state) they describe do not imply an end point.
This is shown in the following definitions of these verbs given by Gakusyu Kokugo Sin-Ziten ‘The
New Learning Dictionary of Japanese’:
(49) a. aruku: asi-o ugokasite susumu
leg-Acc moving step forward
‘to step forward by moving one’s legs’
b. tatu: massugu tate-ni naru
upright vertical become
‘to become upright’
The definitions of aruku and tatu given in (49a, b) clearly show that they do not contain the meaning of
causing a change of state of the subject referents, and therefore they are incompatible with the
resultatives kutakuta-ni ‘dead tired’ and yuumei-ni ‘famous’, respectively. Hence, the unacceptability
of sentences (49a, b) results.
It may be helpful here to give some examples of change-of-state verbs in English and Japanese
(for further examples, see Levin (1983), Nitta (1983) and Kageyama (1996)):

(50) a. break, cut, split, grind; roll, bend, fold; tint, dye, paint; bake, burn, fry, toast; freeze,
melt, dry, fade, close, heat
b. waru ‘break’, kiru ‘cut’, tubusu ‘crush’, hiki-saku ‘tear up’, hiku ‘grind’; mageru
‘bend’, oru ‘fold’, nobasu ‘roll’; nuru ‘paint’, someru ‘dye, tint’; yaku ‘burn’, ageru
‘fry’, musu ‘steam’; kooru ‘freeze’, kawakasu ‘dry’, yogosu ‘make dirty’, katameru
‘harden’
3.2 The Relationships between Verbs and Resultatives
Let us next consider the semantic relationships between change-of-state verbs and resultatives.
Observe the following:
(51) a. The boy broke the glass to pieces. (=35a)
b. The pond froze solid. (=40a)
(52) a. Mary tinted her hair blonde. (=35b)
b. The field dried up because of the long drought.
(53) a. The man was burned to death in the fire.
b. The mountaineer froze to death.
(54) a. *Mary tinted her hair short/curly.
b. *The man died famous/forgotten.
We have seen in 3.1 that the verbs in (51)-(54) (i.e., break, freeze, tint, dry, burn) are all change-ofstate
verbs, and die in (54b) is also a change-of-state verb, as shown in the following lexical conceptual
structure of the verb:
(55) die: [ ]y BECOME [[ ]y BE AT-[NOT [ALIVE]]]
However, there are some significant differences among the pairs of examples in (51)-(54) with
respect to the semantic relationships between the verbs and the resultatives. In (51), the resultatives to
pieces and solid, as shown in 3.1, are part of the meanings of the change-of-state verbs break and
freeze, respectively. For ease of reference, let us repeat here the lexical conceptual structures of the
verbs (emphasis added):
(56) a. break: [ ]x CAUSE [[ ]y BECOME [[ ]y BE AT-[SMALL PIECES]]]
b. freeze: [ ]y BECOME [[ ]y BE AT-[SOLID]]
In (52), on the other hand, the resultatives blonde and up are not part of the meanings of the changeof-state
verbs tint and dry, respectively, but are clearly implied by their meanings. This is shown in the
following (see Kageyama (1996: 217)):
(57) a. tint: [ ]x CAUSE [[ ]y BECOME [[ ]y BE AT-[COLORED]]]
|
blonde
b. dry: [ ]y BECOME [[ ]y BE AT-[NOT [WET]]]
|
up
The features COLORED and NOT WET in (57a, b) imply or induce the resultatives blonde and up in
(52a, b), respectively, because blonde is a hyponym of the word color, and up indicates one end of the
degrees that the state of being not wet has. The resultative sentences (51) and (52), though different,
as we have just shown, with respect to the semantic relationships between the verbs and the resultatives,
seem to be collapsed as one type of resultative constructions, because they are similar in the sense that
the resultatives are closely related with the lexical meanings of the verbs. Therefore, for ease of
reference, we will call this type of resultative sentences “lexical resultatives.”

In contrast to (51) and (52), the resultative to death in (53) is neither part of the meanings of
the verbs burn and freeze, nor implied by the verbs, as understood from the following conceptual
structures:
(58) a. burn: [ ]x CAUSE [[ ]y BECOME [[ ]y BE AT-[ON FIRE]]]
b. freeze: [ ]y BECOME [[ ]y BE AT-[SOLID]] (=56b)
However, we can easily expect or infer from our pragmatic knowledge of the world the cause-result
relationship denoted by the verbs and the resultative. That is, it is readily understood that if someone
is burned or freezes, he/she will eventually die. In short, this type of resultative sentences is dependent
on our reasoning or pragmatic knowledge, and therefore we will call it “pragmatic resultatives.”
Now, consider the unacceptable (54). The resultative short/curly in (54a) is neither a part of
the meaning of tint, nor implied by the verb. Further, we do not find any logical cause-result
relationship between tint and short/curly; one’s hair does not necessarily become short or curly as a
result of tinting it. In (54b) as well, the verb die neither contains nor implies the meaning of
famous/forgotten in its lexical conceptual structure. We cannot pragmatically infer the cause-result
relationship between them, either; one may or may not be famous or forgotten after he/she dies. In
other words, tinting one’s hair or dying serves as neither a necessary nor a sufficient premise for the
consequence that one’s hair becomes short or curly, or that one gets famous or forgotten.
From the above discussion it has now become clear that the English resultative construction is
acceptable only to the extent that the semantic cause-result relationship expressed in the sentence is
incorporated (i.e., is either contained or implied) in the verb meaning, or is logically inferred in light of
our pragmatic knowledge. To put differently, the resultative construction is understood as a
construction in which two propositions expressing a cause and its result can be lumped together as
one clause only when the expressed cause-result relationship is lexically or pragmatically reasonable.
Otherwise, the two propositions have to be expressed as two separate clauses. Hence, the unacceptable
(54), to express the intended meanings, must be split up into two clauses, as in the following:
(59) a. Mary tinted her hair and it became short/curly.
b. The man died and after that he got famous/forgotten.
Let us now hypothesize the following constraint:
(60) A Semantic/Functional Constraint on the English Resultative Construction: The
English resultative construction is acceptable to the extent
(i) that the expressed semantic cause-result relationship is either specified or implied in
the verb meaning (lexical resultatives), or
(ii) that it is reasonably inferred from our pragmatic knowledge
(pragmatic resultatives).
Sentences (51) and (52) are acceptable because they satisfy (60i), and sentences (53) are also
acceptable because they satisfy (60ii). On the other hand, sentences (54) are unacceptable because
they satisfy neither (60i) nor (60ii).
In 3.1 it was shown that use of change-of-state verbs leads to the acceptability of the resultative
construction. But in this subsection we have shown that this is not necessarily the case, as evidenced
by the unacceptability of (54a, b). We have then proposed the Semantic/Functional Constraint on the
English Resultative Construction (60), which does not resort to change-of-state verbs. This constraint
can account not only for the acceptable sentences observed in 3.1, as partly shown in this subsection
(see (51) and (52)), but also for the unacceptable sentences (36) and (41), repeated below:
(36) a. *John drove his car into a piece of junk.
b. *Mary used the sheet of paper crumpled.
c. *Sue loves Mike happy. (*on resultative reading)
(41) a. *The guests arrived sick. (*on resultative reading)
b. *John came to my house breathless. (*on resultative reading)
c. *Many silver spoons have been placed there rusty.

In (36a), for example, the semantic relationship between the cause proposition (i.e., ‘John drove his
car.’) and the result proposition (i.e., ‘His car became a piece of junk.’) is neither specified nor
implied by the meaning of drive. This relationship is not reasonably inferred from our pragmatic
knowledge, either; even if one drives a car, it does not generally become a piece of junk unless he/she
repeatedly drives it for more than, say, ten years. Hence, (36a) satisfies neither (60i) nor (60ii), and the
unacceptability results. The same is the case with (36b, c) and (41a-c).
Let us next consider the resultative construction in Japanese. Interestingly enough, Japanese
does not allow pragmatic resultatives, though it allows lexical resultatives. Observe the following
examples:
(61) a. Taroo-wa sara-o konagona-ni watta. (=44a) (cf. 51a)
-Top plate-Acc pieces-into broke
‘Taro broke the plate into pieces.’
b. Ike-ga katikati-ni kootta. (=47a) (cf. 51b)
pond-Nom solid-to froze
‘The pond froze solid.’
(62) a. Hanako-wa keeki-o yottu-ni kitta. (=44b)
-Top cake-Acc four pieces-into cut
‘Hanako cut the cake into four pieces.’
b. Taroo-wa kabe-o akaku nutta. (cf. 52a)
-Top wall-Acc red painted
‘Taro painted the wall red.’
(63) a. *Sono hito-wa kazi-de sini yaketa. (cf. 53a)
the person-Top fire-in death-to burned
‘That person was burned to death.’
b. *Sono tozan-ka-wa sini kootta/kogoeta. (cf. 53b)
the mountaineer-Top death-to froze
‘The mountaineer froze to death.’
(64) a. *Osyoo-san-wa takibi-de imo-o yottu-ni yaita.
priest-Top bonfire-in sweet potato-Acc four pieces-to burned
‘*The priest burned the sweet potato into four pieces in the fire.’
b. *Sono gaka-wa yuumei-ni sinda. (=25a)
the painter-Top famous-to died
‘*The painter died famous.’
The verbs used in the above examples (i.e., waru ‘break’, kooru/kogoeru ‘freeze’, kiru ‘cut’, nuru
‘paint’, yakeru ‘burn (intransitive)’, yaku ‘burn (transitive)’, sinu ‘die’) are all change-of-state verbs.
In (61a, b), the resultatives konagona-ni ‘into pieces’ and katikati-ni ‘solid’ are part of the meanings
of waru ‘break’ and kooru ‘freeze’, respectively. Hence, the sentences meet (60i), and the
acceptability results. In (62a, b), the resultatives yottu-ni ‘into four pieces’ and akaku ‘red’ are not
part of the meanings of kiru ‘cut’ and nuru ‘paint’, respectively, but they are implied by their
meanings, because yottu-ni specifies the meaning betubetu-ni ‘into separate pieces’ that the verb kiru
contains (see (46b)), and akaku specifies color that the verb nuru contains. Hence, the sentences also
meet (60i), and the acceptability results. The sentences in (61) and (62), parallel to the English
sentences in (51) and (52), are called lexical resultatives.
(63a, b) are instances of pragmatic resultatives, since we can reasonably infer, as in (53a, b),
that if someone is burned or freezes, he/she will eventually die. However, the sentences, unlike the
English (53a, b), are totally unacceptable. To express the intended meanings in Japanese, we have to
resort to lexical compound verbs such as yake-sinu/syoosi-suru ‘be burned to death’ and kogoesinu/toosi-suru
‘freeze to death’, as shown in the following (syoosi and toosi are Sino-Japanese
(syoo- ‘be burned’, too- ‘freeze’ and -si ‘death’)):
(65) a. Sono hito-wa kazi-de yake-sinda/syoosi-sita.
the person-Top fire-in be burned to death
‘That person was burned to death.’
b. Sono tozan-ka-wa kogoe-sinda/toosi-sita. 6
the mountaineer-Top froze to death
‘The mountaineer froze to death.’

(64a, b) are also unacceptable. This must be due to the fact, as in (54a, b), (i) that the
expressed semantic cause-result relationships are neither specified nor implied in the verb meanings,
and (ii) that they are not reasonably inferred from our pragmatic knowledge. Yaku ‘burn’ does not
contain or imply the resulting state of being into four pieces. Moreover, even if one burns a sweet
potato, it does not generally separate into (four) pieces. (64b) is explained in the same manner as the
unacceptable English sentence (54b). Hence, the unacceptability of (64a, b) results, in violation of
both (60i) and (60ii). To express the intended meanings, they have to be described in two separate
clauses. From the above observation, let us tentatively hypothesize the following:
(66) A Semantic/Functional Constraint on the Japanese Resultative Construction:
The Japanese resultative construction is acceptable to the extent
(i) that the expressed semantic cause-result relationship is either specified or implied
in the verb meaning (lexical resultatives).
We can say that the Japanese resultative construction is more limited than the English resultative
construction in the sense that only lexical resultatives can be allowed. Alternatively, we can say that it
is a construction in which two propositions expressing a cause and its result can be lumped together
syntactically as one clause only when the expressed cause-result relationship is lexically reasonable.
The above constraint can account not only for the acceptable sentences observed in 3.1, as
shown in this subsection (see (61) and (62)), but also for the unacceptable sentences (45) and (48),
repeated below:
(45) a. *Taroo-wa sara-o konagona-ni sawatta.
-Top plate-Acc pieces-into touched
‘*Taro touched the plate into pieces.’
b. *Hanako-wa hon-o boroboro-ni yonda.
-Top book-Acc crumpled-to read
‘*Hanako read the book crumpled.’
(48) a. *Taroo-ga kutakuta-ni aruita.
-Nom dead tired walked
‘*Taro walked tired.’
b. *Sono doozoo-wa Ueno-kooen-ni yuumei-ni tatte-iru.
the bronze statue-Top -park-in famous-to stand
‘*The bronze statue stands famous in Ueno Park.’
The verb sawaru ‘touch’ in (45a) neither contains nor implies the resulting state of being into little
pieces. Similarly, yomu ‘read’ in (45b) neither specifies nor implies the cause-result relationship
between ‘reading a book’ and ‘its becoming crumpled.’ Hence, the unacceptability of these sentences
results. In (48a, b), likewise, aruku ‘walk’ and tatu ‘stand’, as understood from their definitions (49a,
b), neither contain nor imply the resulting states of tiredness and being famous, respectively; hence
unacceptability.
3.3 Action Verbs That Take Resultatives
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we have demonstrated that change-of-state verbs can take resultatives
only when their semantic relationships with the resultatives are either specified or implied in their
meanings (lexical resultatives (in both English and Japanese)), or when the relationships are logically
inferred in light of our pragmatic knowledge (pragmatic resultatives (in English, but not in Japanese)).
However, verbs that can take resultatives are not restricted to change-of-state verbs. Even some action
(activity) verbs can, as shown below:
(67) a. John hammered the metal flat.
b. She pounded the dough flat (as a pancake).
c. Mary wiped the table clean.
d. We scrubbed the floor clean.

Each of the verbs hammer, pound, wipe and scrub in (67) does not specifically contain the meaning of
causing a change of state of the object referent. This is shown in the following definitions of hammer
and wipe given by Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English:
(68) a. hammer: to strike (something) with a hammer
b. wipe: to pass a cloth/other material against (something) to remove dirt, liquid, etc.
These verbs are therefore action verbs, simply denoting actions of the subject referents. Since the
events they describe do not necessarily have end points, they are different from change-of-state verbs
such as break with respect to whether they take durative phrases:
(69) a. John hammered/pounded/wiped/scrubbed it for three hours.
b. *John broke it for three hours.
Let us next consider the semantic cause-result relationships expressed in (67). The resultative
flat seems to be implied by the verbs hammer and pound, and clean by wipe and scrub, as shown by
the following definitions of these verbs given by American Heritage Dictionary and Longman
Dictionary of Contemporary English (emphasis mine):
(70) a. hammer: to flatten with a hammer (AHD) (cf. 68a)
b. pound: to hit something many times with a tool in order to break it into pieces or make
it flat (LDCE)
c. wipe: to pass a cloth/other material against (something) to remove dirt, liquid, etc.
(=68b) (LDCE)
d. scrub: to clean by hand rubbing, as with a stiff brush (LDCE)
As seen in (70a, b), hammering/pounding something implies the resulting state of flatness, though this
implication is not provided in the definition (68a). Wipe and scrub also imply the resulting state of
cleanness, as understood by ‘to remove dirt, liquid, etc.’ in (70c) and ‘to clean’ in (70d). Note here
that these verbs do not contain the meanings of the resultatives given in (67) in their lexical conceptual
structures, as shown by the acceptability of the following:
(71) a. John hammered the metal, but it didn’t become flat.
b. Mary wiped the table, but it didn’t become clean.
This is in sharp contrast to the case of change-of-state verbs that contain the meanings of some given
resultatives:
(72) a. *The pond froze, but it didn’t become solid.
b. *The snow melted, but it didn’t become liquid.
To sum up, the verbs in (67) are action verbs, not change-of-state verbs, and the sentences in
(67) are lexical resultatives, the cause-result relationships being implied by the verbs.
The following sentences also use action verbs, but the cause-result relationships expressed in
the sentences are radically different from those in (67):
(73) a. John hammered the metal hot/shiny.
b. The gardener watered the tulips flat.
c. The soldier bled to death.
d. John beat Mary black and blue.
e. Rover chewed my shoes to tatters.
f. The bears frightened the hikers speechless.
While hammer in (73a) implies the resulting state of flatness, as shown above, it does not necessarily
imply the resulting state of hotness or shininess. However, we can reasonably infer from our
pragmatic knowledge that hammering a metal leads to such a resulting state. Similarly, the verb water
in (73b) does not imply the resulting state of flatness, but we can easily expect excessive or continuous
watering to have plants get flat. Further, while bleed does not imply the resulting state of death, we can

eadily understand excessive bleeding as causing death. The same applies to (73d-f) as well. Hence,
the sentences in (73) are interpreted as instances of pragmatic resultatives.
It is interesting to observe here that the distinction between lexical and pragmatic resultatives
plays an important role in deciding the acceptability of wh-extraction of resultative APs. Observe the
following contrast:
(74) a. How flat did John hammer the metal? (cf. 67a)
b. How clean did Mary wipe the table? (cf. 67c)
c. How hard did you boil the eggs?
(75) a. ??/*How hot did John hammer the metal? (cf. 73a)
b. ??/*How flat did the gardener water the tulips? (cf. 73b)
c. ??/*How red did you boil the lobster?
Sentences (74a-c) are acceptable, while (75a-c) are unacceptable. Kuno and Takami (1993: Chapter 2)
have proposed the following constraint to account for the acceptability of wh-extraction of predicative
APs (emphasis added):
(76) Functional Constraint on Wh-Extraction of Predicative APs: Wh-extraction of
predicative APs is acceptable to the extent that the hearer can reconstruct the “V. . . AP”
pattern upon hearing the V.
N. B. At least three factors are relevant in determining how easily the hearer can reconstruct
the “V. . . AP” pattern:
a. general frequency of use of the V in the “V. . . AP” pattern;
b. discourse priming of the pattern;
c. the semantics of the V (with respect to whether the V
implies the AP) (see McNulty (1988))
The expressions hammer . . . flat, wipe . . . clean and boil . . . hard are frequent, and the verbs hammer,
wipe and boil imply the resulting states of flatness, cleanness and hardness, respectively. Therefore
the hearer can determine that how flat, how clean and how hard in (74a-c) are object-oriented APs the
moment he/she hears hammer, wipe and boil; hence acceptability. On the other hand, the expressions
hammer . . . hot, water . . . flat and boil . . . red are not common at all, and hot, flat and red are not
implied by the verbs hammer, water and boil, respectively. Therefore the hearer cannot interpret how
hot, how flat and how red in (75a-c) as object-oriented APs of hammer, water and boil, respectively,
when he/she hears these verbs; hence unacceptability (for further details, see Kuno and Takami (1993:
Chapter 2)).
Next, compare (67) and (73) with the following unacceptable sentences:
(77) a. *John hammered the metal beautiful/safe/tubular. (see 34b)
b. *He wiped it damp/dirty/stained. (Green 1972: 84)
c. *She shot him lame/paranoid. (ibid.)
In these sentences, the intended cause-result relationships are not logically derived from our common
knowledge; in (77a) hammering a metal does not necessarily serve as a necessary premise for deriving
the consequence that the metal becomes beautiful/safe/tubular. Further, the cause-result relationship
intended in (77b) contradicts our common-sense understanding, since wiping something generally
leads to the resulting state of cleanness or dryness. In (77c), it is impossible to interpret the act of
shooting as a direct cause of his lameness/paranoid, and therefore we do not find any strong or
reasonable causal relationship between them (for some relevant discussion for sentences like (77c), see
Goldberg (1995: 193-195)). Hence, these sentences satisfy neither (i) nor (ii) of the
Semantic/Functional Constraint on the English Resultative Construction, and the unacceptability
results. To express the intended meanings, they have to be described in two separate clauses, as in the
following:
(78) a. John hammered the metal and it became beautiful/safe/tubular.
b. He wiped it but it was still damp/dirty/stained.
c. She shot him and (later) he became lame/paranoid.

Observe, next, the following contrasting examples:
(79) a. The hunter shot the tiger dead.
b. *The hunter shot at the tiger dead. (=2c)
(80) a. John loaded the wagon full with hay.
b. *John loaded hay into the wagon full. (=2d)
(79a) and (80a) are instances of pragmatic resultatives because we can reasonably infer that a tiger will
probably be killed by being shot, and a wagon will probably become full with hay by being loaded
with it. (Note that the action verbs shoot and load neither contain nor imply the resulting states of
being dead and full, respectively, in their lexical conceptual structures, and therefore (79a) and (80a)
are not instances of lexical resultatives.) In (79b) and (80b), on the other hand, shooting at a tiger is
much less likely to kill the tiger, and loading hay into a wagon is much less likely to make the wagon
full. This inference is supported by the following contrast (Green (1972: 91) and Jackendoff (1990:
106)):
(81) a. ?The hunter shot the tiger, but/and missed it.
b. The hunter shot at the tiger, but/and missed it.
(82) a. ?The hunter shot the tiger, and/but only wounded it.
b. The hunter shot at the tiger, and/but only wounded it.
(83) a. ??The hunter shot the tiger, but it died.
b. The hunter shot the tiger, and it died.
(84) a. ?*John loaded the truck with some books.
b. John loaded some books onto the truck.
The sentences in (81)-(83) strongly suggest that the tiger in The hunter shot the tiger would have been
killed as a result of being shot, while it in The hunter shot at the tiger was not necessarily done so.
Further, the unacceptability of (84a) suggests that the truck in John loaded the truck with books was
full of books, while the acceptability of (84b) suggests that it in John loaded books onto the truck was
not necessarily so. Hence, in (79a) and (80a) we can find a logical or reasonable causal relationship
between the given action and its resulting state; hence acceptability, while in (79b) and (80b) we cannot
find any strong or reasonable causal relationship; hence unacceptability.
The above argument is closely connected with the often-noted semantic differences in the
following pairs of sentences (see, for example, Fillmore (1968), Anderson (1971), Chomsky (1972)
and Jackendoff (1990: 105-106, 171-172)):
(85) a. John loaded the wagon with hay.
b. John loaded hay into the wagon.
(86) a. Mary sprayed the wall with paint.
b. Mary sprayed paint on the wall.
(87) a. They littered the park with garbage.
b. They littered garbage around the park.
The (a) examples in (85)-(87) are for the most part “completive” or “perfective” in a way that the (b)
examples are not. For instance, if John has loaded the wagon with hay, it is implied that the wagon is
full of hay; this is not necessarily the case if John has loaded hay into the wagon. (Hence, the
difference in acceptability between (84a) and (84b).) To put differently, the direct object is interpreted
as being totally affected by, and directly involved in, the action denoted by the verb, while the oblique
complement is not. (This is consistent with what has been pointed out as properties characteristic of a
prototypical transitive clause (see Hopper and Thompson (1980), Rice (1987) and Langacker
(1991)).) In (80a), therefore, the implication observed in (84a) and (85a) is made explicit with the
resultative full. On the other hand, since there is no such implication in (85b), the intended causal
relationship is not logically derivable. 7
The fact that the direct object rather than the oblique complement is totally affected by, and
directly involved in, the action denoted by the verb seems to contribute to the acceptability of what
Carrier and Randall (1992) call “intransitive resultatives”, in which the verbs used in such resultative
sentences are essentially intransitives. Observe the following:

(88) a. Dora shouted herself hoarse. (cf. 8a)
b. The dog barked the baby awake. (=10a)
c. The joggers ran their Nikes threadbare. (=10d)
Herself (=Dora), the baby and their Nikes in (88), taking the direct object position, help us recognize
that there is a strong semantic connection between the described causes and their results. In (88a),
herself (=Dora) is understood as totally affected (i.e., got hoarse) as a result of shouting. Similarly, in
(88b) the baby is interpreted as affected (i.e., got awake) as a result of the dog’s barking. The same is
the case with (88c). Hence, the acceptability of (88a-c) is dependent on the direct object status of the
affected entities and our pragmatic reasoning, and they are interpreted as instances of pragmatic
resultatives.
Note here that the following sentences are unacceptable, because herself and the baby are no
longer the direct object (see also (79b) and (80b)):
(89) a. *Dora shouted at herself hoarse.
b. *The dog barked at the baby awake.
As a result of the oblique complement status, the intended causal relationship is not straightforward; it
is not reasonably inferred from our pragmatic knowledge. Shouting may or may not make one hoarse,
and a dog’s barking may or may not make a baby awake. Hence, (89a, b) are unacceptable, violating
the Semantic/Functional Constraint on the English Resultative Construction.
It is interesting to note some intransitive resultative sentences, as in the following, in which the
described causal relationship is hard to be established, even if an affected entity takes the direct object
position:
(90) a. The joggers have run the pavement thin. (Carrier and Randall 1992: 217)
b. He laughed himself sick. (cf. 8b)
It is not reasonably inferred that running makes a pavement thin, and laughing makes one sick. The
sentences in (90) should rather be interpreted as hyperbole; the joggers have run to the extent that the
pavement seems to become thin, and he laughed to the extent that he seemed to become sick (see
Goldberg (1995: 185)). Note, however, that this sort of hyperbole becomes possible due to the fact
that the speaker intentionally places an affected entity in the direct object position. Otherwise,
unacceptability results, as in the following:
(91) a. *The joggers have run on the pavement thin.
b. *He laughed sick.
As a result of the direct object status of an affected entity, the described causal relationships in (90),
even if much weaker than those in acceptable transitive resultatives, would be allowed, and sentences
such as (90a, b) are marked acceptable. 8
Let us now turn to an examination of Japanese action verbs, and consider whether they can
take resultatives, as in the case of English action verbs. Since we have argued in 3.2 that pragmatic
resultatives are unacceptable in Japanese, it is predicted that only action verbs that imply the resulting
states specified by resultatives are acceptable. This prediction is corroborated by the following
contrast:
(92) Lexical Resultatives:
a. Hanako-wa teeburu-o kirei-ni huita. (cf. 67c)
-Top table-Acc clean wiped
‘Hanako wiped the table clean.’
b. Kono yuka-o pikapika-ni huku nante muri dayo.
this floor-Acc shiny wipe impossible is
‘It is impossible to wipe this floor shiny.’
c. Boku-wa heya-o kirei-ni soozi-sita.
I-Top room-Acc clean swept
‘I swept the room clean.’

(93) Pragmatic Resultatives:
a. *Uekiya-san-wa tyuurippu-ni petyanko-ni mizu-o kaketa. (cf. 73b)
gardener-Top tulips-Dat flat-to watered
‘The gardener watered the tulips flat.’
b. *John-wa kinzoku-o atuku hanmaa-de tataita. (cf. 73a)
-Top metal-Acc hot hammer-with hit
‘John hammered the metal hot.’
c. *Poti-wa watasi-no kutu-o boroboro-ni kanda. (cf. 73e)
-Top my shoes-Acc to tatters chewed
‘Pochi chewed my shoes to tatters.’
The action verbs huku ‘wipe’ and soozi-suru ‘sweep’ seem to imply the resulting state of cleanness
or shininess. This is shown in the following definitions of these verbs given by Gakusyu Kokugo
Sin-Ziten ‘The New Learning Dictionary of Japanese’ (emphasis ours):
(94) a. huku: nuno ya kami nado de kosutte, yogore ya suibun-o
cloth and paper etc. with scrub dirt and liquid-Acc
torinozoku
remove
‘to scrub something with a cloth or paper and remove dirt or liquid’
b. soozi-suru: gomi ya yogore nado-o torinozoite kirei-ni suru
trash and dirt etc.-Acc remove make clean
‘to remove trash or dirt and make something clean’
Hence, (92a-c) are instances of lexical resultatives. Note here that, as with English action verbs such
as wipe and pound, huku and soozi-suru do not contain the meanings of the resultatives given in (92)
in their lexical conceptual structures, as shown by the acceptability of the following (see (71)): 9
(95) Hanako-wa teeburu-o huita ga, kirei-ni nara-nakatta.
-Top table-Acc but clean become not-Past
‘Hanako wiped the table, but it didn’t become clean.’
Now consider (93a-c). As we have seen for the corresponding English examples (73), the
verbs mizu-o kakeru ‘water’, (hanmaa-de) tataku ‘hammer’ and kamu ‘chew’ do not necessarily
imply the resulting states of flatness, hotness and tatteredness, respectively. But we can reasonably
infer the intended causal relationships, and therefore the sentences are interpreted as pragmatic
resultatives, just as the English examples in (73). However, these pragmatic resultatives, as predicted,
are all unacceptable in Japanese. To express the intended meanings, they must be described in two
separate clauses, as partly shown in the following (in these cases, lexical compound verbs are not
available):
(96) Uekiya-san-wa tyuurippu-ni mizu-o kakete petyanko-ni sita.
gardener-Top tulips-Dat watered and flat-to made
‘The gardener watered the tulips and made them flat.’
Hence, the acceptability of (92) and the unacceptability of (93) are straightforwardly captured by the
Semantic/Functional Constraint on the Japanese Resultative Construction (66).
This constraint can further account for the unacceptability of the following examples:
(97) a. ??Hanako-wa teeburu-o bisyobisyo-ni huita. (cf. 77b)
-Top table-Acc quite wet wiped
‘*Hanako wiped the table quite wet.’
b. *John-wa zibun-o kutakuta-ni odotta. (cf. 88a)
-Top self-Acc dead tired-to danced
‘John danced himself tired.’
c. *Zyogingu-soosya-wa naiki-o boroboro-ni hasitta. (cf. 88c)
joggers-Top Nikes-Acc threadbare-to ran

‘The joggers ran their Nikes threadbare.’
(97a) does not mean that the table became quite wet as a result of Hanako’s wiping it. This is because
wiping something generally implies the resulting state of cleanness or dryness (see (77b)), and hence
the unacceptability results. (97b, c) are also unacceptable, though the corresponding English examples
are acceptable, as instances of pragmatic resultatives (see (88)). Thus, the unacceptability of (97b, c) is
what the Semantic/Functional Constraint on the Japanese Resultative Construction predicts, since
pragmatic resultatives are not allowed in Japanese. The sentences must instead be described in two
separate clauses:
(98) John-wa odotte kutakuta-ni natta.
-Top danced and dead tired-to became
‘John danced and got tired.’
Finally, to summarize this section, we have clarified the facts described in the following
problems, and demonstrated that such problems can be straightforwardly accounted for by the two
constraints we have hypothesized for the English and Japanese resultative constructions:
(99) a. Why many (but not all) change-of-state verbs can take resultatives;
b. Why they are incompatible with a certain class of resultatives;
c. Why some action verbs can take resultative;
d. Why they are incompatible with a certain class of resultatives;
e. Why the other action verbs and stative verbs cannot take resultatives;
f. Why the range of the Japanese resultative construction is more limited than that of the
English resultative construction.
4. Washio (1997) and Kageyama (1996)
Washio (1997) and Kageyama (1996: Chapter 5) discuss the English and Japanese resultative
constructions in terms of lexical semantics, and they also observe that the range of the Japanese
resultative construction is more limited than that of the English resultative construction. Further, their
analyses and ours have something in common, and therefore it seems necessary here to briefly review
their claims and then to make clear the differences between their analyses and ours.
Washio (1997) (see also Washio (1996)) examines and compares the resultative constructions
in languages such as English, Japanese, French and Italian, and argues that the languages are divided
into two broad types; namely, those (like English) which permit what he calls “strong resultatives”
and those (like Japanese) which do not, although what he calls “weak resultatives” is potentially
possible in both types of languages. Strong resultatives are those in which the meaning of the verb
and the meaning of the adjective in the patterns of SVOA in English and of SOAV in Japanese are
completely independent of each other. That is, “the given adjective creates a new predication relation
with the object, and it is not repeating or modifying what the verb already contains in its semantics.”
Resultatives that are not “strong” in this sense are referred to as weak resultatives.
Some examples of both types are cited below from Washio (1997):
(100) Strong Resultatives:
a. The horse dragged the logs smooth.
b. The jockeys raced the horses sweaty.
c. The joggers ran the pavement thin.
(101) Weak Resultatives:
a. John painted the wall blue.
b. Mary dyed the dress pink.
c. He wiped the table clean.
The verbs drag, race and run in (100) do not contain the meanings of the given resultatives smooth,
sweaty and thin, respectively, in their lexical semantics. The meanings of the verbs are totally
independent of the meanings of the resultatives. In (101), on the other hand, the verbs paint and dye
imply color in their lexical semantics, and wipe implies the resulting state of cleanness. Therefore, the
meanings of the verbs are closely related to the meanings of the resultatives. 10, 11

In Japanese, as predicted, the sentences corresponding to (100) are unacceptable, while those
corresponding to (101) are acceptable, as shown below (they are from Washio (1997) except (102c)):
(102) a. *Uma-ga maruta-o subesube-ni hikizutta.
horse-Nom log-Acc smooth dragged
‘The horses dragged the logs smooth.’
b. *Kisyu-tati-wa uma-o asedaku-ni hasiraseta.
jockeys-Top horse-Acc sweaty raced
‘The jockeys raced the horses sweaty.’
c. *Zyogingu-soosya-wa hodoo-o usuku hasitta.
joggers-Top pavement-Acc thin ran
‘The joggers ran the pavement thin.’
(103) a. John-ga kabe-o buruu-ni nutta.
-Nom wall-Acc blue painted
‘John painted the wall blue.’
b. Mary-ga doresu-o pinku-ni someta.
-Nom dress-Acc pink dyed
‘Mary dyed the dress pink.’
c. Kare-wa teeburu-o kirei-ni huita.
he-Top table-Acc clean wiped
‘He wiped the table clean.’
Following Jackendoff (1990), Bresnan and Zaenen (1990) and Goldberg (1995), Washio
further argues that in acceptable English (and Japanese) resultative sentences, the post-verbal NPs
must be patients (see note 8), and therefore the following sentences are unacceptable:
(104) a. *John saw Mary stiff. (cf. Simpson 1983: 146)
b. *Max received the letter flat. (Jackendoff 1990: 230)
The reader may have already been aware that Washio’s strong and weak resultatives are
essentially tantamount to our pragmatic and lexical resultatives, respectively. This may be true in the
long run. However, his analysis and ours are crucially different in that he depends on the notion of
Patient to differentiate acceptable (strong) resultatives from unacceptable ones, while we depend on the
logical/pragmatic necessity of the causal relationships described in the resultatives. The dependence
on the notion of Patient, however, seems to encounter at least two problems in a way that our account
does not. First, since strong resultatives are those in which the meaning of the verb is independent of
that of a given resultative, it will be predicted that all sentences of this type should be acceptable, as
long as the post-verbal objects are patients. However, this is not necessarily the case, as the
unacceptability of the following shows:
(105) a. *She shot him lame/paranoid. (=77c)
b. *John hammered the metal beautiful/safe/tubular. (=77a)
c. *John watered the tulips alive. (cf. 73b)
d. *I danced myself unconscious. (cf. 8f)
The arguments that the resultatives are predicated of in (105) are all construed as patients, as shown by
the acceptability of the following pseudo-cleft tests (see note 8):
(106) a. What she did to him was shoot him.
b. What John did to the metal was hammer it.
c. What John did to the tulips was water them.
In spite of this, sentences (105a-d) are all unacceptable, which fails to be accounted for in Washio’s
framework. This seems to indicate that it is necessary to take into account, as we have done, the causeresult
relationship described in the resultative construction, and consider whether the relationship is
logically or pragmatically reasonable or not.

The second problem is that, as pointed out in note 8, patienthood is not a crucial factor for
determining the acceptability of the resultative construction. Observe, once again, (26c-f), repeated
below:
(26) c. *John kissed Mary speechless.
d. *Fido licked the bone shiny.
e. *The man patted the dog angry.
f. *She touched the vase into pieces.
As pointed out in note 8, there is no problem with the pseudo-cleft tests for (26c-f). Hence, the
unacceptability of these sentences is left unaccounted for by Washio’s analysis.
Let us turn to Kageyama’s (1996: Chapter 5) analysis. He argues that in Japanese, only
change-of-state verbs produce acceptable resultative sentences, while in English, not only change-ofstate
verbs but also some action (activity) verbs can produce acceptable sentences. Observe the
following sentences taken from Kageyama (1996: 242-243):
(107) Change-of-State Verbs:
a. He painted the kennel white.
b. She tore the letter to pieces.
(108) Action Verbs (Verbs that Act on Something):
a. The earthquake shook the building apart.
b. He screwed the lid tight.
The verbs paint and tear in (107) are change-of-state verbs, and the resultatives white and to pieces
serve to specify the resulting states given in the lexical conceptual structures of the verbs (see (39) and
(57)). On the other hand, the verbs shake and screw in (108) are action verbs (verbs that act on
something), and they do not imply any change of state of an object that they act on. As predicted, the
Japanese sentences corresponding to (107) are acceptable, while those corresponding to (108) are
unacceptable, as shown below (Kageyama (1996: 242)):
(109) a. Kare-wa inu-goya-o siroku nutta.
he-Top kennel-Acc white painted
‘He painted the kennel white.’
b. Kanozyo-wa sono tegami-o biribiri-ni yabutta.
she-Top the letter-Acc pieces-to tore
‘She tore the letter to pieces.’
(110) a. *Zisin-ga biru-o barabara-ni yusabutta.
earthquake-Nom building-Acc apart shook
‘The earthquake shook the building apart.’
b. *Kare-wa bin-no huta-o kataku nezitta.
he-Top bottle’s lid-Acc tight screwed
‘He screwed the lid of the bottle tight.’
To produce acceptable English resultative sentences such as (108a, b), Kageyama (1996)
proposes the following (see also Pustejovsky (1991, 1995) and Levin and Rapoport (1988)):
(111) Merger of Upper Event with Lower Event: Merge the upper event (ACT ON or ACT)
with the lower event (BECOME [BE AT]]) by a causal relationship (CAUSE):
[x ACT ON y] + [y BECOME [y BE AT -z]]
----> [x ACT ON y] CAUSE [y BECOME [y BE AT -z]]]
| | | |
subj verb obj resultative
e.g. John kicked the door open
(111) roughly means that an event (such as John’s kicking the door) and a resulting event that it
causes (such as the door’s becoming open) are merged as a single sentence (i.e., the resultative

construction) such as ‘John kicked the door open’. Kageyama maintains that this sort of merger does
not apply to Japanese, since in Japanese complex verbs of the pattern of V+V (such as uti-korosu
‘(lit.) shoot-kill’ and osi-akeru ‘(lit.) push-open’ are available. He also maintains that for (111) to
work, the upper event must directly lead to the resulting state denoted by the lower event (see also
Goldberg (1995: 193: 195)). He states that this accounts for the unacceptability of the following
sentences (Kageyama (1996: 256)):
(112) a. *The dog licked the door open.
b. *He watched the TV broken.
It is difficult to interpret a dog’s action of licking a door as a direct cause of opening the door.
Similarly, just watching TV is generally not a direct cause for the TV set to be broken. Hence, (111)
does not apply to the two events denoted in each of (112), and the resultative construction cannot be
formed. As the reader may have already noticed it, Kageyama’s analysis and ours have a number of
similar claims. But there are at least two differences between them. One difference is that while
Kageyama claims that only change-of-state verbs are acceptable in the Japanese resultative
construction, we claim that even some action verbs are also acceptable. Therefore, the acceptability of
sentences such as (92a-c), repeated below, will be a problem for Kageyama’s analysis:
(92) a. Hanako-wa teeburu-o kirei-ni huita.
-Top table-Acc clean wiped
‘Hanako wiped the table clean.’
b. Kono yuka-o pikapika-ni huku nante muri dayo.
this floor-Acc shiny wipe impossible is
‘It is impossible to wipe this floor shiny.’
c. Boku-wa heya-o kirei-ni soozi-sita.
I-Top room-Acc clean swept
‘I swept the room clean.’
Kageyama (1996: 243-247) is aware of this type of sentence, and argues that while clean in Hanako
wiped the table clean is a resultative, the corresponding Japanese kirei-ni ‘clean’ is not a resultative,
but an adverb, and huku ‘wipe’, unlike wipe, is a sort of a change-of-state verb, whose lexical
conceptual structure is shown below (p. 246):
(113) [x ACT ON z] CONTROL [z BECOME [[DUST] y -on- [ ] z BE [NOT-AT z]]]
Kageyama states that huku means, roughly speaking, ‘to scrub a place (z) and remove dust or trash
there’, and that kirei-ni ‘clean’ modifies NOT-AT in (113). Hence, (92a) is not a counterexample to
his claim, and (92c) is probably not, either, if soozi-suru ‘sweep’ is assumed to have a lexical
conceptual structure like (113).
However, the above assumption seems to run afoul of the following contrast:
(114) Hanako-wa teeburu-o huita ga hokori-ga mada nokotte-ita.
-Top table-Acc wiped but dust-Nom yet remained
‘Hanako wiped the table, but there was still dust there.’
(115) a. *Mizu-o kooraseta kedo katamara-nakatta. (change-of-state verb)
water-Acc froze but become solid not-Past
‘*I froze water, but it didn’t become solid.’
b. *Gokiburi-o korosita kedo mada ikite-ita. (change-of-state verb)
cockroach-Acc killed but yet alive-was
‘*I killed the cockroach, but it was still alive.’
The contrasting acceptability between (114) and (115) seems to suggest that the verb huku is not a
change-of-state verb, but an action verb (just implying the resulting state of cleanness). Further, kireini,
just like the English clean, is assumed to be a resultative. Therefore, acceptable resultative sentences

in Japanese does not seem to be restricted only to change-of-state verbs. This would show that a
constraint that does not resort to change-of-state verbs is preferable and more comprehensible. 12
The second difference between Kageyama’s analysis and ours is that while Kageyama claims
that for the English resultative construction to be acceptable, an action described in the sentence (i.e.,
what he calls the upper event) must be a direct cause of producing the resulting event expressed in the
sentence (i.e., his lower event), we claim that, this being not a sufficient condition, it is necessary to
consider whether the given causal relationship is logically or pragmatically reasonable or not. That is,
whether an action is a direct cause of the resulting state is just one condition, which would be
subsumed under the consideration of whether the given causal relationship is logically or
pragmatically inferrable. This seems to be borne out by the unacceptability of sentences such as the
following:
(116) a. *John hammered the metal beautiful/safe/tubular. (=77a)
b. *John watered the tulips alive. (=101c)
c. *She wrenched it broken. (Green 1972: 84)
d. *She shot him wounded. (ibid.)
e. *John kissed Mary happy.
f. *John criticized Mary unhappy.
g. *The man touched the dog angry.
In each of the above sentences, the action described is interpreted as a direct cause of the resulting state
denoted by the resultative. For example, hammering the metal is construed as a direct cause of the
resulting state of beauty/safety/tubularity. In spite of this, the sentences in (116) are all unacceptable.
This would show that it is indispensable to consider whether the expressed causal relationship is of
logical or pragmatic necessity.
5. Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that the widely held hypothesis that only unaccusative and
transitive verbs are compatible with resultative phrases is untenable, even if coupled with Levin and
Rappaport Hovav’s (1995) restriction that verbs of inherently directed motion and stative verbs are
incompatible with resultatives. We have further shown that the acceptability of the English and
Japanese resultative constructions is not primarily controlled by verb types such as unaccusatives,
unergatives and transitives, or accomplishments, achievements, activities and states, but that it is
controlled by the considerations of (i) whether the expressed causal relationship is incorporated in the
verb meaning (lexical resultatives), and (ii) whether it is logically inferred from our pragmatic
knowledge (pragmatic resultatives).
Although many researchers such as Miyagawa (1989) and Tsujimura (1990a, b, 1996) have
assumed that the English and Japanese resultative constructions are essentially the same phenomenon,
we have shown, along with Washio (1997) and Kageyama (1996), that this assumption is empirically
wrong. We have shown that the difference between the two constructions is that English allows both
lexical and pragmatic resultatives, whereas Japanese allows only the former resultatives. Finally, we
have made clear some differences between our analysis and Washio’s and Kageyama’s analyses.

Notes
1. It has often been argued that the Direct Object Restriction can be reduced to a mutual ccommand
(or m-command) requirement on predication (see Williams 1980, Rothstein 1983, among
others); namely, resultative phrases and the phrases that they are predicated of must c-command (or mcommand)
each other. However, Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 49) point out some problems
with this requirement (see also Carrier and Randall 1992), and argue that the Direct Object Restriction,
which is merely a generalization, follows from the following rule, which roughly means that an NP
whose referent undergoes the change of state must be governed by the verbs or the direct object:
(i) The Change-of-State Linking Rule:
Version (a): An NP that refers to the entity that undergoes the change of state in the
eventuality described in the VP must be governed by the verb heading the VP.
Version (b): An NP that refers to the entity that undergoes the change of state in the
eventuality described in the VP must be the direct object of the verb heading the VP.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 51) state that “the version (a) formulation will be necessary if the
postverbal NP in a resultative construction based on an unergative verb is not the direct object of the
verb, but the subject of a small clause.”
In connection with this, Hoekstra (1988, 1992) argues that a resultative phrase and the NP that
it is predicated of form a small clause (SC) no matter what type of verb is used in the resultative
construction. Thus, (1a), (4a) and (6a) have the following structures, respectively:
(ii) a. Mary [VP wiped [SC the table clean]]. (=1a)
b. The lakei [VP froze [SC ei solid]]. (=4a)
|_______________|
c. *Dorai [VP shouted [SC PROi hoarse]]. (=6a)
Each of the small clauses in (iia-c) is L(exical)-marked by the verb (Chomsky 1986), and therefore it
is transparent to government, allowing the subject of the small clause to be either a lexical NP (as in
(iia)), or an NP-trace (as in (iib)). On the other hand, in (iic) PRO is also governed by the verb
shouted, thereby violating the PRO Theorem requiring that PRO be ungoverned (Chomsky 1981).
(Carrier and Randall (1992) critically examine the small clause analysis, and alternatively argue for a
ternary-branching VP analysis.)
2. The account of Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) reviewed in the text predicts that the
unacceptable sentences (11a-c), repeated below, have no problem with Case, since the
nonsubcategorized postverbal NPs, just as those in (8)-(10), can be assigned accusative Case:
(11) a. *Those teenagers laughed themselves.
b. *Sylvester cried his eyes.
c. *The dog barked the baby.
Then, why are (11a-c) unacceptable? It seems that Levin and Rappaport Hovav, following Carrier and
Randall (1992), attribute the unacceptability to the assumption that the postverbal NPs are not
arguments, thereby receiving no θ-roles.
This line of explanation, however, seems to be at odds with the acceptability of the so-called
cognate object construction, exemplified below:
(i) a. John laughed a sad laugh.
b. Sylvester cried a good long cry.
c. Fido barked a loud bark.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) claim that cognate objects such as a sad laugh, a good long cry
and a loud bark in (ia-c) are assigned not only accusative Case but also θ-roles, being true arguments
of the verbs. However, this account based on Case and θ-roles simply stipulates that the postverbal

NPs in (11) are not arguments, while those in (i) are, without providing any criterion of what is an
argument and what is not. Therefore, their account seems to lack a predictive power.
3. Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 61) attribute the unacceptability of the following sentence
to the assumption that appear is a stative verb.
(i) *The Loch Ness monster appeared famous.
This assumption, however, is highly questionable, and the verb is regarded as an achievement verb in
Vendler’s (1967) classification of verbs into states, achievements, activities and accomplishments.
This is corroborated by criteria such as (i) an achievement verb has habitual interpretation in simple
present tense, while a stative verb does not (see (iia)), and (ii) the former cooccurs with a phrase such
as in an hour, while the latter does not (see (iib)) (see Van Valin (1990: 223)):
(ii) a. The Loch Ness monster appears in this lake. (habitual)
b. The Loch Ness monster will appear in an hour.
Thus, the unacceptability of (i) is left unaccounted for by Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s framework.
This also applies to the unacceptability of the following sentence in which disappear, the same type of
verb as appear in Vendler’s verb classification, is used:
(iii) *The UFO disappeared into pieces.
4. Jackendoff (1990: 240) attributes the unacceptability of (32b), repeated below, to the fact that
break is a nonrepeatable point-event verb. However, this account is clearly untenable, since (32a), also
with the verb break, is perfectly acceptable.
(32) a. The vase broke into pieces.
b. *The vase broke worthless. (Jackendoff 1990: 240)
5. The account presented so far in the text is similar to those given by Van Valin (1990) (see
(27)) and Kageyama (1996), but this is not the whole story, however, as will be developed further in
the following sections. Moreover, Van Valin has identified verbs containing the feature BECOME as
accomplishment and achievement verbs, and argued that only these types of verbs can appear in the
resultative construction. However, this is simply not true, as we have shown in Section 2 (see (28)-
(31)). We will also argue below in the text that the acceptability of the resultative construction is not
simply a matter of verbs, but of the semantic relationship between the verb and the resultative (see 3.2).
For differences between our analysis and Kageyama’s, see Section 4.
6. The intended meaning of (65b) can also be expressed in two clauses, as in the following:
(i) Sono tozan-ka-wa kogoe-te sinda.
the mountaineer-Top froze-and died
‘The mountaineer froze and died.’
Note that the following sentence, corresponding to (65a), sounds strange:
(ii) *Sono hito-wa kazi-de yake-te (yaka-re-te) sinda.
the person-Top fire-in be burned-and died
‘That person was burned in the fire and died (was killed).’
The unacceptability of (ii) seems to be due to the fact that it is unnatural to use yakeru/yakareru
‘burn/be burned’ for living people (*Taroo-ga yaketa/yakareta ‘Taro was burned’), though the verb is
compatible with body parts or corpses (Kami-ga yaketa ‘My hair burned’/ Sitai-ga yakareta ‘The
corpse was burned). This may partly contribute to the unacceptability of (63a).
7. The fact that the direct object is totally affected, but not the oblique complement, can also be
observed in the following pairs of examples:

(i) a. John ate the apple. (complete consumption)
b. John ate at the apple. (noncompletion)
(ii) a. I hear you clearly. (direct hearing)
b. I heard of you. (indirect hearing)
(iii) a. John caught a straw. (complete catch)
b. A drowning man will catch at a straw. (no such implication)
It has been argued in the literature (e.g., Pinker (1989)) that the direct object, which is generally
affected by the action denoted, is interpreted as Patient, while the oblique complement is not.
8. Many researchers such as Jackendoff (1990), Bresnan and Zaenen (1990) and Goldberg
(1995) have claimed a condition such as the one formulated in (i) for the resultative construction:
(i) Patient Condition: For the resultative construction to be acceptable, an argument that a
resultative phrase is predicated of must be construed as Patient.
The traditional test for patienthood is that the expression in question can occur in the following frame
(Lakoff 1976):
(ii) a. What X did to was . . .
b. What happened to was . . .
The Patient Condition is understandable from the discussion given in the text, since Patient is
generally understood as an entity that is affected by the action denoted by the verb.
The unacceptability of (91b), repeated below, may alternatively be explained on the basis of the
notion of Patient:
(iii) *He laughed sick. (=91b)
In this example, the subject he is interpreted as receiving double θ-roles; Agent performing the action
of laughing, and Patient that gets sick. This, however, violates the following θ-criterion (Chomsky
1981: 36):
(iv) θ-criterion: Each argument bears one and only one θ-role, and each θ-role is assigned to one
and only one argument.
It would not be amiss here to point out that the Patient Condition (i) is not sufficient for
predicting the acceptability of the resultative construction. Observe the following examples.
(v) a. *John kissed Mary speechless. (=26c)
b. *Fido licked the bone shiny. (=26d)
c. *The man patted the dog angry. (=26e)
d. *She touched the vase into pieces. (=26f)
The arguments that the resultatives are predicated of in (va-d) (i.e., Mary, the bone, the dog, the vase)
are all interpreted as Patient, as witnessed by the fact that they all pass the following pseudo-cleft tests
for Patient:
(vi) a. What John did to Mary was kiss her.
b. What Fido did to the bone was lick it.
c. What the man did to the dog was pat it.
d. What she did to the vase was touch it.
Hence, the Patient Condition fails to account for the unacceptability of sentences such as (va-d). It
further fails to account for the difference in acceptability of sentences such as (32)-(34).

9. One might wonder why the following example is marginal or unacceptable, in spite of the fact
that the corresponding English example is acceptable:
(i) ??/*John-wa kinzoku-o hirataku hanmaa-de tataita. (cf. 67a)
-Top metal-Acc flat hammer-with hit
‘John hammered the metal flat.’
The unacceptability of (i) seems to be attributable to the fact that the verb (hanmaa-de) tataku, unlike
the English hammer, does not imply the resulting state of flatness (see Washio (1997) for a similar
account).
10. Paint and dye in (101a, b) are change-of-state verbs, as shown in 3.1, while wipe in (101c) is
not, as shown in 3.3. However, Washio does not specifically take this difference into account, and
considers whether or not a given verb implies in its lexical semantics the resulting state denoted by the
resultative phrase.
11. Washio further points out that there is a class of sentences (what he calls “spurious
resultatives”), as in (i), which bear certain superficial resemblance to resultatives, but constitute a
separate phenomenon:
(i) He tied his shoelaces tight/loose.
Washio argues that (i) is not a true resultative expression, because it cannot be paraphrased as in (ii),
and in this type of sentence, adjectives alternate with adverbs with virtually no difference in meaning, as
in (iii):
(ii) He caused his shoelaces to become tight/loose by tying them. (≠ (i))
(iii) He tied his shoelaces tightly/loosely.
(iii) shows that (i) describes the way (manner) he tied his shoelaces, and not the result of his tying his
shoelaces.
12. Washio (1997) also argues that the class of verbs that can appear in the Japanese resultative
construction is not equal to the class of change-of-state verbs: the latter class of verbs is smaller than,
and contained in, the former. He states that in addition to huku ‘wipe’, verbs such as migaku ‘polish’,
niru ‘boil’ and many others are also activity (action) verbs, and not true change-of-state verbs, as
evidenced by the acceptability of the following sentences ((ia) is Washio’s example, and (ib) is mine):
(i) a. Kono kabin-wa ni-zikan migai-te mo mattaku kirei-ni
this vase-Top two hours polish-even if at all clean
nara-nakatta.
become-not-Past
‘I polished this vase for two hours, but it didn’t become clean at all.’
b. Kono niku-wa ikura nite-mo yawarakaku nara-nai.
this meat-Top much boil-even if soft become-not
‘No matter how much I boil this meat, it doesn’t become soft.’
Given that migaku and niru are not change-of-state verbs, the acceptability of the following would pose
a problem to Kageyama’s analysis, and support Washio’s and our claims (the examples are from
Washio’s):
(ii) a. John-wa kinzoku-o pikapika-ni migaita.
-Top metal-Acc shiny polished
‘John polished the metal shiny.’
b. John-wa niku-o yawarakaku nita.
-Top meat-Acc soft boiled
‘John boiled the meat soft.’

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