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foreknowledge
Essential Resources for Intelligence Analysts
Issue Five
October 2012
Analytic
rigour
LEIU awards
Intelligencia,
secreto y política
Evaluating effectiveness
of analysis in
criminal investigations
www.foreknowledge.info
ISSN 2225-5613
Walking a tight rope …
ethics for
intelligence analysts
Politicisation of
intelligence analysis
Ethical dilemmas
for the
intelligence analyst
Finding Nemo:
discovering the value
of open source
intelligence in
social media

Contents
From the editor 3
Walking a tight rope: ethics for the 4
Intelligence analyst
The ethical implications of the politicisation of
intelligence analysis
Intelligence & ethics: uncomfortable companions
Intelligencia, secreto y politíca
Pathologies of intelligence-policy relations
Some advice on ethics for intelligence analysts?
Categories of ethical dilemmas
Resources on ethics for intelligence analysts
Toolbox: Analytic rigour 13
Upcoming events 14
LEIU Awards 2012 14
Finding Nemo: discovering the value of 15
open source intelligence in Social Media
Evaluating effectiveness of analysis in 16
criminal investigations
The effective analyst: attributes 17
The all-discipline intelligence process: 18
wanted - a simplified construct with real
explanatory power
Psychology of intelligence analysis # 5 20
Advertise in Foreknowledge 22
Endorsing organisations:
Association of Law
Enforcement
Intelligence Units
International Association
of Law Enforcement
Intelligence Analysts
Association of Crime
and Intelligence
Analysts
Australian Institute
for Professional
Intelligence Officers
Cover: Shutterstock
Editor:
Dalene Duvenage
Publisher:
4Knowledge Analysis Solutions
PO Box 40467
Moreleta Park
Pretoria
2 October 2012 Foreknowledge
0044
South Africa
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Editor: Dalene Duvenage, Pretoria, South Africa
A lot has been written the last few years on the ethical aspects of intelligence, including politicization, interrogation,
drones and various war and intelligence doctrines. Ethics is a fuzzy concept and dependent
on individuals, organisations, ethnic groups, religious groups, cultures and countries’ interpretation and
interests. These debates, mostly US-centric, usually take place on a policy-making or academic level.
There is silence on how other countries and intelligence sectors deal with ethical issues while we as intelligence analysts
struggle to find the relevancy to our day-to-day work. More often than not, we find ourselves walking a
tight rope between what we feel is the right thing to do and what our clients or managers want from us. It’s easy to
say “Talk truth to power” when work, management and political realities and pressures makes it difficult. However,
if we are serious about improving intelligence analysis and professionalisation, we need to operationalise this
and talk about what is best practice and acceptable and what is not. I doubt that we will ever agree on a
“Hippocratic Oath” for analysts, but at least we should put our problems out there so that we can assist each other
to deal with it more effectively. This issue of Foreknowledge reflects on what intelligence ethics means to our daily
tasks. I hope that it will stimulate debate wherever you are.
Our contributors in this edition include intelligence professionals writing under pseudonyms as well these experts:
Richards Heuer is a veteran intelligence
scholar and analyst. He has
written numerous books and resides
in Monterey, California, USA. He gave
us permission to summarise his book,
Janet Evans is Associate
Investigator, Centre of Excellence in
Policing and Security, Australia
Amongst others, Jan Goldman is the
editor of the Scarecrow Professional
Intelligence Education Series and is a
founding member of the International
Intelligence Ethics Association. He
teaches as NDIC and Georgetown University
in Washinton, US.
Mario Eybers is a mortgage
fraud analyst at First National
Bank, Johannesburg, South Africa
from the editor
Dalene
Don McDowell (SCCA) received awards for
his book Strategic Intelligence: a handbook
for practitioners, managers and users,
teaches intelligence analysis throughout the
world, has a private intelligence distance
learning college and is a founding member of
AIPIO. He is from Pambula, NSW, Australia.
Juan Pablo Somiedo is from Madrid,
Spain where he is a strategic and competitive
intelligence specialist .
October 2012 Foreknowledge 3

ethics
The ethical implications of the
politicisation of intelligence
analysis
Before we can discuss the
ethical implications of the
politicisation of intelligence
analysis, we must first define
what is meant as
“politicisation of intelligence
analysis.” Then, after we can
agree on a definition of this term,
can we better understand its impact
on how it both assists and
hinders intelligence analysis.
So, what is the politicisation of
intelligence analysis? Simply put,
“politicised intelligence” is any
intelligence or analysis that is developed
to meet the conclusion of
key judgements that have already
been predetermined to
support policy.
Other definitions include the manipulation
of intelligence to reflect
policy preferences. Of
course, the policymaker is not
interested in objective intelligence
analysis because of policy
bias that may already exist by the
person responsible for receiving
the intelligence.
Consequently, the intelligence
analyst is not being asked to be
objective (that is, letting the facts
speak for themselves) but rather,
the consumer is asking the analyst
to be subjective (that is, delivering
assessments that speak for
themselves IN SPITE of the facts).
Having your boss come over to
your desk and telling you to
Jan Goldman
Editor of the International Journal of Intelligence Ethics
Shutterstock
change your conclusions is the
most blatant and obvious form of
politicisation of intelligence; however,
there are many other forms
of politicisation of intelligence,
that are more subtle and yet, just
as deadly for the intelligence analyst
to lose their
credibility…because, if you are
willing to fix your intelligence
assessment to please your boss,
then why should you ever be
trusted to provide accurate intelligence
in the future?
The danger of the politicisation of
intelligence community is real.
Moreover, the danger can never
be eliminated but the challenge is
to develop reasonable safeguards.
There is a need to protect intelligence
from any kind of pressure.
The intelligence community can
defend itself by strengthening its
professional ethos from political
pressure, by both establishing unbiased
analytical approaches and
strong leadership that is not
afraid to speak truth to power.
Additionally, when intelligence
analysts see intelligence not being
handled or prepared in an objective
manner, they need to speak
out and make these concerns
available to their chain-of-command.
When intelligence is misused,
everyone loses.
Shutterstock
4 October 2012 Foreknowledge

1Indirect manipulation of
intelligence analysis
This is when the boss uses
subtle efforts to shape
intelligence. These actions
occur in how your boss
“suggests” better ways to
write a report leading to a
different conclusion, or
providing incentives to
assessments that “prove a
point” rather than seeking to
find out what the point is.
2
Direct manipulation of
intelligence analysis
This action occurs when the
policymakers points out that
these are the specific findings
that will be accepted and
nothing else. This is probably
the easiest and most obvious
form of politicization of
intelligence.
3
Subtle assumptions of fact
When analysts are expected
to use certain basic
4 Career
5 Partisan
assumptions that are agreed
upon by their bosses and
colleagues. Analysts are not
allowed to wander off and
develop their own
assumptions.
interests
When analysts are driven by
how the intelligence will
advance their careers in the
organization. By becoming
the intelligence expert – that
provides the required
answers to the intelligence
questions, your status will be
enhanced. Of course, you are
not allowed to accept other
opinions or facts that might
contradict your assessments.
intelligence
When political motives
influence the decision of the
analyst and their assessment.
Clearly, when two or more
political parties are vying for
power in a country, there is a
ethics
Here are 7 additional and different forms of politicisation that exists. The list includes the obvious and
less obvious but is important that analysts be aware of such frameworks.
carryover to how it may
prove or disprove a political
party’s platform.
October 2012 Foreknowledge 5
6 Bureaucratic
intelligence
Bureaucracies use
intelligence to gain power
and favour from those in
political power. Good
supportive intelligence for
one party over another
political party will result in
how it will affect the
organization’s budget,
resources and organizational
goals.
7
Intelligence as a scapegoat
Politicians will often blame
intelligence for failed policies,
or when government
operations go wrong.
Intelligence analysts can be
easy prey for politicians -
especially when the element
of secrecy is involved.
Consequently, intelligence
analysts can rarely speak out
in their own defense.

ethics
Though this topic keeps occasionally
appearing in print
and in discussions about intelligence
activity in all its forms,
most of the hub-bub simply tends
to die away. Ethics seems not to be
a topic that we in the global intelligence
community want to embrace
or treat seriously. 1 This article, the
first in a series, looks at ethics in
the enforcement and corporate intelligence
context, although drawing
parallels with other forms and
applications of the intelligence
craft.
A non-issue or unpopular subject
Having for several years taught,
lectured and given presentations
on ethics a nd morality in various
domestic and international settings,
I still find it difficult to engage intelligence
officers in any serious
discussion about this topic. Clearly
one could be forgiven for thinking
that the “ethics and intelligence”
nexus is either a non-issue, or at
least an unpopular one that perhaps
should neither be mentioned
nor explored.
It is all too easy for intelligence
staff to ignore the issue of ethical
and moral challenge, relying instead
on our presumed knowledge
of “right and wrong.” Moreover,
the conviction that we do what we
do for a good and proper purpose
sustains belief in self. We are not
alone in this either; operational
agents and investigators face exactly
the same choices and are driven
by the same convictions.
Insufficient rules and regulations
Reliance on rules and regulations
to guide – as well as to constrain
actions and behaviour - allows intelligence
officers to expect that acting
according to rule will overcome
any ethical or moral considerations
and challenges.
Intelligence & ethics
Uncomfortable
companions
In being employed and legitimized
by governments or corporations,
there is a virtual umbrella of protection.
Within military circles as well as
enforcement paramilitary organizations,
publication of ROE (rules off
engagement) satisfies two requirements:
firstly, that a set of rules has
been developed to ensure behaviour
is authorised and legitimized;
and secondly, that everyone involved
knows what they can do
and what they cannot.
However, ROE are produced for
specific operational purposes governing
the behaviour of all concerned
(including intelligence
operatives) and defining the pa-
Don McDowell
Pambula, Australia
Shutterstock
rameters of action and contact with
opposing offenders or combatants.
No such procedural mechanism
exists for day-to-day activities of
intelligence staff. Instead, and even
then not always universally applied,
government departments
and corporate organizations may
publish a code of ethics as part of
their standard operating procedural
instructions (SOPs).
When it comes to intelligence units
(particularly in enforcement), we
face the obvious dilemma of being
involved in what is often typified
as secretive behaviour, trying to
gather information and interpret it
in a sensitive environment, always
to protect the safety and security of
6 October 2012 Foreknowledge

Thinking only operational staff and not analysts are bound
by ethical considerations? This is a truly mistaken belief at
the most fundamental level, unto the point of self-delusion.
We share responsibility …
government and the people. The
same can be said of corporate intelligence
activities.
Ethical challenges almost never
seem to loom large in our traditional
thinking as intelligence officers.
Yet there are recorded cases in
which scandals erupt when data
collection activities – overt and covert
- go “wrong,” raising questions
about whether our actions were justifiable
in all the circumstances. The
easy solutions always seem to be to
focus on those who conducted the
data gathering, whether authorised
or not, and rarely focus on the intelligence
thinking behind the direction
to collectors.
If we direct collection, we share
responsibility
This brings us to the real challenge
facing intelligence staff. We see ourselves
as absolutely important to
the role of guiding and directing
data gathering for an intelligence
case, even though we might not,
ourselves, be physically involved in
that activity. Hence the responsibility
for improper action, were it to
occur, can easily be seen to rest on
the collectors.
But the questions remain unanswered:
if we in intelligence direct
data collection, do we not also
share responsibility for ensuring
that the targets are properly chosen?
For the hypothetical rationale?
For directing the collection effort?
For the specifically focused directions
given by our intelligence
staff? All must be rational and logical,
and beyond reproach in terms
of ethical and moral considerations.
We can always rationalise that we
carry out our functions with the
best of intentions and thus perhaps
“the end justifies the means.” Yet
there are quite stringent legal requirements
for enforcement and
intelligence action, and merely
quoting that well-known aphorism
would be little useful defence
against potential prosecution.
Self-interested justification
In the intelligence world, analysis
enjoys seemingly the greatest level
of protection and self-interested justification.
After all, analysts merely
analyse and give advice and we do
not get involved in any real physical
activity that needs be considered
against ethical or moral issues and
benchmarks. This is a truly mistaken
belief at the most fundamental
level, unto the point of self-delusion.
In giving advice, analysts must
make decisions to share their convictions
with their clients and commanders.
How do we decide what
to tell and what to keep out of the
briefing or report? It is human nature
to want to satisfy ourselves
that we have done something
worthwhile; to admit to mistakes or
errors, threatens our well-being.
Yet to withhold from a client or
commander information that might
be essential – that we have missed
out on some element of research,
that some data is unreliable, or even
that there are conflicting suppositions
and possibilities – all these deprive
the client of an ability to make
a completely informed decision.
Telling what we know and don’t
know
Are we right to focus only on the
positives? Most analysts and com-
ethics
manders might be tempted to answer
“Yes” on the basis of urgency
and time and critical decisions
needing to me made. But if decision-making
is so critical, then
surely we, the analysts, need to respond
holistically, stating what we
know and admitting what we
don’t.
Only in that way do we provide a
fully disclosing, balanced intelligence
report to our client. Only by
acting this way are we approaching
the briefing challenge with our ethical
values intact.
Making sure that this can happen is
a matter of training and development,
conditioning, monitoring
and regulation. More about these
issues, problems, challenges and
solutions will come in planned future
articles.
Don McDowell has been an intelligence officer
for nearly 50 years across a wide variety of
working environments. He is a respected author,
consultant, advisor and lecturer. Don was
the co-founder and Charter President of AIPIO
from 1990 to 1994, is co-Vice Chair of the International
Association for Intelligence Education
(IAFIE).
1 The exception is the focal point that the International
Intelligence Ethics Association provides through its
conferences and publications. The IIEA body, however,
tends to focus primarily on ethical issues as they
relate to national security, defense and espionage,
rather than on enforcement.
October 2012 Foreknowledge 7

ethics
INTELIGENCIA,
SECRETO Y
POLÍTICA
La obtención y el análisis
de información para
su posterior transformación
en conocimiento al
servicio de ciertos intereses particulares
o generales no es una realidad
nueva, sino que es casi tan
vieja como el hombre mismo y
nació con las primeras civilizaciones.
Es una actividad que ya
aparece documentada en la Biblia,
como bien ha estudiado Rose Mary
Sheldon.
Desde sus orígenes mismos, hay
una relación crucial entre información,
inteligencia y poder. Uno de
los riesgos de cualquier institución,
en el aspecto funcional, como señala
Peter Jackson, es su politización.
De hecho, la historia está sembrada
de casos en los que determinadas
instituciones cedieron ante las presiones
del poder político. Por ejemplo,
la antigua inquisición fue,
muchas veces, un instrumento utilizado
por las monarquías de media
Europa para lograr
determinados fines políticos.
Los servicios de inteligencia no son
ajenos a este riesgo y pueden llegar
a acomodar su información a los
intereses políticos predominantes.
Pero también se ha dado el revés
de la moneda, es decir, el poder
público y político es manejado por
determinados servicios de inteligencia
o de información para
satisfacer intereses privados o individuales.
Es el caso de Edgar Hoover.
El que fuera director del
Juan Pablo Somiedo
Madrid, Spain
Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) desde 1924, controló a los
sucesivos presidentes y fiscales
generales, a quienes, en ocasiones,
amenazó con desvelar escándalos
en caso de ser destituido, lo que le
permitió, a pesar de las críticas,
permanecer en su cargo hasta su
muerte en 1972. Se le atribuye al
presidente norteamericano Johnson
una curiosa analogía relacionando
política y servicios de
inteligencia:
“La política es como ordeñar una
vaca. Ves la leche salir, aprietas
más y la leche burbujea y sale; y
justo cuando el cubo está lleno, la
vaca con su rabo empuja el cubo y
todo se derrama. Esto es lo que la
CIA hace a la política”.
Otro de los riesgos añadidos en
esta relación obligada entre inteligencia
y política tiene que ver
con la dirección política de los
servicios de inteligencia. La experiencia
demuestra que cuando no
existe una adecuada dirección o
existen vacíos de poder y decisión,
normalmente son siempre ocupados
por alguien.
Lo que, en algunas ocasiones, ha
favorecido que, quien verdaderamente
tenía la responsabilidad de
haber tomado determinadas decisiones
acuse a quien las tomó en su
defecto cuando las cosas no salieron
tal y como estaban planeadas.
Por otro lado, cuando hablamos de
gobiernos democráticos, la alternancia
política no debiera implicar
Shutterstock
cambios drásticos en cuanto a la
planificación y las directrices, pues
la continuidad implica estabilidad
y esta última generalmente redunda
en eficacia de los servicios de
inteligencia.
Pero es el secreto el que cierra esta
triada circular. El secreto se halla
en la médula misma del poder.
Buena parte de la fuerza de las
dictaduras de todo tipo y signo
político reside en la capacidad de
concentrar el secreto, que en las democracias
se comparte y se diluye
entre muchos.
Pero todos los secretos guardados
en una sola mano o círculo restringido,
acaban siendo fatales, no
solo para sus depositarios, sino
para todos los afectados. El ejemplo
de la Stasi en el antiguo Berlín
oriental quedará siempre como un
recuerdo imperecedero del lado
más peligroso del secreto.
Juan Pablo Somiedo is from Madrid, Spain
where he is strategic and competitive
intelligence specialist. He runs a Spanish blog,
Intel Times here
8 October 2012 Foreknowledge

Pathologies of intelligence-policy
relations
Joshua Rovner
From Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence.
Cornell University Press (2011). Book available here
1
Excessive harmony
Mutual satisfaction leads to shared tunnel
vision. Intelligence and policy fail to challenge
each others’ assumptions and beliefs,
potentially leading to disaster.
2
3
Direct manipulation
Policymakers and staff pressure intelligence to produce specific
findings. Alternately, they appoint malleable analysts.
Politicization
Indirect manipulation
Policymakers send tacit signals about acceptable and unacceptable
conclusions. Implicit threats and promises accompany these signals.
Embedded assumptions
Neglect
Ignore the messenger
Policymakers ignore intelligence that undermines
their objectives. Instead, they cherry-pick supporting
information or ignore intelligence altogether.
Self-isolation
Intelligence self-consciously avoids contact
with policymakers.
Widely held strategic assumptions and social norms restrict the
bounds of acceptable analysis.
Intelligence subverts policy
Intelligence estimates publicly undermine policy decisions. Policymakers
may ignore intelligence because they fear this kind of subversion.
ethics
Shutterstock
Intelligence parochialism
Analysts tailor findings for personal or professional gain. Depending
on the analyst’s goals, this can lead to “intelligence to
please” or subversion.
Bureaucratic parochialism
Intelligence agencies tailor findings to support their organizational
interests.
Partisan intelligence
Political parties use intelligence issues for partisan gain, often by
accusing rivals of mismanaging intelligence.
Intelligence as scapegoat
Policymakers deride intelligence when it does not support policy
decisions. In addition, intelligence is blamed for failure to predict
events like surprise attacks.
October 2012 Foreknowledge 9

ethics
Sources of information
MA: Sources may be reliable, unre-
liable, or they may be spies serving
other agendas. Even when sincere
and well placed, sources can be
simply wrong. So assessing the
quality of sources is important for
accuracy of your conclusions. Less
discussed, but equally important in
my view, is protecting your sourc-
es from bureaucracies that may
abuse them without any trace of
conscience. In fact, it is common
for intelligence bureaucracies to
Some advice on ethics to
intelligence analysts?
Professional integrity and best practice
DD: We often forget about work ethic when we debate intelligence ethics.
As analysts, we at least have some control over our attitude towards our
work, in contrast to politicisation and other ethical dilemmas. Analysts
should be mindful and reflective: improve the application for methods, learn
new approaches, be mindful of the biases that clouds my perspective, actively
looking for counter arguments that might make my analysis better. As an
analyst, I can make sure that I have done my best in terms of methods, opinions,
showing what I know and what not, and be ready to answer any question
or critique from my client. But if he does not want to listen to me
because of his own biases and political reasons, my hands are tied. I’ll get
frustrated, but being an analyst, my raison d’être is to make sense and advise,
and that should be enough. If it is not, I should get another job!
MA: Cognitive biases are a problem for analysts because they affect perceptions,
conclusions, and the questions one selects for research. Leaders have
biases too, so a delicate balance must be struck between suppressing
yours and catering to theirs without violating your
commitment to objective truths. Failure can have huge consequences.
TN: The challenge facing any intelligence analyst is that not
only will they be judged by the ethics of the
present, but also the ethics of the future. This
makes the framework that dictates how we gather,
build, complete, and pretty up our work critical.
For the intelligence analyst to forget ethics altogether,
rather than making an informed decision
of where to apply them, could lead to a career
disaster not only now, but also in the future.
squeeze as much as possible from
sources, indifferent to their welfare
and obsessed with short term
goals. Analysts may not be direct-
ly involved in collection or han-
dling sources, but analytic
products have consequences too.
So remembering the humanity of
those you use, and even those you
may target, is important to pre-
serving some moral foundation for
the whole endeavor.
(MA): Prof Michael Andregg:
University of St Thomas, St
Paul, Minnesota, US.
mmandregg@stthomas.edu
(DD): Dalene Duvenage:
Trainer, consultant, scholar,
Foreknowledge editor
Pretoria, South Africa
(TN): Tony Nolan, Risk,
Intelligence and Analytics
Officer, Australian
Government
Impunity and arrogance
MA: Another issue is the illusion of im-
punity and hubris or extreme arro-
gance. Hubris can destroy you in many
ways. Countless analysts have dis-
tanced themselves from the conse-
quences of their work on the theory
they are tiny cogs in big machines, and
that moral judgments are reserved for
policy people. Bureaucracies encour-
age that view, but they are fundamen-
tally amoral, having neither conscience
nor soul. If you make errors in target-
ing and a house full of children is de-
stroyed instead of a house full of
terrorists, the soldier who pulled the
trigger is no more responsible than the
men or women who told him what to
destroy.
Do not be deceived by those who say
the moral way is for sissies and preach-
ers. The prime missions of intelligence
professionals are protecting your peo-
ple from the dangers of our troubled
world, and protecting innocence as a
concept. Be professional and protect
10 October 2012 Foreknowledge
them.

Sins of Commission
An agency is in competition with another over scarce resources.
In furtherance of that end a supervisor approaches a junior analyst
and asks for a product with a specific conclusion. When the
analyst tells her supervisor that she's not sure the data supports
that conclusion, the supervisor replies: “C'mon, you can make
statistics say anything.”
Sins of commission, where someone in power attempts to
strong arm an analyst to deliver a particular judgment,
are rare among those agencies that have a strong tradition
of professionalism and where analysts are able to
progress beyond the lowest levels of the organization.
Yet, in the United States, the past decade has seen an explosion
of domestic intelligence personnel in law enforcement
and 'homeland security' agencies. Most of these
agencies have little or no orientation or traditions in intelligence
analysis, are fragmented with few analytical personnel
and rarely afford analysts the opportunity to rise
within the organization to positions with decision making
authority.
It is under these conditions where analysts are most likely
to be directed to produce politicized analysis and also
where they will have the fewest opportunities for redress.
Difficult ethical decisions
impact on our career
paths…
Raising questions about practices
like those discussed above, can be
problematic - even for experienced intelligence
personnel. While in the federal
intelligence community, raising
such questions may result in a transfer
to a less desirable post or delayed career
advancement, in the law enforcement or
counter-terrorism communities the consequences
can be much longer lasting.
Many analysts in those communities
work for small agencies and have few
career opportunities other than moving
to other agencies. Acquiring a reputa-
Categories of ethical dilemmas
Travels with Shiloh
tion as not being a
'team player' can effectively
destroy a career via
informal channels.
Expecting analysts to both be
aware of ways in which their work
can be manipulated (consciously or
not) and expecting them to act as
warning system to prevent that occurring
without training or support may
just be too much for them to bear.
New intelligence analysts frequently
come into their agency wanting to both
ethics
Sins of Omission
A political protest erupts in cities around the country. The
protestors are dedicated to non-violence and, despite attracting
large numbers of supporters, engage in little serious criminal
activity. Yet, the movement attracts the attention of law enforcement
and counter-terrorism officials who demand a steady
stream of products linking the protest to other, violent movements
despite little to no evidence of any such connection. As
intelligence resources are focused on the movement, other criminal
and terrorist threats are given lower priority and attention.
A more common and subtle ethical issue for intelligence
analysts falls into this category. Intelligence personnel
may be directed to focus their energies towards a particular
conclusion for any number of biases or interests. The
end result, however, remains the same. Analytical judgments
are influenced and manipulated based upon the parameters
under which intelligence personnel directed.
As in the case of the search for WMDs in Iraq, repeated
requests to find evidence of a particular threat, along with
increasing amounts of resources devoted to the question,
inevitably leads to increased reporting. Often this reporting
involves information of decreasing quality or repetitive
reporting but its quantity can lead to superficial
assessments that threats exist where they really don't.
make a good impression
and a difference in their community.
The important nature of the work, culture
of hierarchy and presence of people
of great experience, even if in a
non-intelligence field, can make the
pressures against raising concerns formidable
at best.
October 2012 Foreknowledge 11

Renseigner, c’est aussi influencer
celui ui attend une réponse. Compte
tenu de l’influence potentielle des
éléments fournis, il est important
que l’information soit présentée de
manière neutre et non à travers un
prisme politique déformant. Les
prismes déformants dans l’analyse
et la présentation des renseigne-
ments sont de graves fautes profes-
sionnelles qui peuvent avoir des
conséquences funestes, tant pour la
politique qu’elle croit servir que
pour la crédibilité du service.
Éric Denécé, 2011, L'éthique dans les activités de Renseignement in
. Pdf Here
1
2
3
The 3 approaches to ethics in intelligence
The realist approach: National security is an end which
justifies all means and therefore intelligence officials may
potentially pursue any course of action in the defence of
national security.
The consequentialist approach: Intelligence activities
have to be judged in view of their manifest consequences.
In this view, no activities (including torture or extrajudicial
killings) are intrinsically wrong, the ethical evaluation depends
on the consequences. The “just intelligence” theory
fits here. They argue that in making judgements on selection
of targets and methods of obtaining the information
we must ask: is this a last resort, is there just cause, what
are the prospects for success, are the means deployed
proportional to the ends sought, what is the possibility of
damage to innocent people and the need for oversight of
the actions.
The deontological approach which contends that
some activities are intrinsically wrong and can never be
justified.
From Hans Born and Aidan Wills, (2010) Beyond the oxymoron: exploring ethics through the intelligence cycle
in Jan Goldman (ed) Ethics of spying: a reader for the intelligence professional vol 2 available here
Click on the book cover to access the books in our Amazon bookstore. Click on the Kindle link below to get the e-book.
International Journal of Intelligence
Ethics (IJIE) is the primary source for
multidisciplinary information and
research on the role of ethics in its
application to intelligence activities.
Books:
Resources on ethics for intelligence analysts
Kindle here Kindle here Kindle here
Kindle here
Andregg, Michael (ed) 2007. Ethics: the definitive work of 2007. PDF here
Goldman, Jan (ed) 2005. Ethics of spying: a reader for the intelligence professional. Book here
Goldman, Jan. (Ed) 2009. Ethics of Spying: A reader for the Intelligence Professional, 2 nd edition. Book here.
Rovner, Joshua. 2011. Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. Book available here
Articles
ethics
Armstrong, Fulton. 2002. Ways to make analysis relevant but not prescriptive. Studies in Intelligence 46. Web here
Bar-Joseph, Uri. 2010. The Professional Ethics of Intelligence Analysis. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 24(1) $ here
Go their website here
get a free copy here
Email the editor here
There are hundreds of articles and books on intelligence ethics in general and intelligence oversight, but only a few on the analysis function specifically:
Davis, Jack. 2006. Intelligence analysts and policymakers: Benefits and dangers of tensions in the relationship. Intelligence and National Security, 21(6). $ here
Davis, Jack. 2003. Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence. Kent Centre Occasional Papers, 2(2). Web here
Denécé, Éric. 2011. L'éthique dans les activités de Renseignement in Revue Française D'administration Publique. Pdf here
Gentry, John A. 1995. Intelligence analyst/manager relations at the CIA. Intelligence and National Security,10(4), $ here
ODNI Intelligence Community Directive 203. 2007. Analytic standards. Web here
Patterson, Eric & Casale, Teresa. 2005. Targeting terror: The ethical and practical implications of targeted killing. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence,
18(4). $ here
Lunstroh, John. 2007. A proposed analysts’ code of ethics. Defence Intelligence Journal 16(1)
Selim, George. 2011. Talking terrorism: can we ethically communicate the threat? International Journal of Intelligence Ethics, 2(2)
Shelton, Allison. 2011. Framing the oxymoron: e new paradigm for intelligence ethics. Intelligence and National Security, 26(1). $ here
Westerfield, H. Bradford. 1996. Inside Ivory bunkers: CIA analysts resist managers' “pandering” — Part I. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence,
9(4), $ here
12 October 2012 Foreknowledge

Analytic rigour
The previous pages stressed how important it is that we as analysts are honest in our thinking, analysis and communicating the
threat to our clients. A few scholars and practitioners are now developing methods and tools to enhance mindfulness and rigour in
our quest to provide insight and foresight to clients. In this issue we look at Daniel Zelik et al’s rigour model which tries to answer
the question:
“How can intelligence analysts ensure that they have been rigorous in the analytical process?”
How far beyond simply collecting and
listing data did analyst go?
Low: Compiled a unified form
High: Integrated with thorough consideration
of diverse interpretations
8. Explanation critiquing
7. Information synthesis
Were the perspectives of domain experts
included into the assessments?
Low: No effort to seek out expertise
High: Experts have been consulted
How many different perspectives were incorporated
in examining the primary hypotheses?
Low: Little use of other analysts
High: Peer & expert review on
chain of reasoning with strong
and weak inferences clearly indicated
Does the analyst consider and
understand the assumptions
and limitations of their analysis?
1. Hypothesis exploration
5. Sensitivity analysis
Were multiple hypotheses considered
in explaining data?
Low: minimum weighing of alternatives
High: Multiple perspectives to
identify the best & most probable
explanations
toolbox
3. Information validation
4, Stance analysis
6. Specialist collaboration2. Information search
Low: Explanation seems valid on
surface
High: Analyst has strategy to consider
strengths of explanations if supporting
sources were to prove invalid
Dalene Duvenage
The depth and breadth of the search process
used in collecting data.
Low: Routine and readily available data sources
High: Exhaustively explore all data
The levels at which information sources are corroborated
and cross-validated.
Identify the stance or perspective
of the source and
placing it into a broader
context for understanding
Low: Analyst notice bias in source
High: Research into source background to understand
how their perspective might influence
their stance
Low: No effort to verify source accuracy
Based on Zelik, Daniel et al 2007. Understanding Rigor in Information Analysis papers here, here and here
High: Systematic approach to verify
information and where possible use
source closest to issue
October 2012 Foreknowledge 13

events
discuss
November 2012
3 rd International
Congress of
Intelligence
14 November 2012
Barcelona, Spain
Information here
Association of Law Enforcement
Intelligence Units
2012 Awards
LEIU Special Recognition
Award
Gary Williams
Gary has had a long and distinguished 40 year
career with the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) retiring at the rank of Captain in charge
of the Major Crimes Division where he supervised
several investigative units as well as the
Intelligence Unit. He also served as a LEIU
Board member from February 2004 until his
retirement in 2007. Gary volunteered to come
out of retirement to further the cause of the
LEIU mission, and has taken on the role of a
LEIU Foundation Board member.
share
The LEIU Distinguished Service Award
December 2012
Australian Security
and Intelligence
Conference
3-5 December 2012
Perth, Australia
Information here
2013
Rick Morton: Orange Country (CA) District Attorney’s Office
collaborate
International Crime
and Intelligence
Analysis Conference
13-14 December 2012
Manchester, UK
Information here
● April 2-6 2013: International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, US. info
● April 8-12 2013: IALEIA/LEIU Annual Training Conference, Chicago, US. info
● May 20-23 2013: International Association for Intelligence Education, El Paso, Texas, US. info
● July 24-26 2013: AIPIO annual conference, Canberra, Australia. info
LEIU General Chairman’s Award
New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC)
This center has not only been a leader in the national network of Fusion Centers—it has significantly
assisted all levels of law enforcement with solving and preventing criminal activity
throughout the state--through the fusion of information and intelligence.
L-R: Col Rick Fuentes (Superintendent of the New Jersey
State Police), Major Chris Schulz (Commander of the New
Jersey State Police Regional Operations and Intelligence
Center - ROIC), Assistant Director James McDermond,
(U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives, Office of Strategic Intelligence
and Information), Lt KevinFoley (Union County Prosecutor's
Office, New Jersey, Commander of the Intelligence Unit)
This award is presented to the person who has shown a sustained contribution to the Association of
Law Enforcement Intelligence Units and a continuous effort to enhance the professionalization of the
criminal intelligence profession. Rick began his law enforcement career in 1968 with the Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD) and he retired in 1994 as a Lieutenant Commander. Rick began working as
a supervising investigator with the Orange County District Attorney’s Bureau of Investigation. During
(From Left to Right) Dale Ferranto, representing Lexis Nex-
the past 18 years he has been assigned to the Intelligence/Organized Crime Unit, the Anti-Terrorism
is, Rick Morton and Van Godsey, LEIU General Chairman
Unit, and the Gang Target Unit. During his 44 year law enforcement career Rick Morton has shown a
sustained contribution to the mission of LEIU and has demonstrated a sustained effort of professionalism to the criminal intelligence profession.
14 October 2012 Foreknowledge

Using open source intelligence to
flush out the antihero may be as old
as the hills, but Social Media is a
relative new kid on the block. Much
hype has been created around the
role of SNSs (social networking services)
in various circumstances of political
protests, unrests and
demonstrations throughout the
world.
As a leading microblogging service,
Twitter has been the darling of interaction
and news dissemination in
several prominent hotspots of unrest
since 2009 (Moldova, Tunisia, Iran,
Egypt). By posting user-generated
content to mass audiences, the rapid
organizing of protests and mobilizing
of bulk participation is executed
in a flash across a borderless society
only bound by common interest.
To the intelligence analyst, SNS platforms
present a treasure trove of
data to explore for patterns and
clues towards understanding behavioral
patterns. The unstructured content
of messaging within enormous
sets of records may seem daunting
to some, but to an analytically
trained eye with an appetite for nodal
investigation, the rewards can be
substantial.
The examination of networks is not
new, but tracking and mapping the
messaging relative to its impact on
network change has only recently
become a possibility due to the visualization
tools which can render
such complexities. The structured
content around the messenger is
fairly simple to cognize for profiling,
Discovering the value of open source
intelligence in Social Media
by RJG
tech@foreknowledge.info
but scrutinizing the semantics of the
qualitative content (the actual text of
the message) is more delicate.
Through tailored lexicons, sentiment
tracking, keyword- and entity
extraction; clusters can be generated
to be explored for its influence on
networks and more specifically, explicit
nodes in such networks.
A good example would be a recent
case analysis done on Twitter to
trace poachers of protected marine
resources in a small fishing village.
HUMINT indicated that poachers
used the term “goldfish” as an euphemism
for a specific protected
marine resource. The keyword was
inserted into a Twitter extraction
script linked to its API (open
programming interface to Twitter)
which then trawled the network for
a prescribed period.
The harvested data posed a rich
array of classes for evaluation which
enabled the analyst to first generate
a topic view to identify clusters of
expression and filter residual clutter.
Specific clusters identified actors
within the network. Categories of
users (tweeters) were created and a
network was constructed by linking
common users with the IDs of retweeters
coupled with various keywords.
The word ‘goldfish’ returned
an unusual number of links in a
common cluster and enabled the analyst
to converge on the central
nodes within the network which
participated in the messaging process
of the goldfish theme. Within
minutes, the network, the centrality
IT tools
Finding Nemo
and the theme was mapped to identify
the extent of the poaching network
in the village.
The tools at hand to assist the analyst
in Social Media Intelligence are numerous
but obligate the user to possess
a firm understanding of what
the output and expectations are to
be. NodeXL, Palantir, Starlight, Analyst
Notebook, and Memex are but
a few which can yield strong outputs
but no analytics in this environment
can be effective unless viewed
through the lens of big data management.
Social media data is colossal and the
noise is titanic—the tools necessary
to illuminate intelligence from such
volume are not all embracing. Given
Gladwell’s 10 000-hour prescription
for specialization and the “freshness”
of social media, real SM analytical
gurus are few and far
between. To understand social media
is not enough. To secure an inclusive
perception of a specific theme,
the analyst’s ability to fuse assorted
streams of cross-platform data will
be imperative.
So, to trace the beloved Nemo via
Twitter, one would have to extract
who tweeted his disappearance, who
tweeted his reappearance, how
many times his sightings had been
retweeted, and who finally tweeted
his arrival in Australia. That would
not take more than 4.3 degrees of
separation and should be analytically
probable in lesser time than it
takes to explore the film.
Now, let’s go find Lord Lucan…
October 2012 Foreknowledge 15

need2share
No investigation or project can start
without deciding up front on how
the success of the investigation will
be measured. Evaluating the effectiveness
of the information management
and analysis approach is
therefore crucial and often one of
those critical aspects of an investigation
that is neglected. It generates
focus areas for future improvement
in the analytical approach and
identifies those analytical models
and techniques that are not
effective.
Note that the focus areas of evaluation,
as far as information and analysis
activities are concerned, will
differ from investigation to investigation.
Evaluation should be focused
on the entire team’s
performance in all activities relating
to the management and analysis of
information:
● Information management:
Here the focus can be on the
effectiveness of the analyst to
manage the information, the
creation and optimisation of
communication channels to
stimulate participation, as well
as the effectiveness of the team
to maximise on information
available under guidance of
the analyst.
● Participation and communication:
Here the focus can be
on the participation of team
members in analytical process,
the quality of input provided
by the team with regard to
product requirements as well
as the willingness of team
members to participate in information
sharing activities.
● Analytical products and services:
Applicability of analytical
techniques to the analysis of
specific information sets. Effectiveness
of analytical products
to meet the investigation requirements.
To make the review more effective,
it may be useful to use an independent
evaluator to conduct the final
debriefing session. All team members
must be present, and participate
in the activity, while feedback
and recommendations must be documented.
Part of the evaluation process can be
to develop a scorecard that can
Score Card Measuring the Effectiveness of the Information Analysis
Approach during an Investigation
Low Score High Score
● No initial assessment of available information
● No criminal value chains
● No scenarios
● No analytical plans
The role of analysis in
criminal investigations
Project or Case Initiation
Analyst and investigator make contact with team members
and do initial information assessment. Following
documentation is available:
Investigation
● Criminal value chain
● Analytical plan
No planning for analysis Planning for analysis
Information pushed towards analyst with limited consultation
on what is to be achieved.
Team take responsibility for entire investigation inclusive
of the development of analytical products.
Analysis is seen as a support function Analysis is the driving factor that will push the investigation
to a successful conclusion
Analyst provides feedback to client and investigation
team only during investigation and project meetings.
The following is presented during formal meetings:
● Link charts with no supporting analytical report.
● Communication analysis containing no inferences
or conclusions.
Clients and investigating officer cannot peruse analytical
working files whilst the analysis of information is in
progress.
Part 2: Evaluating effectiveness
Mario Eybers
Investigation officer together with the analyst ensures
that all clients and team members are updated on:
● What is being analysed
● What techniques are utilised during the analysis
● What the expected end results will be
● How these results will influence the outcome of
the investigation
Investigation team have full access to all analytical
files.
Prosecution
No role Testifying to analytical work conducted.
Case Finalisation
greatly assist to measure the
effectiveness of information
management during an
investigation. Standard debriefing
reports are often qualitative in
nature, whereas scorecards can
assist to quantify the effectiveness
based on the specific criteria chosen
for evaluation. The table below
depicts an example of such a
scorecard.
Understanding what contributes to
a successful investigation is essential
to ensure that analytical efforts
make a positive contribution to the
investigation and prosecution of
criminals.
No debriefing session Debriefing of analyst and project/ investigation team.
16 October 2012 Foreknowledge

The effective analyst
Part 4: Attributes
Janet Evans
Associate Investigator, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australia
In this last article in a series of four, Janet takes us through the findings of research by her and Mark
Kebbell on what makes intelligence analysts effective.
In this the final article
in the series, I
will consider the final
theme that
emerged from considering
what makes
an effective analyst -
Attributes of the analyst. Secondly,
and perhaps more importantly, I am
going to reflect on the most ethical
way forward for us as a community
of practitioners now knowing the
findings offered by this study.
In the previous issues I described
how 246 constructs were used by the
subject matter experts to describe the
theme of analytical products and 107
constructs to describe the theme relating
to the analysts attitude. In contrast
only 21 constructs were used to
describe the attributes of the analyst
by subject matter experts. The theme
of attributes incorporated inherent
characteristics and qualities as well
as physical characteristics like age or
gender.
From this study it is asserted that the
attributes of the analysts contribute
less than other themes to indicate an
analyst as more or less effective.
From an ethical or equity perspective
this is heartening as there is no indication
that men or women, older or
younger analysts make better analysts.
The attribute factors that held
some interest for the subject matter
experts were being confident, being
calm and patient, and being likable.
The results of this research serve as
the first empirically-based set of
characteristics required to effectively
perform the role of analyst.
The importance of the analytical
product in understanding and determining
an analysts’ effectiveness has
been clearly demonstrated. For an
analyst to be viewed as effective
they need to have skills in developing
a product as well as disseminating
their results. The most critically
important variable in disseminating
the product was the ability to communicate
with the recipient of the
product both in general terms and
through briefings and a written
product.
This requires us to reconsider our
approach to recruitment and development.
It is our moral responsibility
to select analysts who can
perform in these domains and, if we
already employ analysts, ensuring
they are servicing the goals of law
enforcement as effectively as they
can by having received the ‘right’
training. It is no longer enough to
train analysts on software or to give
them another tool. This study shows
that effective analysts derive meaning
and develop inferences that require
enhanced thinking skills.
Analysts need to develop themselves
into advanced problem-solv-
need2share
ers. In this study computer and
technical skills were barely mentioned
and the importance of thinking
skills and life experience were
highly sought after in determining
effectiveness.
Although data collection and collation
are described as part of the intelligence
cycle they were not
considered to be an indicator of analyst
effectiveness It is now our ethical
responsibility to decide if this is
because they in fact are not part of
an analyst’s role and if so why are so
many of our analysts consumed
with this task? Is it because this is
what they have become comfortable
doing? As managers can we pave a
new path towards where analysts
predominantly think (rather than
collect), derive meaning and create
and deliver products?
This study has raised a number of
questions that require further investigation,
including how we best test
for effective communication skills
and how do you measure an analyst’s
attitude to the position. These
questions and others have at their
heart an ethical responsibility to
make choices not just at a point in
time, for the sake of your career, to
ease the pain of recruitment or to silence
an analyst who just wants another
mapping course, but for a
profession in it’s development years
and in many cases for the safety of
our communities or countries.
October 2012 Foreknowledge 17

insight
The all-discipline
intelligence
process:
wanted -
a simplified
construct with real
explanatory power
The two preceding contributions
argued that the traditional intelligence
cycle as a notional construct
that do not accurately
convey the way in which intelligence
‘works’. This was based on
the central contention that the intelligence
cycle does not accommodate
counterintelligence at all. In
substantiation, an outline of the
counterintelligence process was
provided and this was compared
with the traditional cycle. The latter
was shown to be, at most, a positive
intelligence model. It was further
mentioned that an overarching
intelligence process model should
accommodate all main intelligence
Brouard’s model
In this 3 rd instalment of a discussion on the intelligence cycle and counterintelligence functions process, the
scholar and practitioner B offers a model that might assist us in understanding the complexity of our discipline.
processes in a simplified construct
with real explanatory power.
Business Intelligence – can
we borrow?
Such integrative proposals are in
short supply within Intelligence
Studies. Significant progress has,
however, been made in Business
Intelligence. A seminal model in
this regard was forwarded by Nolan
in 1997. This was followed by
contributions by various others.
While copyright restriction prevents
an inclusion of Nolan graphical
depiction in this magazine, the
proposal by Brouard 1 (2004) below
is an example of the work done
within in Business Intelligence.
Business Intelligence models are
useful, but for various reasons cannot
be summarily applied to the
statutory context and thus Intelligence
Studies.
Intelligence Studies – no
eureka-type insights as yet
Within Intelligence Studies, we
need to be frank that we don’t
know. We don’t as yet have an eureka-type
insight on an overarching
intelligence process model that
actually works. How then should
we progress toward this goal? Progression
has several requisite
which are discussed in the article
cited below. Suffice to state here
that the forwarding of high-level
theoretical constructs is but one dimension
of this quest.
Duvenage & Hough’s (2011) 2 proposition
serves as an example such a
theoretical contribution on a high
level of abstraction:
Key contentions on which the nexus
rests are:
● The overarching statutory
intelligence process is the
sum of processes executed
in three principal disciplines 3,
namely, positive intelligence,
counterintelligence
and covert action. Each of
these has a distinctive and,
to a degree, a unique pattern
of activities.
18 October 2012 Foreknowledge

● Analysis and collection are
functional areas of activity
performed within all three
principal disciplines and as
part of the collective all-discipline
process. Notwithstanding
obvious
similarities, there are simultaneously
significant differences
in emphasis and
methodology in the manner
in which these functions are
executed within the respective
primary disciplines. In
comparison with positive
intelligence, counterintelligence
analysis for one is
more diverse in its scope,
methodology and techniques.
Cognisance is taken
of the fact that some practitioners
may categorise collection
and analysis as
‘disciplines’ or ‘subdisciplines’.
If so, then they are
functional, not primary disciplines.
Be that as it may,
functional areas are not limited
to analysis and collection.
The identification of
further functional areas
would require dedicated research
and only ‘intelligence
management’ is proposed as
an addition here.
● The intelligence process is
performed by means of a
multi-directional activity flow.
The latter applies to the respective
principal disciplines,
the functions and the
combination thereof in the
all-discipline process.
The contour provided above clearly
requires considerable refinement
and substantiating research. Notwithstanding
its cursory nature, the
nexus holds out against one of the
litmus test for theories, namely conceptual
clarification. The notional
‘uncluttering’ of the relationship
between counterintelligence and
transnational security concerns
such as counter-proliferation (of
Weapons of Mass Destruction –
Conceptual nexus towards an all-discipline intelligence process: Duvenage & Hough
WMD), organised crime and counterterrorism
serves as an example.
While some scholars consider counterterrorism
as part of counterintelligence,
others assert
counterterrorism to have “developed”
into a “separate intelligence
discipline.” Counterterrorism is neither
a separate intelligence discipline,
nor is it part of
counterintelligence. It is a security
concern that involves facets of positive
intelligence, covert action as
well as counterintelligence. The
same applies to counter-proliferation
and organised crime.
Is this really helpful?
This three part contribution demonstrated
an abundance of fragmented
knowledge of ‘what we know’ and
‘what we think we know’ in as far
as the intelligence process is concerned.
What counterintelligence
practitioners and scholars ‘do not
know’ is how to structure these
multi-facetted processes in a manner
that satisfactorily meet model
construction’s demand of reflecting
this reality in a simplified notional
construct with real explanatory
power.
Similar to other contemporary models,
the nexus above neither attains
this evasive goal, nor does it escape
several deficiencies cited in respect
of other existing postulations. It
should thus be viewed as part of
the gradual progression towards to
a viable intelligence process model.
insight
Who knows perhaps it will be
found to be a circle after all?
1 Nolan, J A. 1997. “Confusing Counterintelligence with
Security Can Wreck Your Afternoon” Competitive
Intelligence Review, 8(3)
2 Article based on Petrus Duvenage and Mike Hough,
2011, The conceptual structuring of the intelligence
and the counterintelligence processes: enduring holy
grails or crumbling axioms – quo vadis? Strategic
Review for Southern Africa, vol. 33, no. 1, pp.29-77.
Download here. (10MB pdf)
3 The axiom of intelligence consisting of the four principal
disciplines is thus contested. It is unclear how
the common acceptance of ‘analysis’, ‘collection’,
‘counterintelligence’ and ‘covert action’ as the principal
intelligence subdisciplines originated or evolved.
Future studies by Intelligence Studies’ historians and
historiographers might well find that it was influenced
by the organisational structuring of some post-World
War II, Western statutory intelligence services.
Whatever the reason, this axiom is incongruent with
reality.
International specialists with a proven
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analysis, strategic assessment, classroom
& distance education.
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www.intelligencecollege.com
October 2012 Foreknowledge 19

thinking
Psychology
of
intelligence
analysis
Richards Heuer
There are still thousands of intelligence analysts and their managers who have not yet read the seminal Psychology of Intelligence
Analysis by Richards Heuer. We will carry excerpts from the book’s chapters in each edition of Foreknowledge.
This is an excerpt of chapter 4 on Strategies for Analytical Judgment - applying theory. You can also download the entire
book here.
In the previous Foreknowledge,
we looked at situational logic as
one of the means in which an analyst
generate hypotheses if available
data is insufficient to provide
foresight. In this edition, we look
at how we apply theories to understand
data.
Theory is an academic term not
much in vogue in the Intelligence
Community, but it is unavoidable
in any discussion of analytical
judgment. In one popular meaning
of the term, "theoretical" is associated
with the terms "impractical"
and "unrealistic". Needless to say,
it is used here in a quite different
sense.
A theory is a generalization based
on the study of many examples of
some phenomenon. It specifies
that when a given set of conditions
arises, certain other conditions will
follow either with certainty or with
some degree of probability. In oth-
er words, conclusions are judged
to follow from a set of conditions
and a finding that these conditions
apply in the specific case being analyzed.
For example, Turkey is a
developing country in a precarious
strategic position. This defines a
set of conditions that imply conclusions
concerning the role of the
military and the nature of political
processes in that country, because
analysts have an implicit if not explicit
understanding of how these
factors normally relate.
There are both advantages and
drawbacks to applying theory in
intelligence analysis. One advantage
is that "theory economizes
thought." By identifying the key
elements of a problem, theory enables
an analyst to sort through a
mass of less significant detail. Theory
enables the analyst to see beyond
today's transient
developments, to recognize which
trends are superficial and which
are significant, and to foresee future
developments for which there
is today little concrete evidence.
Consider, for example, the theoretical
proposition that economic development
and massive infusion of
foreign ideas in a feudal society
lead to political instability. This
proposition seems well established.
When applied to Saudi
Arabia, it suggests that the days of
the Saudi monarchy are numbered,
although analysts of the
Saudi scene using situational logic
find little or no current evidence of
a meaningful threat to the power
and position of the royal family.
Thus, the application of a generally
accepted theoretical proposition
enables the analyst to forecast an
outcome for which the "hard evidence"
has not yet begun to develop.
This is an important strength
of theoretical analysis when applied
to real-world problems.
20 October 2012 Foreknowledge

Yet this same example also illustrates
a common weakness in applying
theory to analysis of
political phenomena. Theoretical
propositions frequently fail to specify
the time frame within which developments
might be anticipated to
occur.
The analytical problem with respect
to Saudi Arabia is not so much
whether the monarchy will eventually
be replaced, as when or under
what conditions this might happen.
Further elaboration of the theory
relating economic development
and foreign ideas to political instability
in feudal societies would
identify early warning indicators
that analysts might look for. Such
indicators would guide both intelligence
collection and analysis of sociopolitical
and socioeconomic data
and lead to hypotheses concerning
when or under what circumstances
such an event might occur.
But if theory enables the analyst to
transcend the limits of available data,
it may also provide the basis for
Former US Navy SEAL Matt Bissonnette, who has written a controversial
book detailing the Abbotabad raid that killed Osama bin Laden,
has credited a ‘feisty’ female CIA analyst for leading them to their target,
after spending five years hunting him. Bissonnette said that he
and the other SEALs asked the young agent, "What you do think?
Think he's there? "She's like, ''One hundred percent. One hundred
percent he's there,” he said. Read more here.
Top 5 Things Only Spies Used To Do (But Everyone Does Now)
Kris Wheaton
1. Use satellites: even our cell phones have capabilities that were not
even dreamed of by spies 10 years ago!
2. Have an agent network: sure, that's not what we call twitter,
LinkedIn etc, but that is what they are!
3. Use passwords and encrypt data: buying/selling on the internet,
007?!
4. Shake a tail: we are all using sophisticated tools to help us navigate
the internet without being followed.
5. Have a cover story: we all have multiple email accounts for various
aspects of their lives or different social media platforms for different
purposes.
Theory enables the
analyst to transcend
the limits of available
data, but it may also
provide the basis for
ignoring evidence that
is truly indicative of
future events
ignoring evidence that is truly indicative
of future events.
When evidence is lacking or ambiguous,
the analyst evaluates hypotheses
by applying his or her general
background knowledge concerning
the nature of political systems and
behavior.
Logic-of-the-situation analysis also
draws heavily on theoretical assumptions.
How does the analyst
select the most significant elements
to describe the current situation, or
identify the causes or consequences
of these elements, without some
thinking
implicit theory that relates the likelihood
of certain outcomes to certain
antecedent conditions?
For example, if the analyst estimating
the outcome of an impending
election does not have current
polling data, it is necessary to look
back at past elections, study the
campaigns, and then judge how
voters are likely to react to the current
campaigns and to events that
influence voter attitudes. In doing
so, the analyst operates from a set
of assumptions about human nature
and what drives people and
groups.
These assumptions form part of a
theory of political behavior, but it
is a different sort of theory than
was discussed under theoretical
analysis. It does not illuminate the
entire situation, but only a small
increment of the situation, and it
may not apply beyond the specific
country of concern. Further, it is
much more likely to remain implicit,
rather than be a focal point
of the analysis.
A part-time army of civilian spies is set to be recruited
by the UK intelligence agency GCHQ to
help in the war against cyber crime. Hundreds of
computer experts will work one or two days a
week at the agency’s Cheltenham headquarters
and they have already been dubbed “iPlods”, under
plans being discussed by ministers. The move
is part of an ongoing drive to harness the best
skills in the private sector to combat the growing
threat of hackers. Read more here.
Snippets
Researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Common
Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab have
embarked on several innovative programs that allow both
intelligence analysts and tactical operators to visualize the battlefield
as never seen before. The lab’s staff is comprised of an
eclectic group of researchers that includes interdisciplinary
faculty partnered with seasoned special operators with years
of boots-on-the-ground experience. Together, they aim to
illuminate the “human terrain” by utilizing advanced analytical
methodologies. Read more here
October 2012 Foreknowledge 21

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22 October 2012 Foreknowledge