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ethics Sources of information MA: Sources may be reliable, unre- liable, or they may be spies serving other agendas. Even when sincere and well placed, sources can be simply wrong. So assessing the quality of sources is important for accuracy of your conclusions. Less discussed, but equally important in my view, is protecting your sources from bureaucracies that may abuse them without any trace of conscience. In fact, it is common for intelligence bureaucracies to Some advice on ethics to intelligence analysts? Professional integrity and best practice DD: We often forget about work ethic when we debate intelligence ethics. As analysts, we at least have some control over our attitude towards our work, in contrast to politicisation and other ethical dilemmas. Analysts should be mindful and reflective: improve the application for methods, learn new approaches, be mindful of the biases that clouds my perspective, actively looking for counter arguments that might make my analysis better. As an analyst, I can make sure that I have done my best in terms of methods, opinions, showing what I know and what not, and be ready to answer any question or critique from my client. But if he does not want to listen to me because of his own biases and political reasons, my hands are tied. I’ll get frustrated, but being an analyst, my raison d’être is to make sense and advise, and that should be enough. If it is not, I should get another job! MA: Cognitive biases are a problem for analysts because they affect perceptions, conclusions, and the questions one selects for research. Leaders have biases too, so a delicate balance must be struck between suppressing yours and catering to theirs without violating your commitment to objective truths. Failure can have huge consequences. TN: The challenge facing any intelligence analyst is that not only will they be judged by the ethics of the present, but also the ethics of the future. This makes the framework that dictates how we gather, build, complete, and pretty up our work critical. For the intelligence analyst to forget ethics altogether, rather than making an informed decision of where to apply them, could lead to a career disaster not only now, but also in the future. squeeze as much as possible from sources, indifferent to their welfare and obsessed with short term goals. Analysts may not be direct- ly involved in collection or han- dling sources, but analytic products have consequences too. So remembering the humanity of those you use, and even those you may target, is important to pre- serving some moral foundation for the whole endeavor. (MA): Prof Michael Andregg: University of St Thomas, St Paul, Minnesota, US. mmandregg@stthomas.edu (DD): Dalene Duvenage: Trainer, consultant, scholar, Foreknowledge editor Pretoria, South Africa (TN): Tony Nolan, Risk, Intelligence and Analytics Officer, Australian Government Impunity and arrogance MA: Another issue is the illusion of impunity and hubris or extreme arrogance. Hubris can destroy you in many ways. Countless analysts have dis- tanced themselves from the consequences of their work on the theory they are tiny cogs in big machines, and that moral judgments are reserved for policy people. Bureaucracies encour- age that view, but they are fundamen- tally amoral, having neither conscience nor soul. If you make errors in target- ing and a house full of children is de- stroyed instead of a house full of terrorists, the soldier who pulled the trigger is no more responsible than the men or women who told him what to destroy. Do not be deceived by those who say the moral way is for sissies and preach- ers. The prime missions of intelligence professionals are protecting your people from the dangers of our troubled world, and protecting innocence as a concept. Be professional and protect 10 October 2012 Foreknowledge them.
Sins of Commission An agency is in competition with another over scarce resources. In furtherance of that end a supervisor approaches a junior analyst and asks for a product with a specific conclusion. When the analyst tells her supervisor that she's not sure the data supports that conclusion, the supervisor replies: “C'mon, you can make statistics say anything.” Sins of commission, where someone in power attempts to strong arm an analyst to deliver a particular judgment, are rare among those agencies that have a strong tradition of professionalism and where analysts are able to progress beyond the lowest levels of the organization. Yet, in the United States, the past decade has seen an explosion of domestic intelligence personnel in law enforcement and 'homeland security' agencies. Most of these agencies have little or no orientation or traditions in intelligence analysis, are fragmented with few analytical personnel and rarely afford analysts the opportunity to rise within the organization to positions with decision making authority. It is under these conditions where analysts are most likely to be directed to produce politicized analysis and also where they will have the fewest opportunities for redress. Difficult ethical decisions impact on our career paths… Raising questions about practices like those discussed above, can be problematic - even for experienced intelligence personnel. While in the federal intelligence community, raising such questions may result in a transfer to a less desirable post or delayed career advancement, in the law enforcement or counter-terrorism communities the consequences can be much longer lasting. Many analysts in those communities work for small agencies and have few career opportunities other than moving to other agencies. Acquiring a reputa- Categories of ethical dilemmas Travels with Shiloh tion as not being a 'team player' can effectively destroy a career via informal channels. Expecting analysts to both be aware of ways in which their work can be manipulated (consciously or not) and expecting them to act as warning system to prevent that occurring without training or support may just be too much for them to bear. New intelligence analysts frequently come into their agency wanting to both ethics Sins of Omission A political protest erupts in cities around the country. The protestors are dedicated to non-violence and, despite attracting large numbers of supporters, engage in little serious criminal activity. Yet, the movement attracts the attention of law enforcement and counter-terrorism officials who demand a steady stream of products linking the protest to other, violent movements despite little to no evidence of any such connection. As intelligence resources are focused on the movement, other criminal and terrorist threats are given lower priority and attention. A more common and subtle ethical issue for intelligence analysts falls into this category. Intelligence personnel may be directed to focus their energies towards a particular conclusion for any number of biases or interests. The end result, however, remains the same. Analytical judgments are influenced and manipulated based upon the parameters under which intelligence personnel directed. As in the case of the search for WMDs in Iraq, repeated requests to find evidence of a particular threat, along with increasing amounts of resources devoted to the question, inevitably leads to increased reporting. Often this reporting involves information of decreasing quality or repetitive reporting but its quantity can lead to superficial assessments that threats exist where they really don't. make a good impression and a difference in their community. The important nature of the work, culture of hierarchy and presence of people of great experience, even if in a non-intelligence field, can make the pressures against raising concerns formidable at best. October 2012 Foreknowledge 11
Page 1 and 2: foreknowledge Essential Resources f
Page 3 and 4: Editor: Dalene Duvenage, Pretoria,
Page 5 and 6: 1Indirect manipulation of intellige
Page 7 and 8: Thinking only operational staff and
Page 9: Pathologies of intelligence-policy
Page 13 and 14: Analytic rigour The previous pages
Page 15 and 16: Using open source intelligence to f
Page 17 and 18: The effective analyst Part 4: Attri
Page 19 and 20: ● Analysis and collection are fun
Page 21 and 22: Yet this same example also illustra

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